A. THE!CONSTITUTION!AS!A!SOCIAL!CONTRACT.!
/People! having! the! power,! agreeing! for! the! ascertainment! of! that! intent! is! but! in! keeping! with! the!
common!good!establish!a!system!of!governance.!
! intent! of! the! framers! of! the! organic! law! and! of! the! people!
NORTH!COTOBATO!VS!GOVERNMENT!
GRP! violated! the! Constitutional! and! statutory! provisions! on!
public! consultation! and! the! right! to! information! when! they!
negotiated! and! initiated! the! MOA/AD! and! it! are!
unconstitutional! because! it! is! contrary! to! law! and! the!
provisions!of!the!constitution!thereof.!The!GRP!is!required!by!
this!law!to!carry!out!public!consultations!on!both!national!and!
local!levels!to!build!consensus!for!peace!agenda!and!process!
and!the!mobilization!and!facilitation!of!people’s!participation!
in!the!peace!process.!
!
B. HOW!TO!READ!THE!CONSTITUTION!
• Verba!legis/plain!meaning!rule!
• Ratio! legis! est! anima/intent! of! the! law!
makers!
• Ut!magis!valeat!quam!pereat/as!a!whole!
! great!document!
FRANCISCO!VS!HRET!
Verba! legis,! that! is,! wherever! possible,! the! words!
used! in! the! Constitution! must! be! given! their! ordinary!
meaning!except!where!technical!terms!are!employed.!!
We!look!to!the!language!of!the!document!!itself!in!our!search!
for! its! meaning.! We! do! not! of! course! stop! there,! but! that! is!
where!we!begin.!It!is!to!be!assumed!that!the!words!in!which!
constitutional! provisions! are! couched! express! the! objective!
sought! to! be! attained.! They! are! to! be! given! their! ordinary!
meaning! except! where! technical! terms! are! employed! in!
which!case!the!significance!thus!attached!to!them!prevails.!As!
the!Constitution!is!not!primarily!a!lawyer’s!document,!it!being!
essential! for! the! rule! of! law! to! obtain! that! it! should! ever! be!
present! in! the! people’s! consciousness,! its! language! as! much!
as! possible! should! be! understood! in! the! sense! they! have! in!
common! use.! What! it! says! according! to! the! text! of! the!
provision! to! be! construed! compels! acceptance! and! negates!
the! power! of! the! courts! to! alter! it,! based! on! the! postulate!
that! the! framers! and! the! people! mean! what! they! say.! Thus!
these! are! the! cases! where! the! need! for! construction! is!
reduced!to!a!minimum!
Second,! where! there! is! ambiguity,! ratio! legis! est!
anima.!!The!words!of!the!Constitution!should!be!interpreted!
in!accordance!with!the!intent!of!its!framers.!!!
A! foolproof! yardstick! in! constitutional! construction! is! the!
intention!underlying!the!provision!under!consideration.!Thus,!
it! has! been! held! that! the! Court! in! construing! a! Constitution!
should!bear!in!mind!the!object!sought!to!be!accomplished!by!
its!adoption,!and!the!evils,!if!any,!sought!to!be!prevented!or!
remedied.!A!doubtful!provision!will!be!examined!in!the!light!
of! the! history! of! the! times,! and! the! condition! and!
circumstances!under!which!the!Constitution!was!framed.!The!
object!is!to!ascertain!the!reason!which!induced!the!framers!of!
the! Constitution! to! enact! the! particular! provision! and! the!
purpose! sought! to! be! accomplished! thereby,! in! order! to!
construe!the!whole!as!to!make!the!words!consonant!to!that!
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
! !
reason! and! calculated! to! effect! that! purpose,! ! The!
fundamental!principle!of!constitutional!construction!that!the!
adopting! it! should! be! given! effect.! The! primary! task! in!
constitutional! construction! is! to! ascertain! and! thereafter!
assure! the! realization! of! the! purpose! of! the! framers! and! of!
the!people!in!the!adoption!of!the!Constitution.!It!may!also!be!
safely! assumed! that! the! people! in! ratifying! the! Constitution!
were! guided! mainly! by! the! explanation! offered! by! the!
framers.!
Finally,! ut! magis! valeat! quam! pereat.!! The!
Constitution!is!to!be!interpreted!as!a!whole.!!!
!The! members! of! the! Constitutional! Convention! could! not!
have!dedicated!a!provision!of!our!Constitution!merely!for!the!
benefit! of! one! person! without! considering! that! it! could! also!
affect! others.!! When! they! adopted! subsection! 2,! they!
permitted,!if!not!willed,!that!said!provision!should!function!to!
the! full! extent! of! its! substance! and! its! terms,! not! by! itself!
alone,! but! in! conjunction! with! all! other! provisions! of! that!
It!is!a!well/established!rule!in!constitutional!construction!that!
no!one!provision!of!the!Constitution!is!to!be!separated!from!
all! the! others,! to! be! considered! alone,! but! that! all! the!
provisions!bearing!upon!a!particular!subject!are!to!be!brought!
into!view!and!to!be!so!interpreted!as!to!effectuate!the!great!
purposes!of!the!instrument.!!Sections!bearing!on!a!particular!
subject!should!be!considered!and!interpreted!together!as!to!
effectuate! the! whole! purpose! of! the! Constitution! and! one!
section! is! not! to! be! allowed! to! defeat! another,! if! by! any!
reasonable! construction,! the! two! can! be! made! to! stand!
together.!
In! other! words,! the! court! must! harmonize! them,! if!
practicable,! and! must! lean! in! favor! of! a! construction! which!
will!render!every!word!operative,!rather!than!one!which!may!
make!the!words!idle!and!nugatory.!
!
!
!
C. FRAMEWORK!FOR!CONSTITUTIONAL!LITIGATION!
WE! have! agreed! to! delegate! to! the! state! power! to!
the! government! through! the! Constitution,! the!
power! was! DISTRIBUTED! to! the! officials.! While!
there! may! be! separation! of! powers,! conflicts! may!
arise,! overlaps! may! arise,! in! resolving! the! conflict!
they!determine!whether!they!are!kept!within!their!
boundaries!set!by!the!Constitution.!
!
EXECUTIVE/to!execute!laws!
LEGISLATIVE/to!make!laws!
JUDICIARY/to!interpret!the!laws.!
!
POLITICAL!QUESTION/!those!questions!which,!under!
the!Constitution,!are!to!be!decided!by!the!people!in!
their! sovereign! capacity,! or! in! regard! to! which! full!
discretionary! authority! has! been! delegated! to! the!
Legislature!or!executive!branch!of!the!Government.!
CADC%AUFSOL! 1.
!
 It!is!concerned!with!the!issues!dependent!upon!the! policy! interests,! and! could! disrupt! our! relations! with! Japan,!
wisdom,!not!legality!of!a!particular!measure.! thereby! creating! serious! implications! for! stability! in! this!
! region.! For! the! to! overturn! the! Executive! Department’s!
FRANCISCO!VS!HOR! determination! would! mean! an! assessment! of! the! foreign!
THE!CASE!IS!NOT!BEYOND!JUDICIAL!REVIEW.! policy! judgments! by! a! coordinate! political! branch! to! which!
The!seven!limitations!of!the!power!of!the!judicial!review! authority! to! make! that! judgment! has! been! constitutionally!
• Not! pass! upon! in! a! friendly,! non/adversary! committed.!
proceeding.!
• Not! anticipate! a! question! of! constitutional! law! on! From!a!municipal!law!perspective,!certiorari!will!not!lie.!As!a!
advance! general!principle,!where!such!an!extraordinary!length!of!time!
• Not! formulate! a! rule! of! constitutional! law! broader! has! lapsed! between! the! treaty’s! conclusion! and! our!
than!is!required!by!the!facts! consideration!–!the!Executive!must!be!given!ample!discretion!
• Not!the!lis!mota!of!the!case! to! assess! the! foreign! policy! considerations! of! espousing! a!
• No!legal!standing! claim!against!Japan,!from!the!standpoint!of!both!the!interests!
• Not!pass!upon!the!constitutionality!of!a!statute!for! of! the! petitioners! and! those! of! the! Republic,! and! decide! on!
one!who!has!benefited! that! basis! if! apologies! are! sufficient,! and! whether! further!
• Ascertain!first!whether!a!construction!is!possible!by! steps!are!appropriate!or!necessary.!
which!the!question!will!be!avoided.!
! In! the! international! sphere,! traditionally,! the! only! means!
! available! for! individuals! to! bring! a! claim! within! the!
D. THE! 1987! CONSTITUTION! PREAMBLE! AND! international! legal! system! has! been! when! the! individual! is!
DECLARATION!OF!PRINCIPLE!AND!STAE!POLICIES! able! to! persuade! a! government! to! bring! a! claim! on! the!
! individual’s!behalf.!By!taking!up!the!case!of!one!of!its!subjects!
! and!by!resorting!to!diplomatic!action!or!international!judicial!
• PREAMBLE:!states!the!purpose!of!the!Constitution.! proceedings! on! his! behalf,! a! State! is! in! reality! asserting! its!
Why! is! it! important?! The! preamble! serves! as! a! guide! for! own!right!to!ensure,!in!the!person!of!its!subjects,!respect!for!
judicial! branch! to! ascertaining! the! meaning! of! ambiguous! the!rules!of!international!law.!
provisions.! We! can! see! the! state! of! the! framers! in! the!
PREAMBLE.!
PREAMBLE! Within!the!limits!prescribed!by!international!law,!a!State!may!
! exercise! diplomatic! protection! by! whatever! means! and! to!
WE!THE!SOVEREIGN!FILIPINO!PEOPLE!IMPLORING!THE!AID!OF! whatever! extent! it! thinks! fit,! for! it! is! its! own! right! that! the!
ALMIGHTY! GOD,! IN! ORDER! TO! BUIILT! A! JUST! AND! HUMANE! State! is! asserting.! Should! the! natural! or! legal! person! on!
SOCIETY! AND! ESTABLISG! A! GOVERNMENT! THAT! SHALL! whose! behalf! it! is! acting! consider! that! their! rights! are! not!
EMOBODY! OUR! IDEALS! AND! ASPIRATION,! PROMOTE! THE! adequately! protected,! they! have! no! remedy! in! international!
COMMON! GOOD,! CONSERVE! AND! DEVELOP! OUR! law.! All! they! can! do! is! resort! to! national! law,! if! means! are!
PATRIMONY.,! AND! SECURE! TO! OURSELVES! OUR! POSTERITY! available,! with! a! view! to! furthering! their! cause! or! obtaining!
AND! THE! BLESSINGS! OF! INDEPENDENCE! AND! DEMOCRACY! redress.! All! these! questions! remain! within! the! province! of!
UNDER!THE!RULE!OF!LAW!AND!A!REGIME!OF!TRUTH,!JUSTICE,! municipal!law!and!do!not!affect!the!position!internationally.!
FREEDOM,! LOVE,! EQUALITY,! AND! PEACE! DO! ORDAIN! AND!
PROMULGATE!THIS!CONSTITUTION.! Even! the! invocation! of! jus! cogens! norms! and! erga! omnes!
