First Part Evidence

ear Class,
I am still in the process of updating and finalizing our syllabus.
For the upcoming class, please refer to the coverage of our

discussion below:
I. General Provisions
A. Definition of evidence; truth as purpose

1. Direct and circumstantial evidence
2. Cumulative and corroborative evidence
3. Positive and negative evidence
B. Proof and evidence
C. Scope and applicability of the rules on evidence
D. Requisites for admissibility of evidence
1. Multiple admissibility
2. Conditional admissibility
3. Curative admissibility
E. Relevancy; collateral matters
Rule 128, Rules of Court

1. Tan, Jr. v. Hosana, G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016- a void
contract is still admissible in evidence to prove the
consideration; transactions during the execution of the contract.
No provision of the law provides for its exclusion only
enforceability.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G.

HOSANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the

August 28, 2009 decision2 and November 17, 2009 resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
88645.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C.

Hosana (Milagros) on January 14, 1979.4 During their marriage,
Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga
City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 21229.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan,
Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale
executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in
her favor.6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the
lot was P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled
and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of
Tomas.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of

Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages against
Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City.9 The
complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 62, Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he
was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and
knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging
Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized
Milagros to sell the subject property to
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good

faith and for value.11 Before he paid the full consideration of the
sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend who
told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in
order.12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing
Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of the
title.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed

compensatory and moral damages, attorney's fees, and expenses,
for litigation, in the event that judgment be rendered in favor of
Jose.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her
answer to Jose's complaint and Tomas' cross-claim.15 On the other
hand, it dismissed Tomas' complaint against the Register of
Deeds since it was only a nominal
party.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits

ensued.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole

witness. Bonifacio testified that he learned of the sale of the
subject property from Milagros' son.18 When Bonifacio confronted
Milagros that Jose would get angry because of the sale, Milagros
retorted that she sold the property because she needed the
money. Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who was then in
Japan, of the sale.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the
Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with the Register of
Deeds and discovered that the title covering the disputed
property had been transferred to
Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was

forged.21 Bonifacio presented documents containing the signature
of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit,
duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis
pendens, community tax certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen
signatures, and a handwritten letter.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as

corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his goddaughter.
Sometime in December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to the
house of Milagros to confirm if Jose knew about the sale
transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana
was able to talk to Jose who confirmed that he was aware of the
sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale.
Rosana informed Tomas of Jose's
confirmation.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas
made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00
upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale).
Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros on the
Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written
consideration was lower than the actual consideration paid.
Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes. Tomas also
learned from Milagros that she needed money badly and had to
sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her
money.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC Ruling
In its decision dated December 27, 2006,25 the RTC decided in

favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to
Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein
Jose supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was
actually null and void.
Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally

indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate
damages.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA Ruling
Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.

In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void. However, the
CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the
award of temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose and
Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00,
with interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite
Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the
CA found that there was no convincing evidence that established
this claim.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision

on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 as reimbursement
for the purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient and
not supported by the evidence formally offered before and
admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the actual amount he
paid as consideration for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported
by his testimony before the RTC.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit"

in a resolution dated November 17,
2009.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Petition
Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to

challenge the CA ruling which ordered the reimbursement of
P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price he paid in
the amount of P700,000.00.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale,

including the consideration stated, cannot be used as evidence
since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was
not specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of the
sale;32third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of
P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must
return the full amount actually paid under the principle of solutio
indebiti.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from

questioning the purchase price indicated in the deed of dale for
failing to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms of
an agreement reduced into writing are deemed to include all the
terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other
than the terms of the agreement
itself.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issues
The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the
basis for the amount of consideration paid; and (2) whether the
testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase
price of the sale.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
OUR RULING
We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.
Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a

question of fact not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the correctness of the
appellate court's factual findings are not the functions of this
Court, as we are not a trier of facts.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to

rule on "the truth or falsehood of alleged facts,"37 except in the
following cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for

the subject property is a factual question that the CA had already
resolved in the negative.39 The CA found Tomas' claim of paying
P700,000.00 for the subject property to be unsubstantiated as he
failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim.
We uphold the CA's finding.
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations
has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of
their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered
by their opponent.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the

aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence." 42 Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of
the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid

Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be considered as proof of
payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this
claim. Tomas' bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not
automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the

burden of proving it;44 the burden rests on the defendant to prove
payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.45 A
mere allegation is not evidence,46 and the person who alleges has
the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite
quantum of evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of
evidence.
The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its

admissibility as evidence.
The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly

ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale, based on the principle of
unjust enrichment.
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the

consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis for the
reimbursable amount because a null and void document cannot
be used as evidence.
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very
beginning.47 This rule applies to contracts that are declared void
by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal
property without the other spouse's written consent. 48 A void
contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil
effects.49 It cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription.50 When, however, any of the terms of a void
contract have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence
is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under
it.51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the

restoration of what has been given is in order." 52 This principle
springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that
"every person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same." Hence, the restitution of what each party has
given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be

enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the
admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that
occurred in the course of executing the contract, i.e., what each
party has given in the execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the

truth respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned by the Rules of
Court.53 The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to
ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be the
entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a
means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated
and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of
sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the contract,
which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The
deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine matters that
occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination
of what each party has given under the void contract to allow
restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not

excluded by the law of these rules.54 There is no provision in the
Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void
document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant
and not excluded by the Rules for its
admissibility. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
55
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the

purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain the truth
respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the
document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence

which appears to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them
on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other
hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by
positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal
property without the spouse's consent. It does not, however,
preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated
therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is
consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit the
evidence: which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue
before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis

for the court to determine the presence of the essential elements
of the sale, including the consideration paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to
prove the actual consideration of the sale and, hence, cannot be
considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both
parties as evidence.57 Tomas, in fact, formally offered it for the
purpose of proving its execution and the regularity of the
sale.58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily

allowed the; lower courts to consider the terms written therein to
determine whether all the essential elements59 for a valid contract
of sale are present, including the consideration of the sale. The
fact that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent the
court from relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to
determine the actual amount paid by the petitioner for the
purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.
Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual
consideration of the sale is not necessary since it is necessarily
included in determining the regular execution of the sale.
The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima

facie evidence of the amount paid by the petitioner.
The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima

facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
60
Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on

its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient
to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting
the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or
contradicted, will remain sufficient.61chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale

constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount paid by Tomas for
the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce
satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the consideration
stated as the actual consideration and amount paid to Milagros
and Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive

provision of law requiring the consent of both spouses for the sale
of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the
presence of the consideration of the sale, except with respect to
the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and
effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the actual
consideration paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that

he paid to Milagros the amount of P700,000.00, instead of the
amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary
or testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher amount
was presented, apart from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole
testimony of payment is self-serving and insufficient to
unequivocally prove that Milagros received P700,000.00 for the
subject property.
Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains

sufficient evidence of the actual amount the petitioner paid and
the same amount which should be returned under the principle of
unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit

at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity, and good conscience."62 The prevention of unjust
enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is based
on Article 22 of the Civil Code.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he

or Milagros received under the void contract which presumably
benefitted their conjugal partnership.
Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount

of P200,000.00 since this the consideration stated in the Deed of
Sale and given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose
expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled to recover
the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing
in the contract.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review

on certiorari. The decision dated August 28, 2009 and the
resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., on leave.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 4-20.
2
Id. at 26-36. Penned by CA Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now
with the Supreme Court) and Antonio L. Villamor
3
Id. at 46-47.
4
Id. at 27.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 29.
8
Id. at 27.
9
Id. at 27-28. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-0341.
10
Id. at 28.
11
Id.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id at 21.
18
Id. at 28-29.
19
Id. at 29.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 22.
22
Id. at 29.
23
Id. at 29-30.
24
Id. at 21-24.
25
Id. at 24.
26
Id. at 26-36.
27
Id. at 35.
28
Id. at 37-44.
29
Id. at 46-47.
30
Id. at 9.
31
Id at 11.
32
Id. at 13-15.
33
Id. at 15-17.
34
Id. at 105-109.
35
Bognot v. RRI Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 180144, September

36
24, 2014, 736 SCRA 357, 366.
First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No.

37
166616, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 504.
New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.

38
No. 149281, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 220, 221, 227.
Rollo, p. 35.
39
Ramos v. Obispo, G.R. No. 193804, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA
40
240, 248.
Id.
41
Id. at 249.
42
Id.
43
Supra note 36, at 367.

44
Id.
45
Supra note 40, at 249.

46
Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 702,
47
711.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Mat 712.
51
Nool v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 106, 110 (1997).

52
Section 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

53
Section 3 of Rule 128.

54
Id.
55
Geronimo v. Sps. Calderon, G.R. No. 201781, December 10, 2014.

56
Rollo, pp. 49, 52.

57
Id. at 52.
58
Article 1318 in relation to Article 1458 of the Civil Code.
59
The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer

ownership in exchange for the price;
b) Determinate subject matter; and
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
Sps. Santos v. Sps. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007, 519
60
SCRA 408, 426.
Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No. 164575, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA

61
429,438.
Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr., G.R. No. 160600, January 15, 2014, 713
62
SCRA 224.
Id.
63
2. Atienza v. Board of Medicine, G.R. No. 177407, February 9,

2011, 642 SCRA 523-
Evidence is the means sanctioned by these rules in ascertaining
in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact-
The rules on evidence provides the manners of ascertaining in a
judicial proceeding- it includes admissions and notice or those
matters which need not be proven. Judicial notice on science.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177407 February 9, 2011
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated September 22,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico
Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, assailed the
Orders2 issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in
Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went

to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995.
Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to
Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several
diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right
kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she
underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s husband, Romeo
Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence
and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr.
Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio
Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or

incompetence committed by the said doctors, including
petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully
functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and
non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant

Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent Editha
Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of
documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she
offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated.
She described her exhibits, as follows:
"EXHIBIT ‘A’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request

form dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as
Annex ‘2’ as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III’s counter affidavit filed with the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal
complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation
of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally,
this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the
certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex ‘2’ to
the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x
Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable
Board in answer to this complaint;
"EXHIBIT ‘B’ – the certified photo copy of the X-ray request

form dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex
‘3’ as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III’s counter-affidavit filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the
criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the
said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally,
this exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the
certified photo copy of the document marked as Annex ‘3’
which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended
as such Annex ‘3’ to the counter-affidavit dated March 15,
2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with
this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.
"EXHIBIT ‘C’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request

form dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex
‘4,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination.
"EXHIBIT ‘D’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request

form dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex
‘16,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally,
this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final
report of the same examination which is the document
appended as Annexes ‘4’ and ‘1’ respectively to the counter-
affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela
Vega however, the document which is marked as Annex ‘4’
is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin,
the document marked as Annex ‘1’ is a certified photocopy.
Both documents are of the same date and typewritten
contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit
‘D.’
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent’s

[Editha Sioson’s] formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said
exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies,
not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to
establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits
are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent

[Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated
May 26, 2004. It reads:
"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson],

the Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein
respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of
[therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the
[BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of
this case.
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the
reception of the evidence of the respondents.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned

Order basically on the same reasons stated in his
comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in
its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it should first
admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its
probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board,
it can determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will
take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to,

Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the
BOM’s Orders which admitted Editha Sioson’s (Editha’s) Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE

PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004
AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD,
WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF
PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A PROPERTY RIGHT OR
ONE’S LIVELIHOOD.4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is

the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in
evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate
from the judgment that completely or finally disposes of the
case.5 At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing

that the BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA’s finding
that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse
of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha
contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are
inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by

Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not been
properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay;
and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner
contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not

strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such
as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence,7 in connection with evidence
which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful

or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other
hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the

admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded
the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals9 teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not

the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the
other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question
of whether or not it proves an issue.-
Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s

exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his
medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on
Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission
Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in

accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply
in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the
admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive
rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.10
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the

exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the
two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations
at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions

are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course

of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms

dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and
May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s medical case. The
documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of
the examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes
to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the
criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the
doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical
procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the
exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their
proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s

exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is
covered by mandatory judicial notice.11
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for

ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.12 Thus, they
likewise provide for some facts which are established and need
not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both
mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of nature involving the
physical sciences, specifically biology,14 include the structural
make-up and composition of living things such as human
beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s
kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most
human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence

rule is inapplicable.1awphil Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When

the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot

be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control

of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other

documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a

public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors

before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the
right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-
functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical
locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the
RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in
evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the

anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. To further drive home
the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of
Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her
abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of

the exhibits, is allowed.15 Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that
the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the
exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x
to the new building."16 Ultimately, since the originals cannot be
produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of
evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative
value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,

CASTILLO* JR.**
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T.

Carpio per Raffle dated August 2, 2010.
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A.

