The Meaning of Universal Validity in Kant's Aesthetics

Author(s): Kenneth F. Rogerson

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Spring, 1982, Vol. 40, No. 3
(Spring, 1982), pp. 301-308
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/429687

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 KENNETH F. ROGERSON

The Meaning of Universal Vali

in Kants Aesthetics

KANT'S PROJECT in the "Critique of Aes- state personal preferences but "lays claim
thetic Judgment" is to show on what to everyone's assent."2 In this respect, judg-
grounds we can make a legitimate "judg-ments of taste are like ordinary statements
ment of taste" (i.e., a judgment that some- of fact. Both are either correct or incorrect
thing is beautiful). While recent interpre- ("valid") independently of who makes the
tations have attempted to explain and eval- judgment ("universally").
uate this demonstration, my hunch is that Yet the parallel between judgments of
much of the difficulty of interpretating taste and statements of fact cannot be taken
Kant's argument stems from the more basic too far. In paragraph 8 of the "Critique"
problem of understanding just what Kant Kant distinguishes between objectively and
thinks he must show. Since, as Kant ac- subjectively universal judgments.3 To make
knowledges, justifying judgments of tastea statement of fact, e.g., "Lola is a cat,"
crucially depends upon supporting their we need only subsume the object with its
claim to "universal validity," I shall con-particular properties (feline constitution)
sider here only the restricted question ofunder a concept with the appropriate
how we should understand the meaning of"marks" (felineness). If the subsumption is
this claim.1 My position, simply stated, isdone properly, the judgment will be "ob-
that judgments of taste for Kant are a jectively universal"-that is, it will be true
species of imperatives. Specifically, a judg-for everyone. But judgments of taste, Kant
ment of taste issues a demand to all per- holds, cannot be objectively valid because
sons (i.e., universally) that if they attend beauty is not a concept.4 Beauty does not
properly to the object, which I judge asdescribe a set of properties such that all
beautiful, then they ought to take pleasureobjects with these properties are beautiful.
in that object. Only if this point is appre-Instead, Kant claims, beauty is ultimately
ciated, I maintain, can we make any head-a matter of objects that please subjects. But
way in identifying Kant's argument justi-unlike ordinary, merely subjective reports
fying judgments of taste. of pleasure, judgments of taste claim that
beautiful objects are (or should be) a source
I. of pleasure for all persons. Judgments of
taste are, in this sense, subjectively univer-
At least on the face of it, the notion of sal. To put Kant's point in more contem-
universal validity is an easy one to under- porary terms, to claim that an object is
stand. Universal validity implies a non- beautiful is to say that appreciating the
relativistic account of judgments of taste. object is an intrinsically pleasurable ex-
Thus Kant's position in the "Critique" is perience-a pleasure not peculiar to me, but
that a judgment of taste does not simply in some sense one that can be imputed
rightfully to all.5
KENNETH F. ROGERSON is visiting lecturer in litera- In paragraph 7, however, Kant seems to
ture at the University of California, San Diego. use slightly different terms to describe uni-

