On Defeating Death: Group Reification and Social Identification As Immortality Strategies

EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
2005, 16, 221 – 255
On defeating death: Group reification and social

identification as immortality strategies
Emanuele Castano
New School for Social Research, New York, USA
Mark Dechesne
Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
This chapter investigates the role of social identification in the management of

human beings’ existential concerns. We begin by presenting an overview of
Terror Management Theory (TMT). This theory addresses the mechanisms that
individuals have developed to prevent, or at least lessen, the anxiety deriving from
the uniquely human ability to foresee one’s death. We then present two
perspectives concerning the role of social identities as anxiety-buffer mechanisms.
A first one, which falls more squarely within TMT, suggests that social identities
are functional in obtaining self-esteem (one of the two anxiety-buffer mechanisms
proposed by TMT). A second perspective grants a more independent role to social
identities. In this perspective, individuals seek transcendence by becoming a part
of reified entities that are larger and longer lasting than the individual self.
Findings emerging from these two lines of research are presented, along with an
analysis of the relationship between identity, death anxiety, and immortality,
from a historical and cross-cultural perspective.
. . . d’une part, l’aspiration à une vision du monde qui transcende notre existence, nos
souffrances, nos dećeptions, qui donne un sens—fut-il illusoire—à la vie et à la mort; de
l’autre, le besoin qu’a tout homme de se sentir lie´ à une communaute´ qui l’accepte, qui le
reconnaisse, et au sein de laquelle il puisse eˆtre compris à demi-mot.
(Maalouf, 1998, p. 128)1
Correspondence should be addressed to Emanuele Castano, New School for Social

Research, 65 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10003, USA. Email: castanoe@newschool.edu
We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and Miles Hewstone for the invaluable
comments and suggestions to a previous draft of this contribution. Our gratitude also extents to
Claudio Fogu for providing assistance with the interpretation of historical, philosophical, and
sociological literature, and to Mary Hoeveler for her careful editing of the final version.
1
‘‘On the one hand, the aspiration to a vision of the world that transcends our existence, our
suffering, our disappointments, which gives meaning—however illusory—to life and death; on
the other, every human being’s need to feel connected to a community which accepts him, which
recognises him, and within which he can be quickly understood.’’
Ó 2005 European Association of Experimental Social Psychology

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pp/10463283.html DOI: 10.1080/10463280500436024
222 CASTANO AND DECHESNE
Among Italians, the comic actor Massimo Troisi is famous for a scene
from the movie Nothing left to do but cry, in which the heretic monk
Savonarola repeatedly yells at him ‘‘remember, thou shall die!’’, to which
Troisi, seemingly disturbed, answers that he will take note of that, and
mimics jotting the thought down on a notepad. The comic power of such a
scene rests chiefly in Troisi’s untranslatable Neapolitan accent and
idiosyncratic facial expression when he seriously considers Savonarola’s
reminder.
Who, indeed, needs such a reminder? Isn’t death the only certainty in life?
Alas, it certainly is, but that does not mean that we like to remember it. If it
is true that monks in medieval times used to keep a skull on their desk to
remind themselves of their mortality, this is an exception that proves the
rule. Typically we do all we can to forget about it, or to deny it. According
to a character in Don Delillo’s novel White Noise, to deny our mortal nature
is ‘‘the whole point of being different from animals’’ (1984, p. 296).
What seems to be particularly problematic with death is not the pain that
may be associated with it, but rather the self-annihilation that it entails. We
may endure pain, but we cannot accept the idea that we will stop being.2
Religion, philosophy, and literature have long dealt with this question and
provided plenty of insights into how humans go about it, or have dictated
how they should go about it. In the last century, efforts have been made to
understand the consequences of the awareness of the inevitability of one’s
death for human psychology. Specifically, early psychoanalytical thinking
and modern social-psychological theory suggest that we have developed
psychological mechanisms that help us quickly remove death-related
thoughts from the focus of attention and, more importantly, to neutralise
their potentially frightening effects on our psychological equanimity.
The main claim of this chapter is that the process of social identification
constitutes one such mechanism, in so far as it helps buffer the anxiety deriving
from one’s awareness of the inevitability of death. The chapter begins with an
overview of Terror Management Theory (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 1986), which constitutes the first attempt to put the existential
question at the heart of a general theory of human behaviour, and to test it
experimentally. We will then focus on the nature of the psychological
mechanisms that the theory identifies as anxiety buffers, in order to better
elucidate the role of social identification processes in maintaining psycholo-
gical equanimity in the face of the existential dilemma. We will do so primarily
by reporting findings from our own research programmes, but also by
including a historical and a cross-cultural analysis of the relationship between
identity, death-anxiety, and the quest for immortality.
2
Research on ostracism has shown how aversive being ignored by others, as if one did not
exist, can be; indeed it has been explicitly equated to death (Case & Williams, 2004).
REIFICATION, IDENTIFICATION, AND IMMORTALITY 223
TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

Modern Man is drinking and drugging himself out of awareness, or he spends his
time shopping, which is the same thing.
(Becker, 1975, p. 284)
Drinking, drugging, and shopping; why would the modern man engage in
such activities to avoid self-awareness? Is self-awareness such a pitiful
state? Self-awareness is an adaptive psychological feature that we believe
to be characteristic of the socially evolved beings that we are (Humphrey,
1984). We despise animals for not being self-aware, so why would we
‘‘drink’’ ourselves out of it? The problem with self-awareness is that it
brings about the awareness of the inevitability of death. We are capable of
knowing so much that we know we will die, for most people an unbearable
thought.
In recent times this fairly simple notion has inspired one of the most
ambitious general theories of human behaviour since Freud’s psycho-
analytical theory. The theory is appropriately called Terror Management
Theory (TMT), to indicate that the awareness of the inevitability of death
has the potential to cause a paralysing terror that would render life itself
impossible, and that psychological mechanisms are needed to manage
such terror (Greenberg et al., 1986; for a recent review, see Solomon,
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004a).
Building on earlier insights, notably the work on death and the creation
of meaning by Becker (1962, 1973, 1975), TMT suggests that we have
developed two fundamental mechanisms to cope with this anxiety. The first
mechanism is the development of a cultural system of meaning, or cultural
worldview. Cultural worldviews provide the world with meaning, order,
stability, and permanence, and incorporate standards for what is considered
valued behaviour, as well as the promise of literal or symbolic immortality
to those who live up to these standards (e.g., Solomon, Greenberg, &
Pyszczynski, 1991a). The second mechanism is self-esteem, and is construed
within this framework as the sense that one is actually living up to those
standards. From this perspective, one could conclude that we, as a species,
have fared well not despite the potential for such anxiety, but precisely
because of it. No less than culture and our sense of self-worth may be at least
partially the consequence of our need to protect ourselves from this
formidable anxiety.
Since the mid 1980s, empirical evidence has accumulated for the claim
that cultural worldviews buffer anxiety deriving from our awareness of the
inevitability of death. A great deal of this research stems from a basic
hypothesis of TMT: If cultural worldviews serve to attenuate mortality
concerns, then reminding people of their own death should lead to an
increased need to bolster faith in their worldview.
There are many ways in which people can be reminded of their own
death, but the simplest and most straightforward one consists simply in
asking them to think about it. This is the technique used in the first
studies that attempted to test the above-mentioned hypothesis. Rosenblatt,
Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, and Lyon (1989) asked half of their
participants to describe in a paragraph the emotions that the thought of
their own death arouses in them, and then to jot down what they think will
happen to them as they physically die and once they are physically dead. The
other half of the participants were asked to answer questions similar in
form, but concerning a topic unrelated to death (e.g., watching television).
Subsequently, in an allegedly unrelated task, participants engaged in a
judgement task in which they were asked to impose a fine on an alleged
prostitute. Rosenblatt and colleagues reasoned that because prostitution is
largely considered an immoral profession (in the United States where the
experiment was held, but also elsewhere), prostitutes would be a direct
threat to the participants’ worldview; and since this threat would be
particularly important when death-related thoughts are salient, people
would want to punish the prostitute more harshly after writing about death.
Several experiments confirmed this prediction. Both professional judges and
college students set higher fines for the prostitute after being reminded about
death. One of the experiments conducted by Rosenblatt et al. further
revealed that a person who conformed to the worldview of the participants
was granted a greater reward after participants were reminded of their
mortality.
Greenberg et al. (1990) extended these findings by showing that reminders
of mortality also influence judgement at the group level. Specifically, they
demonstrated that when Christian participants were reminded about death,
they judged a Christian person more favourably, and a Jewish person more
negatively (Greenberg, et al., 1990; Expt. 1). A follow-up study revealed that
this effect was primarily found among participants with strong authoritarian
values, i.e., participants with a strong preference for social rules and
hierarchical power relations, and fear of ambiguity. A third study revealed
that when participants were asked to evaluate two essays of which one
commended and the other criticised the worldview of the participants,
reminders of mortality led to more positive evaluations of the worldview-
commending essay, and to more negative evaluations of the worldview-
critical essay.
Over the years, a number of studies have demonstrated similar effects of
mortality salience on a variety of worldview threats. For instance, research
has shown that preference for a positive over a critical essay about the US is
stronger among American participants who have been reminded of their
death compared to American participants who have not been reminded of
their mortality (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994;
Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). Greenberg,

Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1995) further showed that the
sacred meaning surrounding cultural icons is intensified as a result of
mortality salience. When participants were asked to use a crucifix as a
hammer and the American flag as a sieve during a problem-solving task,
they experienced more negative affect, hesitancy, and difficulty if they had
previously been reminded of their own death.
Other research has shown that, in addition to fostering negative attitudes
towards them, mortality salience also increases aggressive behaviour
towards those with dissimilar attitudes. Realising that the widespread fame
of Milgram’s obedience studies (Milgram, 1963) has rendered the instrument
of shock allocation too transparent a measure of aggression in a social-
psychological experiment, McGregor et al. (1998) sought an alternative way
to measure the urge to harm another person. Following some events in
the news in the US, where several people were deliberately harmed by the
addition of chilli powder to their food, McGregor et al. reasoned that the
allocation of hot sauce while preparing a meal for a person who has
explicitly informed participants that he does not like spicy food would
constitute a good approximation of aggressive urges. Consistent with
predictions, when mortality was made salient, participants allocated a
greater amount of hot sauce to a person who criticised the participants’
worldview. To the extent that these mechanisms evolved to keep at bay the
death-related terror, the maxim from the Latin writer Publilius Syrus is
instructive: The fear of death is more to be dreaded than death itself.3
Although it has not elicited the same amount of experimental research,
the hypothesis that self-esteem acts as a death-anxiety buffer has also
3
Two fundamental issues with the mortality salience paradigm are the role of negative mood/
affect in the emergence of the effects, and the specifics of psychological mechanisms leading to
these effects. Both issues have inspired a great deal of research. With regard to the former, the
message emerging from such studies is that priming death does not, generally, induce negative
mood/affects, and when it does this does not correlate with the dependent variable of interest.
With regard to the latter, TMT specifies that effects of the kinds reviewed here on cultural
worldview defence happen when the concept of death is salient but outside focal attention
(hence the delay between supraliminal manipulation of death and the collection of dependent
variables). According to the theory, people who are consciously confronted with the prospect of
their mortality first try to suppress death-related thoughts. Analogous to the results of the
research on suppression by Wegner (1994), death-stimuli presented outside of focal awareness
are first suppressed, but such suppression effort culminates in a subsequent heightened
accessibility of death-related thoughts. This heightened accessibility of death-related constructs,
in turn, is posited to instigate the defences that are reported throughout this chapter (hence the
use of subliminal manipulations or the inclusion of a delay between the explicit death-
manipulation and the collection of the dependent variable). Given the focus of the present
article we do not discuss these issues further, the details of which can be found in, respectively,
Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski (1997) and Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon (2001).
received empirical support. At the time TMT was developed, evidence

already existed that the presentation of death-related words has an impact
on self-perception. Paulhus and Levitt (1987) demonstrated that the
presentation of death and sex-related words outside of the focal visual field
led to shorter reaction times during a task in which participants were asked
to answer as quickly as possible whether certain positive traits were
applicable to them. However, since both sex and death words were primed,
it is impossible to decide which of the two taboo-related set of words
triggered the effects.
More direct evidence comes from a set of creative experiments
by Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian, and Mikulincer (1999). In two studies,
they assessed the extent to which participants derived self-esteem from a
risky driving style prior to reminding half of them about death. They
subsequently measured whether the induction of mortality salience would
lead to increased intention to drive recklessly and an actual increase in
reckless driving. Participants who did not derive self-esteem from a
reckless driving style expressed lower intention to drive recklessly after
being reminded about death, whereas participants who did derive positive
self-worth from reckless driving intensified their intention to drive
recklessly after being reminded about death. Two additional studies
demonstrated that the striving for self-esteem as a result of mortality
salience also has behavioural implications. Of the participants who were
reminded about death, those who indicated prior to the experiment that
they derived self-esteem from a reckless driving style drove more recklessly
in a car simulator. Those who did not derive self-esteem from the risky
driving, however, drove more cautiously after a mortality reminder
compared to participants whose self-esteem was also linked to risky
driving but who were not made aware of their mortality, and to those who
did not derive positive self-esteem this way. The results suggest that
reminders of mortality intensify the striving for a positive self-image. They
also indicate that striving for self-esteem after mortality has been made
salient can take on forms that, ironically, reduce the chances of prolonged
survival.
Goldenberg, McCoy, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (2000)
provided further evidence for the same hypothesis. Their primary interest
was to investigate under which circumstances reminders of mortality lead to
increased identification with the body (i.e., the extent to which one’s
physique constitutes an integral part of one’s self-concept), to an increase in
the appeal of sex, and to an increase in the tendency to monitor one’s
physical appearance. Results showed that, after being reminded about
death, participants who derived self-esteem from their body increased
identification with it and rated physical sex as more appealing. These
authors also demonstrated that participants who were reminded of death
and derived little self-esteem from their bodies decreased their appearance
monitoring when reminded of their own mortality.
SOCIAL IDENTITY AS A PROVIDER

OF SELF-ESTEEM
Alongside physical appearance and reckless driving, human beings
(fortunately) derive self-esteem from a variety of other sources. Groups to
which we belong constitute one of these sources. Cialdini and his colleagues
elucidated this process in an original study which looked at variance in the
display of affiliation with sports teams depending on the recent team
successes or failures (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan,
1976). Results from this study demonstrated a greater display of affiliation
in case of success than failure, a result that was interpreted as evidence of
striving for positive self-esteem. Identification with a successful sports team
enhances self-esteem by virtue of self-identification with the team, and the
relationship between the team and success. Cialdini and colleagues termed
this phenomenon BIRGing, or ‘‘basking in the reflected glory’’.
Group-based self-enhancement has been the focus of much research since
the earlier research within the Social Identity Theory tradition (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). Research in this tradition using the minimal group paradigm
has shown that individuals favour their ingroup over the outgroup both in
terms of allocation of resources and overall evaluation (for a review, see
Brewer, 1979), and such findings have been interpreted as stemming from
members’ preoccupation with establishing a positive identity for their
ingroup, in which they can partake. However, is group-based self-esteem
any good when it comes to battling death-anxiety? That is the question we
tested in a series of studies.
First, we set out to further investigate the role of self-esteem in mortality
salience effects, and tried to demonstrate that striving for a positive
self-image can lead to distancing from a group (Dechesne, Greenberg,
Arndt, & Schimel, 2000a). The phenomenon of self-distancing from group
was particularly important because such a finding would demonstrate the
existence of alternative reactions to reminders of mortality apart from
rigidly hanging on to one’s beliefs and social identities.
In a first study (Dechesne et al., 2000a, Exp. 1), after either thinking
about death or about watching television, participants were asked to predict
the outcome of a soccer game between the Netherlands and Germany that
was scheduled to take place days after the experiment. The Netherlands and
Germany have a fierce rivalry on the soccer pitch, which has culminated in
several classic matches, including the World Cup final of 1974 and the semi-
final of the European Championship in 1988. While the Germans won the
World Cup final (2 – 1), the Dutch won the European Championship match
(2 – 1). Both matches are considered classics in the Netherlands, where