! obligations! will! not! alter! this! analysis.! Petitioners! have! not!
! shown! that! the! crimes! committed! by! the! Japanese! army!
DECLARATION!OF!PRINCIPLE!AND!STATE!POLICIES! violated! jus! cogens! prohibitions! at! the! time! the! Treaty! of!
! These! are! not! immediately! executor.! State! policies! Peace!was!signed,!or!that!the!duty!to!prosecute!perpetrators!
are!also!sources!of!rights!and!they!are!also!inherent.! of! international! crimes! is! an! erga! omnes! obligation! or! has!
! attained!the!status!of!jus!cogens.!
• INCORPORATION!CLAUSE!
ARTICLE!2!SECTION!2! The! term! erga! omnes! (Latin:! in! relation! to! everyone)! in!
THE! PHILIPPINES! RENOUNCES! WAR! AS! AN! INTRUMENT! OF! international! law! has! been! used! as! a! legal! term! describing!
NATIONAL! POLICY,! ADOPTS! THE! GENERALLY! ACCEPTED! obligations!owed!by!States!towards!the!community!of!states!
PRINCIPLES! OF! INTERNATIONAL! LAW! AS! PART! OF! THE! LAW! as! a! whole.! Essential! distinction! should! be! drawn! between!
OF! THE! LAND! AND! ADHERES! TO! THE! POLICY! OF! PEACE,! the! obligations! of! a! State! towards! the! international!
EQUALITY,! JUSTICE,! FREEDOM,! COOPERATION,! AND! AMITY! community! as! a! whole,! and! those! arising! vis/à/vis! another!
WITH!ALL!NATIONS.! State! in! the! field! of! diplomatic! protection.! By! their! very!
! nature,!the!former!are!the!concern!of!all!States.!In!view!of!the!
VINUYA!VS!ROMULO! importance! of! the! rights! involved,! all! States! can! be! held! to!
Court! cannot! compel! the! Executive! to! take! action! regarding! have!a!legal!interest!in!their!protection;!they!are!obligations!
the!petition!of!the!Malaya!lolas! erga!omnes.!
!
The! Executive! Department! has! determined! that! taking! up!
The! term! “jus! cogens”! (literally,! “compelling! law”)! refers! to!
petitioners’!cause!would!be!inimical!to!our!country’s!foreign!
norms! that! command! peremptory! authority,! superseding!

!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER. CADC%AUFSOL! 2.
! ! !
conflicting! treaties! and! custom.! Jus! cogens! norms! are!
considered!peremptory!in!the!sense!that!they!are!mandatory,!
do!not!admit!derogation,!and!can!be!modified!only!by!general!
international!norms!of!equivalent!authority!
! However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office
! when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the
PHAP!VS!DUQUE!(MILK!CODE)!
How!are!international!instruments!considered!part!of!the!law!
of!the!land?!
1. transformation/local!registration;ratification!
2. incorporation/!mere!constitutional!declaration!
! contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law
by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such
as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional
declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA
resolutions were not treaties as they have not been
concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as
required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had
been transformed into domestic law through a local
legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is
almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
! !
!
! The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos.
! The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with
• SANCTITY!OF!THE!FAMILY!
THE! STATE! RECOGNIZES! THE! SANCTITY! OF! FAMILY! LIFE! AND!
SHALL! PROTECT! AND! STRENGTHEN! THE! FAMILY! AS! A! BASIC!
AUTONOMOUS! SOCIAL! INSTITUTION.! IT! SHALL! EQUALLY!
PROTECT! THE! LIFE! OF! THE! MOTHER! AND! THE! LIFE! OF! THE!
UNBORN! FROM! CONCEPTION.! THE! NATURAL! AND! PRIMARY!
RIGHT! AND! DUTY! OF! PARENTS! IN! THE! REARING! OF! THE!
YOUTH! FOR! CIVIC! EFFICIENCY! AND! THE! DEVELOPMENT! OF!
MORAL! CHARACTER! SHALL! RECEIVE! THE! SUPPORT! OF! THE!
GOVERNMENT.!
! !
IMBONG!VS!OCHOA!
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory
construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that
life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the
view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for
(a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In
addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and
those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the
life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from
passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot
interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent
and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits
not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
! !
those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.
term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses
the term “primarily”, must be struck down.!
!
!
• RIGHT!TO!HEALTH!
SECTION! 15.! THE! STATE! SHALL! PROTECT! AND! PROMITE! THE!
RIGHT! TO! HEALTH! OF! THE! PEOPLE! AND! INSTILL! HEALTH!
CONSCIOUSNESS!AMONG!THEM.!
OPOSA!VS!FACTORAN!
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious
management of the country’s forests. This right is also
the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial
or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may
thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.!
!
MMDA!VS!CONCERNED!CITIZENS!OF!MANILA!BAY!
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation,
the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for
all concerned executive departments and agencies to
immediately act and discharge their respective official
duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence;
hence, there is a need to set timetables for the
performance and completion of the tasks, some of them
as defined for them by law and the nature of their
respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource,
playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-
emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the
Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the
plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters.
But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could
only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help
and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put
their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This
means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the
lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila
Bay.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need
not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed,
like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of
CADC%AUFSOL! 3.
!
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an that may have become underpinnings of the
issue of transcendental importance with obsolete or that are judged document)-to determine
intergenerational implications. Even assuming the to be dangerous.! how and to what extent it
absence of a categorical legal provision specifically should be altered.!
prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the NON!STRUCTURAL! STRUCTURAL!
men and women representing them cannot escape their CAN!BE!RATIFY!THROUGH!
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the CONSITUTUENT!ASSEMBLY! CONSTITUENT!ASSEMBLY!
waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as CONSTITUTIONAL! CONSTITUTIONAL!
possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust CONVENTION! CONVENTION!
reposed in them.! PEOPLE’S!INITIATIVE!
E. NATIONAL!TERRITORY!
B. PROPOSAL!!
Our!courts!can!only!exercise!within!its!territory.!
• By!congress!acting!as!Con!Ass!by!votes!of!
!
¾!
• PHILIPPINE!ARCHIPELAGO!
NOTE: When convened, a mere MAJORITY VOTE of
• Historic!title! the members is all that is normally required for the
• Where! Philippines! exercise! its! administrative! approval of a proposed amendment to or revision of the
jurisdiction.! Constitution.
!
ARTICLE! 1.! THE! NATIONAL! TERRITORY! COMPRISES! THE! !
PHILIPPINE! ARCHIPELAGO,! WITH! ALL! THE! ISLANDS! AND! • By! CON/CON/! not! the! congress.! It! will!
WATERS! EMBRACED! THEREIN,! AND! ALL! OTHER! TERRITORIES! create!conflict!of!interest.!
OVER! WHICH! THE! PHILIPPINES! HAS! SOVEREIGNITY! OR! a) Congress, acting as a
JURISDICTION,! CONSISTING! OF! ITS! TERRESTRIAL,! FLUVIAL,! CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, !by a vote of
AND!AREIAL!DOMAINS,!INCLUDING!ITS!TERRITORIAL!SEA,!THE! 2/3 of all its members, may submit to
SEABED,! THE! SUBSOIL,! THE! INSULAR,! SHELVES,! AND! OTHER! the !people, call a CONSTITUTIONAL
SUBMARINES! AREAS.! THE! WATERS! AROUND,! BETEWEEN,! CONVENTION.
AND! CONNECTING! THE! ISLANDS! OF! THE! ARCHIPELAGO,!
REGARDLESS! OF! THEIR! BREADTH! AND! DIMENSIONS,! FORM! b) Congress, acting as a
PART!OF!THE!INTERNAL!WATERS!OF!THE!PHILIPPINES.! CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, by the vote of
! MAJORITY of all its members, may submit to
! the people, the question of calling
F. STATE!IMMUNITY! such !convention.
INTERNATIONAL! LAW:! the! state! cannot! be! sued! in!
another!sovereign.!(diplomatic!officials)! !
/based! on! the! equality! of! states.! States! are! GONZALES!VS!COMELEC!
sovereign! within! their! reigns,! but! because! of! The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the
reciprocity,! the! sovereignty! is! acknowledge! by! power to amend as well as the power to propose amendments
other!states.! to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of
DOMESTIC!LAW:!immunity!of!the!republic,!and!the! legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not
immunity!of!the!President.!! constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such
The!state!cannot!be!sued!without!its!consent!but!if! powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty
the! state! has! waived! his! immunity! through! in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes
expressed!or!implied!waiver.! amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing
! so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent
assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a
!
legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The
PART!II.!
Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the
!
constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations.
! There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only
! be held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in
A. AMENDMENT!VS!REVISION! this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the
! election therein referred to is a special, not a general election.
! The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
! Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification
AMENDMENT! REVISION! in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best
envisages an alteration of the guiding original to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not
one or a few specific and intention and plan negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
separable provisions. The contemplate a re- ratification in general elections.!
guiding original intention examination of the entire !
of an amendment is to document-or of provisions • People’s!Initiative/!by!a!petition!signed!by!
improve specific parts or of the document (which at! least! 12%! of! all! the! registered! voters!
to add new provisions have overall implications and!at!least!3%!of!each!legislative!district.!
deemed necessary to meet for the entire document or !
new conditions or to for the fundamental
SANTIAGO!VS!COMELEC!
suppress specific portions philosophical
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER. CADC%AUFSOL! 4.
! ! !
amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate
to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution
provides: “Amendments to this constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least there per centum of the registered
voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right” This provision is
obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be
passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated “without implementing legislation Section 2,
Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending
the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on
Congressional action.” Bluntly stated, the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold
niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason
does not provide for its implementation.!
! ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the
!
!
LAMBINO!VS!COMELEC!
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the
people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private
capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to
the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to
the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those
who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that
the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition
contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all
the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read
and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely
handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not
attach thereto the full text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the
constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in
violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment
should only contain one issue. The proposed amendment/s by
petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would
enable the would-be parliament to enact more rules.
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at
hand can be decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court
avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other
means to resolve an issue at bar.!
!
! shall be vested in one supreme court and in such lower
C. SUBMISSION!
DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION: the plebiscite
must be held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90
days after the approval of the proposal by Congress or
the ConCon, or after the certification by the COMELEC
of the sufficiency of petition.
- To give people sufficient and reasonable time
to study and discuss the proposed
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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amendments.
- Plebiscite may be held on the same day as
regular elections. Piecemeal amendments are not
allowed.
!
!
TOLENTINO!VS!COMELEC!
If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an
improper submission to the people. Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is
singular which meant that the entire constitution must be
submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore,
the people were not given a proper “frame of reference” in
arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea
yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would
proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This
is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the
proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to
the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time,
NOT piecemeal.!
!
!
D. RATIFICATION!
RATIFICATION: any amendment to or revision of
the Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of all the votes cast in a plebiscite.