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 302 ROGERSON

versal validity. When someone

an ambiguity injudges an of this
Kant's description
object as beautiful, Kant writes,
notion. ".half
In the first . .ofhethe passage,
expects [mutet] the very same
Kant pleasure
maintains ofjudge some-
that when we
thing
others, he judges not solely foras beautiful,
himself, we but
can "expect" that
for everyone, and then speaks
everyone will
of be beauty
pleased by the
asobject. But
if it were a property of in the second half
things." Kant of the
con-same passage,
Kantthing
tinues, ". . . he says of the also says that
it is we beau-
can "demand" that
tiful, and does not count on others
everyone agree-
agree with our judgment of pleas-
ing with his judgment of ure. pleasure
It has been argued
. . recently
. that there
rather he demands [fordern] is an important
this distinction
agree- between "ex-
ment from them.6 pecting" and "demanding" agreement in
The substance of the claim that judg-matters of taste.7 For surely there is a con-
ments of taste are universally valid seems siderable difference between reasonably ex-
to be that when we take pleasure in anpecting something and rightfully demand-
object, which we purport to be beautiful, ing the same thing. Assuming Kant makes
we are justified in "expecting" or "demand-this distinction, we are forced to read the
ing" that everyone find the object pleasinguniversality claim as either a demand for
-that everyone agree with our "judgment agreement or an expectation of it in order
of pleasure." Kant sharply contrasts thisto resolve the apparent ambiguity.
with ordinary, nonuniversal judgments of The predominant way of reading univer-
pleasure. Most objects will or will not givesal validity is as a "rational expectation"
pleasure to various persons depending uponfor agreement.8 On this interpretation, a
their individual likes and dislikes. Thus, judgment of taste is the factual prediction
in order to justify the universal validitythat,
of under the proper conditions, everyone
judgments of taste, Kant must show that will be pleased by the object we judge as
there is a source of pleasure that is not beautiful. More precisely, if we: (1) prop-
contingent upon our likes and dislikes, but erly appreciate an object (where for Kant
rather one that can be assumed for all per- this means we attend disinterestedly to the
sons. As a reader familiar with the "Cri- object's "form of finality"); (2) derive pleas-
tique" knows, Kant argues that a particular ure from the object; and (3) locate the
mental state, similar to cognition, is such source of this pleasure in the free harmony
a source of pleasure. Kant calls this mentalof the imagination and the understanding;
state the "free harmony of the imaginationthen (4) we are entitled to predict that any-
and the understanding." one who properly appreciates the object
To make a complicated story far too will feel pleasure also.
simple, the position for which Kant argues While most commentators subscribe to
is this: properly appreciating or "estimat-the "expectation" reading of universal va-
ing" certain objects leads to a mental statelidity, they do not deny that Kant also talks
of "free harmony." We are justified in im-about demanding agreement. The most
puting the pleasure we feel from this ex-popular way of accommodating such lan-
perience to anyone else who appreciates theguage is to argue that, for Kant, there are
object since, Kant argues, there is a neces-two senses in which we may require every-
sary connection between free harmony andone to "agree" that an object is pleasing.9
pleasure-one that holds for all persons.First, there is the agreement that we can ra-
This necessary connection lies at the foun-tionally expect. This, supposedly, is equiv-
dation of the claim to universal validity. alent to the claim to universal validity.
This characterization of Kant's position But, second, since Kant obviously talks of
is, I hope, fairly uncontroversial, if only "demanding agreement"--indeed even of
because it is so general. However, spelling demanding it as a "duty"-such a demand
out the precise meaning of universal valid-is considered a different, logically distinct
ity is not nearly so uncontroversial. The claim for agreement, which extends beyond
language of the passage cited above suggestsuniversal validity. The language of de-

