SAMBRIA Crim Law Case Digest PDF

SAMBRIA, SWITZEL JOY C. FIRST YEAR-J.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTICLE 11
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
DEFENSE OF SELF, RELATIVES, AND STRANGERS

People v. Dela Cruz,
G.R. No. 128359, 6 December 2000………………………………………..…3
Palaganas v. People,
G.R. No. 165483, 12 September 2006…………………...................................5
AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL

People v. Ricohermoso,
G.R. No. L-30527-28, 29 March 1974………………………………………...6
People v. Norma Hernandez,

G.R. No. 22553-R, 14 April 1959…………………………………...………...7
FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
Mamangun v. People,
G.R. No. 149152, 2 February 2007…………………………………………...9
People v. Dagani,
G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006…………………………………………. 10
OBEDIENCE TO A LAWFUL ORDER OF A SUPERIOR

People v. Beronilla,
G.R. No. L-4445, 28 February 1955………………………………………....12
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 103501-03, 17 February 1997……………………………………..14
ARTICLE 12
INSANITY
People v. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537……………………...….16
People v. Bonoan,
G.R. No. L-45130, 17 February 1937, 64 Phil. 87…………………………..17
People v. Dungo,
G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991, 199 SCRA 860…………………..…………..18
1
SAMBRIA, SWITZEL JOY C. FIRST YEAR-J.D
People v. Rafanan,
G.R. No. L-54135, 21 November 1991, 204 SCRA 65……………………..20
People v. Robios,
G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 581…………………………….21
People v. Opuran,
G.R. Nos. 147674-75, 17 March 2004, 425 SCRA 654……………………..28
Verdadero v. People,
G.R. No. 216021, 2 March 2016……………………………………………..29
MINORITY
People v. Doqueña,
G.R. No. 46539, 27 September 1939, 68 Phil. 580………………………….32
Ortega v. People,
G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008…………………………………………..33
People v. Mantalaba,
G.R. No. 186227, 20 July 2011………………………………………………34
ACCIDENT
People v. Castillo,
G.R. No. 172695, 29 June 2007, 526 SCRA 215…………………………….36
People v. Retubado,
G.R. No. 124058, 10 December 2003………………………………………..37
Pomoy v. People,
G.R. No. 150647, 29 September 2004, 439 SCRA 439…………………..…40
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A

GREATER INJURY
People v. Loreno,
G.R. No. L-54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311……………………………..42
People v. Del Rosario,

G.R. No. 127755, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 740…………………………...43
INSUPERABLE CAUSE
People v. Bandian,
G.R. No. 45186, 30 September 1936, 63 Phil. 530………………………….44
2
ARTICLE 11 CASES
A. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. DEFENSE OF SELF, RELATIVES, AND STRANGERS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROBERTO E. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 128359, December 06, 2000
VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
The victim Daniel Macapagal, a married man, had been a live-in

partner of prosecution witness Ma. Luz Perla San Antonio for about two to
three years before San Antonio took appellant Roberto de la Cruz,
widower, as lover and live-in partner.
At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, San Antonio and appellant

were resting in their bedroom when they heard a car stop in front of their
house and later knocks on their door. San Antonio opened the front door
and she was confronted by Macapagal who made his way inside the house
holding a gun in his hand, despite San Antonio's refusal to let him in.
He seemed to be looking for something or somebody as Macapagal

walked past San Antonio and inspected the two opened bedrooms of the
house. He then went to the close bedroom where the appellant was and
banged at the door with his gun while yelling `Come out. Come out’.
Appellant then opened the door, but he was greeted by Macapagal's gun
which was pointed at him. Appellant immediately closed the door while
Macapagal continued banging at it. When appellant again opened the door
moments later, he was himself armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The two
at that instant immediately grappled for each other's firearm. A few
moments later shots were heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor.
Appellant told San Antonio to call the police on the phone and he
surrendered his firearm he used to shot Macapagal and invoked self
defense. According to the autopsy Macapagal sustained (4) gunshot
wounds. Three were non-penetrating found in the upper jaw of the left side
of the face, below the left shoulder and the right side of the waist. Another
gunshot wound on the left side of the chest penetrated the heart and killed
Macapagal instantly.
3
It was later found by the police that the firearm used by Macapagal
was a 9mm caliber pistol. It had one magazine loaded with twelve (12) live
ammunition but an examination of the gun showed that its chamber was
not loaded. Macapagal had a license to carry said firearm. On the other
hand, appellant, who denied ownership of the .38 caliber revolver he used,
had no license therefore."
ISSUE:
Whether or not self defense can be invoked.
RULING:
Here, the Court scarcely finds reversible error on the part of the trial
court in rejecting the claim of self-defense.
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would

presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
on the life and limb of a person - not a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor.
True, the victim barged into the house of accused-appellant and his
live-in partner and, banging at the master bedroom door with his firearm,
he yelled, "come out." Accused-appellant, however, upon opening the door
and seeing the victim pointing a gun at him, was able to prevent at this
stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have
stopped there. Instead, accused-appellant, taking his .38 caliber revolver,
again opened the bedroom door and, brandishing his own firearm,
forthwith confronted the victim. At this encounter, accused-appellant
would be quite hardput to still claimself-defense.
The second element of self-defense would demand that the means

employed to quell the unlawful aggression were reasonable and necessary.
The number of the wounds sustained by the deceased in this case would
negate the existence of this indispensable component of self-defense. The
autopsy report would show that the victim sustained four gunshot wounds
which would, in fact, indicate a determined effort to kill.
It would be essential, finally, for self-defense to be aptly invoked that

there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. When accused-appellant, opening the bedroom door the second
time confronted, instead of merely taking precautionary measures against,
the victim with his own gun he had taken from the cabinet, accused-
appellant could no longer correctly argue that there utterly was no
4
provocation on his part.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-

appellant ROBERTO DELA CRUZ y ESGUERRA is hereby held guilty of
HOMICIDE with the use of an unlicensed firearm, an aggravating
circumstance that is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
PALAGANAS VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006
CHICO, NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their