PART III: JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS
B. THEORY AND JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW.
JUDICIAL REVIEW: this is the power of courts,
ultimately the SC, to interpret the Constitution, and
TO TEST THE VALIDITY of executive and
legislative acts in the light of their conformity with
the fundamental law.
JUSTIFICATION: The Constitution as the direct
enactment of the sovereign people, is the supreme
law of the land. Any statute, executive order,
regulation, ordinance or treaty repugnant to the
constitution is void and unenforceable,
NATURE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW-the judicial power
courts as may be established by law.
SCOPE:
• To settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable
• To determine whether or not there has
CADC%AUFSOL! 5.
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 been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of excess jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
government
ANGARA!VS!!ELECOM!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!When! the! Court! allocates! constitutional! boundaries,!
it!neither!asserts!supremacy,!nor!annuls!the!acts!of!
the!legislature.!It!simply!carries!out!the!obligations!
imposed! upon! it! by! the! constitution! to! determine!
conflicting! claims! and! to! establish! for! the! parties!
the!rights!which!the!constitution!grants!to!them.!
C. JUSTICIABLE!AND!POLITICAL!QUESTIONS!
!
FRANCISCO!V!HRET!
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
99
legality, of a particular measure. (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and
seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court
vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases
which involved political questions. In some cases, this
Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
100
review. In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court
assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
101
political bodies. Even in the landmark 1988 case of
102
Javellana v. Executive Secretary which raised the
issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified,
hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question
doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the
people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a
question decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political
question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over
certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief
Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial
review and its application on issues involving political
questions
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary
is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1,
which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard
to the present controversy.
!
!
VINUYA!VS!ROMULO!
Baker v. Carr remains the starting point for analysis under
the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court explained
that:
x x x Prominent on the surface of
any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it, or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on question.
In Tañada v. Cuenco,[ we held that political questions refer "to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political
questions.[One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is
well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision." The US Supreme Court has
further cautioned that decisions relating to foreign policy
CADC%AUFSOL! 6.
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 are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil. They are
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility.
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present
political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe
or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts
but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace
of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by
the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
! !
!
! The Court held that, in the present case, there was no
D. REQUISITES!OF!JUDICIAL!REVIEW!
• ACTUAL!CASE!OR!CONTOVERSY!
• PROPER!PARTY/LEGAL!STANDING!
• QUESTION! RAISED! AT! THE! EARLIEST!
OPPORTUNITY!
• LIS!MOTA!
! SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
a. actual!case!or!controversy!
/conflict! of! legal! rights! or! an! assertion! of! opposite! legal!
claims! susceptible! of! judicial! determination.! The! court!
must!resolve!constitutional!issues!only!when!they!come!
to!it!at!the!right!time.!
! Government Code of 1991.!
IMBONG!VS!OCHOA!JUSTIC!LEONEN!DISSENTING!
stice Leonen noted that none of the petitions properly
present an “actual case or controversy” which deserves
the Court’s exercise of judicial review. He said that it
would be better to wait for the proper parties suffering
real, actual or more imminent injury, which petitioners in
this case do not. In his words, “Claims relating to the
beginning of life, the relationship of objection, and the
right of religion, the effects of contraception, and even
the majority opinion writer claim that the family is put in
danger when one spouse decides when there is
disagreement between them are best decided within real
contexts so that we will be able to narrowly tailor the
doctrines in our decision. The danger of ruling on
abstracts is that we foreclose real litigation between real
parties. The danger of an advisory opinion is that we are
forced to substitute our own imagination of the facts that
can or will happen x x x.”
He also argued: “This court is not the venue to continue
the brooding and vociferous political debate that has
already happened and has resulted in legislation . . .
Petitioners have come before us driven by their unfailing
belief in the moral rightness of their faith and their
causes. Their faith is not to be questioned and their
conviction is solid. But these cases are premature,” he
added.
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
! !
Specifically Justice Leonen objected to the Court’s
discussion on the beginning of life since, according to
him, any declaration on this issue will be fraught with
contradictions. Moreover, the petitions have failed to
present clear cases when the provisions for
conscientious objection would truly amount to a violation
of the right of religion. For these and more, to him, the
petitions should have been dismissed.
!
!
PREMATURUTY!
PACU!VS!SECRETARY!OF!EDUCATION!
Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any
of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no
reason exists for them to assail neither the validity of the
power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of
Education. No justiciable controversy has been presented to
us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has
prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or
intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger
of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.!
MONTESCARLOS!VS!COMELEC!
actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6,
2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless
amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date
not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the
petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely
restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original
charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for
membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old.
Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence
of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local
!
MARIANO!VS!COMELEC!
No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.!
!
!
MOOTNESS!
/!A!case!becomes!moot!when!there!are!facts,!injuries!and!
heated!arguments!but!for!some!reason!the!legal!problem!has!
become!stale.!When!a!case!is!moot!and!academic,!it!ceases!to!
be!a!case!and!controversy.!Any!decision!reached!by!the!court!
would!not!be!conclusive!on!the!parties.
ATLAS FERTILIZER VS SEC DAR
This is a consolidated case questioning the
constitutionality Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32
of RA 6657. That the said provision extends agrarian
reform to aquaculture lands even as Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of
the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural
CADC%AUFSOL! 7.
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lands. The said provisions being violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution by similarly treating
of aquaculture and agriculture lands when they are
differently situated. That the said provisions distort
employment benefits and burdens in favor of
aquaculture employees and against other industrial
workers even as Section 1 and 3 of Art. XIII of the
Constitution mandates the State to promote equality in
economic and employment opportunities and that the
questioned provisions deprived petitioner of its
government-induced investments in aquaculture even as
Sec. 2 and 3 of Art. XIII of the Constitution mandate the
State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right
of enterprises to reasonable returns of investments and
to expansion and growth.
In the petitioner's argument they contended that in the
case of Luz Farms, Inc v. Secretary of Agrarian and
Reform, the Court has already ruled impliedly that lands
devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands. That in
aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land
is only incidental to and not the principal factor in
productivity and hence, as held in the above-mentioned
case, they too should be excluded from RA 6657 just as
land devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been
excluded for the same reason.
While this case is pending RA 7881 was approved by
Congress amending RA 6657.
Whether or not the said provisions of RA 6657 are
unconstitutional.
The question regarding the constitutionality of the above-
mentioned provisions has become moot and academic
with the passage of RA 7881 and RA 7881 expressly
stat that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from
the coverage of RA 6657.
LACSON!VS!PEREZ!
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc.
No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition
has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents
have declared that the Justice Department and the
police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of
arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and
until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing
the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly
arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the
period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the
officer responsible for such may be penalized for the
delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with
arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were
neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure
orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave
the country in the near future. To declare the hold
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in
the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged
impending warrantless arrests is premature being that
no complaints have been filed against them for any
crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled
for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which
Petitioners are not subjected to. !
!
Exceptions!to!mootness:!
• if the question is capable of repetition and evasive of
review
• if there exits a mere possibility of collateral legal
consequences if the court does not act
• voluntary cessation from wrongful act by the
defendant, if he is free to return to his old ways.
SANLAKAS!VS!EXECUTIVE!SECRETARY!
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section
18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state
or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-
in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President
has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. While the Court may examine whether the power
was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no
merit as there was no indication that military tribunals
have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of
usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of
no moment since the President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1
and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2),
Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this
whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long
as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas
and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal
standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and
Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing
to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its
decision in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are
CADC%AUFSOL! 8.
!
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution
! in the government service, as long as the President
! deems that person competent.
PIMENTEL!VS!ERMITA!
Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those
instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint
are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope
of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission
on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its
power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not
have appointed respondents as acting secretaries
because “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a
Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary.”
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended
to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of
a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy
in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the
President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become
vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee
will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book
III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President
may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to
prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is
a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The
absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year!
!
B.!PROPER!PARTY!
A! proper! party! is! one! who! has! sustained,! or! is! in! imminent!
danger! of! sustaining,! an! injury! as! a! result! of! the! act!
complained!of.!
GENERAL!RULE:!validity!of!the!statute!may!be!contested!only!
by!one!who!will!sustain!a!direct!injury,!in!consequence!of!its!
enforcement.!
!
JOYA!VS!PCGG!
Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those
instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint
are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope
of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission
on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its
power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.
CADC%AUFSOL! 9.
!
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not
have appointed respondents as acting secretaries
because “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a
Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary.”
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended
to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of
a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy
in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the
President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become
vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee
will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book
III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President
may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet
in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to
prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is
a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
! !
circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The
absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and
Taxpayer’s Suit:
There are certain instances however when this Court has
allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as
when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure
the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a
public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a
taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and
artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the
legal personality to restrain respondents Executive
Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public
duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to
18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The
Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
governing the preservation and disposition of national
and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor
their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by
them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as
great works of art. They allege that with the
unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces,
petitioners have been deprived of their right to public
property without due process of law in violation of the
Constitution.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack
basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the
paintings were donated by private persons from
different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-
stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine
arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady
Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R.
Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings
legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given
the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings
when they were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique
silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from
friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their
silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to
them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by
the revolutionary government, these paintings and
silverware were taken from Malacañang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the
Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these
properties by the Aquino administration however should
CADC%AUFSOL! 10.
!
not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation. If
these properties were already acquired by the
government, any constitutional or statutory defect in
their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must
be raised only by the proper parties — the true owners
thereof — whose authority to recover emanates from
their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes
and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are
the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued
pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not
possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question
their alleged unauthorized disposition.!
!
CHR!EMPLOYEES!ASSOC!VS!CHR!
Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner
has no locus standi considering that there exists
no official written record in the Commission
recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization
of its employees nor is there anything in the
records to show that its president has the
authority to sue the CHR.
On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we
held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is
one who has sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of
rank and file employees of respondent CHR,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of
positions benefited only a select few in the upper
level positions in the Commission resulting to the
demoralization of the rank and file employees.
This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed,
the CHR’s upgrading scheme, if found to be valid,
potentially entails eating up the Commission’s
savings or that portion of its budgetary pie
otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from
which the benefits of the employees, including
those in the rank and file, are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this
case was recognized by the CSC when it took
cognizance of the CHREA’s request to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-National Capital
Region Office. CHREA’s personality to bring the
suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed
upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should
our hands be tied by this technical concern.
Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue
that was neither raised in the complaint nor in
the court below cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.!
!
CITIZEN!STANDING!
TANADA!VS!TUVERA!
The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or
repeal or modify it if it finds the same as impractical. That is
not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The
task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
! !
law as conceived and approved by the political departments of
the government in accordance with prescribed procedure.
Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon
their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in
full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
The clause “unless otherwise provided” pertains to the date of
publication and not the requirement of publication.!
!
CHAVEZ!VS!PEA!AND!AMARI!
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to
be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands
of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas
of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of
the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA
also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.!
!
ASSOCIATIONAL!STANDING!
KMU!LABOR!VS!!GARCIA!
!
IBP!VS!ZAMORA!
!
EXECUTIVE!SECRETARY!VS!CA!
!
KILOSBAYAN!VS!GUINGONA!
