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Anthropological Theory

Copyright © SAGE Publications

London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi
Vol 1(1): 9–29
[1463-4996(200103)1:1;9–29;015920]

Theory counts
(Discounting) discourse to the contrary by
adopting a confrontational stance
Stephen P. Reyna
University of New Hampshire

Abstract
This article argues the virtues of a particular research methodology, the
confrontational stance, for making theory count by helping it to formulate
approximate truths of some rigor. Argument proceeds by first showing how a
particular anthropological tradition, social anthropology, achieved success by
haphazardly adopting such a stance; and then by suggesting certain requirements
needed to systematically adopt such a stance.

Key Words
approximate truth • research methodology • social anthropology • validation

Tiresias . . . a blind prophet, usually said to have been blinded because he saw Athena
bathing, and then to have been awarded the gift of prophecy . . . (Random House
Dictionary, 1967)

This article begins with an assessment of the state of current anthropology in order to
do something about it. Lévi-Strauss observed that anthropology began as a Rousseauean
project because J.-J. Rousseau had once remarked, ‘. . . the whole world is covered with
nations of which we know only the names’ (in Lévi-Strauss, 1976: 30). So, to acquire
further knowledge, he recommended that dauntless folk be sent ‘. . . traveling in order
to inform their compatriots by observing . . . Let us suppose that these new Herculeses
. . . then wrote the natural, moral, and political history of what they had seen; we our-
selves would see a new world come from their pens . . .’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1976: 30). Now
the observers who became the ‘new Herculeses’ were the anthropologists, and as a result
of their odysseys, they created ‘a new world’ of theory about humanity.
In the 19th century the likes of E.B. Tylor and Lewis Henry Morgan constructed uni-
linear evolutionary theories that sought to account for the universals of human culture.
Radcliffe-Brown offered his ‘view of social anthropology’ in the 1930s which became a
British social anthropological canon in the first half of the 20th century; a canon whose
first premise was that social anthropology was ‘. . . the theoretical natural science of

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human society . . .’ (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965/1940: 188, 189). This was a deft piece of
intellectual imperialism. Sociology, political science, and economics – as they studied
particular types of societies, or different aspects of particular societies, smaller realities
in the larger whole – were reduced to sub-disciplines within anthropology, as they well
should be. At roughly the same time, largely at Columbia University, Franz Boas and
his associates were devising an even vaster anthropology which would be ‘the science of
man’ in all aspects, biological as well as cultural (Kroeber, 1963/1923: 1). Thus, anthro-
pology was the most comprehensive discipline investigating humanity in either its 19th
century form or its two variants in the first half of the 20th century. It was a vast project
sending ‘new Herculeses’ everywhere to erect a human science and in science: theory
counts! That was then; what can be said of the anthropological present?
Sherry Ortner, writing on the subject of anthropological theory since the 1960s,
determined that it had become ‘a thing of shreds and patches’ (Ortner, 1984: 126).
Judgements in the 1990s continued Ortner’s concern. Keith Hart, in 1990, castigated
anthropology as ‘alienated . . . and lacking any vision’ (in Firth, 1992: 208). Joel Kahn
(1990: 230) described it in a state of ‘methodological and epistemological crisis’. Debate
in the US pertains to whether the discipline is ‘self destructing’ (Knauft, 1996: 1).
Sahlins (1995: 14) believes that ‘ “Culture” . . . is in the twilight of its career, and anthro-
pology with it’. Geertz agrees, prophesying that the discipline will probably disappear
in about 50 years (in Handler, 1991: 612). Such opinions, according to Knauft (1996:
296), are ‘widely shared’. The point of the preceding is that significant thinkers ques-
tion the ‘vision’, to use Hart’s term, of anthropology. It is as if the discipline has gone
from a confederacy of new Herculeses to one of blind Tiresiases, sightless seers.
Why does anthropology appear to be in such a situation? There are a number of
answers to this question. Certainly, the investment preferences of current neo-liberalism
hurt anthropology. Such preferences privilege financing of penal institutions at the
expense of those in education. Prisons are growing everywhere in the US, while public
universities are declining or stagnating. This explains in some measure why perhaps half
of those who have received PhDs in anthropology in the US since the early 1970s have
not been able to secure permanent positions in colleges or universities (Roseberry, 1996).
So great a loss of intellectual resources over three decades unquestionably clouds anthro-
pology’s vision. But there is another problem.
This problem is, that for a number of reasons, a strong anti-science faction has arisen
in anthropology. This faction, in the words of Steven Tyler (1987), finds science ‘degraded’
and ‘archaic’. It insists upon ‘thick description’, or ethnography (Geertz, 1973), in place
of science. Some in the tradition consider themselves ‘experimentalists’ who want to ‘trade
in the scholarly treatise . . . for interviews, conversations, and biographical portraits in a
manner more evocative of journalists’ (Marcus, 1993: 1). Let us be crystal clear about what
is being proposed here. The blind Tiresiases will ‘trade in’ scientific scholarship for ‘inter-
views’. Theory no longer counts in such an anthropological discourse.1
How does one confront such discourse? One strategy is to bracket it in the sense of
the Greek sceptics when they put something in epoche. When you place a discourse in
epoche, you suspend judgement on it; that is, you bracket it and get on with other busi-
ness. If I bracket (war) I set speech of war aside, and get on with talking about peace. If
the Tiresiases discount theory, we shall discount – without rancor, with dispatch – their
(discounting) to confront the chore of helping to make theory count.

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How can one do this? Albert Einstein once remarked that a decisive event in science
was that of the ‘confrontation of theory and facts’ (Einstein, 1970: 29). Further, for a
long time ‘many scientists’ have been ‘fully aware’ that there are ‘difficulties inherent’ in
grasping the nature of this confrontation (Lakatos, 1970: 113). This article contends
that a way of making theory count can be had if anthropologists examine what is
involved in confrontation, and then take a confrontational stance.

