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Categorization: group of things that are similar to each other

Concept: mental representation of a category

Categorization
1. Superordinate level: global/broad (e.g., furniture)
2. Basic level (e.g., table)
→ Basic level effect: the level ppl tend to focus on
(only when not specialized in a specific category!)
3. Subordinate level: specific (e.g., kitchen table)
- Knowledge: the level ppl tend to focus on depends on expertise = not same for everyone
→ more expertise & familiarity = focus on more specific info
- Intermediate (basic) level = cognitively critical
1. bcs it maximizes the dissimilarity btw categories → makes it possible to discriminate
btw different categories
2. & maximizes the similarity within a given category → means that this category can be
used efficiently
- different basic levels used in different cultures
→ individuals in non-industrialized countries use biological genus to name plants (ex:
'maple')
→ individuals in Western countries use level above (ex: 'tree')

How are objects placed in categories?


Classical-Based Approach
- Definitional approach – deciding whether sth. belongs to a category by determining
whether an object fits the category-definition
- Defining features:
 individually necessary: all members have those features
 jointly sufficient: when all those features present = member
- To classify an object, one simply considers the features in the concept & tests whether
they are matched by the properties of the object
→ a bachelor is defined as an adult male who is not married. If any of these features is
missing, it means that a necessary feature is not present, & therefore the example is not
a member of the category 'bachelor'.
- Definitions are crystal-clear → consequences:
 Category-membership = binary (an object is either a member or not)
= hard boundaries
 A concept will select all the members of the category
 Classification not affected by context
(that somebody is a bachelor isn’t affected by time of day)
 Concepts can be organized using a hierarchy of inclusion relations
(mouse = mammal, mammal = vertebrate, vertebrate = animal)

Types of concepts:
- Simple concepts: defined by a simple attribute: ‘objects have to be triangles to belong to
category X’
- Conjunctive concepts: several attributes have to be met: ‘objects have to be square &
black to belong to category X’
- Disjunctive concepts: at least 1 attribute present: ‘objects have to be square or black to
belong to category X’
Limitations:
- Sometimes incorrect info → can’t lead to clear-cut concepts & hierarchies
- Sometimes impossible to identify the necessary & sufficient conditions for most concepts
→ no group of clear-cut features that distinguish things that are games from things that
are not → musical instruments can be played too but aren’t games
→ not all games have same rules as Monopoly
- Family resemblance → defining features cannot always be determined
(chairs → different sizes & shapes, but every chair resembles other chairs in some way)
- No natural category with clear-cut features
- Categories not always binary (tomato → fruit/veggie)
- Concepts can’t always be organized in a hierarchy (car seats = chair = furniture but car
seats ≠ furniture)
- Less good square doesn’t work for the theory
- Typicality effects aren’t explained (reaction timer faster to identify the typical instance)

Prototype-Based Approach
- Membership determined by comparing the object to a prototype or ‘average’ of all the
members of the category; based on prior experience
- Prototype = most typical member of a category
- Prototypes are represented as a set of characteristic features
→ characteristic feature for concept of ‘bird’ = ability to fly → but some birds don’t fly →
that’s why these features are characteristic & not defining (work not always)
 characteristic features found by averaging the description of all members of a given
category we have met in our life & taking the features that occur most often
 every matching feature increases similarity & each mismatching feature decreases it
 features = characteristic but not defining
 not all necessary to fit to category
- Influence of context: weight of feature based on centrality
- A typical prototype is built using the average of members (representations) of a category
that we experienced often → as we learn, we ‘abstract out’ our prototype
- Assumes that we keep only a few prototypical representations
- Family resemblance: things in a category resemble each other in ways (allows variation)
→ variations within categories = differences in typicality (typicality gradient)
- Prototypical food is favored (strange looking strawberry = disgusting, toxic)
- Typicality effect: some members match closer to prototype than others
(highly typical vs. atypical members)
 Fuzzy boundaries btw categories
 High typicality: closely resembles prototype
 Low typicality: doesn’t
 Rosch: Rating typicality of objects on a scale of 1 (good ex. of category) to 7
(poor example)
→ prototypical items judged to be better examples (penguin: bad ex of bird)
- Objects more similar to prototype:
o are named first
o are identified faster
o receive higher explicit typicality scores
o invite users to make inferences across the entire category (unlike atypical
objets)
 Best when category is large, bcs with the exemplar approach u would have to
compare a new flower-type to every flower u have encountered in the past
 Best when category is new, bcs if the category is new u have no exemplars & thus
cannot compare it to sth.