! ! A!party’s!standing!in!court!is!a!
procedural!technicality!which!may!be!
set!aside!by!the!Court!in!view!of!the!
importance!of!the!issues!involved.!
Thus,!where!the!issues!raised!by!
petitioners!are!of!paramount!public!
interest!or!of!transcendental!
importance,!the!Court!may!brush!aside!
the!procedural!barrier!
!
!
TAX!PAYER!STANDING!
ITF!VS!COMELEC!
!
VOTER’S!STANDING!
TOLENTINO!VS!COMELEC!
!
LEGISLATIVE!STANDING!
OPLE!VS!TORRES!
CADC%AUFSOL! 11.
!
 A!senator!has!the!requisite!standing!to!bring!a! expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
suit!assailing!the!issuance!or! and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
implementation!of!a!law!as!a! 110
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily,
usurpation!of!legislative!power! the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
!
!
GOVERNMENTAL!STANDING!
PEOPLE!VS!VERA!
! ! A!person!has!standing!to!challenge!the!
governmental!act!only!if!he!has!a!
personal!and!substantial!interest!in! 3. EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

the!case!such!that!he!has!sustained,!or! General Rule:the question must be raised in the pleadings.

will!sustain,!direct!injury!as!a!result!of!
its!enforcement.! IT MUST BE RAISED AS SOON AS THE QUESTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS FILED. RTC LEVEL

! 4. Lis Mota
!
FACIAL CHALLENGE Because of the doctrine of separation of powers which
demands that proper respect be accorded the other
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN branches of government, courts are loath to decide
on constitutional questions as long as there is some
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a other basis that can be used to resolve the case. It
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of must appear conclusively that the case before the
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The court may not be legally settled unless the
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe constitutionality of the statute involved is determined (
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
singleprosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify I. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT A. Nature and
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no Classification Legislative Power 1. Nature:
requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The The authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected them.
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and Vested in Congress, except to the extent reserved to
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible the people by provision on initiative and referendum
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
Plenary (The Congress may legislate on any subject
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. matter provided that the limitations are observed.)
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial 2. Classification of Legislative Power:
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against
1. Original - possessed by the sovereign people
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech 2. Derivative - delegated by the sovereign people to legislative
bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people

3.Constituent - power to amend and revise the Constitution

IMBONG V OCHOA
4.Ordinary - power to pass ordinary laws
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the
subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on a. Senate (Art. VI secs. 2-4)
its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
Composition: 24 senators elected at large
n this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S.
has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While Qualifications:
this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
108 1. Natural-born citizen
penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
109 2. At least 35 years old on the day of the election
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification
is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its

!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER. CADC%AUFSOL! 12.

! ! !
3. Able to read and write
4. A registered voter
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 2 years immediately
preceding the day of the election
th
Term of Office: 6 years, commencing at noon on the 30 day
of June next following their election
Term Limits: only up to 2 consecutive terms. However, they
may serve for more than 2 terms provided that the terms are not
consecutive.
Qualifications of Representatives:
1. Natural-born citizens .
2. At least 25 years old on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter in the district he seeks to represent
5. A resident of the said district for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election
th
Term of Office: 3 years, commencing at noon on the 30 day
of June next following their election.
Term Limits: No member of the House of Representatives
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms.
c. Synchronized terms of office (Secs 1-2, Art XVIII)
The first elections of Members of the Congress under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1987. The first local elections shall be held on a date to be
determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress.
It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. The
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the
local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years
and the remaining twelve for three years.
ALLOCATION OF DISTRICTS
SEMA VS COMELEC
The creation of local government units is governed by Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units –
province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of
the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of
authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional
or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and
provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code,
“only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.[26]
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress
the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership
in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers
Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power
to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself
enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative
bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts
of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed
by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the
“power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of
the power (of Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested
exclusively in Congress.
Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts
cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by
Congress itself.
MACIAS VS COMELEC
HELD: Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of
inhabitants more representative districts than those with bigger
population is invalid because it violates the principle of
proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution. Such
law is “arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of
equality.”
TAN VS COMELEC
Held: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and
there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of
a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected”
must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the
division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units
would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
CADC%AUFSOL! 13.
!
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as
a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view
of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it
means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is
to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two
or more municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an
area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of
the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic
effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a
patent nullity.
In the Party-list System:
1. The parties must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.
2) Major political parties must comply with this statutory policy
3) Religious sects are prohibited by the Constitution
4) The party must not be disqualified under RA 7941
5) The part must not be an adjunct of an entity orproject funded
by the government
6) The party and its nominees must comply with the
requirements of the law
7) The members must come from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors
8) The nominee must be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court,
through Carpio’s ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54 petitions and
remanded these petitions to the Comelec. The party-list groups
and organizations covered by the 41 petitions that obtained
mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a
chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court
ordered the poll body to determine “whether petitioners are
qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections” under the
new parameters set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning,
the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the poll body merely
for purposes of determining whether they may be granted
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate
in the May 2013 elections.
The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be
faulted for acting on the basis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong
Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the party-list
system. These earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on who
may participate in the party-list system.
New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may
participate in the May 2013 party-list race and subsequent
party-list elections
The Decision identified three groups that may participate in the
party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
On the part of national parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations which intend to participate in the party-
list race, the new guidelines state that these parties “do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any ‘marginalized or underrepresented sector.’”
As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race
by registering under the party-list system and no longer field
congressional candidates. These parties, if they field
congressional candidates, however, are not barred from
participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is
register their sectoral wing or party under the party-list system.
This sectoral wing shall be considered an “independent sectoral
party” linked to a political party through a coalition.
The question is: where does representation of “marginalized
and underrepresented” sectors come in?
The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend
to participate in the party-list system.
The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations
may either represent “marginalized and underrepresented”
constituencies or those “lacking well-defined political
constituencies.” The high court went on to enumerate
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, as follows: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.
The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector
they intend to represent also applies only to the sectoral parties
or organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that “[a]
majority of the members of the sectoral parties or
organizations… must belong to the ‘marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent.’” The same is true for
those who lack “well-defined political constituencies.”
As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations,
the new guidelines provide that they must either be members of
CADC%AUFSOL! 14.
!
the sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector.
Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations be disqualified, the party or
organization itself will not be disqualified “provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.”
The party-list system, according to the Decision
Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list
system, the high court stated that it is “not synonymous with
that of the sectoral representation.” The high court stressed that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave out
“non-sectoral parties” in the party-list system and exclusively
limit it to sectoral groups.
“The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part,
but not the entirety, of the party-list system… In fact, the
framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list
system exclusively to sectoral parties.
“There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the
1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the
party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that
they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties,” the Decision read.
To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art.
VI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the Party-list System Act,
specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms):
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or
groups, one from the others, could only mean that they are not
one and the same.
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL…VS COMELEC
Representatives Electoral Tribunal questioning the Resolution
of the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list
groups listed above.
ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave
abuse of discretion in its interpretation of the formula used in
25
BANAT v. COMELEC to determine the party-list groups that
would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections
Article VI, Section 5,paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1987
Constitution provide the following:
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Veterans laid down the "four inviolable parameters" in
determining the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election
based on a reading of the Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941:
First, the twenty percent allocation-the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold-only those parties garnering
a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit-each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation-the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to
their total number of votes.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
AQUINO V COMELEC
CADC%AUFSOL! 15.
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Held:
(a) No; Domicile of origin is not easily lost. Petitioner failed to
prove an actual removal or actual change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning former place of residence. (b) No.
Votes for Aquino would not have gone automatically to Syjuco if
the former was disqualified at the time of election.
Ratio:
1. Residency rule for local officials: Must be a resident of the
district where seeks election at least one year prior to the
elections. Rationale: to avoid strangers who will transplant
themselves in the district for a chance to be elected (to the
prejudice of actual residents), despite the fact that they are not
familiar with the concerns and aspirations of that community.
Residence = domicile, in political law. It is where the party
―actually or constructively has his permanent
home.# Hence there must be ―clear and positive
proof# showing a successful abandonment of—or
removal from—previous domicile.
HOR electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction over all contests
involving the election, returns, and qualifications of
candidates once they have become duly proclaimed
members. Otherwise, Comelec has jurisdiction.
MARCOS V COMELEC
Held: Imelda Marcos‘ adoption of husbands domicile ceased
upon the latter‘s death. There is no need for positive
declaration. Hence she can run for public office in Tacloban
because it was her domicile of origin, which is not easily lost.
Padilla, J. (dissenting): Court must abandon Labo case which
held that the second place not automatically winner when
winning candidate is disqualified. Padilla said second placer
must be automatic winner under the circumstances.
Regalado, J. (dissenting): In the absence of affirmative
evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that the domicile of
wife follows that of her husband and will continue after his
death.
Davide, J. (dissenting): Burden of proof is upon the wife that
she exercised her right to acquire her own domicile after
husband‘s death.
TORAYNO VS COMELEC
HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency
requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty candidate.
He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually
resided there before he registered as a voter in that city in
1997.
The actual, physical and personal presence of herein private
respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to
show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters
to evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very
legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
! !
requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common
sense rationale for the residence requirement.
Election
a. Regular Elections
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
shall be held on the second Monday of May. (Sec 8, Art VI)
b. Special Election
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term. (Sec 9, Art VI)
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance
plebiscite on the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18,
before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under
revision) had been approved. Tolentino et al filed a motion to
prohibit such plebiscite and the same was granted by the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: The propose amendments shall be approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for ratification.
Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitution
must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only.
Furthermore, the people were not given a proper “frame of
reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the
time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution
would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess
the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document.
This is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the
proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to
the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT
piecemeal.
a. Election of officers OFFICERS:
1. Senate President
2.Speaker of the House
3, Such officers as deemed by each house to be necessary
By a majority vote of all respective members
SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA
RULING:
The petition fails.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of
times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or
CADC%AUFSOL! 16.
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more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words
of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate
President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the
senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who
comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said
body. And there is no showing that the framers of our
Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of
the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily,
no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the
larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half.
This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is
“a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number
would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the
minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings,
it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the
leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a
multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by
petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties,
one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the
“dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections.
In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members
either belong to different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof
has the right to select the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in
Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress
the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of legislature
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the
positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an
open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the
holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court
is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of
the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect
for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within
the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this
Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
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as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure
and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the
body adopting them
Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not
have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and
prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe
the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court
has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty
that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp;
rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the
rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would
practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
b. Quorum
• Majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum.
• A smaller number may adjourn from day
tOday and may compel the attendance of
absent members.
• In computing a quorum, members who are
outside the country, thus outside of each
House’s coercive jurisdiction, are not
included.
Avelino v. Cuenco There is a difference between a
majority of "all members of the House" and
a majority of "the House", the latter
requiring less number than the first.
Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all
members of the Senate less one (23)
constitutes constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of the quorum.