Bertrand Russell, writing in Unpopular Essays, pointed a way to understanding con-

frontation when he said, ‘But if philosophy is to serve a positive purpose, it must not
teach skepticism, for while the dogmatist is harmful, the skeptic is useless’ (Russell, 1951:
27). Dogmatism was ‘harmful’, according to Russell, because it was an absolutist posture
that insisted there was Absolute Truth, when it was uncertain whether such truths exist.
Skepticism was ‘useless’ because it, too, was an absolutist position, one whose prac-
titioners produced a lack of knowledge, an Absolute Ignorance. The unilinear evolu-
tionists, like Morgan, with his insistence upon the absolute truth of one line of evolution
from savagery to civilization, are an example of Russell’s dogmatism. Postmodernists,
like Lyotard (1984), with his skepticism towards all metanarratives, exemplifies Russell’s
skepticism. What Russell was suggesting was that ‘philosophy’, here understood as an
epistemological stance, could have ‘a positive purpose’ if it steered a course between the
Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of skepticism.
I argue in this article that a confrontational stance is just such a ‘philosophy’ and will
utilize the social anthropologists’ encounter with unilinear evolutionary theory to illus-
trate why. Argument is developed over four sections. The first section introduces certain
basics of confrontation. The second section presents the social anthropologists’ version
of it. The third section documents the social anthropologists’ confrontation with uni-
linear evolutionary theory. The fourth section explains how the formulation of validation
histories is vital when taking a confrontational stance, and provides insight as to how to
make such histories. Finally, the conclusion, surveying the analysis of the preceding sec-
tions, argues that when confrontational stances establish validation histories bearing
upon theoretical propositions, they create more rigorous approximate truths of social
reality, a rigor necessary for making theory count.

THE CONFRONTATIONAL STANCE

Different forms of scientific practice may tend toward one of two limits where, as one
approaches them, they (the practices) become less and less scientific. One limit is that
of pure theory. Here, practitioners utterly ignore observation while propounding non-
validated generalizations. The other limit is that of pure observation. Here, prac-
titioners only perform observation, while formulating no generalizations. The former
limit might be called ‘Panglossian,’ because Dr Pangloss’s discourse in Candide was a
babble of theoretical absurdities unconstrained by reality. The latter limit might be said
to be ‘Baconian’ because many commentators thought that Sir Francis, like Detective
Webb in Dragnet, fancied ‘just the facts’. A science away from these extremes operates
under the principle that every generalization should have its set of validating obser-
vations and every set of observations should have their generalizations. Such a science
is ‘confrontational’, confronting generalization with observation, and observation with
generalization.

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It is important to recognize what is confronting what. The confrontation in the con-

frontational stance is not directly between one group of thinkers jawing with another
group concerning whose views are truer, although this can occur. It is a ‘confrontation’
between a particular theoretical proposition, or sets of such propositions, and reality.
Theoretical propositions are generalizations in which there are at least two concepts and
at least one relationship between these concepts. Such propositions may be one of three
types. Empirical generalizations are propositions that are relatively low in generality and
abstraction, and are arrived at through observation. Theories are propositions with enor-
mous generality and high abstraction arrived at through a formal or informal logical pro-
cedure. Hypotheses are propositions deduced from theories which are lower in generality
and abstraction than the theory from which they derive.3 Scientists formulate ‘theory’
whenever they construct any of these three types of propositions.
Empirical statements are needed to allow theoretical propositions to confront reality.
Theoretical propositions assert uniformities of relationship in reality. Empirical state-
ments describe how to sense the posited reality because they contain information con-
cerning what sensations of reality correspond to which concepts in the theoretical
propositions. For example, Emile Durkheim invented in Suicide (1897) the theoretical
proposition that ‘deviance varied inversely with social integration’. Empirical statements
applicable to this theory are: ‘Suicide is a form of deviance’, ‘Catholicism and Protes-
tantism are forms of social integration’, and ‘inverse relationships are observed when
something goes up when something else goes down’.
Confrontation is based upon having showdowns.4 The image that this word may
evoke is of the moment of truth at the end of a cowboy movie when the good guy and
the bad guy test each other to discover who shoots best. I use the term in a slightly differ-
ent sense. A ‘showdown’ is certainly a moment of truth involving a test; but what is being
tested is whether what is observed of reality is what has been imagined of it. Scientists
make observations that produce sensory information concerning whether what is asserted
in theory to be is sensed in reality to be. Thus, the showdown in the confrontational
stance is between imagination and perception of reality, and concerns whether the
sensory information of reality, the ‘facts’, is the sensory information that particular
empirical statements of particular theoretical propositions imagined would be the
sensory information of that reality.
Persons adopting a confrontational stance will be involved in two related practices –
those of observation and validation. ‘Observation’ concerns the sensing of being. It is
‘focusing’ upon a patch of reality with a particular sense, i.e. vision, and taking a ‘snap-
shot’ of it, i.e. of allowing that sense to make a neurological record of the reality.The neuro-
logical record is the observation. ‘Validation’ concerns the production of a particular
knowledge about observation. Either what theories assert will be observed is observed, in
which case the propositions are validated (for those observations); or what they assert will
be observed is not observed, in which case they are falsified. Repeated confrontation of
contending theories concerning some reality with that reality results in validation histories
which contain information concerning how well contending propositions do when con-
fronting reality. Validation histories provide the basis for assertions of ‘approximate truth’
(Miller, 1987). This is not The Truth, but truer truth among galaxies of contending truths
given a particular validation history. Confrontational showdowns are moments of truth
because at the end of them you know who has the truer truth.

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The actual techniques that sciences use when they make their confrontations are their
observational and validational toolkits. Some might deride the notion of a toolkit as an
unimportant concept of interest only to more technical plebs. My judgement is precisely
the reverse. More approximately, true knowledge depends upon more complete and
accurate observation and validation, which is what toolkits are all about. Let us investi-
gate something of the confrontational toolkits with which the unilinear anthropologists
and social anthropologists practiced their anthropologies.

‘FULL-FLAVOURED’ OBSERVATION
William James tells us that when he asked Sir James Frazer about natives he had
known, Frazer exclaimed, ‘But heaven forbid!’ (in Jarvie, 1969: 2).
The anthropologist must relinquish his comfortable position in the long chair . . .
He must go out into the villages, and see the natives at work in gardens, on the beach,
in the jungle, must sail with them . . . and observe them in fishing, trading, and cer-
monial . . . Information must come to him full flavoured from his own observations
of native life . . . (Malinowski, 1954/1926: 146–47).

