G.R. No. L-26741 July 31, 1969 - IN RE - TESSIE ASTERO v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF DAGUPAN CITY - July 1969 - Philipppine Supreme Court Decisions

10/1/22, 7:35 PM G.R. No. L-26741 July 31, 1969 - IN RE: TESSIE ASTERO v.
TERO v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF DAGUPAN CITY : July 1969 - Philipppine S…
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G.R. No. L-26741 July 31, 1969 - IN
RE: TESSIE ASTERO v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF DAGUPAN
CITY:

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26741. July 31, 1969.]
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1969julydecisions.php?id=299 1/19
10/1/22, 7:35 PM G.R. No. L-26741 July 31, 1969 - IN RE: TESSIE ASTERO v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF DAGUPAN CITY : July 1969 - Philipppine S…
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

OF TESSIE ASTERO. TESSIE ASTERO, Petitioner-
Appellee, v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF DAGUPAN CITY,
Respondent-Appellant.
Hermogenes S. Decano for Petitioner-Appellee.
First Assistant City Fiscal Peregrino Cornel and

Second Assistant City Fiscal Rafael B. Hidalgo for
Respondent-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF ACTION;

CRIMINAL ACTION COMMENCED EITHER BY COMPLAINT
OR INFORMATION. — The premise that a public crime, such
as that of corruption of minors "is not one of those which
may be prosecuted upon the complaint of the offended
party," is manifestly erroneous; because Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, explicitly provides that "all
criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or
information."
cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. — Under

the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a criminal
action or prosecution may be instituted in the courts
specified therein in either one of two ways. In the first
place it may be commenced by any person presenting to a
court or to a magistrate the complaint. Such complaint is
the process which begins the action and gives the court or
magistrate jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and
the subject-matter of the action. Where such complaint has
been presented no other or further pleading on the part of
the government is necessary. The prosecution proceeds
upon the complaint alone. In the second place the action
may be commenced by the promotor fiscal by presenting to
the court and filing with the clerk thereof the information.
In that case such information is the process which
institutes the action and the prosecution proceeds upon it

as the people’s pleading. It is the duty of the fiscal to
prosecute the action, whether commenced by complaint or
information. This enables him to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecutions by private persons.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INFORMATION MAY BE FILED ON A

COMPLAINT BY A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL. — The fact that
the information was filed in court on a complaint by a
private individual is of no consequence for the reason that,
except where the law specifically provides the contrary, a
complaint that a public crime has been committed can be
laid by any competent person.
4. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL COMPLAINANTS MAY BE FILED WITH

THE FISCAL OR WITH THE CITY COURT IF BOTH ENTITLES
SHARE THE FUNCTION OF CONDUCTING PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION. — Where the City Charter expressly
grants to the city court the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations, this grant of power necessarily connotes
that the City Attorney shares that function with said court,
and that, accordingly, the latter may entertain complaints
filed by a person other than the City Attorney. Indeed, the
initiation of a criminal action by the City Attorney would
imply that he had conducted the requisite preliminary
investigation, so that none would have to be made by the
City Courts. Thus, under a City Charter expressly granting
the city court authority to conduct preliminary
investigations, it was held that a complaint filed by the
offended party with said court was perfectly valid; that so
was the arrest warrant issued by the city court, after
making the corresponding preliminary examination; and
that consequently, the apprehension and confinement of
the accused were, likewise, lawful and valid.
5. STATUTES; CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES ARE

CONSTRUED AS TO HARMONIZE THE SAME. — The
different provisions of a statute should be so construed as
to harmonized the same, and that, "when there are
inconsistent provisions in the same statute, the last in point
of time or order of arrangement prevails."
6. ID.; EFFECT OF APPEAL IN HABEAS CORPUS; BOND

REQUIRED. — A decision ordering the release of a person
detained, without requiring the posting of a bond to secure
his appearance before the appellate court, violates Section
20, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which reads: "A judgment
remanding the person detained to the custody of the offer
or person detaining him, shall not be stayed by appeal. A
judgment releasing the person detained shall not be
effective until the officer or person detaining has been
given opportunity to appeal. An appeal taken by such
officer or person shall stay the order of release, unless the
person detained shall furnish a satisfactory bond in an
amount fixed by the court or judge rendering the
judgment. The bond shall be so conditioned for the
appearance of the person detained before the appellate
court to abide its order in the appeal.
DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