Abad per Raffle dated August 2, 2010.
1
Penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (a retired
member of this Court), with Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enrique, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp.
95-106.
2
Dated May 26, 2004 and October 8, 2004, respectively; id. at
408-411.
3
Id. at 95-99.
4
Id. at 677-678.
Raymundo v. Isagon Vda. de Suarez, G.R. No. 149017,

5
November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 384, 403-404.

6
Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 451 Phil. 839,
845-846 (2003).
7
Francisco, EVIDENCE RULES 128-134 (3rd ed. 1996), p. 9.
8
Id., citing People v. Jaca, et al., 106 Phil. 572, 575 (1959).
9
358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998).
Rollo, p. 101.
10
RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 1.

11
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court

shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

12

13
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court

may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.
Science of life, definition of Webster’s Third New

14
International Dictionary.

15
TSN, July 17, 2003; rollo, pp. 347-348.

16
Atienza vs Board of Medicine

GR No. 177407 February 9, 2011
Facts: Due to her Lumbar parts, private respondent Editha Sioson
went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4,
1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was
referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that
her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her
left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. This, she
underwent kidney operation in 1999, September. On February 18,
2000, private respondents husband Romeo Sioson, filed a
complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the
board of medicine against the doctors who allegedly participated
in the fateful kidney operation. It was alleged in the complaint
that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the
said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of
private respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the
left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney. Among the
evidence presented are certified photocopy of the results of the
ultrasound and X-ray conducted to Editha with the interpretation
that both of her kidneys are in their proper anatomical location.
Issue: Whether or not the doctors who conducted the kidney

operation are liable for gross negligence despite the evidence
presented were mere photocopies.
Held: Yes. To begin with, it is a well settled rule that the rules of

evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the Board of Medicine. It is the
safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or
technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent,
can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or
ignoring them.
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for

ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. This, they
likewise provide for some facts which are established and need
not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both
mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the
physical sciences, specifically biology include the structural
make-up and composition of living things such as human beings.
In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys
before, and after the time of her operation, as with most human
beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
3. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90487, November 21,

1991
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL

COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and
DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.
Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and as counsel for
respondent Tantoco, Jr.
NARVASA, J.:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R.
Santiago — together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and
Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No.
0008 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on July 21,
1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The
complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages,"
and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of
President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and

Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "MOTION
TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND
FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated
Nov. 3, 1987. 1 The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, 2 and the
movants, a reply to the opposition. 3 By order dated January 29,
1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and
accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45)
days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain
allegations. 4
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of
Basically, they sought an

Court" dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25." 5
answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG

(aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the
complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs.
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in
the . . case?" 6 The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated
February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as
being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as
the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and
irrelevant under any
guise." 7
On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded
As this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago

Complaint. 8
reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through a

Manifestation dated April 11, 1988. 9
the Sandiganbayan denied the

Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988, 10
motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file
interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual
basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out
impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan
declared inter alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and
clear enough," there are adequate allegations . . which clearly
portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged participation
of defendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in
said Complaint," and "the other matters sought for
particularization are evidentiary in nature which should be
ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined that
"(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without
leave of court is premature . . (absent) any special or
extraordinary circumstances . . which would justify . . (the same)."
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory

Counterclaim under date of July 18, 1988. 11 In response, the
PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss
Compulsory Counterclaim " 12
On July 25, 1989, the PCGG

The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. 13
submitted its PRE-TRIAL. The pre-trial was however reset to

14
September 11, 1989, and all other parties were required to submit
pre-trial briefs on or before that date. 15
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to
and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to

Plaintiff," 16
Plaintiff"' 17 as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of

Documents. 18
The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's amended
complaint, through such questions, for instance, as—
1. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 1 . ., what specific property or properties does the plaintiff
claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago for being ill-gotten?
3. In connection with the allegations . . in paragraph 10 (a) . . what specific act or acts . . were committed by
defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in "concert with" defendant Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit,
of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gotten wealth?"
5. In connection with . . paragraph 13 . ., what specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago . . were committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of
defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?
7. In connection with . . paragraph 15(c) . . is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case that Tourist Duty Free
Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially owned by either or both defendants
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders
of record of the same corporation are mere "dummies" of said defendants Ferdinand and /or Imelda R. Marcos?
On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination and copying
of—
1) the "official records and other evidence" on the basis of which the verification of the Amended
Complaint asserted that the allegations thereof are "true and correct;"
2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and . . marked as
exhibits for the plaintiff;" and

3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the decision (of
the Chairman and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar.
By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents (production being scheduled
on September 14 and 15, 1989), respectively.
On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989
(allowing production and inspection of documents). It argued that
1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked as exhibits during the pre-trial on September 11, 1989
anyway, the order for "their production and inspection on September 14 and 15, are purposeless and
unnecessary;"
2) movants already know of the existence and contents of the document which "are clearly described . . (in)
plaintiff's Pre-Trial Brief;"
3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are intended to be used against the PCGG and/or its
Commissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order No. 1, viz.:
(a) No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted
in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order.
(b) No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
which the
It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the Amended Interrogatories, 19
Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration of the

Resolution of August 21, 1989 (admitting the Amended
Interrogatories). The opposition alleged that —
1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the person
to whom they are propounded . .," or "who in the PCGG, in
particular, . . (should) answer the interrogatories;"
2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which had
already been decreed . . as part of the proof of the Complaint
upon trial . .;"
3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about

"matters of fact . . which defendants . . sought to . . (extract)
through their aborted Motion for Bill of Particulars;"
4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a deposition,

which is prematurely filed and irregularly utilized . . (since) the
order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence."
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September

18, 1989.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)

Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of
documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the
permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff
(PCGG). 20
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be
nullified because rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. More particularly, it claims —
a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff
PCGG:
1) that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular
individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the
PCGG;
2) that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the
Sandiganbayan (in denying the movants' motion for bill of particulars) had
already declared to be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial; and
3) that the interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers
witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and related issuances;
and
b) as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:
1) that movants had not shown any good cause therefor;
2) that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already
been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, and
the movants had viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto
and made comments thereon; and
3) that the other documents sought to be produced are either —
(a) privileged in character or confidential in nature and their use is
proscribed by the immunity provisions of Executive Order No. 1, or
(b) non-existent, or mere products of the movants' suspicion and fear.

This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989,
directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its questioned
resolutions of September 29, 1989 in Civil Case No. 0008. 21
After the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties,
the Solicitor General withdrew "as counsel for plaintiff . . with the
reservation, however, conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478, the
provisions of Executive Order No. 292, as well as the decisional law of
'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,' (G.R. No. 92561, September 12,
to submit his comment/observation

1990) 22
on incidents/matters pending with this . .

