Tactics “Y - IVENe-vaINi PLUS THE GALLIC WARS: Caesar's Acquisition of Gaulstrategy Tactics MAGAZINE Editor Chiat: Micrel Moore ‘Aasitant Edt: Caries Ramsay Prodcton Stat Marin Favoro, en Licas ‘Buninoss Manager: Dob Csusono (Otfce sat: Pam Mainay, Sharon Water Ear: chor Bg, Grog Costin Dev: by, Chases "Kami JO Dovid Martin Laon Miman, A A No Jon Prados Spoatl thanks wot Peri fore asisanoe. Product Manager: Dave J Rrchie Deen Director Krsine Bary [Graphics contbution: Jim Holioway Seve Suan STRATEGY & TACTICS Magannespubched sixties yosr One year susenplons (inca & quoi “gaa” sues and 2 special en (ome editor) ar 824 In US funds (checks of money errs oy. 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Box 110 Lake Geneve, W 53147 ISSN O738-554K STRATEGY & TACTICS® Magazine Special Edition, Spring. 1983, Volume 1, Number 1 tn this Issue page BALANCE OF TERROR 8 An Assessment of Nuclear Deterrents In the 1980's John Prados THE GALLIC WARS: 26 Caesar's Acquisition of Gaul Wiliam Hain OUTGOING MAIL The Editors 2 FOR YOUR INFORMATION AA. Nofi 3 RICHARD BERG'S a REVIEW OF GAM Richard Berg WARS OF THE SOLDIER KING jon Southard 46 FOX KILLED: 52 O'CONNOR vs. GRAZIANI Steven Copley COLONIALS ANDREDCOATS §—Ciayton V. Smith 60 Leonard Millman On the cover: The defense tried of the United ‘States. 05 portrayed by Jim Holloway. STRATEGY & TACTICS isa registered trade. mark owned by TSR Hobbies, Inc.™ indicates ‘other trademarks owned by TSR Hobbies, Ine, tuless specified otherwise Outgoing Mail Brave New Worlds Welcome to the first Special Edition of S&T" Magazine. While maintaining the same historical format as S&T, the Special Edi- tions will aso carry gaming articles, design prospectus articles, special features, and per- hhapsan unexpected game or two. We will also Include special subscriber-oriented features, ‘more about which in a minute. ‘The schedule for the magazine is more or less set, The issues of S&T magazine with ‘games are now planned to be mailed at the end of January, April. July,and October. The Special Editions will be mailed in late April and October. Well-known author and game designer John Prados leads off this issue witha look at strategic weapons balance in the 1980s. Inthe next Special Edition, Dr. John Jessup will discuss the history of the Soviet Navy. A. second major historical article will also appear ineach Special Edition, along with “For Your Information, "Space permitting, we will also include medium-length historical articles of four to seven pages and short articles of one ‘or two pages Fans of The Desert Fox" game should find Steven Copley’s “prequel” an exciting bonus. DF has generated a good deal of ‘excitement in gamers and reviewers (see Fire & Movement magazine nt.32), One thing sil lacking in the game is a set of short scenarios starting at other major points in the cam- paign, say “Operation Crusader,” the Battle of Gavala, and El Alamein scenarios. Many of our gaming articles are created by our readers, and we strongly encourage potential authors to try their hands at such variants. ‘Another type of article we mean to in- clude in each Special Edition isa design pros pectus, such as.Jon Southard’s analysis of the Seven Years’ War. Thesearticlesare intended to examine battles, campaigns and historical ‘eras that, by and large, have been ignored as games. For the do-ityourselfers and tyro ‘designers, they should provide guidelines for creating games. Startingin the next issue, we will include several new features, First, a leters to the editor column will be introduced to allow readers to air their gripes and praises. If you have questions about how we do things or ‘comments on the games and magazines, we'd like to hear them. Second, there will be an ‘addenda column to answer questions about (continued om page 40)For Your Information ‘Special Edition Volume 1, Number 1 Edited by A.A. Nofi A Wide Ranging Survey of Historical Data and Analysis DID YOU KNOW...? > The Civil War cost the United States ap- proximately $3,400,000,000 in total or about 152,500,000. day. > During the height of World War II Bri- tain’s normal stockpile of its most precious strategic materialamounted toapproximately 150,000,000 tons, enough to “brew up" about £6,000, 000,000,000 cups of tea > One contemporary officer, commentingon the accuracy of the cighteenth-century mus et, noted that “a soldier must be very ‘unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aimed at him." > The first jet air combat in history oceurred over Britain on4 August 1944, whenan RAF Meteor 1, its guns having jammed, used a wingtip to nudgea German V-I missile intoa premature dive, thereby causing it to fall harmlessly into a rural area, Pn 1932 the US Army had only 40,331 infantrymen organized in 38 understrength regiments, a figure which rose to 1,782,832 ‘men in 288 regiments and 99 separate battal- ions by early 1945, and then fel to 126,121 ‘menin4l regimentsand 7 separate battalions by the middle of 1947, > Amongst the other peculiarities of the im- probable Imperial-and-Royal” Austro-Hun- arian armed forces was a submarine sup- plied with a piano. > Lord Louis Mountbatten was the only per- som besides the Sovereign ever to simultane- ously hold the ranks of Admiral in the Royal Navy, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, and Lieuténant-General in the British Army, in Addition to having been at 43 the youngest full Admiral in British history. Pn 24 hours on 19-20 September 1526, column of some 6,800 men loyal to the Co- Jonna family, marched 60 miles to Rome, centered the city,and plundered the Vatican of 300,000 ducats, roughly two weeks” pay for each man at contemporary rates, and a proper reward for what remiains one of the more impressive marching accomplishments in history, In the late 1930's Stalin purged 90% of all the generalsin the Red Army: three ofthe five ‘marshals, all [I vice-commissars of war, 75 of 80 members of the Supreme War Council, 13 of ISarmy commanders, 51 of 85 corps com- ‘manders, and 110 of 195 division and brigade ‘commanders. In Greek mythology, the illegitimate off- spring of Ares, god of war, and Aphrodite, goddess of love and beauty, were Eros, Pas” sion and Harmony. > Austro-Hungarian cavalry regiments in 1914 had exactly 666 mounted combatants, FOOTNOTES Ghost of the Roman Empire The grandeur that was Rome persisted longafter the Empire itself had crumbled into dust and caitle began grazing in the Forum. ‘Numerous efforts have been made to claim the heritage of Rome. The Byzantine Empire was, of course, the only true heir to Rome, its evolution from the Eastern portions of the ‘old Empire being clear and uninterrupted Butfrom$00 A.D. the Byzantines hada rival in the West, when Pope Leo III proclaimed (Charlemagne, King of the Franks, "Roman Emperor,” though the ttle was more com- monly known in Germany as Kaiser — “Cac sar." The “Holy Roman Empire of the Ger~ ‘man Nation” would endure for more than 2 thousand years, vainly trying to assert its imperium, until it was dissolved in 1806 dur- ing the afiermath of the Freneh Revolution and the rise of Napoleon. Additional claimants to the mantle of Rome have occasionally cropped up. As the Byzantines lost ground in Asia Minor, the Seljuk Turks inthe tenth century A.D. estab- lished. what they called the "Sultanate of Rum,” that is, “Rome.” In 1204 the Fourth Crustde, finding the enfeebled Byzantines less doughty foes than the Sons of the Proph- et, seized Constantinople and established their own “Latin Empire,” which claimed the Imperial heritage. Within a few years two rival “Roman Empires” were established to dispute that claim. Trebizond, on the north= tern coast of Asia Minor, became the capital of the Trapezuntine Empire” undera former Byzantine dynasty, and endured until 1461;in the caster portions of Asia Minor members of another old Byzantine dynasty established the" Empire of Nicaea” in 1206, Within half a century the Nicacans were back in Constan~ tinople and the Byzantine state was reborn, ‘In 1453 the Ottoman Turks took Con- stantinople,extirpating the Byzantine Empite. Less than a decade later, they overthrew the Trapezuntines as well. They too claimed the Roman heritage, the Sultan becoming"Qaysar- i-Rum — Caesar of Rome.” Meanwhile, far to the north, the Grand Duke of Muscovy, Ivan IV, proclaimed himself “Tsar,” yet another Variant on Caesar; by virtue of mari- talconnections withthe late Byzantine Paleo- logus Dynasty, he claimed Moscow as the Third Rome,” after the original and Con- stantinople. The Tsar, however, was also third after the Holy Roman Kaiser and the ‘Ottoman Qaysar. The Ottomans and Tsarist Russians survived into the First World War, by which time two new claimants for Roman greatness had emerged. The Bulgarians, situ- ted virtually within sight of Constantinople, began to call their king Tsar. Ferdinand | of Bulgaria even purchased the alleged regalia of 1 Byzantine monarch froma theatrical outfit- ter, keeping it ina trunk in is palace towards the day when his armies would “liberate” Constantinople Through all ofthis the Greeks, who had ‘been at the core of the Byzantine state, pre- served their notions of being the true Romaiot ‘or Romans — Hellene has only come into fashion over the last century or so under the influence of Western Romanticism. At the tend of World War 1, Greece received large portions of the old Ottoman Empire, includ Ing chunks of Asia Minor and Thrace. The more chauvinistic among them desired more, however. So Greece invaded Turkey, intent ‘on re-establishing the frontiers of the Byzan- tine state. Ina long war, the Turks repulsed them and reclaimed considerable territories, bout that did not end the matter. The last King. fof Greece, Constantine Il, was regularly addressed ‘as “Constantine XIII" by more nationalistic elements, in suecession to Con- stantine XI, the last Byzantine Emperor. Greek maps still have “Constantinople” in- stead of “Istamboul.” The two most recent claimants to Roman alory were both Italian. Mussolini, of course, Sought nothing less than a rebirth of the Roman Empire. Before he was through, Ital ans had died uselessly in Spain, Africa, Rus- siaand Italy itself. Still more recently, a court in taly ruled thata certain cireusclownis the true heir to the Byzantine, and thus the Roman, throne— by virtue of being legal heir to the now nonexistent Marquisate ot Mont- ferrat. which was held by a branch of the Paleoiogi, the last Byzantine dynasty, during the Renaissance. Sic transit gloria mundi The Captain of Kopenick Few societies have been as deferential to uniforms as was. Imperial Germany in the reign of Wilhelm I1(1888-1918). A man with- ‘Out a uniform was a nonentity. A cabinet minister without a reserve commission was noneaistent. Militarism was rampant, often leading to abuses, notably in the Zarben affair, when one oificer brutally beat up an elderly Alsatian for being less than properly impressed with the uniform. One ofthe best, and most amusing examples ofthe degree to ‘which the civil population and government was subordinated to the military was the inc dent known as the “Captain of Kopenick." The Captain of Kopenick was, frst of all, nota captain, In fact, he was not even in the army, Wilhelm Voigt was an East Prus- sian of unsavory character, a drifter and petty criminal having more than passing familiar- ity with the inside ofa jail. Asa result of a ‘conviction for some minor offense, Voigt had been deprived of his citizenship, which pet mitted the local police to deny