INVESTIGATION OF THE STRUCTURAL DISTRESS

INCIDENT AT GHAGHRA BRIDGE SITE OF

JAIPRAKASH ASSOCIATE LTD (JAL)

CONFIDENTIAL : This report has been prepared by Prosava Pvt Ltd, Gurgram India for Mack
Insurance Surveyors & Loss Assesors Pvt Ltd.(Mack) for their reference and use. All information
contained or pertaining to this document is property of Mack and is available to said parties under
strict obligation of non  disclosure and restricted use unless otherwise agreed between the parties.
DOC ID- Mack.JALDohrighat.210122.PreCast SP7
JANUARY 21, 2022
PROSAVA PVT. LTD.
Sl. No. Chapters Page No.
1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 3
2 THE INCIDENT 3
3 SITE VISIT AND EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS 4
4 FAILURE INVESTIGATION 5
5 CONCLUSION 11
6 ATTACHMENTS 12
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

JAL is engaged in construction of 850 m long bridge over river Ghagra as part of four
laning project of Varanasi Gorakhpur section of NH-29. The bridge consists of two
separate twin lane structure for independently supported carriage way.

The entire super structure is designed as a precast segmental construction divided in 34

numbers 50-meter spans. Each lane has 17 precast segments which are 12.5 mtr wide
and 2.5 meter deep (Typical layout as below).

2. INCIDENT

While erection of components of the 7th spans the failure incident took place with
following events leading to it:

(i) The segments of entire span were cast on different dates between the period
January 2019 to October 2020. It is important to note that the S1 segment which
suffered the major distress was cast on 28th October 20

(ii) Shifting of the entire section was done to erection site after clearance from
casting yard and erection was initiated on 8th May 21 by suspending each
segment on mechanized launching girder suspension system.

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 (iii) Completion of alignment, dry-matching, gluing and threading activity as per
specified procedure was done and stressing of cables was initiated on 12th May
21.

(iv) Cable stressing was completed by early hours of 13th May21 and the entire span
was lowered on stools resting on bearing pedestals

(v) Almost 32 hours after lowering the entire span on 14th May 21 at around 10.30
AM, a sound was heard from right hand side web of S1 anchorage segment at
the dead end. It was further noticed that four cones corresponding to cables 3 to
6 had punctured the concrete and gone inside the web, also cable 2 & 7 were
displaced from their original position. The concrete of web portion (almost 1
meter) in vicinity of punctured cone was totally crushed and reinforcement was
exposed. The inner surface of web concrete was however intact.

In aftermath of the event, after due consultations with designers and key stakeholders, the
launching girder was again engaged and affected section was lowered successfully.
Subsequently affected segments were saw cut and transported back to yard. During the
entire event no loss of life or injury to any person or equipment took place.

3. SITE VISIT AND EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS

On advice of Mack Insurance Surveyors & Loss Assessors Pvt. Limited (MACK),
CEO of Prosava Pvt Ltd together with Design Engineer visited the site on Dec 15,2021
to inspect the damaged structure and prepare report on possible causes leading to this event.
Detailed discussions were held with project team from JAL followed up with a visit to
the yard where the failed segment was preserved for examination. Further to this, a visit
was also made to the casting yard where fresh segments were being prepared for casting
to understand the procedures being followed at site. Subsequent to the visit, following
project documents and test reports were requested from JAL site team for conducting
detailed examination and preparing a report on the possible cause of this incident.

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 1. Detailed construction drawing of the entire section along with alignment details.
2. SOP for construction along with details of tensioning
3. Mix design
4. Site procedure, tensioning chart and quality controls
5. Date of Concrete pouring for the section
6. Cube test report
7. Testing procedure
8. Post failure Core testing / UPV test report of immediate vicinity along with location
9. MTC report of tensioning cone
10. Incident report
11. Quality Assurance Plan
12. Inspection Release Note

4. FAILURE INVESTIGATION
Overall failure investigation was carried out keeping following factors that could be the reasons of
failure of the concrete structure:

1. Errors in design calculation and detailing

We examined the drawings and documents available at construction site

The bridge is designed by Consultants M/S AECOM INDIA Pvt Ltd., Checked
by Proof Consultant M/S Indian Technocrat Ltd & Authority Engineer M/S
Theme Engineering Pvt Ltd. The Drawings were approved by Prof. of IIT
Delhi.

Launching girders have been designed by M/s NC Infracon.

Detailed signed drawings are available with the site team for project execution.
Based on this, in our opinion sufficient safeguards and expertise has been used
before release of drawings for construction. Hence, possibility of any errors in
design calculation, detailing or communication is ruled out.

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 2. Incorrect use of materials for construction
We examined following documents pertaining to sourcing of raw materials for
construction

(a) Cement test certificate Ref: Annexure-2A

(b) Coase & fine Aggregate Ref: Annexure-2C
(c) Reinforcement steel Ref: Annexure-2B
(d) Tensioning Cones, wedges & Tensioning Wires Ref: Annexure-10

The detailed examination of the above documents results in conclusion that all the
raw materials procured and used at site were in line with design specifications.

