Name:

Subject: PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS LAW

Topic: (based on the syllabus)                                     
                                Title of the case
                                        Citation
Facts:
Issue: (include only relevant issues re PERSONS)

RTC RULING

CA RULING
SC RULING

1.)People vs. Que Po Lay

• Que Po Lay has been found guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 and was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila.
• The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20.
• The appeal is grounded on the fact that Circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the
appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect.
• The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official
Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
• Although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months
after appellant's

Supreme Court Ruling

• It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
• The circular in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle
and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
• The said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or
after November 1951.
• The decision was reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.

Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank
Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to
pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S.
money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following
the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20
was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said
circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be
published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this
contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular
issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and
notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions,
decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In
other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably,
for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of
special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the
Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular
No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it
has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities
cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question
which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and
theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be
published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely,
that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the
day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the
word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido
de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus
disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta,
advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa,
Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its
penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November
1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have
failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on
appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that
has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of
the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had
not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated
and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to
have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

2. Co vs. Court of Appeals

• Albino Co delivered a check to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983, postdated November 30, 1983 as a guarantee for the performance of
an obligation.
• The check was deposited by the salvaging company and it has bounced for reason of “closed account.”
• A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) was filed by the salvaging firm against Albino Co with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City and resulted into Co's conviction of the crime charged.
• Co argued that the RTC erred in its judgment as during the time that the bouncing check was issued, the SC has yet to render the decision that
a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22.
• The SC, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987), 4 years after Co’s issuance of the bouncing
check. Co argued that during the time of the issuance of the bouncing check, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an
obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
• This administrative circular by the Ministry of Justice was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984

(Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check.
• The Court of Appeals rejected Co’s theory noting that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction
or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22.

Supreme Court Ruling

• The Que doctrine should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official
opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
• In the present case, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less
than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance
may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision.
• Reference to “when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.” (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974])

ALBINO S. CO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel — and in payment of his share of the
expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983, in the
sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."  chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the salvage company against
Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co’s conviction of the crime
charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the
salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00. chanrobles law library

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error
for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on
September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 — i.e., that a check issued merely
to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the
time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as
follows: chanrobles law library

"2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation,
whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res.
No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano v. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon v.
Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido v. Miguel A. Mateo, Et Al., November 17,
1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro v. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981)." cralaw virtua1aw library

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular
No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on
September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981
appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the
explanatory note on the original bill, i.e., that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to
secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," decreed as follows: 4

"Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse
its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its new interpretation applies only prospectively
(Waterbury Savings Bank v. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued
as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation or to facilitate collection will no longer be
considered as a valid defense." cralaw virtua1aw library

Co’s theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos v.
Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of
new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3,
1979.

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for
reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the
Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued
against the merits of Albino Co’s theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of
Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties’
arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co’s appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.

"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . ." 5

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These
include: Buyco v. PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested
the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to
an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, Et Al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30,
1962), ruling that RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada,
Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections. 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD
1752, could have no retroactive application; Peo. v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be
convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of
the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No.
27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment
of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing
P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 which removed "personal
cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a
statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old
Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500,
holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and
Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v.
COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed
the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it
was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle
to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was
issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not
laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the
New Civil Code, ‘Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system . . .’"

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid
down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7
reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be
acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the
complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and
this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, ‘Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .’ The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim ‘legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet’ — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and
when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967,
but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society." cralaw virtua1aw library

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (G.R. No.
97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992,
205 SCRA 515, 527-528: 8

"We sustain the petitioners’ position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February
24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to
the petitioners on September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated
in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these
decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code ‘judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.’ But while our decisions form part of the
law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that ‘laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.’ This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit,
non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new
doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974] ‘. . . when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof." cralaw virtua1aw library

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited
case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine
advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification,
as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, in this Court’s decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared "that
presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect,"
and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible
unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have no acts done in reliance on the validity of those presidential
decrees . . ." — the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged
the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act
No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President
Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war
sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953
‘unreasonable, and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." — the Court made
substantially the same observations, to wit: 11

". . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any
legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law
once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper . . . It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or
executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it
and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard
be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid
in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be
reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as
to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official’ (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308
US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil.
1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent
instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114,
Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095)." cralaw virtua1aw library

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v Military Commission No 34, 12 —
declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had
resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court, in Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA
686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively
only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there
should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military
courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was
serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial
be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If
a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account
of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

x          x           x

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of
their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now
prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v
Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by
executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished." 13

It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court’s
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 — i.e., that a check issued merely
to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly situated, who relied on the
official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. V. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the
familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only
relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those
in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other Government
officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . .
(of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In
the present case, on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private
lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of
Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by
private individuals as reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this,
particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in his office
as regards prosecutions for their violation. 17 Senarillos v. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent
Court of Appeals is crucially different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative
interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine
of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as hereinabove set out
and discussed, negativing criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set
aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.

3. Leal, et al. vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

• The IAC reversed a decision of the CA ordering the petitioners to accept the sum of P5,600.00 from the private respondent as
repurchase price of the lots described in the "Compraventa" and, thereafter, to execute a Deed of Repurchase to effect transfer
over ownership over the same properties to the private respondent.
• Some 50 years ago, a contract entitled “compraventa,” written entirely in the Spanish language, provided an express prohibition
against the sale of the lots described in the “compraventa” to third persons or strangers. It should only be sold back to the seller
or his successors.

Supreme Court Ruling

• The provision is a nullity. The SC agreed with CA Justice Paras that a prohibition to alienate should not exceed at most a period
of twenty years; otherwise, there would be subversion of public policy which naturally frowns on unwarranted restrictions on
the right of ownership [Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.]
• But even assuming that such a right of repurchase is granted under the "Compraventa," the petitioner correctly asserts that the
same has already prescribed. Under Art. 1508 of the Civil Code of Spain (Art. 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines), the right
to redeem or repurchase, in the absence of an express agreement as to time, shall last four years from the date of the contract.
• The IAC ruling was set aside and the CA ruling was reinstated.

RENEO LEAL, JOSE LEAL, CATALINA LEAL, BERNABELA LEAL, VICENTE LEAL EUIOGIA LEAL PATERNO RAMOS,
MACARIO DEL ROSARIO, MARGARITA ALBERTO, VICTORIA TORRES, JUSTINA MANUEL, JULIAN MANUEL,
MELANIA SANTOS, CLEMENTE SAMARIO, MARIKINA VALLEY, INC., MIGUELA MENDOZA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF RIZAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), and VICENTE SANTIAGO
(Substituted by SALUD M. SANTIAGO), respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

In its resolution dated September 27, 1983, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, 1 speaking through Justice Porfirio V, Sison, ordered,
in part, the petitioners to accept the sum of P5,600.00 from the private respondent as repurchase price of the lots described in the "Compraventa" and, thereafter, to execute a
Deed of Repurchase to effect transfer over ownership over the same properties to the private respondent.

This ruling was a complete reversal of the earlier decision,   dated June 28, 1.978, penned by Justice Paras, of the Court of
2

Appeals, in the same case, affirming the trial court's dismissal of the private respondent's complaint.

The petitioners, feeling aggrieved and astonished by the complete turnaround of the respondent court, come to Us with this
petition for review by certiorari.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

This case brings us back almost half a century ago, on March 21, 1941, when a document entitled "Compraventa," written
entirely in the Spanish language, involving three parcels of land, was executed by the private respondent's predecessors-in-
interest, Vicente Santiago and his brother, Luis Santiago, in favor of Cirilio Leal the deceased father of some of the petitioners,
Pursuant to this "Compraventa," the title over the three parcels of land in the name of the vendors was cancelled and a new one
was issued in the name of Cirilo Leal who immediately took possession and exercised ownership over the said lands. When
Cirilo died on December 10, 1959, the subject lands were inherited by his six children, who are among the petitioners, and who
caused the consolidation and subdivision of the properties among themselves.

Between the years 1960 and 1965, the properties were either mortgaged or leased by the petitioners-children of Cirilo Leal — to
their co-petitioners.

Sometime before the agricultural year 1966-1967, Vicente Santiago approached the petitioners and offered re- repurchase the
subject properties. Petitioners, however, refused the offer. Consequently, Vicente Santiago instituted a complaint for specific
performance before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City on August 2, 1967.

