Asian Geographer

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Climate change, neoauthoritarianism,

necropolitics, and state failure: the Duterte regime
in the Philippines

William Holden

To cite this article: William Holden (2022): Climate change, neoauthoritarianism,

necropolitics, and state failure: the Duterte regime in the Philippines, Asian Geographer, DOI:
10.1080/10225706.2022.2029506

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10225706.2022.2029506

Published online: 24 Feb 2022.

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ASIAN GEOGRAPHER
https://doi.org/10.1080/10225706.2022.2029506

Climate change, neoauthoritarianism, necropolitics, and state

failure: the Duterte regime in the Philippines
William Holden
Department of Geography, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The Philippines is vulnerable to climate change and the natural Received 23 October 2020
hazards it has enhanced. The Philippines lacks peace, suffers from Accepted 27 October 2021
weak state institutions, and is a fragile state. Since 2016 President
KEYWORDS
Rodrigo Duterte has embarked upon a war on drugs, claiming Philippines; climate change;
thousands of lives. This war on drugs is perceived to be a pretext peace; state failure; war on
for the establishment of an authoritarian government. The drugs
confluence of weak state institutions, a disregard for human
rights, and weak public participation in environmental governance
generates difficulty for coping with climate change in the
Philippines. The intersection of climate change and state weakness
is found in the violation of the human rights of environmentalists
and the Philippines is among the leading countries in the world in
terms of the number of environmentalists killed.

Introduction
In 2013 the Philippines attracted global attention when Super Typhoon Haiyan, history’s
most powerful land-falling tropical cyclone, devastated the city of Tacloban (Theriault
2020). Haiyan’s potency was attributed to the higher sea surface temperatures occurring
with climate change because, as the ocean’s surface warms, more energy is provided for
tropical cyclone formation (Holden 2018). Then in 2016, the Philippines again attracted
global attention when President Rodrigo Duterte began his war on drugs. Using the over-
lapping theoretical frameworks of peacefulness and failed states, this article examines the
simultaneity of climate change and authoritarian government in the Philippines. Climate
change and the war on drugs have no causal relationship between each other. However,
an authoritarian government can impinge upon the Philippines’ ability to cope with
climate change.
The article does not argue climate change will contribute to imminent state failure in
the Philippines. However, the current trajectory towards authoritarian government will
generate difficulty for coping with climate change. The intersection of climate change and
state weakness is found in the killing of environmentalists, which is a global phenom-
enon. Between 2002 and 2019, approximately two thousand people were killed in 57
countries for engaging in environmental activism (Le Billon and Menton 2021). These
killings occurred in Asian countries including Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, and the

CONTACT William Holden wnholden@ucalgary.ca Department of Geography, University of Calgary, 2500 Uni-
versity Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, T2N 1N4
© 2022 Hong Kong Geographical Association
2 W. HOLDEN

Philippines. South and Southeast Asia, with 19 percent of all killings over the 2002–2019
period, was the world’s second most dangerous region for environmentalists behind
Latin America, where 80 percent of all such killings occurred (Larsen et al. 2021). This
emphasis on the killing of environmentalists places this discussion in the realm of
what Mbembe (2003, 39) refers to as “necropolitics,” the “subjugation of life to the
power of death.” Necropolitics is regarded by Menton, Navas, and Le Billon (2021, 54)
as “the politics of determining who shall live and who shall die.” Accordingly, the
article builds on, and adds to, research conducted by other authors on the killing of envir-
onmentalists (Larsen et al. 2021; Le Billon and Menton 2021; Menton, Navas, and Le
Billon 2021).

Data and methodology

The article is based on a review of secondary literature (both scholarly and from NGOs)
augmented by 15 semi-structured key informant interviews conducted at undisclosed
Philippine locations during 2019. In accordance with the ethics requirements of the
author’s academic institution, prior informed consent was obtained from interview part-
ners and, to ensure their safety; all interviews were conducted anonymously with partners
referred to by pseudonyms they selected. While the requirement of anonymity excluded
presenting biographic information on the respondents, they were highly experienced
people, including a senior staff member at the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
a human rights journalist, and activists engaging in activism involving climate change,
development, environmentalism, human rights, and women’s rights. A bishop, a
brother, and two priests were also interviewed. Members of the Roman Catholic
Church were cited as key informants as the church is an influential institution in the Phi-
lippines with a long involvement in environmental activism, including climate change
activism (Holden and Nadeau 2020).

Theoretical framework
This article argues the intersection of climate change and state weakness occurs when
environmental activists are killed. Climate change does not have a linear and direct
relationship with state failure (Butler and Gates 2012). Rather, climate change’s effects
on states are a function of the level of peacefulness within states, which is, in turn, a func-
tion of state institutions. States with strong institutions are peaceful and are better posi-
tioned to cope with climate change’s shocks; states with weak institutions lack
peacefulness and are more poorly positioned to cope with climate change’s shocks.
“Peace,” wrote Reglime (2021, 1), “is one of the most widely used yet highly contested
concepts.” One of the principal ways of defining peace is the absence of violence (Galtung
1969). Direct violence represents brutal events including physical violence, sexual vio-
lence, psychological violence, and the repression of protests (Menton, Navas, and Le
Billon 2021). Direct violence is visible and apparent; it is caused by at least one actor
(although it may be carried out through systems and technologies not under the control
of any one person). Less apparent is structural violence, which stems from social structures
impacting individual and collective wellbeing (Menton, Navas, and Le Billon 2021). Struc-
tural violence consists of inequalities, discrimination, racism, corruption, and a denial of
 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 3

