Case No. 221424 & No. 247718

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 247718, March 03, 2021 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAYNARD

AGUSTIN Y PARAGGUA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, C.J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the September 26, 2017 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08557, which affirmed with
modifications the July 18, 2016 Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 4, Tuguegarao City in Criminal Case No. 13738, finding accused-
appellant Jaynard Agustin y Paraggua (Agustin) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Rape with Homicide committed against AAA.3
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Agustin was indicted for the crime of Rape with Homicide in an

Information,4 dated November 3, 2010, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 1, 2010 in the municipality

of █████████████████, province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused JAYNARD AGUSTIN y PARAGGUA with
lewd design and by the use of force, threat and intimidation carry, drag and
brought the victim, AAA, minor 12 years old into a sugarcane plantation and
while thereat, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the complainant, AAA, a minor 12 years of age against
her will. That on the same occasion of the rape, the accused with intent to kill,
did, then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangle the victim, AAA, a minor
12 years old which caused her death and accused in order to prevent the
discovery of the victim and to conceal his overt acts buried the victim in the
same sugar plantation where he raped the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During arraignment, the above Information was read and explained to Agustin
in the Ilocano dialect, to which he is fully conversant with, and thereafter, he
entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.6 After the termination of the
pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution

To substantiate its charge against Agustin, the prosecution presented BBB, Dr.
Francisco Romulo D. Villaflor (Dr. Villaflor), Atty. Luis Donato, Jr. (Atty.
Donato, Jr.), Barangay Captain Alfredo Ruam (Brgy. Capt. Ruam) and Police
Officer 3 Joel Mora (PO3 Mora) as its witnesses.
BBB, the mother of AAA, testified that her deceased daughter was born on
September 28, 1998. AAA was only 12 years old when said victim was killed on
November 1, 2010. BBB averred that she was in Manila working as a
housemaid when the incident happened.7
BBB's further testimony was dispensed with after the prosecution and defense
entered into a stipulation that in the event that Agustin is convicted of the
crime charged, he shall be liable to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity.8
Dr. Villaflor a medico-legal officer at the Regional Crime Laboratory Office

2, █████████████████, Tuguegarao City, testified that he conducted a
post-mortem examination on the cadaver of AAA on November 2, 2010. He
recalled that the whole body of AAA was almost covered with soil debris. He
described the cadaver to be in the state of secondary flaccidity, the condition of
the body after having undergone rigor mortis, which usually occurs 18 hours
after death. During post-mortem examination, he noted that AAA sustained a
total of eight (8) injuries, excluding those inflicted upon her genitalia. The most
prominent of these injuries were the hematomas with superimposed abrasion
found on the left and right portions of the anterior neck of the victim. He
opined that the victim could have sustained those injuries while she was being
strangulated. He concluded that the cause of the victim's death is asphyxia by
strangulation.
Dr. Villaflor added that he found three (3) injuries in the genitalia of AAA. The
first injury was a fresh abrasion with hematoma found on the lower wall of the
victim's vagina. The second injury was a fresh hymenal laceration at 5 o'clock
position extending to the left vaginal wall. He opined that the hymenal
laceration could have been caused by the insertion of blunt object, like a
hardened male organ, into the victim's vagina, or by a forceful and violent
sexual intercourse. The third injury was a fresh laceration at the fourchette
which is the lower part of the victim's vagina. He opined that these three (3)
injuries were all inflicted within the last two or three days from the time the
victim's vagina was examined. His medical findings were reduced in writing
and were reflected in the Medico-Legal Report No. M-078-2010.9
At the witness stand, Atty. Donato, Jr. recounted that police officers
from █████████████████ Police Station requested for his presence at the
police station to render assistance to Agustin who wants to give a confession
relative to the commission of a crime. He is a resident of
the ████████████████████. He surmised that this could have been the
reason why the police officers choose him to be the lawyer who will assist
Agustin. He saw Agustin at the police station and requested the police officers
to leave the room so he could have some moment alone with said accused to
confer with him. Initially, the police officers gave him only two (2) minutes to
talk with the accused, but he asked for additional time considering the gravity
of the offense involved. He claimed that Agustin confessed his guilt for the rape
and killing of AAA and even related to him how said incident took place in the
afternoon of November 1, 2020. He recalled that Agustin gave exactly the same
narration to the police investigator during the taking of the latter's extrajudicial
confession.
Atty. Donato, Jr. recalled that before Agustin gave a confession, he apprised
the latter of his right to remain silent. He also reminded Agustin that whatever
statement he will give can be used against him. However, accused was
insistent and later, he confessed to the rape and killing of AAA during the
investigation. He translated the questions propounded by the investigating
officer in Ilocano dialect to Agustin, who answered the queries also in Ilocano
dialect. He is conversant with the Ilocano dialect. He explained to Agustin the
questions asked by the investigating police officer. He translated the answers of
Agustin in English to the investigating police officer, who reduced said
accused's confession in typewritten form.
Atty. Donato, Jr. claimed that he was with the Agustin during the entire time of
the investigation. There was also another police officer who witnessed the
proceedings. Agustin placed his thumbmark on the printed copy of his
extrajudicial confession as proof that he voluntarily gave the same. After
thoroughly reading the printed copy of the Agustin's extrajudicial confession,
he affixed his signature thereon to prove that he assisted accused while the
latter was giving his confession. The other police officer who witnessed the
taking of Agustin's statement also signed the printed copy of the document.
He clarified that his purpose for coming over to the police station was to ask
Agustin if the latter wants his assistance while said accused gives his
confession/statement. He described accused as unschooled, that the latter
cannot read nor write. During trial, he identified Agustin as the same person
he assisted during the investigation held on November 2, 2010 on which
occasion, said accused gave an extrajudicial confession of his authorship of the
crime charged.10
The prosecution also called to the witness stand Brgy. Capt. Ruam
of █████████████████, Cagayan, at the time material to the case. Brgy.
Capt. Ruam testified that he knows accused Agustin and identified AAA as the
daughter of CCC and BBB. Thereafter, the court reset the trial of the case to a
later date for the continuation of Brgy. Capt. Ruam's direct
testimony.11 However, he was no longer presented by the prosecution in the
succeeding hearings.
During the hearing held on September 2, 2014, the testimony of PO3 Mora was
dispensed with after the parties stipulated that he was the investigator of
the ██████████ Police Station who took down the extrajudicial confession of
Agustin.12
Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and offered its documentary
evidence.
Among the evidence submitted and offered by the prosecution is the document
denominated as "EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF JAYNARD AGUSTIN Y
PARAGGUA TAKEN BY PO3 JOEL MORA INVESTIGATOR
OF █████████████████ POLICE STATION THIS 2ND DAY OF NOVEMBER
2010 IN THE PRESENCE OF AND WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ATTY. LUIS
DONATO TO WHICH STATEMENT WAS TAKEN IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE BUT
TRANSLATED IN ILOCANO DIALECT IN WHICH THE DECLARANT FULLY
SPEAKS AND UNDERSTAND"13 In substance, it was stated in the said
extrajudicial confession stated that: on November 1, 2010 at about 3:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, the confessant saw AAA taking a bath in a pump well; AAA
was then naked while taking a bath; when AAA saw him, she ran at the back of
her house; he chased her and when he cornered her, he brought her to the
sugarcane plantation of █████████████████ in █████████████████,
Cagayan where he succeeded in raping her; after raping AAA, he strangulated
her and then buried her inside the same sugarcane plantation; the following
day, November 2, 2010, he admitted to Brgy. Capt. Ruam and to PO3 Ronie
Laxa that he raped and killed AAA. This written extrajudicial confession bore
the thumbmark purportedly of the said accused which was placed above the
printed name "JAYNARD P. AGUSTIN."
Version of the Defense
The defense presented accused Agustin as its lone witness. Agustin interposed
the defense of outright denial. He denied any involvement in the commission of
rape with homicide against AAA. He denied placing his thumbprint on the
subject extrajudicial confession at the police station of ███████████████,
Cagayan. He denied to have known Atty. Donato, Jr. He denied affixing his
thumbmark on another document when he was brought by the police officers
to Tuguegarao City. He knew that Brgy. Capt. Ruam, AAA and CCC, the
victim's father, were from ██████████████, but denied having knowledge
that AAA was killed on November l, 2010. He alleged that he never went to
school and hence, does not how to read and write.14
The RTC Ruling

On July 22, 2016, the RTC promulgated its July 18, 2016 Judgment finding
accused-appellant Agustin guilty as charged. The fallo of which reads: ]
ACCORDINGLY, accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 266 A No.
1 (a) and (d) in relation to Article 266-B fourth paragraph and 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.
Accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is

likewise ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Records show that the accused was under the custody of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan since November 3,
2010. The preventive [imprisonment] of the accused during the pendency of
this case shall be credited in full in his favor if he abided in writing with the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC ruled in favor of the admissibility of the subject written extrajudicial
confession ratiocinating that all the cardinal requirements for its admissibility
had been complied with. It found Agustin's extrajudicial confession as
sufficient to hold him liable for the crime charged. The RTC declared that
Agustin's confession was corroborated by the findings in the medico-legal
report of Dr. Villaflor that AAA's vagina sustained injuries indicating forced
coitus and that the cause of her death was asphyxia by strangulation.
According to the RTC, the evidence adduced by the prosecution convincingly
established the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and pointed to
Agustin as the perpetrator thereof.
Not in conformity, Agustin appealed the RTC's verdict of conviction before the
CA.
The CA Ruling
On September 26, 2017, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming the
conviction of Agustin, but modified the amounts of damages to be awarded.
The dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated July 18, 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 4 in Criminal Case No. 13738
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-Appellant Jaynard Agustin y
Paraggua is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of AAA the following amounts:
Civil Indemnity Php100,000.00
Moral Damages Php100,000.00
Exemplary Damages Php100,000.00
All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.16
The CA also found the written extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence.