The unilinear evolutionists’ confrontational toolkit was based on circuitous and indirect
observation.5 Certainly, nobody had the slightest intention of directly observing those
being investigated, as the above quotation concerning Frazer makes clear. Rather, they
would practise the ‘comparative method’. The basic procedures of this were to first read
accounts of the ‘savages’ by missionaries, soldiers, and colonial administrators to discover
survivals, elements of low culture that survived in higher culture. Once these had been
identified, the information they supposedly bore would be treated as premises in syllo-
gisms from which other aspects of ‘primitive’ culture would be inferred. Of course,
soldiers, and the like, were gullible and biased so that the accuracy of the premises which
formed the basis of their deductions was unknown. This being the case, Malinowski
(1944: 26) declared that the ‘shortcomings’ of unilinear evolutionary theory resulted from
insufficient ‘attention to . . . reality’. All in all, the unilinear evolutionary theorists’ com-
parative method made the observational part of their confrontational toolkit conjectural.
The social anthropologists’ antidote for neglecting reality, as the above quotation
from Malinowski underscores, was to get out of the ‘long chair’ to make ‘full flavoured’
observations.6 This included a number of observational procedures championed by
Malinowski in the first chapter of Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) that became
the social anthropologists’ standard ethnographic toolkit and was the observational basis
of their confrontational stance.7
A.C. Haddon and W.H.R. Rivers had actually developed the essentials of the social
anthropological observational toolkit following the Torres Straits expedition at the turn
of the century. Haddon introduced the notion that the preferred type of research should
be based upon ‘fieldwork’ (Young, 1988: 4). Rivers (1900) developed the ‘genealogical
method’ during the Torres Straits Expedition. The unilinear evolutionists had made it
clear that ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ lived with their relatives. This indicated who needed
to be directly observed. But the evolutionists, with their aversion to actually meeting
with the object of their study, could only suggest utilization of the comparative method
to make these observations.

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The genealogical method was the first technique explicitly developed for directly
observing relatives. It was to be utilized in conjunction with census and settlement plans
of localities, and required the collection of the vital statistics, kinship ties, and statuses
concerning rights and responsibilities, especially as these referred to the inheritance of
property and succession to office for individuals in the census of a particular locality.
Thus, it forced anthropologists to see and hear actualities of ‘primitive’ actors, and
thereby gave its users an observational advantage over unilinear evolutionists.
Notes and Queries on Anthropology, used since the 1870s as a handbook of anthropo-
logical method, was revised in 1912. Rivers contributed an article to the new, fourth
edition, ‘General Account of Method’. This was, perhaps, the first presentation of par-
ticipant observation. A guiding principle offered in this article was that, ‘the abstract
should always be approached through the concrete’ (Rivers, 1912: 115). The ‘concrete’
was actual observation of discourse and practice. The methodological point argued here
is that more abstract generalizations need to be validated by ‘concrete’ observation. Of
course, the term ‘concrete’ has its ambiguities, so it is appropriate to probe further to
explore in greater detail what it meant.
Rivers was interested in problems of the observation of discourse. He was especially
concerned not to conflate the cultural categories of native discourse with those of the
observer. This meant that, as with practice, discourse was to be actually experienced so
that ‘native terms must be used’ to designate the meaning of this discourse, ‘wherever
there is the slightest chance of a difference of category.’ Furthermore, ‘the greatest
caution must be used in obtaining information by means of direct questions, since it is
probable that such questions will inevitably suggest some civilized category’ (Rivers,
1912: 110–111). If ethnographers were to know what ‘native terms’ corresponded to
what sensed discourse, then they had to move in with the natives to ‘acquire as com-
pletely as possible’ their languages (Rivers, 1912: 109), and through interaction in their
lives, to hear how these categories were actually used in ordinary discourse. This, of
course, meant participant observation.
How did Malinowski fit into the current of Rivers’s observational innovations? He
went with the flow. His brief treatise on fieldwork in the first chapter of Argonauts added
additional techniques for directly observing people in communities that complemented
Rivers’s genealogical method, but these were amplifications of Rivers’s intention of having
anthropologists experience what those they observed experienced; for, as Malinowski
said, the ‘. . . goal is . . . to grasp the native’s point of view, . . . to realize his vision of his
world’ (Rivers, 1912: 25, emphasis in the original).
The Rivers/Malinowski approach to observation came to dominate social anthro-
pology after 1922. Consequently, no more comparative method, no relying upon some
amateur’s observations and fractured logics based upon those observations. As Mali-
nowski declared at the beginning of this section, ‘long chairs’ were out and tents were
in, as everybody rushed to be there with the natives. So, Frazer’s refusal to meet the natives
was replaced by Malinowski’s ‘full-flavoured’ observation; or as he put it, ‘I saw them
through their eyes . . .’ (Malinowski, 1989: 163).
‘Full-flavoured’ observation sharpened the anthropologists’ observational toolkit,
strengthening their ability to be confrontational. The significance of this needs to be
recognized. Microscopes were revolutionary to the biologists’ toolkits because they reveal
new, microscopic realities. ‘Full-flavoured’ observation did the same in social and cultural

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realms. Theory could be confronted with greater and more detailed observation. Greater
and more detailed observation could inform theory. Jarvie (1969: 2) has judged that the
switch to ‘full-flavoured’ observation was a ‘revolution’ that social anthropology intro-
duced to social and cultural thought. I agree. It is time to investigate how this enhanced
power of confrontation was used against unilinear evolutionary theory.

CONFRONTING UNILINEAR EVOLUTION

. . . one feels also a moral separation from the anthropologists of last century – or at
least I do. Their reconstructions were not only conjectural but evaluatory. . . . they
believed above all in progress, the kind of material, political, social, and philosophi-
cal changes which were taking place in Victorian England. . . . consequently the
explanations of social institutions they put forward amount . . . to little more than
hypothetical scales of progress, at one end of which were placed forms of institutions
or beliefs as they were in 19th-century Europe and America, while at the other end
were placed their antitheses . . . (Evans-Pritchard, 1962: 41).

