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The Capitalist Peace
The Capitalist Peace
The Capitalist Peace
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The Capitalist Peace
ErikGartzke ColumbiaUniversity
166
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CAPITALIST
PEACE 167
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168 ERIKGARTZKE
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CAPITALIST
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leadersintent on remainingin office seek to retainthe Which explanationsfor the democraticpeace are
supportof a winningcoalitiondrawnfromthe groupof mostnearly"right?" Givenso manyaccounts,it isa safebet
politicallyrelevantcitizens(the selectorate).Sizematters thatat leastsometheoriesmustbe in error.Still,whittling
in this theory,as leadersin societieswith smallwinning awayat the panoplyof plausibleargumentshas proven
coalitions(autocracies)can efficientlytargetbenefitsto difficult.Textbooksocial sciencebegins with deductive
key supporters,while leadersfacingbig winning coali- theories,implicationsof which are then tested empiri-
tions (democracies)arebetteroff providingpublicgoods cally.Theevolutionof democraticpeaceresearchhasbeen
to stayin power.Democraciesfightharderbecauselead- messier,withthebulkof explanationscomingin response
ers with largewinning coalitionsare more likelyto be to the observation.Severalauthorsseekto criticallyeval-
replacedin the event of defeat.Twodemocracies,taken uatedemocraticpeacetheory(Gates,Knutsen,andMoses
together,promiseparticularly expensivecontests,leading 1996;Layne1994;Rosato2003),but cullingtheoriesde-
democratsmoreoftento prefernegotiatedsettlements.17 ductivelyis problematic.A poorlycraftedargumentcould
Comparisonsof the costsor risksof waroftentell us still be fundamentallysound. Conversely,explanations
more about who gets what than about whetherforce is that areseen to be flawedareoften revised,escapingin-
neededto get there.Sincedisputestypicallyend in some tellectualdeath.Othertheoriesmightbe deductivelyco-
division of the stakes,the democraticpeace can be de- herent,butremainproducts,ratherthanpredictors,of the
scribedin terms of the timing of bargains,ratherthan observation.It is not clear,for example,how to reconcile
abouttactics.Severalauthorsview democraciesas more the persuasivetheoryof Buenode Mesquitaet al. (2003)
transparent(Mitchell 1998;Small 1996;VanBelle 1997).18 aboutlargeselectorates,with the persuasiveevidenceof
Othersarguethat "audiencecosts"or oppositiongroups Mousseau,Hegre,andOneal(2003)thatonly somelarge
allowdemocraciesbetterto signalresolve(Fearon1994; selectoratesmatter.Giventhemalleability of assumptions,
Schultz1998, 1999;Smith 1998). Properlyunderstood, one shouldbe ableto developnumerouslogicallycoherent
however,these explanationsanticipatemonadicdemo- explanationsfor almostanygivenempiricalrelationship.
craticpacifism,not the dyadicdemocraticpeacerelation- Indeed,giventhe flexibilityof assumptions,andthe num-
ship. Contestsshouldbe less likelyin all dyadspossess- ber of brightmindsengaged,it is rathera riddlethatthe
ing at leastonedemocraticstate,regardlessof the regime democraticpeacehas yet to producenumerouslogically
typeof thedyadicpartner.19AsSchultzacknowledges, do- coherenttheoreticalexplanations.
mesticsignalingarguments"... arefundamentally claims Statisticaltestingis necessaryto substantiateanythe-
about democraticstates,ratherthan democraticdyads" oretical claim that is at variancewith the established
(1999, 243).20 democraticpeace observation.21 This same evidenceis
also sufficientto challengeexistingtheoriesof the demo-
'7Tomy knowledge, Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (2003) are unique craticpeace. Ratherthan seek to show that every con-
in providing a formal logic consistent with the democraticpeace ceivableattributeof democracycannotpossiblyinfluence
observation.To achievethis result,however,the authorsappearto the propensitytowardinterstateviolence-an impossible
essentiallyturn Kant'soriginal intuition on its head. Where Kant task-this articlefocuseson comparingdemocraticand
arguesthatwar "doesnot requireof the ruler... the leastsacrifice"
and is "apoor game"for citizens "decreeingfor themselvesall the capitalistvariantsof the liberalpeaceempirically.