On or about August 18, 1966, Leticia del Pilar, a minor 17 years

of age, filed with the City Court of Dagupan a complaint, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11037 of said court,
charging Lita Mendoza, Susan Dequito, Susana Soriano and
herein petitioner Tessie Astero, with "corruption of a minor,"
in:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That during and between June 27, 1966 and July 2, 1966 in
Dagupan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused confederating and
mutually helping one another, habitually and/or with abuse of
authority or confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously by the use of force, threats and intimidation
and by taking advantage of the undersigned (Leticia del Pilar),

a minor 17 years of age, who was detained at the Mendoza
Hotel, Perez Boulevard, Dagupan City, by their confederates,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote or facilitate the
prostitution or corruption of the undersigned, to satisfy the lust
of several men unknown to her and in order to profit
therefrom, to her damage and prejudice in the sum of
P50,000.00."
After conducting a preliminary examination, said court issued

the corresponding warrant of arrest and, in compliance
therewith, petitioner was, among others, subsequently
apprehended and confined in the City Jail of Dagupan. On
October 7, 1966, she commenced, in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, the present case 1 for habeas corpus,
against the Chief of Police of Dagupan City, upon the ground
that said complaint is "null and void . . . because" :
"A—Under the City Charter of Dagupan City, it is only the City

Fiscal who can institute criminal action;
"B—And, even granting that Leticia del Pilar can institute a

criminal action, such is only true where there is the civil liability
involved in the case, which is not so in the instant case,
because —
"1. Prostitution of minor is a purely public crime, in which there

can not be private offended party.
"2. And, even if Leticia del Pilar were the offended party, her
interest in the civil aspect has been instituted in criminal case
No. 11036, a copy of which is hereto attached, wherein she
claimed damages arising out of the same act."
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of first instance

rendered a decision, dated October 30, 1966, granting the writ
prayed for and ordering "the Chief of Police of Dagupan City or
any of his officers in charge of the City Jail . . . to release the
petitioner, Tessie Astero." Hence, this appeal by the
Respondent.
The ratio decidendi of said decision is found in the paragraph

immediately preceding its dispositive part, which reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Under Section 24 of Republic Act 170 (Charter of Dagupan

City), the city attorney (Fiscal) ‘shall investigate all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of laws and city
ordinances and prepare the necessary informations or make
the necessary complaints against the persons accused’. The
wordings of this provision are clear and leave no room for
interpretation. Said section has enjoined the city fiscal to
‘prepare the necessary informations’ or ‘make the necessary
complaints’ against persons accused of ‘crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of laws and city ordinances’. The crime for which
the petitioner was charged is a public crime and not one of
those which may be prosecuted under the law upon the
complaint of the offended party. Thus, it devolved upon the city
fiscal to file, if the evidence warrants, the complaint or
information for corruption of minor against the petitioner, and
this mandatory duty cannot be delegated to the offended party
himself/herself. Thus, it is the considered opinion of this court
that the said complaint (Criminal Case No. 11037 of the City
Court of Dagupan) and all proceedings thereunder are of no
effect inasmuch as the complaint filed by the offended party in
that court is not valid."
The premise to the effect that a public crime, such as that of

corruption of minors "is not one of those which may be
prosecuted . . . upon the complaint of the offended party," is
manifestly erroneous. Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, explicitly provides that" (a)ll criminal actions
must be commenced either by complaint or information . . ." In
fact, as early as U.S. v. Narvas, 2 it was held:
"The Code of Criminal Procedure contains the following:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Sec. 2. All prosecutions of public offenses shall be in the name

of the United States (now Philippines) against the persons
charged with the offenses.
‘Sec. 3. All public offenses triable in Courts of First Instance or

in courts of similar jurisdiction, now established or that
hereafter may be established, must be prosecuted by
complaint or information.
‘Sec. 4. A complaint is a sworn written statement made to a