replays are shown on national television and words such as ‘‘immortal’’,
‘‘heavenly’’, and ‘‘eternal’’ are often used to describe the achievement of the
Dutch soccer players who played in these matches. In other words, this is a
context in which the ‘‘BIRGing’’ process should be at work.
The rationale behind this study was straightforward: if people need to
bolster their self-esteem when confronted with their mortality, making
mortality salience would lead to greater optimism (from the Dutch)
regarding the outcome of the Netherlands – Germany match, as reflected
in the number of goals predicted for the Netherlands and for Germany.
Results indicated that on average, participants who were reminded about
death indeed predicted that the Netherlands would score more goals than
Germany, whereas in the control condition, again on average, the reverse
was found (see Table 1).
Heider’s (1958) balance theory, on which the BIRGing phenomenon is
grounded, not only implies that identification with successful sports teams
enhances self-esteem, but also that identification with unsuccessful teams
poses a threat to one’s self-esteem. Upon a confrontation with mortality,
identification with a team that has proven unsuccessful may be considered
particularly undesirable. It was therefore argued that if participants are
asked to indicate their identification with a team that has proven
unsuccessful, a reminder of death would lead to lesser rather than greater
identification with that team. To examine this hypothesis, we made use of
the season opener of the University of Arizona college football team
(Dechesne et al., 2000a, Exp. 2).
University of Arizona students who had indicated that they were fans of
the team were invited to participate in an experiment that was held the week
before and the week after the first game of the football season. Fortunately
for the hypothesis under investigation, the game ended in a very dramatic
loss for the Arizona football team, and hence the impact of the loss on
identification with the team as a function of mortality salience could be
examined. Prior to the game participants were found to be optimistic about
TABLE 1
Number of predicted goals for the Netherlands and Germany as a function
of mortality salience
Mortality salient Control
Netherlands 1.61a 1.08b

Germany 1.20ab 1.25ab
Adapted from Dechesne et al., 2000a.

Means that do not share a subscript differ at p 5 .02.
the outcome of the season opener, and mortality salience was found to
enhance this tendency. After the loss, however, the expected effect of
mortality salience on optimism did not emerge. Interestingly, in the control
condition, relative identification with the Arizona football team compared
to the basketball team did not vary depending on the outcome of the game.
In the mortality-salient condition, however, there was relatively lower
identification with the football team after the loss (see Table 2).
The pattern emerging from these studies suggests that self-esteem
concerns may actually moderate the effect of mortality salience on people’s
identification with social groups. However, it is also at odds with evidence
showing that people do sometimes hang on to their ingroup, even when it is
unlikely to provide them with positive self-esteem. Several factors may
account for this apparent discrepancy. On the one hand, groups may vary
with respect to the function that they serve for individuals, and this may in
turn moderate the effect of mortality salience on identification with these
groups (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughin-Volpe, 2004). We will return to
this point in the next section. Other factors, like contextual variables or
individual differences, may also impact on people’s tendency to ‘‘fight’’ for
or ‘‘fly’’ from their ingroup. Two studies explored the effect of these two
factors.
Following the classic literature on motivation (e.g., Kruglanski, 1996), it
was argued that the decision to stay with a group is determined by the value
an individual places on staying with it and the recognition that alternative
options for identifications are available. To examine the role of value in
hanging on to or abandoning a particular group commitment, insights
derived from lay epistemic theory (Kruglanski, 1989) are relevant.
Kruglanski has suggested that some individuals may be especially prone
to identify quickly with particular beliefs and group memberships and to
TABLE 2
Relative identification with the University of Arizona basketball team relative to the
University of Arizona football team as a function of mortality salience and loss of
Arizona football team
Pre-loss 1.64a 4.77b

Post-loss 6.82c 3.00b
From Dechesne et al., 2000a.

Scores could vary between 732 (extreme identification with the University of Arizona football
team relative to the basketball team) to þ32 (extreme relative identification with the basketball
team relative to the football team).
Means that do not share a subscript differ at p 5 .08.
fiercely hang on to them, in order to avoid uncertainty. Individuals who

exhibit this tendency are referred to as individuals with a high ‘‘need for
closure’’. Shah, Kruglanski, and Thompson (1998) have shown that
individuals with a high need for closure are especially likely to value group
membership, as it validates their beliefs and thereby helps to avoid
uncertainty.
Given the differences in value associated with maintaining group
membership, we reasoned that need for closure may constitute a moderator
of whether people defend or distance themselves from a group that
reflects negatively upon them when confronted with mortality (Dechesne,
Janssen, & Van Knippenberg, 2000b). Whereas individuals high in need for
closure are expected to be more prone to hang on to their group and defend
it, individuals low in need for closure are expected to be more prone to
distance themselves from group membership when it reflects negatively on
the self, after a confrontation with mortality. To examine this hypothesis,
participants were divided into high and low need for closure on the basis of a
median split on their score on the Personal Need for Structure scale (PNS;
Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).4 Half of the participants were then confronted
with death by means of subliminal presentations of the word ‘‘death’’ (see
Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997, for details about this
subliminal manipulation), while participants in the control condition were
exposed to subliminal presentation of ‘‘xxxx’’. All participants were
subsequently confronted with negative information about their university.
The level of identification with the university and the evaluation of the
source of this negative information were recorded directly afterwards
(Dechesne et al., 2000b). Consistent with the hypothesis, high need for
closure participants in the mortality-salient condition maintained their level
of identification with the university (compared to the control condition) and
exhibited stronger dislike for the critic of their university. These findings
suggest that individuals high in need for closure who are confronted with
death, and with negative information about group membership, cling on to
their group and defend it ( fight strategy).
Individuals who were low in need for closure exhibited the opposite
pattern. Specifically, judgement of the critic of the university was not
affected by the mortality salience manipulation. However, these participants
exhibited considerably less identification with the university in the
mortality salience condition relative to the control ( fly strategy). The
findings supported the hypothesis that need for closure affected the terror
4
Although the measure used is the Personal Need for Structure, the reasoning behind the
original study was in terms of Need for Closure. The two concepts are linked, although there is
an ongoing debate in this regard (Kruglanski, Atash, DeGrada, Mannetti, Pierro, & Webster,
1997; Neuberg, Judice & West, 1997).
management strategy used. Whereas individuals high in need for closure

stick to their group and defend it, in spite of the negative implications for the
self, low need for closure individuals are more prone to abandon a group
that reflects negatively on the self (see Table 3).
In a second study (Dechesne et al., 2000b; Expt. 2), we proposed that
structural properties of the group, specifically the ‘‘permeability’’ of the
group, would constitute a particularly powerful determinant of how group
members respond to manipulations of group status and mortality salience.
The extent to which individuals are able to distance themselves from a
particular group is likely to depend on the ‘‘permeability’’ of group
boundaries (Tajfel, 1978). Perceiving group boundaries as permeable may
make dis-identification more likely to occur, for members of these groups
see individual mobility as an easier strategy than defending the group when
it is a source of negative self-esteem.
In the study, participants first read one of two versions of a newspaper
article. One version of the article suggested that university affiliation is
difficult to break with (impermeability condition) while the other version
suggested that university affiliation is easy to break with (permeability
condition). The subsequent procedure was similar to that used in the first
study. Results indicated that participants who were made aware of the
impermeability of university affiliation responded with greater dislike of a
critic of their university when they were reminded of death, whereas
participants who were made aware of the permeability of this affiliation did
not. Rather, these latter participants responded to the criticism with lower
identification after they were reminded about death. It thus seems that
having alternative identifications influenced participants’ decision to
distance themselves from or defend their group under conditions of
mortality salience (see Table 4).
TABLE 3
Cell means for the interaction between need for closure and mortality salience on
university affiliation and evaluation of a critic
Identification Evaluation of critic

Mortality salient Control Mortality salient Control
High NFClo 5.07a 5.37a 3.45a 4.05a,b

Low NFClo 4.26b 5.70a 3.84a,b 3.77a,b
Adapted from Dechesne et al., 2000b, Study 1.

Scores could range from 1 (extremely low identification; extreme disliking) to 9 (extremely high
identification; extreme liking).
Means that do not share a subscript differ at p 5 .05 from adjacent row and column. NFClo
denotes Need for Closure.
TABLE 4
Cell means for the interaction between permeability and mortality salience on
university identification and evaluation of a critic
Identification Evaluation of critic

Mortality salient Control Mortality salient Control
Impermeable 5.96a 5.61a 2.62a 3.36b

Permeable 4.60b 5.82a 3.69b 3.50b
Adapted from Dechesne et al., 2000b, Study 2.

