Case 1:15-cv-00293-LTS-JCF Document 194 Filed 06/16/17 Page 1 of 3

June 16, 2017

VIA ECF

Hon. Laura Taylor Swain

United States District Court
Southern District of New York
Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse
500 Pearl Street
New York, New York 10007-1312

Re: S & A Capital Partners, Inc., et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al.
No. 15-cv-00293-LTS-JCF

Dear Judge Swain:

I write to request an adjournment of the 2 pm TRO hearing that the Court set in the
above-captioned action for Monday, June 19, 2017. An adjournment should be granted for the
following reasons:

1. Undersigned counsel for Chase has a prior and longstanding commitment to be in

Texas to celebrate his mother’s 80th birthday on Monday, June 19th, the day set for a TRO
hearing. Undersigned counsel is lead counsel on this matter and cannot be replaced by another
attorney at a TRO hearing.

2. There is no emergency here; in fact, the application for a TRO or a preliminary

injunction borders on the frivolous. This litigation was filed in 2014. The vast majority of the
alleged conduct discussed in Plaintiffs’ motion papers allegedly occurred between 1994 and
2014. Plaintiffs allege in particular that, in the 2012-2014 period, Chase improperly purported to
forgive loans or release liens associated with “hundreds” of mortgage loans sold to Plaintiffs in
2009 and earlier. Plaintiffs now assert that Chase also released liens on one loan in 2017 and on
five loans in 2016. If “hundreds” of alleged incidents between 2012 and 2014 did not cause
Plaintiffs to seek emergency relief, then one incident in March 2017 and a few in 2016 cannot
possibly supply grounds for seeking emergency relief. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756
F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff’s delay in seeking preliminary injunction was unjustified
when it waited “more than ten weeks after it learned directly of [defendant’s allegedly unlawful
conduct], and more than nine months after it received notice through the press . . . .”); Majorica,
S.A. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 762 F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Lack of diligence, standing alone, may .
 Case 1:15-cv-00293-LTS-JCF Document 194 Filed 06/16/17 Page 2 of 3

. . preclude the granting of preliminary injunctive relief, because it goes primarily to the issue of
irreparable harm . . . .").

3. Chase is voluntarily taking immediate steps to further prevent any adverse action
relating to loans sold to Plaintiffs. The “system of record” on which Chase houses the loans at
issue is called “Recovery One” or “RCV1.” In addition to the loan coding already in place as
part of Chase’s normal business practices, RCV1 personnel are currently building an additional
“ring fence” around the disputed accounts. These accounts will be put in their own “queue”
within RCV1; they will be marked “closed”; and anyone who attempts to call up the accounts
will see a banner warning them that the accounts are closed and cannot be the subject of Chase-
initiated activity. Designating the accounts in this manner will further guard against any
inadvertent acceptance of payments or inadvertent adverse activity on the accounts. Chase
expects this work to go into effect by Monday morning.

4. The request for temporary relief plainly fails for lack of irreparable harm. Plaintiffs’
request for relief asks the Court to oversee Chase’s business for two basic purposes: (i) to
prevent Chase from receiving and keeping payments on loans sold to Plaintiffs and (ii) to prevent
Chase from releasing any liens that secure loans sold to Plaintiffs. See ECF No. 190, at 25
(request for relief). Any such harms, however, would be compensable by money damages. The
purpose of a lien is to secure a loan, i.e., to secure a promise to pay money. To the extent that a
lien is impaired and, as a result, loan payments are curtailed, any resulting harm can be
compensated by an award of money damages that could be made at the conclusion of the case.
Accordingly, no temporary emergency relief is warranted. See, e.g., JSG Trading Corp. v. Tray-
Wrap, Inc., 917 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Irreparable injury is one that cannot be redressed
through a monetary award. Where money damages are adequate compensation a preliminary
injunction should not issue.”); Loveridge v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 788 F.2d 914, 917 (2d
Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“It is well established that irreparable injury
means injury for which a monetary award cannot be adequate compensation.”).

5. Plaintiffs’ motion papers fail to point to any “imminent” harm they are facing that
would be avoided by the temporary relief they seek. Nor is there any apparent emergency relief
that the Court could order that would go beyond the steps that Chase is already taking, i.e.,
building a ring fence around the accounts at issue in RCV1.

6. Plaintiffs ambushed Chase with their “emergency” papers. No advance warning was
given to Chase or its counsel. No attempt to meet and confer with Chase or work out any alleged
concerns was made in advance of the application. Opposing counsel nevertheless insists that the
owner and operator of the Plaintiff entities, Mr. Laurence Schneider, is unavailable for
deposition at any time before July 28, 2017. Plaintiffs’ request for temporary relief rests
primarily on Mr. Schneider’s affidavit. Mr. Schneider and his counsel should not be permitted to
insulate Mr. Schneider from cross-examination on his affidavit by springing an inexplicable
ambush on Chase and then claiming that Mr. Schneider is “unavailable” until July 28. Mr.
Schneider – who has personally attended each and every deposition in this case – should make
himself available for his own deposition before the Court holds a hearing on the application for
extraordinary relief.

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7. Plaintiffs’ motion papers at times appear to request additional discovery or account

information from Chase. The information at issue is already at issue in a meet-and-confer
process set up by the Magistrate Judge. See ECF No. 184, at 2-4. Any attempt to seek discovery
or account information by way of a TRO hearing would be an egregious end-run around the
Magistrate Judge’s order.

For the foregoing reasons, Chase requests that the Court (i) summarily deny the request
for a TRO and/or (ii) postpone any TRO hearing by at least one to two weeks and/or (iii) order
that Mr. Schneider make himself available for deposition on his declaration prior to any hearing
in this matter. Undersigned counsel respectfully requests that an order issue today to help him
preserve plans to celebrate his mother’s 80th birthday on Monday.

Undersigned counsel asked opposing counsel if he would agree to postpone the hearing
or to make Mr. Schneider available for deposition before July 28th. He declined.

Respectfully submitted,

s/Robert D. Wick
Counsel for the Chase defendants

cc: All counsel of record (via ECF)