First Paper - Human Nature and The Rationality and Induction

Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science: HPS100H1

Elise Burton/ Karina Vold

Kiwan‌‌Kim‌‌1005990493‌‌
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October 5th, 2022
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In his book A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume explores the logical reasoning behind

the actions humans commit through the scope of human nature. Hume asserts that in order for

inductive reasoning to be considered logical the premise presented in the following excerpt

must be accepted. “If reason determined us, it would proceed upon that principle, that

instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had

experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.” (Hume 1737,

90) To Hume, the presumption that the past can, with certainty, predict the future is flawed

and simply unreasonable. In this paper, I will discuss the meaning of Hume’s excerpt, its

effect on the problem of induction as well as the dilemma’s scientific significance, and how

Hume’s logic on the flaws of inductive reasoning may be concrete yet may not discount

induction’s importance to the scientific method of attaining knowledge.

In the excerpt, Hume argues that in order for induction to be reasonable the principle

needs to be accepted that occurrences which a person has not experienced will always

duplicate the experience of a similar occurrence the person has experienced. In essence,

Hume states that this principle of uniformity between certain past and future occurrences

must exist in order for induction to logically function. (Owen 1992, 185) The problem of

induction exists on the understanding that this uniformity principle does not exist. Hume

argues that a rational person must admit that anything is possible in any situation. Therefore,

it is not guaranteed that the Sun will rise tomorrow even though it has risen every previous

morning. Hume’s excerpt presents a premise that is necessary for inductive reasoning to be

valid, and the invalidity of the uniformity principle creates the problem of induction.

The problem with induction extends its scope to the entirety of scientific knowledge.

Hume’s assertion that induction is unreasonable indicates that anything assumed by science

as being true, but not experienced, is in turn illogical and not proven facts. For example,

gravity is observed in everyday life; however, reason dictates that gravity could disappear at
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any moment without precedent. Therefore, since induction is not driven by reason, it is

unreasonable to believe that any phenomenon that has not been experienced can be predicted

with certainty from the experience of previous, similar occurrences. This goes to illustrate

how the problem of induction results in the inability of anything new to be discovered with

certainty.

This conclusion seems, quite rightfully, grim. In an effort to disprove Hume,

philosophers proposed the idea of probability playing a role in inductive reasoning. (Merill

2003, 156) For example, there are two possible results in flipping a coin. It lands on heads or

tails with an equal chance of either occurrence. So if someone flips a coin and the coin lands

on heads, then the next flip, according to mathematical probability, should be tails. However,

Hume is correct in arguing that there exists no logical reason for someone to believe the next

flip will land on tails. I believe that the problem of induction simply is impregnable.

However, I also think that the problem of induction is a greater problem in the scope of

philosophy than in the scope of science. It is important to note that, even though induction

cannot be justified through logical reasoning, induction, in terms of probability, has predicted

the result of too many phenomena with certain accuracy for its scientific value to be

completely disregarded. Therefore, I believe the best response to the problem of induction is

to simply surrender to its logical reasoning. It is possible to believe inductive reasoning as

being logically flawed and also how inductive reasoning, with its previous success in

establishing scientific truths, is an illogical yet effective method of establishing causal

relations.

Hume’s excerpt proposes a premise that must be accepted for inductive reasoning to

be logically sound, this premise being flawed leads to the problem of induction, and, even

though Hume’s logic is infallible in the realm of philosophy, I assert that inductive reasoning

has benefitted the general scientific knowledge to a degree that justifies its wide use in the
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scientific method of establishing causal relationships. I also believe that science and

philosophy can contradict one another and still hold a certain level of individual truthfulness.

(720 Words)
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Bibliography

Hume (1739): Book 1, part iii, section 6 of A Treatise of Human Nature.

Merrill, Kenneth R. Review of Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief.

Hume Studies 29, no. 1 (2003): 155-162.

Owen, David. "Hume and the Lockean Background: Induction and the Uniformity Principle."

Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 179-207.