drinking spree at their house but later decided to proceed to Tidbits
Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime
Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas (nephew) and
Virgilio Bautista.
When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him as
the latter was familiar with the song (My Way). Jaime Palaganas got
irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being mocked by Melton Ferrer,
that caused him to go to the Ferrer’s table and uttered statements which
began the fight.
Ferdinand sought help to Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the Bar

and upon seeing the Ferrers outside, Ferdinand pointing at the Ferrers
instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano,
Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a result, Melton
was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his
right shoulder.
The petioner was sentenced by RTC and Affirmed by the CA for the
guilty of crime of Homicide and two counts of Frustrated Homicide. A
rumble, caused by the song “my way” at videoke bar resulted in the
shooting by the petitioner, who answer the call of help of his brother who
was involved in rumble incident. Petitioner invoked self-defense to justify
his shooting.
ISSUE:
5
Whether or not self-defense can be validly invoked.

RULING:
Petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are

present in the instant case and, thus, his acquittal on all the charges is
proper; that when he fired his gun on that fateful night, he was then a
victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by the Ferrer brothers; that
he, in fact, sustained an injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the
stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers
For a valid self-defense, primarily unlawful aggression must be

existed. In the case at bar. There is no unlawful aggression on the part of
the Ferrer brothers that justified the act of petitioner in shooting them.
Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar and
were not carrying any weapon.
When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not
in a state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5
meters) of the latter from the location of the former. He was still capable of
avoiding the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have
also called or proceeded to the proper authorities for help.
2. AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL
PEOPLE V. RICOHERMOSO
G.R. No. L-30527-28, March 29
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son

Marianito de Leon and one Rizal Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso.
Owning a parcel of land, which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin,
Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest and added that she
should be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso
said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.
Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano

dropped by Ricohermoso’s house and asked him about the palay, to which
6
the latter answered defiantly that he will not give him the palay, whatever
happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point as if by prearrangement.
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo

Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place,
Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced
Marianito. They grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point
Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, he discovered that
the rifle he carried beforehand was gone and that his father was mortally
wounded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying
circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
RULING:
No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is

erroneous because his act in preventing Marianito from shooting
Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the aggressors in this case, was
designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to the
assailants and not an act to prevent infliction of greater evil or injury. His
intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.
Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted
the appellants with lesiones leves, from an attempted murder charge with
respect to Marianito de Leon.
PEOPLE V. NORMA HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 22553-R, 14 April 1959
CONCEPCION, C., J.:
FACTS:
Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma

Hernandez and after months of courtship, appellant finally accepted Vivencio. On
the same date, she asked him to bring his parents over her home so that they could
talk about their marriage.
7
When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought chickens
and goats and they agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the
sponsors and to repair the uncle’s roof. While the celebration was going on,
appellant was nowhere to be found. Vivencio and his parents waited but she
never showed up thus causing them great shame and humiliation.
Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but that
she wasn’t really in love with him. Her parents tried to persuade her to accept the
proposal and that she only accepted it out of obedience to her parents and the
uncle’s insistence. Before Vivencio’s parents came to their home, she already
counselled them not to bring the chickens and that they should not regret
whatever may happen later.
Appellant said she felt torture because she wasn’t honestly in love with
Vivencio and so she decided to leave home as last recourse to prevent the
marriage. Appellant’s parents also corroborated her testimony. RTC convicted her
of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent
celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a
loveless marriage.
RULING:
The Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.
Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There
is no malice in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She was merely
exercising her right not to give her consent the marriage after mature
consideration. Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the
complainant & appellant before the incident. There always existed good relations
between them for they were neighbors so it cannot be sustained that appellant was
motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately frustrating the marriage.
Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to

marry and it would be utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed
simply because she desisted in continuing with the marriage. If she would be
liable then that would be tantamount to compelling her to go into a marriage
without her free consent. Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of
going through a loveless marriage.
8
3. FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
MAMANGUN V. PEOPLE,
G.R. No. 149152, 2 February 2007
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS:
Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-

holdup call, with his fellow police officers, at Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. A certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, which prompted
residents to respond and chase the suspect, who entered the yard and
proceeded to the rooftop of Antonio Abacan. Mamangun, with PO2 Diaz
and Cruz, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop and
saw a man who they thought was the robbery suspect. Mamangun, who
was ahead of the group, fired his gun once and hit the man, who turned
out to be Gener Contreras (not the suspect) – Contreras died of the gunshot
wound.
According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the

policemen to the lighted rooftop. He was beside Mamangun when he
(Ayson) recognized the deceased. According to Ayson, Mamangun pointed
his gun at the man, who instantly exclaimed “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to
which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” and shot him.
The defense rejects this testimony, alleging that they were the only
ones at the dark rooftop when Mamangun noticed a crouching man who
suddenly continued to run. Mamangun shouted “Pulis, tigil!” whereupon
the person stopped and raised a steel pipe towards Mamangun’s head.
This prompted Mamangun to shoot the person. The three police claim that
Contreras only said “Hindi ako, hindi ako” only when they approached
him. Mamangun then asked “Why did you go to the rooftop? You know
there are policemen here.” Mamangun reported the incident to the desk
officer who directed investigator Hernando Banez to investigate the
incident. Banez later on found a steel pipe on the roof.
ISSUE:
W/N the death of the victim was the necessary consequence of the
petitioner’s fulfillment of his duty.
9
RULING:
No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms

Sandiganbayan’s decision after finding the petitioner’s testimony to be
nothing but a concocted story designed to evade criminal liability. Per
Sandiganbayan’s observations, the defense was self-serving for the accused
and biased with respect to his co-policemen-witnesses because:
1. After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by