It concurred with the RTC's observation that Agustin's written extrajudicial
confession is consistent with the physical evidence as established by the
Medico-legal Report No. M-078-201017 prepared by Dr. Villaflor. The CA noted
that the subject extrajudicial confession contained details that only the person
who committed the crime could have possibly known. The CA observed that
nowhere in the evidence on record does it show that violence or coercion was
employed on the person of Agustin to compel him into admitting liability of the
crime under investigation. Lastly, the CA rejected the retraction by Agustin as
a flimsy machination to extricate himself from criminal liability.
The Issues
Unfazed, Agustin filed the present appeal and posited the same assignment of
errors he previously raised before the CA, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [AGUSTIN] OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [AGUSTIN] OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.18
In the Resolution,19 dated August 5, 2019, the Court directed both parties to

submit their supplemental briefs, if they so desired. On November 28, 2019,
accused-appellant Agustin filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental
Brief)20 averring that he would adopt all his arguments in his Appellant's Brief
filed before the CA. On December 5, 2019, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed its Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief)21 stating
that it will no longer file a supplemental brief as its Appellee's Brief had
sufficiently ventilated the issue raised.
The Court's Ruling
In seeking the reversal of the challenged decision, Agustin mainly contends

that the extrajudicial confession upon which the trial court placed heavy
emphasis to convict him of the crime charged suffers from constitutional
infirmity because the same was extracted from him by the police officers in
violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, he maintains that although
the extrajudicial confession states that he was informed of his constitutional
rights under custodial investigation, there was no showing that said rights
were explained to him in a way that an uneducated person like him could
understand. He argues that the questions asked of him during the custodial
investigation should have been thoroughly explained to him and that he should
have been asked whether he understood all of them. He stresses that the mere
presence of Atty. Donato, Jr. during the custodial investigation did not satisfy
the constitutional requirement because the latter is not a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice.
In the ultimate, the foregoing boils down to whether the evidence adduced by
the prosecution establishes the guilt of Agustin beyond reasonable doubt. Two
points will be addressed: first, the admissibility of Agustin's extrajudicial
confession; and second, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Agustin's
guilt.
The nexus that connects Agustin to the rape-slay perpetrated against AAA was
his extrajudicial confession. After an exhaustive examination of the records,
the Court finds that the Agustin's written extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible and must perforce be discarded for having been obtained in clear
violation of his rights enshrined in the Constitution. The remaining evidence
proffered by the prosecution, on the other hand, is sorely insufficient to sustain
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the appeal is impressed with
merit.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory

protection afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a crime
and the correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate.
It states:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.
Republic Act No. 743822 (R.A. No. 7438) has reinforced the constitutional
mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation. The
pertinent provisions read:
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial

Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. –
(a) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an
offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him,
of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer
privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If
such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided
with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
xxxx
To be acceptable, extrajudicial confession must conform to the constitutional

requirements. An extrajudicial confession is not valid and inadmissible in
evidence when the same is obtained in violation of any of the following rights of
an accused during custodial investigation: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have an
independent and competent counsel preferably of his choice, (3) to be provided
with such counsel, if unable to secure one, (4) to be assisted by one in case of
waiver, which should be in writing, of the foregoing, and (5) to be informed of
all such rights and of the fact that anything he says can and will be used
against him.23
An extrajudicial confession must meet the foregoing requirements. Otherwise,

it is disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the exclusionary
rule. This exclusionary rule sprang from the recognition that police
interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physical and
psychological of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under
investigation.24 Its purpose is not to discourage the accused from confessing
guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.
It must appear clearly that the accused have been beforehand accorded his
right to be informed of such rights. Let it be underscored that law enforcement
agencies are required to genuinely and concretely communicate the rights of a
person under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood by him. The
right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights
entails an effective communication that results in an understanding thereof.
Any effort falling short of this standard is a denial of such right.25 As
elucidated by the Court in People of the Philippines v. Tizon, Jr.,26 thus:
The right to be informed of one's constitutional rights during custodial

investigation refers to an effective communication between the investigating
officer and the suspected individual, with the purpose of making the latter
understand these rights. Understanding would mean that information
transmitted was effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the
Constitution does not merely require the investigating officers to "inform" the
person under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be
"informed."27 (Citation omitted)
Flagrantly violated in the case at bench is Agustin's right to be informed of his

rights under custodial investigation.
As proof of compliance with the constitutional standards, the extrajudicial

confession contains the following statements:
PRELIMINARY: Mr. Jaynard Agustin you are being informed that you are under
investigation for your alleged involvement in the commission of an offense
particularly an alleged Rape with Homicide committed on November 1, 2010
at █████████████████, Cagayan. But before we proceed further, I wish to
inform you that pursuant to Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, You have the right to remain silent, anything you may say can be
used for against you in any court proceedings, to be assisted by a counsel
preferably of your own choice and if you cannot provide your own counsel, you
will be provided one to assist in this investigation. Is this clear and understood
by you?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Do you have any lawyer to assist you in this investigation?
ANSWER: There is none sir.

QUESTION: Do you like that we will provide you a lawyer to assist?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
QUESTION: We will provide Atty. Luis Donato to assist in this investigation. Do

you like to confer him?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
QUESTION: So we will give two (2) minutes for you to confer with Atty. Luis
Donato.
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
x x x x 28
The extrajudicial confession itself shows that in the course of the custodial
investigation, Agustin was not adequately informed of his constitutional rights.
Appellant was supposedly apprised of these rights through a kilometric
sentence punctuated by a terse answer of "Yes, sir" initiated by him. This, in
our view, did not satisfy the strict requirements mandated by the Constitution.
Too, it was not demonstrated that Agustin understood his constitutional rights.
Thus, there was only a perfunctory, superficial and ceremonial reading of his
rights without the slightest consideration of whether the same would result in
an understanding by Agustin of what was conveyed to him.
To reiterate, in order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should

be meaningful communication to and understanding of his rights by the
appellant, as opposed to a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital
thereof.29 Since comprehension is the objective, the degree of explanation
required will necessarily depend on the education, intelligence, and other
relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing
investigation.30 Here, it was undisputed that Agustin is an illiterate at the time
of the investigation and could only speak and understand Ilocano. This fact
should engender a higher degree of scrutiny in determining whether he
understood his rights as allegedly communicated to him.
Appellant should have been made to understand comprehensively the full

extent of his rights using the Ilocano dialect. Also, care should have been
observed by PO3 Mora when Agustin was specifically asked those questions
considering that the latter cannot read and write. The records are bereft of any
finding that PO3 Mora labored to properly apprise Agustin and make him
understand his constitutional rights in Ilocano or the local vernacular.
Strikingly, while it was made to appear in the subject extrajudicial confession

that Agustin was informed of his right to a counsel of his own choice and that
the police shall provide him with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel,
it was overlooked that it was not similarly made to appear in the same
statement that appellant was advised that he had the option to reject the
counsel provided for him by the police authorities. Also, Agustin was not even
informed that he may waive his constitutional rights only in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Truly, PO3 Mora was remiss in performing his duty.
A confession made in an atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in informing

the accused of all the rights, to which he is entitled, would be rendered
valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is by non-compliance with the
procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under
the Bill of Rights and as now further implemented and ramified by statutory
law (R.A. No. 7438).31 The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authority
are fatal to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession supposedly given by
Agustin to PO3 Mora.
The punctilious and artificially stately style of the subject extrajudicial

confession do not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding
on the part of Agustin. The statements do not evince a clear and sufficient
effort to inform and explain to Agustin his constitutional rights, much less
satisfy the constitutional prerequisites. Indeed, the showing of a spontaneous,
free and unconstrained giving up of a right is wanting.
In any event, the Court finds the written extrajudicial confession to be

unreliable. Records show that since Agustin is unschooled, the questions in
English language had to be translated to Ilocano dialect, while his answers in
Ilocano were translated to English for the benefit of the investigating officer.
This Court has held that such a multiple process of reading and translating the
questions and translating and typing the answers and reading and translating
again the said answers is naturally pregnant with possibilities of human, if
unintentional, inadequacies and incompleteness which render the said
confession unsafe as basis of conviction for a capital offense.32 Further, it was
not shown that the confession was read and translated to Agustin by PO3 Mora
and that said appellant understood every part of it.
The illegality of the subject extrajudicial confession is further demonstrated by

the fact that Agustin exercised no satisfactory waiver of his rights. In this
jurisdiction, the burden to prove that an accused waived his constitutional
right before making a confession under custodial investigation rests with the
prosecution. The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing
evidence.33 The prosecution miserably failed to do so.
Agustin allegedly made an express waiver of his constitutional rights through

the Certification portion of the extrajudicial confession, viz.:
CERTIFICATION
I, JAYNARD AGUSTIN Y PARAGGUA, do hereby certify that before taking down
any sworn statement, the investigator had fully explained my constitutional
right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which I
fully understood and hereby waive the aforestated right as provided by Article
III, section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.34 (Underscoring supplied)
To the mind of the Court, this is not the waiver that the Constitution clearly
and strictly required. The waiver failed to show Agustin's understanding of his
rights, his waiver of those rights, and the implications of his waiver. The waiver
was not couched in a manner clearly manifesting his desire to do so.
Noteworthy is the part of the confession in which the appellant allegedly waived
his rights referred to them as "the aforestated right as provided by Article III,
section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution." As presented, the prosecution
would have us refer to the first part of the extrajudicial confession for
guidance, as if it were a footnote saying "please see first part."
At any rate, there is no basis for declaring that Agustin knowingly and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, because as we discussed earlier,
such rights were not properly and effectively imparted to and understood by
him. It cannot be said the waiver of his rights is an informed one in all aspects.
Verily, the waiver itself is lamentably insufficient to constitute a waiver of his
rights cherished and enshrined in our fundamental law.
Lastly, we find that Atty. Donato, Jr. failed to act as the competent and
independent counsel envisioned by the Constitution.
The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision

is not an empty rhetoric. It emphasizes the need to provide the accused with a
diligent and capable lawyer who will fully safeguard his constitutional rights
while under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation.
Swept into a strange and unfamiliar environment and surrounded by
intimidating police officers, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of an
effective and vigilant counsel. The Court's ruling in People v. Peñaflor35 is
instructive on this score, to wit:
To be a competent and independent counsel in a custodial investigation, the

lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview, counselling
or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping
the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. It has
been made clear that counsel should be present and able to advise and assist
his client from the time the confessant answers the first question until the
signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain
that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation
fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to
counsel and to be presumed innocent.36 (Citations omitted)
In the case at bench, Atty. Donato, Jr. did not provide effective and adequate
legal assistance to Agustin. He did not display any measure of zeal
commensurate to the magnitude of his responsibility. He made no effort to
determine whether Agustin was treated well upon conferring with the latter to
rule out any possibility that he was coerced, intimidated or forced to give a
statement. There was no showing that Atty. Donato, Jr. warned Agustin the
possible consequences of his confession that he allegedly intends to give freely
and voluntarily. Neither did Atty. Donato, Jr advise Agustin not to give any
statement if he was in doubt and to think things over. He never advised
appellant that the latter has the right not to affix his thumbmark on the
extrajudicial confession if he thinks that it may incriminate him. Knowing the
gravity of the offense, Atty. Donato, Jr. did not explain to Agustin that he was
being investigated for a grave crime punishable by a long period of
imprisonment and that by his confession, he would be admitting to the
commission of the crime.
In People v. Obrero,37 the Court wrote:
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial

investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed
independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship
between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.38
A perusal of the records disclosed that Atty. Donato, Jr. was merely picked out
and provided by the police officers of the █████████████████ Police
Station, thus putting into serious doubt his independence and competence in
assisting Agustin during the investigation. Atty. Donato, Jr. merely observed
the entire investigation and from a reading of the subject extrajudicial
confession, there was no indication that he constantly advised Agustin from
the time the latter answered the first question until he placed his thumbmark
thereon. It appears that said lawyer's role was reduced to a mere witness to the
affixing of the thumbprint by Agustin. Such token participation is not the kind
of legal assistance that should be accorded to appellant in legal contemplation.
Clearly, Atty. Donato, Jr. failed to meet the exacting standards of a competent
and independent counsel as required by the Constitution.Ꮮαwρhi ৷ Hence, the
extrajudicial confession executed by Agustin, even if gospel truth, is deemed an
uncounseled confession, and must be struck down as inadmissible in evidence.
It may not be amiss to observe at this juncture that there is no showing from
the records that Agustin thumbmarked the subject written extrajudicial
confession in the presence of any of the witnesses enumerated in Section 2,
paragraph D of R.A. No. 7438, to insure its genuineness and due compliance
with the constitutional requirements. Such omission rendered the extrajudicial
confession inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. Said provision states:
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial

Investigation; Duties of Public Officers. -
xxxx
(c) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under

custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in
the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the
municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or
minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Inasmuch as the extrajudicial confession executed by Agustin was given in

violation of the safeguards in Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
and of Section 2, paragraph b of R.A. No. 7438, we hold that the same is totally
inadmissible, and it was erroneous for the RTC to use it in convicting Agustin.
No presumption of constitutionality may be accorded any extrajudicial
confession until the prosecution convincingly establishes the regularity of its
taking and its compliance with the Constitution. This is the price the
prosecution has to pay before it can be allowed to use such formidable
evidence against the accused.39 Without the extrajudicial confession, the
conviction of Agustin cannot stand.
The only other prosecution evidence left is the Medico-legal Report No. M-078-
2010 with which the confession supposedly coincides, as the RTC concluded.
However, since the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible, it becomes
irrelevant whether it dovetails with the medico-legal findings. The corroboration
that medico-legal or autopsy report lends to an extrajudicial confession
becomes relevant only when the latter is considered admissible. In People v. De
la Cruz,40 we held, to wit:
It is significant that, with the exception of appellant's putative extrajudicial
confession, no other evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the
People. The proposition that the medical findings jibe with the narration of
appellant as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into the fatal error
of figuratively putting the horse before the cart. Precisely, the validity and
admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial confession are in question and the
contents thereof are denied and of serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be
used as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which
has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando.41
Although the defense of denial interposed by Agustin is weak, this fact alone
would not warrant his conviction. The burden is on the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on him to prove his innocence. Well-
entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must
rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution.42 Courts should not magnify the weakness of the defense and
overlook the prosecution's failure to discharge the onus probandi.
Our Constitution and our laws dearly value individual life and liberty and
require no less than moral certainty or proof beyond reasonable doubt to offset
the presumption of innocence. Courts are task to determine whether the
prosecution has submitted sufficient legally admissible evidence showing
beyond reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed, and that the
accused committed it. In the case at bench, the prosecution has failed to
present adequate proof demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant Agustin was the culprit who raped and killed the victim AAA. The
unpardonable assault on the 12-year old girl is tragic; and the RTC, even the
CA, may have been swayed by the tide of human indignation. We must,
however, uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the required quantum of proof
necessary to support a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 26, 2017 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08557 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Jaynard
Agustin y Paraggua is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Rape with Homicide
on the ground of reasonable doubt and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for another cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections of Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The said
Director is ordered to report to this Court the action he has taken within five
(5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Caguioa, Gesmundo,* Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Designated additional Member per Raffle dated February 8, 2021.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of the

Supreme Court), with Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and
Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of the Supreme
Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 3-15.
2 Penned by Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino; records, pp. 183-189.
3 In accordance with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, the

identities of the parties, records and court proceedings are kept
confidential by replacing their names and other personal circumstances
with fictitious initials, and by blotting out the specific geographical
location that may disclose the identities of the victims.
4 Records. pp. 3-4.
5 Id. at 3.
6 Id. at 30.
7 TSN, June 8, 2011, pp. 1-3
8 Order dated June 13, 2012, records, p. 80.
9 TSN, August 30, 2012, pp. 1-12
10 TSN, March 12, 2014.
11 TSN, April 10, 2012, pp. 1-4.
12 Order dated September 2, 2014, records p. 133.
13 Exhibit "H," records, p. 14.
14 TSN, February 11, 2015, pp. 1-3.
15 Records, p. 189.
16 Rollo p. 14.
17 Records, p. 10.
18 CA rollo, p. 28.
19 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
20 Id. at 27-29.
21 Id. at 32-33.
22 An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under

Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and
Investigating Officers, and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof; approved
on April 27, 1992.
23 People v. Muleta, 368 Phil. 451, 462-463 (1999).
24 People v. Bravo, 376 Phil. 940-941 (1999).
25 People v. Binamira, 343 Phil. 1, 19 (1997).
26 434 Phil. 588 (2002).
27 Id. at 605.
28 Records, p. 14.
29 People v. Porio, 427 Phil. 82, 97-98 (2002).
30 People v. Canoy, 385 Phil. 73, 86 (2000).
31 People v. Dela Cruz, 344 Phil. 653, 661 (1997).
32 Peoplev. Maisug, et al., 137 Phil. 161, 173 (1969).
33 People v. Bariquit, 395 Phil. 823, 851 (2000).
34 Records, p. 14.
35 766 Phil. 484 (2015).
36 Id. at 500-501.
37 387 Phil. 937 (2000).

38 Id. at 953.
39 People v. Santos, 347 Phil. 723, 736 (1997).
40 Supra note 31.
41 Id. at 666.
42 People v. Tomaquin, 478 Phil. 885, 912 (2004).

