MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS,
respondent (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing
Constitutional Provisions
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the
MPHC matched the bid price  in a letter to GSIS.
MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On
17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC
came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and
has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and
culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution,
particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito Case Digest
Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez
Facts:
This is a petitioner for prohibition to prevent the
congressional resolution proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as
an ordinance thereto. Petitioners are 8 senators, 17
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic
Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth
Party. Petitioners allege that the resolution is contrary
to the Constitution.
The 3 petitioner senators and 8 representatives have
been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Comelec
as having been elected senators and representatives in
the elections held on April 23, 1946. The 3 senators
were suspended by the Senate shortly after the
opening of the first session of Congress due to
alleged irregularities in their election. The 8
representatives since their election had not been
allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part
in the election of the Speaker, although they had not
been formally suspended. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not been
acted upon definitely by the House when the petition
was filed. Consequently, the 3 senators and 8
representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary ¾
vote which is required in proposing an amendment to
the Constitution. If the petitioners had been counted,
the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary
¾ vote in either House of Congress.
Respondents argue that the Court has jurisdiction,
relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of the
enrolled bill/resolution.
Petitioners contend that respondents are confusing
jurisdiction (substantive law) with conclusiveness of
an enactment or resolution (evidence and practice).
Issue:
WON the Court can take cognizance of the issue.
WON the resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
Ruling:
No. Political questions are not within the province of
the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal
with such questions has been conferred upon the
courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions. The difficulty lies in determining what
matters fall within the meaning of political question.
However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political
question and hence not justiciable. If a ratification of
an amendment is a political question, a proposal
which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a
highly political function performed by Congress. If a
political question conslusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified
law or resolution also binds the judges under the
“enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.
Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as
amended by Act No. 220, provides two methods of
proving legislative proceedings:
By the journals, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order; andIn case of acts
of the Legislature, a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof.In US v. Pons, the Court
looked into the journals because those were the
documents offered in evidence. It does not appear
that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in
existence or was placed before the Court; and it had
not been shown that if that had been done, this Court
would not have held the copy conclusive proof of the
due enactment of the law.Even if both journals and an
authenticate copy of the Act had been presented, the
disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment
theory, for the due enactment of a law may be proved
in either of the 2 ways specified in Section 313 of
The Code of Civil Procedure. No discrepancy appears
to have been noted between the 2 documents and the
court did not say or so much as give to understand
that if discrepancy existed it would give greater
weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof.”
RAMON A. GONZALES v. COMELEC, GR No. L-
28196 & L-28224, 1967-11-09
Facts:
House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120... two (2)
elective delegates from each representative district,...
become delegates to the... aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting their
respective seats in Congress.
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at... the
general elections which shall be held on November
14, 1967.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is
admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter.  latter should be deemed modified accordingly.  The
He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class
suit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and
voters similarly... situated.  Although respondents and
the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying
the truth of this allegation,
Issues:
May Constitutional Amendments
Be Submitted for Ratification... in a General
Election?
Would the submission now of the... contested
amendments to the... people violate the spirit of... the
Constitution?
Ruling:
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to
propose amendments thereto is not included in the
general grant of legislative powers to Congress.[10] It
is part of the inherent powers of the people as the
repository of... sovereignty in a republican state, such
as ours[11] to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law.  Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the
same explicitly grants such... power.[12] Hence,
when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component elements of
a constituent... assembly.  When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the
same function,[13] for their authority does not...
emanate from the Constitution they are the very
source of all powers of government, including the
Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental
Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the
final say on whether or not their acts are within or
beyond... constitutional limits.  Otherwise, they could
brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to
the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not
of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. 
Such rigidity is stressed by the... fact that, the Con-
stitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,
[14] the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,
[15] despite the eminently political character of the...
treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of
Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates
the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and,
to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with...
the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,[16] the
Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used
in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be
construed as meaning a special election.  Some
members of the Court even feel that said term
("election") refers to a "plebiscite,"... without any
"election," general or special, of public officers. 
They opine that constitutional amendments are, in
general, if not always, of such important, if not
transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the
attention of the people be focused... exclusively on
the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon
may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial
and considered view on the merits of the proposed
amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by
extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the...
partisan political considerations that are likely to
affect the selection of elective officials.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in
favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R.B.H.
Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the
petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are
hereby, dismissed, and the writs therein prayed for
denied, without special... pronouncement as to costs.
Planas v Comelec
(49 SCRA 105)
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.