The social anthropologists, as the preceding quotation from Evans-Pritchard makes clear,
had reservations concerning the unilinear evolutionists’ theories, reservations that
extended into moral domains. Consequently, they sought to challenge these theories
whenever possible. They did not do so by explicitly applying validation procedures,
though I hope to show in the next few pages that this is implicitly exactly what they did.
The heart of unilinear evolutionary theory, as expressed by Tylor, was the insistence that
culture occurred in different ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ ‘grades’ – with it understood that ‘primi-
tives’ had failed to make the grade (Tylor, 1958/1871: vol. 1: 1). They did not do so
because they were devoid of reason, the key determinant of sociocultural evolution.
Comte (1896: 667) expressed this view as follows, ‘It is only through more and more
marked influence of reason over the general conduct of man and of society that the
general march of our race has attained . . . regularity . . .’. ‘Reason’ organized the ‘general
march’ and, as Spencer put it, the ‘inferior races’ (Spencer, 1883: vol. 1: 62) missed their
marching orders because they were subject to the ‘uncontrolled following of immediate
desires’ (Spencer, 1883: vol. 1: 71), as they lacked ‘adequate mental powers’ (Spencer,
1883: vol. 1: 119). Social anthropologists, using their ‘full-flavoured’ toolkit, confronted
the truth of such propositions. Below, different examples of such confrontations are
explored. Let us begin with kinship, as this was perhaps where the social anthropologists
enjoyed their finest hour.

Kinship
The social anthropologists seemed to devote ‘exclusive’ attention to ‘kinship’ and the
subjects ‘directly related’ to it (Murdock, 1951: 466). There was a rationale guiding this
infatuation with kinship. The unilinear evolutionists, most importantly Morgan (1870;
1877), discovered that ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ organized themselves for the most part
into systems of consanguinity and affinity. He, and other unilineal evolutionary theor-
ists, then, offered theoretical propositions concerning these systems, propositions to
which the social anthropologists took exception. Fortes believed that enough evidence had
been collected by the 1950s to relegate ‘. . . to the limbo of historical curiosities’ such uni-
linear evolutionary chestnuts as ‘. . . the Matriarchal Controversy; the pseudo-historical

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and pseudo-psychological theories of classificatory kinship, incest, totemic descent and

so forth . . .’ (Fortes, 1957: 158).
The thrust of the arguments in these works was that efforts to confront particular uni-
linear explanations about kinship with evidence led to their falsification. Morgan, for
example, posited an evolutionary sequence for the family that started with ‘promiscu-
ous intercourse’ (Morgan, 1877: 505). Try as they might, the old social anthropologists
never observed a single instance of this. Perhaps the classic confrontation was between
Henri Junod and Radcliffe-Brown over how to explain a nephew’s relationship to his
maternal uncle in certain populations.
Junod, a missionary turned ethnographer of the Thonga in southern Africa, discov-
ered what he believed was a ‘most curious’ aspect of Thonga society (Junod, 1962/1913:
253). Generally, throughout Africa, juniors treat their elders with respect. The curiosity
was that, among the Thonga, younger sisters’ sons treated their elder maternal uncles
with a hearty disrespect. For example, a nephew who arrived when food had just been
prepared was allowed to gobble it down, leaving nothing for his maternal uncle. Junod
explained this in terms of unilinear evolutionary theory, asserting that it was a survival
of a matriarchal stage.
Radcliffe-Brown, in ‘The Mother’s Brother in South Africa’ (1924) – as he was about
to offer his own solution to this curiosity, and speaking of theory-building in general,
said it was ‘easy enough to invent hypotheses’ but difficult when ‘we set out to verify
them’ (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965: 21) – was being confrontational and using the term
‘verify’ as we have been using ‘validate’. He was saying that he would confront whether
what Junod’s theory states will occur with observations to see whether it actually does
occur. Radcliffe-Brown then proceeded to show that crucial aspects of the mother’s
brother’s (MB’s) behaviour towards the sister’s son (ZS) were unaccounted for in the
matriarchal survival theory (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965: 24, 25). He pointed out that in
more ‘matriarchal’ societies the MB has considerable authority within the lineage
organization and is usually accorded respect. This means, if the MB/ZS relationship is
a survival of an earlier matriarchal stage, that the ZS should show respect to his MB.
But as already observed, he does not. What the theory imagines should occur, respect
of ZS for MB, does not occur. So, Junod’s theory appears falsified when confronted
with this evidence.
Radcliffe-Brown, then, offers an alternative explanation based on a ‘principle’ of ‘the
equivalence of brothers’ (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965: 29–30). This ‘principle’ was a gener-
alization about how particular relatives are treated. His explanation can be summarized
as follows:

1 People in kin-based societies group their kin into cultural categories towards whom,
and from whom, particular types of behaviour are assigned.
2 This categorization is based upon analogies between kin within the nuclear family
and more distant relatives.

This leads us to the principle of the equivalence of siblings, which is that:

3 Siblings of parents are placed in the same category as parents.

4 Therefore, a MB is treated like a mother.

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5 A mother is treated in a free and easy, indulgent manner.

6 Therefore, a MB should be treated in the same manner.

The two theories may now be compared. What is supposed to occur in Junod’s theory
does not, while what is supposed to occur in Radcliffe-Brown’s theory does. Radcliffe-
Brown’s theory, when confronted with the evidence, passed the confrontation. Junod’s
flunked it. Consequently, given this validation history, Radcliffe-Brown’s theory is
approximately truer than Junod’s. Let us now turn to economics.

Economics
Unilinear evolutionary theorists insisted that ‘savage’ economies were wretched. Morgan,
speaking of native Americans, tied the weakness in their economies to the absence of a
mental trait that allowed a ‘race’ to become ‘civilized’, for he said, ‘The great passion
[for economic gain] of civilized man . . . never roused the Indian mind. It was doubt-
less the great reason for his continuance in the hunter state, for the desire for gain is one
of the earliest manifestations of the progressive mind. It . . . has civilized our race’
(Morgan, 1851: 139). Essentially what was being said here was that the ‘great reason’
savages had pathetic economies, was that they were not racially driven to ‘gain’. Spencer
tied this lack of ‘passion’ to their impulsiveness. If the ‘inferior races’ were ‘impulsive’,
as Spencer insisted they were, then they were lazy, because – as Spencer put it referring
to a group in India – they ‘will half starve rather than work . . .’ (Spencer, 1883: vol. 1:
66). The outrage of laziness was reported by colonial bureaucrats concerned to get the
colonized to work for their colonizers. For example, the colonial administration in
Northern Rhodesia (today Zambia) lamented that the natives were ‘incorrigibly lazy . . .’
(in Richards, 1939: 398).
Such judgements were premature because, as Malinowski said, concerning economics,
‘There is no other aspect of primitive life where our knowledge is more scanty and our
understanding more superficial’ (Malinowski, 1922: 84). Social anthropological research
rapidly altered this situation. Malinowski’s own work on the Trobriand economy in both
Argonauts (1922) and Coral Gardens (1935); Firth’s on Tikopia in Primitive Polynesian
Economy (1939); and Richards on the Bemba, whom the administrators termed lazy, in
Land, Labour and Diet (1939), provided detailed accounts of non-industrial production,
distribution and consumption. These accounts provided a first observational base from
which to confront unilinear evolutionary claims of laziness.
For example, Malinowski documented in Argonauts that one aspect of Trobriand
culture was the belief that certain objects called vaygu’a – principally bracelets (mwali)
and necklaces (soulava) – were of immense value and, hence, desirable to possess. He
further established that a particular practice called the kula, where Trobrianders made
long ocean voyages exchanging these bangles, was the way by which Trobrianders could
satisfy their goal of acquiring value. In fact, most of Argonauts’ text can be read as a docu-
mentation of how hard the natives worked (building canoes, sailing canoes, etc.) to get
their vaygu’a. After reading Argonauts, some commentators might impugn Trobrianders
for putting their faith in bangles, but they could not fault them on their work ethic to
get those bangles. A tacit criticism here was that natives would labour for themselves,
not their colonizers. Attention now focuses upon politics.