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBELYN CABANADA Y

ROSAURO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before Us for review is the August 29, 2014 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05585, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated April 24,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 214, Mandaluyong City in
Criminal Case No. MC-09-12269 finding accused-appellant Robelyn Cabanada
y Rosauro (Cabanada) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Theft.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Cabanada was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft,

the accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of April 2009, in the City of Mandaluyong,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, being then employed as housemaid of complainant
Catherine Victoria y Tulfo, with grave abuse of confidence and taking
advantage of the trust reposed upon her with intent to gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following to
wit:
a) cash amounting to [P]20,000.00;
b) one (1) Pierre Cardin lady's watch worth [P]10,000.00;
c) one (1) white gold ring with diamonds and white gold earring with
diamonds worth [P]90,000.00;
d) one (1) Technomarine lady's watch worth [P]15,000.00;
e) one (1) Santa Barbara [lady's] watch worth [P]6,000.00;

f) one (1) Relic lady's watch worth [P]3,000.00;
g) one (1) pair of white gold with briliantitos earrings worth [P]10,000.00
h) assorted ATM cards
in the aggregate amount of [P] 154,000.00 belonging to one Catherine Victoria

y Tulfo, without her knowledge and consent, to her damage and prejudice in
the aforementioned amount.
Contrary to law."3
Cabanada pleaded not guilty at her arraignment. Subsequently, the trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution established that: at about 9:00 a.m. on April 12, 2009, an
Easter Sunday, private complainant Catherine Victoria (Catherine) and her
family visited her mother in Bulacan. Cabanada was left at the house since she
was not feeling well and would rather clean the house. The family returned at
9:30 p.m. of the same day.4
On April 13, 2009, Catherine asked her husband Victor Victoria (Victor) for the
P47,000.00 he was supposed to give for their household expenses. Victor went
to his service vehicle to get the money he kept in the glove compartment, and
was surprised that P20,000.00 was missing. When Victor informed her,
Catherine checked their room and discovered that several pieces of her jewelry
were also missing. She immediately called the Mandaluyong Police Station to
report the incident.5
In the course of the interview at the Victoria's residence, Cabanada admitted to

PO2 Maximo Cotoner, Jr. (PO2 Cotoner) that she took the money. She led them
to her room and took a pouch (white envelope) containing P16,000.00 cash.
She also showed a white leather wallet containing the missing master key of
Victor's vehicle. Thereafter, Cabanada was brought at the Criminal
Investigation Unit (CIU) for further investigation. Cabanada apologized to
Catherine, and admitted that she still had some of the missing jewelry in her
house at Panatag Compound, Welfareville, Mandaluyong City. The police went
to her house and recovered the Technomarine, Pierre Cardin, Relic and Santa
Barbara watches and a pair of earrings with diamonds placed in a tool box. 6
On the other hand, the defense narrated a different set of events. At around
9:00 a.m. on April 12, 2009, Cabanada went to Catherine's house to work as a
stay-out housemaid, and left around 9:00 p.m. upon arrival of the Victoria
family. On the same date, the plantsadora came around 9:00 a.m. and left at
3:00 p.m. In the morning of April 13, 2009, Cabanada returned to the house to
resume her work. She was washing clothes at around 9:00 a.m. when
Catherine called her and asked about the missing items. She denied any
knowledge of the same. The police came and asked her and her sister Rose to
board the police mobile. For half an hour, Catherine was talking with the
police, while Cabanada and her sister stayed in the mobile. Thereafter, they
were brought to the police station, and while in a small room, she was asked
thrice if she mortgaged the missing jewelry, to which she denied any
knowledge. She was not assisted by a lawyer at the police station nor was
allowed to call her relatives.
The RTC found Cabanada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft. It held that the prosecution was able to establish the
continuous series of events which undoubtedly point to Cabanada as the
perpetrator of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Robelyn

Cabanada y Rosauro GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Qualified Theft and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that
Cabanada's admissions were not obtained under custodial investigation as it
was established that she was not yet arrested at that time. The "uncounselled
admissions" were given freely and spontaneously during a routine inquiry. The
CA considered the testimony of PO2 Cotoner that they contemplated that
Cabanada might have been covering for someone else. The fallo of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby

AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, the instant appeal was instituted.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation, 9 informed this
Court of its intention not to file a supplemental brief since its Brief 10 dated July
23, 2013 has exhaustively discussed and refuted the issues in the case. For
her part, Cabanada, through the Public Attorney's Office, asserted that she
adopts all her defenses and arguments in her Appellant's Brief, and asks for
the said Manifestation be considered as substantial compliance in lieu of
supplemental brief.11
Cabanada alleges that her alleged admissions cannot be considered as done in
an ordinary manner, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily as it was elicited
through the questions of PO2 Cotoner. She was patently treated as a suspect
when she was being interviewed at the Victoria's residence. Thus, her
uncounselled admissions are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained
without a valid waiver on her part.12
On the other hand, the OSG argues that although Cabanada's confession may
have been obtained through PO2 Cotoner's interview, the same was given freely
and spontaneously during a routine inquiry and not while she was under
custodial investigation. She made the said admission in her employer's
residence wherein she was neither deprived of her liberty nor considered a
suspect. The OSG emphasizes that since the investigation had just begun, it
was entirely within the authority and discretion of the police officers to
question any person within the household who could have related any unusual
events that occurred on the day the Victoria family went to Bulacan. 13
This Court finds the appeal partly meritorious.
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution provide that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The above provision in the Constitution embodies what jurisprudence has

termed as "Miranda rights.'' The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person
under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he
says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to
talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present
when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
provided before any questioning if he so desires. 14 The said rights are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as would lead
the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.15
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Bill of Rights pertains to

"custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a
crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. 16
This Court expounded in People v. Marra:17
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases
to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out
a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate.18
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional mandate and
expanded the definition of custodial investigation. This means that even those
who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of
their Miranda rights.19 The same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this
scenario. A portion of Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 reads:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation;

Duties of Public Officers. -
xxxx
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of

issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of
the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.20
Applying the foregoing, Cabanada was not under custodial investigation when
she made the confession, without counsel, to PO2 Cotoner that she took the
missing P20,000.00. The prosecution established that the confession was
elicited during the initial interview of the police after Catherine called to report
the missing money and personal effects. The investigation was still a general
inquiry of the crime and has not focused on a particular suspect. Also, she
admitted to the crime while at the residence of her employer, thus, she was not
yet taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom. As PO2 Cotoner's
testified:
Q: Why did you start your interview with accused Robelyn

Cabanada?
A: Because she's only the person left in that house during that time,
ma'am.

Q: You said that you started interview with Robelyn Cabanada, what was
her reaction if you can remember when you started to interview her?
A: At first she was crying and later she was talking and talking and
admitted that she was the one who took the money, ma'am.

Q: How according to her were she able to get the money, you mentioned
earlier that private complainant in this case Catherine Victoria told
you that she discovered [P]20,000 out of [P]47,000.00 inside a white
envelope which white envelope was inside her car. How did accused
tell you how she got the money?
A: She said that she also stole the master key of the car prior to that
time she stole the money, ma'am.

Q: When you were interviewing accused Ms. Robelyn Cabanada, who

were present?
A: The complainant, ma'am.

Q: Aside from the complainant who else were present?
A: PO3 Rodel Samaniego, ma'am.

Q: How did complainant react when accused told you or related

information that she knows the stolen master key of the car, who
open the same?
A: The complainant revealed that she lost the key several months ago,
ma'am.

Q: What happened after this information was given to you?
A: Together the complainant the accused led us in her room and in a

cabinet she took from there the white envelope which consists of [P]
16,000.00 and after that she also get the leather wallet which
contained the master key of the car which she stole several months
ago, ma'am.
x x x21
The records of the case reveal that Cabanada was brought to the CIU office for
further investigation after she admitted the crime and after Catherine
expressed her desire to pursue the case against her. However, prosecution
witness PO2 Cotoner admitted that Cabanada was not apprised of her
constitutional rights. He insisted that their investigation has not yet concluded
and that the accused was not yet arrested. Thus, in his direct testimony:
PROSEC. LALUCES:
xxxx
Q: How did the complainant react when the accused actually presented
this [P] 16,000.00 as well as the leather wallet which the wallet (sic)
contained the key of the car?
A: She was so angry and she told us that she would pursue the case
and we brought the accused to our office together with the
complainant, ma'am.

Q: For what purpose?
A: For further investigation, ma'am.

Q: After bringing the accused to the CIU for further investigation as

you said, what happened next?
A: The accused continued talking, talking, crying and afterwards

she told us that there were more pieces of jewelry in their house
at Panatag Compound Welfareville, Mandaluyong City, ma'am.

Q: Where did she actually tell you this?
A: Inside our office, ma'am.
Q: Which particular part of your office, was she already inside the
detention cell?
A: No, ma'am, office of our chief, ma'am.

x x x x22

Q: The accused practically admitted to you while she was still in the
house of Catherine Victoria who having taken the cash belonging to
the complainant and reported to you by said Catherine Victoria. Why
did you not give her the rights at that time she made the
admission so that she can secure the services of counsel?
A: Because at that time she was not arrested yet, ma'am.

Q: Why did you not arrest her at that time when she practically
admitted to you of this thing?
A: Because we thought that the accused was covering up for

someone we have not yet finished our investigation, ma'am.

Q: You have not concluded your investigation?
A: Yes, ma'am.

x x x23
This Court elucidated that the Miranda rights are intended to protect ordinary

citizens from the pressure of custodial setting. 24 In the case of Luz v.
People25 citing Berkemer v. McCarty,26 it was explained that:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the

police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing,to relieve the
"inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting
itself," "which work to undermine the individual's will to resist," and as
much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to
try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary.
Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons
suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of
felonies.27
The circumstances surrounding Cabanada's appearance before the police

station falls within the definition of custodial investigation. Despite the claim
that she was not considered as a suspect at that time, the fact remains that
she confessed to having committed the crime and was able to produce the
money from her room. The investigation, therefore, ceased to be a general
inquiry even if they contemplated that she was covering for someone.
The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the CIU office can be considered as

having been done in a custodial setting because (1) after admitting the crime,
Cabanada was brought to the police station for further investigation; (2) the
alleged confession happened in the office of the chief; (3) PO2 Cotoner was
present during Cabanada's apology and admission to Catherine. The
compelling pressures of custodial setting were present when the accused was
brought to the police station along with Catherine.
In People v. Javar,28 it was ruled that any statement obtained in violation of the
constitutional provision, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain
of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes
inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had
been voluntarily given.29 Cabanada's confession without counsel at the police
station, which led to the recovery of the other items at her house, is
inadmissible.
Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of Cabanada's admission made in CIU does

not necessarily entitle her to a verdict of acquittal. Her admission during the
general inquiry is still admissible.
Theft is qualified under Article 310 of the RPC, when it is, among others,
committed with grave abuse of confidence, thus:
ART. 310. Qualified Theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the

penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation,
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)
The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are
as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner's consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 30
The following circumstances are established during the trial: Victor, who had
the habit of leaving valuables inside his car, left P47,000.00 in the glove
compartment; he hid the car keys in the filing cabinet; Catherine's car keys
were missing since 2005; Cabanada worked as Victoria's housemaid for several
years; she has unrestricted access to all parts of the house including the
master bedroom; on April 12, 2009, she was left alone at the house when the
family went to Bulacan; the plantsadora, who only reported for work every
Sunday, had no access to the house and the car; Cabanada was alone from
3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. after the plantsadora left at 3:00 p.m.; the next day,
on April 13, 2009, Victor discovered that the money was missing; and there
was no sign of forced entry or of an intruder entering the house. In addition to
the said circumstances, Cabanada admitted to the police in the presence of
Catherine that she stole the money and led them to her room where they
recovered the P16,0000.00 cash and white leather wallet containing the master
key of Victor's car.
The above circumstances and Cabanada's admission, coupled with

presentation of the money, albeit less than the missing amount, establish the
presence of the element of unlawful taking. The fact that the money was taken
without authority and consent of Victor and Catherine, and that the taking was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor
force upon things, were also proven during the trial. Intent to gain or animus
lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. 31 The taking was also clearly done
with grave abuse of confidence. Cabanada was working as a housemaid of the
Victoria family since 2002.32
From the foregoing, a modification is called for as regards the imposable

penalty. Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Qualified Theft
"shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article," while Article 309 of the RPC
states:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph,
and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The case of Cruz v. People33 is instructive as to the proper penalty for qualified
theft if the value of the property stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00. Thus:
x x x In this case, the amount stolen was P15,000.00. Two degrees higher
than prision mayor minimum and medium is reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum shall be prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance in the commission of the offense, the maximum period of the
indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11
days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days. The minimum penalty imposed by the
RTC is correct. However, the maximum period imposed by RTC should be
increased to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days.34
In this case, the value of the property stolen is P20,000.00. Applying the above
pronouncement, Cabanada should be sentenced to suffer the penalty often (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five
(5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.

05585, affirming the Decision dated April 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 214, Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-09-12269, which
found accused-appellant Robelyn Cabanada y Rosauro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Cabanada is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of Ten (10)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Sixteen (16) years,
Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Mendoza, and Martires, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., on wellness leave.
Endnotes:
1
Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, with Associate Justices
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Apolinario D. Bruselas,
Jr., concurring, rollo, pp. 2-12.
Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Ofelia L. Calo; CA rollo, pp. 22-28.
2
CA rollo, pp. 13-14.

3
Id. at 23-24.
4
Id. at 24.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 28.
7
Rollo, p. 11.
8
Id at 20.
9
10
CA rollo pp. 77-89.
11
Rollo pp. 33-34.
12
CA rollo pp. 53-54.
13
Id. at 84.
14
People v. Mojello, 468 Phil. 944, 952-953 (2004).
15
People v. Andan, 336 Phil. 91, 106 (1997).
People v. Guting y Tomas, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015, 770 SCRA
16
334, 341.
17
306 Phil. 586 (1994).
18
People v. Marra, supra, at 594. (Citation omitted).
19
People v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014, 735 SCRA 728, 751.
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR

20
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE

ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, approved on May 15, 1992.
21
TSN, August 25, 2009, pp. 6-7.
22
Id. at 7-8.
23
Id. at 12-13.
24
People v. Chavez, supra note 19, at 750.
25
683 Phil. 399 (2012).
26
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
27]
Luz v. People, supra note 25, at 410. (Emphasis ours).
28
297 Phil. 111 (1993).
29
People v. Javar, supra, at 118.
30
People v. Mirto, 675 Phil. 895, 906 (2011). (Emphasis supplied)
31
Matrido v. People, 610 Phil. 203, 212 (2009).
32
TSN, December 13, 2011, p. 4. Victor Victoria
Q: If you can remember, sir, when did she start to work for your family as part
of your household?
A: It was sometime I think in year 2002, ma'am.
33
586 Phil. 89 (2008).
Cruz
34
v. People, supra, at 102-103.
July-2017 Jurisprudence
 G.R. No. 170341, July 05, 2017 - MANILA BULLETIN PUBLISHING