basic services. Although Galtung (1969, 183) described “social justice” as the absence of
structural violence, this should only be thought of as a starting point as social justice
requires not just freedom from structural violence but also a range of positive civic free-
doms, including those associated with freedom of assembly, speech, and dissent.
Climate change-induced ecological threats are inversely related to peacefulness. High
peace countries have greater capacity to adapt to climate change and deal with its impacts
while low peace countries have lower adaptive capacity (Institute for Economics and
Peace 2020). The Institute for Economics and Peace (2020, 73) defines positive peace
as “the attitudes, institutions, and structures creating and sustaining peaceful societies.”
“Positive peace,” to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2020, 73), “can be used as the
basis for empirically measuring a country’s resilience to shocks, including ecological
threats.” “Resilience,” defined by Harper (2017, 54), as “the measure of a society’s
capacity to absorb shocks and to fund recovery from injury,” is essential for coping
with climate change; a lack of peace, and the presence of conflict within society,
reduces resilience and aggravates climate change’s effects.
Positive peace is found in strong state institutions, which can prevent conflict under
conditions of climate change-induced resource scarcity (Adano et al. 2012). In unpacking
the issue of vulnerability to climatic shocks, it is critical to identify not just climatic
drivers but also the social, economic, and political conditions contributing to vulner-
ability and shaping adaptation to climate change; achieving food and water security in
a changing climate involves building long-term resilience through stronger institutions
(Salifu, Lawson, and Wrigley-Asante 2021). Climate-related conflicts are more likely to
occur in places where people are vulnerable to adverse climatic conditions and state insti-
tutions are ineffective (Detges 2017). Countries with aggrieved groups, high levels of
inequality, poor public services, and weak institutions are less able to cope with
climate change’s ecological threats. A strong state, present among the population, and
interested in solving their problems, can prevent conflict when climate change-
induced ecological threats occur, while a weak, corrupt, and disinterested state will
cause conflict given climate change’s ecological threats (Benjaminsen et al. 2012).
When the state protects property rights in an unbiased manner, conflict is reduced;
but when the state provides property rights in a biased manner, conflict is exacerbated
(Butler and Gates 2012).
The Institute for Economics and Peace (2020, 2) quantifies peace and measures the peace-
fulness of 163 countries with its Global Peace Index (GPI), which it declares to be “the
world’s leading measure of global peacefulness.” The GPI measures how peaceful each
country is using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators. The GPI measures peace using
three thematic domains: societal safety, conflict, and militarization. The lower the GPI
score, the more peaceful the country; the higher the GPI score, the less peaceful the country.
A strong state is one with reach over its entire territory and with bureaucratic capacity
(Busby 2021). Strong states have effective control over their territory, are perceived as
legitimate by a significant portion of their population and provide domestic security
for their citizens (Saeed 2020). An important determinant of state strength is whether
it has a monopoly over the use of force (Englehart 2007; Saeed 2020). When the state
is strong, it is the only entity permitted to use force. Strong states do not authorize the
illegal use of force by rogue state agents; they do not tolerate police corruption, nor do
they arm non-state actors, such as vigilantes (Englehart 2007).
4 W. HOLDEN

In contrast to strong states, weak states lack reach over their entire territory and lack
bureaucratic capacity (Busby 2021). Weak states are perceived as illegitimate by signifi-
cant portions of their populations and fail to provide domestic security for their citizens
(Saeed 2020). A clear sign of state weakness is a state lacking a monopoly over the use of
force (Englehart 2007; Saeed 2020). A state granting licence to violent non-state actors,
such as vigilantes, to operate within its territory indicates state failure (Aliyev 2017). In
the words of Aliyev (2017), “the emergence of extra-state agents with licence on violence
is one of the key indicators of imminent state failure.” “Notwithstanding their pro-regime
stance,” wrote Aliyev (2017), “these violent non-state agents might still precipitate state
failure by appropriating the state monopoly on violence.” Weak states delegate their
monopoly on violence to non-state agents to avoid accountability, and to provide denia-
bility, for the violence they commit (Aliyev 2017; Englehart 2007). When a state begins to
give licence to non-state groups to engage in violence, it gravely weakens itself (Aliyev
2017).
Assuming the shocks of climate change cause weak states to become failed states, one
may ask: what is a “failed state?” The term is attributed to Helman and Ratner (1992, 3),
who defined it as a state “incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international
community.” Aliyev (2017) defines a failed state as “a mere shadow of a nation-state that
has lost control over its territory and most of its institutions.” According to George (2018,
475), “failed states are those nation states that cannot provide security to their citizens,
cannot offer adequate social and physical infrastructure, and cannot enforce rules and
laws on their territory.” The term “failed state” entered use in the early 1990s as part
of the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s peacebuilding
program (Englehart 2017). The concept received extensive use after 11 September
2001 due to concerns terrorists could use failed states as sanctuaries (Rotberg 2002).
A “fragile state” is a weak state that has not failed but is in danger of failing. “Despite
its significance and impact,” wrote Saeed (2020, 771), “the concept of state fragility is
notoriously difficult to pin down.” Signs of state weakness include rubber-stamp legisla-
tures uncritically passing legislation to serve the interests of the executive, a judiciary
lacking independence, a legal system providing no opportunities for seeking redress
against the state, a bureaucracy existing solely to carry out the wishes of the executive,
and a military intervening in politics (Rotberg 2002).
The Fragile States Index (FSI) prepared by the Fund for Peace is, according to Saeed
(2020, 773), “the most well-recognized state fragility ranking.” The FSI identifies when
pressures a state faces outweigh its management capacity and lead to state failure
(Fund for Peace 2020). The FSI ranks 178 countries based on their levels of fragility.
The lower the score, the lower the level of fragility and the higher the score, the higher
the level of fragility. The FSI is based on 12 indicators. The Security Apparatus indicator
considers security threats. The Factionalized Elites indicator assesses institutional frag-
mentation along ethnic, class, racial, or religious lines. The Group Grievance indicator
focuses on divisions between different social groups, particularly divisions based on
social or political characteristics, including the presence of vigilante justice and reports
of mass killings. The Economic Decline indicator considers economic decline within a
country. The Uneven Economic Development indicator assesses economic inequality.
The Human Flight and Brain Drain indicator considers whether there is an exodus of
professionals. The State Legitimacy indicator accounts for the representativeness and
 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 5