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Politics
Here we must deal with politics both in societies that lacked government, the ‘savages’
in unilinear evolutionary schemes, and in those with some form of more centralized
government, the ‘barbarians’. Bear in mind: political evolutionary theory could legiti-
mate imperialism if it made ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian’ governments incompetent, because
imperialists were then justified in stepping in and taking over. Herbert Spencer, com-
menting upon a group of Shoshone, an uncentralized Native American foraging
people, revealed something of unilinear evolutionary sentiment towards ‘savage’ politics
when he announced, that the Digger Indians, ‘very few degrees removed from the
ourang-outang’, who scattered among the mountains of the Sierra Nevada, sheltering
in holes and living on roots and vermin, ‘drag out a miserable existence in a state of
nature, amid the most loathsome and disgusting squalor’, and differ from the other
divisions of the Shoshones by their entire lack of social organization (Spencer, 1883:
vol. 2: 248).
Next contemplate the account by a Danish traveler, J.V. Helms, of a barbarous Indo-
nesian kingdom he happened upon in the 1880s. Helms confided,

While I was at Bali one of these shocking sacrifices took place. The Rajah of the neigh-
boring State died . . . his body was burned with great pomp, three of his concubines
sacrificing themselves in the flames.
It was a sight never to be forgotten by those who witnessed it, and brought to one’s
heart a strange feeling of thankfulness that one belonged to a civilization . . . To the
British rule it is due that this foul plague of suttee is extirpated in India . . . Works
like these are the credentials by which the Western civilization makes good its right
to conquer and humanize barbarous races. . . (in Geertz, 1983: 37–39).

The foregoing indicates just how disparaging unilinear evolutionary theory was of
‘savage’ or ‘barbarian’ politics. Governmentless ‘savages’ were like apes living in ‘dis-
gusting’ anarchy. ‘Barbarous races’, for their part, did ‘shocking’ things to their women
which made ‘good’ the ‘right’ of ‘Western civilization’ to ‘conquer’ them.
Most social anthropologists studied stateless peoples, and most, to some degree or
other, addressed the issue of anarchy. Evans-Pritchard’s Nuer studies became the key to
discussions of this question. This research was performed at the ‘request of ’ the colonial
government of the Sudan (Evans-Pritchard, 1940: vii) when the Nuer were at war with
the authorities requesting Evans-Pritchard’s assistance. It has been condemned as an
instance of anthropological collaboration with colonial projects (Johnson, 1981). Cer-
tainly, stripped of veiling hypocrisies, the authorities, bent on conquering the southern
Sudan, hoped that the anthropologist would give them pointers about how to rule the
unruly Nilotics. Evans-Pritchard gave them something else.
He took Durkheim’s notion of segmentary organization, elaborated in The Division
of Labor (1964/1893) on the basis of few empirical specifics, and developed a series of
generalizations derived from his direct observation of how the Nuer controlled their
lives. These generalizations, such as that concerning the ‘segmentary principle’ (Evans-
Pritchard, 1940: 263), sought to explain how segmentary lineages actually governed
various aspects of social life without all the bother and expense of government. When

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confronted with evidence, the unilinear evolutionary claim of savage anarchy was
unsubstantiated. Thus, in effect, what Evans-Pritchard did in The Nuer was, instead of
showing the colonialists how to rule, showed them that those they were killing in order
to rule, ruled themselves quite well. Of course, he did not openly criticize the colo-
nialists. He merely pointed a finger and thanked the authorities for their ‘hospitality’
(Evans-Pritchard, 1940: vii).
Other social anthropologists replicated Evans-Pritchard’s findings by observing other
institutions by which ‘savages’ controlled themselves. There were institutions that did
this by organizing people on the basis of age (Wilson, 1951; Gulliver, 1963). Equally
important were studies of the feud (Evans-Pritchard, 1940), witchcraft (Bohannon,
1958), and divination and ancestor worship (Middleton, 1960), which showed how
these operated, often together, to motivate people to comply with the values of their
society. Such findings, summarized in Gluckman (1963), Mair (1962) and Schapera
(1956), falsified the unilinear evolutionary assertion that ‘savages’ lived in anarchy. In
fact, they governed themselves so well that a new approximate truth seemed to have
emerged. Fortes expressed this when, on the basis of his Tallensi fieldwork, he offered
what amounted to an empirical generalization that ‘economic life’ among the Tallensi
‘made possible’ a social ‘equilibrium’ (Fortes, 1945: x). Out with the old, anarchy; in
with the new, equilibrium.
Let us turn to barbarous states. In African Political Systems (Fortes and Evans-
Pritchard, 1940), these were given the designation ‘Type A’ societies and their study
began later than did that of uncentralized polities. However, by the 1950s, social anthro-
pologists had provided the most extensive analysis of non-Western centralized polities
that had been offered up to that time. These included, in southern Africa, Krige’s (1936)
account of the Zulu and her (1943) description of the Luvedu; H. Kuper’s (1947) analy-
sis of the Swazi; and Schapera’s (1940) investigations among the Tswana. There were, in
eastern Africa, Barnes’s (1954) inquiry into the Ngoni; Fallers’s (1956) work among the
Soga; and Southwald’s (1961) study of the Ganda. Finally, in west Africa, S.F. Nadel
(1942) wrote on the Nupe; Bradbury (1957) researched Benin; Lloyd (1954) analysed
the Yoruba; and M.G. Smith (1960) investigated Zaria.
This was a diverse group of studies. However, they generally corroborated the con-
clusions of the authors who wrote about centralized societies in African Political Systems.
Fortes and Evans-Pritchard summarized these findings. If African states were not liberal
Western democracies, nevertheless,