Court if called for by circumstances in the
interest of the Government or if he is so
required by the Court." 23 This, the Court
allowed by Resolution dated January 21,
1991. 24
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court
that the cases from which the Solicitor General had withdrawn would
henceforth be under his (Maceren's) charge "and/or any of the following
private attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko, Mario Jalandoni
and such other attorneys as it may later authorize." 25

The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully
ventilated their respective positions, the Court now proceeds to decide the
case.
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery
and
provided in the Rules of Court: interrogatories to parties , 26
production and inspection of documents

and things. 27 Now, it appears to the Court
that among far too many lawyers (and not a
few judges), there is, if not a regrettable
unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance
about the nature, purposes and operation of
the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet
unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination
to resort to them — which is a great pity for
the intelligent and adequate use of the
deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled
with pre-trial procedure, could, as the
experience of other jurisdictions
convincingly demonstrates, effectively
shorten the period of litigation and speed
up adjudication. 28 Hence, a few words
about these remedies is not at all
inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as
everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts.
This essential function is accomplished
by first, the ascertainment of all the material
and relevant facts from the pleadings and
from the evidence adduced by the parties,
and second, after that determination of the
facts has been completed, by the application
of the law thereto to the end that the
controversy may be settled authoritatively,
definitely and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of
the adjective law in this jurisdiction is
occupied with assuring that all the facts are
indeed presented to the Court; for
obviously, to the extent that adjudication is
made on the basis of incomplete facts, to
that extent there is faultiness in the
approximation of objective justice. It is thus
the obligation of lawyers no less than of
judges to see that this objective is attained;
that is to say, that there no suppression,
obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion
of the facts; and that no party be unaware of
any fact material a relevant to the action, or
surprised by any factual detail suddenly
brought to his attention during the trial. 29
Seventy-one years ago,
this Court
in Alonso v. Villamor, 30
described the nature and object of litigation

and in the process laid down the standards
by which judicial contests are to be
conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:
A litigation is not a game of
technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather a contest
in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue
and then brushing aside as wholly trivial
and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice
be done on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts. There should be no vested
right in technicalities. . . .
The message is plain. It is the duty of each
contending party to lay before the court the
facts in issue-fully and fairly; i.e., to present
to the court all the material and relevant
facts known to him, suppressing or
concealing nothing, nor preventing
another party, by clever and adroit
manipulation of the technical rules of
pleading and evidence, from also
presenting all the facts within his
knowledge.
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts
before the court is accomplished by the
pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only
in a very general way. Only "ultimate facts"
are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only
the barest outline of the facfual basis of a
party's claims or defenses is limned in his
pleadings. The law says that every pleading
"shall contain in a methodical and logical
form, a plain, concise and direct statement
of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as
the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts." 31
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are
alleged too generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable . . (an adverse party) properly to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a
"more definite statement" may be ordered by the court on motion of a party.
The office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to making more
particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading It is not its office to
supply evidentiary matters. And the common perception is that said
evidentiary details are made known to the parties and the court only during
the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the
pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by
the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law
that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial —
should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action,
not only those known to them individually, but also those known to
adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be
carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible
through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The
experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial,
under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of modern
procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby
shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game
with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before
trial is measurably increased. . ." 32
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to
remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore
performed primarily by the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a
device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify
the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the
facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable
parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible

knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said
trials are carried on in the dark. 33
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or
interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a
witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are
relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those
matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party
the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as
to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in
which generally
Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) 34
allows the examination of a deponent —

1) "regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject of the
pending action, whether relating to the
claim or defense of any other party;"
2) as well as:
(a) "the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible
things" and
(b) "the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts."
What is chiefly contemplated is the
discovery of every bit of information which
may be useful in the preparation for trial,
such as the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts; those
relevant facts themselves; and the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-
discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of "fishing expedition"
serve to preclude a party from inquiring
into the facts underlying his opponent's
case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever
facts he has in his possession. The
deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure
can be compelled from the time of trial to
the period preceding it, thus reducing the
possibility, of surprise, . . . 35
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-
discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether
by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b)
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions
under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally,
without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave
of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer
It is only when an

to the complaint has been served. 36
answer has not yet been filed (but after

jurisdiction has been obtained over the
defendant or property subject of the action)
that prior leave of court is needed to avail of
these modes of discovery, the reason being
that at that time the issues are not yet joined
and the disputed facts are not clear. 37
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a)
production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27,
or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which
may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise
untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the
party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or
proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the
disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the
party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining
a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as
established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery;
refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims
or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further
proceedings. 38
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be
undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention. "As indicated
by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to
annoy, embarass, or oppress the person subject to the
And . . . further limitations come into

inquiry. 39
existence when the inquiry touches upon

the irrelevant or encroaches upon the
recognized domains of privilege." 40
In fine, the liberty of a party to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if
the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the
inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.
It is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition-discovery
mechanism, in relation of course to the particular rules directly involved,
that the issues in this case will now be resolved.
The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance
with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained.
It should initially be pointed out — as regards the private respondents
—
"Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 41
that it was correct for them to seek leave to

serve interrogatories, because discovery
was being availed of before an answer had
been served. In such a situation, i.e., "after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property subject of the
action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule
24 (treating of depositions), in relation to
Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with
interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires
"leave of court." 42 But there was no need for
the private respondents to seek such leave
to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to
Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 1989 43) after they
had filed their answer to the PCGG's
complaint, just as there was no need for the
Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
1. The petitioner's first contention — that
the interrogatories in question are defective
because they (a) do not name the particular
individuals to whom they are propounded,
being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b)
are "fundamentally the same
matters . . (private respondents) sought to be
clarified through their aborted Motion . . for
Bill of Particulars" — are untenable and
quickly disposed of.
The first part of petitioner's submission is
adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25
which states that if the party served with
interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a
public or private corporation or a
partnership or association," the same shall
be "answered . . by any officer thereof
competent to testify in its behalf." There is
absolutely no reason why this proposition
should not be applied by analogy to the
interrogatories served on the PCGG. That
the interrogatories are addressed only to the
PCGG, without naming any specific
commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of
no consequence, and may not be invoked as
a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule
states, the interrogatories shall be answered
"by any officer thereof competent to testify
in its behalf."
That the matters on which discovery is
desired are the same matters subject of a
prior motion for bill of particulars
addressed to the PCGG's amended
complaint — and denied for lack of merit —
is beside the point. Indeed, as already
pointed out above, a bill of particulars may
elicit only ultimate facts, not so-
called evidentiary facts. The latter are
without doubt proper subject of
discovery. 44
Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lack
specificity. The merest glance at them disproves the argument. The
interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's
expanded complaint and inquire about details of the ultimate facts therein
alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the
interrogatories, on the ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the
inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress
But until such an objection is presented

