1906A

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE PEACE PALACE
THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS

Disputes Pertaining to unlawful use of

force in the state of Legendipity

IN THE MATTERS OF

GOGOLIA
APPLICANT
v.
THE REPUBLIC OF SHEKARPUR
RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index of Authorities..................................................................................................................iv

Statement of Facts....................................................................................................................vii

Statement of Jurisdiction........................................................................................................viii

Issues for Consideration............................................................................................................ix

1. Whether Respondent has the Sovereign right over Legendipity?.................................ix

2. Whether Respondent’s Attack on Applicants territory amounts to an unlawful use of

force?.....................................................................................................................................ix

3. Whether Respondent committed an internationally wrongful act And is libale to pay

reparation under ASR?..........................................................................................................ix

Summary of Arguments.............................................................................................................x

I. Sovereign right over Legendipity lies with Gogolia since Lease agreement does not
amount to transfer of title.......................................................................................................x

I. Shekharpur’s Attack on Gogolian territory amounts to an unlawful use of force.........x

II. Shekharpur committed an internationally wrongful act under article 2 of the Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [“ASR”]...............................x

Arguments Advanced.................................................................................................................1

I. Sovereign right over Legendipity lies with Gogolia since Lease agreement does not
amount to transfer of title.......................................................................................................1

A. The lease agreement does not amount to a transfer of title........................................1

B. In any event, the lease arrangement is a temporary arrangement..............................1

II. Respondent’s incursion into Applicant’s territory amounts to an unlawful use of force.
2

A. Respondent’ s incursion was not a valid exercise of the right to self-defense...........2

i. BLF’s acts do not amount to an armed attack........................................................3

ii. Assuming that there was an armed attack, it was not imputable to the Applicant.3

ii
 B. Further, Shekharpur’s use of force under self-defence was not justified because it
was not necessary...............................................................................................................5

C. Shekharpur’s use of force under self-defence was not justified because it was not
proportional........................................................................................................................5

I. Shekharpur committed an internationally wrongful act under article 2 of the ASR......6

A. Shekharpurian PM Motilal’s order of a special military operation in Legendipity

can be attributed to the state of Shekharpur.......................................................................6

B. Shekharpurian PM Motilal’s order of a special military operation in Legendipity

constitutes breach of an international obligation...............................................................7

C. Accordingly, Shekharpur is liable to pay reparations to Gogolia..............................7

Prayer for Relief.........................................................................................................................8

iii
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Case laws
1980 I.C.J. 3.............................................................................................................................14
2005 I.C.J. 116, ¶147...............................................................................................................13
2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶¶377-415........................................................................................................13
Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566
..............................................................................................................................................10
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4............................................................................11
Factory at Chorzòw (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, 44 (May 25, 1926)
[“Chorzow”]........................................................................................................................16
Gabcikovo-Nagumaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Feb. 5)................16
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933 P.C.I.J.(ser.A/B) No.53, 53
(Apr. 5).................................................................................................................................10
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
¶103......................................................................................................................................11

Statutes
.N. CHARTER art.51...............................................................................................................12
Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary by International Law Commission................16
Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, 186 Cons.T.S.
310........................................................................................................................................10
International Law Commission [“ILC”], Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 56th Sess., A/RES/56/83 (2002), art. 4(2) [“ARSIWA”]art.
31;.........................................................................................................................................16
U.N. CHARTER art.2(4).........................................................................................................11
U.N. CHARTER arts.43-48.....................................................................................................11

Other Authorities
JESSUP, MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 164-67 (1948.......................................................11

Rules
10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 507–9 (Bernhardt ed., 1987);

Shaw, 490; J.L.BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 162 (6th edn., OUP, 1963).....................10

iv
C U AITCHISON, A COLLECTION OF TREATIES, ENGAGEMENTS AND SANADS
RELATING TO INDIA AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES 267 (Vol X, 1930)...........10

M.N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 490 (6th ed. 2008).................................................10

OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 569 (Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992)...............................................................................................................................11
PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 158............................................................................................10

