BOOK I

CASE DOCTRINE
1. Functional, Inc. vs. Granfil, 660 SCRA 279, The rule is long and well settled that, in illegal dismissal cases like the one at bench, the burden of proof is upon the employer to show that
Nov. 16, 2011 the employee's termination from service is for a just and valid cause. The employer's case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and
not the weakness of that adduced by the employee, in keeping with the principle that the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the latter in
case of doubt in the evidence presented by them. Often described as more than a mere scintilla, the quantum of proof is substantial evidence
which is understood as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally
reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. Failure of the employer to discharge the foregoing onus would mean that the dismissal is
not justified and therefore illegal.

Denying the charge of illegal dismissal, FI insists that Granfil abandoned his employment after he was transferred from his assignment at the NBS
Megamall Branch as a consequence of the latters request for his relief. In the same manner that it cannot be said to have discharged the above-
discussed burden by merely alleging that it did not dismiss the employee, it has been ruled that an employer cannot expediently escape liability
for illegal dismissal by claiming that the former abandoned his work. This applies to FI which adduced no evidence to prove Granfil's supposed
abandonment beyond submitting copies of NBS 31 July 2002 request for said employees transfer and its 1 August 2002 written acquiescence
thereto. While these documents may have buttressed the claim that Granfil was indeed recalled from his assignment, however, we find that the
CA correctly discounted their probative value insofar as FIs theory of abandonment is concerned.

Being a matter of intention, moreover, abandonment cannot be inferred or presumed from equivocal acts. As a just and valid ground for
dismissal, it requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment, without any intention of returning. Two
elements must concur:

2. Loon vs. Power Master, Inc., 712 SCRA 440,
Dec. 11, 2013
[1] failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
[2] a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. The burden of proving abandonment is once again upon the employer who, whether pleading the same as a
ground for dismissing an employee or as a mere defense, additionally has the legal duty to observe due process. Settled is the rule that mere
absence or failure to report to work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.
FACTS:
Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various PLDT
offices in Metro Manila. The petitioners alleged that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave,
and 13th month pays. They further averred that respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, they amended their
complaint and included illegal dismissal therein. They claimed that respondents relieved them from service in retaliation.

On March 15, 2002, the LA partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. The LA awarded the petitioners salary differential, service incentive leave,
and 13th month pays. In awarding these claims, the LA stated that the burden of proving payment of these money claims rests with the employer.
The LA also awarded attorney’s fees in favor of the petitioners. However, the petitioner’s claims for backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium
pays were denied by the LA. The LA observed that the petitioners failed to show that they rendered overtime worked and worked on holidays
and rest days without compensation. The LA further concluded that the petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from employment
because they did not show any notice of termination of employment nor were they barred from entering the respondents’ premises.

On appeal in the NLRC, the respondents claimed that they paid the petitioners minimum wages, service incentive leave and 13 th month pays. As
proofs, they attached photocopied and computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal. They further argued that the
petitioners were validly dismissed because their repeated defiance to their transfer to different workplaces and their violations of the company
rules and regulations constituted serious misconduct and willful disobedience.

On January 3, 2003, the respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached to it photocopied and computerized copies of list of
employees with ATM cards. The list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards.

The NLRC affirmed the LA’s awards of holiday pay and attorney’s fees. However, it overturned the LA’s awards of salary differential, 13 th month
and service incentive leave pays. In so ruling, it gave weight to the pieces of evidence attached to the memorandum on appeal and the
supplemental appeal. It maintained that the absence of the petitioners’ signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their
authenticity. It pointed out that the payment of money claims was further evidenced by the list of employees with ATM cards. The NLRC further
ruled that the petitioners were lawfully dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct. It found that the petitioners failed to comply with various
memoranda directing them to transfer to other workplaces and to attend training seminars for the intended reorganization and reshuffling.

The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling and upheld the NLRC’s findings on the petitioners’ monetary claims.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to salary differential, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and 13 th month pay

RULING:

The Court reversed the NLRC’s finding that the petitioners are not entitled to salary differential, service incentive, holiday, and 13 th month pays.
The general rule is that the burden rests on the employer to prove payment rather on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment of these money claims.
The rationale for this rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents — which will show that
differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid — are not in the possession of the worker but are in the custody
and control of the employer.

3. Cervantes vs. PAL, 688 SCRA 113, Feb. 18,
2013
4. South East International Rattan, Inc. vs.
Coming 718 SCRA 658, March 12, 2014
However, the Court ruled that petitioners are not entitled to overtime and premium pays. The CA was correct in its finding that the petitioners
failed to provide sufficient factual basis for the award of overtime, and premium pays for holidays and rest days. The burden of proving
entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for holidays and rest days rests on the employee because these are not incurred in the normal
course of business. In the present case, the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence that would show that they actually rendered service in
excess of the regular eight working hours a day, and that they in fact worked on holidays and rest days.
Cervantes resigned from his employment.
LABOR LAW: resignation
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in
favor of the exigency of the service, such that he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. This is precisely what
obtained in this case. The statements in Cervantes’ telex message is plain and straightforward.
Cervantes also failed to substantiate his claim that he and the Filipino crew members were being subjected to racial discrimination on board.
LABOR LAW: employer-employee relationship
In order to establish the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the four-fold test is used, to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of
the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee conduct, or the so-called ontrol
test.
In resolving the issue of whether such relationship exists in a given case, substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence, which a
reasonable mind might accept, as adequate to justify a conclusion is sufficient.
The petitioners presented the following to support their stance that respondent is not their employee: (1) Employment Reports to the SSS from
1987 to 2002; (2) the Certifications issued by Mayol and Apondar; (3) two affidavits of Vicente Coming; (4) payroll sheets (1999-2000); (5)
individual pay envelopes and employee earnings records (1999-2000); (6) and affidavit of Angelina Agbay(Treasurer and Human Resources
Officer).
The respondent, on the other hand, submitted the affidavit executed by Eleoterio Brigoli, Pedro Brigoli, Napoleon Coming, EfrenComing and Gil
Coming who all attested that respondent was their co-worker at SEIRI.
The Court in Tan v. Lagrama, 436 Phil. 190, held that the fact that a worker was not reported as an employee to the SSS is not conclusive proof of
the absence of employer-employee relationship. Otherwise, an employer would be rewarded for his failure or even neglect to perform his
obligation. Nor does the fact that respondent name does not appear in the payrolls and pay envelope records submitted by petitioners negate

5. Dreamland Hotel Resort vs. Johnson, 719
SCRA 29, March 12, 2014
the existence of employer-employee relationship.
As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for just
or authorized causes. Otherwise, the dismissal becomes illegal.
Since respondent dismissal was without valid cause, he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits of their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
However, where reinstatement is no long feasible as an option, back wages shall be computed from the time of the illegal termination up to the
finality of the decision. As an alternative to this, separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service should likewise be
awarded in case reinstatement is not possible.
Labor Law - Constructive dismissal
Although the resort did not open until approximately 8th October 2007, Johnson's employment began, as per Employment Agreement, on 1st
August 2007. During the interim period, Johnson was frequently instructed by Prentice to supervise the construction staff and speak with
potential future guests who visited the site out of curiosity.
The petitioners maintain that they have paid the amount of P7,200.00 to Johnson for his three weeks of service from October 8, 2007 until
November 3, 2007, the date of Johnson's resignation,which Johnson did not controvert. Even so, the amount the petitioners paid to Johnson as
his three-week salary is significantly deficient as Johnson's monthly salary as stipulated in their contract isP60,000.00. Thus, the amount which
Johnson should have been paid is P45,000.00 and not P7,200.00. In light of this deficiency, there is more reason to believe that the petitioners
withheld the salary of Johnson without a valid reason.
It only goes to show that while it was Johnson who tendered his resignation, it was due to the petitioners acts that he was constrained to resign.
The petitioners cannot expect Johnson to tolerate working for them without any compensation.
Since Johnson was constructively dismissed, he was illegally dismissed. Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages
and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained
relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.
Labor Law - doctrine of strained relations
The accepted doctrine is that separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the
parties. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated. Under the doctrine of
strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer

6. Virjen Shipping and Marine, 125 SCRA 577,
G. R. No. L-580011, July 20, 1982
desirable or viable.
In the present case, the NLRC found that due to the strained relations between the parties, separation pay is to be awarded to Johnson in lieu of
his reinstatement.
The NLRC held that Johnson is entitled to backwages from November 3, 2007 up to the finality of the decision; separation pay equivalent to one
month salary; and unpaid salaries from August 1, 2007 to November 1, 2007 amounting to a total of P172,800.00.
While the Court agrees with the NLRC that the award of separation pay and unpaid salaries is warranted, the Court does not lose sight of the fact
that the employment contract states that Johnson's employment is for a term of three years.
Accordingly, the award of backwages should be computed from November 3, 2007 to August 1, 2010 - which is three years from August 1, 2007.
Furthermore, separation pay is computed from the commencement of employment up to the time of termination, including the imputed service
for which the employee is entitled to backwages.
From a considered review, the Court finds that Barraquio’s resignation was voluntary.
Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service and he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.
Barraquio’s resignation can be gleaned from the unambiguous terms of his letter to Captain Cristino.
Barraquio’s bare claim that he was forced to execute his resignation letter deserves no merit. Bare allegations of threat or force do not constitute
substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation. That such claim was proferred a year later all the more renders his contention
bereft of merit.
Barraquio claims entitlement under Section 20 (B) [2] of the Standard Employment Contract of the POEA, which must be read in conjunction
with Section 20 (B) [3]. The provision requires Barraquio to submit himself to a post-medical employment examination by a company designated
physician within three working days from arrival or, in Barraquio’s case, three working days after May 15, 2000, a Monday, when he arrived by
ship or not later than May 18, 2000.
Barraquio sought examination-treatment on May 17 – June 30, 2000 from Dr. Romina Alpasan who appears to be a physician of his choice. He
only tried to look for a company-designated physician after treatment by Dr. Alpasan. Clearly, he did not comply with the 3-day requirement to
seek the services of a company-designated physician for purposes of post-employment medical examination.
Barraquio goes on to claim that he underwent treatment for Ischemic heart disease which developed while employed by petitioners. Ischemic
heart disease is a condition in which fatty deposits (atheroma) accumulate in the cells lining the wall of the coronary arteries. These fatty deposits
build up gradually and irregularly, however, in the large branches of the two main coronary arteries which encircle the heart and are the main
source of its blood supply. This process, called atherosclerosis, leads to narrowing or hardening of the blood vessels supplying blood to the heart
muscle (the coronary arteries) resulting in ischemia – or the inability to provide adequate oxygen – to heart muscle and this can cause damage to

7. Hortencia Salazar vs. Tomas D. Achacoso
and Ferdie Marquez, G.R. No. 81510, March
14,
1990
the heart muscle. Complete occlusion of the blood vessel leads to a heart attack.
Finally, Barraquio claims that in light of the opinion of the physician in Korea that he had ―suspected ischemic heart,‖ petitioners affirmed his
medical repatriation. As reflected in the immediately preceding paragraph, however, ischemic heart disease cannot develop in a short span of
time that Barraquio served as chief cook for Virgin Shipping. In fact, as indicated above, the Gleneagles Maritime Medical Centre doctor who
treated respondent in May 2000 for abscess in his left hand had noted respondent’s ―[h]istory of hypertension for 3 years. Moreover, the
Korean physician did not make any recommendation as to respondent’s bill of health for petitioners to assume that he was fit for repatriation.
PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.