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Tab 4
Tab 4
v.
(2) The exercise of the rights under the TOL had passed to the
fourth respondent, not the second respondent anymore. The
C relief sought by the appellants would legally and commercially
affect the third and fourth respondents directly as the fourth
respondent was the holder of the TOL. At all material times,
the third and fourth respondents were not named or made
parties to the judicial review proceedings and were not parties
D to the stay application in the High Court. As the outcome of
granting the stay would be to affect detrimentally the
operations of the fourth respondent, the failure on the part of
the appellants at the material time to include the third and
fourth respondents from the very outset in the injunction/stay
E application was fatal to their applications. Hence, there were
really no serious issues to be tried in context of the
appellants’ injunction/stay application. (para 11)
For the appellants - Bastian Vendargon (Hon Kai Ping, R Sarengapani, Anne
Vendargon & Gene Vendargon with him); M/s Bastian Vendargon
D For the 1st & 2nd respondents - Shamsul Bolhasan Khalid (Nurul Farhana
Khalid with him) SFCs
For the 3rd & 4th respondents - Cecil Abraham (Wong Kah Hui, Sunil
Abrahim, Idza Haidar Idzam & Emily Chin with him); M/s Jeff Leong
JUDGMENT
(2) That the exercise of the rights under the TOL issued on or
about 3 September 2012 pursuant to the decisions of the 2nd
and 1st respondents made on 30 January 2012 and 13 June
2012 respectively, be forthwith stayed till the final disposal of
D
these judicial review proceedings;
A Francis Noel John v. Mohd Noor @ Harun Abdullah & 2 Ors [1995]
1 CLJ 293; [1995] 1 MLJ 193, it is the argument of learned
counsel for the 3rd and 4th respondents that there are really no
serious issues to be tried in the context of the applicants’
injunction/stay application. We find there is much force in this
B argument. The significant point here is that it cannot be disputed
that the rights under the TOL can only be exercised by the 4th
respondent. The exercise of the rights under the TOL has passed
to the 4th respondent, not the 2nd respondent anymore. The
relief sought by the applicants would legally and commercially
C affect the 3rd and 4th respondents directly as the 4th respondent
is the holder of the TOL. At this point, we should highlight an
important fact. It is this. At all material times the 3rd and 4th
respondents were not named or made parties to the judicial review
proceedings and more than that were not parties to the stay
D application in the High Court. For this, it is all the more striking
that the 3rd and 4th respondents had to file an application to
intervene to be added as parties. In this respect, the case of
Regina v. Inspectorate of Pollution Ex P Greenpeace Ltd (supra), which
was alluded to by the learned High Court Judge in her judgment,
E discussed the issue of stay and injunctions where similarly, an
affected party, was not made a party to the proceedings. In much
the same way, in the present case, as the outcome of granting the
stay will be to effect detrimentally the operations of the 4th
respondent, we take the view that the failure on the part of the
F applicants at the material time to include the 3rd and 4th
respondents from the very outset in the injunction/stay application
is fatal to their applications. Hence, in our judgment there are
really no serious issues to be tried in the context of the
appellants’ injunction/stay application. Moreover, the balance of
G equity must not be weighed as between the appellants and the
1st and 2nd respondents only, but must be ascertained with
regards to the rights and interests of the 3rd and 4th respondents
as well, having invested large sums of money for its operations.
The 3rd and 4th respondents have invested a sum of around
H RM1.7 billion as at 21 March 2012 in the LAMP project. In light
of the huge investments by the 3rd and 4th respondents, it is
imperative that the appellants make an undertaking as to damages
and financial loss to be suffered by the 4th respondent, and not
merely undertaking as to damages, if any, to be suffered by the
I 1st and 2nd respondents. It is trite law that an applicant for
1128 Current Law Journal [2013] 3 CLJ
[13] In the first place, we are of the view that in judicial review
proceedings an application for an injunction can only be made
F
pursuant to O. 53 r. 2(3) of the Rules of Court 2012, which
provides as follows:
(3) Upon the hearing of an application for judicial review, the
court shall not be confined to the relief claimed by the applicant
but may dismiss the application or make any court orders, G
including an order of injunction or monetary compensation.
[17] For all the reasons stated, we are of the view that the
learned judge had exercised her discretion correctly in dismissing
E
the applicants’ injunction/stay application. The decision of the
learned judge in dismissing the application was correct in law and
fact. All considered, in our judgment, the learned judge was
justified in so deciding. With respect, the applicants have failed to
show any valid grounds warranting our interference in the exercise
F
of the learned judge’s discretion.