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DE274 Joint Response To Garfinkles Objection To Caldwell Settlement 9-22-2011
DE274 Joint Response To Garfinkles Objection To Caldwell Settlement 9-22-2011
In re:
Bankruptcy Estate (the “Trustee”), and the Estate of Harold Caldwell (through its Personal
Representative, Dawn Caldwell Fedrigon)(the “Caldwell Estate”), and Dawn and Michael
Fedrigon, (“Fedrigon”) (the Caldwell Estate and Fedrigon will jointly be referred to as the
“Settling Parties”) hereby files this their joint response to the Objection filed by Paul Garfinkle1
(“Garfinkle”) [D.E. #269] to the Trustee’s Motion to Approve Settlement with the Settling
Overview
he is not a creditor of the estate. Although Garfinkle asserts in his Objection that he has an
equitable interest in the Glory Hole Assets (See Garfinkle’s Objection at ¶10), and that he has
been given a Power of Attorney to sign and file Proofs of Claim by approximately twenty
defrauded creditors of Merendon (¶13), Garfinkle has in fact filed only a single Proof of Claim—
a claim filed on behalf of the late Harold Caldwell under a Power of Attorney that was allegedly
given to Garfinkle. This Proof of Claim was designated as Claim #482-1 (the “Claim”) and
in further detail below, not only was this Power of Attorney explicitly revoked by Howard
Caldwell in a letter dated August 12, 2006, but this Power of Attorney automatically terminated
upon the death of Caldwell.2 Accordingly, Garfinkle lacks standing to raise this Objection.
2. In his Objection, Garfinkle asserts that the proposed settlement does not provide
any economic benefit to the estate because the sum of $600,000 “is a mere pittance of the true
value of the property,” without providing any support for that assertion. However, this statement
does not account for the important fact that the Trustee would first be required to expend
significant resources and fees in order to litigate the contentious issue of the actual ownership of
Glory Hole before it could recover anything or make any distributions to creditors, and to date
this settlement offer is still higher and better then any offer the Trustee has received for just the
Glory Hole. Even worse, the bankruptcy estate could potentially lose the issue of ownership
altogether and be required to turn over all of the sales proceeds on top of any litigation expenses
already incurred.
3. This settlement will provide $600,000 to the Estate without further cost, and will
resolve all claims between the Trustee and the Settling Parties. The Trustee submits that based on
the specific facts of this case, the proposed settlement is reasonable and in the best interest of the
estate.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Debtor’s Bankruptcy
Jane L. Otto, and Diane Kaplan-Berk (the “Petitioning Creditors”) filed a Chapter 7 Involuntary
Petition in this Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (“this Court”) against the
1
Garfinkle’s Objection is the only one that has been filed against the proposed settlement.
2
A Power of Attorney would no longer have any legal effect after the death of Harold Caldwell. Hunt v.
Rousmanier's Adm'rs, 21 U.S. 174, 5 L.Ed. 589, 8 Wheat. 174 (U.S.1823)(A power of attorney, even if irrevocable
during the life of the grantor, becomes extinct by his death); Hunt v. Rhodes, 26 U.S. 1, 1 Pet. 1, 7 L.Ed. 27 (U.S.
1828); Bush v. Flynt, 257 Fed.Appx. 241, 243-44 (11th Cir. 2007).
2
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5. On June 9, 2009 (the “Relief Date”), this Court entered an Order for Relief [D.E.
#29], and on June 10, 2009, Marcia Dunn was appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee over Debtor’s
6. On December 15, 2009, the Trustee commenced Adversary Proceeding No. 09-
02518 (the “SubCon Case”) against the Alter Ego Defendants/Non-Debtor Entities, which
included, but were no limited to the Debtor’s affiliates located in the United States: (a) Merendon
Mining (Colorado), Inc., a Colorado corporation; (b) Merendon Mining (Arizona), Inc., a
Nevada corporation; (c) Merendon Mining (California), Inc., a Nevada corporation; (d) True
North Productions, LLC, a Nevada corporation, and (e) Sentinel (collectively, the “U.S.
Merendon Mining Entities”) seeking, inter alia, to pierce the corporate veil of the U.S.
Merendon Mining Entities, and declare that the assets of the U.S. Merendon Mining Entities are
property of the Debtor’s estate, including the Glory Hole Mining Properties (the ”Glory Hole”).