Mamangun, it is contrary to human experience for a man (who is not the
suspect) to attack one of three policemen with drawn guns.
2. Mamangun’s admission that he did not ask the victim “Why did you try
to hit me, if you are not the one?” clearly belies their claim.
3. The location of the entry of bullet belies their claim because it appears
that the victim instinctively shielded himself instead
Additionally, petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him was not
initially reported to the desk and was only conveniently remembered when
the investigator found a pipe in the crime scene.
Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely

justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal gunshot. The element of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim was absent, which leads to the failure
of the petitioner’s plea. Also, there can only be incomplete justification (a
privileged mitigating circumstance) in the absence of a necessary justifying
circumstance the injury was caused by necessary consequence of due
performance of duty.
PEOPLE V. DAGANI
G.R. No. 153875, 16 August 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group

composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln Miran (Miran), and two other
10
individuals had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound
of the Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. All of a sudden, appellants, who were security officers of
the PNR and covered by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered
the canteen and approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran,
causing the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held Javier while
Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to

investigate a commotion at the canteen. Upon reaching the place, Santiano
ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to enter, while the former waited outside.
Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on

the table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber revolver and attempted to fire
at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside the
canteen, Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he saw Javier
and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun which belonged to Javier.
During the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire
a warning shot. He heard Javier’s gun fire again, so he decided to rush into
the canteen. Santiano then shot Javier from a distance of less than four
meters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred when it failed to consider the
fact that the accused-appellants were in lawful performance of an official
duty.
RULING:
No. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who
acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office
does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before
this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2)
the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise. These requisites are absent in the
instant case.
The defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on
duty at the time they were at the canteen. The trial court gave weight to the
fact that the appellants were unable to submit their daily time records to
show that they were on duty at the time. Appellants’ assertion that they
were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied by PNR Security
Investigator Rolando Marinay’s testimony that PNR security officers work
11
in two 12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00
a.m.
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the
injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of
appellants’ due performance of an official duty.
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as
a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot
otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police
officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be
true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when
pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action
is needed.
It must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers

in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither capriciously
nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and
legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the
dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law.
We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are
apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are
dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be protected,
these criminals are also human beings with human rights.
4. OBEDIENCE TO A LAWFUL ORDER OF A SUPERIOR
PEOPLE V. BERONILLA
G.R. No. L-4445, 28 February 1955
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto

Adriatico file an appeal from the judgement of the Abra CFI, which
convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected
mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be
aiding the enemy.
12
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by

Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold,
regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as
guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla
received a memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo
men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or abetting the
enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing
in Bangued, he was placed under custody and tried and sentenced to death
by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents. Beronilla
reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying “…I can only compliment
you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case.”
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger

and jury, were indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after, President
Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty to
persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla
and others were convicted on the grounds that the crime was made on
purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after the
expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.
ISSUE:
W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying

circumstances for obedience to lawful order of superior
RULING:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which
as military subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith
without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that

arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to express
orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla
received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander,
which called attention to the illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence.
Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared to report it to
Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their part
because of the conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal,
suspension of trial based on doubts of illegality and death sentence review
sent to the superior officers.
13
Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here

is actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of
the person performing the act complained of to be innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to
the benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of
contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were
contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if
there are “any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within the
(amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the accused.
TABUENA V. SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. No. 103501-03, 17 February 1997
FRANCISCO, J.:
FACTS:
Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to

pay directly to the president’s office and in cash what the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985
memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin.
Tabuena agreed.
About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez,

then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated 8
January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction. In
obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum,
Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused
the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3)
withdrawals.
On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million,
following a letter of even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting
the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository branch of MIAA
funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The
check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the
cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which,
Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on
the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue
14
any receipt for the money received. Similar circumstances surrounded the
second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made
on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January
1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter-
request for a manager’s check for this amount. Peralta accompanied
Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the
counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the
trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the
money to Mrs. Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million
that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from
Tabuena.
The receipt was dated January 30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta were
charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained at large. One of
the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions
asked were more the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October
1990, they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Tabuena and
Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the Sandiganbayan
decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20 December 1991.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.
RULING:
Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of

malversation. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS
Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and
bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land.
It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its
face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of
an obligation illegal.
This fact coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains
one to act swiftly without question. Records show that the Sandiganbayan
actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the
accused themselves. The questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.
Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is
nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider such matter as
additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal
throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
15
appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error
or not.
ARTICLE 12 CASES
1. INSANITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,

Municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit andwound BEN
GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon,
which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several
wounds which caused his death. The lower court found the accused,
Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH. On
appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of
repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband,
the lower court failed to appreciate herself-defense theory. She claimed that
under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was
equivalent to self-defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea

within the concept of self-defense is applicable in this case.
RULING:
16
No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-

defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our
main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save
her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable not necessarily immediate and actual grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites
of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all
of these elements were duly established.
People of the Philippines v. Bonoan

G.R. No. L-45130, February 17, 1937
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
On December 12, 1934, Celestino Bonoan met with Carlos Guison. A

witness heard Bonoan said "I will kill you." Guison said to Bonoan "I will
pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and stabbed
Guison thrice on his left side which caused the latter's death two days
afterwards. Bonoan was charged with the crime of murder.
When the case was called for arraignment of the accused, the defense
counsel mentally objected to the arraignment on the ground that the
defendant was hospital, Becanged and was at the time confined in the
Psychopathic Because of this, the court issued orders requiring the director
of the hospital and the hospital's doctors to render report on the mental
condition of the accused. The doctors reported that Bonoan was suffering
for a disease diagnosed as dementia praecox which is similar to manic
depressive psychosis.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Hernandez of the hospital reported that the
defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial as he
was considered as recovered case. On February 27, 1936, the accused was
arraigned, and trial was had.
17
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is exempted from the criminal liability on

the ground of the doctors' findings that he is suffering from dementia
praecox?
RULING:
Insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance must be proved

beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of the crime is established.
When a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental
incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. In this case,
the defense interposed that the defendant was insane at the time he killed
the deceased. Prior to the commission of the offense, he was confined in the
insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease
diagnosed as dementia praecox.
The circumstance tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at

the time of the occurrence of the crime is not entirely lacking any rational
or scientific foundation. All persons suffering from dementia praecox are
clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies
them for legal responsibility for their actions. It is similar to those of manic-
depressive psychosis where the mind appears "deteriorated" because when
a person becomes affected by this kind of disease, during the time of
excitement, he has no control whatever he acts. The accused was held by
the court to be exempted from criminal liability.
PEOPLE v. DUNGO
G.R. No. 89420. July 31, 1991
PARAS, J.:
NATURE:
Automatic review of the decision of the RTC of Pampanga convicting

the accused of murder.
FACTS:
On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to
Mrs. Sigua's office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit,
Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope
18
he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he
departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied
bladed weapon. The Autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14
wounds, 5 of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that sometime in