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Kant's Aesthetics 303

manding agreement, according to the pre- ure in a manner analogous to the way he
dominant interpretation, appears in the argues for the principles in the first Cri-
later section of the "Critique" where Kant's tique. In particular, from the materials of
aim is to demonstrate the moral significance paragraphs 21 and 38, Kant is represented
of aesthetic appreciation. In this context,as offering what has been called an "epis-
demanding agreement in matters of tastetemological" argument for universal valid-
is understood as the imperative, enforcedity.1 Anything like a detailed analysis of
by morality, to take an interest in beauty.this "epistemological" argument exceeds
Presumably, Kant want to show that the the scope of my present project. However,
pleasing experience of aesthetic apprecia- in general, as the argument is typically re-
tion is of such importance that we can de-constructed, it attempts to show that the
mand all persons to "agree" with our feeling premise that free harmony is pleasing for
of pleasure by demanding that they appre- all persons follows from the conditions for
ciate beauty. This imperative apparently the possibility of experience.12 That is to
exceeds the claim to universal validity, since
say, we must assume that all persons neces-
the universality claim only states that wesarily will find free harmony pleasing, for
can expect others to feel pleasure only ifotherwise knowledge of the world would be
they properly appreciate an object. Theimpossible.
connection with morality, however, author- Yet while this reconstruction of Kant's
izes us to demand that everyone properlysupport of universal validity, construed as
appreciate beautiful objects. a rational expectation, has become well ac-
This "expectation" interpretation has di- cepted, it is also widely held that the so-
rect consequences for the further issue of called epistemological argument is inade-
what Kant must show to warrant judg-quate.13 Kant does not establish that, based
ments of taste. In order to know that every-on the possibility of experience, we must
one will feel pleasure under the circum- share similar feeling states on the occasion
stance described, we must know that every- of similar dispositions of the imagination
one will find free harmony pleasing. Only and the understanding-a premise Kant
on this assumption are we justified in ex-supposedly needs for his "epistemological"
pecting that everyone will share our pleas-argument. The failure to find a good argu-
ure in free harmony. But if this is what ment to support a rational expectation
Kant needs to show, then the task of the should, of itself, be sufficient motivation for
"Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" must be considering an alternative interpretation of
parallel to that of the first Critique. Ac- universal validity.
cording to recent interpretations, Kant However, the insistence upon reading
must establish a connection between free universal validity as an expectation raises
harmony and pleasure that is known to another
be interpretative difficulty-namely
strictly universal, i.e., a connection known
what we should make of the principle of
to hold for all persons. Thus, it seems that,
"Common Sense." In paragraph 20, Kant
like the principles of the first Critique, argues that judgments of taste appeal to a
Kant must argue for an a priori factual "Common Sense," where this is, I believe,
connection between free harmony and pleas-correctly understood as the principle speci-
ure.10 It must be factual, since on the ex-fying a necessary connection between free
pectation interpretation the judgment that harmony and pleasure. As we have seen,
only by granting this connection are we
all others will feel pleasure in free harmony
is a prediction about what will, as a matter
justified in imputing the pleasure we feel
of fact, happen. And, consistent with Kant's
in free harmony to all others. The inter-
epistemology, the connection must be known
pretative problem that arises is whether we
to hold a priori, since no amount of em-
should understand "Common Sense" as a
pirical data could insure strict universality.
constitutive principle or a regulative Idea.
Further, Kant supposedly argues for the Interpreting the connection between free
connection between free harmony and pleas-harmony and pleasure as factual, I will ar-

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 304 ROGERSON

gue, forces a constitutivebecause

reading of
they did Com-
so occasionally in the past;
rather heto
mon Sense-a reading contrary demands
thethis agreement from them.
text.
He censures them if they judge differently and
denies them taste, which he yet demands they
II. should have.l4

The predominant interpretation of the The first part of the passage apparently
"Critique" I have sketched out rests upon describes universal validity as a factual
two doubtful premises: (1) that Kant dis- (nonimperatival) statement about what we
tinguishes between two logically independ- can expect others to feel. The later portion
ent claims-expecting and demanding (orof the passage, however, contains just the
exacting) agreement; and (2) that rationallysort of language that supposedly refers to
expecting agreement is equivalent to thethe morally enforced demand to appreciate
universality claim. A close study of the text, beautiful objects. Yet an examination of
I maintain, reveals that Kant's univocal the original German does not, I believe,
stand on judgments of taste is that they support this sort of distinction. One might
make a demand for everyone to take pleas-suppose, for instance, that the contrast in
German would be the sharp factual/im-
ure in the object judged as beautiful. Spe-
peratival one between erwarten (literally
cifically, we should understand a judgment
of taste as the following imperatival claim:
"to await") and fordern (the usual equiva-
lent for "demand"). But I have found no
If we properly appreciate an object (we
place where Kant uses erwarten in contexts
find it to occasion a free harmony), then
we can legitimately demand that anyone
discussing agreement. Instead, the term
else who would appreciate the object find Cerf consistently translates as "expect" is
it pleasing since, in general, we can de- the verb muten.15 While it may be plau-
mand that everyone have the "taste" to take
sible to reconstruct a factual/imperatival
pleasure in free harmony. This, I claim,distinction
is between erwarten and fordern,
what Kant means by the universal validity it is much less so in the case of muten and
forderi . A more standard translation of
of judgments of taste. Further, this impera-
tive is not different from the one Kant at- muten as "to demand, sue for, or claim"
tempts to support by a connection with
shows rnilten, like fordern, to have impera-
morality. In the end Kant wants to argue
tival force.16 If we keep in mind the close-
that taking pleasure in free harmonyness is of meaning of muten and fordern,
something we can demand of all persons Kant's use of the two terms in the above
passage would seem to indicate nothing
because having such taste is akin to a moral
disposition. However, I find no evidence more philosophically important than a
for the wider thesis that we can demandfacon de parler employed to make a single
point about judgments of taste. Such judg-
persons to exercise their taste by seeking
out and appreciating beauty. ments do nothing but issue a demand that
everyone who appreciates the object we
The first question to consider is whether
judge as beautiful should find it pleasing.
or not the text supports a philosophically
important distinction between expecting Not only can muten and fordern be used
and demanding agreement. Walter Cerf's to make the equivalent "demand" claim,
translation of paragraph 7, cited earlier,
but in the passage above Kant apparently
would seem to be good evidence forunderstands
such "expecting" (muten) agree-
a distinction: ment as a demand (fordern) for agreement.
Many a thing may be attractive and pleasurable
After stating that judging something as
to him; no one cares about that; but if he de- beautiful is tantamount to "expecting"
(mrnten)
clares something to be beautiful, he expects the agreement, Kant concludes without
further argument ("hence") that
very same pleasure of others, he judges not solely we can
for himself, but for everyone, and then speaks of
demand (fordern) agreement from every-
beauty as if it were a property of things. Hence,
one-even "criticize them for lack of taste"
he says, the thing is beautiful, and does not count
if they fail to agree. The simplest
on others agreeing with his judgment of pleasure way to