openness of government. The Public Services indicator refers to the presence of basic
state functions serving the people. The Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator con-
siders the protection of human rights. The Demographic Pressures indicator assesses
pressures from population growth rates, or population distributions consisting of a
youthful population. The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons indicator measures
pressures caused by forced displacement of people. The External Intervention indicator
considers the influence of external actors in the functioning of a state. The Fund for
Peace, after assigning states their scores, rates them in terms of their fragility, from
being “sustainable” (a score of 10 to 30), to “stable” (30 to 60), to “warning” (60 to 90)
and to “alert” (any score 90 or higher).
Care must be implemented when interpreting GPI and FSI scores because most of the
world’s countries are listed as low peace countries and fragile states, while a minority of
them are listed as high peace countries and sustainable states (Saeed 2020). Also, many
countries with favorable GPI and FSI scores are former colonial powers, while many
countries with unfavorable GPI and FSI scores are former colonies suffering a post-colonial
legacy (Saeed 2020). Consider Belgium, a country with favorable GPI and FSI scores, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a country with unfavorable GPI and FSI scores.
Both countries have played a role in their mutual historical trajectories (Saeed 2020). The
Belgian colonization of the Congo provided resources for Belgium, making it a prosperous
country, while leaving the DRC ravaged and impoverished. One cannot compare Belgium’s
GPI and FSI scores with the DRC’s GPI and FSI scores without discussing the role of the
former in the latter’s historical trajectory. If two relatively comparable countries (the
DRC and Mozambique) are compared, then the GPI and FSI provide utility; but if two
incomparable countries (Belgium and the DRC) are compared, the GPI and FSI lose utility.
Weak states tend to have poor human rights conditions. According to Englehart (2017,
1), “the effectiveness of the state apparatus is one of the crucial variables determining
human rights.” State capacity can contribute to the protection of human rights while
state failure contributes to human rights abuse. Strong states have the capacity to facilitate
conditions for human rights, and weak states, lacking in this capacity, tend to create poor
human rights conditions. Human rights abuses are greater in weak states because leaders
are less able to control state agents and private actors thus generating less accountability
for abuses. Many human rights abuses are committed by what Englehart (2017, 3) calls
“petty despots” including “grasping landlords, corrupt minor officials, local party
bosses, gangs of armed thugs, and bigoted individuals.” State strength is required for pro-
tecting the rights of people unpopular among local power holders, such as union organi-
zers, ethnoreligious minorities, and people with alternative sexualities (Englehart 2017).

The Philippines
Vulnerability of the Philippines to climate change
The Republic of the Philippines (Figure 1) is an archipelago of 7,107 islands in Southeast
Asia with a land area of 300,000 square kilometers (Holden 2021). “Faced with what
seems like a constant string of landslides, floods, typhoons, and other disasters,” wrote
Theriault (2020, 195), “the Philippines is not just one of the most disaster-prone
countries in the world, it is also one of the most vulnerable to the effects of climate
6 W. HOLDEN

change.” Over the 1996–2015 period, the archipelago was rated the fifth most vulnerable
of the ten countries most at risk to long term climate risk (Table 1).
The Philippines is situated west of the genesis region for Northwest Pacific tropical
cyclones (Figure 2) and is vulnerable to tropical cyclones amplified by climate change.
In addition to higher sea surface temperatures, discussed above, increasing subsurface
sea temperatures also contribute to stronger tropical cyclones with climate change

Figure 1. The Philippines. Source: the author .

 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 7

(Holden 2018). During a tropical cyclone, the disturbance of the ocean’s surface causes
an upwelling of cold water, which reduces sea surface temperature, and acts as a natural
break on tropical cyclone strength. However, with rising subsurface temperatures, a
natural buffer on tropical cyclone potency is removed, facilitating stronger tropical
cyclones. For every one-degree Celsius increase in temperature, the air holds seven
percent more water (Rohling 2017). Accordingly, climate change also leads to wetter tro-
pical cyclones carrying more moisture and generating heavier rainfall. Typhoon Ketsana,
for example, impacted Metro Manila in 2009, depositing 341 millimeters of rain in six
hours, shattering the 1967 Philippine precipitation record when 334 millimeters fell in
24-hours (Holden and Jacobson 2012). The archipelago’s cities are inhabited by millions
of urban poor lacking resilience to climate change’s effects, such as floods, and Manila is
regarded as one of the world’s most vulnerable cities to climate change (Grosvenor 2014).
As terrestrial glaciers melt, and the oceans experience thermal expansion, sea level
rises. Global sea-level rise concomitant with stronger storms poses challenges for
coastal regions (Rohling 2017). Sea level rise is globally heterogeneous, and the Philip-
pines have experienced above average sea level rise and is regarded, along with the Car-
ibbean and Sundaland, as one of the three most vulnerable places to sea level rise (Holden
2019). More than 80 percent of all Filipinos live within 50 kilometers of the coast, and
most food is produced close to sea level (Broad and Cavanagh 2011).
There is also evidence of increasing frequency, and intensity, of El Niño Southern
Oscillation (ENSO) events with climate change (Wisner et al. 2004). The rising tempera-
tures occasioned by climate change leads to an increase in frequency of ENSO events (Cai
et al. 2014), and the higher temperatures occasioned by climate change intensify ENSO
induced droughts when they occur (King, Van Oldenborgh, and Karoly 2016). In the
Pacific Ocean, normal weather patterns involve high air pressure, with low levels of pre-
cipitation, in the east and low air pressure, with high levels of precipitation, in the west.
However, during an ENSO, Pacific Ocean weather conditions reverse and what is normal
in the east becomes prevalent in the west and what is normal in the west becomes preva-
lent in the east (Cook 2019). During an ENSO, heavy rains develop on the west coast of
South America and the cold dry air normally descending there shifts eastward, descends
over Southeast Asia, lowers rainfall, and triggers drought. The Philippines experienced El
Niño induced drought during 1982–1983, 1990–1992, 1997–1998, 2005–2006, 2009–
2010, and 2015–2016. During the 2015–2016 drought, farmers protesting the govern-
ment’s drought response in Kidapawan, on the island of Mindanao, were fired upon

Table 1. Long-term climate risk index, top ten countries from 1996 to 2015.
Climate risk index ranking Country
1 Honduras
2 Myanmar
3 Haiti
4 Nicaragua
5 Philippines
6 Bangladesh
7 Pakistan
8 Vietnam
9 Guatemala
10 Thailand
Source: Kreft et al. (2016).
8 W. HOLDEN

Figure 2. Genesis Region for Northwest Pacific Tropical Cyclones. Source: the author.

by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 1 April 2016. This became known as the
Kidapawan Massacre, with two farmers killed and several others injured (Holden 2019).

