G.R. No.

197291 April 3, 2013

First Division: BERSAMIN, J.:

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner, vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of
Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.

Principle: In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to
direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently,
the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to
include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain
way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.

Case: This is a direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari, taken from the final order issued on
June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila,
dismissing petitioner’s petition for mandamus.

Facts: History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57
innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao
Province. Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of
Datu Unsay, Maguindanao. The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other
suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao
massacre.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when he was
arraigned. Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. Petitioner,
wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima to request the inclusion of Dalandag in
the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation
in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. However, Secretary De Lima denied
petitioner’s request.

Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel
respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing
trial in the QC RTC. RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus.

 
Issue: Whether or not the respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as
an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ?

Held & Ratio: No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government
whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what
and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best
appreciated by the public prosecutors. The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the
determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of
appropriate criminal charges against a respondent.

Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in
court. Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court
deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow
the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what
constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By
way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent
and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law."

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the
tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be
resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action,
but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to
compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion. As
such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but
may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request. Considering that
respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letterrequest, mandamus was no longer available as
petitioner's recourse.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order issued on
June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10- 124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and ORDERS petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.

Salazar v People |g.r no. 149472 |October 15, 2002| PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

FACTS: The accused received from Olivier Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. the amount of
$41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture of seven
hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound to deliver to said complainant, and
the accused once in possession of the same, far from complying from his obligation, with unfaithfulness
and abuse of confidence and to defraud said complainant, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his own personal use and benefit
despite repeated demands to return the said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do
so, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned amount of $41,300.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine currency.

ISSUE: WON it is necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal?

RULING: No. It is not necessary that the proper “offended party” file a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the fiscal—a “complaint” filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may
be filed by any person; If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended
party and in case of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal.—The “complaint” referred to in
Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court to commence a criminal action in those cases where a
complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of an information which is generally filed by
a fiscal. It is not necessary that the proper “offended party” file a complaint for purposes of preliminary
investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot
be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for preliminary investigation. Thus,
as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or information, both of which are filed
in court. If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case
of an information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a “complaint” filed with the fiscal prior
to a judicial action may be filed by any person. Thus, in the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by
Skiva despite the finding of the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.

Zapanta v. People

G.R. No. 170863

March 20, 2013

FACTS:

                Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner with the crime of qualified theft. The
petitioner, Anthony V. Zapanta, then Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project
being undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR. A Mojica Construction and General
Services  undertook the Porta Vaga building construction. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and
erection of the building’s structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon family. The
petitioner instructed the truck driver, and about 10 Anmar welders to unload about 10 to 15 pieces of
20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar’s alleged new contract project along Marcos Highway. On
another occasion, he again instructed the driver and welders to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters
and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams on Marcos Highway. Later, Engr. Aquino, project manager of
AMCGS informed Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams has been returned to Anmar’s
warehouse as reflected in the logbook. The petitioner entered a plea of “not guilty.” In his defense, the
petitioner denied the charge against him. He claimed that AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him. The
prosecution offered in evidence oral testimonies as well as documentary evidence as established facts.
RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. CA set aside the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the
RTC’s decision. Later, CA denied the motion for reconsideration that followed, the petitioner filed the
present petition.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision convicting
the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.  

HELD:

                The CA did not commit a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision. Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of the complaint or
information, provides: “xx information is sufficient if it states,  xxx, the approximate date of the
commission of the offense, xxx”As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of
the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds: “It is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense. xx” With these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged. In this case, the petitioner had been fully
apprised of the charged of qualified theft since the information stated the approximate date of the
commission of the offense through the words “sometime in the month of October, 2001.”

G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs
PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, Accused-Appellants
Facts:
The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on 2005
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City. Co-accused Edwin withdrew
from the appeal, leaving Eduardo as the sole accused in the resolution of the
appealed case. Accused herein seek acquittal.

According to the State’s evidence of guilt, they averred that sometime in

March 2000, in one evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen
(which also includes a jai alai betting station) in Quezon City. Estrella was
preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband. Estrella’s
son, the deceased Moises, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan owned the
said canteen and managed the betting station. At about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito and Ferdinand arrived at the canteen to
greet their stepfather. At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration
was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a
motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Accused asked the teller (Jonathan),
while attending to other customers, to come out. Moises, however,
approached the accused and tried to pacify them. Estrella prevented Moises
not to go near the accused since she saw the latter armed with guns. Despite
this, Moises proceeded and advised the accused not to force Jonathan to go
out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten
Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.”
Successive shots were thereafter heard, leaving Moises dead. Ferdinand
approached to help his brother but was then shot, even Joselito was shot,
hitting his back while running.

The accused version of the story had been different but was not given merit by
the lower court.
The Information filed by the State includes conspiracy and treachery which
qualifies the crime to murder. On appeal, accused assails among others that
the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery as alleged
in the Information.

Issue:
Whether or not the Information sufficiently alleged the attendance of
treachery to convict the accused of three counts of murder.

Held:
No. The Court pronounced PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of
three murders, on account of the Informations not sufficiently alleging the
attendance of treachery. However, it affirmed the CA’s decision on the
credibility of the witnesses and the presence of conspiracy between the two
accused as proved in the facts alleged.