All the trial, the court a quo rendered its decision,-dismissing the complaint on the ground that the same was still premature
considering that there was, as yet, no sale nor any alienation equivalent to a sale. Not satisfied with this decision, the private
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter, acting through the Fourth Division and with Justice Edgardo Paras
as ponente affirmed the decision of the court a quo.

The petitioners seasonably filed a motion to amend the dispositive portion of the decision so as to include an order for the
cancellation of the annotations at the back of the Transfer certificates of Title issued in their favor. The private respondent,-on
the other hand, filed a-timely motion for reconsideration of the above decision and an opposition to petitioners' motion to amend.
These incidents were not resolved until then Court of Appeals was abolished and in lieu of which the Intermideate Appellate
Court was established In view of the said reorganization, case was reassigned to the Fourth Civil in this cases Division.

Resolving the abovestated motion for reconsideration, the respondent court, in a resolution penned by Justice Sison and
promulgated on September 27, 1983, ruled, as follows:
 WHEREFORE, Our decision of June 28, 1978 is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered
ordering: (1) defendants-appellees surnamed Leal to accept the sum of P5,600.00 from plaintiff-appellant
(substituted by Salud M. Santiago) as repurchase price of the lots described in the "Compraventa" of March 21,
1941, and thereafter to execute a deed of repurchase sufficient in law to transfer ownership of the properties to
appellant Salud M. Santiago, the same to be done within five (5) days from payment; (2) ordering the same
defendants Leals and defendant Clemente Samario to indemnify appellant in the sum of P3,087.50 as rental for
the year 1967-1968 and the same amount every year thereafter; (3) ordering an the defendants jointly and
severally to pay the sum of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation; and (4) ordering
defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42535 in the names of Vicente
Santiago and Luis Santiago upon presentation of the deed of sale herein ordered to be executed by the
appellees in favor of Salud M. Santiago and to issue thereof another Transfer Certificate of Title in the name
alone of Salud M. Santiago. No costs here and in the courts (sic) below.

SO ORDERED.

Verily, the well-spring whence the present controversy arose is the abovementioned "Compraventa," more particularly
paragraph (b) thereof, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) En caso de venta, no podran vender a otros dichos tres lotes de terreno sino al aqui vendedor Vicente
Santiago, o los herederos o sucesores de este por el niismo precio de CINCO MIL SEISCIENTOS PESOS
(P5,600.00) siempre y cuando estos ultimos pueden hacer la compra.  3

xxx xxx xxx

which is now the subject of varying and conflicting interpretations.

xxx xxx xxx

It is admitted by both parties that the phrase "they shall not sell to others these three lots but only to the seller Vicente Santiago
or to his heirs or successors" is an express prohibition against the sale of the lots described in the "Compraventa" to third
persons or strangers to the contract. However, while private respondent naturally lauds the resolution of Justice Sison, which
sustains the validity of this prohibition, the petitioners, on the other hand, endorse the decision penned by Justice Paras, which
states, in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, there is grave doubt re the validity of the ostensible resolutory condition here, namely, the prohibition to
sell the lots to persons other than the vendor (appellant); uncertainly, a prohibition to alienate should not exceed
at most a period of twenty years, otherwise there would be subversion of public policy, which naturally frowns on
unwarranted restrictions on the right of ownership.  4

xxx xxx xxx

We agree with the Paras ponencia.

Contracts are generally binding between the parties, their assigns and heirs; however, under Art. 1255 of the Civil Code of
Spain, which is applicable in this instance, pacts, clauses, and conditions which are contrary to public order are null and void,
thus, without any binding effect.

Parenthetically, the equivalent provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines is that of Art. 1306, which states: "That contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Public order signifies the public weal — public
policy.   Essentially, therefore, public order and public policy mean one and the same thing. Public policy is simply the English
5

equivalent of "order publico" in Art. 1255 of the Civil Code of Spain.  6

One such condition which is contrary to public policy is the present prohibition to self to third parties, because the same virtually
amounts to a perpetual restriction to the right of ownership, specifically the owner's right to freely dispose of his properties. This,
we hold that any such prohibition, indefinite and stated as to time, so much so that it shall continue to be applicable even
beyond the lifetime of the original parties to the contract, is, without doubt, a nullity. In the light of this pronouncement, we grant
the petitioners' prayer for the cancellation of the annotations of this prohibition at the back of their Transfer Certificates 'Title.