him residence. ‘In 1906 Voigt was in Berlin, whereas was by now customary the police refused him a resi- ence permit. No longer welcome in Ger many, Voigt resolved to emigrate. This rea- sonabie solution to his problems had but one4 flaw: he had no money. So he set about ob- taining some, ‘Securing the uniform ofa Captain of the Guards, Voigt descended on the barracks of ‘ne of the Guards regiments on an October ‘day in 1906, He commandeered a detachment ‘of ten men and ordered them to accompany him, informing them that revolutionary activ ity Wasafoot. With much clicking of heels and many “Jawohls,” the troops fell in and fol~ lowed Herr Hauptmann to the railroad sta- tion. Voigt ordered them aboard the first available train, using his authority as an officer to waive the minor necessity of the fare. Detraining in the outlying suburban community of Kopenick, Voigt marched his ‘men to the city hall. ‘The troops occupied the city hall, arrest- ing without objection the burgomeister, the city clerk, and the police inspector. Claiming he was under orders to investigate certain irregularities in the municipal accounts, Voigt impounded" al available cash to the tune of ‘some 4,000 marks (easily $10,000 today). He then disappeared. Voigt now had sufficient funds to emigrate. However, his basic charac ter caught up with him, Rather than leave Germany immediately — which was veryeasy in those days when passports: were rarely required — Voigt tarried until his newly- found wealth had run out, Slipping back into the demi-monde, he eventually ended up in jail again, where he incautiously boasted of his deed to a fellow prisoner. The man informed the prison authorities. Voigt sas ‘charged with theft and, more seriously. “im- personating an officer,” for by this time the mysterious events in Kepenick had become a very important police matter indeed. Voigt was eventually sentenced to many years in prison. But his trial in open court demo: strated clearly that anyone ina uniform could get away with anything in Germany. Principle, Principal, Practical ‘The “Principles of War" were first enun- ciated by Baron Anthoine Henri Jomini (1779-1869), Swiss who served fora consi erable time on Napoleon's staff and sub quently transferred to the service of Russia. In his masterwork, The Art of War (1838) Jomini suggested that there were eetain u ‘versal principles which had guided the gre captains. These include such notions as the “Princip ofthe Objective," that is, toalways have a elear concept of the purpose of one’s mission; “The Principle of Unity of Com- ‘mand,"tobecertain tha all forces committed toan operation re under the direction of one will: and 50 on through @ half-dozen or so ‘more, including “The Principle of Surprise,” do unto your enemy what he least expects, when and where he least expects its and the “Principle of Seeurity,"be sure he does not do ito you firs. Jomini maintained that the most sue- cessful commanders in history had been the ‘ones who conducted their operations withthe Closest adherence tothe principles as was pos- sible, sven the circumstances. It was acce able to neglect one or two of the principles if the situation was desperate, thus one might ‘overlook Security if there was a reasonable chance that doing so would not risk irrepara- ble danger before adecision could be reached through the use of forces which might other ‘wise be committed toSecurity ina main effort under “The Principle of Concentration,” the ‘employment of maximum strength necessary to achieve the objective. Jomini cautioned that neglect of some of the principles too ‘often, oF of too many of them just once, was formula for disaster ‘Tomini’s influence on the conduct of wa has been profound, Many armies haveadopt- ced “The Principles of War” as guidelines for the conduct of military operations. However, “principle” is defined as a “fundamental, primary or general truth upon which other truths depend." If, indeed, the “Principles of War" exist, why is it that the Americans and Israelis say there are nine such “Principles,” while the Germans claim there are eight, the Soviets say five, or maybe seven (depending ‘upon pre- of post-1945), the British say ten (though it was only eight before 1920), and at the extremes, the Argentines thirteen and the French but three? From the Dustbin of History. “tis pardonable to be defeated, but never surprised” —Froderick the Great. Prediction: je Daily Personnel Losses in World War I! When planning an operation, @ com: ‘mander and his staff have available an enor- ‘mous mass of statistical data, This data relates to a variety of matters, such as fuel consumption, ration requirements, ammuni- tion expenditure, and so on. Not the least important is data relating to casualty predic« tion, The table below shows the different rates at which casualties will be incurred, Biven as a percentage of troops actually in contact with the enemy, based upon World War Il experience. All figures inelude non- combat casualties at a daily rate of 0.6% due to accidents, disease, exposure, and so forth In winter this figure would rise to 1% or more. Covering and Security Operations 32 Amtack, meeting engagement 78 Attack. position, first day ns ‘Attack, position, subsequent day(s) 61 Antack fortified zone, first day 187 Attack, fortified zone, subsequent dayis) 9.8 Defense, mesting engagement 4g Defense, position first day 61 Defense, position, subsequent dayis) 3.5 Defense, sector, frst day 98 Defense, sector, subsequent davis) 5.2 Inactive, nether side atacking 26 Pursuit 43 ‘Withouta constant flow of replacements 4 division would soon melt away as its pe sonnel, particularly its infantry, became cas ualties. In assaulting a fortified zone, a di- Vision would lose 70% of its strength in just twelve days, with efficiency declining precip- itously. Even with replacements, of course, the unit's eflicieney would decline since the new men would be less experienced than the ‘veterans they replaced. Further alfecting these figures is the ratio of strength between the attacker and defender: a unit attacking at ‘overwhelming odds is likely to incur fewer feasualties than one doing so with inferior strength, assuming both sides are employed intelligently in each case. Terrain would also play a role in modifying these figures, but if terrain is viewed as having the effect of mul tiplying one’s strength, it can be calculated into strength ratios. During World War IT ‘American infantry divisions in the European ‘Theater sufered an average of 7.33 casualties peer 1,000 men on strength, while armored ivisions averaged only 4.73 per 1,000 men, Note that Medical Corps planning statistics etail the nature ofthe injuries to be expected under varying circumstances. “We Have Met the Enemy and They Is Smashed!” Col. Richard Meinertzhagen was one of the mor impressive British officers in World War, serving as an intelligence and special operations expert in. Tanganyika. and the Middle East"As a. proponent of victory regardless of the orthodony of the methods employed, Meinerizhagen —asecond-gener- ation Anglo-German was frequentivin hot water withthe miltary establishment, whic probably explains why he never rose above Colonel. Among his more impressive feats were reconnaissance missions in East Africa attired and pigmented as a native, one of ‘which fed to the location ofthe German light cruiser Konigsherg hidden beneath the jungle fanopy in the estuary of the Ruf River Perhaps his greatest achievement, however, was in paving the way forthe British victory Inthe Thitd Battle of Gaza, 30 October November 1917 Twas, probably fortuitous that Mei nertzhagen's commanding officer at the ine teas not only unusually able fora World Wat Teommander, but also was fond of wnor- thodox soldiers, General Sir Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby also numbered TE. Law- rence among his protepes. Even Ailenby, however, must have been taken aback when ‘Meinertzhagen revealed his plans. Neverthe- Jess, he was always sit on the uplake, and approval was prompt. Precisely how Meinertzhagen accom- plished his mision is diffeult vo determine Ror long before he scheduled. offensive, which was designed to break the deadlock before Gaza in southern Palestine and open the way for the capture of Jerusalem, Mets hertzhagen managed to secur sufficient quan. {ites of a “controled substance,” This he sed to liberally lace some thousonds of Cigarettes, He then arranged for some venal types tosmugalethe cigarettes to the Turkish {toops holding. the vital_Beersheba ‘wel, Which controlled the exposed Turkish lef Tank stretching from the sea at Gaza into the Nesey Desert. The ofensive was launched on 30 Oeto- ber, with strong infancy forces attacking the ‘Turkish front at Gaza and Beersheba, Mean- while, the Australian and the Australlan-New Zealand mounted divisions swept around the desert Mank of the Turks in the Becrshcha position, The Anvacs took the wellsandtownFeeding The Fight: 45° Gun ‘Amerlean Ammunition Expenditure, Northwestern Europe: 6 June 1944-8 May 1945 eon MunmONns: “GPENBED Danrnare 240mm Hwtar Bszooka Rocke 331,280,000 Zas.o7e7 Rewsete Rote serous erseapeo 2588288 eredan 105,618,000 Grenades, Hand _ Zonm Mi 281.196 Sommir___ 481.188 14.4843 parpaior Topedaas Simm Me 8928289187863 Fg atm A 407.814 Simm aT 170081 40mm AA 1.158.156 5421.9 Waniter vay, they ar ihe ‘7mm Cannon ea 155737 “5 (al types) en Ts 0mm AA ‘90mm Cannon 424,741 05mm Hote 18,780,429 155mm Gun 548,526 1,395,224 185mm Hyer 2,886.2 3033.1 1.2604 55,7283 east one 13.4971 4140.1 evista militar 1948, 04794 2.0800, 484523, 14978 1236 362038 3.8897 1.817.767 5.2039 4953688 55081 73.734 2188 7:107.360.162 3368,131.0 {Although most of the figures given above look very authoritative in their precision, i shouldbe realized that they areatbestanapproximation orto put olf” totals of ammunition “officially” expended in the 337 days rom the D-Day landings tothe surrender of Ger many Not included in these figuresare |) the considerable amount of aramuni- tion simply misaid by one wnt an Ammunition which was captured and later re-taken from the encm and then expended, 3) the enormous amount of O such as Blmm mortar rounds, which were interchangeable, or 4) cases where US units “adopted” German equipment and used captured aramuntion. At 'S out, the SOist Parachute Infantry Regiment, made it formal policy to capture and use panzerfaust wnt-tank weapons, even stocking them And having litle manual printed up to explain their use tothe troops “found” and expended by another. 