Scores could range from 1 (extremely low identification; extreme disliking) to 9 (extremely high
identification; extreme liking).
Means that do not share a subscript differ at p 5 .05 from adjacent row and column.
The studies presented in this section yield further support for the idea
that under mortality-salient conditions, individuals’ striving for a positive
self-esteem is enhanced. They showed that group-derived self-esteem may
also serve to appease existential concerns and that individuals may move
away from group memberships that could contribute negatively to their
sense of self. In the next section, we present findings from another line of
research, in which social identities are considered to be the repository of a
different level of existence, which may serve as an anxiety-buffer
mechanism per se.
SOCIAL IDENTITY AS A PROVIDER OF EXISTENCE

Since the early 1990s, scholars working in the social identity theory tradition
have questioned the emphasis that research inspired by the theory had
placed on self-esteem as a primary motivator of ingroup bias, as well as on
its consequences for the quality of intergroup relations (for a review, see
Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Abrams and Hogg (1988), for instance, argued
that needs other than attaining a positive self-esteem are satisfied through
membership in social groups. Notably, the need to know oneself; to know
who one is. These authors do not question that individuals, when
categorised into laboratory groups, favour their group in order to attain
positive distinctiveness. However, they focus on distinctiveness, rather than
on positive. Individuals, they argue, want to have a clear sense of who this we
is, and differentiation from the non-we is a way to achieve this goal.
The hypothesised need to achieve a clear image of this we is consistent
with more recent work on the concept of ingroup entitativity. The term
entitativity was coined by Campbell (1958) to refer to the extent to which
a group is (perceived to be) a real entity, an entity possessing a real existence.
Starting in the early 1990s, the concept was rediscovered by social
psychologists (for a recent review see Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004)
because of its importance in understanding stereotyping and the perception
of outgroups in general (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), as well as the
relationship individuals hold with their own ingroups (for reviews, see
Castano, 2004a; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens & Paladino, 2000).
Of particular importance to the present purpose are findings showing a
link between the perception of ingroup entitativity and identification with
the ingroup. For instance, Castano, Yzerbyt, and Bourguignon (2003) found
that heightening the perception of the entitativity of the European Union led
to increased identification among EU citizens, while lessening the perception
of the EU as a real entity resulted in disidentification from it.
Why is entitativity a valued characteristic of the ingroup? Work in the
field of international relations suggests that entitativity leads to the
perception of intentionality, which is associated with agency and therefore
with the perception of security at the collective level (Castano et al., 2003;
Sacchi & Castano, 2002). Ingroup entitativity, however, may serve a much
more fundamental need for individuals. It may turn the groups to which one
belongs into real entities, of which individuals can become part in order to
attain a different level of existence than that guaranteed by the individual
self.
Becoming part of collective entities would allow individuals to extend
their selves in space and time to overcome the inherent limitations of their
individual identity, an identity inextricably linked to a perishable body
(Castano, Yzerbyt, & Paladino, 2004). As discussed above, death’s most
terrifying aspect is the cessation of existence, the breaking of a continuity.
Belonging to a community and sharing a collective identity guarantees
precisely that one’s continuity is not lost at death. The philosopher Fichte
expressed this idea very clearly, describing the ancient Romans’ attachment
to their community: ‘‘What inspired the men of noble mind among the
Romans [. . .] to struggles and sacrifices, to patience and endurance for the
fatherland? [. . .] It was their firm belief in the continuation of their Roma
and their confident expectation that they themselves would eternally
continue to live in this eternity in the stream of time’’ (quoted in Pecora,
2001, p. 119).
If the above rationale has some validity, individuals should show a
certain proclivity to see their ingroups as entitative and to identify with them
whenever their continuity as unique human beings is threatened. This
rationale was tested across a series of studies. To keep with Fichte’s idea
about the Romans, a first study was conducted in Italy, at the University of
Padova (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002c). In this study, half of
the participants were first asked to think of their own death and write down
what they thought would happen to them when they died and what
emotions they would feel. The other half completed a similar task in which
they thought about reading a book.5 After the manipulation and a brief
delay (see footnote 3), participants completed what was presented to them as
a second, unrelated, part of the study. This concerned itself with their
perceptions of Italy, and included measures of the entitativity of their
national group, Italians (e.g., ‘‘Italians have many characteristics in
common’’, ‘‘Italians have a sense of common fate’’, ‘‘Italy has real existence
as a group’’; Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 1999), ingroup identifi-
cation (e.g., ‘‘I identify with Italians’’, ‘‘Being Italian has nothing to do with
my identity’’), and ingroup bias. The latter consisted of ratings of Italians
and Germans (the outgroup) on 10 traits (e.g., gourmet, warm, hard-
working). The findings of this study yielded support for our hypothesis.
Mortality-salient participants identified more strongly with Italy and they
judged Italians more favourably than participants in the control condition,
while judgements of Germans were not affected by the manipulation.6 Most
crucially, the perception of the entitativity of Italy was greatly enhanced in
the mortality-salient condition, compared to the control condition (see
Table 5).
These results complemented previous findings in the TMT and ingroup
bias literature. Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, and Simon (1996) had
shown that priming people with death led to stronger ingroup bias, and a
study by Gaertner and Schopler (1998) yielded evidence that fostering
ingroup entitativity increases ingroup bias. Further analyses of our data
revealed that the perception of entitativity mediated the impact of the
mortality-salience manipulation on ingroup bias (Castano et al., 2002c).
The results presented above provided clear evidence in support of the
hypothesis that making death salient would increase identification with the
ingroup, and especially the perception of ingroup entitativity. Here
entitativity was measured via a direct procedure: we asked participants to
indicate their agreement with statements such as ‘‘Italy has a real existence
as a group’’. However, entitativity can also be assessed indirectly, notably
5
Traditionally, in mortality salience studies the control condition has consisted in asking
participants to think about watching television, a visit to the dentist, or speaking in front of a
large audience. While the first control condition simply attempted to control for participants’
writing activity done in the mortality salience condition (where they write about their own
death), the two other control conditions are attempts to match the unpleasantness of the events,
by asking participants to think of a fearful event (visit to the dentist) or an anxiety-inducing
event (speaking in front of an audience). Whether or not these constitute entirely appropriate
control conditions remains open to discussion, but since they have been accepted as such in the
literature so far, we do not discuss this issue in the present contribution.
6
Although lesser judgements of outgroups do occur in mortality salience studies, this is not a
consistent finding and it is at times moderated by order of presentation of the target groups
(Greenberg et al., 1990). Concern with the ingroup and its value is, on the other hand, a greater
concern for individuals both in general (Brewer, 1999) and particularly so when mortality is
made salient.
TABLE 5
Entitativity, identification, ingroup, outgroup, and ingroup bias (ingroup – outgroup
rating) scores as a function of experimental condition (Mortality salient vs Control)
Entitativity 5.40a 4.77b

Identification 6.19a 5.09b
Ingroup 6.70a 5.88b
Outgroup 5.69a 5.43a
Ingroup bias 1.01a 0.45b
Adapted from Castano et al., 2002c.