Treatises
Michael J. Strauss, Guantanamo Bay and the Evolution of International Leases and
Servitudes, 10 N.Y. City L. Rev. 479, 492 (2006-2007.......................................................11
Wen-Sze King, The Lease Conventions between China and the Foreign Powers, 1 Chinese
Soc.& Pol.Sci.Rev.24 (1916)...............................................................................................10

Regulations
12 R.I.A.A. 155, 198 (1956......................................................................................................13
G.A. Res 3314(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.No. 31, art.3(g), U.N. Doc.A/9631
(1974)...................................................................................................................................12

Constitutional Provisions
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, The Foreign Relations (1965).....10
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 (53 & 54 VICT. CH. 37) (British)..........................................10

Books
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 231-80
(1963);..................................................................................................................................11
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 121 (2002)....13
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (OUP, 3rd edn. 2015)
355 [“Shelton 2015”]; ARSIWA art. 31; ILC.........................................................................16
FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 1
(1999....................................................................................................................................11
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 100 (2004); Nicaragua,
1986 I.C.J. at ¶¶121-22........................................................................................................12
Panama Canal Treaty, September 7, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1022.....................................................10

v
TERRY D. GILL, THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
(2nd edn..), 221 (2015)..........................................................................................................15
WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1997)...............................................................11

Commentaries
COMMENTARIES TO THE DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR

INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS 79arp-80 (2002) [“ARSIWA Commentary”], 207.. . .16

Articles
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE  (Cambridge University Press, 2017)208–
10..........................................................................................................................................14
NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 148–53;Y........................................................................................................14
O. SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff,
1991)....................................................................................................................................14
THEODORA CHRISTODOULIDOU, KALLIOPI CHAINOGLOU, The Principle of Proportionality
from a Jus Ad Bellum perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1205-56 (2015)................................................................................15

vi
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Background
Gogolia and Shekarpur were neighbouring states. Legendipity was a coastal territory that was
a part of Gogolia. However, Legendipity was leased to Shekarpur for 55 years starting in
1965 after the third conflict between Shekarpur and Gogolia in exchange for Shekarpur
paying an annual fee to Gogolia. Shekarpur would be in charge of upholding the rule of law
and overseeing Legendipity's overall administration. Police officers from Shekharpur were
stationed at Legendipity to keep the peace. Demilitarization of Legendipity was another
provision of the accord.
The conflict

The Bhamashah Liberation Front (“BLF”) was formed in Gogolia and organised large-scale
protests against Shekharpurian rule over Legendipity over the ensuing economic issues in
Gogolia. The Amir Ali United Front (“AAUF”) came to power in Shekharpur, and Motilal
Nayak was appointed as prime minister (“PM”). The BLF then turned to terrorist and
cyberattacks on Shekharpurian citizens in Legendipity. To control BLF,  the Gogolian
police detained several BLF supporters, cut off their money, and banned the group. However,
since the organisation kept up its attacks, not much was accomplished. 54 Shekharpurian and
19 Gogolan nationals were killed in one such terrorist attack. Additionally, Shekarpur
directed a special military operation in Legendipity with the stated objective of eliminating
the terrorists affiliated with the BLF. Since the end of the 1965 War, armoured vehicles and
Shekharpurian military battalions entered Legendipity for the first time. According to the PM
of Gogolia, this was an unjustified act of hostility; as a result, the case has been brought
before this Court.

Thus, the present matter before this court.

vii
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Gogolia submits the following dispute to this Court in accordance with Article 41 of the
Bilateral Treaty on Peace and Friendship which mandates peaceful settlement of any dispute
by the International Court of Justice. The Jurisdiction of this Court thus extends to all matters
referred to by the parties in accordance with Article 36(1) of the Statute of the Court.

All of which is urged in detail in the written submission and is submitted most respectfully.

viii
 ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

1. WHETHER RESPONDENT HAS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OVER LEGENDIPITY?

2. WHETHER RESPONDENT’S ATTACK ON APPLICANTS TERRITORY AMOUNTS TO AN
UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE?

3. WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMITTED AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT AND IS

LIBALE TO PAY REPARATION UNDER ASR?

ix
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. SOVEREIGN RIGHT OVER LEGENDIPITY LIES WITH GOGOLIA SINCE LEASE

AGREEMENT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO TRANSFER OF TITLE.

Mere temporary transfer of land through lease does not amount to transfer of title and
sovereign right. The title i..e sovereignity over Lgenditpity lies with Gogolia only.

I. SHEKHARPUR’S ATTACK ON GOGOLIAN TERRITORY AMOUNTS TO AN

UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE.

Article 51 of the UN Charter specifically states that the occurrence of an armed attack is a
prerequisite for exercising self-defense. In this case, Shekharpur cannot assert the right to
self-defense since the BLF's actions do not constitute an armed attack. Such behaviours, in
any event, cannot be attributed to Gogolia. Gogolia did not provide such a government seal or
order, which specifically pledged to take action against BLF and arrest individuals associated
with BLF. A State must exercise “overall control” over the group not just by providing it with
equipment and funding, but also by coordinating or participating in the overall planning of its
military operations. Therefore, Gogolia cannot be held accountable for BLF's actions because
it neither planned nor coordinated the attacks.
 
II. SHEKHARPUR COMMITTED AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT UNDER

ARTICLE 2 OF THE ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR

INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS [“ASR”].

 
According to Article 5 of the ARSIWA, the state is responsible for the actions of anyone
acting on behalf of the government. In this situation, Motilal, the PM of Shekharpurian, acted
in an official governmental capacity when he declared a military intervention in Legendipity.
Shekharpur and Gogolia negotiated a bilateral treaty on friendship and peace as part of which
Shekharpur received Legendipity on lease. Shekharpur's decision to conduct a military
operation in Legendipity is a clear violation of its treaty responsibilities.

x
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. SOVEREIGN RIGHT OVER LEGENDIPITY LIES WITH GOGOLIA SINCE LEASE

AGREEMENT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO TRANSFER OF TITLE.

Shekharpur does not have de jure sovereignty over the area it has leased from Legendipity,

which is required for statehood. The essence of territorial sovereignty lies in the title, 1 which
continues to rest with Gogolia. The lease agreement does not amount to a transfer of title [A].
In any event, the lease arrangement is a temporary arrangement [B].

A. The lease agreement does not amount to a transfer of title.

According to state practice, leases do not transfer title because the lessor state still retains
residual sovereignty.2 Despite being leased "in perpetuity," 3
the Panama Canal was given
back to Panama in 2000. A lease is categorised as a temporary transfer of a minor right over
territory and is not a method of acquiring territory. 4 In fact, the granting and safeguarding of
minor territorial rights is regarded as an exercise of sovereignty. 5 Moreover, the Raja of

Cochin granted the British administration full control over a portion of Cochin. 6 However,
this was considered foreign territory by the British. 7 Therefore, the Legendipity being under
Shekharpur's jurisdiction does not constitute a transfer of sovereignty.

B. In any event, the lease arrangement is a temporary arrangement.

There is a requirement for territory to be permanent, 8 which is not being fulfilled by the lease
agreement. As with any agreement, the lease could be rescinded – as done in the lease of the

1
Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566 (Dec. 22); M.N.
th
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 490 (6 ed. 2008).
2
Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, 186 Cons.T.S. 310; Wen-Sze
King, The Lease Conventions between China and the Foreign Powers, 1 Chinese Soc.& Pol.Sci.Rev.24 (1916).
3
Panama Canal Treaty, September 7, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1022.
4
PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 158
(1997); 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 507–9 (Bernhardt ed., 1987); Shaw,
th
490; J.L.BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 162 (6 edn., OUP, 1963).
5
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933 P.C.I.J.(ser.A/B) No.53, 53 (Apr. 5)
6
C U AITCHISON, A COLLECTION OF TREATIES, ENGAGEMENTS AND SANADS RELATING TO
INDIA AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES 267 (Vol X, 1930).
7
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 (53 & 54 VICT. CH. 37) (British).
8
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, The Foreign Relations (1965).