court or magistrate that a person has been guilty of a
designated offense.
‘Sec. 5. An information is an accusation in writing charging a

person with a public offense, presented and signed by the
promotor fiscal or his deputy and filed with the clerk of court.’
"Under the provisions of these sections, a criminal action or

prosecution may be instituted in the courts specified therein in
either one of two ways. In the first place it may be commenced
by any person presenting to a court or to a magistrate the
complaint above defined. Such complaint is the process which
begins the action and gives the court or magistrate jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant and the subject-matter of the
action. Where such complaint has been presented no other or
further pleading on the part of the government is necessary.
The prosecution proceeds upon the complaint alone. In the
second place the action may be commenced by the promotor
fiscal by presenting to the court and filing with the clerk
thereof the information defined and set forth in the section
above quoted. In that case such information is the process
which institutes the action and the prosecution proceeds upon
it as the people’s pleading. It is the duty of the fiscal to
prosecute the action whether commenced by complaint or
information. This enables him to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecutions by private persons." 3
Again, pursuant to section 2 of said Rule 110:
"Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person

with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace
officer or other employee of the government or governmental
institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the law
violated."
As a consequence, in People v. Hernandez, 4 this Court used

the following language:
"The fact that the information was filed in court on a complaint

by a private individual is of no consequence for the reason
that, as has been held in the case of United States v. Yu Tuico
(34 Phil. 209), except where the law specifically provides the
contrary, a complaint that a public crime has been committed
can be laid by any competent person . . ." 5
It is true that Section 24 of the Charter of Dagupan City (R.A.

No. 170) imposes upon its city attorney the duty to
"investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and
violations of laws and city ordinances" and to "prepare the
necessary informations or make the necessary complaints
against the person accused . . ." There is every reason to
believe that the conclusion drawn therefrom by His Honor, the
trial Judge, was influenced, to a considerable degree, by a
similar provision in the Charter of the City of Manila, which has
been construed to mean that in that city "criminal complaints
may be filed only with the City Fiscal, who is thereby given, by
implication, the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in
the different courts of said City . . ." 6 It should be noted,
however, that, in the language of Sayo v. Chief of Police: 7
"Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the

commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is
not filed with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance
of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or
conduct a preliminary investigation proper . . ."
This view was reiterated by Chief Justice Moran in Espiritu v.

De la Rosa8 , and quoted with approval, as well as applied to
the City of Bacolod, in Montelibano v. Ferrer. 9
Seemingly, the lower court overlooked, however, the fact that,

unlike the courts of Manila and Bacolod, the city court of
Dagupan is explicitly vested with the power to "conduct
preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to the
limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind

over any person charged with such offense to secure his
appearance before the proper court." 10 Thus, the legal basis
for the exclusive power of the City Fiscal of Manila or City
Attorney of Bacolod to initiate criminal actions in their
respective jurisdictions is wanting in the case of Dagupan.
What is more, the express grant to its city court of the
authority to conduct preliminary investigations, necessarily
connotes that the City Attorney of Dagupan shares that
function with said court, and that, accordingly, the latter may
entertain complaints filed by a person other than said officer.
Indeed, the initiation of a criminal action by the City Attorney
would imply that he had conducted the requisite preliminary
investigation, so that none would have to be made by the City
Court.
In other words, we can not sustain the alleged sole power of

said officer to institute criminal actions in Dagupan City without
setting at naught or nullifying the authority of the city court,
under Section 77 of R.A. No. 170, to conduct preliminary
investigations. It is well settled that the different provisions of
a statute should be so construed as to harmonize the same,
and that, "when there are inconsistent provisions in the same
statute, the last in point of time or order of arrangement
prevails. 11
It is clear, therefore, that the aforementioned complaint filed

by Leticia del Pilar was perfectly valid; that so was the warrant
of arrest issued by the city court, after making the
corresponding preliminary examination; and that,
consequently, the apprehension and confinement of petitioner
herein were, likewise, lawful and valid.
It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed from