“majority” refers to the number of members
within the “jurisdiction” of the Congress
(those it can order arrested for the purpose
of questioning). In this case, one Senator
was out of the Philippines which is not
within the “jurisdiction” of the Senate, so
that the working majority was 23 Senators.
Rules of Proceedings
Each House shall determine its own procedural rules.
CADC%AUFSOL! 17.
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Corollary to Congress’ power to make rules is the power to
ignore them when circumstances so require.
Issues may either be:
Political- On matters affecting only internal operation
of the legislature, the legislature’s formulation and
implementation of its rules
Justiciable - when the legislative rule affects private
rights.
PACETE VS COMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Held/Ratio:
1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must be
given force and effect. Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for
prohibition on the ground that the letter of then Senator
Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to
reconsider an appointment duly confirmed, was without force
and effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole.
a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo,
which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, which reads: ―Resolution of the
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on
motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after
their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to
grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the
table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.# Holding
of the Court was that the mere filing of a reconsideration did not
have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. In the case,
Aldeguer‘s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to
the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it
would have if the motion approved, and hence, would dispense
with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence
of a majority of the members present is necessary. This is
inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the
Commission.
In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the
motion for reconsideration having expired, under Section 22,
then the motion for reconsideration not having been acted upon
is not approved and therefore, has no effect whatsoever.
What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified
simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed, without its
being voted upon and approved.
b. ―The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next
adjournment of Congress.#
- A distinction is made between the exercise of such
presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when
Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former,
the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA
may the person assume office. As with ad interim appointments,
the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is
effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next
adjournment in Congress. There must either be a rejection by
the CA or nonaction on its part.
2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is untenable. It would
extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond
its legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that
private rights are not invaded.
- Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of
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government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral
Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to
approve appointment submitted to it by the President of the
Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and interference,
except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
of the powers as will constitute a denial of due process.
ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
Ratio:
1. What is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of
R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law. Therefore, it cannot be subject to judicial review.
· Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum
but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation
of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum.
· Petitioners contend that the House rules were
adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that
―each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings# and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. However, petitioners
mistakenly cite the provision. Instead of supporting
judicial review, it supports claims of autonomy of the
legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts.
· Cases, both here and abroad, all deny to the courts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting
a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals
· Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the power
of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings.
o Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view
is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
i
involved.
6. · No rights of private individuals are
involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional
provisions is shown.
7. · Each of the three departments of our
CADC%AUFSOL! 18.
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 government has its separate sphere which the others 2. Expulsion
may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance
on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for Other disciplinary measures:
the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter
1. -deletion of unparliamentary remarks from the
upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules
record
of the House. We must accordingly decline the
invitation to exercise our power. 2. The case does
not present a situation in which a branch of the 2. -fine
government has ―gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction# so as to call for the exercise 3. -imprisonment
of the court’s power.
4. -censure
· Petitioners contend that under Art. VIII, §1,
―nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other
branches of the government] amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.#
Alejandrino v. Quezon
· Implicit in this statement is an acknowledgment that
the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and Senate expelled Senator Alejandrino for disorderly
controversy requirement and to the requirement of a conduct for assaulting Senator de Vera during one of
justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate their debates in session. Senate adopted a resolution
constitutional questions. depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives,
privileges and emoluments of his office fot the period
of one year. The Court held that the resolution was
· The established rule is that courts cannot declare
illegal since it amounted to expulsion and it would
an act of the legislature void on account merely of
deprive the electoral district of representation without
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself,
any means to fill the vacancy. The Senate had no
it follows that such a case does not present a
authority to suspend an appointed Senator like
situation in which a branch of the government has
Senator Alejandrino.
―gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction# so as to call for the exercise of our
power. 3. Petitioners were not prevented from
seeking reconsideration.
OSMENA VS PENDATUN
· Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the
House was ―railroaded.# They claim that Rep. 8. Held/Ratio:
Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the
latter declared Rep. Albano‘s motion approved.
1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides
that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or
· What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo‘s Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
approval and ratification of the conference committee States, wherein the provision has always been understood to
report. The Chair called out for objections to the mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for
motion. Then the Chair declared: ―There being their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
none, approved.# At the same time the Chair was nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking,
―What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?# The Chair and Rep.
- Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete
Leader‘s motion, the approval of the conference
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
committee report had by then already been declared
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
by the Chair.
outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
· Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules
of the House, Rep. Albano‘s motion for the approval
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
of the conference committee report should have been
unbecoming a member thereof.
stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of
the Members should have been taken.
2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly
on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but
which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to,
and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct
constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed
D. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory
of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
Each house may punish its members for disorderly behavior, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
and with the concurrence of 2/3 of ALL its members: department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters

1. Suspension (shall not exceed 60 days)

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within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
- "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary,
subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage
or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil., 192, 212.)
3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the
House, such approval amounted to a suspension of the House
Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may be
done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure."
4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or
of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to
take, disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been recognized in
the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of
Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the
Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
SANTIAGO VS SANDIGAN BAYAN
Three Criminal Cases were filed against the petitioner Criminal
Case #1 (filed in the Sandiganbayan)
A group of Employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) filed a complaint against petitioner Mme.
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago for the legalization of the
stay of 32 aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
1988 which prohibits the legalization of the said disqualified
aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified.
Criminal Case #2 (filed in Manila RTC)
Violation of PD No. 46
Criminal Case #3 (filed in Manila RTC)
Libel
For the case filed in Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed several
cases in the attempt to enjoin Sandiganbayan from proceeding
with the said case and to dismiss the 32 criminal informations.
All three motions were repeatedly denied, along with respective
petitions for certiorari.
Meanwhile, while the court was resolving the criminal case on
the 32 criminal informations that were filed, the prosecution filed
on July 31, 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an
order suspending petitioner.
Santiago opposed the motion to suspend but to no avail. The
order of suspension for 90 days was decreed on January 25,
1996. Hence this petition for Certiorari assailing the authority of
the Sandiganbayan to decree the preventive suspension.
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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Ratio:
SANDIGANBAYAN HAD THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER.
Section 13 RA 3019
Suspension and loss of benefits- any incumbent public officer
against whom any valid criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code of for any offense involving fraud upon
government of or public funds or property whether as a simple
or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office.
It is a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon the determination of the validity of the
information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty because it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. Section 13 does not
state that the public officer must be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he
has been charged.
The requirement of valid information does not require that the
guilt of the accused must be established in a pre- suspension
proceeding bfore a trial on the merits proceeds. It does not
contemplate a proceeding to determine the strength of the
evidence of culpability against him, the gravity of the offense
charged, or whether or not his continuance in office could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence before the court
have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending
the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is the
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of
the proceedings against him.
In her motion to quash informations, the court held that she had
admitted hypothetically to the validity of the information by
claiming that the acts complained of therein were authorized
under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation Adopted the
policy of approving applications for the legalization of spouses
and unmarried, minor children of ―qualified aliens# even
though they arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983.
This behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty
to issue the order of preventive suspension which is distinct
from the power of the Congress to discipline its members. This
was what the court held in PAREDES v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
when Congressman Ceferino Paredes claimed that such
preventive suspension issued by the Sandigan bayan is an
encroachment of the prerogatives.
THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS DOES NOT
BY ITSELF EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDE MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS FROM RA 3019 AND ITS SANCTIONS.
Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowers the
court to act to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When the question pertains to an affair internal to either
Congress or the Executive, the court subscribes to the view that
unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional
proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign
substitute its own judgment over that of any of the two other
branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear
CADC%AUFSOL! 20.
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disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that
can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention.
RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in
thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
the members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
(GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension provided for in
the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid
Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order
of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
upon a determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from
frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident
to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand,
the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is
a House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore,
a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain
order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be
deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress
from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim
simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government –
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive
prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence
and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into
the internal affairs of either branch.
e. Journal and Congressional Records
(1) The Enrolled Bill Theory
1. An enrolled bill is the official
copy of approved legislation and bears the
certifications of the presiding officers of
each House.
2. where the certifications are
valid and are not withdrawn, the contents of
the enrolled bill are conclusive upon the
courts
3. respect due to a co-equal
department requires the courts to accept
the certification of the presiding officer of
the legislative body. (Casco v Gimenez)
Case Law: binding on the
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courts
CASCO CHEMICAL V GIMENEZ
Facts:
Casco filed a petition for review of the Auditor General‘s
decision to deny refund of margin fee for urea and
formaldehyde (which the petitioner used in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glue) which it claimed to be exempted from
margin fees under RA 2609. Auditor of Central Bank refused
to approve vouchers for the refund on the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not in accord
with RA 2609, Sec 2(18) which only exempts ―urea
formaldehyde#— the finished product, not the chemicals (as
clarified by NIST).
Issue:
WON the enrolled bill—which uses the term ―urea
formaldehyde#—is conclusive upon the courts, despite
mistake in the printing of the bill and individual statements
made on the floor of the Senate.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. Decision is affirmed. If there is a mistake in printing, this
may be corrected by an amendment or corrective legislation,
not by judicial decree.
(2) Probative value of the Journal
The Journal is conclusive upon the courts.
But when the contents of the journal conflicts with
that of an enrolled bill, the enrolled bill prevails over
the contents of the journal.
US v. Pons
Facts:) Probaive Value of the Journal
Juan Pons et al, charged with illegal importation of opium. Each
were found guilty of the crime and were charged – thus, the
appeal of Juan Pons.
In the motion, counsel of Pons alleged and offered to prove that
the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature
th
for 1914 was the 28 day of February; that act no. 2381, under
which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed
nor approved on or before the said date. But on March 1; (the
journal stated that the session ended 12:00 midnight sine die,
however, it is maintained with corroboration by witnesses that
the clock was stopped and the session actually ended on the
early hours of the day after) thus null and void.
Issue: The vital question in this case is the date of adjournment
of the legislature; which splits into two more issues:
How this is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or
extraneous evidence.
Whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals
CADC%AUFSOL! 21.
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 Congress may validly continue enacting billseven
beyond the reglementary period of adjournment.
When the journal shows that Congress conducted a
sine die session where the hands of the clock are
stayed in order to afford Congress the opportunity to
continue its session. All bills enacted during the sine
die session are valid and conclusive upon the Courts.
The Journals are conclusive evidence of the contents
thereof and Courts are bound to take judicial notice of
them.
(3) Matters required to be entered in the Journal
• Yeas and Nays on third and final reading of a bill
• Veto message of the President
• Yeas and Nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by
the President
• Yeas and Nays on any question at the request of 1/5
of members present
(4) Journal Entry Rule v. Enrolled Bill Theory
Astorga v. Villegas
Facts: In March 1964 HB 9266 (An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-
Mayor of Manila etc.) was filed in the
House. It passed on third reading sans
amendments in April. When referred to the
Senate for approval, upon second reading,
many amendments were introduced, and
approved by the Senate. When sent back
to the House by the Secretary of the
Senate, the Senate-approved amendments
were not included, but only Sen. Roxas‘
minor amendment on succession which
was made by his committee. The House
approved this version. Copies were printed
and attested by presiding officers including
Senate President et al. The President also
signed it in June, and the bill became RA
4065. The President and Senate President
would later withdraw their signatures upon
learning the circumstances. Vice-Mayor
filed a petition for Mandamus and
Prohibitory Injunction to compel
respondents to comply with RA 4065.