Scores could range from 1 (low identification, entitativity, group positivity) to 9 (high
identification, entitativity, group positivity).
Means in the same line with different subscripts differ at p 5 .05 or less.
through participants’ reliance on strategies aimed at ensuring it. Research

stemming from Social Identity Theory has shed light on strategies
individuals use to safeguard the integrity of their group, such as the
‘‘black-sheep effect’’ (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988): Group members
maintain the integrity of their ingroup by judging a poorly performing
ingroup member in an extremely negative manner, considering him or her as
atypical of the ingroup and possibly expelling him from the ingroup
(Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002a).7
Consistent with the wisdom that an ounce of prevention is better than a
pound of cure, group members seem to be particularly attentive when it
comes to including others in the ranks of their own group. Early research on
prejudice and racial categorisation showed that highly prejudiced indivi-
duals who were asked to classify pictures of individual targets as belonging
to their own ingroup or a stigmatised outgroup (e.g., Jews), classified a
greater number of targets as members of the outgroup (e.g., Allport &
Kramer, 1946). More recently, Leyens and colleagues proposed that group
members show this tendency as a consequence of their need to protect their
ingroup; to safeguard it from infiltration of outgroup members. In several
studies it was shown that group members do indeed over-exclude from their
own ingroup when engaged in a categorisation task (Leyens & Yzerbyt,
1992; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995). This was termed the ingroup over-
exclusion effect, and as one would expect to observe if the effect was indeed
an ingroup defence strategy, it seems to occur particularly among group
7
The black-sheep effect can also be interpreted as serving the maintenance of the stereotype,
or image of the ingroup. We consider, however, that maintaining its image can be part of a
broader strategy to maintain its entitativity.
members who strongly identified with the ingroup (Castano, Yzerbyt,

Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002b).
We therefore used an ingroup – outgroup categorisation task to provide
a further test for our hypothesis concerning the effects of death thoughts
on the importance of ingroup entitativity (Castano, 2004b). This study was
conducted at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and consisted of the
classification of pictures of individuals as Scottish or English. The stimuli,
50 head-shots of males, had been pre-tested within the same population
subsequently used for the actual study, in order to identify the extent to
which each individual depicted was considered Scottish or English. The set
of pictures was subdivided into five different groups, representing different
levels of ‘‘Scottishness’’, or ‘‘ingroupness’’. Pictures at level 1 were those
that tended predominantly to be classified as English; pictures at level 5
tended to be classified predominantly as Scottish; and the remaining levels
consisted of pictures that were perceived as intermediate along this bipolar
continuum.
A random sample of 30 of these pictures was then presented to each
participant in the actual study, also conducted with Scottish participants.
Beforehand, however, participants completed an alleged word-association
task, in which they had to decide whether two words that appeared in the
centre of the computer screen in short sequence were related (e.g., rose and
flowers) or not (e.g., rose and cat). Participants were presented with a total
of 23 trials. Unknown to them, in between the two words, a third word was
flashed at the centre of the computer screen for 47 milliseconds. This word,
which constituted the subliminal prime, varied depending on the condition,
and it was either field or death.
Building on previous over-exclusion findings (Castano et al., 2002b) we
anticipated that participants in the death-prime condition would show a
stronger degree of ingroup over-exclusion, particularly at lower levels of
ingroupness, that is, for target pictures that the pretest indicated were likely
to be categorised as English (i.e., outgroup members). The reverse pattern
was expected to emerge for targets that very much looked like ingroup
members. This was precisely the pattern that was observed (see Figure 1).
While at lower levels of ingroupness, death-prime participants classified
more pictures as outgroup members than did control participants, the
opposite trend was observed at higher levels of ingroupness (Castano,
2004b).
In addition to the categorisation decisions, the latency for categorisation
was also recorded. The findings on this variable showed that while the
control condition revealed no relationship between the type of target to be
classified and the categorisation latency, most interesting linear and
quadratic trends emerged in the mortality-salient condition. The linear
trend suggested that these participants took longer to classify pictures when
they looked like ingroup members compared to when they looked like
outgroup members. The quadratic trend, however, suggested that ambiguity
of the picture also played a role, with participants taking the longest time to
categorise them (see Figure 2). This result is consistent with the hypothesis
Figure 1. Categorisation as a function of ingroupness and the experimental condition (adapted

from Castano, 2004b).
Figure 2. Categorisation-latency as a function of ingroupness and the experimental condition

(adapted from Castano, 2004b).
that ingroup – outgroup categorisation becomes a more important task

under mortality-salient conditions. More precisely, it suggests that ingroup/
outgroup boundaries are more important and thus ingroup entitativity more
valued under such circumstances.
Shifting from common-identity to common-bond groups (Prentice,
Miller, & Lightdale, 1994),8 a third experiment, which aimed at assessing
the impact of death-thoughts on the perception of ingroup entitativity,
was conducted using a sample of Belgian undergraduates at the Catholic
University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve (Yzerbyt, Castano, & Vermeulen,
1999). After the classic manipulation of mortality salience in which some
participants were asked to write about their own death while others wrote
about the experience of watching television, participants were presented with
an allegedly unrelated questionnaire, which ostensibly focused on how people
perceived themselves and their group of friends. The questionnaire contained
our measure of group entitativity, which was a modified version of the
‘‘Inclusion-of-other-in-self’’ measure (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) depict-
ing six different configurations of overlapping circles, from completely
overlapping, to not overlapping at all, representing the participant and the
members of his or her group of friends. In the present study, participants chose
one amid various configurations of circles that corresponded to different levels
of overlapping between themselves and their group of friends. The higher the
overlap, the higher the perceived entitativity of the group (cf. Gaertner &
Schopler, 1998). In line with expectations, we observed a higher perception of
entitativity of the group of friends in the mortality-salient condition.
Two further studies yielded more evidence in support of our conjecture.
In one study, we primed participants with death using the classic
manipulation described above and subsequently asked them to complete
the who-am-I? task. We then simply counted the social identities that were
listed (male/female; Belgian/Italian; student; etc.). Consistent with expecta-
tions, participants in the mortality-salient condition listed a greater number
of social identities than those in the control condition (Castano & Sacchi,
1999).
In another study, we also focused on the effect of mortality salience on
social identification, but took another, more subtle approach (Yzerbyt,
Carnaghi, & Castano 2003). In this study, psychology majors at the Catholic
University of Louvain first rated the extent to which a series of traits were
characteristic of themselves and then, depending on the experimental con-
dition, were instructed to write a paragraph about their own death
8
Common-bond groups are groups characterised by face-to-face interaction, tend to be
smaller in size, and are based on the relationship between group members. Common-identity
groups tend to be large social categories, with a defined social identity and stereotypical group
characteristics. Members of these groups are not necessarily familiar with each other and
therefore concerned with other specific members, but with belonging to the social category.
(mortality-salient condition), or about leaving their parental home in order

to start living on their own (control condition). Subsequently, participants
were asked to rate the ingroup (psychologists) on the same traits that they
had used to rate the self. Both lists of traits comprised a series of filler traits
along with six traits that pretesting had revealed were stereotypical of
psychologists. There were three positive traits (empathic, understanding,
sensitive) and three negative traits (disorganised, messy, disordered). In
order to make participants’ task somewhat less obvious, the order of the
presentation of the traits differed between the self and the group.
The critical dependent variable was the degree of overlap between the self
and the ingroup ratings, which was measured by means of a d-square score.
This score provides a measure of the similarity between two profiles (in the
present context, the self and the ingroup) while taking into account the
distance between the ratings given to the traits. We computed one d-score
for the positive traits and one for the negative traits to obtain two indices of
self – group similarity. Analyses on these scores revealed that the self –
ingroup overlap was much higher in the mortality-salient condition than in
the control condition. However, this was the case only for the negative
traits. The absence of effects of the manipulation on the positive traits was
most likely due to a ceiling effect. Indeed, the self – ingroup overlap on
positive traits was very high in both conditions (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Reversed d-square as a function of experimental condition and trait valence (high
scores denote stronger self-ingroup overlap; Yzerbyt et al., 2003).
These data yield further evidence for the claim that stronger attachment
to the ingroup in a mortality salience condition, compared to a control
condition, can be observed with indicators that are not easily controllable
by participants. Moreover, because the enhanced self – ingroup overlap
occurred on negative traits, the present findings suggest that, at least in the
present case, identification was unlikely to be due to self-esteem concerns.
The work reviewed in this section yielded evidence in support of the
hypothesis that when we are reminded of death, we see the groups to which
we belong as more entitative and we identify more strongly with them. All in
all, therefore, it seems that identification with a reified ingroup may well
serve as an anxiety buffer mechanism. These findings are noteworthy
because of the variety of manipulations utilised, as well as the fact that
effects on identification and entitativity emerged for a variety of social
groups, both common-bond and common-identity groups.
So, is this about existence or self-esteem? Our work on the effects of
mortality salience on social identification and group perception processes
has moved away from asking this question. There is little doubt that
individuals do derive self-esteem from the social groups to which they
belong, and that mortality salience may lead group members to dis-identify
from certain groups when they risk reflecting negatively upon them. Arndt,
Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (2002) have recently found a
dis-identification effect similar to those presented here, but this emerged only
among stigmatised groups (e.g., Hispanic identity in the US), and in
contexts in which individuals could switch to a more inclusive social identity
(e.g., American). In addition to this, the results of the studies presented here
also show that dis-identification from social groups under mortality salience
is not for everybody. Some individuals (low need for closure) chose to fly
from the group, while others (high need for closure) chose to fight for the
group when it is threatened and death-thoughts are accessible. Finally, it is
reasonable to assume that not all groups are equal with respect to the
function that they satisfy for individuals, or, even more importantly,
with respect to the relevance to one’s identity. Hence, membership in
and identification with just any group may not serve as an anxiety-buffer
mechanism.
Research suggests that individuals organise information about social
groups according to a specific typology (intimacy groups, task-oriented
groups, and social categories) and that these groups have different functions
for individuals (Lickel, Hamilton, Wieczorkowska, Lewis, Sherman, &
Uhles, 2000; Sherman, Castelli, & Hamilton, 2002). It is therefore possible
that some social groups may serve as anxiety-buffer mechanisms by
providing self-esteem while others do so by providing a different level of
existence altogether. Furthermore, it is likely that several avenues are
available to individuals in their quest for some sense of immortality. Which
specific one is used may depend on the interaction between some relatively
stable individual characteristics and even constant features of the social
environment on the one hand, and changing contextual factors on the other.
The manipulation of the relative attractiveness of the ingroup, for instance,
may make self-esteem highly salient, and elicit responses to death-prime
aimed at defending the contextually threatened self-esteem, even at the cost
of abandoning a social identity that may constitute an anxiety buffer under
normal circumstances. Future research may also attempt to pit these
strategies against each other, in a manner similar to a series of studies by
Wisman and Koole (2003). In one of these experiments participants were
confronted with the dilemma of choosing between sitting alone and
defending their worldviews or sitting in a group and assuming the group’s
worldviews, which opposed those held by the participants themselves.
The results indicated that participants in the mortality-salient condition
were more likely to resolve the dilemma by choosing affiliation (with
outgroup support) over isolation (with support of one’s view against the
outgroup’s).
All in all, we believe that the goal of future research will likely be that of
disentangling who uses which strategy under which circumstances. Since
many of the effects of making mortality salient are negative (e.g., more
dislike for dissimilar others) this research may also provide some insights
with respect to the kind of social and psychological environment that would
be less conducive to such effects. In other words, it is unlikely that death-
anxiety will go away anytime soon, but perhaps the way in which individuals
deal with it may become less destructive. In the next section, we initiate this
discussion by presenting a historical and a cross-cultural perspective on
the relationship between sense of identity and the avenues available to
individuals in their quest for immortality.
SELF-CONSTRUAL, INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE

IMMORTALITY
In his cogent analysis of Rank’s work, Becker (1973, p. 177) points to the
fact that neurosis (which is seen by these authors as intrinsic to the human
condition, rather than a pathological state) is not only an individual private
phenomenon, but has a clear historical component. Its gravity is a function
of the individual’s ability and talent for dealing with the fundamental
existential question, as well as the precise historical period in which he/she
lives. As observed by Lifton (1996; p. 293), with ‘‘retrospective romanti-
cism’’ we are used to looking at the ancient past as a period in which
symbolic forms were more available than they are in current times.
However, in Western societies, periods of strong symbolisation have
alternated with periods of symbolic breakdown throughout history.
Among the various periods, those of interest for our purposes here are
those that reflect a change in the extent to which one’s identity was
profoundly embedded in the social rather than being individualised.
According to the rationale presented here, societal arrangements that secure
the inclusion of the self in the social should be conducive to lesser death-
anxiety at the individual level than periods in which the self is highly
individualised. Furthermore, if societal arrangements systematically prevent
a large part of the population from achieving some form of individual
immortality, this part of the population may redirect its efforts towards
attaining collective immortality. Below we present an analysis of two periods
in the history of Western civilisation in which a change in the sense of
identity seems to have been accompanied by reflections on human beings’
existential concerns. Naturally, such historical analyses have less internal
validity and a higher degree of subjectivity than we are accustomed to in
modern experimental psychology.
Death across time

Primitive man . . . developed language. We reflected on our own existence. We
became aware of ourselves as creatures with a past and a future, individual and
collective histories. We developed culture . . . but there’s a downside to self-
consciousness. We know that we’re going to die. Imagine what a terrible shock it
was to Neanderthal Man, or Cro-Magnon Man, or whoever it was that first
clocked the dreadful truth: that one day he would be meat. Lions and tigers don’t
know that. Apes don’t know it. We do.
(Lodge, 2002, p. 101)
One such juncture is described by David Ulansey, a scholar who

specialises in religions of the ancient Mediterranean societies. Ulansey
argues that a turning point in the human relationship to death occurred
as a consequence of the conquests of Alexander the Great, around
330 BC. According to Ulansey, prior to such conquests, identities were
linked to one’s relationships to others within fixed social arrangements
represented by the tribe or the polis. An individual’s death was not an
issue, in as much as life itself was not an issue; its meaning was derived
from belonging to the local community. The community was the real
entity, and individuals were only instantiations of it. Individual death,
however great a source of pain, suffering, and despair, was part of the
larger order of things. An order in which the community was central not
only in the organisation of daily life, but, most importantly, to the
business of immortality. The community constituted the bridge between
the individual and the gods and so ensured the former a collective form
of transcendence: ‘‘the fact that the collective would continue after one’s
personal death was experienced unconsciously as reducing the stress that
the knowledge of human mortality might otherwise produce’’ (Ulansey,

2000, p. 216).
This state of affairs was completely challenged by the new order that
followed the military conquests of Alexander the Great. For the common
man, the change that this brought about was not so much with respect to the
arrangements of daily life, but rather at the metaphysical level. Immortality
was previously ensured by the communities to which one belonged, but these
were now gone, lost in the new societal arrangements and especially in the
new narrative that had been imposed through military conquest. This thesis
is aptly synthesised by Tarn’s conclusion that ‘‘with Alexander begins man
as an individual’’ (1968; p. 79). This change had profound consequences on
people’s relationship to the problem of death (Ulansey, 2000, p. 218):
. . . before the Hellenistic age, anxiety about death was dealt with through
identification with the community which would live on after one’s death. However,
when this sense of corporate identity succumbed to the new individualism of the
Hellenistic era, the problem of death moved quickly into the foreground of
consciousness. The result was that the search for new ways of coming to terms with
one’s mortality became intertwined with the search for new symbolic systems that
could help achieve an understanding of the divine realm but that were no longer
tied to particular localities.
This ‘‘historical dislocation’’ (Lifton, 1996) provided fertile ground for

the emergence of Christianity, which moved away from collective
immortality and, through the resuscitation of the soul, offered to the
individual his/her own unmediated gateway to eternal life.9
There is not space here to even attempt a synthetic treatment of the
relationship between the individual and death in Christian civilisation. For
our purposes it is sufficient to highlight the conflict that from roughly the
16th century onwards has characterised religious-transcendental and
rational-scientific conceptions of man within Western Christian civilisation.
The evolution of this conflict has been studied by countless historians,
sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists, from a wealth of
often contentious perspectives. Dissenting interpretations notwithstanding,
it seems undeniable that the latter part of the 18th century can still be
regarded as a watershed in the ride of what some commentators call
‘‘modern Europe’’ and others call ‘‘modernity’’.
9
The Christian strategy of granting immortality on a personal basis, as opposed to through
the local community, is of course not the only response to this symbolic breakdown. Different
societies evolved out of this metaphysical vacuum in different ways. The Jews ‘‘projected their
own national anxieties onto the universe as a whole, and produced in their apocalyptic literature
an astonishing array of cosmological symbolism and visionary predictions’’ (Ulansey, 2000,
p. 219), while at the same time solidifying the family as the entity of which, and within which,
immortality was to be pursued (Rank, 1950).
In the passage from pre-modern to modern times, positive knowledge