It will be noted, moreover, that the petitioners have never sold, or even attempted to sell, the properties subject of the
"Compraventa. "

We now come to what we believe is the very issue in this case which is, whether or not under the aforequoted paragraph (b) of
the "Compraventa" a right of repurchase in favor of the private respondent exist.

The ruling of the Fourth Division (Justice Paras) is that the said stipulation does not grant a right to repurchase. Contrarily, the
resolution of the Fourth Civil Cases Division (Justice P. V. Sison) interpreted the same provision as granting the right to
repurchase subject to a condition precedent.

Thus, the assailed Resolution, reversing the earlier decision of the same respondent court, ruled

xxx xxx xxx

The all-importartant phrase "en caso de venta," must of necessity refer to the sale of the properties either by
Cirilo or his heirs to the Santiago brothers themselves or to their heirs, including appellants Vicente Santiago
including appellants Vicente Santiago and Salud M Santiago, for the same sum of P5,600.00, "siempre y
cuando estos ultimos pueden hacer la compra" (when the latter shall be able to buy it).

xxx xxx xxx

... We repeat, The words envision the situation contemplated by the contracting parties themselves, the resale of
the lots to their owners, and NOT to a sale of the lots to third parties or strangers to the contracts. ... 
7

xxx xxx xxx

The law provides that for conventional redemption to take place, the vendor should reserve, in no uncertain terms, the right to
repurchase the thing sold.  Thus, the right to redeem must be expressly stipulated in the contract of sale in order that it may
8

have legal existence.

In the case before us, we cannot and any express or implied grant of a right to repurchase, nor can we infer, from any word or
words in the questioned paragraph, the existence of any such right. The interpretation in the resolution (Justice Sison) is rather
strained. The phrase "in case case" of should be construed to mean "should the buyers wish to sell which is the plain and
simple import of the words, and not "the buyers should sell," which is clearly a contorted construction of the same phrase. The
resort to Article 1373 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is erroneous. The subject phrase is patent and unambiguous, hence, it
must not be given another interpretation

But even assuming that such a right of repurchase is granted under the "Compraventa," the petitioner correctly asserts that the
same has already prescribed. Under Art. 1508 of the Civil Code of Spain (Art,. 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines), the
right to redeem or repurchase, in the absence of an express agreement as to time, shall last four years from the date of the
contract. In this case then, the right to repurchase, if it was at four guaranteed under in the "Compraventa," should have been
exercise within four years from March 21, 1941 (indubitably the date of execution of the contract), or at the latest in 1945.

In the respondent court's resolution, it is further ruled that the right to repurchase was given birth by the condition precedent
provided for in the phrase "siempre y cuando estos ultimos pueden hacer la compra" (when the buyer has money to buy). In
other words, it is the respondent court's contention that the right may be exercised only when the buyer has money to buy. If
this were so, the second paragraph of Article 1508 would apply — there is agreement as to the time, although it is indefinite,
therefore, the right should be exercised within ten years, because the law does not favor suspended ownership. Since the
alleged right to repurchase was attempted to be exercised by Vicente Santiago only in 1966, or 25 years from the date of the
contract, the said right has undoubtedly expired.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution dated September 27, 1983, of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and
the Decision promulgated on June 28, 1978 is hereby REINSTATED. The annotations of the prohibition to sell at the back of
TCT Nos. 138837, 138838, 138839, 138840, 138841, and 138842 are hereby ordered CANCELLED. Costs against the private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., took no part.