The Court noted that treachery encompasses a wide variety of actions and
attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime
committed. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically
aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal
conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of
affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself. Further the Court laid
down its decision in People vs. Dimaano that “No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. “

Also, the Court ruled that “The averments of the Informations to the effect
that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting them
with a gun, hitting them” on various parts of their bodies “which were the
direct and immediate cause of their deaths” did not sufficiently set forth the
facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the killings.
It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the
crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the
defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an
instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that
could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery
constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but
a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the Informations.”.

The allegations in the Information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus,

when there is a variance between the offense charged in the Information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. In
that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.

Issue: Whether or not the judgement by the appellate court downgrading the penalty of Edwin’s co-accused is
applicable to him.

Held: Yes. On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the
crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three counts of
murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable
to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly
unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against
the victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

A literal interpretation of the phrase “did not appeal,” as espoused by private respondent, will not give justice to the
purpose of the provision.

It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an
accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact,
several cases rendered by the Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an
appeal by a co- accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.

People vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth), Supra

Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464 – Case Digest

FACTS
Petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr. (Sibal), was charged of violation of Section
4 of R.A. No. 8049-Anti-Hazing Law

That on January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol, Calamba, City, Province of Laguna, the above
named accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and
present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is
not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence
upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the
fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the victim.

The accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment and filed a motion to quash for lack of probable
cause which was denied by the RTC.

RTC indicted Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily assault
and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final initiation
rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites, but they also
brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

Also, the witnesses presented by the defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested
parties. 

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and RA 8049 sec 4 is unconstitutional.

The CA denied the notice of appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 arguing that they were convicted of a crime not
stated in the information. While the evidence proved that they were guilty of hazing by inducement this
does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual participation. Thus, they cannot be
convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information.

The Court argued that Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper
offense and convicted for such.

Dungo and Sibal were found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Their involvement in the hazing of
Villanueva is not merely based on prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial
evidence and an unbroken chain of events. Wherefore petition is denied.

ISSUE

Whether or not violation of Anti-Hazing law is mala in se or mala prohibita?

RULING

Violation of Anti-Hazing Law is mala prohibita. The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum
prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute
to be malum prohibitum. The Congress created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of
mala prohibita. 

In Vedana v. Valencia, the Court noted that in our nation’s very recent history, the people had spoken,
through the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal. The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be
against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial
in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.

G.R. No. 182926               June 22, 2015

ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner,vs.

HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, or the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, DKT
PHILS., INC., represented by ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents

Facts:

The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc.,
represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still
its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses
in the amount of ₱1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of ₱810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and
claimed reimbursement for it.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The accusatory
portion of the Information filed against her reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in the said
receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (₱810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (₱1,810.00) and thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT
Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result of which received the amount
of 1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be
proved during trial. Acts committed contrary to the provision of Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article
171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied it in a
Resolution7 dated January 24, 2006. Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the
November 2, 2005 Order and January 24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.

On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis
or merit. Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA. In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA
dismissed Navaja’s appeal and affirmed in toto the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.

Issue:
WON THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.

Ruling: YES, the Municipal Trial Court of Jagna, Bohol have jurisdiction over the case. Venue in criminal
cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle was explained by the Court in Foz, Jr. v.
People, thus:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.15

In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has
jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood
from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed
constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Furthermore, in Union Bank of the Philippines v. People, the Court said that both provisions categorically
place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of
action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense
was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.

In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually
falsified, to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the
falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended.

Balindong vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 177600 and 178684, 19 October 2015

UNION BANK VS. PEOPLE

Summary:
Union Bank and Desi Tomas, an employee of theirs, are questioning the venue used for the
filing of the Information that alleges Perjury against Tomas. Tomas had been accused of being
untruthful in the forum shopping certifications, where two cases were filed against the same
party Union Bank was attempting to collect from. The oath was taken in Makati City, and was
submitted to the court in Pasay City. The Supreme Court held that Makati City was the proper
venue for the case on perjury, because that was where the elements of the crime occurred.

Doctrine:
Venue is based on the location where any of the essential elements take place.

2. Perjury in the RPC punishes two acts: a) the giving of false testimony in court, b) the
making of a false statement under oath

Facts:
 Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping
 The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza
Tamondong and a John Doe
 Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against
Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of
the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in
the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding
involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
 Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the venue was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and
used) and not the MeTC Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.
 The MeTCMakati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over
the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.
 Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the RTC against the MeTC Decision,
but this was dismissed by the RTC which found that the MeTC committed no grave
abuse of discretion
 Hence the current petition

Issues Ratio:
1. WON the proper venue for the filing of the Information on Perjury against Thomas is in
the MeTC of Makati, which is where the certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized. – YES

 Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only

the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
 Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
o (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred.
 Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
o Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient
if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or
some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction
of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
 Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not
only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
 In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against
litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora.
 The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
o (a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon
a material matter.
o (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath.
o (c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
o (d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by
law or made for a legal purpose
 Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined
together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently
support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the
territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC Makati City.
 The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati
City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City:
 We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also
sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City
 Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she
made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary
public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she
subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and
MeTC Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to
 Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
 (THERE IS ALSO A LONG AND WINDING DISCUSSION OF THE
CONFLICTING PRECEDENTS – REFER TO CASE FOR THIS IN THE EVENT IT
IS PERTINENT)
 With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which
provides:
 in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a
proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires
an oath.
 As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the
site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made
 In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts
of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the
respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a
complaintaffidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in
the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas
of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
 Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision;
thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which
penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a
duly authorized person.
 To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed
through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the
time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that
all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed
through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the
sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and
the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.