1
Lado Enclave in 1906.9 The lease only extends for a period of 55 years. 10 It was made clear in
the treaty that the province must return peacefully to Gogolia after the end of the lease
period11, clearly indicating the parties’ intention for it to be a temporary arrangement.

Therefore, sovereign right over Legendipity lies with Gogolia since Lease agreement does
not amount to transfer of title and is a temporary agreement.

II. RESPONDENT’S INCURSION INTO APPLICANT’S TERRITORY AMOUNTS TO AN

UNLAWFUL USE OF FORCE.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires States to refrain from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner

inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.12 Such Article covers any and all,13 uses
of, or threats to use, force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States
not only by means of visible armed attacks but inconceivable attacks short of actual armed
attacks.14As exceptions to such prohibition, States may use force in self-defense when an

armed attack occurs,15 while the Security Council may authorize such use of force. 16
However, Respondent’ s incursion was not a valid exercise of the right to self-defense in this
case [A]. Further, Shekharpur’s use of force under self-defence was not justified because it
was neither necessary [B], nor proportional [C].

A. Respondent’ s incursion was not a valid exercise of the right to self-defense.

Article 51 of the UN Charter expressly requires the occurrence of an armed attack as a

condition for the exercise of self-defense. 17 In the present case, the Respondent cannot seek
9 th
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 569 (Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., 9 ed. 1992);
Michael J. Strauss, Guantanamo Bay and the Evolution of International Leases and Servitudes, 10 N.Y. City L.
Rev. 479, 492 (2006-2007).
10
CRE Problem, ¶3.
11
Id.
12
U.N. CHARTER art.2(4).
13
WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1997).
14
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶103.
15
Id.; DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 175 (2005); BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 231-80 (1963); SIMMA, THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 661-78 (1994); Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 263.
16
U.N. CHARTER arts.43-48; FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED
CONFLICTS 1 (1999).
17
JESSUP, MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 164-67 (1948); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4;
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.

2
the right to self defense as BLF’s acts do not amount to an armed attack [i]. In any case, such
acts cannot be attributed to Gogolia [ii].
i. BLF’s acts do not amount to an armed attack.

In defining an armed attack in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ relied on the UN General

Assembly’s Definition of Aggression,18 which defines an “armed attack” as the sending by or

on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack

conducted by regular forces.19 In this case, the acts purportedly committed by the Bhamashah
Liberation Front (“BLF”) which is not backed by state failed to meet this standard. BLF’s
main purpose and course of action involved organising mass demonstrations and distributing
pamphlets to the general public telling them about the history of the entire Legendipity
episode with a few irregular attacks.20

Further, Article 51 of the Charter requires Members which exercise their right to self- defense
to immediately report to the Security Council measures taken for the latter to determine the

legality of the use of force.21 Failure to comply with such requirement is indicative that the

State itself was not convinced that it was acting in self-defense. 22 Accordingly, the absence of
an armed attack coupled with Respondent’s failure to report the same negates Respondent’s
claim of self-defense.

ii. Assuming that there was an armed attack, it was not imputable to the
Applicant.

Acts of a party are a attributable to the state, if the state controls them or later on
acknowledges and accepts them. In the present case, applicant neither controlled the acts of
BLF [1] nor did it acknowledge and adopt BLF’s acts [2].

1. Applicant did not control the acts of BLF.

18
G.A. Res 3314(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.No. 31, art.3(g), U.N. Doc.A/9631 (1974).
19
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 194-95.
20
CRE Problem, ¶ 4, 6.
21
U.N. CHARTER art.51; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶¶121-22.
22
U.N. CHARTER art.51; GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 100 (2004);
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶¶121-22.

3
In Nicaragua, the ICJ recognized “effective control” as the standard for attributing to a State

the acts of a non-state armed group, 23 which standard was reaffirmed in the recent cases of

Congo v. Uganda24 and Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro. 25 According to the
ICJ, effective control may be inferred from the fact that the leaders of the group were selected
by the State, and from other factors such as the “organization, training, and equipping of the
force, planning of operations, the choosing of targets, and the operational support provided to

such group by the State.”26 Here, the Applicant au contra arrested numerous people
associated with BLF, choked their funding and banned the organisation. Even though facts
are silent on the source of funding of BLF, assuming that BLF benefited from Gogolia’s
financing, the ruling in Nicaragua is clear that assistance “in the form of provision of

weapons or logistical or other support”27 — while constituting use of force — will not suffice
to attribute an armed attack to a State.