2) hat ‘man ammunition taken and used, from the rear on 31 October, They were pleased to find that many of the defenders were “largely incapable of coping” with the reality of a battle. This “glorious” victory totally unhinged the Turkish Gaza defense line, Jerusalem fell some weeks later. AsforMeinertzhagen, he remained with ‘Allenby’s army to the end of the campaign, conducting several important operations. ‘These included the impressive camouflage ind deception effort before Allenby’s final ‘Meggido” offensive in late 1918. After the war, Meinertzhagen became a distinguished London elubman, being somewhat indepen- dently wealthy —he even had his own cable address, "Montezuma, London.” Hesurvived to sce another war, finally passing on in the late 1960’. A remarkable adventurer, one of ‘many unanswered, and perhaps unanswera- bile, questionsabout his career remains that of how he managed to obtain all that opium. DATA FILE Joachim Murat and the Campaign of 1815 The spectacular events of the Waterloo campaign during Napoleon's" Hundred Days” in the Spring of 1815 overshadow another campaigh of considerable proportions which ‘eeurted shortly before the Emperor set out fn hisrendezvous with destiny. This was Jos- chim Murat campaign ia March, Apa and May of 1815 “The general collapse of the Napoleonic Empire in 1813-1814 id not affect Murat’s Kingdom of Naples. A judicious bit of treach- xy at precisely the right moment had pre- Served or that “beau sabeur™ his throne, though not the affections of his brother-in- law Napoleon, Though permitted to continue to hold his Kingdom, Murat’s position was precarious, There was considertble hostility {mong the Alles, particularly the Austrians, {his continued presence in Naples. Though not particulary perceptive, Murat could see thathis tenure waslikelytobeshor unless he could do something which would permanent- ly secure his kingdom. The only way that ‘could be done was through a victorious war ‘with Austria, which wasat that time unthink- able. Then came the news of Napoleon's ‘escape from Flba and his tesumption of the French throne. Suddenly, the prospects of @ war with Austria were no longer so bad, With the Allies having to cope with Napoleon, the ‘odds against him would not be too great. The proper thing to have done would have been to ‘coordinate any offensive with Napoleon and thereby achieve maximum effeet upon the ‘enemy's resources. Murat refused to consider this, despite his wife Caroline’ urgings. He ‘chose to make his bid for power asan Italian patriot, in the expectation that the Italians, dissatisfied and restive under Austrian rule, ‘would rally to his standard. ‘Murat's army was faily strong. It total- Jed some $0,000 men with 56 cannon, backed ‘up by some 10,000 fortress troops and a further 30,000 militia. Many’ of his regulars hhad seen active service, and many of the offi- ‘cers were Napoleonic veterans who had fled to Naples on the Emperors fall in 1814. The ‘enemy, of course, would also be strong, with ft Teast 50,000 men. But many of Austria’ troops were Italiani origin, whole battalions being composed of Napoleonic veterans. A swift campaign in the name of a free Ttaly ‘might spark a popular revolt, inducing, mass desertion from the enemy ranks. Murat was able to mobilize with com- ‘mendable speed. By 19 March his forces were concentrated on the frontiers of the Papal States, The Royal Guard (5,800 foot, 2.400 horse, 16 guns) was about Gaeta on the Tyr- Thenian coast, and the Main Body (36,000 foot, 3,000 horse, 40 guns) at Ancona on the Adriatic. Each group was to advance north- ‘ward alongs respective coast, clearingenemy Forces as it went while enroiling volunteers and proclaiming the freedom and indepen dence of Italy. At Florence, the Guard would ‘wm northeastward to join the Main Body at Bologna. Then the army, swollen by thou- sands of volunteers, would strike northwards across the Po into the heart of Austrian- controlled Italy "The Austrians were aware of Murat’ plans, They began concentrating their forces {in three corps under Baron Vicenz Friedrich Bianchi, for a total of about $5,000 men. The Corps — under Count Neipperg, the lover of Napoleon's estranged wife — was about Venice (with 18,000 foot, 2,500 horse, 24 guns); the I Corps at Mantua (with 15,000 foot, 18 guns); and the Il Corps was scat- tered through Tuscany and the duchies of Parma, Modena, and Lucca (with 18,000 foot, 2/500 horse, 22 guns). Bianchi intended to let Murat advance until he concentrated his forces for a decisive battle The offensive opened on 22 March with Acceptive case. Aside from some limited skirmishing, there was no fighting as the enemy denied contact. Both Neapolitan col- umns advaneed quickly. At Rimini on 30 March, Murat issued @ resounding call for ‘oluntcers to assist in the work of liberation and unification. The turnout was disappoint- ing. Barely 350 men came forward, mostly officers of Napoleon's former Kingdom of Ttaly. The ltalians were dissatisfied with Aus- trian rule, but Murat was not the man 10 whom they wished to rally. Had he gone northward in Napoleon's name, they would have come forward. Nevertheless, he pressed fon. By 2 April, Bologna fell to the Main Body. The Guard, however, had not come up as planned, Undaunted, Murat advanced. On 4 April, on the banks of the Panaro, a tribux tary of the Po near Modena, the enemy was brought to battle. ‘About 12,000 men of the Austrian 11 Corps werein position on thestream. Attack- ing with hisadvaneed guard, some 8,000 men, Murat drove the enemy back, The Austrians, retreated, giving up Modena, Over the next Few days a series of small actions cleared the ‘enemy from the south side of the Po. On 7 April, Murat attempted a crossing of the ‘reat river at Occhiobello, to be bloodily re- pulsed shortly after attaining a bridgehead.6 ‘The enemy now struck back. On 8 April, 5,000 Austrians fell upon 2,000 men posted below the Po at Carpi. Aided by a well- prepared position, the troops held into the next day before being forced back. On 10 April, Murat concluded that the enemy was present in too great a strength, The army Would have to retreat ‘The retreat went smoothly. Though the Austrians pressed closely, they made noetfort to interfere. On 15 Apri, not far north of Bologna, the Neapolitans turned to offer bat- Ue. Along the Reno, a small river, they posted some 15,000 men with 35 guns. Atthe nearby village of Spilimberto were a further 2,200 ‘men and two guns. The Austrians came with ‘more than 20,000 men but only 28 guns. They attacked repeatedly, being repulsed each time Finally, having lost some 1,300 men to but 500. they gave up. But their efforts at Spilim- berto had driven off the defenders, uncover- ing the Neapolitan lank. The Neapolitans fell back. On 20 April they halted on favorable {ground at Forlimpopoli. Bianchi decided to foregoanattack. Confronting Mutat with his 1 Corps, he sent the I] Corps westward into the Apennines co out flank theenemy. Mean while he probed the Neapolitan. positions Over the next three days, as the two armies confronted each other, a series of short, sharp ‘combats occurred in the vicinity of Forlim- Popoli. None had any decisive effect, nor ‘were casualties high. Their morale effec, however, was considerable. Neapolitan esprit, already in decline, fel further. On 23 April Murat resumned the retreat, Over the next few days the 1 Corps pressed the Neapolitan rearguard closely. Aside from almost daily skirmishes, a serious faction occurred in front of Senigailia on 30 April, when Murat’s rear guard, some 7,000 men with 12 guns, turned and offered battle, though outnumbered about two to one. The Austrians called off the engagement after incurring 1,500 casualties. The retreat resum- ed, Murat reentered his kingdom at Ancona the next day. little more than a month after he had set out. There he found the Royal Guard Awaiting him. The Royal Guard had been somewhat ‘cautious in itsadvanee, Itwas further delayed by the brilliant rear-guard operations of the enemy's III Corps. By the time the Guard feached Florence, Murat had already fallen back from Bologna. The enemy began to apply pressure and the Guard retreated over the Apennines towards the Adriatic coast The Austrian III Corps chose not to pursue, ‘marching south instead Murat'situation was eitial, Even with the Guard, he had no more than 30,000 men availableat Ancona. To besure, theenemy's | Comps numbered no more than 15,000, but he hhad additional forces in approximately equal strength as yet unlocated, which were to prove decisive. These forces were, of course Bianchi’ Il Corps, which, under his personal leadership, was marching through the Apen- nines in an effort to get behind Murat, Now Bianchi was ina position to strike. On i May hhe had reached the town of Tolentino, 25 kilometers to Murat’ rear, with more than 12,000 men and 24 cannon, Murat was neatly pocketed at Ancona Whatever his faults, lack of courage was not ‘one of them. Leaving two divisions and some Outline Order Of Battle Italian Campaign of 1815 Nespoktan Army Royal Guard Ist 2nd Div Sra 4th (Res) Div 5th Ow ih Ov CavDw GH Res Gavia Garrison ‘Austrian Army ‘core ‘Adv Gd ‘at de 2nd Be Cov Be corps ‘Agi ‘st d0 2 Be corps ‘Adv Ga Tt B80 2ne Be “Tuscan Bde Cave For the Neapolitans, figures include the field forces (the Guard, Istlth and Cay Dir visions, OHQ Reserve) and the principal gar son forees th Div from Calabria, 6th from ‘Abnizz,and Fortress Gaeta). There werealsoa few thowand additional regulars pis 30,000 nila, For the Austrians, figures include field ‘cavalry to confront the enemy's 1 Corps, Murat hastened off towards Tolentino with the Guard and two divisions, litle more than, 18,000 men, The Battle of Tolentino was the last gen- ‘eral engagement of the campaign, Bianchi hhad taken up a strong position on Monte Milone. When Murat’ leading elements came upon? May, he immediately threw them into 4 vigorous attack which proved remarkably successful; they secured the position, though at considerable cost, with Several generals ‘among the casualties. The situation Was stil critical, but might yet be saved. A well- ‘conducted battle to rout Bianchi, thena quick return to Ancona to fall on I Corps might ‘tum imminent disaster into vietory. Murat planned for a battle ate on 3 May. Mean- ‘hile, he rested his troopsand ordered forag ing parties out. By dawn much of the army was dispersed In mid-morning the Royal Guard impet- uously advanced without orders against Bi- anchi. Unable to recall the men, Murat threw everything he had into the attack. Personally fighting in the foremost ranks, Murat led repeated assaults, but the Austrians held their ground. Finally one of Murat's divisions broke. Panic set in and the troops began to fee. The Austrians went over to the attack, Murat ordered a general relzeat, then person ally led the rear guard which, Supported by the artillery, prevented the Austrians from sons ors, wen 20 9 58,600 8 2 +8200, > 1 9700 : 1 9000 : 1 8300, - 1 8400, z : 4000 ~ : 1800 u : 3000 1 1 3000 = 2 22500 42 10 55,900 18 3 20,600 = 4 5500 - 1 15200 1 8200 18 = 2700 2 4 14800 2 1 4000 - 2 6060 : 1 4750 12 3 20.500 - 1 4300 z 1 5850, - 5700 : 7 2500 2 x 2160 ‘orees only, thus excluding fortress troops and the forees of Austriandominated states except ‘where included im the field army. Although ‘Murat ended up with sbout 2,060 volunteers {rom northern Italy, his opponents had ovee 4.500 jn Italian state units and 3,000 more in et own units totally destcoying the remnants of his army. Amid constant rearguard actions, Mu ratsarmy melted awayan it retreated over the next few days, He reached Naplcs on/8 May With 8,000 men. He tried to collst more, but Could manage only 12.000 regulars and some tnreliable miltiay Bianchi IL Corps was Clone behind His Il Corps wasalso quite close, Advancing south along the western coast, I had sulfered a minor reverse at lin on TI-12 May, ut had gone on to favest the great fortress at Gaeta, perennially the las strong hold of a Neapolitan sovereign. The game wasup. Murat fed to Frances where Nepo: leon ina fit of pique rfosed to employ him, though he might well have been of inestima’ ble value with the cavalry at Waterloo. Murat’ campaign wa il-conceved. He had achieved gresiness at Napoleon's hand Though his treachery [81a had temporary preserved his throne, he could only be secure tna Europe dominated bythe Corsican, Had he stayed his hand until Napoleon was ready to strike, and then moved in the Emperors name, coordinating his efforts with the French, great things might have tanspited But Murat wished to play in a league far beyond his ability and resources. He never understood this Months after Waterloo he tiempted to recover his kingdom. Game 10 the end, the handsome trooper asked nly that they spare his face, ss the order tothe Ting aad was even bicierNow TSR Hobbies Offers You the Best of Both Worlds. STRATEGY & TACTICS? and ARES” Magazines The Leaders Are Back! STRATEGY & TACTICS® MAGAZINE...a joumey through the annals of history. With each subscription 10 SAT™ magazine, youll receive four quarterly isbes, phastwo semi-annual Special Editions. 