Limitations:
- Assumes that ppl use only superficial features for categorization
- Cannot deal with atypical cases (see Penguin example ↓)
- Prototypes = averages of instances → lose info about variability (Pizza / Ruler example)
- Category membership judgement & typicality don’t always co-vary
→ ppl use binary way of classifying odd & even numbers, but also make typicality
judgements that are (presumably) based on similarity with prototypes/instances
- Some concepts can be unstable (reading first about cows makes it more available)
- Fuzzy boundaries: no clear-cut concepts, no definitions
- Ex: misshapen food → rejection due to idealized prototypes → food waste →
environmental impact → greenhouse gas emissions

Exemplar-Based Approach
- Comparing new object to all of the members you have ever encountered
- Assumes that we hold a large number of memory representations → exemplars
→ exemplar = actual member of category that an individual has encountered in past
→ matched to object in parallel using a measure of similarity
(match doesn’t need to be perfect)
- Typicality Effect: matching is faster for object if confirmed by many exemplars
- Keeps info about variablilty
- Instability of concepts: different contexts = different instances retrieved
- Family resemblance: for typical objects there is going to be more overlapping features
btw new object & examples stored in our mind
 Best when we have atypical cases, bcs: it’s harder to come up with a prototype that
represents all features; u have more nuances/info in your category
 Best when category is variable: u can incorporate multiple features

Evidence for it:


- Explain typicality gradients & other typicality effects
- When there are numerous instances that are similar → quicker to match each exemplar
to a certain category since more exemplars will "vote" for that category
→ faster naming of typical instances is explained by this faster matching
- Exemplar theories can deal with atypical cases more readily that prototype theories can
→ Penguins = atypical birds, bcs cannot fly. But, according to exemplar theories,
exemplars have been stored for penguins every time we have seen a picture of them.
Thus, some fairly high similarity resemblance can be computed for them. This is hard to
explain for the prototype theory, as penguins would have to match the prototypical
representation of birds, which they do not.
- Can account for the instability of concepts
→ matching objects in different contexts will retrieve different instances, & so different
concept
- Keeps info about variability, as all the instances are stored in LTM (Pizza / Ruler example)

Problems:
- Category membership judgement & typicality don’t always co-vary
→ ppl use binary way of classifying odd & even numbers, but also make typicality
judgements that are (presumably) based on similarity with prototypes/instances
- No explanation of relations btw different concepts & hierarchies
- Some matching based on similarity → what about (arbitrary) categories with few
similarities

Theory-Based Categorization
- One decides whether sth. belongs to a category by determining whether the features of
the test item are best explained by the “theory” that underlies the category
- Individuals classifying objects & events with this approach do not just compare features,
but instead use their knowledge of concepts
- Example: What makes someone a “good sport”?
→ in the Classical Approach, u would try to isolate features of a good sport
→ in the Prototype Approach, u would try to find characteristic features
→ in the Exemplar Approach, u would try to find good examples
→ in the Theory-Based Approach u would use your experience to concepts for an
explanation for what makes someone a good sport
- According to this view, ppl can distinguish btw essential & incidental, or accidental
features of concepts bcs of their complex mental representations

Explanation-Based Categorization
- People use common-sense explanations to categorize objects
→ diagnostic (central role) vs. surface (less important) attributes
- Context:
 rapid response = surface attributes
 qualitative response = central features & context
- Common-sense explanations specify what attributes should be used for categorizing
→ when classifying abstract drawings of faces that follow a random classification rule,
participants might remember that eyes are very important in identifying ppl & thus that it
is likely to be predictive feature

Evidence for it:


- idea of linking concepts to other types of knowledge = plausible & advantageous
- also explains why classification times sometimes vary depending on task
1. in tasks where a rapid identification is required, ppl will use a measure of similarity
based on superficial features
2. in tasks where time isn’t essential, but the quality of categorization, ppl will rely on
more central features & the type of explanations they provide
- explains why some concepts seem more natural & coherent than others: if an
explanatory theory can be found, coherence will increase
- explains why classification can vary btw contexts: different attributes (superficial/central)
are used

Limitations:
- Lack specificity (not clear what a ‘theory’ is & how it relates to other parts of semantic
memory)
- Concepts based on explanations, but explanations depend on concept
- Lot of cognitive processing required: when do you stop thinking of associated common-
sense knowledge?