7. On January 27, 2010 this Court substantively consolidated a great number of the
Debtor’s related entities with Debtor, including the U.S. Merendon Mining Entities, into the
main bankruptcy case, and the Debtor’s estate [D.E. #84], nunc pro tunc, to the Petition Date
(the “SubCon Order”), as amended by the Court’s Agreed Order entered February 26, 2010,
which included Sentinel [D.E. #84; D.E. #20 in the Sub Con Case].
8. On March 11, 2010, this Court granted Partial Summary Judgment (the “ Sub Con
Judgment”) [D.E. #62 in the Sub Con Case] in favor of the Trustee—in relevant part—piercing
the corporate veil of the U.S. Merendon Mining Entities, determining that property owned by the
U.S. Merendon Mining Entities, including the Glory Hole, are property of the Debtor’s estate,
substantively consolidating those properties into the Debtor’s estate, extending the automatic
stay over those properties, and providing that all persons or entities claiming an interest, by way
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of ownership or lien, in any of those properties, may file a claim in the Bankruptcy Case.
9. The SubCon Order and the Sub Con Judgment were recorded in Gilpin County,
Colorado on March 17, 2010 (No. 141130) and on April 26, 2010 (No. 141349), respectively.
Proceeding No. 10-03623 (the “363 Adversary”) to determine the validity, extent, and priority of
any liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests, including any competing interests in, inter alia,
the Colorado Mining Properties, including the Glory Hole, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §363 and Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 7001(2), in order to facilitate the sale, by 363 motion, of the three Colorado mining
properties, which included the Glory Hole, for a total of $2.25 million to a third party buyer (the
“1st Buyer”) that had been located, subject to higher and better offers at a bankruptcy court
11. It is the Trustee’s position that Paul Garfinkle subsequently interfered with the
sale and Sale Motion and that his conduct caused the proposed 1st Buyer to walk away from the
transaction.3. Before and during this bankruptcy, Mr. Garfinkle has long expressed to the Trustee
and her professionals his desire to acquire the Glory Hole mining property for his own benefit.
Rather than making any written offer to the Trustee and providing earnest money to buy the
Glory Hole or any other mining property from the Trustee, Mr. Garfinkle has chosen to
disrespect the bankruptcy process, and rather has tried to sabotage any sale that does not result in
12. Fortunately, a subsequent third party buyer was found for the Glory Hole, and on
June 9, 2011, the Sale Motion was revised to just sell the Glory Hole, but not the other Colorado
properties to this new third party buyer (the “2d Buyer”), for $495,000, also subject to higher and
3
Upon filing the Sale Motion, Garfinkle then sent a letter to the 1st Buyer which the 1st Buyer, through her
representatives, has advised the Trustee’s undersigned counsel, was the basis of her withdrawing her offer.
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better offers at a bankruptcy court supervised auction (the “Amended Sale Motion”)[D.E. #245].
13. However, while several superior offers4 subsequently came in for the Glory Hole
that led the Trustee and her professionals to believe that substantial competitive bidding would
occur, because the Glory Hole was subject to two competing ownership claims5 by the Settling
Parties and Clearwater Mining Company (“Clearwater”)(as differentiated from lien claimants),
and because this Court at the hearing on the Amended Sale Motion indicated that it would also
not consider bids for the Glory Hole that contained nonmonetary elements, such as settlement of
these competing ownership claims, this Court refused to allow the sale of the Glory Hole until
such time as those ownership issues were resolved by litigation or settlement [D.E. #252, Order
denying the Amended Sale Motion without prejudice, dated July 26, 2011].
14. Notwithstanding the denial without prejudice of the sale of the Glory Hole by this
Court, fortunately, the Trustee was able to persuade the 2d Buyer to agree to purchase the other
two non Glory Hole Colorado mining properties for the same purchase price and to apply its
pending earnest money deposit toward that purchase, which again is also subject to higher and
better offers at a bankruptcy court supervised auction (the “Non Glory Hole Sale” or the “2d
Amended Sale Motion”)[D.E. #256, dated August 3, 2011]6. The hearing to consider approval of
the Sale Procedures for the sale of the Non Glory Hole Colorado Properties pursuant to the 2d
Amended Sale Motion is set to be heard on September 27, 2011 [D.E. #260, Order dated August
8, 2011].
15. At the same time, the Trustee was also fortunately able to successfully settle the
ownership dispute with the Settling Parties through the payment by Fedrigon of $600,000 to the
4
Including one offer received from the Settling Parties, which is virtually identical to the Settlement Agreement
which is the subject of the pending settlement motion.
5
Each of these competing ownership claims emanating from Mr. Garfinkle’s relationship with the late Harold
Caldwell. See Exhibit A hereto.