. . . the government of an African state consists in a balance of power and authority

on the one side and obligation and responsibility on the other. Everyone who holds
political office has responsibilities for the public weal corresponding to his rights and
privileges. The distribution of political authority provides a machinery by which the
various agents of government can be held to their responsibilities. A chief or a king
has the right to exact tax, tribute, and labour service from his subjects; he has the cor-
responding obligation to dispense justice to them, to ensure their protection from
enemies and to safeguard their general welfare by ritual acts and observances. The
structure of an African state implies that kings and chiefs rule by consent. (Fortes and
Evans-Pritchard, 1940: 12)

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The crucial judgement here is that ‘Type A’ politics were found to exhibit a ‘balance of
power’ and to have mechanisms that allowed rulers to govern with the ‘consent’ of the
governed.
Again, confrontation suggested a new approximate truth. The states in societies colon-
ized by imperialists did not really do such ‘shocking’ things. Rather, it appeared to be
the case that they managed with at least some of the attributes of soi disant ‘civilized’
liberal democracies. Implicit in this approximate truth was a criticism of imperialism.
Helms had expressed the imperialist position when he said the civilized had a ‘right to
conquer’, because they could ‘humanize’ the ‘barbarous’. However, the social anthro-
pologists reported that it was mistaken to represent non-Western states as ‘barbarous’,
which eliminated any imperialist justification of their ‘right to conquer’. It is time to
turn to religion.

Religion
The study of religion had been an important feather in the cap of unilinear evolution-
ary theory. The most celebrated scholar dealing with this topic was E.B. Tylor who, as
a result of the application of the comparative method over an enormous range of materi-
als, believed that he had discovered the first form of religion. This was ‘animism’, ‘. . . the
general belief in spiritual beings’ (Tylor, 1871, vol. 2: 10). Tylor saw animism arising
from a ‘childlike philosophy’ (Tylor, 1871, vol. 2: 100). Similarly, he commented upon
the proliferation of magical beliefs among the natives. These he believed were illusional,
and that magic itself was ‘. . . one of the most pernicious delusions that ever vexed
mankind’ (Tylor, 1871, vol. 1: 112). Morgan (1877: 5) caught this spirit when he said,
‘. . . primitive religions are grotesque’. Religion, then, among the ‘lower races’ was full
of ‘magical terrors’ that took the form of ‘grotesque’, ‘childlike’ ‘delusions’, and thus
appeared to confirm the claim that ‘inferior races’ could not make the grade because they
lacked reason.
There was a considerable old social anthropological research in religion. Perhaps the
most influential research was that of Evans-Pritchard among the Azande (1937) and
Nuer (1956). Additionally important, however, were Nadel’s (1954), Middleton’s
(1960), Leinhardt’s (1961), and Douglas’s (1966) contributions. Much is divergent in
these studies, but common to all was a reluctance to issue sweeping proclamations, such
as Tylor’s that he had found the first form of religion. Rather, as Nadel put it, in the
spirit of cautious confrontational science, ‘Today we have grown more modest, but also
more conscious of the need for precision and solid empirical evidence’ (Nadel, 1957:
198). However, all agreed with Evans-Pritchard, speaking of the Nuer, that the evidence
pointed to one truth, that the ‘. . . religious thought’ of those they analysed was, ‘remark-
ably sensitive, refined and intelligent. It is also highly complex’ (Evans-Pritchard, 1956:
311).
The essential text reporting evidence in support of this proposition was Evans-
Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (1937). Commenting upon
it almost two decades after its original publication, Evans-Pritchard said that it was an
attempt to take ‘what at first glance’ seems to be the ‘absurd superstition’ (1962: 102)
of Azande beliefs and practices involving witches and ‘. . .to make [these] intelligible, all
of which are foreign to the mentality of a modern Englishman, by showing how they
form a comprehensible system of thought. . .and how this system of thought is related

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to social activities, social structure, and the life of the individual’ (Evans-Pritchard, 1962:
98). Further, he allowed that the complex system of beliefs surrounding Azande witch-
craft ‘. . . make sense only when they are seen as interdependent parts of a whole’ which
has a ‘logical structure’ (Evans-Pritchard, 1962: 99).
The point of the preceding is twofold. The Azande may not have had Cartesian reason
that Comte could recognize, but they had a ‘logical structure’, a reason. So, ‘savage’
thought was not ‘childlike’. Rather, evidence supported a new approximate truth. There
were forms of reason that existed of which the ‘savages’ were informed, and Comte and
his colleagues were oblivious. Secondly, implicit in Evans-Pritchard’s evidence was an
irony. Those who called others ‘childlike’ turned out to be ‘childlike’ themselves, because,
like impetuous children, they were unable to resist the impulse to make assertions based
upon the ‘first glance’.
What conclusion might readers draw from the two previous sections? The social
anthropologists were not confrontational in the sense of having an explicit research strat-
egy that they consciously applied. Rather, imagining themselves as scientists, they
muddled their way to making observational advances, chiefly by replacing the com-
parative method with ‘full-flavoured’ observation. Furthermore, if they did not know
they were interested in invalidating theory, they did know they intended to confront
unilinear theory with the facts; which they did, and in so doing, they literally assumed
a confrontational stance. It may be observed that Franz Boas, and his students, were sub-
jecting unilinear theoretical propositions to confrontation at exactly the same time and
it became clear: the imagined world of the unilinear evolutionists, so congenial to the
Imperial imaginary, was unreal. Confrontation had done the job. Basic theoretical
propositions of the unilinear evolutionists were falsified. Now, if informal application of
the confrontational stance can have such impressive results, perhaps it is sensible to for-
mally specify some of the practices involved in this stance, especially as they pertain to
validation histories, so as to know how to replicate these results.