4. Cui vs. Arellano University

• • Cui was a law student of Arrellano University and a scholar from first year up to fourth year 1 st semester. During his last semester, he
transferred to Abad Santos University when his uncle assumed the deanship of the latter and left Arellano.
• • Since he was a scholar, his tuition fees are returned to him at the end of every semester.
• • When he finished his law degree, he applied for permit to take the Bar exams, however, one of the requirements was a complete
transcript of records of his entire law school.
• • Cui went to Arellano University to get his transcript but he was refused unless he would return the cash equivalent of his scholarship
grant. He paid, but under protest.
• When he became a lawyer, he sued the university. It turned out that before he was granted the scholarship, he signed a
• waiver of his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds the school of the cash equivalent of the scholarship grant.
• • ISSUE: Whether the above contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another
school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
Supreme Court Ruling:
• • The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void.
• • Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy.
• • Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the
costs, and dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim.

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.

G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.

E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University
from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof
thereon.

In the language of the decision appealed from:

The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by
the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the
school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law
course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law
studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in
which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was
the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of
his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R.
Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the
College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of
his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter
university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his
scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to
him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the
fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar
examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano
University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had
paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to
recover from defendant in this case.

Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract
covenant and agreement:
 "In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another
school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.

(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the
subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:

1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer full or partial scholarships
to deserving students — for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to
poor but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the
students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships.

2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and earned.
The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be
offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the
effect that they could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not be released unless they would pay
the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to
transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer.

that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the
issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of
P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that,
this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even
recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release said transcript of record, "so that the
case may be presented to the court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did
pay under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought
this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as
attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.

In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its
contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a
counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.

The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the
former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is
valid or not. The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of
the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although
the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without
good reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that
the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority to
issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.

We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient
reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far
reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither
do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the
opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely
incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to
the defendant,

There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered into between Cui and
Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are
limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government
officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in
your communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the four factors in determining a
public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of
 public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its
object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic
honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y.
359). If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this
office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September
10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private
Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de
Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a
court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of
society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual
rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition
of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university
scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus
conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this
definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of social
and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not
good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with
reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding
value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are
granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted
students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of
this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.

5. People vs. Veneracion

• This involved a case of rape with homicide. The RTC convicted the defendants with "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories
provided for by law."
• The prosecutor disagreed with the sentence and filed an MR for the imposition of the death penalty instead, alleging that the accused was found
guilty but instead of imposing death penalty prescribed by the law existing at the time, the judge let his religious convictions take over as imposed
reclusion perpetua instead.
• Judge Veneracion was a devoted Catholic and an active member of a religious organization and believes that death penalty can never be
justified.
• The People of the Philippines went to the SC to question the decision of the said judge.
Supreme Court Ruling:
• A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system,
judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor.”
• In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which
respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.
• This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law,
refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
• The case is hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with
respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide.
• Courts are duty bound to impose the law. DURA LEX SED LEX, meaning that the law may be harsh but it is the law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case has, on
the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua or Death?
The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner,  involve the perpetration of acts so bizarre and
1

devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all civilized men:

On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and yellow
table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan
St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.

When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light colored
duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the left chin, left ear, lacerations on
her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.

On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of the victim, Abundio
Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila
were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071, reads:

That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose true names, identifies and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior
strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL
ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick
piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the
latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "LANDO" and others,
caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo, Manila,
Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino,
a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282
Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated
August 11, 1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR," JEOFREY and
HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who have already been charged in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila of the same offense under Criminal Case No. 94-138071, and helping one another, with
treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with the
use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and
once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her
vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL
ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and consent and
on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates ABUNDIO LAGARTO y
PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately
thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over by
respondent Judge.

Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by police
escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12, 1994), pleaded
"Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information.

After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision  on January
2

31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories
provided for by law."  Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion
3

for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents
Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portion reads:

The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with the
legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this Court cannot take
cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.

WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by both herein
accused is hereby reiterated.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases, together with the
notices of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's determination of guilt and its
conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate time on appeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of
events to those cold facts antecedent to the instant case relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e.,
whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or
refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of
Rape with Homicide.

We find for petitioner.

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs
were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by
those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor,"  resist encroachments by governments, political parties,  or even the interference of their own personal
4 5

beliefs.

In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its
provisions.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:

Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation.

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
 When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. . . . 6

Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While
Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion —
depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed — to impose the penalty of either Reclusion
Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly
and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under
the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.