6
Those two other Colorado properties, as compared to the Glory Hole, are fortunately not subject to competing
ownership claims.
5
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bankruptcy estate in exchange for releasing any interest the bankruptcy estate has in the Glory
Hole, resulting in the Trustee on August 19, 2011, filing her Motion to Approve the Settlement
with the Settling Parties (the “Settlement Motion”) [D.E. #262], which Settlement Motion is set
to be heard on September 27, 2011 at 3 p.m. [D.E. #’s 263 & 264, dated August 19, 2011], and
was also served to all parties via the “negative notice” provision of the Local Rules, and stated as
follows:
“Any interested party who fails to file and serve a written response to this motion
within 21 days after the date of service stated in this motion shall, pursuant to Local
Rule 9013-1(D), be deemed to have consented to the entry of an order in the form
attached to this motion. Any scheduled hearing may then be canceled.”
16. On August 25, 2011, Garfinkle timely filed his Objection to the Settlement
Motion (the “Objection”) [D.E. #269]. No other written responses to the Settlement Motion were
filed by the Negative Notice deadline, nor subsequent to the same, and as such all other parties
17. It is not surprising that the only objector to the Rule 9019 Settlement Motion is
Mr. Garfinkle, who despite the fact that this Court made itself clear that it would not approve a
sale of the Glory Hole absent resolution of the ownership issues, Mr. Garfinkle nonetheless
wants to force the Trustee to sell the Glory Hole to him, or persons or entities affiliated with him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has not made a single written offer or provided any deposit
besmirching of the reputation of The Trustee and her Court approved professionals7, the result of
this settlement with the Settling Parties over the Glory Hole will lead to a substantial benefit to
the Estate, as compared with a sale of the Glory Hole, in that (1) the proceeds of the settlement
7
This Court should be mindful that this attack from Mr. Garfinkle is coming from a twice convicted criminal, and
disbarred attorney, who twice served time in Federal prison on conspiracy, fraud, tax fraud and money laundering
charges (See, Garfinkle’s own Affidavit, D.E. #1-1 in the Sub Con Case, pg. 3, ¶¶11-13).
6
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would go directly to the estate for the benefit of injured victim investors, rather than potentially
being lost through litigation, during which the Trustee would have to rely upon the testimony of
Mr. Garfinkle, a convicted felon, to support its case, (2) the costs of litigation may overwhelm
the recovery that may be received through sale, and (3) the proceeds of any such sale would have
to be delayed until after ownership issues were resolved through litigation or settlement that may
result in sharing those proceeds with competing claimants, or (4) even worse the bankruptcy
estate could potentially lose the issue of ownership outright and have to turn all of the sale
the Trustee nonetheless believes that ultimately she would have prevailed on both the law and
the facts of this unique case, primarily on the basis that notwithstanding what occurred between
the decedent Caldwell and Mr. Barnes in Texas and Colorado, the sale to the Debtor by Barnes,
with Debtor’s creditor investors funds, was made pursuant to a valid non stayed execution sale in
Colorado, and that as a result Debtor was a bona fide purchaser for value of the Glory Hole mine.
Notwithstanding the same, the fact that these issues had been tied up in state court litigation for
more than a decade in Texas and Colorado before even this case was filed, coupled with the risks
described above, led the Trustee to exercise her business judgment and determine that settlement
with the Settling Parties is in the best interests of the estate and its creditors.
20. On January 14, 2010, Garfinkle purportedly filed a Proof of Claim which was
designated as Claim #482-1(the “Claim”) in this case. A review of the Claim reveals that
Garfinkle was not acting on his own behalf, rather the Claim was allegedly filed on behalf of
Harold Caldwell, under a Power of Attorney allegedly given to Garfinkle (see the “signature
21. However, at the time this Claim was filed, Harold Caldwell had died and with his
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death, any claimed Power of Attorney also expired. Second, even if Harold Caldwell was still
alive, it is the Caldwell Estate’s position that he revoked the purported Power of Attorney and
received acknowledgment of the revocation by Garfinkle (See Exhibit A hereto). Third, the
Claim was not signed as directed by the form instructions. Finally, the Claim did not have the
22. On September 12, 2011, the Caldwell Estate through its counsel filed a Notice of
Withdrawal of Proof of Claim 482-1 (the Claim) [D.E. #272]. Also on September 12, 2011, for
the same reasons as espoused by the Caldwell Estate (except on the basis that Harold Caldwell
while alive revoked the Power of Attorney) the Trustee filed an Objection to Claim No. 482
citing Garfinkle’s lack of standing to assert this claim [D.E. #273] (the “Trustee’s Objection”).