The bill was not duly enacted and therefore did
not become law as indeed both the President of
the Senate and the Chief Executive withdrew
their signatures therein.
MORALES V SUBIDO
Facts:
The House submitted HB 6951 to the Senate. Sen.
Rodrigo inserted the phrase below: ―[Chief of a Police
Agency must be]...or any high school graduate who has
served the police department of a city or who has served
as an officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years...#
This was approved by the Senate on the 3rd reading but
when the bill emerged from the conference committee
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(enrolled bill), the part about serving the police department
(under which the petitioner is qualified) was deleted.
Petitioner argues that omission, whether deliberate or not,
was made not by the legislators, but by Congress
employees in the proofreading process.
Issue:
WON enrolled bill doctrine is controlling in this case, i.e.
the judiciary ought to adopt a hands-off attitude in matters
that took place prior to enactment of a law.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. The Court held that it cannot go behind the enrolled
act to discover what really happened. This is in
accordance to respect due to a co-equal branch of
government.
(5) Congressional Record
f. Sessions
(1) Regular Sessions
th
Convenes once every year on the 4 Monday of
July.
Continues to be in session until 30 days before the start of
its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays.
(2) Special Sessions
Called by the President at any time when Congress is
not in session
(3) Adjournments
Neither House can adjourn for more than 3 days
during the time Congress is in session without the
consent of the other House.
Neither can they adjourn to any other place than that
where the two houses are sitting, without the consent
of the other.
(4) Joint Sessions
(a) Voting separately
- Choosing the President (sec. 4, Art VII) - Determining the
President’s temporary disability (Id., sec. 11, par 4) -
Confirming the nomination of a Vice-President (Id.,
sec. 9) - Declaring a state of war (sec. 23(1), Art VI) -
Amending the Constitution (sec. 1(1), Art XVII)
(b) Voting Jointly
- To revoke or extend martial law or suspension of
privilege of habeas corpus (Sec. 18 Art VII)
SALARIES, PRIVILEGES, AND DUSQUALIFICATIONS
PHICONSA VS MATHAY
Congress enacted RA 4134 and 4642 increasing
salaries of Members of the House of Reps for the
year of 1965-1966. Philconsa seeks to enjoin the
Acting Auditor General to pass this in audit on the
ground that 8 of the senators who enacted the bill
have terms that will expire on 1969 thus, it violates
Art VI, Sec 14 of the 1935 Constitution. Petition
granted.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the
Constitution require that not only the term of all the
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members of the House but also that of all the
Senators who approved the increase must have fully
expired before the increase becomes effective?
Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting
period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional
provision refers to “all members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives” in the same
sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of
the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using
the singular form and not the plural, thereby
rendering more evident the intent to consider both
houses for the purpose as indivisible components of
one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in
the singular, when combined with the following
phrase “all the members of the Senate and the
House,” underscores that in the application of Art.
VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the
measure must have expired before the increase in
compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased
compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative
until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it
will have expired.
DOCTRINE: The language of the provision on
salaries of Members of Congress is clear. It refers to
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of
both Senate and House of Representatives
approving such increase. RATIONALE: To remove
personal interest from the increasE
LIGOT VS MATHAY
HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum
would be a subtle way of increasing his
compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly.
Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and
other members of Congress similarly situated whose
term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are
concerned for the simple reason that a retirement
gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within
the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting
their compensation and “other emoluments” to their
salary as provided by law. To grant retirement
gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the
basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the
Constitution from receiving during their term of
office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments
which in effect increase the salary beyond that which
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they were permitted by the Constitution to receive
during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-
General in his decision in the similar case of
petitioner’s colleague, ex-Congressman Singson,
“(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution
for it would lead to the same prohibited result by
enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what cannot be done directly.”
FREEDOM FROM ARREST
PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
Facts:
The privilege of arrest has always been granted
in a restrictive sense.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. However, in spite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the
higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of
obedience rather than exemption.
Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:
A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators
and members of the House of Representatives,
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The
history of the provision shows that the privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason
why he should be exempted from the operation of
Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged
with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.
Doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases
The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of
criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement
pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
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appeal or after final conviction, is public self-
defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as
an example and warning to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.
There is no showing that the above privileges are
peculiar to him or to a member of Congress.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings
will virtually make him a free man
When the voters of his district elected the accused-
appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a
more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with
full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal
illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may
no longer serve his full term in office.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class,
it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils
down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from
the same class as all persons validly confined under
law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded.
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We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties
of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging
to the same class.
SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides “The Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they
shall not be questioned in any other place.” The
publication of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while
the same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either
in Congress or outside the premises housing its
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions
as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question. Congress was not in session when the
letter was published and at the same time he,
himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It
is obvious that, in thus causing the communication
to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to
the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not
sufficient to support Jimenez’ action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the
control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to
as “planners”, and that, having been handpicked by
Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise,
added that “it is of course possible” that plaintiffs
“are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may
have absolutely no knowledge”. In other words, the
very document upon which plaintiffs’ action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that
they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners.
The SC does not think that this statement is
derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them
to recover damages, considering that they are
officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are
by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that
the letter in question seems to suggest that the
group therein described as “planners” include these
two (2) high ranking officers. Petition is dismissed.
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DISQUALIFICATION
ADAZA VS PACANA JR
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution provides as follows:
The Philippine Constitution is clear and
unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke
common law practices abroad. He cannot complain
of any restrictions which public policy may dictate
on his holding of more than one office. Adaza
further contends that when Pacana filed his
candidacy for the Batasan he became a private
citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a
mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to
the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against
BP. 697, the law governing the election of members
of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that “governors, mayors,
members of the various sangguniang or barangay
officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy,
be considered on forced leave of absence from
office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the
coverage of this provision, considering that at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984
BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code.
PUYAT VS DEGUZMAN
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the
SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing
as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and
that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
he is still barred from appearing. He bought the
stocks before the litigation took place. During the
conference he presented himself as counsel but
because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so
under the constitution he instead presented himself
as a party of interest – which is clearly a work
around and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere
work around to get himself involved in the litigation.
What could not be done directly could not likewise
be done indirectly.
DUTY TO DISCLOSE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
a. Composition
1. 3 Supreme Court Justices to be designated by the
Chief Justice (The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.) 2. 6 Members of the
Senate or House, as the case may be, chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and party-list organizations
The ET shall be constituted within 30 days after the
Senate and the House shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker.
Members chosen enjoy security of tenure and cannot be
removed by mere change of party affiliation.
b. Nature of Function
Jurisdiction: be the sole judge of all CONTESTS
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relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. ET has jurisdiction only when there
is an election contest.
‘election contest’ - one where a defeated
candidate challenges the qualification and
claims for himself the seat of a proclaimed
winner.
c. Independence of the Electoral Tribunals
Since the ET’s are independent constitutional
bodies, independent even of the respective
House, neither Congress nor the Courts may
interfere with procedural matters relating to the
functions of the ET’s.
d. Powers
Expiration of Congressional term of office Death or
permanent disability Resignation form political
party which one represents in the
tribunal Removal from office for other valid
reasons
Lazatin v. HRET The HRET will only gain
jurisdiction upon proclamation of the candidate.
Until such proclamation, he is not yet a member
of the House; hence, the HRET will not have
jurisdiction over him. Jurisdiction over such
remains with the COMELEC. Co v. HRET As
constitutional creations invested with necessary
power, the Electoral Tribunals are, in the
exercise of their functions independent organs
— independent of Congress and the Supreme
Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature (Angara vs. Electoral Commission
[1936]).
e. Judicial review of decisions of Electoral
Tribunals
may be had with the SC only insofar as the
decision or resolution was rendered
o without or in excess of jurisdiction, or o with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to denial of due
process.\
ABBAS VS SET
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section
17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be
staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members
of the Senate, the Constitution intended that
both those “judicial” and “legislative”
components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
The legislative component herein cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of
the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may
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inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in
the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand
in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light
of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone
the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest. The five LDP members who
are also members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal may not inhibit themselves since it is
clear that the Constitution intended legislative
and judiciary membership to the tribunal. As a
matter of fact, the 2 :1 ratio of legislative to
judiciary indicates that legislative membership
cannot be ignored. To exclude themselves is to
abandon a duty that no other court can perform.
BONDOC VS PINEDA
Held: No. Section 17 Articles VI supplies the
answer to this question.. So the HRET is the
sole judge of all contests relation to the election,
returns and qualification of their respective
members. The operative term found in the
section was “sole Judge”. It (HRET) was made
to function as a non-partisan court although 2/3
of its members are politicians. It’s suppose to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for
the determination of contests to legislative office
devoid of partisan consideration.
So they cant just shuffle and manipulate the
political component for the electoral tribunal to
serve the interests of party in power.
Its independence would be undermined if the
removal of Camasura for as a punishment for
“party disloyalty” for voting for Bondoc would
allow them to change the judgment of the HRET
in the Bondoc case.If allowed so, then the
HRET isn’t really a sole judge of senatorial
elections. The members of the HRET are
entitled to security of tenure just as the
members of the judiciary are. They can only be
replaced in cases such as expiration, death,
permanent disability, resignation forms the
political party, and formal affiliation with another
party of any valid cause hence mere disloyalty is
not a valid cause for termination.
CODILLA VS DE VENECIA
1. The respondent’s proclamation was
premature given that the case against petitioner
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had not yet been disposed of with finality. In
fact, it was subsequently found that the
disqualification of the petitioner was null and
void for being violative of due process and for
want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore,
respondent, as second placer, could not take
the seat in office since he did not represent the
electorate’s choice.
2. Since the validity of respondent’s
proclamation had been assailed by petitioner
before the Comelec and that the Comelec was
yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order
disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus
Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over
the case pending finality. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not
have jurisdiction to review resolutions or
decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo
warranto must also fail since respondent’s
eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the
COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter, that petitioner won.
The rule of law demands that its (Comelec’s)
Decision be obeyed by all officials of the
land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the
right to the office which merits recognition
regardless of personal judgment or opinion.
PIMENTEL VS HRET
The Constitution expressly grants to the House
of Representatives the prerogative,
w/in constitutionally defined limits, to
choose from its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy
the seats allotted to the House in
HRET and the CA. The petitioners
primary recourse rests with the House
of Representatives and not with this
Court. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House
is necessary before petitioners may
bring the case to the court. Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the Constitution
state that party-list representatives
must first show the House that they
possess the required numerical
strength to be entitled to seats in the
HRET and CA. Moreover, facts show,
at that time, that party- list groups
merely refrained from participating in
the election process (no mention of
nominees)
No grave abuse in the action or lack of action by
the HRET and CA. Under Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the Constitution
and their internal rules, the HRET and
CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves. Also, petitions
have already been rendered academic
with a new set of district
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 representatives elected on May 14,
2001.