calamitiesof war"including, among other things, "havingto pay
the costsof warfrom theirown resources"([ 1795] 1957, 11), Bueno
de Mesquitaet al. assume elites bear the burden of improvingthe TheEconomicTradition
war effort: "By trying harder,B's leader reduces the amount of
resourcesavailableto rewardhersupportersthroughprivategoods" What else but democracycould accountfor liberal
(2003, 232). Where Kant sees sovereignsand their key followers Theassociation
peace?Oneanswermightbe capitalism.
as the principalbeneficiariesof victory, Bueno de Mesquitaet al.
treatthe spoils of war as public goods: "Amilitaryvictorybenefits
everyonein nation B" (2003, 233). Kantsees war as redistributing 21Whilesomequantitative critiquesof thedemocraticpeacechal-
welfarefrom the population to politicalelites. Bueno de Mesquita validity(Spiro1994),culturalbias(Henderson
lengeits statistical
et al. argue that war is costly to elites and victory profitable to 1998),or generalizability (Henderson2002),otherstudiestreat
populations. democracyas a productof peace(James,Solberg,and Wolfson
1999;Thompson1996).Criticsalso offer a varietyof alterna-
"'Fineland Lord (1999) argue, and provide some evidence, that tives,includingalliancestructures(Gowa1994,1995),thecoldwar
transparencycan lead to greaternoise and confusion. (FarberandGowa1995;Gowa1999),satisfaction withthe global
'9Rationalactorswith common priors,and the same information, statusquo (Kacowicz1995;Lemkeand Reed 1996),and com-
should have identicalbeliefs (Myerson1991,67-83). mon interstateinterests(Farberand Gowa1997;Gartzke1998,
2000).Mansfieldand Snyder(1995a,1995b,2002a,2002b)and
20Domesticoppositiongroupscan revealinformation,or pool, con- Braumoeller (1997)arguethat new democraciesare morewar-
fusingobservers,dependingon electoralconditions (Ramsay2003; like,whileacceptingthatmaturerepublicsarepeaceful.Enterline
Trager2004). Increasedcredibilityalso providesnew incentivesfor (1996)andThompsonandTucker(1997)attemptto counterthis
leadersto bluff (Nalebuff 1991). argument.
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170 ERIKGARTZKE
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CAPITALIST
PEACE 171
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172 ERIKGARTZKE
H2:Developmentleadsnoncontiguousdyads
3?In GungaDin (1939), Sgt. Archibald
Cutter (Cary Grant) asks, to be morelikelyto experienceconflict.
"Howcan we get a nice little war going?"
31Boix(2003) arguesthat developmentreduceselite opposition to
democratizationas the bases for wealthbecome more mobile.
34Resultsarecomparable to separateregressions
of territorial
and
32Theoriginal U.S. war plan was for Iraqioil assets to be quickly nonterritorialMIDs(Gartzke2006a).Thecontiguityinteraction
returnedto local control (Woodward2004, 322-24). What com- termis convenienthere(mostterritorial disputesinvolvecontigu-
merce cannot do--where force is still efficacious--is to supplant ous states).Forfurtherdiscussionof therelationshipbetweenter-
obstreperousleadersor to undermineinimical policies. ritoryandcontiguity,seeHensel(2000).
33Asrentier activity becomes unprofitablewith economic devel- effectsof development
35Contrasting arespatially
distinctandtem-
opment, political units default to culturalvariables.Ambivalence porallysequenced.Technology shocksbeginningin the fifteenth
aboutbeing Britishhasbeen a nearconstantin ScotlandandWales, centurypropelledEuropeans abroadin searchof loot, land,and
but official acceptanceof autonomy is a novelty.Conversely,inde- labor.Imperialismfirstflowedandthenebbedasthecostof main-
pendence in Northern Irelandis resistedmore robustlyas it con- tainingarmiesexceeded thevalueofrentsfromoccupation (Gartzke
fronts Protestantidentity. andRohner2006a).
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CAPITALIST
PEACE 173
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174 ERIKGARTZKE
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CAPITALIST
PEACE 175
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176 ERIKGARTZKE
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CAPITALIST
PEACE 177
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PEACE 179
5 /
Markets '
-
4
."