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Subecrinten Form Tel © Say ation (0 S&T Magazine: $24.00 (6 quarry urs pus 2serannual Spc Edition) CO ARES Magazine: $24.00 (4 quarterly issues plus 2 semi-annual Special Editions) Name — Address City, State, Zip Send check or money order to: CO. Both S&T and ARES Magazines: $48.00 Dragon Publishing Charm tvs 2 sinc Spel Elo fh PO Box 110, 172 SR2 Forign Subscribers: eneinlitc wich you woul ike yourmaguine en Lake Geneva, WI 53147 tno You ma add he ayyropra eon pou rrr ech gaan 1 Canada and Meso, a 8.400 6 ise) lhe comnse, a 940 (Fr 6s) Note We camo cep one by rit adn ‘We cannot bill people for subscriptions eney only C1 tat Clans Ma oa one coin ad $06 ts)@BALANCE? By John Prados For strategie forces, this has boen a period of steady development and uncertain Portent. On the positive side there were no \wholly new deployments of nuclear hardware by either superpower. Both sides instead con- tinue to build up their weapons systems al- ready in deployment. Both sides, however are preparing new generations of strategic weapons, and there are disturbing trends in the evolution of nuclear doctrines and diplo- macy on arms control Not only are the superpowers continuing their strategic deployments but lesser nuclear powers have done so as well. Some of the ‘more significant qualitative developments in strategie forces during the 1980's have occur- Fed among these leser powers. Among other developments, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first tested its new ICBM over full Great Britain determined to deploy @ new generation of SLBM's and France sim- ilarly has decided on further nuclear missle submarine construction, along with produc generation of missiles to beequipped with MIRV warheads, Proliferation continues to pose a problem. There are persistent ru ‘mors of joint development ofa cruise missle by both Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan, Consensus among US intelligence ag also growing to the effect that a mysterious signal detected by’ the US nuclear detection system in late 1979 may in fact have been a South African nuclear test. In addition, Pak- istan in south Asia is acquiring the capability to produce a nuclear bomb. On the technological side, the progress of research and development has been con- stant, American missile designers have im- proved both the yield and accuracy of US. fuclear weapons. On the horizon, due to the innovation of terminal guidance for war- hheads, a further generation improvement in accuracy is plainly visible, Soviet missile designers have been no less industrious and they are now fielding ICBM warheads with the accuracy and yield combinations neces- y to destroy US missile silos. “Real time” intelligence and an ability to rapidly change the targets assigned to missile systems, both lled “force multiplirs.” will eventually give the potential for highly flex- ble attack planning: Wholly novel technolo gies, such ts the Pstcalth” aireraft, are also moving rapidly toward maturity in the Unit cd States at least These trends in strategic foreesareexam- ined in the following sections with relevant data and discussion. The first section pro- vides an overview of the diplomacy and pol ties underlying nuclear force decisions. I is followed by a general discussion of features of the present stratewic balance and by discus- sion of military doctrines on nuclear weapons as faras these are known, Weapons programs Of the nuclear powers are then reviewed There are special sections featuring discus” sion of counterforce strategies, exotic weap- ‘ons, the future of land-based missiles, and the problem of strategic anti-submarine warfare (ASW), The concluding section attempts to assess the strategic balance based on the cur rent and prospective trends. Arms, Diplomacy and Politics The SALT Il treaty signed by the USand Soviet Union on 18 May 1979 is a major diplomatic factor affecting current interna- tional relations, The treaty was discussed in Senate committee hearings but never reached the Senate floor for ratilication, Instead the Carter Administration refused to send up the treaty following the Sovict invasion of A ghanistan in December 1979. Although the treaty has never entered force, both sides have tacitly been observing its terms while concern about the fate of arms control has been rising rapidly in both the United States and Europe At the time of the SALT HT committee hearings in the US Congress, there was sub- stantial conservative political support for a Variety of amendments to the agreement, so called “Killer amendments" that would have required Washington to renegotiate the treaty with Moscow. The Carter Administration resisted changes in SALT Il, aware that the Soviets would probably grasp any reopening fof talks a8 an opportunity to raise issues that had been settled in favor of the US. Yet Presi- dent Carter doubted that he had the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate to ratify SALT without the amendments tacked on by the Congress Jimmy Carter ran in the 1980 elections with a strategy of making the campaign a national referendum on SALT. Instead the winner of the clection on 4 November 1980 was Ronald Reagan, who had charged that SALT I was inequitable” and thatan Amer- ican military build-up was needed to close a “window of vulnerability” that favored Rus sia. With Ronald Reagan, the Republican Party also achieved a majority in the Senate, the first time since 1983 that there has been such a GOP majority. Reagan used his sup: Port to push through an extensive domestic rogram. Reagan never sent up SALT fora ote, thouigh the United States observes this treaty as fit were ratified, and he delayed for quite a long time before resuming arms con- {rol negotiations with Russia. When talks began, the Americandelegations were headed by certified “hawks” formerly from the Com mittee on the Present Danger Several times during 1981 Reagan Ad ministration spokespersons promised easly arms control negotiations of even bruited about tentative dates for talks, Reagan, who had said during the transition that his Admin- stration would “hit the ground running,” waited until June 1982, however, to begin arms control discussions at Geneva, The total achievement of the first year was a new acro- ym for arms control — START for Stra tegie Arms Reductions Talks. In 1982 the ‘Americans finally evolved a proposal calling for a two-phase reduction with Ireedom to modernize forces. The most signifieant force reductions would come in the second phase while the variety of quantitative and qualita: tive limits in the first phase would be very similar in many respects to the Carter Admin: stration’s March 1977 SALT proposal While START was slow, one other set of negotiations — on theater nuclear weapons ‘began in December 1981, when a US dele fon went to Geneva under the leadership ‘of Paul H. Nitze. A first round of talks on the subject had been held by the Carter Adminis: ration in September 1980, The Intermediate- range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks seem 10 have been largely a propaganda exercise. The American proposal, for example, was based ‘on President Reagan's “zero option,” under ‘which the US would halt deployment of anew generation of nuclear weapons in Europe (PERSHING II and GLCM) if the Soviets ‘would dismantle their force of $S-20's, Such an arrangement asked the Soviets to disman: tle a force in the field in exchange for an9 TERRORS ‘Americans proposed to exclude the matching ‘American forces, auclear-capable aircraft in Europe, degpte the fact that American arms ‘control’ delegations have been saying for Years that these so-called “forward-based sys- items” would be property included in theater weapons talks. ‘The Reagan “zero-option” proposal must be considered non-negotiable Nuclear “Freeze” Needless to say the Soviet INF proposal also was designed for public consumption The Russians offered a“reere"on the deploy= ment of nuclear weapons systems in Furope. The wording chosen was evidently intended to capitalize on European opposition to the PERSHING-GLCM program. When there were nodevelopmentson INF at Geneva, the Soviet Union unilaterally declared in’ the spring of 1982 that it had halted emplacement of further SS-20'S west of the Ural Moun- tains. The US has more recently counter that the Soviet $S-20 claims are inaceurat that deployment has not infact halted. Both sides proved unprepared for the surge in public support for arms control in ‘both Europe and the United States, In West- em Europe millions of citizens of nations in the NATO alliance matched in demonstra- tions through the summer and fall of 1981 Opposition to PERSHING-GLCM in West Germany weakened Social Democratic Party support for Chaneellor Helmut Schmidt and contributed to the fall of his government in the fall of 1982. An environmentalist anti- nuclear group called the Green Party has won seats in German state legislatures for the frst time, The SPD will undoubtedly move to the Jeft,and should it regain power, it could void German agrecment to serve as a deployment area for the new US nuclear weapons. In the United States there has been mas- sive and_growing support for a verifiable “nuclear ffeeze." A poll in the spring of 1982 found the nuclear “ireere” supported by 72 ‘of adults, Informal resolutions supporting a nuclear “Freeze™have been passed by 446 New England town meetings, 275 city and town, governments, and 12 state legislatures. De- Spite intensive negative campaigning by Ca par Weinberger, Eugene Rostow, and oth Administration officials, nuclear “freeze propositions were approved in eight out of hine states where they appeared on the ballot in the November 1982 elections, representing a quarter of the population of the United States. The organizers of “Ground Zer Week, national educational campaign that ‘was conducted in April 982, and those of the For 38 years the threat of nuclear warfare has loomed over the nations of earth. While no new strategic weapon systems have been deployed by the superpowers in the last year, there are ominous indications that new weapons and doctrines could bring about the Year of the Bomb. EES: massive public rally held in New York this past June, clearly were not isolated voices crying in the dark. Reagan Administration reaction has been ‘unproductive. In 1981 senior officials National Security Council dismissed the European nuclear opposition as a eres ture of Soviet “disinformation,” not the genuine protest movement it is. President Reagan himself extended this charge to the American aiclear “freeze” movement in the fall of 1982 when he called its leaders “dupes” of the Soviets. But the Administration itself ed this by another twenty billion dollars while ing government social programs by twice as much again, The inerease proposed in