Ä ill-advised to look for a single mechanism


Ä different approaches might account for diverse aspects of data: ppl might use
definitions, prototypes, exemplars & explanations in different situations
o using prototypes at beginning of learning & exemplars later on
o exemplar models provide good account of the data when number of instances in a
category is small → possible to memorize individual stimuli
o prototype models seem more suitable to explain how ppl deal with categories that
contain a large number of instances, where learning all stimuli is not possible
Ä concepts don’t stand in isolation, but are linked to several of the cognitive functions
(attention, STM & semantic memory)

Essentialism
= hypothesis that humans represent some categories as having an underlying essence that
joins members of a category & is responsible for their typical attributes & behaviors

Psychological Essentialism
- all things are what they are bcs of some underlying essence that gives them that quality
- psychological essentialism: belief that essences give rise to entities
- some populations are more committed to essentialist thinking than others
- characteristics associated with psychological essentialism:
1. essences are perceived to be immutable
(their characteristics are perceived to endure & largely remain untouched by one's
experiences; lie deep within an individual)
2. ppl think of essences as being deep down & internal, beyond the reach of external
influences
3. ppl think of essences as underlying the natural world
4. they are perceived to draw the boundaries of categories
→ represents what category-members have in common, & what differentiate them
→ serves as one key foundation of prejudice
5. essences can be transferred from individual to individual while preserving their
original identity (one-third of recipients of heart-transplants feel that they have
acquired traits from their donors)

Genetic Essentialism
- genes make a placeholder for essences → leads ppl to imagine that genes share many of
the features that they associate with essences
- genes are perceived to be deep down & internal & thus share the same features as a
nonmaterialistic placeholder
- ppl view genes (like essences) as far-reaching causal factors
- as with essences, genes are understood to be transferred from one generation to another
- as with essences, genes are perceived to be stable & unchanging throughout a person’s
lifetime
1. thus, genes are well-suited to serve as essence placeholders
(as ppl’s understanding of genes aligns well with how ppl view essences)
2. BUT: when these ppl are thinking about genes, they are actually thinking about
metaphysical essences!
 ppl's understanding of genetics may be somewhat distorted
→ ppl overgeneralize rare strong genetic explanations to explain phenotypes
→ essentialist thinking is bound up with intolerance (racism & sexism)

Genetic Essentialism Framework


- suggests that genetic attributions for various traits, conditions, or diseases activate 4
specific psychological processes → genetic essentialist biases
1. immutability/determinism: specifies that thinking about genetic attributions lead ppl
to view relevant outcomes as less changeable & more predetermined
→ genetic attributions decrease perceptions of control over outcomes
→ ppl feel like they have no control over a disease if the disease is due to genetics
2. single or specific etiology: tendency of ppl to reject alternative causal explanations
for complicated phenomena once genetic attributions are made
→ someone who learns that she doesn’t have “the gene for breast cancer,” might
then view herself as not needing to engage in any future screening efforts, which
would be an incorrect conclusion
3. homogeneity/discreteness: states that genetic explanations for (social/natural)
group differences increase the likelihood that each group will be viewed as
homogeneous & more discrete from each other
→ conservatives, who are more likely to see racial groups as homogenous & distinct
from each other than liberals, are also more likely to view racial differences as caused
by genetic dissimilarities
4. naturalness: genetic attributions increase the likelihood that a relevant outcome is
perceived as a natural outcome
→ large “all natural ingredients” labels at the supermarket

The role of causal belief in political identity & voting – Chen

- People who believe that their political identity is causally central (linked to many other
features of the self-concept) will be more likely to engage in behaviors consistent with
their political identity than those who believe that the same aspect is causally peripheral
(linked to fewer other features)
- If causally central features are perceived as more defining of the self-concept, then
changes to these features would make ppl perceive more disruption to their
identity (feeling like one is not acting like him- or herself)
- Example:
 Anna believes that it is her moral qualities that caused her to become a Democrat
& to choose her profession as an academic.
 Alex instead believes that it is being a Democrat that has caused him to develop
his moral qualities & to choose his profession.
 Moral qualities will be more causally central to Anna’s self-concept , bcs
she believes that her morals are causally connected to her profession &
political affiliation
 Alex’s political affiliation will be relatively more central bcs he believes that
it is causally connected to his profession & moral qualities
 Alex would experience a change in political affiliation as more
disruptive to his self-concept than Anna would.
- People who more strongly identify with a political party are more likely to hold beliefs &
act in ways consistent with their party & ppl are more motivated to act in ways consistent
with social categories that they see as important to their self-concept
- Findings:
 ppl who perceived their political party or national identity as more causally
central, are more likely to vote in ways associated with group-norms than ppl who
identified with the same group but who saw the identity as more casually
peripheral

Examining the Relationships Among Categorization – Rees

- Factors that increase social categorization also increase stereotyping


- Once stereotypes have been activated in one context, they remain active in other
contexts
 If categories are made salient, stereotypes may become more accessible & continue to
be so, even if categories are later made less salient

Do humans belong with nature? – Levin

- Children are unlikely to learn about similarities btw humans & other animals until well
after 10 years of age
- During early stages of development → greater likelihood to think that a human belongs
with nature when more personal associations with nature are primed
- Across development → decreasing likelihood to conceive of humans as belonging with
nature when associations btw the self & nature are highlighted
- Children & adults growing up in urban communities in the US are acquiring more
psychologically distant concepts of human nature relations through cultural input they
receive throughout development

Ä findings reveal the importance of context for human-nature categorization, & the
importance of priming personal associations with nature vs. more abstract concepts of
nature

Not just for stereotyping anymore – Tadmor

- Creative stagnation = the rigid activation of typical category attributes when solving a
particular problem
- Racial essentialism = overreliance on racial categories
→ results in increased racial stereotyping & conflicting intergroup relations
- Essentialism effects creativity negatively through how ppl think, not what
→ It is the style of info processing ≠ than the content of one’s thinking that determines
creative potential
- The harmful effects of racial essentialism on creativity are mediated by closed-
mindedness among both majority- & minority-group members

Multiple systems of category learning – Smith

Working Memory Categorization System


- Rule-based categorization = WM
- Decide whether a test item belongs to a particular category by determining whether it fits
a rule that defines the category
- Requires selective attention & temporary storage
- Involved cognitive operations:
1. selectively attending to each critical attribute (= one mentioned in the rule)
2. determining whether its value matches a value/feature specified in the rule
3. combine the outcomes of stage 2 in WM to determine final categorization
- Support:
o activation in left hemisphere: inferior parietal cortex, parietal occipital cortex,
anterior cingulate → associated with selective attention & WM

Explicit LTM Categorization System


- 2 similarity-based categorization processes
o decide whether a test item belongs in a category by determining its similarity to
remembered exemplars of that category
o or by comparing it to the prototype of a category
- Support
o activation in both hemispheres: temporal-parietal cortex
→ associated with integration of multiple features

Implicit LTM Categorization System


- Decide whether an item belongs to a category by assessing the ease with which its
perceptual features can be processed
→ greater perceptual fluency = greater likelihood of category membership
- Similarity-based categorization can be based on either explicit or implicit memory
(support comes from amnesiacs → performed normally during implicit categorization
while showing impairment in recognition)
Lecture

- Culture blindness: assuming that observed findings in one’s own culture are presumed to
be universal
- Rules or Similarities?
o Rule-based classification: analytic, differential weighting of features, high working
memory load, serial & controlled processing, yields certainty over flexibility
 Time pressure = similarities
 High load task = similarities
 Instruction: use rule, be careful = rules
 Instruction: give first impression = similarities
 Random training = similarities
 Blocked training = rules
 Multiple systems for category learning!
o Applying rule vs similarity can be told apart with neuroimaging; different areas are
activated
o Surface similarities (in both pics are cars) vs structural similarities (car is presented
differently)

- Essentialism: object is placed in the category that is associated with the underlying naïve
theory that best explains the object features
→ explanatory/causal relations = more important for determining category than
similarities

- Concept formation: abstraction of feature set


(child acquires representation of concept ‘apple’
- Concept learning: by applying concept & getting feedback
(child learn that/why tomato is not an apple)

Articles – MindMaps

MULTICULTURALISM
- Emphasizing & valuing cultural ethnic differences
o Advantages: promotes diversity, reduces bias; reduced anxiety in interracial
interactions; can increase performance on cognitive tasks for PoC
o Disadvantages: increased stereotyping, reinforcing that racial differences are an
essential human difference; can lead to prejudices
- Opposing view: Color blindness (= minimizing salience of group differences &
emphasizing commonalities)
- Study by Wilton: MC leads to greater essentialist beliefs

(RACE) ESSENTIALISM
- Belief that there are essential biological, stable, innate, & immutable differences btw
racial groups
o increases racial bias, decreases interest in interracial contact
- Can hamper creativity: habitual reluctance to consider alternative perspectives, less
cognitive flexibility (Carmit)

STEREOTYPES
- Stereotype activation: How quickly is a stereotype accessible?
o changed when participants only see white or only black faces
o can stay activated & transfer to other contexts
- Stereotype application: How quickly do we use a stereotype?
o category salience moderates stereotyping (judgment changes depending on
high/low threat)
o depends on context (always changes)

FORMATION OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES


- Using similarities to determine whether a person can be trusted (ex: similarity to mother)
- (Social) Categorization starts at early age
- Preference of in-group (not necessarily negative stereotypes)

CATEGORIES & BRAIN


- Working memory: rule-based categorization
o high WM load, serial & controlled processing, analytic
- Explicit LTM: similarity-based categorization
o used under time pressure, high task load, first impressions
o surface similarities vs deep similarities (meaning/analogies)
o compares item to prototype or remembered exemplar
- Implicit LTM: theory-based categorization
o assessment of ease with which object can be processed
o greater perceptual fluency indicating greater likelihood of category membership

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