Demography of the Philippines

In 2021, the Philippines had a population of 110,818,325 people for a population density
of 369 people per square kilometer (Central Intelligence Agency 2021). The archipelago
has a “bottom-heavy” population pyramid (Figure 3) with many young people and, in
2021, the annual population growth rate was 1.49 percent, meaning the population
will double by 2068 (Central Intelligence Agency 2021).

History of the Philippines

From 1568 to 1898, the archipelago was a Spanish colony and the principal legacy of this
was the entrenchment of an oligarchy. Initially the Spanish entrusted blocks of land to the
control of crown representatives; these were replaced by haciendas where hacendados
were given ownership of the land (Constantino 1975). After the Suez Canal’s 1869
opening, and the reduced travel time between Spain and the Philippines, agricultural
exports grew generating more wealth for landowners (Holden 2020).
As the nineteenth century ended, conditions worsened and much of the archipelago,
wrote Linn (2000, 16), “was in severe distress, plagued by social tension, disease, hunger,
 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 9

Figure 3. Population Pyramid, Philippines 2021. Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2021). In the
Public Domain.

banditry and rebellion.” When revolution against Spain broke out in 1896, it was initially
led by the lower classes. However, it became controlled by the upper classes and became a
revolution against Spanish control of the islands, losing any pretense of being a social
revolution (Holden 2020). On 25 April 1898, the United States and Spain went to war,
and on 1 May 1989, the United States Navy destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay
and American troops arrived to secure the archipelago. By 10 December 1898, when
the Treaty of Paris was signed (giving the Philippines to the United States in exchange
for USD 20 million), the Americans retained the islands. The Filipinos were unwilling
to accept a new colonial master, and on 4 February 1899, the Philippine-American
war broke out, lasting for three years. The conflict was led by the same members of
the elite who led the revolution against Spain, but the Americans prevailed after convin-
cing them their interests would be better served by allowing American control of the
archipelago than by resisting. Democracy had been installed by the American colonial
government but was effectively circumscribed by a prerequisite that only property
holders could vote, which was not repealed until 1935 (Holden and Jacobson 2012).
The Americans provided rudimentary social services but did nothing to address deep-
seated social problems such as land reform (Holden 2020). The combination of introdu-
cing electoral democracy, without land reform, took the archipelago’s economic elite and
transformed it into an economic and political elite.
By independence, on 4 July 1946, the archipelago’s political and economic systems were
controlled by a landowning, agricultural elite generated by Spanish and American coloni-
alism. The archipelago is ruled by an oligarchy described by Kirk (2005, 20) as “far more
concerned about their intertwining networks of family and friends rather than the needs of
a people in distress.” One must, however, acknowledge the many Filipino politicians and
bureaucrats who bring to their work a genuine commitment to serving the public good.
In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos was elected President and then re-elected in 1969. In 1972,
with his second term ending (and prohibited from seeking a third term), Marcos used the
10 W. HOLDEN

Constitution’s emergency provisions, declared martial law, and promised to break up the
country’s entrenched oligarchy (Francia 2010). By the early 1980s, however, the economy
was in crisis and Marcos was plundering billions of dollars. Eventually, Marcos was
forced from office by the February 1986 Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA)
“People Power” protests. Although the EDSA protests seemed to offer the promise of
democracy and inclusive economic development, the oligarchy revived its fortunes
and reasserted itself (Francia 2010). Since Marcos, but prior to Duterte, the Philippines
had five presidents: Corazon Aquino (1986–1992), Fidel V. Ramos (1992–1998), Joseph
Estrada (1998–2001), Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010), and Benigno S. Aquino III
(2010–2016). Throughout these presidential terms, the Philippines has suffered from
state weakness with uncollected taxes, crime, a bloated bureaucracy, low teacher salaries,
and high emigration rates (Abinales and Amoroso 2017).
Another legacy of the failed EDSA revolution is the archipelago’s high levels of
inequality (Holden 2021). Economists cite the Philippines to demonstrate the deleterious
effects of inequality (Milanovic 2016). Inequality is measured by the Gini Coefficient,
ranging from zero (in the hypothetical case of perfect equality) to 1 (in the hypothetical
case of perfect inequality). In 2015, the Philippines had a Gini Coefficient of 0.43 (United
Nations Development Program 2016). One method of demonstrating inequality’s impact
is to take the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite measure of indices
showing a country’s level of “development,” and adjust it for inequality creating the
Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI). In 2015, the Philippines had an HDI score of 0.682
and an IHDI score of only 0.556- equivalent to Myanmar (United Nations Development
Program 2016).

The Duterte Regime

The rise of Duterte
Duterte’s rise began in Davao City. At the end of the Marcos dictatorship, Corazon
Aquino fired all mayors and Duterte, a prosecutor, was appointed Vice Mayor and
Officer in Charge of Davao City (Holden 2021). Then, in 1988, Duterte was elected
mayor- a position he held (subject to term limits) until 2016. Davao was blighted by
crime and Duterte was determined to restore order with no aversion to violence. In
the 1990s, Duterte mobilized the Davao Death Squad (DDS), which killed 1,424
people from 1998 to 2015 (Holden 2021). Its victims included drug sellers, drug users,
petty criminals, and street children. Duterte soon developed a larger-than-life persona,
becoming known as “Dirty Harry,” “Duterte Harry,” “the punisher,” or “the Termin-
ator.” With Duterte in charge, Davao transformed its image from one of the Republic’s
most dangerous places into one of its safest.
In 2016, Duterte sought the presidency exploiting the issue of law and order (in
general) and illegal drugs (in particular). During the election, Duterte pushed for a
war against drugs, warning of disaster if drugs, specifically methamphetamine, were
not eliminated (Holden 2021). Holding out his success in transforming Davao from
despair into the Republic’s safest city, (and as the common knowledge this was done
through the DDS,) Duterte made it clear he could save the country from the perils of
crime and drugs. Duterte, in the words of Theriault (2020, 183), also seized upon
 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 11

“collective anxiety about environmental and climate disruption” and put it “in service to
a broader authoritarian agenda.” In November 2013, after Haiyan destroyed Tacloban,
Duterte dispatched Davao City’s rapid response team to Tacloban to provide relief (Ther-
iault 2020). Then, after the Kidapawan Massacre, Duterte sent an aid convoy providing
food to the farmers (Holden 2021). On 9 May 2016, receiving 16.6 million votes (6.6
million more than his closest rival), Duterte was elected (Holden 2021).