February 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his
wife was requiring so many documents from him. Rodolfo explained to
him the procedure at the DAR. The accused, in defense of himself, tried to
show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense: Two
weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be
in deep thought always, maltreating their children was not used to it
before. There were also times that her when he husband would inform her
that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not.
On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they

didn't bother to buy medicine as the pain went away immediately.
Thereafter, he went back to the store. But when Andrea followed him to the
store, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way
home, she heard people saying that a stabbing occurred. She saw her
husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around. She
asked her husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, "That's
the only cure for my ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the
deceased in a number of days, I would die." That same day, the accused
went to Manila.
Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental
Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per
order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports of their
staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before,
during and after the commission of the alleged crime and classified his
insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to cerebrovascular
accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments
secondary to stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered
dorm occlusive disease, concluded that Rosalino was somehow
rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the
crime charged.
RULING:
19
No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is

necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that he acts w/o the least discernment and that there be
complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.
Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for
insanity. However, the definition of insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised
Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that insanity is
evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties,
which is manifested in language or, conduct. An insane person has no full
and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very

time of doing the act. However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of
his mental condition for a reasonable period before and after the time of the
act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward
acts.
It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who

may have wronged him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to
Mrs. Sigua. From this, it can be inferred that the accused was aware of his
acts. This also established that the accused has lucid intervals. Moreover,
Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been aware
of the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted
(during laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement
makes it highly doubtful that the accused was insane when he committed
the act. The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid
the fatal weapon, that he ran away from the scene of the incident after he
stabbed the victim several times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest,
indicate that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in
stabbing the victim. (This was taken from the 1S's decision).
Judgment: questioned decision AFFIRMED.
SHORTENED FACTS:
Rosalino Dungo stabbed Mrs. Sigua, with a knife from the envelope
he was carrying, inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Mrs. Sigua died and an information for murder was filed against
Dungo. The accused raised the defense of insanity. During the trial, the
prosecution presented the victim’s husband, Atty. Sigua, to testify that the
accused visited their house to confront him on why his wife was making it
difficult for the accused to transfer the landholding his father to him. The
trial court convicted him because the act of concealing a fatal weapon and
the act of taking flight in order to evade arrest indicates that accused was
sane during the time, he committed the stabbing. The case went up to the
Supreme Court for automatic review.
20
PEOPLE v. RAFANAN
G.R. No. L-54135. November 21, 1991
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Complainant Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old when hired as a

househelper by the mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio Rafaran
and his family lived with his mother in the same house. Policarpio was
married and has children. One evening, the mother of the accused called
complainant to help him close the door. When the complainant went near
him, he pulled her inside the store and raped her despite her resistance.
After that, he warned the complainant not to tell anyone about it or he will
kill her. The next day, the family of the accused knew what happened.
Appellant claimed that he is suffering from schizophrenia when he
inflicted violent intentions to Estelita. Trial court suspended the trial; and
ordered his confinement to National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong.
After 2 years, he was reported to be behaved and in improved condition
and in mental condition to stand court in trial. Trial of case resumed.
ISSUE:
W/N the reason of insanity is sufficient to relieve him from criminal

liability
RULING:
No. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.

Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his
reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition.
The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the

amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. costs against
appellant.
21
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELECIO ROBIOS y

DOMINGO,
G.R. No. 138453 : May 29, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecutions version
of how appellant assaulted his pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal
bloodbath, as follows:
1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven oclock in the morning, fifteen-

year old Lorenzo Robios was in his parents house at Barangay San Isidro in
Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his parents,
appellant Melecio Robios and the victim Lorenza Robios, who were at the
sala, quarrelling.
2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, Why did you come home,
why dont you just leave? After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a
distance of about five meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife,
stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from where Lorenza was
hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellants attack on
his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his
grandmothers house where he reported the incident.
3. At around eight oclock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin

Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza Robios, was at the house of his
mother Remedios Bueno at Barangay San Isidro. Benjamin, a
resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his mothers
house for the purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening of
March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robios, at
Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at his mothers house, he
received the more distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had been
killed by appellant.
4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her
house because he was afraid of what appellant might do. From his mothers
house, which was about 150 meters away from his sisters home, Benjamin
saw appellant who shouted at him, Its good you would see how your sister
died.
22
5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who

called the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3
Tirso Martin, together with the other members of the PNP
Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay San Isidro.
The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and
barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime where they saw blood
dripping from the house of appellant and Lorenza. The police told
appellant to come out of the house. When appellant failed to come out, the
police, with the help of barangay officials, detached the bamboo wall from
the part of the house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall
exposed that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant
embracing [his] wife.
6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was
lying on his side and holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his
right hand, was embracing his wife. He was uttering the words, I will kill
myself, I will kill myself. Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing
upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared to be dead.
7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house
and pulled appellant away from Lorenzas body. Appellant dropped the
knife which was taken by SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to resist the people
who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the help of the
barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope.
However, before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and
restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor
of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him
the bloodstained knife.
8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already
dead. She was pale and not breathing. The police thus solicited the services
of a funeral parlor to take Lorenzas body for autopsy. Appellant was
brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be
taken to the Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab wound
9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of