CORPORATION AND RUTHER BATUIGAS, Petitioners, v. VICTOR A.
DOMINGO AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 211170, July 03, 2017 - SPOUSES MAXIMO ESPINOZA AND
WINIFREDA DE VERA, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ANTONIO MAYANDOC AND
ERLINDA CAYABYAB MAYANDOC, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 224395, July 03, 2017 - DISCIPLINARY BOARD, LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE; ATTY. TEOFILO E. GUADIZ, CHAIRMAN; ATTY.
NOREEN BERNADETTE SAN LUIS-LUTEY; AND PUTIWAS MALAMBUT,
MEMBERS; ATTY. MERCY JANE B. PARAS-LEYNES, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR;
AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. CABRERA III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioners, v. MERCEDITA E. GUTIERREZ,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 213424, July 11, 2017 - LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), JANET D. NACION, ANTONIO L.
CASTILLO, LEAH S. DAGUIO, VIRGINIA G. DATUKON, ELSA H. RAMOS-
MAPILI, CECILIA C. RACIMO, FLORENTINA N. SAGABAEN, IRENE P.
SALVANERA, NIMFA VILLAROMAN-SANTOS, TERESITA D. TEVES, AND
LILIAN F. VARELA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 218384, July 03, 2017 - JOHN L. BORJA AND AUBREY L.
BORJA/DONG JUAN, Petitioners, v. RANDY B. MIÑOZA AND ALAINE S.
BANDALAN, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 224515, July 03, 2017 - REMEDIOS V. GEÑORGA, Petitioner, v.
HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON, REPRESENTED BY ROBERTO MELITON AS
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, IRENE MELITON, HENRY MELITON, ROBERTO
MELITON, HAIDE* MELITON, AND MARIA FE MELITON ESPINOSA,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 202308, July 05, 2017 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
v. JUMELITO T. DALMACIO, Respondent.; G.R. No. 202357 - JUMELITO T.
DALMACIO, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND/OR MS.
CYNTHIA JAVIER, Respondents.
 A.M. No. SB-17-24-P [Formerly A.M. No. 14-12-07-SB], July 11, 2017 -
SECURITY AND SHERIFF DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN, Complainant, v.
RONALD ALLAN GOLE R. CRUZ, SECURITY GUARD I, SECURITY AND
SHERIFF DIVISION, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 220057, July 12, 2017 - RENE MICHAEL FRENCH, Petitioner, v.
COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTEENTH DIVISION, CEBU CITY AND MAGDALENA
O'DELL, REPRESENTED BY HECTOR P. TEODOSIO AS HER ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 227894, July 05, 2017 - JOSE S. OCAMPO, Petitioner, v.
RICARDO S. OCAMPO, SR., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 212641, July 05, 2017 - ANGELICA A. FAJARDO, Petitioner, v.
MARIO J. CORRAL, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 223513, July 05, 2017 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ALEX AMAR Y MONTANO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 223862, July 10, 2017 - HON. MYLYN P. CAYABYAB, IN HER
CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF LUBAO, PAMPANGA, AND
ANGELITO L. DAVID, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE BARANGAY CHAIRMAN OF
PRADO SIONGCO, LUBAO, PAMPANGA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EMMANUEL SANTOS, Petitioners, v. JAIME C. DIMSON,
REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT, CARMELA R. DIMSON AND
IRENE R. DIMSON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 216124, July 19, 2017 - RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. FEDERICO A. SERRA, SPOUSES EDUARDO
AND HENEDINA ANDUEZA, ATTY. LEOMAR R. LANUZA, MR. JOVITO C.
SORIANO, ATTY. EDWIN L. RANA, ATTY. PARIS G. REAL, ATTY. PRUDENCIO
B. DENSING, JR., HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, AND ATTY. ERWIN S.
OLIVA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 188057, July 12, 2017 - HILLTOP MARKET FISH VENDORS'
ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. BRAULIO YARANON, CITY MAYOR,
BAGUIO CITY, HON. GALO WEYGAN, CITY COUNCILOR AND CHAIRMAN
ANTI-VICE COORDINATING TASK FORCE, AND THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF
BAGUIO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 190590, July 12, 2017 - ROBERTO V. SAN JOSE AND DELFIN P.
ANGCAO, Petitioners, v. JOSE MA. OZAMIZ, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 167952, July 05, 2017 - GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC.,
Petitioner, v. RUBEN ALCAIDE (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY GLORIA
ALCAIDE, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FARMER BENEFICIARIES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 225051, July 19, 2017 - DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(DFA), Petitioner, v. BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION & AD HOC
ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, COMPOSED OF CHAIRMAN DANILO L. CONCEPCION
AND MEMBERS, CUSTODIO O. PARLADE AND ANTONIO P. JAMON, JR.,
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 220926, July 05, 2017 - LUIS JUAN L. VIRATA AND UEM- MARA
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION (NOW KNOWN AS CAVITEX INFRASTRUCTURE
CORPORATION), Petitioners, v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE, WESTMONT
INVESTMENT CORP., ANTHONY T. REYES, SIMEON CUA, VICENTE
CUALOPING, HENRY CUALOPING, MARIZA SANTOS TAN, AND MANUEL
ESTRELLA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 221058 - WESTMONT INVESTMENT,
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE, Respondent.; G.R. No.
221109 - MANUEL ESTRELLA, Petitioner, v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE,
Respondent.; G.R. No. 221135 - SIMEON CUA, VICENTE CUALOPING, AND
HENRY CUALOPING, Petitioners, v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE, Respondent.; G.R.
No. 221218 - ANTHONY T. REYES, Petitioner, v. ALEJANDRO NG WEE, LUIS
JUAN VIRATA, UEM-MARA PHILIPPINES CORP., WESTMONT INVESTMENT
CORP., MARIZA SANTOS-TAN, SIMEON CUA, VICENTE CUALOPING, HENRY
CUALOPING, AND MANUEL ESTRELLA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 204544, July 03, 2017 - MARLON BACERRA Y TABONES,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017 - UNITED POLYRESINS, INC., ERNESTO
UY SOON, JR., AND/OR JULITO UY SOON, Petitioners, v. MARCELINO
PINUELA, Respondent.
Appellee, v. ROLLY DIZON Y TAGULAYLAY, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 208000, July 26, 2017 - VIRGEL DAVE JAPOS, Petitioner, v.
FIRST AGRARIAN REFORM MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (FARMCOOP)
AND-OR CRISLINO BAGARES, Respondents.
Appellee, v. GILDA ABELLANOSA, Accused-Appellant.
Appellee, v. MARK GAMBA Y NISSORADA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 215029, July 05, 2017 - SUMMIT ONE CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU - NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 204617, July 10, 2017 - ESPERANZA BERBOSO, Petitioner, v.
VICTORIA CABRAL, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 10553, July 05, 2017 - FILIPINAS O. CELEDONIO, Complainant, v.
ATTY. JAIME F. ESTRABILLO, Respondent.
Appellee, v. ALFREDO GUNSAY Y TOLENTINO, Defendant-Appellant.
Appellee, v. RICKY PRIMAVERA Y REMODO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 185647, July 26, 2017 - DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., Petitioner, v.
PETER C. DY, JOHNNY C. DY AND RAMON C. DY, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 203902, July 19, 2017 - SPOUSES DIONISIO ESTRADA AND
JOVITA R. ESTRADA, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.
AND EDUARDO R. SAYLAN, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 230481, July 26, 2017 - HOEGH FLEET SERVICES PHILS., INC.,
AND/OR HOEGH FLEET SERVICES AS, Petitioners, v. BERNARDO M.
TURALLO, Respondent.; G.R. No. 230500 - BERNARDO M. TURALLO,
Petitioner, v. HOEGH FLEET SERVICES PHILS., INC., AND/OR HOEGH
FLEET SERVICES AS, Respondents.
Appellee, v. LUTHER SABADO, SATURNINO SABADO Y LOMBOY AND
HOSPICIO HARUTA Y MARTINEZ, ACCUSED, LUTHER SABADO Y
PANGANGAAN, Accused-Appellant.
Appellee, v. MARLON BELMONTE Y SUMAGIT, MARVIN BELMONTE Y
SUMAGIT, ENRILE GABAY Y DELA TORRE A.K.A "PUNO", AND NOEL BAAC Y
BERGULA, Accused, -- MARLON BELMONTE Y SUMAGIT, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 220700, July 10, 2017 - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
FOR LUZON, Petitioner, v. EUFROCINA CARLOS DIONISIO AND WINIFREDO
SALCEDO MOLINA, Respondents.
 A.M. No. 17-03-03-CA, July 11, 2017 - RE: LETTER OF RAFAEL DIMAANO
REQUESTING INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES
PURPORTEDLY PERPETRATED BY ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JANE AURORA C.
LANTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND A
CERTAIN ATTY. DOROTHY S. CAJAYON OF ZAMBOANGA CITY; OCA IPI No.
17-258-CA-J, July 11, 2017 - RE: UNSWORN COMPLAINT OF ROSA
ABDULHARAN AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JANE AURORA C. LANTION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND A CERTAIN
ATTY. DOROTHY S. CAJAYON OF ZAMBOANGA CITY
 A.C. No. 8450, July 26, 2017 - SPOUSES FELIX AND FE NAVARRO,
Complainants, v. ATTY. MARGARITO G. YGOÑA, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 11663, July 31, 2017 - NANETTE B. SISON, REPRESENTED BY
DELIA B. SARABIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. SHERDALE M. VALDEZ,
Respondent.
Appellee, v. AGAPITO DIMAALA Y ARELA, Accused-Appellant.
 A.C. No. 6933, July 05, 2017 - GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN, JR., Complainant,
v. ATTY. ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., Respondent.
Appellee, v. ROMMEL DIPUTADO, Accused-Appellant.
 A.M. No. P-06-2253 (Formerly A.M. No. 06-9-297-MTC), July 12, 2017 -
THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. ELIZABETH
R. TENGCO, CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, STA. CRUZ,
LAGUNA, Respondent.; A.M. No. P-07-2360 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2427-P),
July 12, 2017 - JUDGE ELPIDIO R. CALIS, Complainant, v. ELIZABETH R.
TENGCO, CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, STA. CRUZ,
LAGUNA, Respondent.; A.M. No. P-13-3157 (Formerly A.M. No. 12-4-30-MTC),
July 12, 2017 - THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
v. ELIZABETH R. TENGCO, FORMER CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT, STA. CRUZ, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017 - ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, RENE A.V.
SAGUISAG, CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, RENE B.
GOROSPE, AND SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioners, v. CONGRESS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO "KOKO" PIMENTEL III,
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AS REPRESENTED BY HOUSE
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, Respondents.; G.R. No. 231694 -
FORMER SEN. WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, BISHOP EMERITUS DEOGRACIAS S.
IÑIGUEZ, BISHOP BRODERICK PABILLO, BISHOP ANTONIO R. TOBIAS, MO.
ADELAIDA YGRUBAY, SHAMAH BULANGIS AND CASSANDRA D. DELURIA,
Petitioners, v. CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE
SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AQUILINO "KOKO"
PIMENTEL III, PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND PANTALEON
D. ALVAREZ, SPEAKER, HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 201018, July 12, 2017 - UNITED COCONUT CHEMICALS, INC.,
Petitioner, v. VICTORIANO B. VALMORES, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017 - JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant, v. ATTY.
VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017 - REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE
RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE, REPRESENTATIVE
EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, AND
REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO, Petitioners, v. SPEAKER PANTALEON
D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, AND
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, Respondents.
Appellee, v. ROSARIO BALADJAY, Accused-Appellant.
 A.C. No. 5161, July 11, 2017 - RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE BAR. -- ROLANDO S. TORRES, Petitioner.
 G.R. No. 207193, July 24, 2017 - ROBLE BARBOSA AND RAMDY
BARBOSA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Appellee, v. NOMERTO NAPOLES Y BAJAS, Accused-Appellant.
 A.C. No. 1346, July 25, 2017 - PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner, v. ATTY. EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN, Respondent.
 A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854 [Formerly A.M. No. 14-4-50-MCTC], July 11, 2017 -
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. PRESIDING
JUDGE BILL D. BUYUCAN AND CLERK OF COURT GERARD N. LINDAWAN,
BOTH AT MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BAGABAG-DIADI, NUEVA
VIZCAYA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 212616, July 10, 2017 - DISTRIBUTION & CONTROL PRODUCTS,
INC./VINCENT M. TIAMSIC, Petitioners, v. JEFFREY E. SANTOS, Respondent.
Appellee, v. ARMANDO MENDOZA Y POTOLIN A.K.A. "JOJO," Accused-
Appellant.
 G.R. No. 219649, July 26, 2017 - AL DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. CAPT.
RENATO OCTAVIANO AND WILMA OCTAVIANO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 212098, July 26, 2017 - JULIO C. ESPERE, Petitioner, v. NFD
INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC./TARGET SHIP MANAGEMENT PTE
LTD./CYNTHIA SANCHEZ, Respondents.
Appellee, v. ROMALDO LUMAYAG Y DELA CRUZ, DIONY OPINIANO Y
VERANO, AND JERRY1 DELA CRUZ Y DIAZ, ACCUSED, DIONY OPINIANO Y
VERANO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 228412, July 26, 2017 - ALASKA MILK CORPORATION AND THE
ESTATE OF WILFRED UYTENGSU, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO L. PONCE,
Respondent.; G.R. No. 228439, 26 July 2017 - ERNESTO L. PONCE,
Petitioner, v. ALASKA MILK CORPORATION, ROYAL FRIESLAND CAMPINA
(RFC), AS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST AND SOLIDARY DEBTORS WITH THE
ESTATE OF WILFRED UYTENGSU, ALASKA MILK WORKERS UNION AND
FREDDIE BAUTISTA, Respondents.
Appellee, v. JOSEPH SAN JOSE Y GREGORIO AND JONATHAN SAN JOSE Y
GREGORIO, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 191458, July 03, 2017 - CHINATRUST (PHILS.) COMMERCIAL
BANK, Petitioner, v. PHILIP TURNER, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 228296, July 26, 2017 - GRIEG PHILIPPINES, INC., GRIEG
SHIPPING GROUP AS, AND/OR MANUEL F. ORTIZ, Petitioners, v. MICHAEL
JOHN M. GONZALES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 198196, July 17, 2017 - SPOUSES LORETO AND MILAGROS
SIBAY AND SPOUSES RUEL AND OLGA ELAS, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO AND JUANITA BERMUDEZ, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 197526, July 26, 2017 - CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER
COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.; G.R. No. 199676-77, July 26, 2017 - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Petitioner, v. CE LUZON GEOTHERMAL POWER COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
Appellee, v. ROBELYN CABANADA Y ROSAURO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 219885, July 17, 2017 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