the Fiscal 1983 budget is even greater: the request made in January 1982 was for $258 billion in total obligational autharity (somewhat lssin actual outlays). Current national security Planning is reported to call for a five-year expenditure of 1.5 to 2.25 willion dollars, which amounts to an average annual military budget of 300-450 billion dollars, The top national security affairs people in the Reagan Administration are William P, Clark heading the NSC staff, Caspar W. as Secretary of Defense, and George P. Shultz as Secretary of State. Clark was a California judge before a brief stint at10 State. Shultz served as Secretary of the Treasury during Richard Nixon's Adminis- tration, Weinberger is a member of Reagan's “kitchen cabinet™ and formerly served as director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Weinberger, who used to be known as “Cap the Knife” for his fearless trimming of budgets in the president’s name, is presiding over the biggest attempt to throw ‘money at military problems since the onset of the Korean War. Developments on the Soviet side also hhave not been reassuring. The passing of longtime Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, ‘Alexei Kosygin and Mikhail Sustov emph Ship. Brezhnev himself had been in evident poor health for several years and required extensive hospitalization before his death. It is not clear that good relations with the US will survive Brezhnev’s passing. The Soviets may prefer to foster good relations with ‘China at the expense of the United States, There may nevertheless be a developing institutional commitment to arms control in theSoviet hierarchy. The top military officer, Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai V. Ogar- ov, is a general who actually rose to his present rank while serving on the Soviet side during the SALT talks, Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov, who warns us that the Soviet Union will match any US force dew ‘opment, is civilian who gained prominence through organizing production of military hardware, and has made statements favora- ble to arms control. There is unofficial sup- port from the Soviet research institutes, par~ ticularly Georgi. Arbatov’s Institute for the USA and Canada, ‘The Soviets, on the other hand, have involved themselves for three years now in a war in Afghanistan, and there have been recent aggressive military moves in connec- jon with the labor movernent and martial law in Poland. Following Ronald Reagan's elec- tion, the Soviet Union cautiously suggested that the US recommend the next step in arms control and what changes might be desirable in SALT II, But the Soviets are also on the ‘verge of an engineering development decision for another generation of ICBM missiles. Ths both sides are posed fra further leap Military Doctrines Nuclear forces, in the current jargon, are intended to "deter" or to prevent war. How precisely such an aim is accomplished has Tong been a matter of contention. Successful deterrence compels a non-action so that itis difficult to tell a case when it occurs or to identify the causal factors involved. Deter rencein.a senses in theeye ofthe beholder as, well as in the perceptions of the adversary For the general planning nuclear forces, how= ever, there are two broad militaryalternatives possible. One consists in emphasizing forces capable of eliminating the adversary’s forces, using a “counterforce” strategy. The other possiilityis to deter by threatening the retal- fatory destruction of the adversary’s economy and Social system, which is called a“eounter- value” strategy. Since the Pentagon tenure of Robert McNamara, the US military strategy thas been based on “Mutual Assured Destruc- tion (MAD)," which isa countervaluetype of approach, much less technically demanding than eounterforee, and much more containa~ ble within a limited military budget ‘When the Carter Administration came to office in 1977, the American perception of the Soviet strategic threat had just been called into question by a high level study of US intelligence estimates, ‘The 1976 "B Team exercise demonstrated that the evidence on Soviet activities also sustains the interpreta- tion that the Soviet intention isto seck stra tegie superiority over the United States, Pres- ident Carter ordered a policy review in the cf strategic forces plus other studies related to SALT. The somber views of the "B “Team” were originally considered exiteme in the defense community, but have now come to be regarded as a real possiblity. There arose, partly asa result of this exercise, sub- stantial and increasing fear that American land-based intereomtinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) could be subjected to a successful attack by an imaginative Soviet adversary using counterforce strategy, and by employ ing weapons combinations that were con ceivable, with existing force levels. In thiscontext of growing concern, in the fall of 1977 President Carter ordered Nation- al Security Couneil review of the US force posture. Since the late 1960's, the US. has relied on a TRIAD of nuclear forees (three legs) comprising ICBM’s, sea-launched bal listic missles (SLBM's) aboard nuclear sub- marines, and manned bombers. The NSC Interagency review was designed to question the utility of each leg of the TRIAD and ‘options for its future. The poliey review con- First launch of the Space Shutlo COLUMBIA to testthe shure’ sysioms (Courtesy National Aor rauties and Space Administration) cluded thatthe requirement for a TRIAD Continues today in view ofthe diverse Soviet. threat, A subsequent Carter decsion, reflected inva Presidential Decision (PD) memoran- ddum of October 1978, also affirmed insrac- tions toincrease preparations for iil defense pring possible nuclear attack. This docu tment, PDs was followed in August 19805 PD-S3, which instructed the US government to work with private industry to improve the Survivability of military communications de ' The actual use of US strategic forces ina nuclear attack is governed by a Single Inte trated Operations Plan (SIOP) thats main tained by the Strategic Ai Command (SAC) forthe US armed forces. When Carter ame to office, SIOP-5, implemented in January 1976, was the existing suthorzation. In 1978 the Pentagon begana nuclear targeting policy review ava teu of fears of Harold Brown and Carter national security advisor, Zbig- new Broeziski, that the SIOP might Be inadequate i the Soviet Union was not ss committed 0 the notion of "Mutual Assured Destruction”aswasthe US, Some NSC stud ies, as well a8 numerous public commenta- {orscargued thatthe Soviets donot subseribe fo°MAD@at all but rather toa warfighting Strategy under which they may blew pot sible to fight and win a nclear war. Inthe tnid-19705, when James R, Schlesinger was Defense Seortary under Presidents Richard Nixonand Gerald Ford there had been some {alk of «policy of “imited™ nuclear options Similarly the 1978 policy review, carried out for the Department of Defense under Leon Sloss, recommended that the SIOP be broad ened to include moe selective options in the stack pet These results came before the NSC in May 979, There Brzerinski pressed hard for formaladoption of poli of limited nciat Options ay recommended by the Sloss group. ‘There was some support for this rom Harold Brown even though the Seerctay of Defense inially opposed concept of limting* nicl ar war, By 1979 Browa's posture statcments Spoke of “countervailing” strategy not ery dliferent fom limited nuclear options There remained the question aa formal ization of thi change. A smal group of Pen- tagon and NSC salfer worked through the twimerand spring of 1980 to produce a draft Gecision memorandum coding limited nic lear options asa US strategy toe reflected inthe SIOP. The resulting PD-59 wa signed by President Carter on 23 Tuly 1980. Harold Brown explained the new doctrine to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group asthe same countervailing” strategy he was advocating Many’ Adminstration sources hastened to insist thatthe PD-39 doctrine infact is no change from the previous US approach to strategic nuclear war “Limited” Nuclear Options ‘This was the status of US nuclear stra- tegy when the Reagan Administration took oflice in January 1981. The Administration, which has heen so ready to blameallits prob: Jems on theactions of President Carter, inter- estingly enough proved quite eager to pursue the limited nuclear options contained in PD- 59. In one of the early national security dec sion documents of the Reagan AdministraAnist’s concept of Teal Ruby low-aitude surveil tance satelite, (Courtesy US. Ax Force) tion, NSDD-13, the limited nuclear options strategy was confirmed and broadened. Al- though White House officials insist that the word “win” is not used in NSDD-13, they concede thatthe decision memorandum does contain the language "to prevail.” The phrase is reiterated by Reagan, Weinberger and ‘other Administration spokespersons. These spokespersons insist that “to win" is not the sme thing as"to prevail,"but they areunable toexplain the distinction. Yet they (00 insist that there has been no fundamental shift in US nuclear thinking In the idiom of the Reagan Administea tion, the US might “prevail” by fighting an extended nuclear war, threatening Soviet mil: ts in a military doctrine that used 10 ting.” There has even been ugly talk, from advisors close to Administra- tion thinking, of deliberate attacks on the adversary’s politcal leadership (the people who are supposed to stopa nuclear war if one begins) for which the term “decapitation” has been used. Despite the disclaimers that no changes in US nuclear doctrine have been ‘made, this approach is clearly far different from “assured destruction.” Although Administration spokespersons have still een unable to explain what factors will “limit nuclear war or how they will be able to contain hostilities and prevent them from escalating, they intend to spend money to be able to fight this extended nuclear war The new military doctrine provides a ratio: nale for procurement of weapons suited to a counterforce role. In the absence of SALT, it helps justify advocacy of the MX “Peace keeper"and TRIDENT Il projects, as well as, new efforts at ballistic missile defense. It also requires additional spending for command control and communications systems (C’), for “real-time” intelligence, and even for indirectly-associated technologies such as NASA‘ Space Shuttle, which will be used to launch all military reconnaissance and com, ‘munications satellites begining in 1985 (one military load was already transported into orbit last year), Relaied tothe concept of limited” nucle- ar options isthe question of whether or not it is technically possible to conduet limited nuclear war in Europe. Ronald Reagan con: tributed significantly to the European oppo- sition to his GLCM/PERSHING program with his October 1981 remark to newspaper editors that he “could see where" there could bea tactical nuclear exchange on the battle- field “without it bringing either one (of the superpowers) to pushing the button.” Rea an'sattitude seemed to be token indifference {o the European peoples who would have these nuclear weapons stationed on their soil as well as a callous manipulation of risks in the American relationship with the Soviet Union. This impression was reinforced by then-Seerctary of State Alexander Haig at Georgetown University in April 1982, where hhe gave a speech that rejected any American initiative ona