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Kant's Aesthetics 305

explain why Kant believes he can move rality. In the passage above, Kant describes
easily from a claim about expecting agree- the claim to universal validity as a right
ment to one of demanding agreement to is demand the "very same pleasure of oth-
that he understands the latter as merelyers," a even "censure and deny them taste"
reformulation of the former, not as a dif- if they disagree. Such imperatival language
ferent claim. Meredith's translation, in this is consistent with that used in paragraph
instance, accurately reflects the identity of 59 (cited above) where Kant's announced
the two claims by rendering both muten intention is to ground judgments of taste
and fordern as "demand." 17 in morality.
The original German does not, at least Nor is Kant's imperatival description of
prima facie, support a factual/imperatival universal validity peculiar to the passage
distinction between expecting and demand- from paragraph 7. Just before the deduc-
ing agreement. However, one might be tion, to cite only one example, Kant re-
tempted to force such a reading on the minds us what universal validity entails
terms nmuten and fordern if muten were and he does so in unmistakably impera-
used only in connection with the early tival terms:
"epistemological" arguments and fordern For these laws [empirical generalizations about
were used only with the later appeal to what people happen to find pleasing] only yield
morality. But this is not what we find. In a knowledge of how we do judge, but they do not
give us a command [Gebot] as to how we ought
the early passage from paragraph 7, which
[werdern soil] to judge, and what is more such a
I have been considering, Kant uses muten command as is unconditioned-and commands of
and fordern interchangeably. Similarly, in this kind are presupposed by judgments of taste,
paragraph 22, well before any talk of the inasmuch as they require [sollen pflichten] delight
moral importance of beauty, fordern, not to be taken as immediately connected with a
representation.. .21
rnuten, is used to express the requirement
for agreement.18 Alternatively, in para- III.
graphs 40 and 59, where Kant does argue
for the link with morality, he uses muten Consistent with the factual interpreta-
in both cases.19 In fact, it is in paragraph tion of judgments of taste, it seems to fol-
59 where Kant claims that, on the basis
low that "Common Sense"-the principle
of morality, agreement about an object's specifying a necessary connection between
pleasurableness can be "exacted from ev-
free harmony and pleasure-must also be
eryone as a sort of duty" and muten is the a factual claim. That is, in order to ground
term translated as "exacted."20
the factual claim that others will feel pleas-
In light of Kant's use of muten and for- ure in an object which occasions free har-
dern to characterize a claim to agreement mony, supposedly Kant must appeal to a
in matters of taste we should draw three
principle that free harmony is, as a matter
conclusions: (1) contrary to the predomi- of fact, pleasing for everyone. But, it is ad-
nant interpretation, these terms do not sup- mitted, this reading of "Common Sense"
port a distinction between a factual claim does not well accord with the text.22 How-
that persons will feel pleasure and an im- ever, if my imperatival reading of judg-
perative that they ought to feel pleasure; ments of taste is correct, the principle of
(2) instead, Kant uses both muten and for-"Common Sense" should also be an im-
dern to state the position that when I prop-perative of the sort: "Everyone ought to
erly judge an object as beautiful, everyonetake pleasure in free harmony." And, I
who takes the trouble to appreciate the ob-hope to show, this reading of "Common
ject ought to take pleasure in it; (3) onSense" does accord with the text.
the basis of the passage from paragraph 7, Paul Guyer, one of the proponents of the
a legitimate demand for agreement is justfactual reading of judgments of taste, raises
what Kant means by the universality ofthe question of whether "Common Sense"
judgments of taste, and this demand is not
should be regarded as a constitutive prin-
different from the one supported by mo-ciple or a regulative Idea.23 The question

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 306 ROGERSON

presents something of a"regulate"

dilemma for
empirical theSuch regula-
enquiry.
factual interpretation. tive On the
Ideas are, asone hand,
it were, nothing more than
much of the text seems to refer to "Com-
useful fictions that may help to uncover
mon Sense" as a regulative Idea. In para-
genuine factual truths. But if we consider
graph 22, Kant explicitly uses Idea"Common
and Sense" as a regulative Idea, un-
Ideal to characterize "Common Sense."24 der this reading of regulative, then univer-
Similarly, in paragraph 8, where Kant uses
sal validity could not be justified in any
the term "universal voice" to do the same rigorous sense. At best we would impute
work as "Common Sense," this principle is
agreement to others on the basis of the mere
again classified as an Idea.25 Nor, I should
useful fiction that everyone will find free
hope, do these references come as a surprise
harmony pleasing. If this were the only way
to a student of the third Critique.toThe understand the notion of regulative Ideas,
larger project of the third Critique thenis toregarding "Common Sense" as such an
argue that aesthetic and teleological judg-
Idea surely would depreciate the force of
ments are species of "reflective judgments."
judgments of taste.
And, as it is oftened observed, reflective
A more adequate interpretation of "Com-
judging is Kant's way of describing whatmon Sense" would be one that is consistent
was considered, in the first Critique, as
with the numerous passages where Kant de-
judging by use of Ideas. scribes the principle as a regulative Idea,
and yet one that does not trivialize the
On the other hand, there are two philo-
sophical considerations that favor a con-
claim to universal validity. I shall not, how-
stitutive view of "Common Sense." If we ever, be concerned if such a regulative read-
understand the constitutive/regulative ingdis-
of "Common Sense" conflicts with an
tinction as it is defined in the first Critique
expectation reading of universal validity. In
-namely as a distinction between princi- the previous section, I have argued on inde-
pendent
ples that are necessary for the possibility of grounds that this interpretation is
experience and principles that have no problematic.
such To be sure, we should agree
warrant-then "Common Sense" must be with the dominant interpretation that Kant
constitutive. This would seem to follow uses "Common Sense" as a justificatory prin-
from the predominant interpretation ciplesince,
for judgments of taste, and, further
on this reading, Kant justifies the that
claim to
it plays this role by specifying a neces-
universal validity by establishing sary
a neces-
connection between free harmony and
sary factual connection between free har-But the nature of this necessary
pleasure.
mony and pleasure on the basis ofconnection,
the re- I maintain, is imperatival, not
quirements for experience. This factual.
is theIt is not the case that everyone will,
as a matter
thrust of the so-called "epistemological ar- of fact, always take pleasure in
gument." free harmony, but that everyone should.
Additionally, if "Common Sense" were Further, reading "Common Sense" as an
regulative, it has been recently argued, it imperative does not depreciate the force of
would be insufficient to justify universal va- judgments of taste. While on my interpre-
lidity.26 On a fairly standard reading of the tation "Common Sense" is not an a priori
constitutive/regulative distinction, regula- factual principle, neither is it a mere useful
tive Ideas are mere heuristic devices-they fiction. Rather, Kant argues that "Common
are not objective laws, as are constitutive Sense" is a well founded, universal impera-
principles. This is, unquestionably, the dis- tive-one ultimately supported by morality.
tinction in the first Critique between the This is how Kant can uphold a rigorous,
constitutive principle of causality and the nonconstitutive link between free harmony
regulative Idea of an infinite series of and pleasure.
causes-to use one of Kant's examples. The But even if reading "Common Sense" as
former is an a priori, factual principle. Thean imperative offers an alternative interpre-
latter, Kant argues, is not factually descrip-
tation of the necessity of the principle, can
tive, but is only a heuristic notion used to"Common Sense" be considered as a regula-

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Kant's Aesthetics 307

tive Idea, as the text requires? This raisesproblem raises several more in its wake. My
the larger question of where imperatival contribution does little to dispel this belief.
principles fit within the critical philosophy.
However, before considering the further in-
I believe that such principles should be un-terpretative problems, I want to clarify one
derstood as regulative, rather than constitu-point about my imperatival reading of uni-
tive. But to see this, a clearer view of the versal validity. It may seem odd to attribute
distinction is needed. to Kant the thesis that we can demand of
It is inaccurate to describe the constitu- anyone who appreciates the object we judge
tive/regulative distinction narrowly as a dis-as beautiful to take pleasure in that object.
tinction between principles required for the It could be argued that "taking pleasure" is
possibility of experience and mere heuristic simply not the sort of thing that can be de-
devices. Rather, the distinction is better un-manded. We either do or do not feel pleas-
derstood as a contrast between principles re-ure. We cannot be commanded to enjoy
quired for experience, and principles thatsomething. In a strict sense, Kant would
are used in a broadly practical fashion. In
agree with this. Kant argues, particularly in
the Dialectic of the first Critique, Kant
paragraph 42, that certain objects (those that
makes two distinguishable points about reg- lead to a free harmony) are the source of
ulative Ideas. First, Kant argues the criticalan intellectual interest, and that in general
point that such notions are neither derived the satisfaction of interests gives pleasure.
from experience, nor necessary for the possi- Kant then claims, on moral grounds, that
bility of our having experience. Thus, they we can rightfully demand all persons to
have intellectual interests.28 Finally, Kant's
are not legitimate, factually descriptive state-
ments. But, second, Kant argues that this position is that objects are beautiful only
does not render Ideas superfluous. Instead if they satisfy an intellectual interest. On
they are assigned a practical role. The ideas this basis, we can demand pleasure from
of the first Critique function as heuristic others only in the extended sense that we
rules in the service of empirical investiga- can legitimately demand persons to have
tion. But surely this is only one examplethe sort of interest that beauty pleasingly
of the practical role a principle may play. satisfies.
Imperatives are also non-descriptive and yetHowever, placing so much importance
fulfill a quite different practical function. upon the later sections of the "Critique"
They tell us what we ought to do. (where Kant discusses the moral importance
The moral law of the second Critique of having intellectual interests) may seem
would seem to be a perfect example of an textually implausible, because it seriously
imperatival principle as described above. reduces the role of the Deduction of judg-
The moral law is surely not an a priori de- ments of taste. For surely, an outcome of
scriptive law (at least not for any of us withmy interpretation is that the warrant for
less than a "holy" will), but neither is ituniversal
a validity is established by the con-
merely heuristic device. Instead, the moral nection with morality-well after the chap-
law "regulates" our activity, insofar as we ters on the Deduction. But it may be ar-
heed its categorical imperative. However,gued, this cannot be correct since we would
this does not jeopardize its universal valid- expect that just as the deduction of the
ity just because the regulation, in this case,first Critique demonstrates the objective
is required of everyone. For these reasons validity of the principles, so should the de-
the moral law is typically understood as duction
a of judgments of taste demonstrate
regulative principle, but this need not have their subjective universal validity.29 Al-
any depreciatory implications.27 though a complete solution to this problem
would require another essay of at least
IV. equal length, the short answer here is that
we should not assume that the deduction
It is nearly a truism of Kant scholarship of imperatival claims must be like the de-
that any attempt to settle one interpretative duction of factual ones. In fact, in the sec-

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 308 ROGERSON

ond Critique, with regard 9Maitland

to the in his
moral"Two Senses of Necessity in
law,
Kant's Aesthetic
Kant goes so far as to assert that Theory" is the most vigorous pro-
a deduc-
ponent of this interpretation, but it can also be
tion of that imperative found
is not possible.30
in Guyer (Kant and the Claims of Taste, p.
While Kant does, finally,261) offer
and Crawfordsomething
(Kant's Aesthetic Theory, p. 145).
called a "deduction" of the moral law, the 10 For some recent versions of this reconstructed