The Trustee’s Objection also reflects that Proof of Claim No. 482 does not contain any
paperwork to document the basis of the Claim and also supports the Claimant’s position that any
Power of Attorney held by Garfinkle for Harold Caldwell, terminated upon the death of Mr.
Caldwell.8 It is the Settling Parties’ position that when Garfinkle filed the Claim, he knew that
the alleged Power of Attorney from Harold Caldwell was not only revoked, but that Mr.
23. Garfinkle has filed no other proofs of claim in this bankruptcy case, and the
claims bar deadline has long since passed. Given the withdrawal of the Claim, and Harold
Caldwell’s pre-petition death, any alleged standing by Garfinkle was terminated and Garfinkle
now stands in the shoes of an intermeddling bystander without any standing in this matter.
24. The Settlement Motion is subject to final approval by the Bankruptcy Court and
8
See fn. 2 above.
9
Despite this known fact, Garfinkle filed the Claim in violation of 18 U.SC. §152(4). It is the Settling Parties’, but
not the Trustee’s, position that the Claim filed by Garfinkle should be referred to the United States Attorney for
further investigation.
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proceedings is within the sound discretion of this Court and will not be disturbed or modified on
appeal unless approval or disapproval is an abuse of discretion. See, In re Arrow, Inc., 85 B.R.
886, 891 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988). In determining the reasonableness of a settlement, the test is
whether the proposed settlement “falls below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness.”
Id. at 891.
25. The legal standard for approval of settlements in the Eleventh Circuit is set forth
in In re Justice Oaks, II, Ltd., 898 F.2d 1544, 1549 (11th Cir.), which requires that the Court
consider: (1) the probability of success in litigation; (2) the complexity of the litigation involved
and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (3) the paramount interest
of the creditors and a proper deference to their reasonable views in the premises. Id.
26. The Trustee and the Settling Parties submit that the Settlement should be
approved because the status of the pending litigation would require the Estate to expend
significant administrative counsel fees on claims that would be zealously contested without any
certainty as to result.
27. Accordingly, the Trustee and the Settling Parties recognize that instead of
needlessly spending money to litigate the ownership of the Glory Hole, assume the risks
attendant with trial, and risk the likelihood that the Settling Parties and/or the Trustee might
prevail, the creditors of the Estate are better served by settling with the Settling Parties that
portion of the Adversary Proceeding dealing with the Glory Hole10 for a sum that enhances the
Estate and at the same time minimizes administrative expenses. That is exactly what the Trustee
will achieve by means of the Settlement Motion. Based on the foregoing, the Trustee and the
Settling Parties believe that the Trustee has demonstrated that the likelihood that the Settling
10
The 363 Adversary will not be dismissed in its entirety because of the proposed sale of the other Colorado
properties. However, because the Glory Hole was the most litigious piece of this litigation, the settlement of this
claim will result in a substantial simplification of the 363 Adversary, and a dismissal of a large number of parties
and claims from that action.
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Parties might prevail on the litigation11 and that the attendant delay and doubtful nature of
realizing any value from the Glory Hole satisfies the first two Justice Oaks factors.
28. What is most central to the present Settlement Motion is that the Trustee
recognizes the difficulty of prosecuting the 363 Adversary due to the competing Settling Parties
and Clearwater ownership claims to the Glory Hole. The cost of litigating the ownership issues
of the Glory Hole, and the risk of losing on this issue at trial weighs heavily in favor of the
settlement with the Settling Parties12, and on such terms as are contained in the Settlement
Motion. The Estate is currently administratively insolvent, and settling the dispute will inject into
the Estate much needed liquidity and leave a residue for the investor creditors, who would
otherwise be looking at complex litigation that bears the very real risk of being unsuccessful13. If
the Trustee pursued the litigation path, she may, and most likely would, run up tremendous
administrative expenses that may never be paid, and the creditors would receive nothing. The
structure of the Settlement Motion will moot much, if not all of the pending litigation over the
Glory Hole mine, or at least the Estate’s further involvement in the same. Accordingly, the
Trustee and the Settling Parties believe that the third Justice Oaks factor is satisfied.
11
See Exhibit A.
