Cayetano v.

Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

FACTS: Renato Cayetano questioned Christian Monsod’s nomination by

President Corazon Aquino as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Cayetano stated that Monsod allegedly lacked the
necessary requirement of practicing law for at least 10 years. However,
despite Cayetano's objection, the Commission on Appointments (COA)
still confirmed Monsod’s appointment.
 
ISSUE: Whether the Commission on Appointments committed grave
abuse of discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment.
 
RULING: COA's power to give consent to the nomination of the
COMELEC chairman by the President is mandated by the Constitution
under Article IX, Section 1 (2), Sub Article C. It provides: "The Chairman
and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity."

The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion to

whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualification required by law. Therefore, there is no
occasion for the Supreme Court to exercise its corrective power since
COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion based on the evidence
presented.
Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
BM 553, June 17, 1993

FACTS: Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the

respondent the Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of the evidence
provided and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than
those allowed by law."

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements in question

reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession,
and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs
sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication

of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should
be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,  reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE: Whether the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic,

Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the
respondent constitute practice of law. The definition of “practice of law”
is laid down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined: Black
defines "practice of law" as: "The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments
of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with
the law."
            
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services
can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been
offering. While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as
the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to
the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to
the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not
be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent
clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving
legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services
is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of
law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings
it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics
of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the
profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify
his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
In re Medado
B.M. No. 2540, Sept. 4, 2013

FACTS: Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979.

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC. He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to
do so allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he
found said Notice. He then realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an
attendance record.

He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as important. The matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.

In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to

provide his roll number for his MCLE compliances to be credited. Not
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll
number.

About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado
justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment."

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be
denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack
of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of

Attorneys.

RULING: The Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the

payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved
for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not
warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the

petition himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years; that he
has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able
legal practitioner, having held various positions at different firms and
companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because
everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.

Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when
he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he
realized that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he could
no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made
him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing
law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise

transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. At the
heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice
of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer.

However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of
the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during
the one-year period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice
of law.
Caronan v. Caronan
AC No. 11316, Jul 12, 2016

FACTS: Complainant and respondent are siblings. Respondent is the

older of the two. Both of them completed their secondary education at the
Makati High School. Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the
University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business
Administration in 1997. 

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at

the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, where he stayed for one year
before transferring to the PMA. In 1993, he was discharged from the
PMA. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife and their 3
children. Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a
college degree.

In 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the

Bar Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college
records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's
College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations. Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate
any adverse consequences to him.

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager,

complainant was ordered to report to the head office of PSC in
Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the NBI
was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in
relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was
using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." Complainant later learned that
the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G.
Agtarap, who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes
and commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon himself to
inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.

However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick

A. Caronan" continued to hound him.

Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop

respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal
practice of law.

ISSUES: Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that:

(a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys;
and
(b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the
Bar.

RULING: As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established

by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan,
merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll
at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and
take the Bar Examinations.

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent

falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain
admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" -
never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is
"Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under
Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to
the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course.

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree.

Respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on
complete his college education and earn a law degree under his real
name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and
educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to
be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character. 

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness
to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and
school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to
resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers. This is imperative
in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.

In re Edillon
AM No, 1928, Aug. 3, 1978

FACTS: The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the

Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Supreme
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization
of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay
the same.

    Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-
condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a
consequence of this, compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of
Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay
his membership fee to the IBP.

RULING: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every

lawyer must be a member of a distinguished from bar associations in
which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are
subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements.
The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not
in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.

    The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court
(Article 139-A) and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

    The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

JK Mercado and Sons, Inc. v. De Vera

Adm. Case No. 3066, December 3, 2001

FACTS: Rosario Mercado won in a civil case with Atty. Eduardo De

Vera as her legal counsel. Upon execution of the decision and collection
of bank deposits for Mercado, Atty. De Vera refused to turn over the
proceeds, saying that the money was used to pay court fees and the
remaining are his as attorney’s fees.

Mercado filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera for infidelity

in the custody and handling client’s funds. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines sanctioned Atty. De Vera with a suspension of practice for one
(1) year. Following this, Atty. De Vera filed baseless lawsuits against
most of the members of the Mercado Family under different jurisdictions.
He also filed cases against IBP governors who recommended his
suspension.