The war on drugs in the Philippines

Duterte is determined to eradicate drugs claiming the archipelago is in danger of becom-
ing a narco-state controlled by drug traffickers (Holden 2021). On 1 July 2016, Duterte’s
first day in office, the PNP implemented its anti-drug program and the most controver-
sial manifestation of this are the killings of people who (allegedly) sell or use drugs. There
are two distinct types of killings. The first is encounter killings, where the police arrest
someone in a (supposed) “buy-bust” operation, the person fights back, and the police
are “forced” to kill them in self-defence. The second type of killings is committed by uni-
dentified killers, often riding in tandem on motorcycles. The government alleges these
killers are “vigilantes,” people taking matters into their own hands, but there are indi-
cations the PNP have outsourced these killings to hired killers- violent non-state
actors. Often the bodies of the victims of these unidentified killers are found in public,
sometimes bearing signs decrying their involvement in drugs.
Quantifying how many have been killed is difficult, with some estimating as many as
36,000 victims (Reglime 2021). Most of the killings have occurred in the urban poor com-
munities of Metro Manila, Central Luzon, the Calabarzon Region, and Cebu City
(Holden 2021). “People from economically impoverished backgrounds,” wrote
Reglime (2021, 15), “constitute a substantial number, if not the majority, of all civilian
deaths recorded in the Philippines.” Theriault (2020, 188) described the war on drugs
as a “deeply classist assault on petty drug users and dealers.”

Neoauthoritarian government in the Philippines

Philippine drug use is not at crisis levels and some perceive the war on drugs as a pretext
for an authoritarian regime (Kim et al. 2017). “The severity of the Philippines drug
problem,” wrote Kim et al. (2017, 419), “has been widely disputed.” The war on drugs
is an example of what Kim et al. (2017, 415) would call “securitization,” which “does
not involve the safety and security of a nation, but rather the articulation of moralistic
or ideological views most frequently used by weakening democratic states to support pol-
itical power.” “The idea of emergency,” wrote Parenti (2011, 209), “is crucial in the pol-
itical theory of authoritarian states” and emergencies are how “democracies smuggle in
authoritarian, or absolutist, politics and law enforcement.” The Duterte regime can be
described as an example of “neoauthoritarianism,” which Teehankee (2016, 293)
defines as a form of strongman rule legitimized by “competing in elections, sparing
use or threat of violence, and generating mass support by exploiting popular issues
and aspirations (oftentimes) through demagoguery.”
Indeed, it can be argued Duterte has taken control of the Philippine state and bent it to
his wishes (Ruland 2021). In May 2018, Duterte rendered the judiciary subservient by
12 W. HOLDEN

pressuring the Supreme Court to remove Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno (a critic of
the war on drugs) for purportedly failing to disclose her wealth (Holden 2021). Congress
has been converted into a rubber stamp. In February 2017, Senator Leila De Lima, a long-
time critic of extrajudicial killings under Duterte, was arrested on charges of drug
trafficking and remains in custody (Holden 2021). The media has been muzzled. In
May 2020, the Duterte administration shut down the ABS-CBN network, the archipela-
go’s largest media network, and one month later Maria Ressa, the CEO of Rappler, was
convicted of cyber-libel (Puente 2020). The Duterte government has engaged in efforts to
silence the press through what Puente (2020, 81) described as “persistent harassment,
intimidation, red-tagging, and outright brutality.” On 3 June 2020, two days after
Duterte’s certification as urgent (thus truncating congressional debate), Congress
passed the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (Republic Act 11479). Notwithstanding its lack
of any clear definition of “terrorism,” this statute enables warrantless arrests for up to
24 days and shields members of law enforcement from liability for false arrests
(Mendoza et al. 2021). “This law,” wrote Guevarra and Arcilla (2020, 490), “represents
a new weapon in the administration’s campaign to suppress dissent.” In the words of
Mendoza et al. (2021, 61), this statute will increase “insecurity and terror rather than
offering security and a path to national peace” and “it may actually exacerbate dissent
and terrorism if abused and unchecked.”

The Philippine GPI and FSI scores

In Table 2, the 2020 GPI scores for the top ten countries most at risk of long-term climate
change are presented. The Philippines is a low peace country and is above average (indi-
cating poorer performance) in terms of conflict and societal safety but below average
(indicating better performance) in terms of militarization. These GPI scores indicate
the Philippines is a low peace country even when compared to other comparable
countries at high long-term risk of climate change. In Table 3, the 2020 FSI score for
the top ten countries most at risk of long-term climate change are presented. The Philip-
pines has an above-average score (indicating poorer performance) with respect to six of
its variables (security apparatus, group grievances, state legitimacy, human rights, demo-
graphic pressures, and internally displaced people) and a below-average score (indicating
better performance) with respect to six of its variables (factionalized elites, economic

Table 2. 2020 GPI scores, top ten countries most at long term risk of climate change, from 1996 to
2015.
Country Conflict Societal safety Militarization
Honduras 1.403 3.230 1.862
Myanmar 2.599 2.804 1.588
Haiti 1.796 2.735 1.925
Nicaragua 2.225 3.366 1.639
Philippines 2.539 2.951 1.656
Bangladesh 2.100 2.453 1.609
Pakistan 3.350 2.966 2.553
Vietnam 1.403 2.240 2.067
Guatemala 1.606 3.107 1.736
Thailand 1.945 2.905 1.539
Average 2.097 2.88 1.82
Source: Institute for Economics and Peace (2020).
 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 13

decline, uneven development, human flight, public services, and external intervention).
The overall 2020 FSI score for the Philippines is 81.0, only slightly better than the
average score for all ten countries of 81.83, and the archipelago has a fragile state
rating of “high warning” (Fund for Peace 2020). These FSI scores indicate a high
degree of state fragility in the Republic even when compared to other comparable
countries at high long-term risk of climate change.