12
The Trustee has learned that one or more of the Settling Parties, settled the 20 year old litigation pending in Texas
and settled most of the litigation pending in Colorado. Ironically, the Claimants have a pending cause of action
against Garfinkle. The fact that the litigation was settled after so many years and the fact that one or more of the
Settling Parties are receiving a benefit from that Settlement seems to weigh heavily in favor of the Claimants being
able to prove that the underlying Judgment obtained by Barnes against Caldwell was obtained without proper
service upon Caldwell and the Trustee believes that the Claimants could possibly demonstrate the improper service
upon Caldwell in the Bankruptcy Court. Given this and the fact that the Settling Parties were willing to litigate this
matter to conclusion leads the Trustee to believe that prevailing in this matter would, at the very least have been
expensive, and could possibly end in a victory for one or more of the Claimants. In that event, not only would the
Bankruptcy Estate possibly be entitled to NOTHING, but the cost associated with receiving nothing could be in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars due to the fact that many of the potential deponents are outside of Florida.
13
Garfinkle claims that the estate has done nothing to pursue estate assets in South and Central America. As this
Court has often noted that just because the Trustee might be successful in getting a judgment or order here in a US
Bankruptcy Court doesn’t mean the Trustee will be successful in getting any such judgment or order enforced in
South and Central America. Because of legal hurdles in those countries, it is impossible for the Trustee without an
infusion of funds into the Estate to pursue such international assets and claims. Garfinkle has repeatedly told the
Trustee and her professionals that he could bring those much needed funds to the Estate through creditor financing,
but no such funding has ever materialized. However, this settlement coupled with the proposed sale of the other
Colorado Properties would provide such needed funds. If this Court were to approve both the Sale of the non Glory
Hole Colorado properties and this settlement, the Estate would receive close to $1.1 million (and possibly quite
more if the non Glory Hole auction proves to be successful). At that point, the Trustee will again have to exercise
her business discretion to decide whether to use those funds to pursue those claims or to just make a distribution of
net proceeds to make a distribution to creditors.
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29. Based upon his prior conduct both before and after this bankruptcy as it has
related to his desire to acquire the Glory Hole property, the Trustee fully expected Garfinkle to
object to the Settlement Motion, but the proper deference to his view is to give it no deference at
all. The Estate is greatly enhanced by the Settlement Motion in that the Estate will finally now
have the resources to pursue the perpetrators of the underlying fraud in this case, or alternatively
make a distribution. Accordingly, the Settlement Motion, as proposed, represents a figure well
above the lowest point in the range of reasonableness and satisfies the Justice Oaks standard.
Clearly, it is in the best interest of the Estate and its creditors. The Settlement Motion should be
granted.
WHEREFORE, the Trustee and the Settling Parties request this Court enter an Order (1)
granting the pending Settlement Motion, (2) denying that Garfinkle has standing to object to the
same, and overruling Garfinkle’s Objection, and grant such further relief as this Court deems just
and proper.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
We HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was furnished this
22nd day of September, 2011 to those who received this via the Court's CM/ECF system and to
Paul Garfinkle via U.S. Mail at 5629 American Circle, Delray Beach, FL 33484, and via email at
garfinkle100@aol.com, and in accordance with the Court’s Order of December 30, 2009 [D.E. #
14
Permission has been given by Attorney Moffa for Attorney Reich to file on his behalf.
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case information.
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EXHIBIT A
Garfinkle’s Crime
1. In early 1997, Harold Caldwell (“Caldwell”) met Garfinkle and retained him to
act as his attorney with regard to a specific business deal. Unbeknownst to Caldwell, Garfinkle
had pled guilty in 1996 to one count of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(3), and one count
of conspiracy to commit fraud, 18 U.S.C. §371. He was sentenced by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Colorado to five years’ probation and a $50,000 fine. Four months after his
sentencing, Garfinkle was further charged with eight violations of his probation conditions.
Among his violations were: [1] failure to follow the instructions of his probation officer; [2]
failure to answer truthfully inquiries made by his probation officer; and [3] associating with
convicted felons. As a result of these violations, Garfinkle’s probation was revoked, and he was
his pattern of deceit and fraud in his future business dealings with Caldwell.