Facts:
On 1 June 1971, a Constitutional Convention was
held to propose amendments to the Constitution of
the Philippines. While the Convention is in session
on 21 September 1972, the entire Philippines were
placed under martial law by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1081. On 29 November 1972, the Convention
approved its proposed Constitution. The next day the
President issued PD No. 73 “submitting to the
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and
appropriating funds therefor”, as well as setting the
Plebiscite for said ratification. On 7 December 1972,
Charito Planas petitioned the Court to enjoin
respondents from implementing PD No. 73 on the
grounds that the calling of plebiscite and
appropriation of public funds are lodged exclusively
in the Congress and that there being no freedom of
speech, press and assembly and no sufficient time to
inform the people of the contents thereof, there is no
proper submission to the people of said proposed
Constitution. On 17 December 1972, the President
temporarily suspended the effects of PD 1080 for
purpose of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution. On 23 December 1972, the Plebiscite
was postponed until further notice by the President.
Thereby the Court refrained from ruling on the cases.
On 12 January 1973, petitioners filed an “urgent
motion” praying for the resolution of the cases “as
soon as possible”.
Issues:
1. WON the validity of PD 73 is justiciable on
the ground that the question at hand is
political in nature.
2. WON PD 73 is valid.
3. WON the Constitutional Convention have
the authority to pass the proposed
Constitution.
4. WON martial law affected the proper
submission of the proposed Constitution to a
plebiscite.
Held:
1. Yes. The Court finds that the issue
aforementioned is a justiciable one since the
assailed decree purports to have the force
and effect of legislation, not only because of
the long list decided by the Court on the acts
of the Executive, but also of Subdivision (1)
of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution.
2. The validity of PD 73 was declared moot
and academic by the Court because the
plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been
postponed.
3. Yes. The Court held that the Constitutional
Convention was legally free to postulate any
amendment it may deem fit to propose for as
long as they adhere to Section 1 of Article
XIV of the 1935 Constitution.
4. The issue involves question of fact which
cannot be predetermined, and that martial
law per se does not necessarily bar the
factual possibility of adequate freedom.
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a
prohibition case to restrain respondents from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
constitution not found in the present constitution.
Javellana maintained that the respondents are acting
without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
proposed constitution and that the president is
without power to proclaim the ratification of the
constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan,
Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for
the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens
Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation
which are similar in their objectives.
ISSUES:
1.    Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102
justiciable?
2.    Was the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention ratified validly in
compliance with applicable laws?
3.    Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the
people?
4.    Are the petitioners entitled to relief?
5.    Is the proposed Constitution in force?
HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to an existing constitution
is a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the
judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has
been amended in the manner required by the
constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance
with Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
which provides only one way for ratification (election
or plebiscite held in accordance with law and only
with qualified voters). Due to the environmental and
social conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law),
the Court cannot honestly say that the people
acquiesced to the proposed Constitution. The
majority ruled to dismiss the cases as the effectivity
of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue posed
by the cases which considerations other than judicial
are relevant and unavoidable. The new constitution is
in force as there are not enough votes to say
otherwise.
De Leon v. Esguerra
G.R. No. 78059
August 31, 1987
Sec. 27 Art. XVIII of the Constitution: This
Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions.
FACTS:
In the Barangay elections held on May 17,
1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S.
Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino,
Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise
known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. On
February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon
received a Memorandum antedated December 1,
1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The
designation made by the OIC Governor was "by
authority of the Minister of Local Government." Also
on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor
signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986
designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo
Z. Lacanienta, Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz
and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to
Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (8P
Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years
which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall
continue until their successors shall have elected and
shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also
their position that with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has
the authority to replace them and to designate their
successors. On the other hand, respondents contend
that under Section 2, Article III of the Provisional
Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, that
respondents contend that the terms of office of
elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that
petitioners continued in office by virtue of the
aforequoted provision and not because their term of
six years had not yet expired; and that the provision
in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office
of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed
to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the
aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the designation made by the
OIC governor via a memorandum dated February 8,
1987 is valid?
HELD:
1. No , The Court held that by virtue of the
1987 constitution which is deemed ratified under Art
XVIII, Sec 27 that it shall take effect after a
plebiscite and shall supercede all previous
Constitutions. That the 1987 constitution was ratified
by the people via a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987.
Therefore the respondents cannot rely on the
Memorandum which was signed on Feb 8, 1987
based on the Provisional Constitution, since the
memorandum was signed after the 1987 constitution
took place, it must therefore follow the guidelines
setforth in the 1987 Constitution and not the
Provisional Constitution. Therefore the Memorandum
dated Feb 8, 1987 is of no legal force and effect.