Seemingly, Prosecutor v. Tadić28 provided a lower threshold — a State must wield “overall
control” over the group not only by equipping and financing the group but also by
coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military activity. However, as Applicant
neither coordinated nor planned the attacks, Applicant may not be held liable for BLF’s acts
under the standard in Tadić.

Therefore, Applicant did not control the acts of BLF.

2. Applicant did not acknowledge and adopt BLF’s acts.

Under Article 11 of General Assembly Resolution 56/83, an initially private conduct

becomes an act of the State only if, and to the extent, that the State acknowledges and adopts

the conduct as its own.29 Article 11 was meticulously crafted in order to prevent any
attribution based on mere complicity to, or endorsement of, a past act. This is evident from
the Commentary of the International Law Commission as Article 11 is a codification of what
23
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶¶102-03.
24
2005 I.C.J. 116, ¶147.
25
2007 I.C.J. 91, ¶¶377-415.
26
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶103.
27
Id.
28
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No.IT-94-1-A, ¶131 (1999).
29
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 121 (2002).

4
various tribunals have done in the past, particularly in the Lighthouses Arbitration30 and

Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran31 where it was held that that the seal of
governmental approval to the acts involved and the decision to perpetuate them translated the
continuing breach of the private group into the acts of Greece and Iran.

In this case, no such seal and decision were given by Applicant which, in fact, expressly
promised action against BLF and arrested people associated with BLF.32

B. Further, Shekharpur’s use of force under self-defence was not justified because
it was not necessary.

Use of force is valid when a State is faced with an imminent peril, and there is no moment
for deliberation.33 As a result, States should avoid causing unnecessary destruction and only
target objects that pose a serious threat.

There is no fact in the problem which indicates that the threat posed by BLF was so imminent
that there was time for deliberation.34 On the contrary, it is evident that Shekharpur could
have collaborated with Gogolia to decide its future course of action since Gogolia was also
taking actions against BLF. Since there was no imminent threat to Shekharpur, it could have
deployed a police troop at bridge to tackle any BLF fighters’ movement through as
Shekharpur had the authority to deploy police personnel in Legendipity. 35 Shekharpur’s use
of force under self-defence was not justified because it was not necessary in the present case.

C. Shekharpur’s use of force under self-defence was not justified because it was not
proportional.

The elements of necessity and proportionality are essential to justify the use of force under
the right to self-defence.36 The ICJ observed in the Nicaragua case that there is a clear
requirement whereby self-defence would warrant only actions which are proportional to the
30
12 R.I.A.A. 155, 198 (1956).
31
1980 I.C.J. 3.
32
CRE Problem, ¶ 6.
33
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion),
2004 I.C.J. ¶140 (July.9, 2004) [“Palestinian Wall”].
34
CRE Problem, ¶3.
35
Id.
36
O. SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 152–5, J.
GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (Cambridge University Press,
2004), 148–53;Y. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE  (Cambridge University Press, 2017)208–
10.

5
armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well set in place in customary international
law.37

States should only use as much force as is necessary to accomplish the goal. 38 The principle
of proportionality states that self-defence actions must roughly match the scope and impact of
the attack.39 Only grave and serious uses of force classify as armed attack, which must be
differentiated from other less severe uses of force.40

Ordering a military operation to wipe out all the members of an entity, 41 was a
disproportionate measure taken by Shekharpur. Using armored vehicles and Shekharpurian
military battalions against BLF, which is a mere organisation which conducts mass
demonstrations is disproportionate. It is pertinent to note that Shekharpur’s military not only
has high end weapons but also comes with past war experience in contrast with a new
organisation with no past war experience.42
I. SHEKHARPUR COMMITTED AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT UNDER

ARTICLE 2 OF THE ASR.