VALIDATION HISTORIES
A first and fundamental requirement of being confrontational is to recognize that to
some degree, all people are blind Tiresiases – rich in imagination, short on vision. The
confrontational stance is a way of combining the frailer visions of many individuals to
achieve a more exact vision for the social whole. It does this by being a comparative enter-
prise, but in a way that is unfamiliar to anthropology. Generally, anthropologists under-
stand comparison to be observation of two different societies or cultures – Barma in
Chad versus Nuer in the Sudan – in order to discover similarities and differences. This
is a comparison of two different realities to understand the degree to which they are a
single type of reality. The comparison which underlies the confrontational stance is
between two or more theoretical propositions and their associated empirical statements
which concern a single type of reality. It is comparison of Comte’s empirical statement
that primitives lack reason with Evans-Pritchard’s assurance that they have it in abun-
dance. If theoretical propositions and empirical statements are imaginations of the real,
then the comparison in the confrontational stance is between whose imaginaries are
more real; and many visionaries are called upon to make the observations that judge the
reality of the imaginary. These visionaries, to avoid being Tiresiases, need to cooperate
in constructing validation histories. The formulation of such histories requires concern

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for confrontational feasibility, validation episodes, validation sets, validation universes,

positive and negative confrontation, confrontation records, and rigour, which are dis-
cussed here.
A ‘validation episode’ is a record of a confrontation of a theoretical proposition, or
propositions, with the reality to which they pertain. However, before a validation
episode can occur, there must be judgements about whether the concepts and the
relationships in theoretical propositions are such that a confrontation is feasible. Con-
frontation, it will be remembered, is observation of whether what somebody imagines
to be is sensed to be. Certain concepts, however, defy observation, either because they
lack empirical referents or they are simply too ambiguous. Empirical referents are infor-
mation in a concept concerning what it refers to in reality. Freudian concepts, such as
the id, have been criticized as lacking in empirical referents. Ambiguous concepts are
those which are so unclear that there is no clarity about what observations could be
made that pertain to the concept. Some would admit to there being ambiguities in the
concept of equality.
The problem with concepts in theoretical propositions that lack empirical referents
and/or are ambiguous is that they do not have the information necessary to instruct an
investigator as to how to sense the reality to which they are imagined to pertain. Where,
for example, do you look to see the id? This makes it impossible to derive empirical state-
ments from them. ‘Confrontational infeasibility’ occurs when there is no, or unclear,
knowledge of how to sense the reality referred to in a concept. For example, Fortes’s
empirical generalization that economic conditions caused equilibrium among the
Tallensi might be considered confrontationally questionable because it is not clear what
sensory information bears upon the concept of equilibrium. Fortes assumed in his text
that his readers knew what equilibrium was, so he gave them no instructions as to what
they would see or hear that indicated a particular social reality is in equilibrium. If an
investigator claims to have made a confrontation, even though it is abundantly clear that
a proposition is confrontationally unfeasible, then that validation episode should be said
to have been inconclusive.
If theoretical propositions are composed of confrontationally feasible concepts, if
empirical statements have been derived from these, then there must be a moment of
confrontation when observations are made. This moment is the ‘validation episode’.
In the confrontation between Junod and Radcliffe-Brown over the MB/ZS relation-
ship, this would be the exact time and place among certain people when Junod made
the observations which he believed allowed him to assert that there had been a matri-
archal stage among the Thonga. Similarly, it would be the exact time and place among
certain people from which Radcliffe-Brown made his observations. In fact, both gen-
tleman were unclear about exactly what observations they were referring to, so that
their specification of the validation episodes which form the basis of their judgements
is obscure.
The results of a confrontation in a validation episode may be said to be positive or
negative. ‘Positive confrontation’ is validation. Sensation of reality consistent with what
an empirical statement says will be sensed. ‘Negative confrontation’ is falsification. Sen-
sation of reality inconsistent with what an empirical statement says will be sensed. The
unilinear evolutionists offered the theoretical proposition that ‘the savages were lazy
because they lacked reason’. An empirical statement based upon this was that ‘particular

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examples of “savages” would be found to not work hard’. However, Malinowski sensed
that the Trobrianders worked darn hard. Thus, the unilinear evolutionary theoretical
proposition received negative confirmation. However, the exact same observations which
falsified the unilinear evolutionists’ theory provided positive confirmation of the alterna-
tive theoretical proposition that ‘people labor industriously to acquire culturally defined
value’.
A ‘validation set’ is the set of all validation episodes reporting confrontation between
particular theoretical propositions and their realities. Validation sets have their ‘con-
frontation records’, which are the number of positive and negative confrontations in the
different validation episodes composing the entire set. If the confrontation record in a
validation set is entirely positive, then the proposition undergoing validation may be said
to be approximately true.
The construction of validation sets is not part of current anthropological practice, so
it is not possible to specify with any certainty the confrontation records of particular
theoretical propositions. However, it might be said informally that a fair number of
anthropologists have examined the question of the ‘savages’ laziness’, and have reported
findings similar to those of Malinowski among the Trobrianders. Thus, it seems likely
that if one were to formulate a validation set for the theoretical proposition ‘people labor
to acquire culturally defined value’, than it would be judged approximately true on the
basis of its confrontation record. However, approximate truths promulgated in the
absence of a validation universe should be recognized to be tentative.
Less tentative approximate truths are possible when validation histories have been
constructed in which there are opposing validation sets. ‘Validation universes’ are two
or more validation sets for two or more theoretical propositions dealing with the same
reality. This means that there is a showdown between the confrontation records of com-
peting validation sets in validation universes. Consider, for example, the dueling
Comtean and Malinowskian propositions that ‘the savages are lazy because they lack
reason’ versus ‘people labor industriously to acquire culturally defined value’. These deal
with the same type of reality, that of people working. Anecdotal evidence of different
validation episodes pertaining to the two validation sets suggests falsification for the
Comtean theoretical proposition and validation for its Malinowskian competitor. If a
formal validation universe for these two theoretical prepositions was constructed, and if
this universe sustained the previous sentence’s judgement, then Malinowski’s theoretical
proposition would be approximately truer than that of Comte.
Finally, let me introduce the notion of rigour as it pertains to the confrontational
stance. Rigour refers to how theory has been produced. The ‘rigour’ of a theoretical
proposition is the number of times and places it has been validated, with it understood
that the greater the number of times and places of validation, the greater the rigour. The
notion of place in a validation episode needs to be made explicit. ‘Places’ are regions in
reality where validation episodes occur, and the greater the number of places in which
a theoretical proposition has been validated, the greater its generality. If a theoretical
proposition has received no validation, it lacks rigour. If it has been validated in a
number of places in a number of validation episodes in a validation set, then it has still
some rigour. However, its rigour is still not sufficient to say that it has some truth.
A theoretical proposition may be known with such rigour that it is said to be true when
a showdown has occurred in a validation universe. If the showdown reveals that one