Mercado contends that Atty. De Vera is exploiting their personal

family problems just to pursue unwarranted cases. She also alleged that
Atty. De Vera is guilty of forum shopping and harassment for the filing of
baseless charges.

Atty. De Vera contends that he is only exhausting all the available legal
remedies, and that the charges filed against members of the Mercado
family were done in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. De Vera violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by instituting baseless and unwarranted suits that are only
aimed to harass Mercado and her family.

RULING: Atty. De Vera was found guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility for raising unfounded
lawsuits against the Mercado family and several IBP board members who
recommended his suspension.

Such act is deemed retaliatory and is unbecoming of a member of the bar

who should uphold the integrity, honesty and dignity of the legal
profession. Atty. De Vera was disbarred permanently from practice.

In re Dacanay
BM 1678, Dec. 17, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He

practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.On July 14,
2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship.On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter,
he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice.

RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an

applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines. He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss
thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired
pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed
never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Before he can can resume his law practice, he
must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:o
the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues; to the payment of
professional tax;o the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

In re Epifanio Muneses
BM 2112, Jul 24, 2012

FACTS: On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses

with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying that he be granted the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the IBP on

March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became
a citizen of the USA on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 or the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. 

ISSUE: Whether to grant the petition to resume the privilege to practice

law in the Philippines

RULING: The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement

for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the
practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner's
membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a
Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-
acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a
member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to
resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that
a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for

the practice of law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the
original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to
his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual
membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance,

particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily
complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
In re Cuevas, Jr.
B. M. 810, Jan. 27, 1998

FACTS: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His
oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution which
permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that
should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed
from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX
TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE
OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a
neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 10,
1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed
and terminated.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Cuevas has the moral fitness required to take
the lawyer’s oath.

RULING: Petitioner is allowed to take the LAWYER’S OATH and sign

the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. The Court shares the sentiment of Atty.
Camaligan, father of hazing victim Raul Camaligan, and condoles with
the untimely death of a son who is expected to become a lawyer and
succeed his father. In his comment submitted to the Court, Atty.
Camaligan submits petitioner’s plea to be admitted to the membershop to
the Philippine Bar, to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The
deliberate participation of Cuevas in the senseless beating of a helpless
neophyte which resulted to his death indicates that petitioner does not
possess the moral fitness required for admission to the Bar. However,
petitioner was discharged from probation without any infraction
thereafter of the conditions of the probation and the various certifications
attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that
he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral
character and atone for the unfortunate death of Camaligan. The Court
then decides to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it
allowed AL ARGOSINO, petitioner’s co-accused to take the lawyer’s
oath.

Cruz v. Mina
G. R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

FACTS:Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal

Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner,
describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz,
Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or
friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.However the MeTC denied
permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground
that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan. Petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging
that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the
effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret
the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
The MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.The petitioner filed
before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the
private respondent and the public respondent MeTC. RTC denied the
petition of the petitioner and its Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an

inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

RULING:Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the

inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not
he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before
inferior courts. There is really no problem as to the application of Section
34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a non-
lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed,
while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Cruz v. Mijares
G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008

FACTS: Ferdinand Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for

and on his behalf before the RTC as the plaintiff in a Civil Case for
Abatement of Nuisance. Cruz, a fourth year law student, anchor's claim
on his Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-lawyer
may appear before ay court and conduct his litigation personally. Judge
Mijares denied the motion with finality. In the same Order, the trial court
held that for the failure of Cruz to submit the promised document and
jurisprudence and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions
under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the court act with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of Cruz as
party litigant.

RULING: The law recognizes the right of an individual to represent

himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party
may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and
that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized
member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything
in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of
the litigation. Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally
conduct the litigation of his case. He would then be acting not as a
counselor or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent
himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that Cruz is a law
student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law
Students Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of
Cruz's claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for
conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter
allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

Santos v. Lacurom
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823 August 28, 2006

FACTS: Respondent judge allowed Santos, a non-lawyer, to appear in

court and litigate personally the three cases. Complainant pointed out that
Santos was already represented by counsels who have not withdrawn
their appearances. Complainant alleged that respondent judge is guilty of
gross misconduct and grave abuse of judicial discretion for having
allowed a non-lawyer to engage in the practice law.

as early as 26 September 2002, complainant had been questioning

the appearance of Santos as "counsel" during the proceedings in court. On
11 November 2002, complainant filed a motion to expunge a pleading
signed by Santos, claiming that santos, a non-lawyer, is not allowed to
sign pleadings.

ISSUE: Whether Santos can represent himself.

RULING: The Rules recognize the right of an individual to represent

himself in any case in which he is a party. The Rules state that a party
may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the progress
of the action from commencement to the termination of the litigation. A
party’s representation on his own behalf is not considered to be a practice
of law as "one does not practice law by acting for himself, any more than
he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself."

Therefore, Santos can conduct the litigation of the cases personally.

Santos is not engaged in the practice of law if he represents himself in
cases in which he is a party. By conducting the litigation of his own cases,
Santos acts not as a counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his right
to represent himself. Certainly, Santos does not become a counsel or
lawyer by exercising such right.
The Court, however, notes the use of the disjunctive word "or" under the
Rules, signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each
of the other things enumerated, to mean that a party must choose between
self-representation or being represented by a member of the bar. During
the course of the proceedings, a party should not be allowed to shift from
one form of representation to another. Otherwise, this would lead to
confusion, not only for the other party, but for the court as well. If a party,
originally represented by counsel, would later decide to represent himself,
the prudent course of action is to dispense with the services of counsel
and prosecute or defend the case personally.

For the orderly administration of justice, respondent judge should

not have allowed Santos to litigate personally because Santos was already
represented by counsel. Respondent judge should have required Santos to
choose between self-representation or being represented by counsel.

Moreover, respondent judge should not have recognized Santos as

lead counsel. The "lead counsel" is the lawyer on either side of a litigated
action who is charged with the principal management and direction of the
party’s case, as distinguished from his collaborating counsels or
subordinates. In recognizing Santos as "lead counsel", respondent judge
made it appear that Santos was a counsel or lawyer when he is not. To
repeat, when a party represents himself in his own case, he does so not as
a counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his right of self-
representation.
In re Joaquin Borromeo
241 SCRA 408 (1995)

FACTS: The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a

lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to
possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles
and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering
of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from
1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in
various courts, dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly
committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court.

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with
was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from
it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage
created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No.
59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister)
and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained
a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time giving as
security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente
V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these
three lots was vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by
their respective owners.
 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money
from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real
estate mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was
constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot covered by TCT No.
75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August
7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a
stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the
vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of
UCPB.

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in

running court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC).
From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in the aggregate sum of
P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979.
To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a
performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability
thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank
and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations.
Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo
and Summa for collection.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent-accused is liable for constructive

contempt?

RULING: Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of

constructive contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings
and instructions given to him, and to the end that he may ponder his
serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the Courts
and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of
imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay
a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a
repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any
similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will
merit further and more serious sanctions.

Catimbuhan, et al. v. Cruz

G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983

FACTS: Petitioner Romulo Catimbuhan filed criminal complaints against

Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical
injuries. Petitioners Nelson Malana and Robert Lucila, were senior law
students of the U.P. College of Law, were required to render legal
assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, they
files their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner
Catimbuhan. Herein respondent Fisccal Quilatan opposed and disallowed
the appearances of said petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners be allowed to appear in court.

RULING: Yes. Complainant Catimbuhan has personal interest in the

case of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be
deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co.

42 SCRA 302

FACTS: A decision of the Case No. 72-ULP entitled, "PAFLU et al v.

Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." was rendered on March 29, 1961.
Reinstatement with back wages was ordered to the complainants Entila
and Tenazas. The complainants' counsel was Cipriano Cid & Associates
throught Atty. Atanacio Pacis. The decision became inal. On October 18,
1963, the Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On November
1963, Atty. Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. The
complainants then subsequently filed their backwages. Thereafter,
Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered"
equivalent to 20% of the backwages, but it was opposed by the Cipriano
Cid on the ground that he is not a lawyer.

It was found out that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Pacis. All hearings were held in Bacolod City
and appearance made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Atty.
Pacis and subsequently by the Respondent Muning.
 On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded a total
of 25% of the backwages as compensation for the professional services
rendered in the case: 10% for the Attys. Cipriano Cid, 10% for the
respondent, and 5% for Atty. Pacis.

Muning's award who is not a lawyer held in question.

ISSUE: Whether a non-lawyer may recover Attorney's fees for legal

services rendered.

RULING: A non-lawyer may not recover attorney's fees for legal

services rendered.

According to Amalgamated Laborer's Ass. v. CIR, an agreement

providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified.
Moreover, according to Section 5 of RA 875, representation of legal
counsel shall not be required in the proceedings before the Court Hearing
Examiners. Thus, it shall be the duty and obligation of the court of
Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the
parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members
of the bar. The permission for non-lawyers to represent or appear in the
said court does not entitle him for compensation. He ethics or the legal
profession should not be violated. Therefore, no one is entitled to recover
compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly
admitted practice and is an attorney in good standing.

Kanlaon Construction, etc. v. NLRC, et al.

G.R. No. 126625, September 18, 1997

FACTS: Petitioner Kanlaon Enterprises Co., Inc. is a domestic

corporation engaged on construction business nationwide. In 1988,
petitioner was contracted by the National Steel Corporation to construct
residential houses for its plant employees in Iligan City. Private
respondents were hired as laborers for the project. They worked under
Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, petitioner started
terminating the services of the respondents as the project neared its
completion. In 1990, the private respondents filed separate complaints
against the petitioner before the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII,
Iligan City. Numbering 41 in all, they claimed the petitioner paid them
wages beow the minimum and sought payment of their salary
differentials and 13th month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were
named co-respondents.

At the conference of June 1990, Engineer Estacio admitted

petitioner's liability to private respondent and agreed to pay their wage
differentials and 13th month pay. As a result of this agreement, Engineer
Estacio allegedly waived petitioner's right to file its position paper.
Private respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their
position papers and were adopting their complaints as their position
paper.
Engineer Estacio asked for another week to settle the claims. Extension
was denied by the Labor Arbiter Sizo and ordered the employer company
to pay the employees.

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations

Commission. Appeal was filed by Atty. Arthur Abudiente. Its alleged that
they were denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had
no authority to represent and bind petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty. Abudiente had
authority to represent petitioner in the hearings before the arbiters and on
appeal to the Commission.

RULING: This was ruled in the affirmative by the Court. Public

respondent NLRC rendered their decision in grave abuse of discretion,
depriving petitioner of due process of law. The decision of NLRC to
affirm the decision of the arbiters were not only based on unauthorized
representations, but were also made in violation of petitioner's right to
due process.
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, et al.
GR. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)

encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable
financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to
incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank.
Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial
woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public
bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a
petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the
court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA
Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to
this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al.
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship and
influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents
Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General
Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan.

It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central
Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently
became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits
former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting
PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former
function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio
Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall
not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the
said service.”

RULING: The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect
of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of
respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the
issue of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict”sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The
key is unlocking the meaning of “matter”and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the “matter”
or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is
“advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of
Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on
the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza
had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank.

The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the

sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include
the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza
because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a
matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The
applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics
is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist
where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of
law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant
and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK.

The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to

assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a
proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator
protecting the interest of government.Petition assailing the Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan is denied.Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Callejo:Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics: “A lawyer, having once held public office or having
been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ.”Indeed, the restriction
against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to
promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on
certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03
makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held
public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction applies to a
lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates to his accepting
“engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the service.

Javellana v. DILG
H.R. No. 102549, Aug. 10, 1992

FACTS: Private respondent filed an Administrative Case against

Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG)
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” and (2) for
oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority. The basis of the
Administrative case is the appearance of petitioner as counsel for a case
against respondent who is a public official.

Petitioner's Claim: That DLG Memorandum Circular Nos. 80-38 and

90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and
exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. That they together with
RA 7160 constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the
legal and medical professions for only sanggunian members who are
lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while
dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others
are not so restricted.

Respondent's Claim: That Javellana, an incumbent member of the

City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by
profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without
securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,
Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58
of the same department. That Javellana also appeared as counsel in
several criminal and civil cases in the city, also without prior authority of
the DLG Regional Director.

ISSUE: Whether the said Memorandum of the Department of Local

Government and RA7160 as to the prohibition to practice profession are
unconstitutional for being discriminatory against legal and medical
professions.

RULING: The Court ruled on the negative. Complaints against public

officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their
duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express
constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer
Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of
Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a
councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia, would
actually be a judgment against the City Government.

By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting

them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the
petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 prohibiting a
government official from engaging in the private practice of his
profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the
government. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not
discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and
municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation.
Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members “may practice
their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours.” If there are some prohibitions that apply
particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of
law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public
service.