We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this
Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted
debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in
specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one,
but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.
In People vs. Limaco 7 we held that:

[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving at a
conclusion and determination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error,
then we are constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the guidance of the courts. We
have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else, layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death
penalty. Today there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either
morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as
long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect
and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature
which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to
interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the
members of the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may
regard a certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department
concerned, its amendment, modification, or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and
give it effect as decreed by the law-making body. 8

Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by the law on the accused."  This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a
9

judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding
that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the
decision imposing the death penalty.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

6. Imelda Pilapil v. Ibay Somera

• • There was a couple, a German and a Filipina. The German husband obtained a divorce decree before the German courts.
• • After the divorce was obtained, the husband returned to the Philippines, and when he discovered that while they were still married, the
wife played fire with another man, he sued for adultery.
• • The wife argued he cannot anymore institute the criminal action for adultery because under Philippine laws, the private offended party
in the crime of adultery is the husband and since the German cannot anymore be considered as her husband at the time of the institution of the
action as a result of the divorce obtained, he has no personality to institute the action for adultery.
Supreme Court Ruling
• • The legal personality to institute a criminal action for adultery should be determined at the time of the filing of the action. Since the
husband is governed by his own law, the divorce decree that he obtained in Germany should be considered as valid insofar as he is concerned.
• • Since the divorce is valid, the husband then cannot anymore be considered as an offended husband.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI;
HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal
infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears
to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 
1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between
them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.  2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.  3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records
show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.  4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto
A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.   However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986,
5

directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.   The complaints were accordingly filed and were
6

eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent
judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-
52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.  7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent
fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed.   A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in
8

Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions
and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if
not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review.  9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon.   As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other
10

hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice.   A motion to
11

quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,   which motion was denied by the respondent judge
12

in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner
and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the
petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment.   Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 
13 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored
on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."  15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March
23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's
ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 
16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,   the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
17

prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.   While in point
18

of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding   and without
19

which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was
added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or
incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator
must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and
rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present
prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence
the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through the scandal of a public trial.   Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
20

presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is
a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.  21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the
action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but
did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at
the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in
law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.  22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had
ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse,
as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law
and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an
offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned   in 23

view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,   after a divorce was granted by a United States court between
24

Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business
concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the
right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ...  25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce
proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the
marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the
reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery,   since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak
26

of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433
of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the
marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity
of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage
contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it
cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration
that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any
complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was
consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited,   must suffer the same fate of
27

inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant.
Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

7. Roehr vs. Rodriguez

• Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina , on December 11,
1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
• On August 28, 1996, the wife filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City.
• Roehr obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The parental custody of the children was granted to the father.
• Roehr filed a motion to dismiss the nullity case as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, which was granted by Judge
Salonga.
• Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the case should proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of
children and the distribution of the properties between her and Roehr. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for
the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.

Supreme Court Ruling

• A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at bar.
• The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances
justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
• As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal
effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
• Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the
German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
• In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the
German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have
parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the
issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the
children.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC,
Branch 149, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by public respondent and
(b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999 of public respondent Judge
Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for
declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed
orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to
the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in
Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October
25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its
order7 dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order8 dated August 13, 1997. On
September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court
denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on
December 16, 1997.

The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buiren of the Court of
First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby
dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the
marriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of
children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.

On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the ground that there
is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma.
Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by
the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,10 endowing
the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the
purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The
pertinent portion of said order provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which
was opposed by respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included
as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her
alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad
which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of the termination of the marriage under
Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the
spouses, and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect
to these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by respondent judge in an order
dated March 31, 2000.12

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge. He cites
as grounds for his petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.13

2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the
Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for
Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999, which
partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and

2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the
present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely inconsistent with her previous
order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the
amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying the motion, or ordering the
amendment of the pleading.

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet
attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
 Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the judgment or final order
and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive
damages have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such
judgment or final order accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the
issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the
court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment
or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality.
Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of
July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment
has not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she partially set
aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of
First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.

