Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 1

archive.today Saved from https://www.economist.

com/leaders/2022/06/02/a-new-nuclear-era search 2 Jun 2022 12:49:23 UTC


history ←prior next→
webpage capture
All snapshots from host www.economist.com

Webpage Screenshot share download .zip report bug or abuse donate

0%

Menu Weekly edition Search Log in

Leaders | The war in Ukraine

A new nuclear era



With his threats to use the bomb, Russia’s president has overturned the nuclear order

10%

Jun 2nd 2022 Share

20% O ne hundred days ago Vladimir Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine by
warning of a nuclear strike. Having exalted Russia’s atomic arsenal and promised
Ukraine’s subjugation, he threatened countries tempted to interfere with
consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history”. Russian tv has
since tantalised viewers with chit-chat about Armageddon.

Even if he never uses the bomb in Ukraine, Mr Putin has thus already upset the nuclear
order. After his threats, nato limited the support it was prepared to o!er, with two
implications that are all the more worrying for having been drowned out by the
drumbeat of Russia’s conventional campaign. One is that vulnerable states that see the
world through Ukraine’s eyes will feel that the best defence against a nuclear-armed

aggressor is to have weapons of their own. The other is that other nuclear-armed states
will believe that they can gain by copying Mr Putin’s tactics. If so, someone somewhere
will surely turn their threat into reality. That must not be this war’s devastating legacy.

The nuclear danger was growing before the invasion. North Korea has dozens of
warheads. Iran, the un said this week, has enough enriched uranium for its "rst bomb.
Although the New start treaty will limit Russia’s and America’s intercontinental
ballistic missiles until 2026, it does not cover weapons such as nuclear torpedoes.
Pakistan is rapidly adding to its arsenal. China is modernising its nuclear forces and,
30% the Pentagon says, expanding them.

All this proliferation re#ects the weakening of the moral revulsion that restrains the
use of nuclear weapons. As memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fade, people fail to
grasp how the detonation of a small battle"eld weapon, of the sort Mr Putin might lob,
could escalate into the tit-for-tat annihilation of entire cities. America and the Soviet
Union only just coped with a two-sided nuclear stand-o!. There is insu$cient alarm
at the prospect of many nuclear powers struggling to keep the peace.

The invasion of Ukraine adds to this malaise. Even if Mr Putin is blu$ng, his threats
  eat away at the security guarantees given to non-nuclear states. In 1994 Ukraine
surrendered the ex-Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory in exchange for
undertakings from Russia, America and Britain that it would not be attacked. By
seizing Crimea and backing separatists in the Donbas regions in 2014, Russia #agrantly
broke that promise. America and Britain, which pretty much stood aside, broke their
promises, too.

This gives vulnerable states an extra reason to go nuclear. Iran may judge that, whereas
renouncing the bomb will win it no lasting credit, having one would now stir up less
trouble than in the past. If Iran tested a bomb, how would Saudi Arabia and Turkey
40%
respond? South Korea and Japan, which both have the know-how to arm themselves,
will place less faith in Western commitments to protect them in a more dangerous
world.

Mr Putin’s strategy of issuing nuclear threats is even more corrosive. In the decades
after the second world war, the nuclear powers contemplated deploying atomic
weapons in battle. But in the past half-century such warnings have been issued only
against countries, such as Iraq and North Korea, that were themselves threatening to
use weapons of mass destruction. Mr Putin is di!erent because he is invoking atomic
  threats to help his invading forces win a conventional war.

And it seems to have worked. True, nato’s support for Ukraine has been more robust
than expected. But the alliance has hesitated to dispatch “o!ensive” weapons such as
aircraft. Although America’s president, Joe Biden, has sent vast amounts of arms, this
week he demurred from providing missiles able to strike deep inside Russia. Others in
nato seem to think that Ukraine should settle with Russia, because in#icting a defeat
on Mr Putin could back him into a corner, with dire consequences.

That logic sets a dangerous precedent. China could impose similar conditions if it
50%
attacked Taiwan, arguing that the island is already Chinese territory. More states may
amass more battle"eld weapons. That would #out the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty, under which they are pledged to work for disarmament.

Mr Putin’s damage will be hard to repair. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons, which came into force last year and is backed by 86 states, calls for their
abolition. However, countries with weapons fear leaving themselves more vulnerable,
even if collective disarmament might make sense.

Arms control, with scrupulous veri"cation, is worth pursuing. Russia may be wary, but

it is impoverished. Nukes cost money and it needs to rebuild its conventional forces.
America could retire its land-based missiles without compromising its security in
exchange for Russian cuts. Both sides could agree on technical measures, such as not
to strike nuclear command, control and communications infrastructure in a
conventional con#ict. Ultimately, the aim should be to bring in China.

Those talks will be easier if Mr Putin’s nuclear tactics fail—starting with ensuring he
does not strike Ukraine. Mr Biden wrote this week that America has not detected
preparations. But countries such as China, India, Israel and Turkey with access to the
60% Kremlin should be warning Mr Putin of their fury if, God forbid, he actually uses a
nuclear weapon.

Sparing Ukraine from a nuclear attack is essential, but it is not enough. The world
must also make certain that Mr Putin does not prosper from his aggression today, as he
prospered in 2014. If, once again, he believes that his tactics worked, he will issue
more nuclear threats in the future. If he concludes nato can be intimidated,
persuading him that he must back down will be harder. Others will learn from his
example. Ukraine therefore needs advanced weapons, economic aid and sanctions on
Russia in order to force Mr Putin’s army into a retreat.

Those countries that see this as just a passing European "ght are neglecting their own
security. And those arguing in the name of peace that Ukraine needs a truce with
Russia right now, to avoid being bogged down in a war it cannot win with an enemy
that has already lost its sting, could not be more wrong. If Mr Putin thought nato
lacked resolve Russia would remain dangerous. If he were convinced that his nuclear
threats had been the di!erence between defeat and a face-saving stalemate, Russia
would be more dangerous than ever. 7

For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly Cover
70%
Story newsletter.

Share Reuse this content

CHECKS AND BALANCE


Exclusive insight and reading
recommendations from our correspondents
in America
Delivered to your inbox every week

example@email.com Sign up

80%

More from Leaders

The signi"cance of the Platinum


Jubilee
The celebrations are absurd, but the queen
represents continuity and consensus


Ukraine needs support, not
timorous advice
A recession in America by 2024 Appeasing Vladimir Putin will not bring
lasting peace
looks likely
It should be mild—but fear its consequences

90%

Subscribe Keep updated


Published since September 1843 to take
Group subscriptions part in “a severe contest between
Reuse our content intelligence, which presses forward, and an
The Trust Project
unworthy, timid ignorance obstructing our
progress.”
Help and contact us

The Economist The Economist Group

About The Economist Group Economist Events Which MBA?


Advertise Economist Intelligence Working Here Executive Jobs
Press centre Economist Impact Economist Education Executive Education
Courses Navigator
Store

100%
Terms of Use Privacy Cookie Policy Manage Cookies Accessibility Copyright © The Economist Newspaper

领取250个 免费旋转
现在加⼊

You might also like