COMMISION ON APPOINTMENTS
COMPOSITION
• Senate President as ex-officio chairman (shall
not vote except in case of a tie.)
• 12 Senators
• 12 Members of the House
• The 12 Senators and 12 Representatives are
elected on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and
party-list organizations.
The CA shall be constituted within 30 days after the
Senate and the House of Representative shall have
been organized with the election of the President and
the Speaker. The CA shall act on all appointments
within 30 session days from their submission to
Congress.
The CA shall rule by a majority vote of all its members.
Meetings:
CA meets only while Congress is in session.
Meetings are held either at the call of the
Chairman or a majority of all its members.
Since the CA is also an independent
constitutional body, its rules of procedure are
also outside the scope of congressional powers
as well as that of the judiciary. Jurisdiction:
1. CA shall confirm the appointments by the
President with respect to the following
positions: a) Heads of the Executive
Departments (except if it is the Vice-President
who is appointed to the post) b) Ambassadors,
other public ministers or consuls c) Officers of
the AFP from the rank of Colonel or Naval
Captain d) Other officers whose appointments
are vested in him by the Constitution (e.g.
COMELEC members) 2. Congress cannot by
law require that the appointment of a person to
an office created by such law shall be subject to
confirmation by the CA. 3. Appointments
extended by the President to the above-
mentioned positions while Congress is not in
session shall only be effective until disapproval
by the CA or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
DAZA VS SINGSON
The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP)
was reorganized resulting to a political
realignment in the lower house. LDP also
changed its representation in the Commission
on Appointments. They withdrew the seat
occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to
the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber
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elected a new set of representatives in the CoA
which consisted of the original members except
Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza
questioned such replacement.
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from
a political realignment validly changes the
composition of the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there
should be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve Senators and twelve
members of the House of Representatives
elected by each House respectively on the basis
of proportional representation” of the political
parties therein, this necessarily connotes the
authority of each house of Congress to see to it
that the requirement is duly complied with.
Therefore, it may take appropriate measures,
not only upon the initial organization of the
Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT
the court.
COSETENG VS MITRA
1. No, it is not. The “political question” issue
was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this
Court ruled that “the legality, and not the
wisdom, of the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed
by the Constitution” is justiciable, and, “even if
the question were political in nature, it would
still come within our powers of review under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by
Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution,
which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of
the government.”
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
reads: “Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission
on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve
Senators, and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their
submission. The commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987
Constitution.) The composition of the House
membership in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties in the
House. There are 160 members of the LDP in
the House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to
80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in
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the Commission on Appointments would equal
9.6 members, which may be rounded out to
ten (10) members from the LDP. The
remaining two seats were apportioned to the
LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next
largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the
KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the
principal opposition party in the House. There
is no doubt that this apportionment of the
House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done “on the basis of
proportional representation of the political
parties therein.” There is no merit in the
petitioner’s contention that the House
members in the Commission on Appointments
should have been nominated and elected by
their respective political parties. The petition
itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They
were elected by the House (not by their party)
as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution. The validity of their election to the
Commission on Appointments-eleven (11)
from the Coalesced Majority and one from the
minority-is unassailable.
GUINGONA VS GONZALES
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the
senate was composed of 15 LDP senators,
5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators,
and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice
the requirement that each house must have
12 representatives in the CoA, the parties
agreed to use the traditional formula: (No.
of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats)
÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results
of such a formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC,
1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5
member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as
the majority floor leader, nominated 8
senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from
LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by
Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist
of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two
NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the
said compromise. He alleged that the
compromise is against proportional
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is
allowed in determining a party’s
representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such
parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the
rule on proportional representation of each
of the political parties. A literal
interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of
the Constitution leads to no other manner
of application. The problem is what to do
with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
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of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority
in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of
one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5
to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one
other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s
representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is clearly
a violation of Section 18 because it is no
longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based
on the proportional representation of the
political parties. The election of Senator
Romulo gave more representation to the
LDP and reduced the representation of one
political party either the LAKAS NUCD
or the NPC. A party should have at least 1
seat for every 2 duly elected senators-
members in the CoA. Where there are
more than 2 parties in Senate, a party
which has only one member senator
cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In
order to resolve such, the parties may
coalesce with each other in order to come
up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have
affiliations with the other party.
DRILON VS DE VENECIA
FACTS: The first petition, G.R. No.
180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot
with the designation of a Liberal Party member
of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as
prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.
As for the second petition, G.R.
No. 183055, it fails.
The second petition filed by
Senator Jamby Madrigal in a summary tackle
about the reorganization of the membership of
the CA and that, in the meantime, "all actions
of CA be held in abeyance as the same may be
construed as illegal and unconstitutional.
Senator Jamby Madrigal
petitions to REORGANIZE the membership of
the CA is based upon the OBSERVATIONS that
she herself observe in the list of COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS membership that there
are certain POLITICAL PARTIES acquire a
seat of membership in CA held a position which
supposedly are not allowed in the provision of
the constitution , moreover, she added to
estopped the intention of the
committee request that "all actions of the
Commission be held in ABEYANCE" .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is
the proper party concerned.
HELD: Senator Madrigal contention has
been dismissed due to the guidelines she
ignored.Petitioner has no standing to file
the petition .Petitioner failed to observe the
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 doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort.
Each House of Congress has the sole function
of reconstituting or changing the composition of
its own contingent to the CA.The extraordinary
remedies of Prohibition and Mandamus and the
relief of a TRO are not available to the
Petitioner.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution providing as
follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators
and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission.
The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of
all the Members.
Wherefore,the Motion with Leave of
Court to Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No.
180055 is Granted. The Petition is Withdrawn.
The Petition in G.R. No. 183055 is Dismissed.
POWERS OF CONGRESS
A.KINDS
1. GENERAL
a. Legislative Powers (Scope) powers of appropriation,
taxation and expropriation authority to make, frame and
enact laws vested in Congress by the Consitution except
to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum
b. Non-legislative Powers(Scope)
power to canvass the presidential elections
declare the existence of war
give concurrence to treaties and amnesties
propose constitutional amendments
Impeach
derivative and delegated power
implied powers such as the power to punish
contempt in legislative investigations
2. Specific Powers
a. Constitutent power
b.Legislative Inquiries
c. Appropriation
d. Taxation
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e. Concurrence in treaties and international agreements
f. War powers and delegations powers
3. Inherent Powers
a. Police Power
9. Make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, as they shall judge for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth and
of the subjects of the same
10. Includes maintenance of
peace and order, protection of life, liberty and
property and the promotion of general welfare
b Power of Taxation c Power of Eminent
Domain d. Implied Powers Contemptpower
B. Limitations: 1. Formal or Procedural
Limitations
Prescribes the manner of passing bills in the
form they should take
LimitationsprovidedbySec26,ArtVI
o Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title o No bill
passed by either house shall become law unless it has
passed 3 readings on separate days o Printed copies in
its final form have been distributed to its members 3
days before the passage of the bill
Exception: president certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency
2. Substantive Limitations
Circumscribe both the exercise of the power
itself and the allowable subject of legislation
Express limitations:
Circumscribe both the exercise of
the power itself and the allowable subject of
legislation
Expresslimitations:
o Sec 24-26, 28-30, Art VI
Express limitations on general powers
o Bill of rights
Implied Limitations
o No power to pass irrepealable law
o Non-encroachment on powers of other departments
o Non-delegability of powers
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LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
A. REQUIREMENTS AS TO BILLS.
1. AS TO TITLE OF BILLS
TIO VS VRB
Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the
constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with
broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced
by PD 1994 which amended the National
Internal Revenue Code. The amendment
provides that “there shall be collected on each
processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of
five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured
or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to
sales tax.” The said law was brought about by
the need to regulate the sale of videograms as it
has adverse effects to the movie industry. The
proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessened the revenue being acquired from the
movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10
of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross
receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered,
among others, that the tax imposition provision
is a rider and is not germane to the subject
matter of the PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only
one subject.
HELD: The Constitutional requirement that
“every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof” is
sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is
not necessary that the title express each and
every end that the statute wishes to accomplish.
The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the
statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject and title. An act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance
of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general object.” The
rule also is that the constitutional requirement as
to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. It should be given a practical rather
than technical construction. In the case at bar,
the questioned provision is allied and germane
to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the
PD, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the VRB as expressed in its title. The
tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign
to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and
control mechanisms scattered throughout the
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PD. The express purpose of the PD to include
taxation of the video industry in order to regulate
and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5
of the said PD which explain the motives of the
lawmakers in presenting the measure. The title
of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably
covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to
express all those objectives in the title or that
the latter be an index to the body of the PD.
LIDASAN VS COMELEC
Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato.
Later, RA 4790, which is entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed.
Lidasan came to know later on that barrios
Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within
the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del
Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant
to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish
precints for voter registration in the said
territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that
RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional
because it did not clearly indicate in its title that
it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but
which includes barrios located in another
province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack
planted upon the constitutional mandate that
“No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title
here presented is not so difficult to perceive.
Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did
not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon
and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del
Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato
voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.
CADC%AUFSOL! 30.
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CRUZ VS PARAS
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators.
They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84,
Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz
averred that the said Ordinance violates their
right to engage in a lawful business for the said
ordinance would close out their business. That
the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier
issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is
pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT
GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled
that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police
power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz
then appealed citing that they were deprived of
due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation,
Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and
the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which
is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night
clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance
would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of municipal corporations,
as well as consistency with the laws or policy of
the State. It cannot be said that such a
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by
Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its
face is characterized by overbreadth. The
purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than
by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title
of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only
regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
TOBIAS VS ABALOS
Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative
district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title
An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong." Same bill is
now in question at to its constitutionality by the
petitioners by invoking their right as tax payers
and residents of Mandaluyong.
With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people
of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion
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of Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city
ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.
Issues:
WON RA 7675 is in:
1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".
2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as
to the number of members of the Congress to
250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.
Ruling:
Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court
dismissed the contention of constitutionality
pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be
given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance
with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject."
As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless
otherwise provided by law" was enforced
justifying the act of the legislature to increase the
number of the members of the congress.
Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was
the Congress itself which drafted the bill
reapportioning the legislative district.
In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was
dismissed for lack of merit.
GeneralLimitations:
Appropriation
• Appropriations must be for a PUBLIC
PURPOSE
• Cannot appropriate public funds or property,
directly or indirectly, in favor of
1. Any sect, church, denomination,
or sectarian institution or system
of religion or
2. Any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or
dignitary as such.
EXCEPT IF THE PRIEST IS ASSIGNED TO.
• AFP
• ANY PENAL INSTITUTION
• GOVERNMENT
ORPHANGE
• LEPROSARIUM
o The government is not prohibited from appropriating
money for a valid secular purpose, even if it incidentally
benefits a religion, e.g. appropriations for a national
police force is valid even if the police also protects the
safety of clergymen.
o Also, the temporary use of public property for religious
purposes is valid, as long as the property is available for
CADC%AUFSOL! 31.