it. 45
and sustained, the obligation to answer

subsists.
2. That the interrogatories deal with
factual matters which will be part of the
PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground for
suppressing them either. As already
pointed out, it is the precise purpose of
discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of
all the relevant facts on the part of all
parties even before trial, this being
deemed essential to proper litigation. This
is why either party may compel the other
to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession; and the stage at which
disclosure of evidence is made is advanced
from the time of trial to the period
preceding it.
3. Also unmeritorious is the objection that
the interrogatories would make PCGG
Commissioners and officers witnesses, in
contravention of Executive Order No. 14
and related issuances. In the first place,
there is nothing at all wrong in a party's
making his adversary his witness . 46 This is
expressly allowed by Section 6, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 6. Direct examination of unwilling
or hostile witnesses. — A party may . . .
call an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public
or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an
adverse party, and interrogate him by
leading questions and contradict and
impeach him in all respects as if he had
been called by the adverse party, and
the witness thus called may be
contradicted and impeached by or on
behalf of the adverse party also, and
may be cross-examined by the adverse
party only upon the subject-matter of
his examination in chief.
The PCGG insinuates that the private
respondents are engaged on a "fishing
expedition," apart from the fact that the
information sought is immaterial since they
are evidently meant to establish a claim
against PCGG officers who are not parties
to the action. It suffices to point out that
"fishing expeditions" are precisely
permitted through the modes of
discovery. 47 Moreover, a defendant who
files a counterclaim against the plaintiff is
allowed by the Rules to implead persons
(therefore strangers to the action) as
additional defendants on said counterclaim.
This may be done pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 6 of the Rules, to wit:
Sec. 14. Bringing new parties. — When
the presence of parties other than those
to the original action is required for the
granting of complete relief in the
determination of a counterclaim or cross-
claim, the court shall order them to be
brought in as defendants, if jurisdiction
over them can be obtained."
The PCGG's assertion that it or its members
are not amenable to any civil action "for
anything done or omitted in the discharge
of the task contemplated by . . (Executive)
Order (No. 1)," is not a ground to refuse to
answer the interrogatories. The disclosure
of facto relevant to the action and which are
not self-incriminatory or otherwise
privileged is one thing; the matter of
whether or not liability may arise from the
facts disclosed in light of Executive Order
No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter
proposition may properly be set up by way
of defense in the action.
The apprehension has been expressed that
the answers to the interrogatories may be
utilized as foundation for a counterclaim
against the PCGG or its members and
officers. They will be. The private
respondents have made no secret that this is
in fact their intention. Withal, the Court is
unable to uphold the proposition that while
the PCGG obviously feels itself at liberty to
bring actions on the basis of its study and
appreciation of the evidence in its
possession, the parties sued should not be
free to file counterclaims in the same actions
against the PCGG or its officers for gross
neglect or ignorance, if not downright bad
faith or malice in the commencement or
initiation of such judicial proceedings, or
that in the actions that it may bring, the
PCGG may opt not to be bound by rule
applicable to the parties it has sued, e.g., the
rules of discovery.
So, too, the PCGG's postulation that none of
its members may be "required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial . .
proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance," has no application to a
judicial proceeding it has itself initiated. As
just suggested, the act of bringing suit must
entail a waiver of the exemption from
giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings
itself within the operation and scope of all
the rules governing civil actions, including
the rights and duties under the rules of
discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would
have to be conceded, that while the parties
it has impleaded as defendants may be
required to "disgorge all the facts" within
their knowledge and in their possession, it
may not itself be subject to a like
compulsion.
The State is, of course, immune from suit in
the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued
without its consent. But it is axiomatic that
in filing an action, it divests itself of its
sovereign character and sheds its immunity
from suit, descending to the level of an
ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a
superior or preferred status to the State,
even while assuming to represent or act for
the State. 48
that the State makes no implied
The suggestion 49
waiver of immunity by filing suit except

when in so doing it acts in, or in matters
concerning, its proprietary or non-
governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it
attempts a distinction without support in
principle or precedent. On the contrary —
The consent of the State to be sued may
be given expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be manifested either
through a general law or a special law.
Implied consent is given when the State
itself commences litigation or when it
enters into a contract. 50
The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right
to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail
itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In
short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the
level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within
certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses
he might have against the state. . . . (Sinco, Philippine Political Law,
Tenth E., pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899)" 51
It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the
State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights
or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private
property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being
paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owner. 52
The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal
contention, of the nullity of the Sandiganbayan's Order for the production
and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its
possession.
The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to
be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and
marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the movants having in fact
viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made
comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about
these documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to the
desire of the private respondents to have copies of those documents in order
to study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any
purpose allowed by law.
The PCGG says that some of the documents are non-existent. This it can
allege in response to the corresponding question in the interrogatories, and

it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently established
that the denial is false.
The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No. 1
has already been dealt with. The PCGG is however at liberty to allege and
prove that said documents fall within some other privilege, constitutional or
statutory.
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good
cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject of the
Some of the documents

motion dated August 3, 1989. 53
are, according to the verification of the

amended complaint, the basis of several of
the material allegations of said complaint.
Others, admittedly, are to be used in
evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such
as these into which inquiry is precisely
allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end
that the parties may adequately prepare for
pre-trial and trial. The only other
documents sought to be produced are
needed in relation to the allegations of the
counterclaim. Their relevance is
indisputable; their disclosure may not be
opposed.
One last word. Due no doubt to the
deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the
nature, purposes and operation of the
modes of discovery earlier
mentioned, 54 there also appears to be a
widely entertained idea that application of
said modes is a complicated matter, unduly
expensive and dilatory. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. For example, as will
already have been noted from the preceding
discussion, all that is entailed to activate or
put in motion the process of discovery by
interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of
the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery
directly to a party of a letter setting forth a
list of least questions with the request that
they be answered individually. 55 That is all.
The service of such a communication on the
party has the effect of imposing on him the
obligation of answering the questions
"separately and fully in writing underoath,"
and serving "a copy of the answers on the
party submitting the interrogatories within
fifteen (15) days after service of the
interrogatories . . ." 56 The sanctions for
refusing to make discovery have already
been mentioned. 57 So, too, discovery under
Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex
than the service on a party of a letter or
other written communication containing a
request that specific facts therein set forth
and/or particular documents copies of
which are thereto appended, be admitted in
writing. 58 That is all. Again, the receipt of
such a communication by the party has the
effect of imposing on him the obligation of
serving the party requesting admission with
"a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters," failing
in which "(e)ach of the matters of which
admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted." 59 The taking of depositions in
accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral
examination or by written interrogatories)
while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless
by no means as complicated as seems to be
the lamentably extensive notion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED,
without pronouncement as to costs. The
temporary restraining order issued on
October 27, 1989 is hereby LIFTED AND SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,

Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., I also join Justice Cruz's concurrence.
Romero, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I am delighted to concurr with Mr. Justice Andres R.
Narvasa in his scholarly ponencia which, besides reaching a
conclusion sustained by the applicable law and
jurisprudence, makes for reading both pleasurable and
instructive. One function of the court not generally
appreciated is to educate the reader on the intricacies and
even the mustique of the law. The opinion performs this
function with impressive expertise and makes the modes of
discovery less esoteric or inaccessible to many members of
the bar.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I am delighted to concurr with Mr. Justice Andres R.

Narvasa in his scholarly ponencia which, besides reaching a
conclusion sustained by the applicable law and
jurisprudence, makes for coding both pleasurable and
instructive. One function of the court not generally
appreciated is to educate the reader on the intricacies and
even the mustique of the law. The opinion performs this
function with impressive expertise and makes the modes of
discovery less esoteric or inaccessible to many members of
the bar.
Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex D.
2 Id., Annex E.
3 Id., Annex F.
4 Rollo, p. 7.
5 Id., pp. 7, 145.
6 Id., p. 7.
7 Petition, Annex G.
8 Rollo, pp. 56-87.
9 Petition, Annex H.
10 Id., Annex I.
11 Id., Annex J.
12 Id., Annex K.
13 Rollo, p. 9.
14 Petition, Annex L
15 Id., Annex M.
16 Rollo, p. 9.
17 Petition, Annex N.
18 Id., Annex O.
19 Petition, Annex R; Rollo, p. 220.
20 Id., Annexes A and B; Rollo, p. 11.
21 Rollo, pp. 244, 245, 245-A.

22 189 SCRA 459.
23 Id., p. 317. The Solicitor General also withdrew his

appearance in other cases involving the PCGG, to wit:
G.R. Nos. 74302 (Tourist Sandiganbayan, et al.); 86926
(Cesar E.A Virata v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.);
89425 (Republic, etc., et al. v. Sandiganbayan . . et al.);
90478 (Republic v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, etc. et al.);
93694 (Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, etc.,
et al. v. PCGG, et al.).
24 Id., p. 320.
25 Id., pp. 328 et seq.
26 Governed by Rule 25.
27 Governed by Rule 27.
28 Moran (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed.,

Vol. 2, pp. 5-6), for instance, points out-citing the
recommendations of the committee of the American
Judicature Society that drafted the Model Rules of
Civil Procedure — that "The English and Canadian
experience has been of more value than any other
single procedural device, in bringing parties to a
settlement who otherwise would have fought their
way through to trial.
N.B. Actions could very well be ended by summary

judgments (Rule 34) on the basis of the results of
discovery.
29 Surprises, it has been observed, are "most

dangerous weapons" in a "judicial duel" (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963, ed., Vol. 2, p.
6).
30 16 Phil. 315, 322 (July 26, 1910); emphasis supplied.
31 Section 1, Rule 8, Rules of Court.
32 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed.,

Vol. 2, pp. 5-6; see footnote 28, supra.
33 SEE Hickman v. Taylor, et al., U.S. Sup. Ct. Rpts.,

91 Law Ed., 51, 455, cited in Feria, Civil Procedure, p.
1969 ed., p. 435; 35A CJS Sec. 527, pp. 785-786; 23 Am
Jur. 2d, See, 156, p. 493.
34 Sec. 5, Rule 25 ("Interrogatories to

Parties") also allows inquiry as "to any matters that
can be inquired into under section 2 of Rule 24 . ."
35 Feria, op. cit., p. 436, citing Hickman v. Taylor, et

al., supra; SEE 23 Am Jur 2d., Sec. 150, pp. 484-487.
36 Sec. 1, Rule 24; Sec. 1, Rule 25; Sec. 1, Rule 26.
37 SEE Everett v. Asia Banking Corp., 49 Phil. 512.
38 Rule 29.
39 SEE Secs. 16 and 18, Rule 24.
40 Hickman v. Taylor, et al., supra, cited in Feria, op.

cit., p. 436.
41 SEE footnote 5, supra.
42 Cf. Uy Chao v. de la Rama Steamship Co., Inc., 6

SCRA 69.
43 SEE footnote 17, supra.
44 SEE discussion at page 8, and footnote 30 and

related text, supra.
45 Cf. Lopez, etc., et al. v. Maceren, etc., et al. 95 Phil.

754; Cojuangco v. Caluag, 97 Phil. 982 (unrep.);
Villalon v. Ysip, 98 Phil. 997; Caguiat v. Torres, 30
SCRA 109-110; Jacinto v. Amparo, 93 Phil. 693.
46 SEE Cason v. San Pedro, 9 SCRA 925, where such

objections as that the interrogatories transferred
the onus probandi from plaintiffs to defendants, or the
latter were being made to prove the former's case, or
that anyway, the facts may be proven by plaintiffs
through their own evidence, were overruled.
47 SEE Tan Chico v. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 141 (1922).
48 It should be pointed out that the rulings in PCGG

v. Peña 159 SCRA 556 (1988) and PCGG v.
Nepomuceno, etc., et al., G.R. No. 78750, April 20, 1990
are not inconsistent with that in this proceeding, the
facts and basic issues therein involved being quite
distinct from those in the case at bar. Unlike the
present case, where the PCGG instituted a civil action
against Tantoco, et al. in the Sandiganbayan neither
Peña nor Nepomuceno involved any suit filed by the
PCGG, the acts therein challenged being simply its
extrajudicial orders of sequestration; and in both said
cases, the Regional Trial Courts issued writs of
preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement and
implementation of the sequestration orders. This
Court nullified those injunctive writs on the ground
that the PCGG, as an agency possessed of primary
administrative jurisdiction (particularly concerning
sequestration) and exercising quasi-judicial functions,
was co-equal to a Regional Trial Court which
therefore had no jurisdiction to review or otherwise
restrain or interfere with its acts, that power being
exclusively lodged in the Sandiganbayan, subject
only to review by this Court. In Nepomuceno, it was
additionally ruled that there was prima facie basis for
the challenged order of sequestration; that the take-
over of the property in question by the PCGG fiscal
agents was necessitated as much by the resistance and
defiance of the holders thereof to the PCGG's
authority as by the desire of the PCGG to preserve
said property; and that since the power to seize
property to conserve it pending the institution of suit
for its recovery was sanctioned by the Freedom
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, the PCGG
must be deemed immune from any suit which would
render that authority inutile or ineffectual.
49 Of the Solicitor General in his Reply to Answer,

etc.: Rollo, pp 168-169.
50 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political