Police at Camiling, Tarlac, prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
The victim Lorenza Robios was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41
stab wounds on the different parts of her body.
That suspect (Melecio Robios) was under the influence of

liquor/drunk [who] came home and argued/quarreled with his wife, until
the suspect got irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered forty one (41)
stab blows.
23
Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the
Provincial Hospital. Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade
sharp knife about eight (8) inches long including handle.
10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present
the doctor who conducted the autopsy on Lorenza Robios body. Nor, was
the autopsy report presented as evidence.
Version of the Defense
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution

that he indeed killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability
by interposing the defense of insanity as follows:
FEDERICO ROBIOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robios, testified

that his parents had occasional quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father
told him that he had seen a person went [sic] inside their house and who
wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his father told the same
thing to his mother and because of this, his parents quarreled and
exchanged heated words.
LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified
that she came to know Melecio Robios only in May to June 1996.
Every time she visited him in his cell, accused isolated himself, laging
nakatingin sa malayo, rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone.
BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal

Colony, testified that he and the accused were seeing each other everyday
from 6:00 oclock in the morning up to 5:30 oclock in the afternoon. He had
observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in the counting of
prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall
in line in the plaza of the penal colony.
DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac

Penal Colony, testified that as the accuseds inmate, he had occasion to meet
and mingle with the latter. Accused sometimes was lying down, sitting,
looking, or staring on space and without companion, laughing and
sometimes crying.
MELECIO ROBIOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on

March 25, 1995, he was in their house and there was no unusual incident
that happened on that date. He did not know that he was charged for the
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember
when he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not
believe that he killed his wife.
24
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was
automatically elevated to this Court for review.
ISSUE:
Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of

errors:
I. The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony
and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding
the accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity
classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.
II. The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellants defense of
insanity.
RULING:
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance
At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any
evidence to contravene the allegation that he killed his wife. Clear and
undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity of the culprit and the
commission of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion.
Appellant, however, interposes the defense of insanity to absolve himself
of criminal liability.
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of

reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of
the crime. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of
mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the
very moment when the crime was committed. Only when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime
should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the

absence of proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound
mind. Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
has the burden of proving it. Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane
when the crime was committed.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellants claim of

insanity is unsubstantiated and wanting in material proof. Testimonies
from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence
that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he
perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.
25
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,

a domestic altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said
that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge
of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a
deliberate and conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled
at him as attested to by their 15year-old son Lorenzo Robios.
Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken
without his awareness of the atrocity of his act.
Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses

hardly supports his claim of insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence
points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission of
the crime. Except for appellants 19-year-old son Federico Robios, all the
other defense witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of his
insanity after he had already been detained in prison.
To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission

of the offense, or the accused must have been deranged even prior thereto.
Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible. Verily, his alleged
insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise
moment when the criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter.
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal

responsibility, the evidence must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence points to
insanity after the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted.
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who

conducted an examination of the mental condition of appellant, does not
provide much help in determining his state of mind at the time of the
killing. It must be noted that she examined him only on September 11,
1995, or six months after the commission of the crime.25 Moreover, she was
not able to make a background study on the history of his mental condition
prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain social worker to gather
data on the matter.
Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused
had already been suffering from psychosis at the time of the commission of
the crime,27 she likewise admitted that her conclusion was not definite and
was merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by the trial court, her
declarations were merely conjectural and inconclusive to support a positive
finding of insanity. According to the RTC:
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined
accused at the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, that
26
at the time of examination accused Melecio Robios was still mentally ill;
that accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering from insanity
and it is possible that the sickness have occurred eight (8) to nine (9)
months before examination; and in her opinion accused was suffering from
delusion and hallucination. And her opinion that at the time accused
stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid interval, is merely her conclusion.
Aside from being her opinion, she conducted the mental, physical
and neurological examinations on the accused seven (7) months after the
commission of the offense. That span of seven (7) months has given
accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr.
Mendoza had no opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the
behavior of the accused immediately before, during and immediately after
the commission of the offense. Her finding is conjectural, inconclusive. She
did not conduct background examination of the mental condition of the
accused before the incident by interviewing persons who had the
opportunity to associate with him.
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he

had already been completely deprived of reason when he killed the
victim.30 Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate
that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will
when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a
confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is
required to establish its existence.31 Indubitably, the defense failed to meet
the quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it

nonetheless erred in imposing the death penalty on appellant. It imposed
the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the capital
penalty was not only baseless, but contrary to the rules on the application
of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. Even the Office of the
Solicitor General
concedes this error in the imposition of the death penalty.
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with

unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for
the graver offense which is parricide. This is in accordance with the
mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: When a
27
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed.
The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with

reclusion perpetua to death. In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to impose one
or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.33 The rules with respect to the application of a
penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as
follows:
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. (Italics supplied)
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible
penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances,
the lower penalty shall be imposed.34 Considering that neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case,
the imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it
is not always punishable with death. The law provides for the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two indivisible penalties, the
application of either one of which depends on the presence or the absence
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Decision of the RTC AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the

penalty is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current
jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly
proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANACITO OPURAN

GR NO. 147674 – 75, MARCH 17, 2004
DAVIDE, JR., C., J.:
FACTS:
28
On Nov. 19, 1998, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar, Anacito Opuran,

herein accused, stabbed Allan Dacles, who was lying on a bench. At 7:45
pm of the same day, Demetrio Patrimonio was walking on the national
highway of Catbalogan, Samar. Thereafter, the accused emerged from
where he was hiding and stabbed Patrimonio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused can use the exempting circumstance of

insanity as a defense.
RULING:
No. Insanity must exist immediately before or at the précised

moment of the commission of the act. The accused failed to prove that he
was insane at the precise moment of commission or immediately before
said act. Thus, insanity is not attendant in the case at bar.
SOLOMON VERDADERO y GALERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 216021, March 2, 2016
MENDOZA, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Solomon Verdadero y Galera, claiming insanity as defense,

prayed for the reversal of the RTC and CA’s decision convicting him of
homicide.
On March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of