In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently held that a divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the status of persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the
parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding,
thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the
custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can
give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the
German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have
parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private
respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states
that neither has she commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike
petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More
importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a
couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as
to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial
court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful
of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the
child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she
claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent
herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of
Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have
they incurred any debts during their marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court
shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.30 Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that
there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no
longer deemed in controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the
union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter
of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31,
2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the
parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

8. Bellis vs. Bellis

• A resident and citizen of Texas executed a will in the Philippines directing the distribution of his estate to his first wife,
illegitimate children, and his legitimate children.
• The American died and the executors carried out his will.
• Two of his illegitimate children filed a case alleging that they were deprived of their legitimes under Philippine laws, even if
Texas has not provided for legitimes in their laws.

Supreme Court Ruling

• It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount
of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
• Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession, versus the 2nd paragraph of Art. 17.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30,
1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen,
whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and
expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall
go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and
Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate
in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or
a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen
by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor —
pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal
portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants
appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the
phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in
itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a
new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

9. De Jesus vs. Syquia

• Syquia met Antonia at Syquia’s brother-in-law’s barber shop. They had intimate relations and the latter bore a
child.

• Syquia lived with Antonia and her mother in a family-style setup. As time progressed, Syquia’s interest in the
relationship decreased, and when Antonia showed signs of being pregnant with a second child, Syquia left them, and he
married another woman.

• Antonia then sued Syquia for damages for breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael (1 st) and
Pacita (2nd) as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of P500
per month, together with costs.
• The Court of First Instance entered a decree requiring Syquia to recognize the first baby as his natural child and to pay
maintenance for him at the rate of P50 per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects

Supreme Court Ruling

• The SC affirmed the CFI’s ruling.

• The SC held that the CFI was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to
marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing
in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This
case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
• ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
• Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.
•

• STREET, J.:
• This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by
her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-
named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as
damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize
Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount
of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court
erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at
the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both parties
appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from
that feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
• At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of twenty-three years, and
an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right. His
brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for
tonsorial attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as
cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a
consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a
constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in
her hands a note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
• Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931
• Rev. FATHER,
• The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
• CESAR SYQUIA          
• The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan;
and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had
developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia,
Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary
anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend
at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila,
where she was cared for during confinement.
• When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551
Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses,
including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and,
when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another
woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had
charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia,
Jr., as was at first planned.
• The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the
letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning
of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment
thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal
rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of
 rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the
ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of
identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual
intended with the name used.
• It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings before us are not legally
sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words
of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived
which was expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and
though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the
defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G,
H, and J. In these letters the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters
were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good appetite in order
that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the defendant
urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
• It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the
acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may
be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of
the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the
admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the
child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed
to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
• The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had
been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that
as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of
article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court
on this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had
acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection with the facts found by the court upon the
second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which
they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a
second time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during which a child
must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince
the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this
action was started is unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that
the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
• What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the appeal of the
plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for
supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the
plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second
baby, Pacita Loanco.
• Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance which the trial
court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First
Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
• The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
• Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.

10.
Flores vs. Spouses Lindo
• The wife obtained a loan from Flores secured by a real estate mortgage on a property in the name of husband and wife.
• The checks issued by the wife in payment of the loan bounced, prompting Flores to file a complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage
with Damages against the spouses. The RTC, however, ruled that the mortgage was not valid as it did not have the husband’s
consent. The husband’s SPA was dated later than the real estate mortgage.

• Flores then filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages. Spouses filed for a motion to dismiss but such was
denied by the RTC.
• The CA, however, reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the complaint for collection of sum of money on the
ground of multiplicity of suits. It ruled that the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the
collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both.

Supreme Court Ruling

• The mortgage is valid because of Art 124 of the Family Code saying that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
• The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract
between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

• The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another
without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this case considering that the wife admitted obtaining a loan
from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously by the RTC.
Flores could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he
should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner
might have against Edna.

• The principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits.

• ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO, Respondents.

• DECISION

• CARPIO, J.:

• The Case

• Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 May 2008 Decision2 and the 4 August 2008 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003.

• The Antecedent Facts

• The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals’ Decision, are as follows:

• On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to ₱400,000 payable
on 1 December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the loan,
Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband
Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note5 and the Deed for herself and for
Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.

• Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds,
prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents. The case was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 (RTC, Branch 33) and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97942.

• In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of
the mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico.
The RTC, Branch 33 noted that the Deed was executed on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
executed by Enrico was only dated 4 November 1995.

• The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he could file
a personal action against her. However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the personal action which
should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the defendant resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure.
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8 January 2004, the RTC, Branch 33 denied the motion
for lack of merit.

• On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against respondents. It was raffled
to Branch 42 (RTC, Branch 42) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-110858.

• Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims where they admitted the loan but stated
that it only amounted to ₱340,000. Respondents further alleged that Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was
contracted by Edna without Enrico’s signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
improper venue, res judicata and forum-shopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7 March 2005,
respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.

• The Decision of the Trial Court

• On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that
res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of the same subject matter, constitute
separate or distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8 February 2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied respondents’ motion. The RTC, Branch 42
ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the
loan petitioner extended to Edna.

• Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.

• The Decision of the Court of Appeals

• In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22 July 2005 and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC,
Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

• The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, the
rule admits of exceptions. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42 acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondents’ motion to dismiss.

• The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute
more than one suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others. The Court of
Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor, that is recovery of the credit with execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative remedies:
either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. The Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he could not
split the single cause of action by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal action to
recover the amount covered by the promissory note.

• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

• Hence, the petition before this Court.

• The Issue

• The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for
collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.

• The Ruling of this Court

• The petition has merit.

• The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the
debt.10 The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a
real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.11 An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there
would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of
the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.12

• The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself.13 If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real
estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice versa.14 The Court explained:

• x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor
either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two
remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for
attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues
his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for
deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open
to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and
any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of
election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so
offensive to justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v. San Agustin, 25 Phil.
404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of
the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.15

• The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to
recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be authorized plural redress for a single breach of
contract at so much costs to the court and with so much vexation and oppressiveness to the debtor.16

• In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into consideration.

• Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to
judicial foreclosure because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed without Enrico’s consent. The RTC, Branch
33 stated:

• All these circumstances certainly conspired against the plaintiff who has the burden of proving his cause of action. On
the other hand, said circumstances tend to support the claim of defendant Edna Lindo that her husband did not consent to
the mortgage of their conjugal property and that the loan application was her personal decision.

• Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by defendant Edna Lindo lacks the consent or
authority of her husband Enrico Lindo, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.

• This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover the ₱400,000 loan plus interest which he extended to
defendant Edna Lindo. He can institute a personal action against the defendant for the amount due which should be filed in
the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides at the election of the
plaintiff in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. This Court has no jurisdiction to try
such personal action.17

• Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the loan. She claimed, however, that her husband did
not give his consent and that he was not aware of the transaction.18 Hence, the RTC, Branch 33 held that petitioner could
still recover the amount due from Edna through a personal action over which it had no jurisdiction.

• Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93 of San Pedro Laguna (RTC, Branch 93),
which ruled:

• At issue in this case is the validity of the promissory note and the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Edna Lindo without
the consent of her husband.

• The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict
dominion and must be consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the
authority or consent of the husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this case was executed on
October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to
October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously made by petitioner.

• The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the
mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null
and void. That obligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it. Under the
foregoing circumstances, what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or
settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or
proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.

• In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of real estate mortgage as void in the absence
of the authority or consent of petitioner’s spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal contract of loan however
subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the real estate mortgage.19

• The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Edna’s liability is not affected by the illegality of the real estate mortgage.

• Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the rules.

• Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

• Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing such decision.

• In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied)

• Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the
Family Code which applies to community property.

• Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."

• In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The
Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other
spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

• However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch
93 to become final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that
petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to
observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner’s avenue for recovery of the loan.

• Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.

• In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not
cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit
or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt.21 In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could
still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another.22

• The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:

• Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
• There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."23 The principle of
unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at the expense of another.241avvphi1

• The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of
another without just cause or consideration.25 The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted
obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void
erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she
filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33
for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33
already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have against Edna.

• Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should
prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that Edna
admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted to ₱340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich
herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed. Moreover,
Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount of her
indebtedness.

• WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94003 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No.
04-110858.

• SO ORDERED.

• ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice