HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner, -versus- EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent. G.R. No.

165496, SECOND
DIVISION, February 12, 2007, CARPIO MORALES, J.

As to the reason for the appellate court’s dismissal of his petition – failure to implead the People of
the Philippines as a party in the petition – indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no moment,
he having appealed only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action,
this Court ruled:

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal
case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of
the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is
merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action
arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant.
There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.

It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment
despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the
civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated
as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended
party and the accused.

FACTS:
In an Information dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999
Philippine National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of
₱1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense
charged. Following the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer
to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that
he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds did not arise.

By Order of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granted
the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.

By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while the evidence presented
was insufficient to prove respondent’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil
liability. It accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the
amount of ₱1,875,000 with legal interest.

Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered
the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent
herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case." Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which, by the assailed
resolutions, dismissed his petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition because petitioners failed to
implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in the petition. (YES)

RULING:
As to the reason for the appellate court’s dismissal of his petition – failure to implead the People of
the Philippines as a party in the petition – indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no moment,
he having appealed only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action,
this Court ruled:

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal
case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of
the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is
merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action
arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant.
There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits. (Underscoring supplied)

It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment
despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the
civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated
as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended
party and the accused.

Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit. When a demurrer to evidence is filed without
leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. At that
juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement
of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.

If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement
of civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any.
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.

The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing
evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of
the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such
aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and
at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not
insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt,
it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence.
For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds.
The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil
aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.
Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People, held:

If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a
remand.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioner, -versus-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 147703, FIRST DIVISION, April 14, 2004,

PANGANIBAN, J.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in
a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability
of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the
basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance
and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in
the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.

FACTS:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days to six (6) years, and to pay damages to the heirs of Justino Torres, to the heirs of Estrella Velero,
to the heirs of Lorna Ancheta, to Maureen Brennan, to Rosie Balajo, to Teresita Tamondong, to
Juliana Tabtab, to Miguel Arquitola, to Clarita Cabanban, to Mariano Cabanban, and to La Union
Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van.

The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for
the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and
executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel
for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.

Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the
trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On
December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor
General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused
from filing [respondents’] brief on the ground that the OSG’s authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31,
1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss."

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee,
the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability
fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included
in the civil liability of the accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may
appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. (NO)

RULING:
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.

"x x x x x x x x x"

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in
a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability
of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the
basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of
any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision
and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.

3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex-delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor
-- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to
pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.

The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which
was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.

In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se
cases, the accused’s employer did not interpose an appeal. "Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single
case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not
possible.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance
and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in
the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused