German Management & Services, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495
Fernan, J.

FACTS:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of
232,942 sq. M. The land was originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds
Rizal as OCT 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on 27 July
1948. On 26 February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing German
Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Consequently, the
German Management obtained Development Permit 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by Gernale and Villeza
and 20 other persons, German Management advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter
refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the development of the subject property
which included the portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al. Gernale, et.al. filed an action for
forcible entry against German Management before the MTC Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are
mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan who have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15
years prior to the promulgation of PD 27, and that they were deprived of their property without due
process of law when German Management forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence
enclosing their farmholdings without notice and bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other
crops that they planted by means of force, violence and intimidation The MTC dismissed Gernale et.al.'s
complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the RTC sustained the dismissal by the MTC. Gernale then filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Said court gave due course to their petition and reversed
the decisions of the MTC and the RTC. The Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al. were in actual
possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by German Management, they have a
right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.
German Management moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court. Hence,
here is the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of self-help may be availed of when respondents refused to vacate the
premises.

HELD: No. The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of the prior
possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429 NCC) is unavailing because
the such doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession, which is
absent in the present case. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 New Civil Code which provides that
"in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He, who believes that he has an action or right to 26 deprive another of the holding of a
thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
Caisip v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 17
Concepcion, C. J.

FACTS:

Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria Cabalag cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of
Hacienda Palico situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, the same land used to be tenanted by Cabalag’s father
when he was still alive. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y Cia, administered by Antonio Chuidian, and
supervised by the overseer, Felix Caisip. Prior to the incident involved, Guevarra sought recognition as a
lawful tenant of Royas y Cia from the Court of Agrarian Relations but his action was dismissed.
Thereafter, Roxas y Cia filed an action against Guevarra for forcible entry with prayer that Guevarra be
ejected from the premises of Lot 105-A. The Justice of the Peace of Court of Nasugbu decided in favor of
Roxas y Cia and on June 6, 1959, a trouble between Cabalag and Caisip occurred regarding the cutting of
sugarcane. A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by
Caisip. Due to Cabalag’s tenacious attitude, Caisip sought the help of the Chief of Police of Nasugbu. The
Deputy Sheriff, however, informed Caisip that his request to eject Cabalag cannot be acted upon
without a proper court order. Nevertheless, the Chief of Police assigned Sergeant Ignacio Rojales and
Corporal Frederico Villadelrey to Haciendo Palico. On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding a
portion of Lot 105-A which was a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused
to do so. So, Caisip went to Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey and brought them to Cabalag. Rojales told
Cabalag to stop weeding but she insisted on her right to stay in the said lot. While in squatting position,
Cabalag was grabbed by Rojales who twisted her right arm and wrested the trowel she was holding.
Villadelrey held her left hand and together Rojales forcibly dragged her towards a banana plantation
while Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun. Cabalag shouted, “Ina ko po! Ina ko po!” and was heard by
some neighbors. Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which Cabalag was affiliated, went with
them on their way to the municipal building. Upon arrival, Cabalag was turned over by Rojales and
Villadelrey to the policemen on duty, who interrogated her. But upon representations made by Rivera,
she was released and allowed to go home. Cabagan then filed a complaint charging Caisip, Rojales and
Villadelrey of the crime of “grave coercion.” The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them guilty as
charged. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip and others, in the exercise of his right granted by
Article 429, is reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property. 27

HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by Article 429. This is totally inapplicable to
the case, for, having been given 20 days from June 6th within which to vacate the lot, Cabalag did not,
on June 17th and within said period, invades or usurps the said lot. She had merely remained in
possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor by reason of
the prior order of the Justice of Peace Court of Nasugbu. Caisip and others did not repel or prevent an
actual or threatened physical invasion or usurpation. They expelled Cabalag from a property which she
and her husband were in possession, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized Guevarra
and Cabalag to stay in said property up to June 26th, and had expressed the view that he could not oust
them without a judicial order. It is clear, therefore, that Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey, by means of
violence, and without legal authority, had prevented the complainant from doing something not
prohibited by law (weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her to do something against her will
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), whether it be right or wrong, thereby taking the law into
their hands, in violation of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code.

People of the Philippines v. Pletcha

G.R. No. 19029-CR, June 27, 1977, 22 CA Rep. 807
Sison, J.

FACTS:

Tito Pletcha, Jr., farmer, invoking ‘self-help’ in defense of the land he inherited from his father 19 years
ago against the workers of Radeco Corporation, who without court order, were constructing a fence in a
hacienda allegedly leased by the corporation from a certain Lopinco. Claiming actual possession and
ownership and believing that the land sought to be fenced was an integral part of the land he inherited,
Pletcha asked the group to desist from fenicing pending a resurvey he proposed, but he was totally
ignored, thus he fought off and prevented the workers. As a result of such resistance he was prosecuted
and convicted of grave coercion by the Municipal Trial Court. Pletcha appealed the decision of the MTC
with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the appellant’s action is a legitimate exercise of a private citizen’s ‘selfhelp.

HELD: Yes. In the instant case,the usurper’s possession has not yet become complete and the
complainants were in the act of building a fence. Such an act constitutes force in contemplation of the
law. This act of trespass justified the appellant to drive them away, even by means of bolo because they
refused to listen to his appeal which is reasonable. The appellant need not rush to the court to seek
redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of his property. The situation required immediate action
and Art. 429 gave him the self executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance. The provision in
Art 429 of the New Civil Code confirms the right of the appellant, an owner 28 and lawful possessor, to
use reasonable force to repel an invasion or usurpation, actual, threatened or physical of his property.
The principle of self-defense and the protective measures related thereto, covers not only his life, but
also his liberty and property. “The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force, not
only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is a sort of self-defense. It is
lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by
force. The use of such necessary force to protect propriety or possessory rights constitutes a justifying
circumstance under the Penal Code.”

DIAMOND FARMS V. DIAMOND FARM WORKERS G.R. 192999

Facts:

Diamond Farms, Inc. is a corporation engaged in commercial farming of bananas. A big portion of this
land measuring 958 hectares was initially deferred for acquisition and distribution under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). On November 3, 1992, Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise approved the Production and Profit Sharing (PPS)
Scheme proposed by the Philippine Banana Growers and Exporters Association as the mode of
compliance with the required production sharing under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Later, on February 14, 1995, the Deferment
Order was lifted and the aforesaid 958-hectare land was placed under CARP coverage. Thereafter,
698.8897 hectares of the 958-hectare land were awarded to members of the Diamond Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARBMUPCO). Petitioner, however, maintained management
and control of 277.44 hectares of land, including a portion measuring 109 hectares. On November 23,
1999, petitioner’s certificates of title over the 109-hectare land were cancelled. In lieu thereof, Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-154155 to T-154160 were issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. On August 5, 2000, the DAR identified 278 CARP beneficiaries of the 109- hectare land,
majority of whom are members of respondent Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(DFWMPC). On October 26, 2000, the DAR issued six Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs)
collectively in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries. Subsequently, on July 2, 2002, petitioner filed a
complaint for unlawful occupation, damages and attorney s fees against respondents. Petitioner alleged
that as of November 1995, it was the holder of TCT Nos. 112068 and 112073 covering two parcels of
land within the 109-hectare land. It alleged that it had been in possession for a long time of the two
lands, which had a total area of 74 hectares, and grew thereon export-quality banana, producing on
average 11,000 boxes per week worth P1.46 million. It alleged that the DAR’s August 5, 2000 order
distributing the 109-hectare land to 278 CARP beneficiaries was not yet final on account of appeals, and
therefore petitioner remains the lawful possessor of the subject land (109-hectare land) and owner of
the improvements thereon. But while the CARP beneficiaries have not been finally designated and
installed, respondents its farm workers refused to do their work from June 10, 2002, forcibly entered
and occupied the 74-hectare land, and prevented petitioner from harvesting and introducing agricultural
inputs. Thus, petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to vacate the subject land; that it be
allowed to harvest on the 74-hectare land; and that respondents be ordered to pay it lost income of
P1.46 million per week from June 10, 2002 until farm operation normalizes. Respondents claimed that
petitioner conspired with 67 CARP beneficiaries to occupy and cultivate the 35- hectare land. Petitioner
tried to allow alleged beneficiaries to occupy portions of the 74-hectare land, but respondents guarded
it to protect their own rights, so the intruders were able to occupy only the pumping structure.
Thereafter, petitioner stopped farm operation on the 74-hectare land and refused their request to
resume farm operation. By way of relief, respondents prayed that their rights as CARP beneficiaries of
the 109-hectare land be recognized and that their counterclaims for production share, profit share,
accrued income and interest be granted. DARAB and CA ruled in favor of the respondents which resulted
to the petitioner filing an appeal.

Issues:

1. whether respondents are guilty of unlawful occupation and liable to petitioner for damages and
attorney’s fees,

2. whether petitioner should turn over possession of the subject land to respondents and respect their
possession thereof, and

3. whether the award of production share and interest was proper

Ruling: On the first issue, we agree that respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation and that
there exists no basis to award damages and attorney’s fees to petitioner as respondents are agrarian
reform beneficiaries who have been identified as such, and in whose favor CLOAs have been issued. We
thus uphold the ruling denying petitioner’s prayers in its complaint for unlawful occupation, damages
and attorney s fees. We also find the action taken by respondents to guard the land as reasonable and
necessary to protect their legitimate possession and prevent precisely what petitioner attempted to do.
Such course was justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code which reads: ART. 429. The owner or lawful
possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. Being legitimate possessors of the
land and having exercised lawful means to protect their possession, respondents were not guilty of
unlawful occupation. On the second issue, petitioner must now turn over possession of the 109-hectare
land. We hold that the 109-hectare land must be distributed to qualified CARP beneficiaries. They must
be installed on the land and have possession and control thereof. To fully address petitioner s
allegations, we move on to its claim that the issue of just compensation is an issue that may easily be
gleaned at least from the submissions of the parties in their pleadings and one that had therefore been
tried under the parties’ implicit agreement. Petitioner’s claim is unfounded. Even the instant appeal39 is
silent on the factors to be considered40 in determining just compensation. These factors are
enumerated in Section 1741 of the CARL which reads: SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation.
In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as
well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. What petitioner stressed before
us and before the CA to assail respondents’ possession is its less-thancandid claim that it has yet to
receive any compensation for the lands acquired by the government.42 Petitioner s cause of action in its
complaint for unlawful occupation with prayer that respondents be ordered to vacate and pay damages
and attorney s fees cannot also be mistaken as one for determination of just compensation. Thus, just
compensation was never an issue in this case. On the third issue, petitioner contends that respondents
are not entitled to production share as well as interest since they are not lawful possessors of the
subject land. Petitioner asserts that the 3% production share under Section 32 of the CARL may only be
given if there are sales from the production of the land. Petitioner however claims that it has incurred
losses and that respondents admitted that farm operations in the subject land have not normalized.
Petitioner thus submits that there is no factual basis in the production share from the sale of agricultural
products in the subject land. The contention has no merit. We have already ruled that respondent’s
possession is legitimate. On petitioner s claim that it incurred losses, Section 32 of the CARL clearly
states that the 3% production share of the farm workers is based on "gross sales from the production of
such lands," to wit: SEC. 32. Production-Sharing. Pending final land transfer, individuals or entities
owning, or operating under lease or management contract, agricultural lands are hereby mandated to
execute a production-sharing plan with their farmworkers or farmworkers organization, if any, whereby
three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60)
days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over
and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize
gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application,
determines a lower ceiling. Petitioner cites its net losses, computed after deductions were made on the
amount of its sales. These losses however, have no bearing in computing the production share which is
based on gross sales. And petitioner s own allegation of weekly production worth P1.46 million the same
amount used by petitioner as basis of its claim for damages debunks its claim that no basis exists that
there were sales from agricultural products of the subject land. Likewise supporting the existence of
sales is petitioner s own computation of respondents’ production share and its deposit of the amount of
P2.51 million before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator. It must be noted also that farm operations
normalized within five days from the filing of the complaint. In sum, petitioner failed to show any
reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the DARAB s computation of respondents’ production
share based on the approved PPS Scheme. Notably, petitioner has admitted the fact of approval of the
PPS Scheme.

Fuentes vs. Roca 

G.R. No. 178902,  [April 21, 2010]
FACTS:

Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to
petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They met in the office of Atty. Romulo D.
Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale and signed an agreement to sell that Atty.
Plagata prepared. It expressly stated that the sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months,
Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife,
Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.

Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the
lot and pay him an additional pay besides the downpayment, depending on whether or not he
succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these
conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and
payment.

The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements
of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign
an affidavit of consent. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who
immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents(collectively, the
Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses
before the RTC.

The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her
consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the
property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid
Tarciano.

The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally
saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He admitted, however,that he notarized the document in
Zamboanga City four months later. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of
forgery was personal to Rosario   and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive
period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their
conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged?

2. Whether the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed?

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the  action to annul
that sale?

HELD:

It was forged

It did not prescribe

The heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the sale.

RATIO:

1. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent had been
forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her consent to her husband’s sale of
the conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic. The SC agreed with the CA that the
signature was forged.

While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms
such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly
relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void
without an authentic consent.

2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not
the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property
to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family  Code took effect on August
3, 1988.

When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership of gains
on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wife’s
consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173 gave
Rosario the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the
sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the
property that Tarciano fraudulently sold.

But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations
Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already
existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.

(n)

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period
within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply
provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same
would be void.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and
effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive
provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent.
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its
terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what
has been given under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.

Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and re-
conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent.
The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

3. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the  ownership of
the property to their heirs,

Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990, 191 SCRA 195 Fernan, C.J.
FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons,
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners instituted a criminal action
against the officers and directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action against
respondent corporation for damages. The trial court dismissed the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, as
the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The appellate court
affirmed the order of the trial court. The motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held
civilly liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to
sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. It must be
stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides
that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected
forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code
imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence. However, responsibility for fault or negligence under the said article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. The plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The decision is reversed and set aside.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA),

Petitioner,

vs.

RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, INC., LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, LEOSA NANETTE AGDEPPA and
MARCELINO VIERNES, MARGARITA TABOADA, PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH ORTIZ, represented by LINA
ERLINDA A. ORTIZ and MARIO ORTIZ, JUAN MAMAC and GLORIA MATAS, Respondents.

SERENO, J.

FACTS:

NIA Is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation specially authorized under P.. 552 to exercise

the power of eminent domain

NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation
Project. On 08 September 1994, it filed with the RT of abacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the
expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land.

RTc issued an Order forming a committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the expropriated
properties to establish the just compensation to be paid to the owners.

The committee included excavations/removed earthfalls separate from the subject lots in determining
the just compensation.

Rtc RULING: rtc adopt the committee report and ordered. inter alla: XXX XXX XXX

3. That the NIA shall pay to the defendant-intervenors, owners of Lot No. 3080, the sum of
P5,128,3/5.50, representing removed earthfill;

4. That the NIA shall pay to the defendants, owners of Lot No. 3039, the sum of P1,929,611.30
representing earthfill;
CA RULING:

CA Decision , however, deleted the inclusion of the value of the soil excavated from the properties in
the just compensaton, It ruled that the propertv owner was enutled to compensaton on iv for the value
or the property at the time of the taking. In the construction of irrigation projects, excavations are
necessarv to build the canals, and the excavated son cannot be valued separate trom the and
expropriated. Thus, it concluded that MIA, as the new owner of the affected properties, had the right to
enjoy and make use of the property, including the excavated soil, pursuant to the latter's objectives

ISSUE: WON the excavated soil should be accounted as separate and distinct from their respective lots
in determining just compensation

HELD: NO

In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al,, we held that rights over lands are indivisible, viz:

Consequently, the CA's findings which upheld those of the trial court that respondents owned and
possessed the propertv and that its substrata was Dossessed ov pettoner since lyd for the underground
tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-
terrain porton or the propertv similariv belonas to respondents. his conclusion is drawn from Article 437
of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the
reasonable requirements of aerial navigation

Thus, The ownership of land extenas to the surrace as welL as to the subsoil under It

We agree with the OSG that NIA, in the construction of irrigation projects, must necessarily make
excavations in order to build the canals. Indeed it is preposterous that NiA will be made to pay not only
for the value of the land but also for the soil excavated from such land when such excavation is a phase
in the building of irrigation projects. That NIA will make use of the excavated soil is of no moment and is
or no concern to the landowner who has been Dad the fair market value or his land As pointed out by
the OSG, the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface area only. Further, NIA,
now being the owner of the expropriated property, has the right to enjoy and make use of the property
in accordance with its mandate and objectives as provided by law. To sanction the Davment or the
excavated sows to allow the andowners to recover more than the value or the and at the time when it
was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the
construction or important public improvements.