2. At the time Caldwell retained Garfinkle to act as his attorney, Garfinkle resided in
Delray Beach Florida, and Caldwell resided in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Garfinkle did not
disclose to Caldwell his history of dishonesty, fraud, association with criminals, and commission
of financial crimes. His failure to do so was a breach of his fiduciary duty to Caldwell, a likely
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4. At the time that he signed the Power of Attorney, Caldwell believed that it
pertained solely to the one specific business deal for which he had retained Garfinkle. Caldwell
would not have signed the Power of Attorney if he had known Garfinkle’s criminal history and
associations, and/or Garfinkle’s intent to use the Power of Attorney in a manner that: (a) could
affect Caldwell’s right, title, and interest in other matters, including his litigation and property
interests in Texas and Colorado; (b) was plainly contrary to Caldwell’s best interests; and/or (c)
was solely in the best interests of Garfinkle and/or Barnes (a litigant against Caldwell in Texas
and Colorado).
Garfinkle and/or others had introduced Caldwell to Merendon, for which Milo Brost (“Brost”)
served as its CEO and Garfinkle served as its agent and/or attorney. Throughout the course of
Garfinkle’s dealings with Caldwell concerning Merendon (and later Sentinel), Garfinkle had a
non-waivable conflict of interest by virtue of his: (a) position as an agent, associate, attorney,
and/or other representative for Merendon and Sentinel; (b) his attorney-client relationship with
Caldwell; and (c) his possession of the May 14, 1997 Power of Attorney.
agreements with Merendon for the development of Caldwell’s patented mining claims and other
interests located in the Glory Hole Area near Central City in Gilpin County.
Clearwater Mining Corporation, Inc., Colorado Chain O’ Mines, Inc., and Chain O’ Mines
Consortium) executed a Glory Hole Mining Agreement that was back-dated to August 15, 2002.
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Merendon told Caldwell that they needed to back-date the agreement to 2002 for tax credit
purposes.
8. Under the terms of the Glory Hole Mining Agreement, Merendon was obligated,
a. make periodic good faith payments, periodic bonus payments, and royalty payments
b. actively engage in the continuous development and production of the Glory Hole
mining claims consistent with acceptable mining and milling professional industry
standards;
c. purchase and deploy equipment sufficient in quantity and type to put in place a
d. refurbish and recondition useable equipment and components of the existing ore line
9. Among the provisions of the Glory Hole Mining Agreement was a “safekeeping
provision” whereby title and ownership to Caldwell’s mining claims was to be held in
“safekeeping” by a “top tier financial institution,” and was to be transferred by the institution to
10. Merendon and Caldwell also executed another Agreement to ensure that, if
Merendon failed to perform its commitment to produce obligations owed under the Glory Hole
Mining Agreement, then Caldwell could remove Merendon from the mining claims and recover
ownership of title to the claims. This additional Agreement was also back-dated to August 15,
2002. In particular, this additional Agreement provided that Merendon was to execute an
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assignment of title back to Caldwell and his companies, and that the assignment would be held in
“safekeeping.” If Merendon was removed from the mining claims pursuant to the Glory Hole
Mining Agreement and the additional Agreement, then the assignment of title would be released
Agreement which confirmed that the financial institution into which the parties’ respective deeds
and assignments to the Glory Hole mining claims would be deposited was US Bank in
Broomfield, Colorado.
12. On June 15, 2006, Merendon defaulted on its third good faith payment obligation
in the amount of $450,000 that was due to Caldwell under the Glory Hole Mining Agreement.
13. By the end of June 2006, Merendon had also defaulted, inter alia, on its
obligations to: (a) purchase and deploy equipment necessary to put in place a research and
development production line by January/February 2006; and (b) refurbish and recondition
useable equipment and components of the existing ore line by June 30, 2006.
14. On July 14, 2006, Caldwell and the companies sent a notice of default and a
demand for payment of the third good faith payment that was necessary in order to avoid
cancellation of the Glory Hole Mining Agreement. They also requested a detailed update
15. Despite demand, Merendon failed to meet its obligations under the Glory Hole
Mining Agreement. Thus, the Glory Hole Mining Agreement was cancelled.
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16. On August 12, 2006, Caldwell and two companies (Korth Corporation and
Clearwater Mining Corp.) signed and sent letters to Garfinkle which clearly and expressly
revoked the May 14, 1997 Power of Attorney and any other powers of attorney that may have
existed.
17. The revocation letter provided clear and express notice to Garfinkle that Garfinkle
and Merendon did not have authority to [1] negotiate any settlements or agreements on behalf of
Caldwell or his companies, including any settlements or negotiations pertaining to any cases
involving Barnes and Caldwell; [2] Garfinkle and Merendon did not have any power of attorney
for Caldwell and/or various companies and family members (including Colorado Chain
and [3] any prior power of attorneys which may have ever existed were null and void.