no-frst-use pledgeand opposed the “nuclear freeze" movernent developing in the United States. A recent paper published in the environmental journal of the Swedish Academy of Sciences concludes that in some scenarios of limited nuclear use in Europe the immediate fatalities could range between one and ten million persons, Soviet Nuclear Doctrine What of Soviet nuclear doctrine? No one can cite Soviet sources with authority equi- valent to NSC documents or annual posture Statements by US Secretaries of Defense. It hhas been said that the Soviet “disclosure sys- u tem” consists solely of the military parades held to celebrate a variety of state occasions. The Russians have been getting better at dis- closure, however. In the past year there have been a variety of authoritalive statements from personalities ranging from the late Brezhnev to Ustinov and Ogarkov. These include both warnings of the danger of nuclear War and of Soviet desire to prevent war or avoid it, seeming to offer arms contra, and threats to continue building armamentsif the US carries out its own buildup. Advocates of both sides of the debate on Soviet military doctrine refer to the same body of data these types of speeches and articles. from Soviet journals — in a process of selective quotation, Only the conclusions drawn differ. ‘On one side of the debate are those who argue the Soviets believe that they must pre- pare to fight and win a nuclear war. This roup incltides former “B Team” members Paul Nitze and Richard E. Pipes, as well as Leon Goure, Dimitri K, Simes and Colin S. Gray. To these analysts Soviet pronounce ments, especially on matters such as civil defense, together with Soviet force programs, Suggest a doctrine that might be termed “assured survivability.” That is, a combina tion of forees could be used to ensure Soviet relative advantage through and following a nuclear exchange. Offensive nuclear forces could blunt opposing offensive forces, thus exercising a damage-limiting function. At the same time missile defenses could reduce the Seale of an incoming retaliatory attack while urban evacuation and civil defense measures might reduce the level of destruction effec lively inflicted by the retaliatory strike to “acceptable” levels, Ifdamage were held toa low enough level (5% civilian casualties is ‘often cited), the Soviets might consider they had “won” a nuclear war. This construction ‘of Soviet nuclear doctrine implies an across the board military build-up plus a minimal interest in arms control, which is held useful only where it can contribute to Soviet ‘argeting strategy. ‘Another conception of Soviet doctrine holds the Russians to be as interested in nuclear Soviet SSN-6 submarine-lounched baltic mis. site. (Courtesy US. Nowy)2 deterring nuclear war as isthe United States, even though the Russians do not advertise their interests in the same way. Numerous statements by the late Soviet President Leo- nid Brezhnev can be cited in favor of arms control and against the “frst strike” or the “second strike," indeed against nuclear warin, general. In August 1980 Lt. Gen, Mikhail A Milstein, retired Soviet General Staff officer and curfent analyst for the Institute on the USA, told an American reporter that “our doctrine is defensive in character, that doc- tine does not envisage attack against another country of initiative in the use of nuclear weapons.” When Milscin’s boss, Georgi A. Arbatov, was asked what would happen ifthe Reagan Administration pressed for SALT IL ratification and failed, headmonished “they'd better not.” Analyst Raymond A. Garthoft has collected, in much the same fashion as Pipes and his conservative colleagues, a litany of quotations from Miltary Thought, the classified journal of the Soviet General Staff, all of which support the notion that Soviet officers take seriously the inevitability of nuclear retaliation, is impossible to effectively resolve the debate on Soviet military doctrine without reference to some authoritative Soviet state~ ‘ment of what their military doctrine is, Rec ‘ognizing this act, in the winter of 1981-82 the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and Progress Publishers in Moscow, put out two pamph- Jets on nuclear matters entitled "Whence the ‘Threat to Peace?” and “The Threat to Eu- rope.” According to these sources, the Soviet Union perceives an “over-all rough strategic military equilibrium” which exists both at the {global level and in Europe. On nuclear war, “the Soviet Union holds that nuclear war ‘would be a universal disaster, and that it ‘would most probably mean the end of civil ation. It may lead to the destruction of all humankind, There may be no vietor in sucha war, and it ean solve no political problems Soviet people are not thinking in terms of ‘winning & nuclear war, but of averting such a war by all means.” The Soviet pamphlets explain that Pipes, Goure, Joseph Douglass ‘and other American analysts who focus on Soviet doctrine have worked only with trans- lations of articles from the 1960's, anera when. Soviet forces were much weaker and had necessarily to rely upon a preemptive stra tegy. The Soviets insist that their docteine “has always reposed on the principle of rtali- tory, that is, defensive action.” The new Soviet material isa welcome advance, but itis still insufficient ro resolve the debate on Rus- sian intentions. US Military Programs United States strategic force programs have progressed at a steady pace. Dollar out- Jays since October 1980 total $29 billion for strategic forces themselvesand S31 billion for research and development. The request for FY 1983is for $23.1 billion for strategic for- ces and $20.1 billion for R&D. Additional amounts have been spent and are being requested for the development and produc tion of nuclear weapons, which have been traditionally carried by the Department of Energy, but whose program is apparently 10 be transferred to the Commerce Department. Some proportion of the $25 billion expended Figure |: US Surviving Warheads after Soviet First Strike WARHEADS wo GENERATED ALERT DAY-TO-DAY ALERT 19791980 1987 10521963. 1008 1565 Note: Forked tine reflects uncertainty about ‘whether Soviets will deploy a single RV. MIRVed (10 RV) payload on the new ICBMs allowable under SALT H for intelligence and communications in FY 1981-82 has also gone to strategie forees pro- grams. The intelligence and communications request for FY 1983 is for SIS billion more ‘The press has reported Reagan Administra. tion plans for spending more than $15 billion ‘on communications for nuclear units alone. The design isto build “survivable” communi cation links necessary to exercise command ina “limited” nuclear war situation. What do American taxpayers get for their money? In his 1980 posture statement Harold Brown declared that “there are excel- lent grounds for confidence in the US stra- legic deterrent. Our alert bombers, SLBM's ‘on patrol, and a number of our ICBMs could expected to survive even a wellexceuted Soviet surprise attack.” By maintaining a diverse triad of forces, engaging in needed modernization and implementing doctrinal ‘changes Brown felt that US forees could be fully adequate. In the same report, however, Brown warned that “longer-term stability is not equally assured” and raised the spe that ICBM missiles eannot be fully survi ble. For Harold Brown this realization led to hisadvocacy of the “countervailing” strategy, ‘which doctrinal shift has been discussed pre Viously. Brown's successor, Defense Seere~ tary Caspar Weinberger, has now had the ‘opportunity to produce a posture statement of his own, that for Fiseal Year 1983, with a full exposition of his own thinking. Harold Brown at least rationalized the thinking that Jed him to advocate “countervailing” st tegy; Secretary Weinberger’ statement is devoid of language that indicates any think- ing on these issues Tees 19671968 7989 ‘Source: Harold Brown 1981 Posture Staament {enclasiedSanuory 79,1960 Char 5-8,» 83. A doctrine of limited nuclear war places special importance on warning and attack identification systems plus intelligence and Command control. This is in addition to reliance on highly capable nuclear weapons. ‘There have been some problems with US ‘warning systems. As early as August 1977, 2 report was sent to President Carter recom mending improvement of US command con- trol systems. One important result has been the emphasis on the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which in 1980 deployed into the Persian Gulf in the context of the Iraqi-Iranian War and to Europe in that ofthe Polish labor crisis, The importance ‘of command control and warning systems ‘was also underlined in late 1979 and in 1980 bya series of failures of US systems designed to warn of strategic nuclear attack on the US. ‘After some investigation inthe summer cof 1980, it was revealed that between I Janu- ary 1979 and 30 June 1980 there had been @ total of 3,703 “missile display conferences" as ‘result of warnings ofa possibleattack, Most ‘f these occurred during changes inthe post tioning or configurations of observation satel~ lites or when infrared sensors aboard satel- lites designed to detect Soviet missile launches ‘were activated by a variety of phenomena including sun flares, fuel tank explosions, plane crashes, forest fires, and, some claim, Interference by Soviet laser beams. Some 147 more serious alerts were triggered by detec- tions of foreign missile launches, either of satellites, or military test rockets. Among the more serious aleris was one on 9 November 1979, when a wargame exercise mistakenly began by feeding hypothetical attack data1B through a computer channel handling live warning indications. On 15 March 1980, a Soviet missile submarine triggered the warn- ing system when, off the Kurle Islands, i launched a salvo of four SLBM's along an Several false alarms are reportedly gen- crated each year by equipment malfunctions Notable instances of this type occurred on 3 and 6 June 1980 when the fatlure ofa compu- ter data chip valued at 46 cents caused erroneous warnings that missles had been simultaneously fired from both land and sea. Although the errors were rapidly discovered by the North American Air Defense Com- mand (NORAD), the incidents led the Seere- tary of Defense to direct that special attention bedevoted to isolating and correcting lawsin the warning system. New Nukes One factor that impacts across the entire range of strategic force programs and which hhas made news recently is the supply of ‘weapons-grade fissile material available from which to construct nuclear weapons. At one time there was no question but that the US was amply supplied with both facilities and ‘materials for weapons, Thirteen plants pro- duced nuclear weapons in the early 1960%, bbuta decision was made by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964 to halt construction of new nuclear weapons plants; by 1980 the number Sill active had fallen to seven. Some, such as the Pantex Corperation in Waco Texas, are now widely held to be obsolete and possibly dangerous. Tnany case, even as plant numbers have Oppasite page: Trident I(C-4) let bale missile test launch. (Courtesy U.S. Navy) Above: Cruise missile breaks from the water following fallen, the number of nuclear weapons whose construction is envisioned has remained at high levels and has even been increased inthe last few years. American plans currently require construction of more than 9,000 nucle- far weapons over the next decade, including 