Cagayan Solomon Verdadero armed with a Rambo knife, with intent to
kill, evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Romeo B. Plata, thereby
inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different parts of his body which
caused his death. The evidence for the defense did not refute the material
allegations but revolved around Verdadero's alleged insanity.
29
Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMC's Psychiatric

Department as he claimed to hear strange voices and had difficulty in
sleeping. Sometime in 2001, he was brought to the Psychiatric Department
of CVMC after he became violent and started throwing stones at a tricycle
with a child on board. On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia and was given medications to address his mental illness.
Then, in 2009, at the time of the incident he was in a relapse and was again
confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC.
The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide. The trial
court, however, opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an
exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero was
unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time
he stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or
coetaneous with the commission of the crime.
The CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate

court agreed that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a
history of schizophrenic attacks but was unable to prove that he was not
lucid at the time of the commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in affirming the

petitioner's conviction even though his insanity at the time of the incident
was established by clear and convincing evidence.
RULING:
Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of

insanity. He claims that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the
proper state of mind before the stabbing took place. As testified to by Dr.
Andres-Juliana he was having hallucinations after the stabbing incident
and Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a relapse at the time of the
stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.
The Court disagrees on the argument of OSG that the Court should
not entertain Verdadero's petition for review as it principally revolves
around the issue of his insanity. A question of fact which should no longer
be addressed in a petition for review.
30
Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for

review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as it is limited to reviewing
only questions of law. The rule, however, admits of exceptions wherein the
Court expands the coverage of a petition for review to include a resolution
of questions of fact.
The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at

the time of the stabbing incident. Obviously, it is a question of fact, which,
ordinarily is not entertained by the Court in a petition for review.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the circumstances in the case at bench
warrant the application of the exception rather than the rule.
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999,

Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC for
treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was
diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the
psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a relapse; (5) he was in and out
of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in 1999 until the
stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on
March 20, 2009.
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia

and the only thing left to be ascertained is whether he should be absolved
from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental state.
It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state
at the exact moment the crime was committed. This, however, is not fatal to
the finding that he was insane. His insanity may still be shown by
circumstances immediately before and after the incident. Further, the
expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu may also be taken into
account.
Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the

observations made by Maynard, a witness for the prosecution. Maynard
was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time.
He had observed that there were times that Verdadero appeared to be of
unsound mind as he would sometimes become violent. On the day of the
stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again of
unsound mind noting that he had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk.
Moreover, he was immediately transferred to the psychiatry department
because of his impaired sleep and to control him from harming himself and
others.
These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony

that drinking wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were among the
31
symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis for his
previous diagnosis.
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be

done with utmost care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard
against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a general plea of
insanity. The circumstances in the case at bench, however, do not indicate
that the defense of insanity was merely used as a convenient tool to evade
culpability.
In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves

him from criminal responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to
indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist,
but the accused is freed from the criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-

appellant Solomon Verdadero y Galera of Homicide by reason of insanity.
He is ordered confined at the National Center for Mental Health for
treatment and shall be released only upon order of the Regional Trial Court
acting on a recommendation from his attending physicians from the
institution.
2. MINORITY
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALENTIN DOQUEÑA

G.R. No. 46539. September 27, 1939
DIAZ, J.:
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, who is 13 years old and a minor, was

prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, for
having killed Juan Ragojos. The court, after trying the case, held that the
accused acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and,
proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be
sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the
age of majority. From this order the accused interposed an appeal alleging
32
that the court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment and in
not having dismissed the case.
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19,1938, Juan

Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan.
Valentin Doqeuna, the accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and,
catching the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach.
For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the yard and
slapped him on the nape and struck him on the mouth with his fist,
returning immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was to continue
playing.
The offended accused looked around the yard for a stone to attack Ragojos,
but finding none, he approached his cousin amed Romualdo Cocal and get
his knife. The accused then approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the
latter to give him another blow with his fist, but he was denied. The
accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife causing Ragojos death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused acted in discernment.
RULING:
Considering the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña

committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil and of the
excellent student in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual,
Pangasinan. This court is convinced that the accused in committing the
crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and
consequences of his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said
accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
We must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of
mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he might have had at
his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act,
and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.
The attorney mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12,

subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for
lack of intention which, is a mitigating circumstance, is included among
other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code.
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from

criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who
33
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the

difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance,
the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not
only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even
during the trial.. Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs
to the appellant.
JOEMAR ORTEGA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 151085, August 20, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner and the victim were both minor, 13 and 6 years old
respectively, at the time of commission of rape. It was alleged that the
petitioner raped the victim three times on three different occasions in 1996.
The lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability
imposed. The case was pending when Republic Act 9344 or the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted amending the age of criminal
irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. The aforementioned
law took effect on May 20, 2006. At the time of the promulgation of
judgment, the petitioner already the age of majority. The Office of the
Solicitor General claimed that the petitioner is not exempt from criminal
liability because he is not anymore considered as a minor as defined by
R.A. No. 9344. The OSG further claimed that the retroactive effect of the
said law is applicable only if the child-petitioner is still below 18 years old.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime alleged by

reason of minority.
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts
by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute
free will of voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Hence,
while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.
34
The Supreme Court held that The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of
criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is
evidently favorable to the petitioner. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the
time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the
certificate of live birth, by petitioner’s own testimony, and by the testimony
of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of
the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the
time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A.
No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA

G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in

Butuan City received a report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was
selling shabu. After a buy-bust operation, two separate information were
filed against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba
pleaded not guilty.
RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was

penalized of reclusion perpetua to death and fine of 500k for selling shabu
and (2) for illegally possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in
application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8 years as
maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC.
Mantalaba appealed that the lower court gravely erred in convicting

him and that there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the
poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation. He also claims that the chain of
custody of the seized shabu was not established.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and

possession.
35
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From the
above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the
elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer
were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the
marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was
also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21

is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance
will not render an accused arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible.
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can

be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. Mantalaba
was minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the
promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect
after the promulgation of the RTC's decision against Mantalaba. The RTC
did not suspend the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law that were
applicable at the time of the promulgation of the judgment. However, as
ruled in People vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be applied but
NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old.
or older. Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of sentence
is already moot and academic.
But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's

minority as privileged mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus,
applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree
lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily,
also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is
prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance
nor aggravating circumstance.
36
3. ACCIDENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO

G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007
SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao,

Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Isaias Castillo y Completo, while conveniently armed with
illegally possessed sling and deadly arrow, with intent to kill his wife
Consorcia Antiporta with whom he was united in lawful wedlock did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife
Consorcia Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on
the right side of her neck causing the laceration of the jugular vein which
caused her instantaneous death.
Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he was the
one who shot his wife with a deadly arrow considering that at the time of
the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all engaged in target
shooting using the sling and arrow. Hence, he surmised that any one of
them could have shot the victim. At any rate, even assuming that he was
the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional.
Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime scene did not
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His arrest while hiding inside
a toilet in the adjoining barangay, while his wife was being treated in the
hospital, likewise does not prove his complicity since the prosecution did
not prove that he deliberately hid inside the toilet.
Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law and

sister-in-law where he asked for forgiveness should not be considered as
admission of guilt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case constitutes as an accident.
RULING:
37
No. There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that

assuming he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and
not intentional. The exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable in
the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The
following are exempt from criminal liability: Any person who, while
performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to

prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The defense miserably failed to
discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting
circumstance, are: A person is performing a lawful act; With due care; He
causes an injury to another by mere accident; Without fault or intention of
causing it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS G. RETUBADO

G.R. No. 124058, December 10, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s younger

brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a
cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and
placed it on the dining table as he was having dinner with his father.
Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was their

neighbor Emmanuel Caon,Jr. The matter was brought to the attention of
the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that
Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The appellant, however, was
bent on confronting Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. Thereafter , the father of
Emmanuel Jr., 50-year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr.,(pedicab driver) was
confronted by Jesus when the former was on his way home. Emmanuel
Cañon, Sr. ignored Jesus so the latter pushed the pedicab which nearly fell
into a canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house. His wife, Norberta
Cañon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him
to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Undeterred, the
appellant continued following Emmanuel.
38
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived
and tarried at the porch. Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and
demanded to know why he was being followed. The appellant told
Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told
the appellant that his son was already asleep. Norberta went down from
the balcony and placed her hand on her husband’s shoulder to pacify him.
Jesus forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot
Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant
walked away from the scene.
They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan District Hospital, but he

died shortly thereafter. Jesus surrendered to the police but failed to
surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim. The appellant admitted
shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act
with due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victim’s death.
He testified that when he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son,
Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun.
The appellant grabbed Emmanuel’s free hand with his right hand, and the
old man almost fell on his knees to the ground. The appellant pulled the
gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the gun suddenly went off.
The bullet hit Emmanuel’s forehead. For his part, the appellant rushed to
his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table before
entering his bedroom. When he went back to the dining room to get the
gun, his younger sister, Enrica told him that their brother Edwin had taken
the gun. He found Edwin outside their house near the church, and the
latter told the appellant that he threw the gun into the sea.
Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion

perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jesus was merely performing a lawful act with due
care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death
RULING:
It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought

about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the same. The
defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that
must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. By
admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the prosecution because if such evidence is weak but the
accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the prosecution can no
39
longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity

is a question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.
There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that
the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author
of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on
the forehead. The court came to this conclusion based on:
1. Norberta Caon’s testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police
authorities that he killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his
brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
3. The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.
There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the crime to

murder. To appreciate treachery., two (2) conditions must be present
namely,(a) the employment of the means of execution that give the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The prosecution
failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the
abovementioned conditions.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender.
ROWENO POMOY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 150647, September 29, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
On 1990, the policemen arrested Tomas Balboa, a master teacher of

the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo, for
he was allegedly connected with a robbery. He was brought to the
Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni
in Iloilo where he was detained. Roweno Pomoy, a member of the Iloilo
Provincial Mobile Force Company, directed the latter to come out, for
tactical interrogation at the investigation room. Petitioner had a gun
hanging from his bolster. After that, 2gunshots were heard. Petitioner was
40
seen holding his .45 calibre pistol facing Balboa who was lying in a pool of
blood.
Balboa allegedly tried to grab the handle of Pomoy’s gun. Balboa was
not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in preventing
him. He and Balboa grappled in taking control of his gun. Balboa was
accidentally shot.--RTC of Iloilo City found Pomoy guilty of the crime of
homicide.--CA modified the RTC decision (removed aggravating
circumstance of abuse of public position) stating that1) the victim was not
successful in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in
control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the gun had been
locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it
went off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he
deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found
on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that
there had been a grappling for the gun. Thus, there is no unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased to justify self-defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an

accident in his fulfilment of duty
RULING:
YES. It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer

that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the
victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster.
Petition is granted and the assailed decision REVERSED. Petitioner is

ACQUITTED. Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability.
The following are exempt from criminalliability:4. Any person who,

while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intent of causing it. Exemption from criminal
liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to
the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not
have been foreseen or controlled. Thus, in determining whether an
“accident” attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual
standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in the present
case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment
the shots were fired? YES, that petitioner did not have control of the gun
during the scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the
41
weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts.