18. On August 13, 2006, Garfinkle responded in writing to the August 12, 2006
revocation of the Power of Attorney. In his response, Garfinkle stated that: [1] he would refuse
to abide by the revocation of the Power of Attorney; [2] he had previously executed agreements
on Caldwell’s behalf with Merendon and others; [3] he had intervened in the Barnes v. Caldwell
Caldwell’s behalf with Barnes; and [5] he intended to sign a settlement agreement with Barnes
19. Garfinkle took his position despite the fact that the May 14, 1997 Power of
Attorney did not contain statutorily required language necessary to make it a durable or
irrevocable power of attorney. In addition, Garfinkle knew that his sole intention was to use the
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Power of Attorney in a manner that was contrary to Caldwell’s best interests, and solely in the
Agreement in which he sought to create a new contract between Merendon and Caldwell. The
Merendon Mining Agreement was signed by Brost as CEO of Merendon, but was never signed
by Caldwell.
21. Despite his role and position as an agent, associate, attorney, and/or other
representative or Merendon, Garfinkle signed the Merendon Mining Agreement as the purported
22. Caldwell did not know about, authorize, or consent to the execution of the
Merendon Mining Agreement which contained several recitals which set forth false, adverse
allegations concerning Caldwell, including the false and inaccurate recitation that the Glory Hole
Mining Agreement was “in serious jeopardy of a Caldwell default” in the absence of a settlement
23. In addition, the actual terms of the Merendon Mining Agreement worked solely in
the best interests of Merendon, and wholly against the best interests of Caldwell. Among other
things, the Merendon Mining Agreement provided that Garfinkle, acting pursuant to the May 14,
1997 Power of Attorney, thereby granted, sold, transferred, and assigned to Merendon all
any other property then or formerly standing in Caldwell’s name in either Colorado or Texas,
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including those that were the subject of Barnes v. Caldwell, Case No. C-2251-93-D in Hidalgo
24. The only purported consideration given to Caldwell for these broad transfers to
Merendon was the payments that were already due to Caldwell under the Glory Hole Mining
25. Moreover, the consideration to which Caldwell was already entitled under the
Glory Hole Mining Agreement was suspended and/or substantially reduced by the Merendon
Mining Agreement drafted and executed by Garfinkle. For example: [1] the payments that were
already due and in default, and all future payments, were to be suspended until 90 days following
the successful conclusion of the Barnes litigation; [2] Merendon’s obligations and restrictions set
forth in ¶¶ 13-18 of Glory Hole Mining Agreement were stricken, including, inter alia,
Merendon’s obligations to pay Caldwell’s legal fees and court costs in the Barnes litigation, and
restrictions against Merendon’s further transfers of title to the Glory Hole mining claims; and [3]
all consideration to be received by Caldwell and his companies under the Glory Hole Mining
Agreement would thereafter be divided equally between Caldwell (50%) and Garfinkle and/or
26. Thus, the only consideration received by Caldwell for the purported transfer of all
of Caldwell’s Colorado and Texas properties to Merendon – who had no real mining operations
or capabilities – was the significant and substantial reduction of the consideration to which he
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27. On September 6, 2006, Caldwell filed a motion for summary judgment against
Barnes in Case No. C-2251-93-D in Hidalgo County District Court. The motion set forth the
undisputed facts developed through discovery showing that Caldwell had never been served in a
prior Texas state court action commenced by Robert F Barnes (“Barnes”) and that the Texas
state court judgment obtained by Barnes against Caldwell was therefore invalid.
28. Subsequent thereto, Barnes and Garfinkle embarked upon new fraudulent
October 6, 2006, four Texas corporations owned by Barnes conveyed the Glory Hole Mining
properties to Sentinel.
30. Caldwell did not know about, authorize, or consent to any of the transfers. The
31. On October 11, 2006, Garfinkle executed, filed, and recorded a Release of Lis
Pendens in Case No. C-2251-93-D, by which he purported to remove and release, on behalf of
Caldwell, any and all Lis Pendenses which Caldwell had filed in Gilpin County or elsewhere in
32. Caldwell did not know about, authorize, or consent to any release of any lis
pendens that he had previously recorded in Gilpin County concerning any of his litigation in
Colorado or Texas.