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all religions.
SpecificLimitations
• For General Appropriations Bills Congress may
not increase the appropriations recommended
by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. Form,
content and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
• No provision or enactment shall be embraced in
the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation
therein.
Procedure in approving appropriations FOR THE
CONGRESS shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations. However, the following may, BY LAW, be
authorized to AUGMENT any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
• PRESIDENT
• SENATE PRESIDENT
• SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
• CJ OF SC
• HEADS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMISSIONS
DISCRETIONARY FUNDS appropriated FOR
PARTICULAR OFFICIALS shall be disbursed
only: For public purposes To be supported by
appropriate vouchers Subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law No public money or
property shall be appropriated If Congress fails to
pass the general appropriations bill by the end of
any fiscal year: The general appropriations bill for
the previous year is deemed reenacted It shall
remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by Congress.
For Special Appropriations Bill Shall specify the purpose
for which it is intended.
Shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer or corresponding
therein to be raised by revenue proposal.
Limitation on Use of Public Funds (Sec 29, Art VI) No
money shall be paid out of the
National Treasury EXCEPT in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law. However, this rule
does not prohibit continuing appropriations, e.g. for debt
servicing, for the reason that this rule does not require
yearly or annual appropriation.
o Four phases of Government’s budgeting process.
• Budget preparation
• Legislative authorization
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• Budget execution
• Budget accountability
DEMETRIA VS ALBA
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the
Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Alba, then
Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds
pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177 or the
Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria
assailed the constitutionality of Section 44 of the
said PD. This Section provides that “The
President shall have the authority to transfer any
fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.” Demetria averred
that this is unconstitutional for it violates the
1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD
1177 is constitutional.
HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends
the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to
any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings
in the item from which the same are to be taken,
or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose
of augmenting the item to which said transfer is
to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation
of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null
and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings
within one department from one item to another
in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the
interest of expediency and efficiency. There is
no transfer from one department to another
here.
GUINGONA VS CARAQUE
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in
automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
CADC%AUFSOL! 32.
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debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated
under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt
service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by
PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and
by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening
the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the
Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed
Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.”
The petitioners were questioning the
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation
for debt service, it being higher than the budget
for education, therefore it is against Section
5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which
mandates to “assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for
debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to “assign the highest budgetary
priority to education,” it does not thereby follow
that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as
to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country.
More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to
education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional
BELGICA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493
and G.R. No. 209251.
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The so-called pork barrel system has been
around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to
the latest “Priority Development Assistance
Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork
barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been
done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower
house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard
projects” (infrastructure projects like roads,
buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft
projects” (scholarship grants, medical
assistance, livelihood programs, IT development,
etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down
to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken
down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for
realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of
funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund
albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources:
(a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya
Gas Project – this has been around since 1976,
and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is
derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has
been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been
besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur
Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork
barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-
government organizations) which would make it
appear that government funds are being used in
legit existing projects but are in fact going to
“ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by
the Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and
several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality
of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel
system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system
is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
CADC%AUFSOL! 33.
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violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress.
It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand,
implements the laws – this includes the GAA to
which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive
may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, what’s happening was that, after
the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which
projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to
– a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted – a violation of the principle of
separation of powers. (Note in the older case of
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as
the legislators only recommend where their pork
barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in
realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have
to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative
power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only
insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative
power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local
government units but this shall involve purely
local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the
Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the
individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a
violation of the rule on non-delegability of
legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress
can delegate the power to the individual member
of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and
balances is the power of the president to veto
items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the
GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify
the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, how can the
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president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting which effectively
renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power
to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, what’s happening is
that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim
it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the
local government – and this is contrary to the
State policy embodied in the Constitution on
local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is
happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal
fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against
the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29
(1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential
pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation
from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD
910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well
as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all
fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof
provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall
be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the
requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD
1869.
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ARAULLO VS AQUINO
When President Benigno Aquino III took office,
his administration noticed the sluggish growth of
the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up
the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow
moving projects to priority projects instead of
waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what
happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly
by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as
“savings” by the Executive and said funds will
then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy
as economic growth was in fact reported and
portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP
(as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the
unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds
are standby appropriations made by Congress
in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator
Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that
he, and other Senators, received Php50M from
the President as an incentive for voting in favor
of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that
the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it
turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that
some non-Executive projects were also funded;
to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B
for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),
P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation
Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that “no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based
on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings
and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec.
25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).
Issues:
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I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle
“no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be
considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP
realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of
unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact
is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art.
VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor
is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did
not violate the Constitutional provision cited in
Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by
law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the
DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s
involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP
were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made “within their respective offices”.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations
may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being transferred to
the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices”
also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP,
even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent
insofar as the GAA is concerned because no
funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the
GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary
to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances,
CADC%AUFSOL! 35.
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when there is an excess in the funding of a o Public. Power to tax should be exercised only for a
certain project once it is completed, finally public purpose
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn o Uniform and Equitable.
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the
statutory definition of savings was not complied Operates with the same force and effect in
with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for every place where the subject of it is found
the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under
Does not prohibit classification for the
the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn
purpose o taxation
from certain projects in the middle of the year
and then being declared as “savings” by the
Executive particularly by the DBM. Requirements for valid classification: Based
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA on substantial distinctions which make real
cannot be used as money source for the DAP differences
because under the law, such funds may only be
used if there is a certification from the National Germane to the purpose of law
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. Applies to present and future conditions
In this case, no such certification was secured substantially identical to those of the present
before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which Applies equally to those who belong to the
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it same class
being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has o Progressivity.
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is The rate increases as the tax base
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, increases
then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
Tax burden is based on the taxpayers’
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
capacity to pay
return what they received especially so that they
relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be Suitedtothesocialconditionsofthepeople
applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the Reflects aim of the Convention that
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or legislature following social justice command
administrative) that they have not acted in good should use taxation as an instrument for more
faith. equitable distribution of wealth

o Constitutional Tax Exemptions:

Taxation (Sec 28, Art VI) Nature
Religious, charitable, educational institutions
o Sec 28 is an enumeration of the limits on the inherent and their properties
and otherwise unlimited power
All revenues and assets of NON-STOCK
Purpose NON- PROFIT EDUCATIONAL institutions are
exempt from taxes and duties PROVIDED that
o Pay debts and provide for the common defense and such revenues and assets are actually, directly
general warfare and exclusively used for educational purposes (
sec. 4 (3) Art XIV).
o Raise revenue
Grants, endowments, donations or
contributions used actually, directly and
o Instrument of national and social policy
exclusively for educational purposes shall be
exempt from tax, subject to conditions
o Instrument for extermination of undesirable acts and prescribed by law (sec. 4 (4) Art XIV).
enterprises
o Special Funds Special Funds
o Tool for regulation o Money collected on a tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and
o Imposition of tariffs designed to encourage and protect paid out for such purpose only.
locally produced goods against competition for imports. oOnce the special purpose is fulfilled or abandoned,
any balance shall be transferred to the general
Limitations funds of the Government

!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER. CADC%AUFSOL! 36.

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TOLENTINO VS SEC OF FINANCE
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality
of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino
averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the
Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated
as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings
in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it
was referred to the Senate Ways & Means
Committee thereafter Senate passed its own
version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino
averred that what Senate could have done is
amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and
substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way
“the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of
the HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco
[however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the
HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the
challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to the
version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9
justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as
far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter
of form. There is no showing that it would make
a significant difference if Senate were to adopt
his over what has been done.
LUNG CENTER VS QC
Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-
stock and non-profit entity established by virtue
of PD No. 1823. It is the registered owner of the
land on which the Lung Center of the Philippines
Hospital is erected. A big space in the ground
floor of the hospital is being leased to private
parties, for canteen and small store spaces, and
to medical or professional practitioners who use
the same as their private clinics. Also, a big
portion on the right side of the hospital is being
leased for commercial purposes to a private
enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and
Garden Center.
When the City Assessor of Quezon City
assessed both its land and hospital building for
real property taxes, the Lung Center of the
Philippines filed a claim for exemption on its
averment that it is a charitable institution with a
minimum of 60% of its hospital beds exclusively
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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used for charity patients and that the major
thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity
patients. The claim for exemption was denied,
prompting a petition for the reversal of the
resolution of the City Assessor with the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City,
which denied the same. On appeal, the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City
affirmed the local board’s decision, finding that
Lung Center of the Philippines is not a
charitable institution and that its properties were
not actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes. Hence, the present petition
for review with averments that the Lung Center
of the Philippines is a charitable institution under
Section 28(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
notwithstanding that it accepts paying patients
and rents out portions of the hospital building to
private individuals and enterprises.
Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a
charitable institution within the context of the
Constitution, and therefore, exempt from real
property tax?
Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is a
charitable institution. To determine whether an
enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the
elements which should be considered include
the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate
purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the
methods of administration, the nature of the
actual work performed, that character of the
services rendered, the indefiniteness of the
beneficiaries and the use and occupation of the
properties.
However, under the Constitution, in order to be
entitled to exemption from real property tax,
there must be clear and unequivocal proof that
(1) it is a charitable institution and (2)its real
properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and
EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes.
While portions of the hospital are used for
treatment of patients and the dispensation of
medical services to them, whether paying or
non-paying, other portions thereof are being
leased to private individuals and enterprises.
Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed
to the exclusion of others, debarred from
participation or enjoyment. If real property is
used for one or more commercial purposes, it is
not exclusively used for the exempted purposes
but is subject to taxation.
GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive
Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any
other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law
on all articles imported into the Philippines, an
additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This
additional duty was imposed across the board
CADC%AUFSOL! 37.
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on all imported articles, including crude oil and
other oil products imported into the Philippines.
In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to
9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed
reinstating the previous 5% duty except that
crude oil and other oil products continued to be
taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from
Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6
of the Constitution which provides: ” All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.” He contends that since the
Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue
bills in Congress, the President may not assume
such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-
generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are
constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may
be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to the President, that they must be
enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution provides as follows: “(2) The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.”
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to
Congress to authorize the President “subject to
such limitations and restrictions as [Congress]
may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff
rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .”
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
FABIAN VS DESIERTO
Fabian was the major stockholder and president
of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in
the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin
was the incumbent District Engineering District
(FMED) when he allegedly committed the
offenses for which he was administratively
charged in the Office in the office of the
Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and unpleasant
incidents developed between the parties and
!CONSTI'MIDTERMS'REVIEWER.
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when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship,
Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do
so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She
eventually filed the aforementioned
administrative case against him. A case ensued
which eventually led an appeal to the
Ombudsman – who inhibited himself – later the
case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The deputy
ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the
decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed
the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989)1 [Effective November 17, 1989.]
pertinently provides that -In all administrative
diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the
Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: Taking all the foregoing circumstances in
their true legal roles and effects, therefore,
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot
validly authorize an appeal to this Court from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of
the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional
provision was intended to give this Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging
its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily
burden the Court.
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