The Vulnerability of environmentalists in the Philippines

The intersection of climate change and state weakness is found when environmentalists are
killed. In many ways, climate change adversely interacts with natural resource management
through activities such as mining, deforestation, coral reef degradation, and mangrove
removal (Holden 2019). Public participation in natural resource management is essential
for addressing the interrelated social and environmental complexities of climate change
adaptation and disaster risk reduction; as Gaillard, Liamzon, and Villanueva (2007, 224)
wrote, “enhancing capacities, reducing vulnerability, and building resilience requires
increasing participation of local communities.” However, in the Philippines, community
engagement is weak and ineffective (Baybay and Hindmarsh 2019).
Both the Climate Change Act of 2009 (Republic Act 9729) and the Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management of 2010 (Republic Act 1021) avail opportunities for public
participation (Baybay and Hindmarsh 2019; Gera 2016). However, the judiciary has
been unreceptive to hearing environmental lawsuits, administrative remedies must be
exhausted before legal proceedings can begin, litigation is expensive, the legal system
is slow, and there is a lack of information about how the legal system works (Gera
2016). There is a long history of strategic lawsuits against public participation
(SLAPP) being brought against environmentalists (Gera 2016). In some instances,
attempting to utilize the substantive provisions of environmental legislation, such as
the withholding of free prior and informed consent under the Indigenous Peoples’
Rights Act of 1997 (Republic Act 8371) can, in the words of Gera (2016, 507), “subject
community members to violence and intimidation amid powerful economic and political
interests.”
The ability of powerful interests to force through projects, such as dams, mines, or
plantations, is referred to as “development aggression,” which Nadeau (2005, 334)

Table 3. 2020 FSI scores for top 10 countries most at risk of long-term climate change from 1996 to
2015.
Country 2020 FSI score Fragile state rating
Honduras 76.8 Elevated Warning
Myanmar 94.0 Alert
Haiti 97.7 Alert
Nicaragua 77.1 Elevated Warning
Philippines 81.0 High Warning
Bangladesh 85.7 High Warning
Pakistan 92.1 Alert
Vietnam 63.9 Warning
Guatemala 79.2 Elevated Warning
Thailand 70.8 Elevated Warning
Average 81.83 –
Source: Fund for Peace (2020).
14 W. HOLDEN

defines as “the process of displacing people from their lands and homes to make way for
development schemes imposed from above without consent or public debate.” Howard,
an environmental activist interviewed on 22 September 2019, indicated the Philippines
lacks public participation in environmental affairs. Environmental laws are good on
paper but are poorly enforced, creating poor governance and reducing climate change
coping capacity. The government spends a lot on infrastructure but does not pay atten-
tion to natural resource management. The priorities of the Duterte administration are
infrastructure development and investment promotion, and this is unsustainable.
Environmental governance is weak and the “poorest of the poor” are not involved in
planning.
Earlier it was pointed out how state strength is required for protecting the rights of
people unpopular among local power holders (Englehart 2017). Environmentalists are
frequently unpopular among local power holders, facing intimidation and assassinations;
important factors contributing to their killing are corruption, a weak rule of law, and
impunity (Larsen et al. 2021; Le Billon and Menton 2021). The Philippines is among
the most dangerous countries in the world for environmental activists (Table 4). From
2017 to 2019, the Republic ranked no lower than second in terms of the number of envir-
onmentalists killed, behind Brazil in 2017 and Colombia in 2019. The inability of envir-
onmentalists to engage in environmental governance because of weak public
participation provisions, SLAPP suits, or outright assassinations, exacerbates the archi-
pelago’s vulnerability to climate change. Public participation is essential for coping
with climate change as it contributes to a range of preventive and mitigating actions
(Wisner et al. 2004). “Citizen protest and lobbying,” wrote Wisner et al. (2004, 371),
“only finds full expression under conditions of economic and political democracy and
respect for human rights.” “There must also be a certain minimum level of social
peace before the most vulnerable can risk becoming publicly involved” (Wisner et al.
2004, 371). The Philippines, unfortunately, lacks this minimum level of social peace.
Extrajudicial killings, wrote Johnson and Fernquest (2018, 379), have “been a prominent
feature of the country’s political landscape for decades.” Assassinations have occurred
since the American colonial period and have resulted from the domination of the coun-
tryside by local bosses, such as wealthy landowners and the local politicians beholden to
them. With the war on drugs, described by Reglime (2021, 7) as “the worst state-initiated
human rights crisis in the country’s modern political history,” assassinations have
become rampant.
The Philippine government has long been known to be what Broad and Cavanagh
(2009, 37) described as “the private preserve of special economic interests.” However,

Table 4. Environmentalists killed in the Philippines, 2014–2020.

Year Environmentalists killed Global rank
2014 15 3rd
2015 33 2nd
2016 28 3rd
2017 48 2nd
2018 30 1st
2019 43 2nd
2020 29 3rd
Source: Global Witness (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019a, 2020, 2021).
 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 15