became a substitute for belief, scientific Truth became the new God, and, in
the words of an authoritative commentator of modernity, Zygut Bauman, a
new transformation of the individual’s relationship to death was born.
Bauman (1992) argues that in pre-modern times death was less of an issue
than it has been in modern times. Not because it was less present, but
because it was more so. ‘‘In those times, death struck frequently, early,
blindly and without warning; death was a daily and highly visible
occurrence, neither a secret nor an extraordinary event’’ (pp. 96 – 97). To
say that death was less of an issue in those times, Bauman emphasises, does
not mean that it was less painful an event to deal with. Rather, it means that
it was more likely to be accepted as yet another event of life: ‘‘Death was
tamed because it was not a challenge, in the same sense in which all other
elements of the life-process were not challenges in a world in which identities
were given, everything was stuck to its place in the great chain of being and
things ran their course by themselves’’ (p. 97). Such an orderly state of
affairs comes to an end with the Enlightenment, when new, revolutionary
ideas about the nature of man and his place in the universe emerged. Men
are no longer members of parishes, families, or guilds; they are (once again)
individuals.
This transition is usually looked upon favourably because of the
theoretical possibility for the re-invention of an individual self that is no
longer situated. The transition, however, is not complete. Side by side
with the institutionalisation of the liberal view of the individual, the same
historical processes that led to the creation of the bourgeois subject-
individual were also creating a society of new collectives: social classes
first, and the more elusive ‘‘masses’’ later, towards the end of the 19th
century. The classes-masses, now metaphysically liberated, do not have
the means necessary to create meaning or to forge a new identity. Elites
possess the ‘‘weapons of self-assertion’’ which render realistic their ‘‘effort
to make their presence in the world significant and consequential’’
(Bauman, 1992, p. 103). The classes-masses clearly do not; they are left
with the awareness that their destiny is in their hands yet there is little or
no room for them to forge any decent form of immortality for
themselves. Whereas in pre-modern times all participated in the same
metaphysical system, the new order produces a deep social split, and for
the masses, deprived of the means to attain significance and thus
symbolic immortality as individuals, the only option is to turn towards
collective forms of immortality. These are fertile grounds for collective
ideologies, since ‘‘embracing an ideology [. . .] can create forms of
experiential transcendence that extend into much of existence’’ (Lifton,
1996, p. 111). And, as observed by Smith (1995, p. 160), nationalistic
ideologies have become the chief provider of collective identity since the
19th century: ‘‘Over and beyond any political and economical benefits
that ethnic nationalism can confer, it is this promise of collective and
terrestrial immortality, outfacing death and oblivion, that has helped to
sustain so many nations and national states in an era of unprecedented
social change.’’ Similarly, Kelman (1969) noted that attachment to the
nation gains much of its strength from the fact that it is likely to fulfil,
among other things, the important need to transcend the self through
identification with distant groups and causes.
It could be argued that nationalism is a particularly well-suited ideology
to buffer death-anxiety, since the national group is usually highly reified.
People see their nation as a timeless entity, and even in the absence of a
state, an essence is thought to characterise and unite all fellow nationals.
However, other ideologies that do not rely on the ‘‘blood and soil’’ imagery,
and thus may be less likely to foster the idea of permanence, also seem to
have played the immortality card. In Soviet Marxist Bogdanov’s collective
philosophy (as reviewed in Williams, 1980), the characteristic of socialist
society is precisely to deify the collective, in a way similar to that in which
capitalistic society deifies the individual and Christianity promises him/her
personal immortality. ‘‘United in its collective will, the proletariat will some
day achieve godlike powers to conquer all obstacles of nature, including
death’’ (Williams, 1980, p. 391).
While they feed on the individual’s need to locate him/herself and thus
reduce death-anxiety, ideologies, paradoxically, sometimes require indivi-
dual deaths, which are presented as ‘‘correct deaths’’ (Berger & Luckmann,
1967). ‘‘All men must die, but death can vary in its significance [. . .] To die
for the people is heavier than Mount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die
for the exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a feather’’ (Mao Tse-tung,
quoted in Lifton, 1968).
Death across space

The two examples above yield some support for the idea that societies in
which the self is highly individualised may lead to greater death-anxiety, and
that individuals who cannot, for instance by virtue of their social class,
aspire to individual immortality will be more likely to pursue forms of
collective immortality, notably through embracing nationalist causes and
collective ideologies.
To investigate the relationship between self-construal, death-anxiety, and
immortality strategies one can also compare cultures in which the sense of
identity of their members is deeply embedded in the social structure, or,
rather, highly individualised. Cross-cultural psychology literature distin-
guishing between individualistic and collectivistic cultures seems to offer an
appropriate vantage point.
A key difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures is the

way in which the self is thought to be construed, with the former being
characterised by an independent self and the latter by an interdependent self
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). While an independent self means a self-
perception as a unique individual, separate from the social context, an
interdependent self stresses the connectedness with others, one’s social roles
and relationships. Although great within-culture variances exist, overall
Asian cultures are thought to be more collectivistic, and Western cultures
more individualistic (Triandis, 1989).
We are aware of no research that has investigated the hypothesis that
individuals in collectivistic cultures experience less death-anxiety than
individuals in individualistic cultures. However, several studies exist which
have tested the effect of mortality-salience manipulations in collectivistic
cultures. Replicating findings observed with North American participants in
Japan (i.e., a collectivistic culture), Heine, Harihara, and Niija (2002) found
greater antipathy towards the writer of an essay that attacked Japan and its
way of life, as well as a tendency among participants to increase preference
for high-status but not for low-status products, in the mortality-salience
condition as compared to a control condition.
However, other research conducted in a collectivistic culture (Costa Rica)
has yielded different results. Across two studies, Navarrete, Kurkban,
Fessler, and Kirkpatrick (2004; Study 3 & 4) explored the effect of various
primes on preference for essays praising or criticising one’s country and
found no mortality-salience effects on pro-ingroup bias. Interestingly, a
priming of social isolation (think of being completely isolated from family
and friends) did lead to a significant increase in pro-ingroup bias as
compared to the no-prime condition. Yet a different perspective on the issue
emerges from a study by Halloran and Kashima (2004), who investigated the
effect of death reminders among Australian aboriginals—another collecti-
vistic culture. These authors first made salient either Aboriginal identity or
Australian identity, next to a control procedure where no identity was made
salient, and then reminded participants about either death or a control topic.
Subsequently, participants’ endorsement of individualist and collectivist
statements was assessed. Although results were only marginally significant,
Aboriginal participants did seem to respond to the mortality reminder. The
nature of the reaction, however, depended on which identity was primed.
When the Aboriginal, collectivistic identity was primed, participants tended
to increase their endorsement of an individualistic way of living. When the
Australian, individualistic identity was made salient, participants who were
reminded about death exhibited a decreased endorsement of collectivistic
values, relative to when they were not reminded about death.
While the studies reported above looked at collectivistic cultures
exclusively, another study by Kashima, Halloran, Yuki and Kashima
(2004) compared Japanese and Australian participants’ responses to a

mortality-salience manipulation. These authors found that while death
reminders led Australian participants to increase their endorsement of
individualist behaviour (i.e., thought to be characteristic of Australian
society), among Japanese participants the opposite was true—in both
groups, these effects emerged only among participants low in self-esteem.
In addition to the classic mortality-salience and control conditions, this
study also included a condition in which participants were asked to imagine
the extermination of their own national group (due to collision with a
meteorite). Interestingly, although this manipulation seemed to affect
participants’ endorsement of individualist behaviour, it did so differently
for the Australian and the Japanese participants. While the manipulation
had little effect among those high in self-esteem, among Australians low in
self-esteem a collective mortality prime led to endorsement of individualist
behaviour to a level intermediate to that of the control and the classic
mortality-salient condition. Among their Japanese counterparts, however, it
was the collective mortality prime that had the strongest effect (i.e., lowest
endorsement of individualist behaviour). This result is noteworthy, as it
suggests that while both Australians and Japanese respond to death primes,
the specific death prime matters.
It is possible that in a collectivistic culture such as Japan an important
way in which individuals achieve immortality is through collective
immortality. In other words, it is not the individual soul that is immortal,
but the collective entity to which all Japanese belong. This is an idea that has
some resonance with Lifton’s (1996) observation about Japanese purifying
rituals following death. Such rituals are necessary for a soul to reach the
kami (God) status, which can be defined as ‘‘a soul which has been cleansed
from impurity and has thereby lost its individual character’’ (p. 97; emphasis
added).10
The research reviewed above investigating the differences in the way the
individual reacts to death reminders in individualistic versus collectivistic
cultures produced mixed findings. While some studies found that the effects
of mortality salience in collectivistic cultures were similar to those found in
individualistic cultures, others, conducted in different collectivistic cultures,
found different patterns. Further research is needed before one can conclude
that reliable differences between these two types of cultures exist with respect
to the way in which individuals react to death reminders. In addition to
10
It should be noted, however, that the manipulation of collective mortality used in the study
by Kashima et al. (2004) may have resonated very differently in the two cultures. Among
Japanese participants, thinking of a meteorite obliterating one’s country may have elicited
thoughts of the nuclear bombing of Japan by the USA at the end of WW2, and thus have served
to prime national suffering. Therefore, more evidence is needed before a conclusion can be
drawn concerning the relative strength of these manipulations.
assessing the differences in reactions to the personal mortality manipula-