For an act to be internationally wrongful under Article 2 of the ASR, the act must fulfil two
requirements. Firstly, the act must be attributable to the state and secondly, it must constitute

a breach of an international obligation of the state. Shekharpurian PM, Motilal order of a

special military operation in Legendipity is internationally wrongful because it can be
attributed to the state of Shekharpur [A] and it constitutes a breach of an international
obligation [B]. Accordingly, Shekharpur is liable to pay reparations [C].

A. Shekharpurian PM Motilal’s order of a special military operation in Legendipity

can be attributed to the state of Shekharpur.

Article 5 of the ASR provides that acts of a person who is performing governmental authority
are attributable to the state. In the present case, Motilal being the PM of Shekharpurian was

37
Nicaragua, ¶176; 1Oil Platforms, ¶72.
38
THEODORA CHRISTODOULIDOU, KALLIOPI CHAINOGLOU, The Principle of Proportionality from a Jus Ad
Bellum perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW , 1205-56
(2015)..
39
TERRY D. GILL, THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (2nd edn..), 221
(2015).
40
Nicaragua, ¶191.
41
CRE Problem, ¶4.
42
CRE Problem, ¶1, 5.

6
acting as per its governmental obligations when he declared a military operation in
Legendipity. Accordingly, under Article 5 of the ASR such an act is attributed to the state of
Shekharpur.

B. Shekharpurian PM Motilal’s order of a special military operation in Legendipity

constitutes breach of an international obligation.

Article 12 of the ASR provides that the breach of an international obligation consists in the
disconformity between the conduct required of the State by that obligation and the conduct
actually adopted by the State i.e. between the requirements of international law and the facts
of the matter.43 This can be expressed in different ways. One of such recognised ways are
treaty obligations.44

In the present case, a Bilateral Treaty on Peace and Friendship was signed between
Shekharpur and Gogolia under which Legendipity was given on lease o Shekharpur. 45
Further, this treaty provides certain responsibilities of Shekharpur one of which includes
dimilitrarisation of Legendipity. Shekharpur’s actions of launching a military operation in
Legendipity is therefore in direct contravention with its treaty obligations. Resultantly,
Shekharpur’s act of ordering a military operations constitutes breach of an international
obligation.

C. Accordingly, Shekharpur is liable to pay reparations to Gogolia.

States that violate international law are required to make full reparation for the harm they
caused.46 Ragnell is required to make reparations to cover all of the negative effects of the
attacks they carried out. In Chorzow Factory, the PCIJ ruled that the State responsible for an
internationally unlawful act also has a duty to make amends or restore the situation as it was
prior to the unlawful act.47 Every violation of an international obligation entails a

43
Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary by International Law Commission.
44
Gabcikovo-Nagumaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Feb. 5).
45
CRE Problem, ¶ 2-3.
46
International Law Commission [“ILC”], Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, 56th Sess., A/RES/56/83 (2002), art. 4(2) [“ ARSIWA”]art. 31; Factory at Chorzòw (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, 44 (May 25, 1926) [“Chorzow”].
47
Chorzow, 21. 47 ARSIWA, art. 35.

7
corresponding duty to make reparation. 48 The state is required to “wipe out all the effects of
the unlawful act.” Any damage must be the “proximate cause” of the unlawful conduct.49

48
ARSIWA, arts. 1 & 31.
49
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (OUP, 3rd edn. 2015) 355 [“Shelton
2015”]; ARSIWA art. 31; ILC, COMMENTARIES TO THE DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS 79arp-80 (2002) [“ARSIWA Commentary”], 207.

8
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore in the light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,

it is most humbly and respectfully prayed before the ICJ that it may be pleased to:

1. Declare the use of force by Shekharpur on the Gogolian territory as unlawful,

2. Shekharpur’s use of force constitutes a breach of an international obligation,
3. Shekharpur is liable to pay reparations.

And pass any other order in favour of the petitioner which this court may so deem fit in the
ends of equity, justice and good conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Place: Hague, Netherlands Agent No. 1906

Date: October 05, 2022 Agents of the Gogolia