ordered the release of petitioner herein, without requiring the
posting of a bond to secure her appearance before the
appellate court, in violation of Section 20, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, reading:
"A judgment remanding the person detained to the custody of
the officer or person detaining him, shall not be stayed by

appeal. A judgment releasing the person detained shall not be
effective until the officer or person detaining has been given
opportunity to appeal. An appeal taken by such officer or
person shall stay the order of release, unless the person
detained shall furnish a satisfactory bond in an amount fixed by
the court or judge rendering the judgment. The bond shall be
so conditioned for the appearance of the person detained
before the appellate court to abide its order in the appeal." 12
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed,

and the petitioner ordered re-arrested and re-committed to the
custody of respondent herein, unless a satisfactory bond in an
amount to be fixed by the City Court of Dagupan, shall have
been furnished, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,

Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Endnotes:
1. Special Proceedings No. 526 of the court of First

Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VIII.
2. 14 Phil. 410, 411.
3. Italics supplied.
4. 59 Phil. 272, 277.
5. Emphasis supplied.
6. Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228, 233.
7. 80 Phil. 859, 869.
8. 78 Phil. 827, 830.
9. Supra.
10. Section 77, R.A. No. 170.
11. People v. Laba, L-28022, July 30, 1969: PNB v.

Court of Appeals, L-27117, July 30, 1969; State v.
City, 109 So. 2d. 368; Town of Homecraft v.
Macbeth, 148 N.E. 2d. 563.
12. Emphasis supplied.
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10/1/22, 7:35 PM G.R. No. L-26741 July 31, 1969 - IN RE: TESSIE ASTERO v.

TERO v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF DAGUPAN CITY : July 1969 - Philipppine S…

Home Law Firm Law Library Laws Jurisprudence

July 1969 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1969 >

[G.R. No. L-26741. July 31, 1969.]

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

Hermogenes S. Decano for Petitioner-Appellee.

First Assistant City Fiscal Peregrino Cornel and

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF ACTION;

cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. — Under

institutes the action and the prosecution proceeds upon it

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INFORMATION MAY BE FILED ON A

4. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL COMPLAINANTS MAY BE FILED WITH

5. STATUTES; CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES ARE

of time or order of arrangement prevails."

cralaw virtua1aw library

6. ID.; EFFECT OF APPEAL IN HABEAS CORPUS; BOND

On or about August 18, 1966, Leticia del Pilar, a minor 17 years

and by taking advantage of the undersigned (Leticia del Pilar),

cralaw virtua1aw library

After conducting a preliminary examination, said court issued

"A—Under the City Charter of Dagupan City, it is only the City

"B—And, even granting that Leticia del Pilar can institute a

"1. Prostitution of minor is a purely public crime, in which there

cralaw virtua1aw library

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of first instance

The ratio decidendi of said decision is found in the paragraph

"Under Section 24 of Republic Act 170 (Charter of Dagupan

cralaw virtua1aw library

The premise to the effect that a public crime, such as that of

"The Code of Criminal Procedure contains the following:

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘Sec. 2. All prosecutions of public offenses shall be in the name

‘Sec. 3. All public offenses triable in Courts of First Instance or

‘Sec. 4. A complaint is a sworn written statement made to a

‘Sec. 5. An information is an accusation in writing charging a

"Under the provisions of these sections, a criminal action or

Again, pursuant to section 2 of said Rule 110:

"Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person

cralaw virtua1aw library

As a consequence, in People v. Hernandez, 4 this Court used

"The fact that the information was filed in court on a complaint

It is true that Section 24 of the Charter of Dagupan City (R.A.

"Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the

cralaw virtua1aw library

This view was reiterated by Chief Justice Moran in Espiritu v.

Seemingly, the lower court overlooked, however, the fact that,

limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind

In other words, we can not sustain the alleged sole power of

It is clear, therefore, that the aforementioned complaint filed

It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed from

"A judgment remanding the person detained to the custody of

the officer or person detaining him, shall not be stayed by

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed,

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

1. Special Proceedings No. 526 of the court of First

2. 14 Phil. 410, 411.

4. 59 Phil. 272, 277.

6. Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228, 233.