3. Weather/chemical attack on concrete structure

(a) The S1 segment which suffered major distress was cast on 28th October 20 and
erected on 08th May 21.
(b) Examination of surface of the element does not show evidence of any bulging or
deterioration due to weather/ chemical attack.
(c) Report of Cube test, UPV and Core cutting (after failure) also show no evidence of
any inherent defect in concrete
Ref:
(1) Annexure-8- Cube Strength- Compressed
(2) Annexure-9A- UPV Test
(3) Annexure-9B- Core Test report
Hence any weather/chemical attack leading to deterioration of concrete is ruled out.

4. External mechanical factors leading to failure

No mishap/incident was reported during transfer of precast element from yard to erection site or
during lifting. The tensioning cone puncturing and concrete failure took place at dead end instead
of Jacking end. The concrete in vicinity of tensioning cones at the jacking end does not show any
deterioration or cracks indicating that the tensioning was carried out properly.
This rules out possible over tensioning of tendons or any other flaw in the tensioning procedure
which is further validated by the tensioning report available at site.
Ref: Annexure-5- SOP for Casting-Transportation-Erection of Segments
Hence, possibility of any external mechanical factors leading to failure is not established.

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 5. Method statement not followed at site and insufficient quality control
and supervision
The failure happened almost 32 hours after stressing all the cables. Tensioning Cones on cable
number 3,4,5 & 6 have displaced more than the adjacent cone 2 & 7. The concrete portion in
immediate vicinity of cones is completely crushed and broken.

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This points towards possible failure of concrete in distress zone as it lacks proper compressive
strength to resist loads in line with specified design considerations.
The maximum load provided during cable tensioning was 39.1 MPA (Ref: Annexure-4.2-Span-7)
The characteristic compressive strength of concrete considered during design was 45 MPA, also a
compressive strength of 65 MPA Ref: Annexure-6- Mix Design was already achieved during cube
test of design mix
(1) The concrete core within the spiral reinforcement provided in vicinity of tensioning cone
remained intact pointing out that the quality and density of concrete was not uniform.

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(2) Lack of binding wires was observed in reinforcement of the failed concrete indicating a
possibility of displacement of reinforcement and uneven spacing, which in turn could affect
the permeability of lean concrete to flow through the gaps especially in regions of dense
reinforcement zone

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(3) The zone where the concrete crushed had a very high density of reinforcement.

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The broken portion indicates possibility of internal flaws and voids in poured concrete. This could
be due to separation of aggregates during pouring of concrete from height of almost 2.5 meter in
high density reinforcement zone combined with improper vibration. Other contributing factors for
this could be inadequate sizing of coarse aggregate, mortar leakage through the formwork,
inadequate workability due to improper water cement ratio.

(a) As per “Precast Segment Quality Assurance Plan,” (Ref: Annexure-5A all precast
segments should be inspected visually as well as by using “hammer hitting” technique to
assess presence of flaws in concrete. This inspection should cover 100% area of the
segment with special focus on concrete in the vicinity of anchorage cones in S1
Segment. Further to this Non‐Destructive Ultrasonic Pulse Velocity (UPV) tests should be
carried out at time of dispatch from manufacturing site. The QAP specifies additional UPV
tests in vicinity of pre-stressing cone for S1 segment.

(b) Based on provided reports the embedded voids and internal flaws in concrete were missed
during the pre-dispatch inspection of the segment and UPV test were not carried out as per
specified procedure prior to dispatch of segment to erection site.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Based on our investigation, we conclude that the likely reason for this failure was non-conformity
in following the method statement coupled with insufficient quality control and supervision at site:

(1) No defects have been observed in other erected portions of the bridge eliminating
possibility of errors at the design stage or in material selection.

(2) The quality of concrete in immediate vicinity of tensioning cones at dead end of S1
segment did not meet the design specifications. As a result, the concrete was completely
crushed and broken when tensioning load was applied.

(3) Presence of voids in concrete is possible due to segregation of concrete, mortar leakage,
incorrect rebar spacing or improper compaction of concrete. This points towards
inadequate supervision and poor workmanship in executing the concreting job.

(4) Quality assurance procedures were not properly followed as inadequately cast element
was cleared for dispatch and erected despite having internal voids which were
eventually missed during inspection before dispatch and lead to failure after application
of prestressing load.

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 6. LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

(a) Incident report Annexure 1

(b) Material Test Reports Annexure 2A,2B,2C
(c) GA & Construction drawing Annexure-3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, 3E
(d) SOP for construction Annexure-4.1A, 4.1B
(e) Pre-Tensioning report Annexure-4.2
(f) SOP Casting, Pre dispatch inspection Annexure -5,5A,5C
(g) Mix design Annexure 6
(h) Deflection Chart Annexure 7
(i) Cube test report Annexure 8
(j) Post failure Core / UPV test report Annexure 9A,9B
(k) TC Strand wire, tensioning cone head Annexure 10
(l) QAP- Construction Annexure 11

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