5,000 warheads for the TRIDENT program, 2.000 for the MX, atleast 1,500 cruise missile ‘warheads, 1,000 gravity bombs, 300 war heads for LANCE battlefield tactical mis siles, and other tactical nuclear weapons, ‘This was the situation when President Carter's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) cut funds in the FY 1981 request for expanding production of plutonium for nucle- ar weapons. Harold Brown asked for recon- sideration of his decision in December 1979, ‘but OMB did not restore funds. In April 1980 the Secretary of Defense informed Energy Secretary Charles Duncan of his doubts that ‘adequate supplies of weapons material could he ensured into the 1980s, In June 1980 the Joint Chiefs of Staff added a note of urgency io this question with their observation that immediate action was necessary to alleviate the plutonium problem. This was also the conclusion of a meeting of the NSC Policy Review Committee on 24 July. Two months later, on 25 September, the Carter Adminis- tration moved ahead witha plan for increased plutonium production. The Reagan Admin- stration is moving ahead withthe program: it ‘may re-activate previously shut-down nucie- ar reactor in Georgia. An additional billion dollars may be expended over five years to sub-surface launch. (Courtesy U.S. Navy) inset ‘Minuteman Mf LGM-30G missile launched trom underground sie. (Courtesy US. Air Force) refurbish the existing nue duction plants ‘One defense problemis over alternatives fora new generation of US strategic weapons. Although the MX is aralong the R&D path, candidate Reagan did express some doubts about it, and many analysts oppose ths st tegic system as wasteful and. unnecessary Former Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Stall Maxwell D, Taylor for example, is now say~ ing that the Air Force has not proved the extent of the threat it must counter with the MX, and also has not shown that the MX is the Best way to meet a threat, There has been growing support on Capitol Hill for an aus- {ere submarine or barge system housing mis siles rather than the large and unwieldy MX. There is also some Pentagon support for air- craft rather than ground basing, Another decision on directions i im- pending with manned strategie aireraft. Here the alternatives are a wide-body plane, sim- ilar to the Boeing 747, tocarry large numbers of eruise missles (ALCM’s), a combination penetrating and standoff bomber based on the Rockwell B-I design that was terminated in June, 1977, or a novel “stealth"-type a craft for the late 1980's and 1990's, The Air Force prefers a B-l derivative, and this was approved by the Reagan Administration in October 1981. One last decision area con: cerns ballistic missle defense, Here again thereare indications of strong Reagan Admin- istration interest in the subject and acceler ated development of “exotic” defense sys weapons pro:14 tems, such as directed-energy weapons, may be expected. MX “Densepack’ “The most important US ICBM program is currently the MX “Peacckeeper “This sa truly massive system scheduled for an Initial ‘Operating Capability (OC) in 1986 and ful ‘operational capacity with 100 ICBM's by 1589, The MX missile self should begin test flghis in 1983. Production of the first nine impiles was included in the FY 1983 budget, but in early December 1982 Congress voted to cut the MX production funds from the military budget, Each missle is to have ten warheads with extremely igh accuracy (0.05 tim Circular Error Probable) and yield egual focurrent US systems(330 KT), Coss or the MX range from the Pentagon’ $34 billion projection to the $56 billion anticipated by Congress’ General Accounting Office (GAO), and to more than $100 billion estimated by Some ofthe opponents, Thehigh figures result from the extensive construction work needed inanarid environment in which the Air Force will have to compete with local users for Water and other necesiies “The Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) version ofthe MIX has been described asthe largest public works project ever undertaken The “racetrack” basing scheme selected by President Carter in Seplember 1979 lasted only eight months before a later version, a Straight “drag strip” mode, was presented Each ICBM would have been caried board 4 transporte and shuttled among twenty- three shelters that provide a modicum of pro- tection (600 psi) and allow the missle 10 be fired. The 9,000 to 12,000 miles of roadway needed for this made would have Been equ talent toa quarter of the entire US interstate Hihway system, Tnaddition, ths mode would have requir. ‘ed construction of 4,600 missile shelters, 193, maintenance clusters, 77 security alert facili tis, 7 deployment support facilities, a main ascembly base with 8400 personnel plus @ Secondary base Tor another 6,300 persons Construction and operation of sucha force posed substantial environmental and eco- omic questions for the southwestern states Considered candidates for the MX. ‘When the Reagan Administration came intoolticet re-evaluated MX deployment yet again, A panel was formed under scientist Charles Townes, which recommended that the “dragstip” MX version be rejected. The ‘Townes pane! found. "no. practical basing mode for missiles deployed on the land's sure face at this time that assures an adequate number of surviving. warheads.” Another Option wasto put ICBMs on aircraft to make them airlaunched. Although air-launched ICBM's were favored by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the airborne MX was not popular withthe Air Foree and was also rejected by the Townes group. Instead a new eployment mode was adopted by.the Ait Free in the spring of 1982, called “Closely Spaced Basing” or more popularly “Dense- pack.” The new mode supplants the White House decision announced 1 October 1981 that the fist forty MX missiles would be Pliced inside existing [CHM silos Tn the" Densepack” deployment mode, a semi-mabile MX willbe periodically shutled amonga group of shelters placed close togeth- er. These would be vertical shelters very sim- ilar to conventional ICBM silos and hard- ened to an extreme degree (figures as high as 10,000 psi have been mentioned). Such hard- ness can be achieved only by usinga new type ‘of construction that absorbs shock by “rid- ing” through the shock waves of detonation rather than rigidly withstanding them. The “dynamic” hardening would require virtual direct hits to destroy sheltered missile, but the MX missiles would be spaced so closely that a warhead exploding on one shelter ‘would destroy or deflect RV's targeted at the nearby MX shelters (*fratricide") At least this is the theory. Infact the physical phenomenon of ‘Tratricide”is one of the most poorly understood of nuclear post- lates and has never been tested in practice “Fratricide™ was “discovered” only in the carly 1970's when a US administration wished toargue that its Minuteman IILICBM's were less capable counterforce weapons than some analysts were saying. Now the Air Force Wishes to rely upon “fratricide” as the main physical mechanism in preserving the MX missiles, In fact no amount of hardening could preserve an ICBM shelter that falls inside the erater-line caused by a nuclear det- onation. Spacing MX shelters closely only ‘makes them less survivable should the adver- ‘sary increase the yield of his warheads, thus increasing prospective circumferences of era~ ters. Moreover, the Soviets may be able to improve the yields of their warheads by tech- nical means and without reducing the number of ICBM RV's. The survivability of "Dense- pack” may not extend beyond the current {generation of Soviet ICBM warheads. Critics have taken to calling the new deployment Upper photo: Nuclear-powered strategic missle ‘submarine USS OHIO SSBN 726) (Courtesy US. ‘Navy Lower photo: Landing of B 52H Stratolor tress averatt ith rear drag chute deployed (Cour tesy US. Air Force) ‘mode “Duncepack.” ‘On 22 November 1982, President Rea- san announced his decision for “Densepack.” The missile itself is to have its first test flight inearly 1983. Nine are to be produced for the test program that began in Fiscal Year 1983, which began last October Ist. The budget request that goes to Congress in January pre- stumably will have MX production funds init fagain, At the same time the ultimate size for the program has been cut in half (0 100 mis- siles) since the Carter Administration projec- tions, while anticipated costs have remained close to previous figures. Ineffect the price of the MX ICBM has doubled despite decreas- ing inflation, Systems Accuracy “The most significant technology program in US strategie forces isin guidance systems. ‘The trend is toward precision accuracy and “real-time” warfighting capability with accu rate missiles plus a new generation of com mand control systems. The prime accuracy program is the Advanced Inertial Reference Sphere (AIRS), slated for the MX warhead, with extremely high accuracy (less than 1 fim). Also in development is a Maneuvering Re-entry Vehicle (MARV) to evade opposing defenses yet sil reach the target. In 1981 the Navy completed work onitsfirst MARV, the Mark 500 warhead The Ait Force has had a precision MARVTable |: United States Weapon and Force Loadings 1979-1982 sas Tas Mare wee gn megane swat sear sre ‘ant ee Wet eer eae ee Aaa Minuenan 34006580 i650_—660_— 1680680680680 1680 Mindnen——_eMsange 4845046045050 480 0800 rs joss 2153 vosa asa tos2__ais2__vost__aist sexasscomantes Timea” evtoour ve tases msn Fomidon(e-)sOaDeTWg) «= —4600~=~SCO aN Aes isaonisay_— ee ee) nein sao 169 seas wm se 6408246702 600-7056——=520_——=sa84 BerCNe aang 358 8H HES Hawt Mew song a ars aaa Sire es soo Saget mina Diane 66 a or at asoa atau sea aes aon ronson vmcee fo Se Spam) = ose age romronsCounes sa we get Nos: en ott i potion ed pn ‘irom tit atc Serpe Sta oe ‘nisicroaee tis Pac under development in its Advanced Ballistics Re-Entry Program since 1975. The first two advanced MARV (AMAR) flight tests were ‘conducted in Fiscal Year 1980, Over $300 million has been spent on both AMARV and on development of the Mark-S00 “Evak Which provides the technological base for AMAR. The Evader has been fight-tested aboard both TRIDENT and moditied Min: lweman missile boosters Another approach to precision accuracy ‘currently under investigation is known as terminal guidance, in which incoming deliv cry vehicles can still correct their aim in the Tast instants before impact, Terminal guid- ance probabilities arise from the networks of lobal positioning system satellites, which could feed guidance systems with necessary data. Terminal guidance is also possible with laser, electro-optical, infrared, or radar tech higues. It is eriticaliy dependent upon the onboard data handling capacity of the missile {Buidance system. It may also be subject to spoofing or ECM defense, however, and the general question of missile defense will {Come more prominent in an era of terminal uidance weapons, To talk about possible future accuracy achievements is not to say that US strategic forces are not already highly capable. In December 1979 the US began to deploy Mark I2A MIRV warheads on 300 of its 350 Min- tuteman IIT missiles, These MIRV warheads have twice the nuclear yield of the Mark 12 MIRV currently in Minuteman Ill. They have also significantly improved accura and are lethal against all but the hardest argets. Moreover, the US now hasa re ing capability to rapidly switeh tar primary and secondary, forall orany portion of the Strategic Air Command's