the war on drugs’ widespread violence has fed a further escalation of assassinations in the
realm of environmental politics (Theriault 2020). These links between the government
and powerful interests facilitate what Global Witness (2019b, 7) called “a growing intol-
erance of protest.” When people become involved in environmental activism and chal-
lenge undertakings such as dams, mines, or plantations, pursued by the rich and
powerful, they can be designed as drug users or sellers and be put at risk of assassination.
The war on drugs, and the toleration of violence against one segment of society occa-
sioned by it, facilitates the use of violence as a method of silencing dissent. “So long as
extrajudicial hits are tolerated against one section of the population,” wrote Global
Witness (2019b, 56), “there is a danger they will be used against others to silence dissent.”
Father Amos, a Roman Catholic Priest interviewed on 17 August 2019, indicated the
war on drugs signals killing people is fashionable and killing environmentalists is a way to
discontinue their activism. Amanda, a human rights activist interviewed on 19 August
2019, regards the war on drugs approach to eliminating people as having been expanded
to look for all enemies of the state such as environmentalists. According to Warren, a
human rights activist interviewed on 30 August 2019, killing environmentalists is
nothing new, this has gone on for a long time, but the current spike is a result of the
war on drugs, which sends a message that killing people is “normal.” “This is the way
we are programmed, if someone gives you a problem you have them killed.” Amber, a
women’s rights activist interviewed on 2 September 2019, regards the war on drugs as
having “created a platform to legitimize killing activists.” Amber has heard of activists
being killed and pockets of methamphetamine being placed on them. “The war on
drugs normalizes violence.” To Amber, a good example of this is are signs saying, “no
throwing of garbage here or you will be killed.” Today, killing is a way of solving pro-
blems. On Duterte’s inauguration day, Gloria Capitan, an anti-coal mining activist,
was murdered (Global Witness 2019b).
Father Anthony, a Roman Catholic Priest interviewed on 9 September 2019, regards
the killing of environmentalists as occurring because there is a “culture of death” in the
Philippines. Anyone can take the law into their own hands. Also, if someone is killed, and
they are even remotely suspected of being involved in drugs, their death will not be inves-
tigated. According to Gloria, a climate change activist interviewed on 18 September 2019,
the war on drugs is used as a reason for all kinds of killings and has a chilling effect on
activists. At the NGO Gloria used to work, they had to put activists in safe houses. One of
these people had a text message sent to them saying “be careful or you will be taken care
of by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency!” In Gloria’s opinion, anyone can be tar-
geted as a drug addict and this has “normalized” killing people. Gloria has been an envir-
onmentalist since 1996, and today’s conditions are the most dangerous she has ever seen;
in her words, “it is a different world right now.” In their activism, they have gone back to
the basis of human rights activism.
Howard views the atmosphere, and culture of violence, as something inspiring human
rights violators to carry out actions against environmentalists. Also, state efforts to
resolve killings are weak. Libel and SLAPP lawsuits are brought against urban environ-
mentalists, but in rural areas assassinations are frequently used. If an indigenous people’s
group, for example, wants to stop a plantation, they will be called “terrorists” and their
concerns will be ignored. “This gives weak government officials a pretext for not addres-
sing genuine complaints.” In such a context, environmental governance becomes weaker.
16 W. HOLDEN

Sonya, a senior staff member at the CHR, interviewed on 4 October 2019, regards the lack
of repercussions coming from the war on drugs as a factor contributing to the killing of
environmentalists.
The archipelago’s prevailing culture of impunity contributes to the killing of environ-
mentalists (Dressler 2021). According to Global Witness (2019b, 6), “the war on drugs
has fostered a culture of impunity and fear, emboldening the politically and economically
powerful to use violence and hitmen against those they see as an obstacle.” Llewellyn, an
environmentalist interviewed on 22 August 2019, indicated the war on drugs “has created
a climate of fear and impunity.” In Metro Manila and Central Luzon, people are reluctant
to get involved in activism perceived as “anti-government.” Methods from the war on
drugs are now being used in natural resource issues. Extrajudicial killings have gone
on for years in the Philippines but, under Duterte, there has been an attempt to normalize
impunity and the heavy-handed treatment of anyone. Bishop Adrian, a bishop in the
Roman Catholic Church interviewed on 28 August 2019, stated four bishops, three
priests, and one brother have been charged with sedition for opposing the killings,
which are an example of impunity in society. “There have been a few examples of pro-
secutions but, by and large, the killers get away.” There is rampant impunity in connec-
tion with the drug killings. In the view of Irene, a journalist specializing in the coverage of
human rights issues interviewed on 3 September 2019, rampant impunity is causing
environmentalists to be killed because there is a culture of impunity and killers know
they can get away with killing. Attorney Dolores, a lawyer and environmental activist
interviewed on 10 September 2019, indicated the war on drugs has generated a
“culture of impunity.” Killing people has become a way of dealing with people. In the
past, corporations bothered by a pesky NGO would file a SLAPP suit; today, however,
they have them killed. Extrajudicial killings are not new in the Philippines, but they
have escalated under Duterte. According to Brother Keith, a member of a religious
order in the Roman Catholic Church and a photojournalist interviewed on 16 September
2019, environmentalists are easy targets in a culture of impunity. Sonya, from the CHR,
stated Duterte did not create impunity. There was serious impunity during the Marcos
years and during the 30-year period after Marcos. Impunity continued from Corazon
Aquino through to Aquino III and Duterte is a product of this impunity. This could
have been addressed years ago but was not.

Is the Philippines a candidate for state failure with climate change?

In many ways, the war on drugs resembles a counterinsurgency campaign implemented
to pacify a population (Holden 2021). Counterinsurgency campaigns are often referred to
as “small wars” as their essence is “combat between the regular forces of a modern state
and the irregular forces of a lesser opponent” (Hoffman 1994, 511). Due to the asym-
metric application of force in small wars, they are also often referred to as “dirty
wars,” and, according to Parenti (2011, 36), “small dirty wars have created societies
totally incapable of dealing with climate change.” Is the Philippines, a low peace
country, a candidate for state failure as it confronts climate change? The answer to
this (admittedly) rhetorical question is not yet, but one should not be optimistic. “The
country is not a ‘failed state,’” wrote Johnson and Fernquest (2018, 376), “but it is dys-
functional in significant ways.” The archipelago is vulnerable to climate change and
 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 17