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ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(1)

theoretical proposition has been validated and another falsified, then the validated
proposition may be said to be approximately truer for the validation universe in which
the confrontations have occurred. Thus, it is literally appropriate to assert that ‘theory
counts’, because researchers must compute the numbers, places and outcomes of con-
frontations in order to establish the truth with any rigour.
The case of the social anthropologists reveals the potential of taking a confron-
tational stance. Malinowski and company disclosed the falsity of unilinear evolution-
ary theory because of their better observational techniques and their will – however
slap-dash – to validate. However, though they took their observation very seriously,
they were casual about validation. They were poor at specifying their validation
episodes. They did not take different ethnographers’ validation episodes bearing upon
the same theoretical propositions and explicitly build validation sets. They never for-
mally sought to build validation universes, though on occasion they casually con-
structed them when Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski confronted Junod and Comte.
Thus, the social anthropologists’ revelation of the falsity of unilinear evolutionary
theory lacked any great rigour.
Further, when the social anthropologists rejected the evolutionists’ comparative
method, they did something that continues to bedevil the discipline’s ability to take a
confrontational stance. Rejection of the comparative method marginalized comparative
research. Such marginalization still characterizes both social and cultural anthropology.
I study my people. You study your people. This means, even though we look at differ-
ent places, as the term has just been defined, we do not compare them. There is no
explicit conducting of validation episodes concerning a particular theoretical proposi-
tion among the different places anthropologists study. This, in turn, means that the gen-
erality of such propositions is not established, so that they lack rigour. Thus, the absence
of comparative research is a fundamental constraint upon the assumption of a confron-
tational stance in anthropology. Let us draw the argument of this article to a conclusion
by returning to the blind Tiresiases and the philosopher.

CONCLUSION
A great deal has been at issue in this essay, for the concern has been to nudge anthro-
pology away from being a confederation of blind Tiresiases, and towards one of new
Herculeses’, with the ability to make it the central discipline investigating humanity. The
blindness of the Tiresiases is not that their visions are always incorrect. Tiresias, in fact,
often got it right. Their blindness lies in the fact that they have no idea how they got it
right. The confrontational stance is a way of knowing how to get it right.
A discipline that deliberately develops improved observational and validational tool-
kits is taking a confrontational stance. Such a methodological strategy tells anthropolo-
gists when they should be skeptical – when there are frail observational techniques and
no validation histories bearing upon theory; and how to avoid dogmatism – by improv-
ing observational capacities as well as formulating validation histories. Such histories
provide anthropologists with chronicles of confrontation in validation universes indi-
cating that this proposition, on the basis of its confrontation record, is approximately
truer than that one. A virtue, then, of the confrontational stance is that, in Bertrand
Russell’s sense, it serves a ‘positive purpose’ by telling one with rigour when it is right to
be skeptical of a truth, in the absence of validation histories, and how to rightly avoid

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dogmatism concerning truth, by making more rigorous validation universes. When last
heard from, the anthropological Tiresiases were bracketed. Let the unbracketing occur,
and the games of confrontation begin.

Notes
1 Tyler and Marcus consider themselves to be postmodern, so it may seem that I judge
postmodernism to be anti-theoretical. This is correct. My sense is that post-
modernists do not formulate theory as it is understood in science. Lyotard (1984),
for example, was interested in the utility of metanarratives. He decided all of these
should be treated skeptically. Now, a certain metanarrative, that of science, is used to
make theory. This meant, if all metanarratives should be treated with incredulity, and
theory was part of the metanarrative of science, then theory was to be treated with
skepticism.
2 Readers should note that the discussion in this paragraph concerns scientific and not
mathematical practices. Mathematical propositions are validated by different logics
and not observation. The argument in this text is not concerned with validation of
mathematical generalizations.
3 Readers may construe discussion of empirical generalization, hypothesis, and theory
in the text as indicating support for covering law explanations. This is not the case.
The article is about the virtues of confrontation and not those of different forms of
explanation. Hence, it does not advocate any particular explanatory mode. However,
I am partial to causal explanations.
4 There are competing doctrines of confrontation in the philosophy of science. The
traditional view had been that of justificationalism, which believed that confrontation
could result in proven theory. This view is said to have suffered a ‘breakdown’
(Lakatos, 1970: 93) and to have been replaced by different forms of neojustifica-
tionalism, notably that of Carnap’s probabalism, also said to have failed (Lakatos,
1968), and to have been replaced by different forms of falsificationism, associated with
Popper (1959) and his followers. The approach proposed in this text is indebted to
Lakatos’s (1970) version of falsificationism.
5 The major unilinear evolutionists, in addition to Tylor and Morgan, were A. Comte,
H. Spencer, J.J. Bachofen, L.H. Maine, J. Lubbock and J.F. McLennon. Their most
intense period of publication was the quarter of a century between 1860 and 1885.
6 The chief social anthropologists, beside Malinowski, were A.R. Radcliffe-Brown,
E.E. Evans-Pritchard, M. Fortes, R. Firth, S.F. Nadel, M. Gluckman, I. Schapera,
G. Wilson and M. Wilson. They flourished from 1922, and the publication of Arg-
onauts, until 1957 when Leach announced that it was time to start ‘rethinking the
whole project’.
7 Readers should not misconstrue this section, and the one following, to be a hagiog-
raphy in praise of social anthropology. They should consult the critical, and not so
critical, commentaries to get a fuller appreciation of the tradition (see especially
Kuper, 1973; and Kuklick, 1991; Goody, 1995; Stocking, 1995). Elsewhere I have
argued that social anthropologists created a regime of hypocrisy congenial to imperial-
ist times (Reyna, n.d.). However, their researches can be used to illustrate the taking
of a confrontational stance.

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REYNA Theory counts

S.P. REYNA is at the Max Planck Institute in Halle until December 2001 after which time he will return to
University of New Hampshire. He is interested in anthropological theory, the history of anthropological
theory, and power within a global context. Address: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Leipzer
Strasse 91 (Ritterhaus), Postfach 11 03 51, 06017 Halle, Germany.
Anthropology Dept., University of New Hampshire, 311 Huddlestone Hall, Durham, NH 03824, USA.
[email: reyna@eth.mpg.de]

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