. / ,
. Interests
0/ "
*
?Development
2-2 00
000 Democracy
"
Valuesof KeyIndependentVariables
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18o ERIKGARTZKE
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CAPITALIST
PEACE 181
D.V.:MID (Maoz) 6 7 8 9
DEMOCRACY
Democracy(Low) -0.1260*** 0.0369 -0.0469 -0.0271
(0.0284) (0.0661) (0.0278) (0.0277)
Democracy(High) 0.0232 -0.0079 0.0337* 0.0282
(0.0241) (0.0511) (0.0155) (0.0226)
MARKETS
TradeDep. (Low) -213.2004 -48.7568 -165.601* -85.2508
(334.1007) (125.1016) (76.7378) (65.4883)
Fin. Open. (Low) -0.4642** --0.1648*
(0.1606) (0.0751)
DEVELOPMENT
GDPPC(Low) 2.66 x 10-4*** 1.82 x 10-4***
(7.13 x 10-5) (4.82 x 10-5)
GDPPCx Contig. -4.19 x 10-4* --2.30 x 10-4**
(1.92 x 10-4) (8.43 x 10-5)
CONTROLS
Contiguity' 0.4951 4.6554*** 2.2827*** 3.3585***
(0.4463) (0.7191) (0.3132) (0.3884)
Distance2 -0.6505*** -0.2937 -0.5898*** -0.4191***
(0.1327) (0.1913) (0.0955) (0.1185)
MajorPower' 3.9806*** 1.5502 2.1806*** 1.4176**
(0.4793) (1.2571) (0.4277) (0.4745)
Alliance' -1.2019** -1.0525 -0.2429 0.1573
(0.4551) (0.6436) (0.3016) (0.4470)
CapabilityRatio2 -0.8650*** -0.6950** -0.3423*** -0.1790*
(0.1230) (0.2291) (0.0658) (0.0850)
Africa' -0.4739 0.6290 0.4002 0.5325
(0.6722) (0.9516) (0.3953) (0.5283)
Asia' 1.8044*** -0.2342 1.2479*** 1.5317**
(0.4529) (0.8432) (0.3753) (0.5046)
Europe' -2.5545* -0.9047* -1.3859
(1.1140) (0.4306) (1.0707)
MiddleEast' 1.7844*** 2.3645*** 1.4481*** 1.5501***
(0.4950) (0.6338) (0.3172) (0.3849)
NorthAmerica' -0.4936 1.0875 -0.1719 0.6321
(0.9559) (0.9510) (0.4573) (0.5607)
SouthAmerica' 0.7952 0.2432
(0.7131) (1.0156)
CONSTANT -1.0745 -4.7603** -2.3843** -4.2320***
(1.0876) (1.7773) (0.8106) (1.0130)
N 280195 165194 282287 171509
Log-likelihood -890.859 -180.725 -1606.849 -689.586
X#16,18,17,20) 519.42** 312.07*** 1796.80*** 1170.63***
splinevariables
fortemporal
Estimates (Standard
suppressed inparentheses).
errors
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p< 0.001.
1dummy variable.
2logged variable.
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182 ERIKGARTZKE
TABLE of KeyVariablesandControlVariables
3 AdditionalOperationalizations
Category Data Construction Effect
Democracy PolityIV dummy/low/low andhigh/Ax B None
Vanhanen (2000) dummy/low/low andhigh/Ax B None
FreedomHouse dummy/low/low andhigh/Ax B None
Markets ChinnandIto(2002) low/A x B Sig.(-)
Quinn(1997) low
interpolated Sig.(-)
Gwartney andLawson(2000) low
low/interpolated Sig.(-)
IMFCap.flows low Sig.(-)
IMFFDI low Sig.(-)
IMFPortfl.Inv. low Sig.(-)
Gleditsch(2002)trade low/lowx Democracy (low) None
Gleditsch(2002)openness low None
Development Mousseau(2000) developmentx democracy None
Interests UN voting (AFFINITY) residualsregress,on AFFINITY Sig. (-)
IGOportfolios of IGOmemberships
similarity Sig.(-)
Alliance COW 3rdand4thpartyties Sig.(+)
ColdWar NATO/Warsaw Pact/Both None
IGOs OnealandRussett(1999c) low Sig.(+)
Capabilities COW low Sig.(+)
NuclearWeapons JoandGartzke(2007) bothnuclear/onenuclear None
Learning Cederman(2001a) (dem.andaut.)dummyx year None
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CAPITALIST
PEACE 183
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PEACE 187
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188 GARTZKE
ERIK
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