tions, that is, the classic TMT paradigm, research will also have to explore
whether personal versus collective mortality primes affect individuals in
these cultures differently.
Research on cross-cultural differences will also have to consider the
distinction between individual, relational, and collective selves (Sedikides &
Brewer, 2001). In a recent cross-cultural investigation, Yuki, Maddux,
Brewer, and Takemura (2005) demonstrated that Northern American
participants were more likely to trust a target with whom they shared a
social identity (e.g., they shared the same university affiliation or
nationality), while Japanese participants trusted targets with whom they
had an interpersonal connection (e.g., they knew someone attending the
same university or coming from the same city/nation). This finding suggests
a primacy of the collective self over the relational self among Americans, but
the opposite among Japanese, and thus points to the need for a better
articulation of the distinction between collectivistic and individualistic
cultures.
Finally, research aimed at exploring the relationship between self-
construal and reactions to personal and collective death reminders may also
benefit from looking at differences between social classes. Snibbe and
Markus (2005) have recently shown that differences in models of agency
(Markus & Kitayama, 2003) between individualistic and collectivistic
cultures (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999) could also be found when comparing
high to low socio-economic status (SES) individuals within individualistic
cultures. Specifically, low SES participants’ model of agency privileged
loyalty and reliability, while that of high SES participants’ favoured models
of agency concerned with uniqueness. If further research confirms this
finding, it could be expected that personal versus collective mortality
salience manipulations may have different effects on these two groups, or
that, when primed with death, low SES individuals may pursue collective
immortality strategies while high SES individuals would pursue individual
immortality strategies. This idea has some resonance with the ideas
expressed by Bauman (1992), and with findings showing the moderating
role of self-esteem on the effects of mortality salience manipulations
(Harmon-Jones, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & McGregor,
1997).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Remember that you shall die, Savonarola cautioned the Renaissance man,
to push him to repent, reject evil of various kinds, and embrace Christ.
Sadly, his reminder of death might have had the opposite effect on its
targets, making them more concerned with their own sense of self-worth, to
be pursued on futile dimensions such as bodily appearance or the

accumulation of wealth (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004b).
A host of such effects have been demonstrated over the last two decades
by experimental research conducted in the framework of Terror Manage-
ment Theory. Building on Rank, Becker, and others, this TMT perspective
suggests that human beings keep at bay the terror deriving from the
inevitable death by constructing meaning, and by perceiving themselves as
valuable members of the cultural system in which they live (Solomon et al.,
2004a). Twenty years after its first appearance, TMT, itself influenced by
psychoanalytical thinking and existential philosophy and psychotherapy,
has influenced a new generation of psychologists and has contributed to the
birth of a new psychological approach to existential questions, which is both
empirical and experimental (Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszczynski, 2004).
We were also inspired by TMT in our quest to understand the why of
social identification. One of us (Mark Dechesne) has focused on the self-
esteem hypothesis and, with his colleagues, provided evidence that social
identities may serve as anxiety-buffering mechanisms because individuals
can bask in the reflected glory of their ingroups, and in so doing obtain
collective self-esteem. The other (Emanuele Castano) started out from a
different perspective, one in which social identities are constitutive parts of
individuals, which allow for a different level of existence than that provided
by the individual self.
Although some of the findings presented here clearly show that death-
primed individuals may move away from certain social identities when these
are presented to them as negative, they do not imply that social
identification serves as an anxiety-buffer mechanism solely through
providing self-esteem. Consistent with most recent thinking in the social
identity theory tradition, social identities are conceived as a constitutive part
of an individual identity rather than an optional component that is used or
dismissed depending on the level of self-enhancement that provides. And as
discussed earlier in this chapter, it is likely that identification with different
kinds of groups may serve as an anxiety-buffer mechanism per se (see
Castano et al., 2004).
Data stemming from our own research studies at the core of the present
review is in keeping with the tradition of our own discipline. However, we
also presented an analysis of two critical junctures in the history of Western
civilisation, which we believe exemplify the key role that social identities
play in individuals’ struggle against the anxiety deriving from the awareness
of their mortality. One of these, at the end of the pre-Hellenistic era, brought
about a new sense of identity in which the self became unsituated. This,
Ulansey (2000) has argued, was accompanied by an increase in the
unconsciously experienced anxiety of death; a conclusion entirely consistent
with our perspective on the transcendental value of social identities.
The other critical juncture discussed here is the advent of the modern era,
in which Bauman (1992) sees the emergence of a split in the way in which the
elite and the masses attempt to ensure themselves some form of
immortality—through fame for the former and through collective endea-
vour, notably nationalism, for the latter. We think that the parallels between
social-psychological theory and philosophical, historical, and sociological
perspectives are of interest, especially given the difference in the levels of
analysis and methods of inquiry. Needless to say, we believe that a multi-
level analysis is to be preferred; it enriches all disciplines and helps to
provide a fuller account of the phenomena under investigation.
Social psychology has long recognised the important role played in
human psychology by social identification processes. The seminal work by
Mead in the 1930s and especially of Tajfel in the 1970s has stimulated
research that significantly advanced our understanding of human social
behaviour. These efforts have focused mostly on the consequences of social
identification, notably on intergroup behaviour. More recently, scholars
have begun to investigate the motives for social identification, and suggested
that such a process may be motivated by a need to reduce uncertainty
(Hogg & Abrams, 1993) and to find an equilibrium between the needs for
differentiation and assimilation (Brewer, 1991). In the present contribution,
we claim that social identities may satisfy yet another need, namely the need
to transcend oneself and, in so doing, help to manage the terror inherent in
the human condition.
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EUROPEAN REVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

2005, 16, 221 – 255

On defeating death: Group reiﬁcation and social

This chapter investigates the role of social identiﬁcation in the management of

Correspondence should be addressed to Emanuele Castano, New School for Social

Ó 2005 European Association of Experimental Social Psychology

TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY

Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). Greenberg,

received empirical support. At the time TMT was developed, evidence

SOCIAL IDENTITY AS A PROVIDER

(2 – 1). Both matches are considered classics in the Netherlands, where

Mortality salient Control

Netherlands 1.61a 1.08b

Adapted from Dechesne et al., 2000a.

Mortality salient Control

Pre-loss 1.64a 4.77b

From Dechesne et al., 2000a.

ﬁercely hang on to them, in order to avoid uncertainty. Individuals who

management strategy used. Whereas individuals high in need for closure

Identiﬁcation Evaluation of critic

High NFClo 5.07a 5.37a 3.45a 4.05a,b

Adapted from Dechesne et al., 2000b, Study 1.

Identiﬁcation Evaluation of critic

Impermeable 5.96a 5.61a 2.62a 3.36b

Adapted from Dechesne et al., 2000b, Study 2.

SOCIAL IDENTITY AS A PROVIDER OF EXISTENCE

Mortality salient Control

Entitativity 5.40a 4.77b

Adapted from Castano et al., 2002c.

through participants’ reliance on strategies aimed at ensuring it. Research

members who strongly identiﬁed with the ingroup (Castano, Yzerbyt,

Figure 1. Categorisation as a function of ingroupness and the experimental condition (adapted

Figure 2. Categorisation-latency as a function of ingroupness and the experimental condition

that ingroup – outgroup categorisation becomes a more important task

(mortality-salient condition), or about leaving their parental home in order

SELF-CONSTRUAL, INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE

Death across time

One such juncture is described by David Ulansey, a scholar who

the knowledge of human mortality might otherwise produce’’ (Ulansey,

This ‘‘historical dislocation’’ (Lifton, 1996) provided fertile ground for

In the passage from pre-modern to modern times, positive knowledge

Death across space

A key diﬀerence between individualistic and collectivistic cultures is the

(2004) compared Japanese and Australian participants’ responses to a

assessing the diﬀerences in reactions to the personal mortality manipula-

be pursued on futile dimensions such as bodily appearance or the

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