v. AUGUSTO F. GALLANOSA, JR., Appellant.
 G.R. No. 173120 & 173141, July 26, 2017 - SPOUSES YU HWA PING AND
MARY GAW, Petitioners, v. AYALA LAND, INC., Respondent.; G.R. No. 173141,
July 26, 2017 - HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANDRES DIAZ AND JOSEFA MIA,
Petitioners, v. AYALA LAND, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 183408, July 12, 2017 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Petitioner, v. LANCASTER PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 217345, July 12, 2017 - WILMER O. DE ANDRES, Petitioner, v.
DIAMOND H MARINE SERVICES & SHIPPING AGENCY, INC., WU CHUN HUA
AND RUBEN J. TURINGAN, Respondents.
 G.R.. No. 214529, July 12, 2017 - JERRYSUS L. TILAR, Petitioner, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
v. MANUEL ESCOBAR, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 11482, July 17, 2017 - JOCELYN IGNACIO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DANIEL T. ALVIAR, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 213192, July 12, 2017 - TERESA R. IGNACIO, Petitioner, v.
RAMON REYES, FLORENCIO REYES, JR., ROSARIO R. DU AND CARMELITA
R. PASTOR, Respondents.
 A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2497-MTJ), July 11, 2017
- EMMA G. ALFELOR, Complainant, v. HON. AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, PRESIDING
JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 37, QUEZON CITY,
Respondent.
 A.C. No. 10580, July 12, 2017 - SPOUSES GERALDY AND LILIBETH
VICTORY, Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIAN JO S. MERCADO, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 9919, July 19, 2017 - DR. EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR.
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 7824, July 19, 2017 - ELIEZER F. CASTRO AND BETHULIA C.
CASAFRANCISCO, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOHN BIGAY, JR. AND ATTY.
JUAN SIAPNO, JR., Respondents.
Petitioner, v. MIGUEL OMENGAN, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 174670, July 26, 2017 - PHILCONTRUST RESOURCES INC.
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS INTER-ASIA LAND CORPORATION), Petitioner, v.
CARLOS SANTIAGO, LITO PALANGANAN, OLIMPIA ERCE, TAGUMPAY REYES,
DOMINGO LUNA, RICARDO DIGO, FRANCIS DIGO, VIRGILIO DIGO,
CORAZON DIGO, WILBERT SORTEJAS, ADRIEL SANTIAGO, CARLOS
SANTIAGO JR., SEGUNDO BALDONANSA, RODRIGO DIGO, PAULINO
MENDOZA, SOFRONIO OLEGARIO, BERNARD MENDOZA, JUN DELPINADO,
EDILBERTO CABEL, ERINITO MAGSAEL, HONORIO BOURBON, MAURICIO
SENARES, RICARTE DE GUZMAN, MANUEL DE CASTRO, CENON MOSO,
JESUS EBDANI, DOMINGO HOLGADO, LETICIA PELLE, REY SELLATORES,
EFREN CABRERA, RONNIE DIGO, RENATO OLIMPIAD, RICARDO LAGARDE,
ERIC DIGO, ISAGANI SENARES, CANCIANO PAYAD, MELITONA
PALANGANAN, VIRGILIO PERENA, EDGARDO PAYAD, WINNIE CABANSAG,
WINNIE AVINANTE, AND VALENTINA SANTIAGO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017 - GENPACT SERVICES, INC., AND DANILO
SEBASTIAN REYES, Petitioners, v. MARIA KATRINA SANTOS FALCESO,
JANICE ANN* M. MENDOZA, AND JEFFREY S. MARIANO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017 - JEFFREY MIGUEL Y REMEGIO,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017 - AMA LAND, INC., Petitioner, v. WACK
WACK RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
 G.R. No. 208735, July 19, 2017 - BDO UNIBANK, INC. (FORMERLY
EQUITABLE PCI BANK), Petitioner, v. NESTOR N. NERBES AND ARMENIA F.
SURAVILLA, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 215874, July 05, 2017 - ARLO ALUMINUM, INC., Petitioner, v.
VICENTE M. PIÑON, JR., IN BEHALF OF VIC EDWARD PIÑON, Respondent.
Appellee, v. GIO COSGAFA Y CLAMOCHA, JIMMY SARCEDA Y AGANG, AND
ALLAN VIVO Y APLACADOR, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 210129, July 05, 2017 - S/SGT. CORNELIO PAMAN, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 224974, July 03, 2017 - MARVIN CRUZ AND FRANCISCO CRUZ,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS BONDSMAN, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Appellee, v. ERNIE CARILLO Y PABELLO ALIAS "NANNY," RONALD ESPIQUE Y
LEGASPI ALIAS "BORLOK," RAFAEL SUSADA Y GALURA ALIAS "RAFFY,"
Accused; ERNIE P. CARILLO AND RONALD L. ESPIQUE, Accused-Appellants.
 G.R. No. 207684, July 17, 2017 - PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES,
INC., AND/OR JOSE PEPITO ALVAREZ, ARSENIO YAP AND CENTURION
SOLANO, Petitioners, v. FRANKLIN CUAL, NOEL PORMENTO, RAMIL TIMOG,
WILFREDO PALADO, ROBERTO VILLARAZA, JOSE NERIO ARTISTA, CESAR
SANCHEZ, RENERIO MATOCIÑOS, VALENTINO SISCAR, LARRY ACASIO,
GERARDO NONATO, JOSE SAFRED, JUAN LUNA, GREGORIO MEDINA,
NESTOR ZAGADA, FRANCISCO MIRANDA, LEON MANUEL VILLAFLOR,
RODOLFO NOLASCO, REYNALDO PORTES, GERARDO CALINYAO, LUTARDO
DAYOLA, VICENTE BALDOS, ROGELIO MEJARES, RENIE SILOS AND
SERVANDO PETATE, Respondents.
Appellee, v. EDGAR ALLAN CORPUZ Y FLORES, Accused-Appellant.
Appellee, v. ZENAIDA FABRO OR ZENAIDA MANALASTAS Y VIÑEGAS,
Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017 - THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINADOR LADRA, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 219501, July 26, 2017 - POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ALAN LA
MADRID PURISIMA, Petitioner, v. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN
HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 232413 [Formerly UDK 15419], July 25, 2017 - IN THE MATTER
OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH
PETITION FOR RELIEF - INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
PANGASINAN LEGAL AID AND JAY-AR R. SENIN, Petitioners, v.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, BUREAU
OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017 - CONCHITA S. UY, CHRISTINE UY DY,
SYLVIA UY SY, JANE UY TAN, JAMES LYNDON S. UY, IRENE S. UY,*
ERICSON S. UY, JOHANNA S. UY, AND JEDNATHAN S. UY, Petitioners, v.
CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS PAULITA
MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO, CESAR DEL CASTILLO, AVITO DEL CASTILLO,
NILA C. DUEÑAS, NIDA C. LATOSA, LORNA C. BERNARDO, GIL DEL
CASTILLO, LIZA C. GUNGOB, ALMA DEL CASTILLO, AND GEMMA DEL
CASTILLO, Respondents.
Appellee, v. ABENIR BRUSOLA Y BARAGWA, Accused-Appellant.
Appellee, v. MARCIAL D. PULGO, Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 196888, July 19, 2017 - AURELIA NARCISE, GLORIA A. DELA
CRUZ, MARITESS O. GARCIA, PHILIP FALCON, ENRICO M. VITUG, LYNETTE
C. PONTRERAS, BONIFACIO BARRAMEDA, RAMON S. MORADA, MANUEL G.
VIOLA, ZENAIDA LANUZA, CIRILO G. SALTO, TEODORO DEL ROSARIO,
NANCY G. INSIGNE, MELANIE G. VIANA, ROMEO TICSAY, AMY J.
FRANCISCO, MARIE J. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA LANUZA, MIGUELITO B.
MARTINEZ, APOLONIO SANTOS, MARIVIC TAN, JANE CLOR DILEMA,
VALENTINO DILEMA, JOSE L. PANGAN, ANTONIA M. MANGELEN, IMELDA
MANALASTAS, TEODORICO N. ANDRADE, AIDA L. CRUZ, MANUEL YAMBOT,
JAIME SERDENA, ARIEL PALACIOS, EVE BOLNEO, LIBETINE MODESTO,
MA. AILEEN VERDE, BENNY ILAGAN, MICHELLE ROMANA, DANILO
VILLANUEVA, LEO NALUGON, ROSSANA MARASIGAN, NELIE BINAY AND
ISABELITA MENDOZA, Petitioners, v. VALBUECO, INC., Respondent.
Appellee, v. FEDERICO GEROLA Y AMAR ALIAS "FIDEL", Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 211947, July 03, 2017 - HEIRS OF CAYETANO CASCAYAN,
REPRESENTED BY LA PAZ MARTINEZ, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES OLIVER AND
EVELYN GUMALLAOI, AND THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER OF BANGUI, ILOCOS
NORTE, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 220383, July 05, 2017 - SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR
UNION (SWOFLU) / RENATO YUDE, MARIANITO REGINO, MANUEL
YUMAGUE, FRANCISCO DACUDAG, RUDY ABABAO, DOMINIC SORNITO,
SERGIO CAJUYONG, ROMULO LABONETE, GENEROSO GRANADA, EMILIO
AGUS, ARNOLD CAYAO, BEN GENEVE, VICTOR MAQUE, RICARDO GOMEZ,
RODOLFO GAWAN, JIMMY SULLIVAN, FEDERICO SUMUGAT, JR., ROMULO
AVENTURA, JR., JURRY MAGALLANES, HERNAN EPISTOLA, JR., ROBERTO
BELARTE, EDMON MONTALVO, TEODORO MAGUAD, DOMINGO TABABA,
MAXIMO SALE, CYRUS DIONILLO, LEONARDO JUNSAY, JR., DANILO
SAMILLION, MARIANITO BOCATEJA, JUANITO GEBUSION, RICARDO MAYO,
RAUL ALIMON, ARNEL ARNAIZ, REBENCY BASOY, JIMMY VICTORIO
BERNALDE, RICARDO BOCOL, JR., JOB CALAMBA, WOLFRANDO CALAMBA,
RODOLFO CASISID, JR., EDGARDO DELA PENA, ALLAN DIONILLO,
EDMUNDO EBIDO, JOSE ELEPTICO, JR., MARCELINO FLORES, HERNANDO
FUENTEBILLA, SAUL HITALIA, JOSELITO JAGODILLA, NONITO JAYME,
ADJIE JUANILLO, JEROLD JUDILLA, EDILBERTO NACIONAL, SANDY
NAVALES, FELIPE NICOLASORA, JOSE PAMALO-AN, ISMAEL PEREZ, JR.,
ERNESTO RANDO, JR., PHILIP REPULLO, VICENTE RUIZ, JR., JOHN
SUMUGAT, CARLO SUSANA, ROMEO TALAPIERO, JR., FERNANDO TRIENTA,
FINDY VILLACRUZ, JOEL VILLANUEVA, AND JERRY MONTELIBANO,
Petitioners, v. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, SUGAR DIVISION-
SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (SONEDCO),
Respondents.
 G.R. No. 224102, July 26, 2017 - RYAN MARIANO Y GARCIA, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 G.R. Nos. 193969-193970, July 05, 2017 - KA KUEN CHUA, DOING
BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE KA KUEN CHUA
ARCHITECTURAL, Petitioner, v. COLORITE MARKETING CORPORATION,
Respondent.; G.R. Nos. 194027-194028 - COLORITE MARKETING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. KA KUEN CHUA, DOING BUSINESS UNDER
THE NAME AND STYLE KA KUEN CHUA ARCHITECTURAL, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 197032, July 26, 2017 - SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. PRICE RICHARDSON CORPORATION,
CONSUELO VELARDE-ALBERT, AND GORDON RESNICK, Respondents.
Appellee, v. JAIME SEGUNDO Y IGLESIAS, Accused-Appellant.
Petitioner, v. RURAL BANK OF HERMOSA (BATAAN), INC., Respondent.
 A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 16-2869-MTJ), July 25, 2017
- ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, Complainant, v. PRESIDING JUDGE EXEQUIL L.
DAGALA, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, DAPA-SOCORRO, DAPA,
SURIGAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 217453, July 19, 2017 - DENMARK S. VALMORES, Petitioner, v.
DR. CRISTINA ACHACOSO, IN HER CAPACITY AS DEAN OF THE COLLEGE
OF MEDICINE, AND DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, FACULTY OF THE MINDANAO
STATE UNIVERSITY, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 220835, July 26, 2017 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Petitioner, v. SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, INC.,
Respondent.
Appellee, v. JULITO DIVINAGRACIA, SR., Accused-Appellant.
 G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017 - BRO. BERNARD OCA, BRO. DENNIS
MAGBANUA, CIRILA N. MOJICA, ALEJANDRO N. MOJICA, JOSEFINA
PASCUAL, SILVESTRE PASCUAL AND ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL
TRIAS, CAVITE, INC., Petitioners, v. LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent.
 A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017 - HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS,
NAMELY, JENNIFER N. CARLOS, JOCELYN N. CARLOS, JACQUELINE
CARLOS-DOMINGUEZ, JO-ANN CARLOS-TABUTON, JIMMY N. CARLOS,
LORNA A. CARLOS, JERUSHA ANN A. CARLOS AND JAN JOSHUA A.
CARLOS, Complainants, v. ATTY. JAIME S. LINSANGAN, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 191657, July 31, 2017 - NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR LAURITO, HERMINIA Z. LAURITO, NIEVES A.
LAURITO, NECITAS LAURITO VDA. DE DE LEON, ZENAIDA D. LAURITO,
CORNELIA LAURITO VDA. DE MANGA, AGRIPINA T. LAURITO, VITALIANA P.
LAURITO, REPRESENTED BY: DOMINADOR LAURITO, Respondents.; HEIRS
OF RUFINA MANARIN, NAMELY: CONSUELO M. LOYOLA- BARUGA, ROSY M.
LOYOLA-GONZALES, BIENVENIDO L. RIVERA, REYNALDO L. RIVERA,
ISABELITA A. LOYOLA, LIWAYWAY A. LOYOLA, LOLITA A. LOYOLA, LEANDRO
A. LOYOLA, PERLITO L. LOYOLA, GAVINA L. LOYOLA, ZORAIDA L.
PURIFICACION, PERLITA L. DIZON, LUCENA R. LOYOLA, ANITA L. REYES,
VISITACION L. ZAMORA, CRISTINA L. CARDONA, NOEL P. LOYOLA, ROMEO
P. LOYOLA, JR., FERDINAND P. LOYOLA, EDGARDO A. LOYOLA, DIONISA L.
BUENA, SALUD L. MAPALAD, CORAZON L. SAMBILLO, VIDAL A. LOYOLA,
AND MILAGROS A. LOYOLA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
ZOSIMO A. LOYOLA, Petitioner-Intervenors.
 G.R. No. 222699, July 24, 2017 - MAUNLAD TRANS INC., CARNIVAL
CRUISE LINES AND/OR AMADO CASTRO, Petitioners, v. GABRIEL ISIDRO,
Respondent.
 G.R. No. 230664, July 24, 2017 - EDWARD M. COSUE, Petitioner, v.
FERRITZ INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MELISSA TANYA F.
GERMINO AND ANTONIO A. FERNANDO, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017 - GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner,
v. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION (NOW METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY), Respondent.
 G.R. No. 228628, July 25, 2017 - REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND EX OFFICIO MEMBER OF THE JBC,
Petitioner, v. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, CHAIRED BY THE HON.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, CHIEF JUSTICE AND EX OFFICIO
CHAIRPERSON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 206890, July 31, 2017 - EVIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
INC., FREE BULKERS S.A. AND/OR MA. VICTORIA C. NICOLAS, Petitioners,
v. ROGELIO O. PANAHON, Respondent.
 G.R. No. 204530, July 26, 2017 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
Petitioner, v. POTENCIANO A. LARRAZABAL, SR., VICTORIA LARRAZABAL
LOCSIN AND BETTY LARRAZABAL MACATUAL, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 231658, July 04, 2017 - REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJAÑO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND
TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners, v. HON. SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MARTIAL
LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO AÑO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR,
Respondents.; G.R. No. 231771 - EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T.
LINCUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO, CARL ANTHONY D.
OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGHIG, RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTINA E. PALABAY,
AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L.
TINIO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE ARLENE D. BROSAS,
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, MAE
PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK
VINCENT D. LIM, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners,
v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GENERAL EDUARDO AÑO,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA ROSA,
Respondents.; G.R. No. 231774 - NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR
DYHANNA S. MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-MAPANDI,
Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(DILG) SECRETARY (OFFICER-IN-CHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M.
AÑO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL
RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C.
ESPERON, JR., Respondents.
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Case No. 221424 & No. 247718