former remark should stand as a warningargument see: Crawford (Kant's Aesthetic Theory,
pp. 125-31); Guyer (Kant and the Claims of Taste,
that the deduction of imperatives is not pp. 284-86); and Elliot ("The Unity of Kant's
strictly parallel to the deduction of factual
'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment,'" p. 245).
principles. 1 The term "epistemological argument" is Guyer's,
but refers to an interpretation widely shared-see
1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans- references directly above for some of the commen-
lated by J. C. Meredith (Oxford University Press, tators who read Kant as offering such an argument.
1952), p. 145. By the "Critique of Aesthetic Judg- 12 See Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, p.
ment" I refer to the first part of the Critique of 297.
Judgment. For future references to this work I shall 3 See Elliot ("The Unity of Kant's 'Critique of
adopt the following method. The abbreviation CJ Aesthetic Judgment,'" p. 245) and Guyer (Kant and
will be used to refer to the Critique of Judgment the Claims of Taste, p. 321) for examples of this
and this will be followed by the pagination of vol- criticism.
ume V of the Akademie-Ausgabe. The latter will be 14 CJ, Ak213, Cerf. p. 13.
abbreviated by the usual Ak. The English transla- 15 For the occurrences of muten see: Ak211, Cerf.
tion, if used, will be cited last by the name of the p. 13; Ak212, Cerf. p. 15; Ak214, Cerf. p. 17; Ak218,
translator and the page number of the translation. Cerf. p. 22; Ak296, Meredith, p. 154; and Ak353,
Two translations will be referred to: Immanuel Meredith, p. 223.
Kant, Critique of Judgement, translated 16byHarold
J. C.
T. Betteridge, The New Cassell's German
Meredith, (Oxford University Press, 1952), and Im-
Dictionary (New York, 1971), p. 329.
manuel Kant, Analytic of the Beautiful from the Meredith, p. 52.
17 CJ, Ak213;
"Critique of Judgment," translated by Walter Cerf
8s CJ, Ak239-240.
(Indianapolis, 1963). 19 CJ, Ak296, Meredith, p. 154, and CJ, Ak353,
2 CJ, Ak216, Cerf. p. 18. Meredith, p. 223.
3 CJ, Ak215.
20 CJ, Ak 353, Meredith, p. 223.
4Kant makes this point several times in the
21 CJ, Ak278, Meredith, p. 132.
"Critique." The argument of paragraph 1 (CJ,
22 While it is Paul Guyer who draws this conclu-
Ak203-204) is perhaps the clearest statement of his
sion, it would seem that anyone holding a factual
position.
interpretation of judgments of taste must take this
5What I have in mind here is that a judgment
position.
of taste, for Kant, is a specific sort of intrinsic value
judgment. Like ordinary intrinsic value claims, they
23 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, pp. 297-
307.
purport to be "objectively" correct, but in the spe-
cific sense that the aesthetic experience is one which 24 CJ, Ak239-240, Cerf. pp. 49-51.
is universally pleasing. 25 CJ, Ak216, Cerf. p. 19.
6 CJ, Ak212-213, Cerf. p. 15. 26 See Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, p. 302.
7 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Har- 27 See Stanley G. French, "Kant's Constitutive-
vard University Press, 1979), p. 354. See also, Jeffrey Regulative Distinction," in Kant Studies Today, ed.
Maitland, "Two Senses of Necessity in Kant's Aes- by Lewis W. Beck (La Salle, Illinois, 1969), pp. 385-
thetic Theory," British Journal of Aesthetics, 16, 86, and Lewis W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
no. 4 (Autumn 1976), 350. Critique of Practical Reason (The University of Chi-
8 While the term "rational expectation" is Guyer's cago Press, 1960), p. 209.
(see Guyer, pp. 256 and 354), this interpretation is 28 Kant is far from unambiguous on this point.
widely shared. See also, Donald Crawford. Kant's His most promising approach is to argue that hav-
Aesthetic Theory (The University of Wisconsin ing intellectual interests is necessary for a Good Will.
Press, 1974), pp. 125-31; and R. K. Elliot, "lhe 29 Guyer makes such a criticism. See, Guyer, Kant
and the Claims of Taste, p. 261.
Unity of Kant's 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement,'"
British Journal of Aesthetics, 8, no. 3 (July 1968), 3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason,
245. These are some of the more recent proponents trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, 1956), p.
of this interpretation. 48.

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