Elements of Accident:1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful
act with due care;2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident;
and3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause
the injury. All these elements were present in this case.
At the time of the incident, Pomoy was a member- specifically, one

tof the investigators of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at
the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was unlawful
performance of his duties as investigating officer that under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a
routine interrogation. It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law
enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when
the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster.
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting

arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect
his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Short Version: Tomas Balboa was brought to the Police Headquarters

where he was detained for alleged robbery. Pomoydirected Balboa to
come out for tactical interrogation at the investigation room. 2
gunshots were heard.Balboa was found dead. Pomoy was charged
with homicide. RTC found him guilty. CA modified the RTCdecision
removing the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position. SC
acquitted Pomoy. Death of Balboa is the result of an accident in
fulfillment of his duty. All the elements of Accident were present in
thiscase: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due
care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part
of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.
4. IRRESISTIBLE FORCE OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A

GREATER INJURY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EUSTAQUIO LORENO Y

MALAGA AND JIMMY MARANTAL Y LONDETE
G.R. NO. L-54414, JULY 9, 1984
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
FACTS:
42
On night of January 7, 1970 in Limbanan, Ilocos Sur, eight

men armed with firearms, six of whom where NPA’s, robbed the
house of of Elias Monge. A man in black sweater raped Elias’s
daughters, Cristina and monica. Loreno was armed with short
firearm; Marantal served as lookout. They were able to get
P10,619.50 worth of properties. Loreno and Marantal pleaded not
guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Loreno and Marantal should be acquitted of

committing robbery with double rape due to exempting
circumstance of irresistible force
RULING:
The decision is affirmed. The accused are guilty of crime of

robbery with double rape, in conspiracy, attended by the
aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime and dwelling. The
accused should suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant’s claim of having acted under the compulsion of an

irresistible force is inconsistent with the established facts that
demonstrated voluntary participation and conspiracy.
As a general rule, person who acts under the compulsion of

an irresistible force is exempt from criminal liability. However, the
compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to
the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. In this case,
the facts show that the appellants contention that they were
threatened by the six NPA’s is untenable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Accused was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced t

o death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony of a
43
tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the
tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused
was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the
location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the
supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of
some of the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the
precinct where his statement was taken on May 14, 1966. However, this
was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute
a waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted
that the accused was handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the
fiscal and based on the authorities* belief that the accused might attempt to
escape otherwise.
ISSUE:
Whether the rights of the accused-appellant were violated.

Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.
RULING:
Yes. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel in the
course of the investigation. The court held that the accused should always
be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the
authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the
court included invitations by police officers in the scope of custodial
investigations.
It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-
appellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the
case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general
inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information
about his participation in the crime.
However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver
is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel.
2nfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made
such a waiver.
No. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct

a lawful warrantless arrests; (a) the accused is caught in flagrante delicto6
(b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed6
and 7 when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the
accused in this case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was
not conducted immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it
was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal
44
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had

committed the offense because they were not there when the crime
was committed. They merely relied on the account of one eyewitness.
Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did
not affect the 8urisdiction of the court in this case because the accused still
submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he
waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.
5. INSUPERABLE CAUSE
PEOPLE V. BANDIAN
G.R. No. 45186, 30 September 1936
DIAZ, J.:
FACTS:
At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentine Aguilar, the

apellant’s neighbor, saw the appelant go to the thicket about four or five
brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it
was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few
minutes later, he then again saw her emerge from the thicket with her
clothes stained with blood both in front and back, staggering and visibly
showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and
having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped
her go up to her house and placed her in her bed.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what had
happened to her, the appellant answered that she was very dizzy. Not
wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom who lived nearby to be there and help him and
the appellant. He asked Comcom to take bamboo leaves to stop the
hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely
gone about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn baby near a path
adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before.
Comcom informed Aguilar of it and the latter told him to bring the body to
the appellant’s house. Upon being asked whether the baby which was
shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president

of the sanitary division went to the appellant’s house and found her still
45
lying in bed still bleeding. In his opinion, the physician declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house, and after which, he threw the child into
the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the
man, Luis Kirol, with whom she was married to, because the child was not
his but with another man with whom she had previously has amorous
relations. Nepomuceno testified that the appellant admitted killing her
child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bandian is guilty of infanticide.
RULING:
No. The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in
causing her child’s death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the
thicket, did so willfully, consciously, or imprudently. She had no cause to
kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former
lover, Luis Kirol took place three years before the incident. The husband of
the appellant testified at the trial affirming the belief that the child was his.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable must be

committed willfully and consciously, or at least it must be the result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits
them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his
mental facilities, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be
held liable.
The law exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under
the circumstances in which the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth
to a child in the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence
or any other cause than that she was overcome by severe dizziness and
extreme debility, with no fault or intention on her part. She has in her favor
the fourth and the seventh exempting circumstances.
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and

considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her
involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her
child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely
independent of her will, it should be held that… under such circumstances,
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code in her favor.
46

SAMBRIA Crim Law Case Digest PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

SAMBRIA Crim Law Case Digest PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

SAMBRIA Crim Law Case Digest PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SAMBRIA, SWITZEL JOY C. FIRST YEAR-J.

DEFENSE OF SELF, RELATIVES, AND STRANGERS

AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL

People v. Norma Hernandez,

OBEDIENCE TO A LAWFUL ORDER OF A SUPERIOR

IRRESISTIBLE FORCE OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A

People v. Del Rosario,

1. DEFENSE OF SELF, RELATIVES, AND STRANGERS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROBERTO E. DELA CRUZ

The victim Daniel Macapagal, a married man, had been a live-in

At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, San Antonio and appellant

He seemed to be looking for something or somebody as Macapagal

Whether or not self defense can be invoked.

Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would

The second element of self-defense would demand that the means

It would be essential, finally, for self-defense to be aptly invoked that

provocation on his part.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-

PALAGANAS VS. PEOPLE

Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their

Ferdinand sought help to Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the Bar

Whether or not self-defense can be validly invoked.

Petitioner argued that all the elements of a valid self-defense are

For a valid self-defense, primarily unlawful aggression must be

2. AVOIDANCE OF GREATER EVIL

Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son

Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano

Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo

No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is

PEOPLE V. NORMA HERNANDEZ

Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma

Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to

Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun was responding to a robbery-

According to the lone witness Crisanto Ayson, he accompanied the

No. The Court denies the instant petition and affirms

1. After supposed introductions and forewarnings uttered allegedly by

Acts in the fulfillment of duty and self-defense does not completely

At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group

Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to

Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on

It must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police officers

4. OBEDIENCE TO A LAWFUL ORDER OF A SUPERIOR

Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto

Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by

Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger

W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying

The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that

Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here

Then President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to

About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez,

Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,

Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea

No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-

People of the Philippines v. Bonoan