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Case No. 221424 & No. 247718

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FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 247718, March 03, 2021 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAYNARD

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Agustin was indicted for the crime of Rape with Homicide in an

That on or about November 1, 2010 in the municipality

Version of the Prosecution

Dr. Villaflor a medico-legal officer at the Regional Crime Laboratory Office

Version of the Defense

The RTC Ruling

ACCORDINGLY, accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of

Accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is

Moral Damages Php100,000.00

Exemplary Damages Php100,000.00

The CA also found the written extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [AGUSTIN] OF THE

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [AGUSTIN] OF THE

In the Resolution,19 dated August 5, 2019, the Court directed both parties to

The Court's Ruling

In seeking the reversal of the challenged decision, Agustin mainly contends

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial

To be acceptable, extrajudicial confession must conform to the constitutional

An extrajudicial confession must meet the foregoing requirements. Otherwise,

The right to be informed of one's constitutional rights during custodial

Flagrantly violated in the case at bench is Agustin's right to be informed of his

As proof of compliance with the constitutional standards, the extrajudicial

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Do you have any lawyer to assist you in this investigation?

ANSWER: There is none sir.

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

QUESTION: We will provide Atty. Luis Donato to assist in this investigation. Do

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

To reiterate, in order to comply with the constitutional mandates, there should

Appellant should have been made to understand comprehensively the full

Strikingly, while it was made to appear in the subject extrajudicial confession

A confession made in an atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in informing

The punctilious and artificially stately style of the subject extrajudicial

In any event, the Court finds the written extrajudicial confession to be

The illegality of the subject extrajudicial confession is further demonstrated by

Agustin allegedly made an express waiver of his constitutional rights through

The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision

To be a competent and independent counsel in a custodial investigation, the

In People v. Obrero,37 the Court wrote:

Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial

(c) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under

Inasmuch as the extrajudicial confession executed by Agustin was given in

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 26, 2017 Decision of

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of

* Designated additional Member per Raffle dated February 8, 2021.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of the

2 Penned by Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino; records, pp. 183-189.

3 In accordance with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, the

4 Records. pp. 3-4.

7 TSN, June 8, 2011, pp. 1-3

8 Order dated June 13, 2012, records, p. 80.

9 TSN, August 30, 2012, pp. 1-12

10 TSN, March 12, 2014.

11 TSN, April 10, 2012, pp. 1-4.

12 Order dated September 2, 2014, records p. 133.