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33. On October 11 and 12, 2006, Garfinkle executed and recorded a quitclaim deed to
one of Barnes’ corporations, by which Garfinkle purported to convey Caldwell’s interest in Lots
4 through 13 and the West 37 feet of Lot 14 of Central City and a portion of the Harlem 700
34. Caldwell did not know about, authorize, or consent to the execution, delivery, or
recordation by Garfinkle of any deed to any properties to Cielo Vista. The above transfer was
35. On October 11 and 12, 2006, Garfinkle executed and recorded another quitclaim
deed to another one of Barnes’ corporations, Colorado Viento Vista, Inc. (“Viento Vista”), by
which Garfinkel purported to convey Caldwell’s interest in a portion of the Old Rice 564
36. Caldwell did not know about, authorize, or consent to the execution, delivery, or
recordation by Garfinkle of any deed to any properties to Viento Vista. The above transfer was
37. On October 11 and 12, 2006, Garfinkle executed and recorded a quitclaim deed to
another one of Barnes’ corporations, Glory Hole Mining Company (“Glory Hole”), by which
Garfinkle purported to convey the following patented mining claims, or portions thereof, to
Glory Hole: Argo 567 (E 1/2); Capital Prize 5679; Copper Bottom 766 (E 1/2); Esperanza 803;
Mountain & Summit 5612 (E 1/2); Colorado Star 907; Durango 673 (E 1/2); Ivanhoe 118; Tiger
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38. Caldwell did not know about, authorize, or consent to the execution, delivery, or
recordation by Garfinkle of any deed to any properties to Glory Hole. The above transfer was
39. On October 18, 2006, Barnes’ now deceased counsel, Tom Matlock, suddenly
advised the Hidalgo County District Court in Case No. 2251-93-D, by letter, that the case and all
related matters between Barnes and Caldwell had been settled, and thus the case had been
(a) an Agreed Mutual Nonsuit with Prejudice signed by Barnes’ counsel and by
Martin Werner, acting as the purported attorney for Garfinkle, acting in turn as the purported
(c) an affidavit by Garfinkle concerning the purported “bona fides of the power of
attorney;”
Texas case.
40. The purported attorney for Garfinkle, Martin Werner, was President of one of
Brost’s companies (SGD/BRA) that was involved in the Merendon securities frauds. The
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conflict of interest.
41. Neither Caldwell nor his attorneys had any prior knowledge of the purported
settlement and neither Caldwell nor his attorneys authorized or consented to the negotiation,
execution, or filing of any settlement of Case No. 2251-93-D or any related matters. In fact, by
the terms of the August 12, 2006 revocation letter, Garfinkle was clearly and expressly notified
42. The first notice that Caldwell and his attorneys received that Barnes and Garfinkle
had executed and filed a settlement with the Court was their receipt of a copy of Matlock’s
October 18, 2006 letter to the Hidalgo County District Court. The first notice that Caldwell and
his attorneys received of the Merendon Mining Agreement, the quitclaim deeds to Sentinel, the
release of the lis pendens, and the quitclaim deeds to Barnes’ corporations did not occur until
much later.
43. As evidenced by the terms of the unauthorized agreements and unlawful transfers
described herein, the purported settlement was wholly against the best interests of Caldwell, and
designed solely to further the improper and unlawful objectives and interests of Barnes
Garfinkle.
44. On October 31, 2006 and December 19, 2006, Caldwell’s attorneys filed
pleadings which challenged the validity and effect of the settlement agreement, moved to set
aside the stipulated nonsuit, and requested that the court retain jurisdiction of the case.
45. On January 8, 2009, Garfinkle advised the Hidalgo County District Court in Case
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(a) he did not believe that the “attempted revocation” of his Power of Attorney was
valid;
(b) he did not believe that the “attempted revocation” could be used to revoke his “50
(c) he had concerns, however, that the Texas Supreme Court may construe the Power
of Attorney as “having been revoked prior to (his) execution of the settlement agreements”; and
(d) he was therefore requesting that the case be “put … back procedurally to the point
it was at prior to (his) execution of the settlement agreements and allow it to proceed to trial and
resolution.”
46. As a result, the Agreed Mutual Nonsuit with Prejudice was revoked and/or
overturned.
47. Despite the revocation, Barnes and Garfinkle failed and refused to cancel any of
the unauthorized agreements or to reverse any of the unauthorized transfers which they executed
in furtherance of their purported settlement. Thus, each quitclaim deed from the Barnes
corporations to Sentinel executed on October 6, 2006 and each quitclaim deed executed by
48. At all relevant times, Garfinkle knew or was recklessly indifferent to the fact that
he:
(a) did not have valid authority under the Power of Attorney;
(b) was acting in a manner that was plainly contrary to Caldwell’s best interests;
(c) was acting in a manner that was plainly intended to serve his improper and
unlawful objectives.
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