has a growing population. With its current population growth rate of 1.49 percent, the
archipelago’s population will double by 2068. This means, in 2068, the archipelago will
have 221,636,650 people inhabiting 300,000 square kilometers and have a population
density of approximately 739 people per square kilometer – a population density com-
parable to the entire population of the world living in Canada! Climate change is on
an undeniable trajectory, with there being little concerted global political will to
implement the necessary reductions in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions for forestalling
it (Rohling 2017). Even if there were a complete cessation of CO2 emissions, it would
take roughly 200,000 years for natural mechanisms to restore atmospheric CO2 to its pre-
industrial level (Rohling 2017).
According to Ada, a human rights activist interviewed on 19 August 2019, add
Duterte’s own instability to authoritarian government, and factor in natural hazards,
and it “could be a recipe for disaster.” Duterte is slow in responding to crises. Despite
all his bluster, this is a weak government unresponsive to pressing issues. In Llewellyn’s
view, “the Philippines is a half-baked democracy anyway.” Bring in climate change and
there are even more problems. The combination of state weakness and environmental
pressures make the Philippines susceptible to state failure. Isacc, a development activist
interviewed on 27 August 2019, indicated the risk of state failure in the Philippines exem-
plifies Naomi Klein’s concept of “disaster capitalism” (Klein 2007). Vulnerable commu-
nities are forced to leave by natural hazards and, when they return, there are
“development projects” displacing them. Sicogon Island, in Iloilo, was a case where
land reform beneficiaries were displaced by Super Typhoon Haiyan. Upon their
return, they were unable to reclaim their land because a tourism development had
taken it. In Warren’s view, “If we allow the system we have created, with Duterte, to con-
tinue we are in danger of state failure.” The Duterte years have set us back at least a
decade. It will be a huge undertaking to put the Philippines back on the right track.
Future generations will inherit a broken system. Attorney Dolores regards the Philip-
pines as capable of becoming a failed state because of climate change. A lot of
conflicts in the Philippines stem from extractive industries, such as mining and agribusi-
ness. People will lack access to water and “this is conflict waiting to happen.” Climate
change, to Howard, will cause more rural to urban migration, and urban areas will be
unprepared to deal with the resulting influx of migrants. In Palawan’s Puerto Princesa
City, urban poor are relocated into mangrove forests, which are vital for providing pro-
tection from storm surge (Holden 2019). According to Gloria, with climate change,
farmers will find it harder to produce crops and fisherfolk will have declining catches;
the Philippines is at risk of state failure. Duterte has weakened many checks and balances
on the government.
Strong state institutions are vital for protecting human rights. In the words of Engle-
hart (2017, 162), protecting human rights requires “fighting corruption, disarming
violent non-state groups, promoting economic development, strengthening the rule of
law, developing independent and effective judicial systems, extending state authority
over peripheral areas and in general promoting what the Canadians call POGG –
peace order and good government.” “State failure,” wrote Rotberg (2002, 93), “is
-made [sic], not merely accidental nor fundamentally -caused geographically, environ-
mentally, or externally.” With strong state institutions, human rights can be protected,
and with human rights protected, there can be meaningful public participation in
18 W. HOLDEN

environmental governance, which can ameliorate climate change’s effects. “If the state
cannot protect those who seek to protect the poor from social and environmental
harm,” wrote Dressler (2021, 406), “there is little hope for a socially just and sustainable
future in the country.” As Global Witness (2021, 16) stated, “The violence against land
and environmental defenders and the climate crisis are intimately connected, and we
will not solve one without the other. The health of our planet and of our societies are
fundamentally linked.” Unfortunately, the Duterte government has greatly weakened
state institutions; in the words of Kusaka (2017, 264):
Duterte has a dilemma, however: While he aims to establish a strong state with the full
power to implement laws and regulations over society, he looks down on the existing judi-
cial system and other state institutions as corrupt and inefficient, and so he tends to rely on
extrajudicial means to achieve peace and order- which should further weaken state
institutions.

Climate injustice
Earlier it was pointed out how many of the countries with favorable GPI and FSI
scores are former colonial powers, while many with unfavorable scores are former
colonies suffering a post-colonial legacy. This notion of the world’s poor countries
suffering a legacy of exploitation at the hands of the world’s rich is relevant to
climate change. In discussing climate change, it is essential to discuss climate injus-
tice. Some countries, such as the United States, are disproportionately more respon-
sible for CO2 emissions, while others, such as the Philippines, are disproportionately
less responsible for low CO2 emissions. The archipelago, along with Bhutan, Costa
Rica, Ethiopia, Gambia, India, and Morocco, is one of only seven countries in the
range of meeting their Paris targets (Wallace-Wells 2019). However, while the Philip-
pines has low CO2 emissions, it is also disproportionately more vulnerable to climate
change’s effects (Holden 2018).
Much of the poverty experienced by developing countries can be attributed to back-
ground injustice, the lasting effects of colonialism (Holden 2018). In many ways, the
Republic’s weak institutions, which (as this article argues) weaken resilience to climate
change, are a legacy of its own post-colonial legacy at the hands of Spain and the
United States. Spanish colonization (as discussed earlier) created a rural land-owning
elite and American colonization entrenched this elite to mollify Filipino nationalism at
the turn of the last century. The United States has done disproportionately more to
cause climate change and its colonial legacy has weakened the ability of the Philippines
to cope with climate change. Consider Samar, one of the archipelago’s most vulnerable
islands to tropical cyclones. On 28 September 1901, the residents of Balangiga, Eastern
Samar destroyed a United States Army garrison, and, in retaliation, the Americans dev-
astated Samar (Holden 2020). It will take time for the Samareños to fully recover from the
American occupation and, while they are still recovering from this, they must also adapt
to climate change. Climate injustice and background injustice must be acknowledged
when climate change in the developing world is discussed. Climate change is dispropor-
tionately caused by the developed countries, and the poverty experienced by the devel-
oping countries is, in many ways, their legacy of having been colonies of the
developed world.
 ASIAN GEOGRAPHER 19

Figure 4. The Bow of the Eva Jocelyn in Tacloban City. Photo credit: the author.

Conclusion
The archipelago is vulnerable to climate change. Climate change will not cause immedi-
ate state failure. However, the Republic is a low peace country suffering from state
fragility, and over time climate change will challenge its ability to cope with climate
change. Climate change is permanent, at least during our lifetimes. We must, as
Rohling (2017, 213) wrote, “think beyond the current century when considering
climate change.” This was made apparent in 2013 when the Eva Jocelyn ran aground
in Tacloban during Super Typhoon Haiyan. Its bow was left as a monument
(Figure 4) with an inscription reading:
20 W. HOLDEN

Figure 5. Schematic diagram showing the intersection of climate change and the war on drugs.
Source: the author.

This shipwreck stands as a remembrance of the thousands of lives that perished throughout
the City of Tacloban on that day. It marks the genesis of our advocacy for resilience and
adaptation to a new normal that will continue for generations to come.

Public participation is essential for coping with climate change, but the Philippines
has a weak commitment to human rights and is among the world’s leading countries
in terms of environmentalists killed. It is through the killing of environmentalists that
climate change and the war on drugs, two simultaneously occurring phenomenon, inter-
sect (Figure 5). Extrajudicial killings have occurred for years in the archipelago but have
become ubiquitous during the Duterte administration. Duterte has weakened many
state institutions, and these weakened institutions will persist as climate change
continues.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors .

ORCID
William Holden http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3929-3704

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