ICBM force. However, all of this not withstanding, fone event in 1980 drew attention to the extreme delicacy ofthe nuclear weapons SAC uses. Around 6:30 p.m. on I8 September 1980, an airman at SAC% Little Rock Air Force Base dropped a socket wrench onto a Titan I missileas it was being refueled, Titan Iis the largest and oldest type of US ICBM, fand is the only one that is liquid-fueled and therefore highly volatile. The accident created ‘fuel leak which some hours later caused an explosion inside the silo. Airman David Liv- ingston was killed, and 21 others were injured, ‘The three-ton warhead of the Titan II MT) was blown from the silo and landed ina field 200 yards away. Fortunately it did not go off ‘SAC contends that sucha freak detonation is, impossible. Base Commander Col. John T Mosher was transferred that December, The same thing happened to a base commander ‘Missile instalation. (Courtesy US. Navy) after a Titan fuel-teak incident in Kansas in ‘August 1978, when two men were killed. There have been a total of 125 Titan fuel-teak incidents inthe past five years, of which only ‘ovo have been fatal ‘Titan IT was introduced in SAC in 1963, Although slated for retirement after 1967, the ICBM's were never dismantled because of their high-yield warheads, which have been attractive to force planners, Today just 51 ‘missiles of this type represent one-third the total throw-weight of the US ICBM foree Titan I was fighttested most recently in 1976 when a new guidance system was intro duced for the missile ‘One “quick fix" strategic option which has had the support of some Reagan advisors isto take about 100 old Minuteman ICBM’s ‘out of storage and mount them in a mobile ‘mode just Like the MX. Nothing has been made of this proposal. Deployment of the Mark 12A during 1980 has not altered the composition of US ICBM forces, which is laid out on Table Strategic Aircraft Programs The old B-52 bomber continues to be the mainstay’ of SAC aircraft sirength, Some 335, of the 144 B-52's produced before 1962remain, in service, These are equipped with gravity bombs of great power (about 5 MT) and Short Range Attack Missiles (SRAMSs) that can be used to suppress defenses. The Air Force still regards its bomber foreeasa highly capable and responsive strategic foree and believes it has certain unigue advantages, especially in light of PD-9. There is, aeord ingly, a program in the works to re-engine and strengthen the B-S2s, witha testbed air craft currently being flown,16 Several B-S2's have been equipped to test the ALCM as well. This airlaunched cruise missile will replace the SRAM in the B-52's arsenal and give this bomber a standoff attack capability, as well as a penetration role, Cruise missles willbe small, low-vield, ‘but highly accurate weapons guided to their targets with terrain contour matching (TER- COM) by computer programs. There have been some delays in the ALCM flight test program and difficulties in perfecting TER- COM. A ban on deployment of ALCM’s existed in a protocol to the unratified SALT 1 treaty, but this expired on 31 December 1981. In the meantime SAC has already begun preparations for conversion of bombers touse LCM’. The first unit equipped with ALCM’s was scheduled to deploy in Decem- ber of 1982. There is no particular reason why one needs a B-52 to launch cruise missiles, as a Boeing 747 would do justas wel; indeed, even Detter since its large size could carry’ even more ALCM's (about 60 rather than 35). The Air Force still believes characteristics of penetrating bomber to be necessary, how- ever. As a follow-on to the B-52, there will ‘most likely bea derivative ofthe B-1 bomber, which at more than $100 million per plane was judged excessively expensive and can- celled in 1977. The B-IB bomber may cost three to four times as much, There has also ‘been interest in a “stretch” version of the FB 111, a smaller aireraft of which SAC cur- rently has 66, The FB-III, however, is an older-technology system and is open to nu- merous objections as a candidate for force ‘augmentation. The B-1Benjoys wide support ‘further possibility i so-called “stealth” technology applied toa bomber aircraft, This, option is the result of an acceleration of a technology base effort the Carter Adminis- tration encountered when taking office in 1977. The idea was to reduce the “observable” ‘characteristics of aircraft. This umbrella func- tion includes provisions to reduce radar sig- natures by use of special materials, coverings, fand shapes: reducing infrared signature b) novel aerodynamic forms; reducing noise emissions, ete. Development of “stealth” air- craft in the US has reached the fight-test ‘stage, with several aircraft having been built for the government by Lockheed Corpora tion, Secretary Brown commented in 1980 that the program would shortly go into the defense budget. as an unconcealable item because of the size of the “stealth” program, Tis reported that several prototypes have crashed, however. Moreover, all the prototypes are reportedly smaller aircraft. Nevertheless, a bomber-size “stealth” type aireraft remains a possibility for the 1990. ‘The question is whether this technology can preserve the aircraft through likely improve ments in Soviet air defense radars over the 1980's. In the bomber business, iis far easier toattack than to defend. The offense-defense permutationsare boundiess. Inany ase SAC maintains, and has done so for many years, that at least 85% of its bombers will reach their targets. There has been no change in the bomberstrength of SAC in the early 1980'sas shown in Table L Submarine Missile Programs ‘The most significant strategic event on the US side is the advent of Trident sea- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The ‘Trident missile has greater range (4,000 nm vs, 2.400 nm) than the current generation of Poseidon MIRVed missles, plus more than twice the veld (100vs. 40 KT) ofthe Poseidon warheads. The new SLBM has equivalent accuracy with is range, or greater accuracyat range equivalent to that of Poseidon's C-3 SLBM. The Navy is arming Trident with the Mark 4 warhead but, as has already been noted, by the end of 1981 there wasadded an additional option for the Mark 500 “Evader” warhead. The submarine fleet, especially if terminal guidance were applied to SLBM's, could have accuracy matching that of land- based systems. Beyond the Trident C-4 missile the Navy FB-111A (USAF photo) already projects the D-S for the late 1980’, ‘This Trident Il can conceivably have an AMARV warhead and a hard target capabil: ity. Even without AMARV the Navy has been pursuing an Improved Accuracy Pro- gram that will allow substantial refinements in SLBM accuracy. Some $632 million has bboen spent for this since FY 1975. Currently plans or Trident D-S envisiona missile with a range extended to 6,000 nm and one of a variety of guidance options including stellar- inertial guidance system, ‘The Navyis converting Poseidon SLBM boats, of which there are 31, to carry the Trident C-4, The missile isalready at se, first deployed in the USS Francis Scott Key (SSBN 657) in October 1979. Currently 12 Trident I boats have been completed, 8 Poseidon boats are undergoing conversion, and theentire fleet of Poseidon boats is she: ‘led for conversion by 1982. To increase the pace of the conversion job, the submarines Are being refitted both in’ dockyards and alongside Navy tenders, Use of the longer range Trident | missile expands the patrol areas (which SLBM submarines ean hide in but still fire on Russia) by 40%. This effec- tively negates present Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilites. The contemplated Trident II missile has more length and diameter than the Trident 1, which will make it impossible for present Poseidon boats to carry the D-S missile. Con- sequently, the Navy néeds a new carrier sub: ‘marine for when the D-5 missile comes into service, The submarine is to be the Ohio- ‘lass, specially designed to carry the Trident II missiles. The USS Ohio (SSBN 726), ‘commissioned on I November 1981, is the lead ship ofa class of the largest submarines, ‘at 18,750 tons, ever builtin the US. Each boat will be 560 feet long with an advanced sodium-cooled nuclear power plant and 24 SLBM, rather than the 16 carried by present Poseidon-Trident I submarines. The Ohios are being built by the Electric Boat division of, General Dynamics Corporation at Groton, Connecticut Unfortunately the submarines have not come alongas quiekly and as smoothly as the ‘Trident! missles. There have been numerous labor disputes at Groton, as well as many last-minute design changes made to the Ohio by the Navy. Eight boats have already been authorized out of a 10 to 14 ship building program, and the Ohio was launched in 1979. Due to these problems, however its sched Uuled delivery date slipped four times, from 1979 to 1981, with attendant cost growth. This first boat will cost $1.5 billion by itself half the cost of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The second boat, USS Michigan (SSBN 727), is likely to be added in 1983. Secretary Brown's 1979 expectation ofa first fullsquadron of Trident boats operational by 1982 has passed unfufilled (Ohio was two and a half years late and $250 million over budget; wo Ohio-lass submarines are included in the FY 1983 budget request), In the mean- time, a tangled array of lawsuits between the Navy and Electric Boat on contract perfor- :mance or from labor disputesis just clearing the courts. There are some indications that ‘the Reagan leadership may want toaccelerate the Trident submarine program, The largest numerical changes shown in Table | occur for submarine missile forces During 1980 the number of SLBM subma- tines actually dropped from 41 to 39. This is because the US has long had plans to retire the oldest submarines in the SLBM force, Polaris A-3 types (10), as the Ohio-lass boats enter the fleet. Even though Ohio has been delayed, the Navy began conversion of the older Polaris boats to attack submarines. To compensate for the loss of these missile subs, the Pentagon has increased the theoret- feal force loading of the Poseidon MIRV's in the remaining boats from 10 to 14, which raises the total warheads from 160 to 224. As a result, even though the number of SLBM submarines falls, and the number of war- heads in the Trident C-4 boats also falls (from 10 or 14 MIRV's to 8 MIRV'), the total of warheads in the US SLBM force rose 1o 7,056 from level of 5,408 in 1979, Total warheads in the US forces now stand at almost 12,000. Soviet Strategic Programs For the Soviet Union there has been steady if unspectacular progress in strategic programs, As in the US, there were no big ew weapon systems that achieved opera- tional status. Asin the US, there are a number ‘of potentially dangerous developments on the horizon, Also as in the US, deployment of current and already highly capable weapons systems continues. According to CIA esti- mates, Soviet spending for strategic forces dropped somewhat in 1979 but is sill greater than US spending. Forces for intercontinen~ tal attack consumed about 35% of total Soviet spending for strategic forces, while Strategie defense took fully 509%; "peripheral alack” forces consumed the remaining 15%, Estimates are that the Soviets have spent ‘more than $100 billion for missile forces and ‘costs per additional RV, given in studies of ballistic missile defense, are at $2.5 million apiece, Strategic defense spending stands at more than $125 billion, with an additional