Law, 1991 ed., p. 33.
SEC. 5, Act No. 3083 (eff., March 16, 1923) provides

that,
"When the Government of the Philippine Islands is

plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of
original jurisdiction, defendant shall have the right to
assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a
similar action between private parties."
51 Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905,

912.
52 Ministerio vs. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, cited

with approval in Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA 294.
53 Petition, Annex O, pp. 206-208.
54 At page 6, last paragraph, supra.
55 Sec. 1, Rule 25, Rules of Court.
56 Sec. 2, Rule 25.
57 SEE footnote 38 and related text.
58 Sec. 1, Rule 26.
59 Sec. 2, Rule 25; see also footnote 38 and related

text, supra.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xx
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 90478, 1991-11-21
Facts:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R.
Santiago... are defendants in Civil Case
The case was commenced... by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines.
The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one
"for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order
No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "MOTION
TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND
FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS"... the
Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and
accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45) days
to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations.
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file
interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court"
The PCCG responded by filing a motion... to strike out said
motion and interrogatories as being impertinent... the PCGG filed
an Expanded Complaint.[8] As regards this expanded complaint,
Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of
particulars,... through a Manifestation
SB... the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of
particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to
be without legal and factual... basis.
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim
In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with
Motion to Dismiss Compulsory
Counterclaim."
The case was set for pre-trial
Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff,"... and... an "Amended
Interrogatories to
Plaintiff"[17] as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents.
SB... the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories
and granted the motion for production and inspection of
documents
MR
PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
SB
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)
Resolutions... the first, denying reconsideration (of the Resolution
allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating
by implication the permission to serve the amended...
interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).
Issues:
orders... should be nullified because rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of
discovery provided in the Rules of Court: interrogatories to
parties,[26] and production and inspection of documents and...
things.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and
learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose
and policy of the law that the parties -- before the trial if not
indeed even before the pre-trial -- should discover or... inform
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those
known to them individually, but also those known to their
adversaries
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve
(1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2)
as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those... issues.
The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent
with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus
prevent that said trials are carried on in the... dark.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by
depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the
interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial.
The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they
be... ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which
are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the
fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the
trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said... trial.
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of
information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such
as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence,
description,... nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party
may compel the other to... disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled
from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing
the possibility of surprise.
The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not
necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an... answer to
the complaint has been served.[36] It is only when an answer has
not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over
the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave
of... court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the
reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the
disputed facts are not clear.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise
untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions
on the party who refuses to make discovery
Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when
permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial
intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules * *, limitations
inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is
being conducted... in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry.
***
The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in
accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be
sustained.
It should initially be pointed out -- as regards the private
respondents' "Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories"... that it
was correct for them to seek leave to serve interrogatories,
because... discovery was being availed of before an answer had
been served.
But there was no need for the private respondents to seek such
leave to serve their
"Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"... after they had filed their
answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the
Sandiganbayan to act... thereon.
(1)
The petitioner's first contention -- that the interrogatories in
question are defective because they (a) do not name the particular
individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only
to the PCGG
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by
Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party served with
interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be
"answered ** by... any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf."
The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of
the PCGG's expanded... complaint and inquire about details of
the ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly
do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the
ground of lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are
being made in bad faith,... or simply to embarass or oppress it.[45]
But until such an objection is presented and sustained, the
obligation to answer subsists.
(2)
That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be
part of the PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing
them, either. As already... pointed out, it is the precise purpose
of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being
deemed essential to proper litigation.
The taking of depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on
oral examination or by written interrogatories) while somewhat
less simple, is nonetheless by no means as complicated as
seems to be the... lamentably extensive notion.
4. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. Pedrajas, G.R. No. 192993,

August 11, 2014
G.R. No. 192993 August 11, 2014
WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC., and REGINALDO

OBEN/WALLEM SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED, Petitioners,
vs.
DONNABELLE PEDRAJAS and SEAN JADE
PEDRAJAS, Respondnets.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing

the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
February 11, 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 102499, which affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated October 31,
2007 and January 30, 2008, respectively, in NLRC OFW Case No.
(M) 04-08-02209-00/NLRC NCR CA NO. 049636-06, awarding
death benefits to respondents.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. is a domestic

corporation licensed to engage in the manning business.
Petitioner Wallem Maritime Ship Management is a foreign
corporation which is the principal of Wallem Maritime Services,
Inc., while Reginaldo Oben is the President of Wallem Maritime
Services, Inc. In 2004, petitioner Wallem Maritime Services, Inc.
and Hernani Pedrajas (Hernani) entered into a contract of
employment wherein Hernani was hired as Engine Boy on board
the M/V Crown Jade. In March 2005, during the effectivity of his
employment contract and while the vessel was in Italy, Hernani
was found hanging on the Upper Deck B of the vessel with a rope
tied to his neck. Hernani's spouse and herein respondent,
Donnabelle Pedrajas (Donnabelle), was informed that Hernani
hanged himself and was found dead in the vessel. She was also
informed that investigations were being conducted by the Italian
Government relative to Hernani's death. His body was
repatriated back to the Philippines in April 2005.
Suspecting foul play, Donnabellesought the assistance of the

Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory to conduct a
forensic examination on the remains of Hernani and to investigate
the cause of his death. Donnabelle also requested the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the incident. After the
investigation, the PNP Crime Laboratory and the NBI concluded
that homicide cannot be totally ruled out. Due to the foregoing, in
June 2005, Donnabelle, as beneficiary of Hernani, filed a claim for
death compensation benefits under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract and the AssociatesMarine Officer's and
Seafarer's Union of the Philippines Collective Bargaining
Agreement (AMOSUPCBA). She also demanded attorney's fees,
moral, and exemplary damages.
Petitioners’ claim that they have no obligation to pay death

benefits to the heirs of Hernani because the latter's death was self-
inflicted and therefore exempted from the coverage of death
benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-
Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC) and the AMOSUP-
CBA. Petitioners argued that Hernani was involved in a drug
smuggling activity and fearing that he would be arrested and
would bring shame to his family, hecommitted suicide. To
support their claim, petitioners attached anauthenticated Forensic
Report3 released by the Medical Examiner in Italy which stated
that Hernani committed suicide by hanging himself. The same
report indicated that during the course of the autopsy, Hernani
was found positive for cocaine.4 When his lifeless body was found
hanging, two suicide notes were found by the Italian authorities.
One was addressed to his wife and the other to the vessel's crew.
The suicide note addressed to his wife stated thathe committed
suicide because he was implicated in a drug syndicate and he did
not want to be jailed for the rest of his life. The second suicide
note led to the arrest of Deck Boy Joseph Harder, who admitted
his participation inthe drug dealing operation. It also pointed the
Italian authorities to where the remaining cocaine and the
proceeds from its illegal sale were being hidden on-boardthe
vessel. On March 31, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor
of petitioners and denied the respondents' claim for death
benefits.5 The LA sustained petitioners' claim that Hernani
committed suicide, giving credence to the Forensic Report
submitted by the Italian authorities concluding that his death was
self-inflicted.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC. On October 31, 2007, the

NLRC reversed the LA's decision and ruled that Hernani's death
was not proven to be self-inflicted.6 Hence, it awarded death
compensation and attorney's fees to the respondents.
Aggrieved, petitionersfiled a petition for certioraribefore the CA.

On February 11, 2010, the CA denied the petition and held that
the Forensic Report issued by the Public Prosecutors Office in
Livorno, Italy was "weakened" by the findings of the PNP and the
NBI, which did not totally rule out homicide.7 The CA further did
not give credence to the photocopies of the alleged suicide notes
presented by the petitioners for its failure to prove that the
suicide notes were written by Hernani. Hence, it found that
petitioners failed to discharge its burden of proving that Hernani
committed suicide, so as to evade its liability for death benefits. A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, but was
denied in a Resolution8 dated July 20, 2010.
Petitioners are now before this Court, raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

FAILING TO ABIDE BY THE EXPRESS MANDATE OF THE
GOVERNING POEA-SEC AND PERTINENT CBA THAT
DEATH ARISING FROM A WILLFUL ACT IS NOT
COMPENSABLE AND WILL BAR THE SEAMAN'S HEIRS
FROM RECEIVING DEATH BENEFITS.
II

FAILING TO CONSIDER AND GIVE CREDENCE TO THE
SEVERAL PIECES OF EVIDENCE AND CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WOULD ALL CONCLUSIVELY POINT TO THE FACT
THAT THE SEAMAN COMMITTED SUICIDE.
III

FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT NO PROOF WHATSOEVER
WAS PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE DEATH OF THE
SEAMAN IS RELATED IN ANY MANNER TO HIS WORK
ONBOARD THE VESSEL.9
The main issue for resolution iswhether Hernani committed
suicide during the term of his employment contract which would
exempt petitioners from paying Hernani's death compensation
benefits to his beneficiaries.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 20 (D) of the POEA-SEC provides:
No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any

injury, incapacity, disability or death of a seafarer resulting from
his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties x x x.
The death of a seaman during the term of his employment makes

the employer liable to the former's heirs for death compensation
benefits.10 This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may
be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the
seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to
his deliberate or willful act.11 Hence, respondents' entitlement to
any death benefit depends on whether petitioners' evidence
suffices to prove that Hernani committed suicide, and the burden
of proof rests on his employer.12
In the case at bar, the Italian Medical Examiner found that:
During the necroscopic investigation, no other forms of injuries

were noted on the body of Pedrajas and his viscera; thisallows us
to retain that Pedrajas suffered no physical violence before the
hanging and that he hung himself, in order to commit suicide, of
his own accord. The presence of flakes of white paint on the
palms of both hands, the same as on the gangway, the banister
and the pipe where the rope was fixed, is an element which goes
to confirm - even if of lesser value - the theory that Pedrajas
himself tied the rope to the metal pipe.
xxxx
Therefore no elements at all have emerged such as would lead us

to believe that third parties may have intervened in causing the
death, and the way inwhich Mr. Pedrajas died, as described,
conforms to suicide.13
The Italian Medical Examiner further concluded that:
x x x There are no elements which may lead one to

suppose/assume the direct intervention of third parties in
causing the death of the young seaman.
In other words, beyond all reasonable doubt, everything points to

Pedrajas having hunghimself in order to commit suicide.14
In the case at bar, the CA did not give credit to the report and
findings made by the Medical Examiner appointed by the Italian
Court who conducted the autopsy on the body of Hernani. The
CA held that the Forensic Report of the Public Prosecutor’s Office
of Livorno, Italy was "weakened" by the findings of the PNP
Crime Laboratory and the NBI. The PNP Crime Laboratory, in its
report, stated thus:
Unfortunately, my knowledge of the case is limited by the fact

that I have no police report and autopsy report done in Italy. I
have no pictures of the following: crime scene, cord/rope, type of
knot, position of the body when it was found. Inthis case, I only
have the body and the verbal information disclosed to me by the
wife and sister of the victim. x x x
To be able to determine if the strangulation is "suicide or

homicide," it should not be only limited to the autopsy, but it
must be based on several aspects like knowledge of the "crime
scene, victim’s behavior and other things related to it. x x x
xxxx
Based on the following information and physical findings, I

cannot totally rule-out homicide.15
The NBI, on the other hand, did notconduct any autopsy of the
body of Hernani and just based their opinion on documents
submitted to them and information coming solely from his
relatives. The Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI found that:
In view of the above facts and observations,it is the opinion of the

undersigned that HOMICIDE cannot be totally ruled out.
This compliance was merely to render an opinion and should not

be construed as judgment.16 From the foregoing, it is more logical
to rely on the findings of the Italian Medical examiner. In
Maritime Factors, Inc. v. Hindang,17 the Court gave credence to
the medical report made by the Saudi Arabian doctor, who
immediately conducted an autopsy on the seafarer's body upon
his death. The Court reasoned, thus:
We give credence to Dr. Hameed's medical report establishing

that Danilo committed suicide byhanging himself.1âwphi1 Dr.
Hameed conducted the autopsy of Danilo'sremains immediately
after the latter's death. He saw first-hand the condition of Danilo's
body, which upon his examination led him to conclude that
Danilo died by hanging himself. His report was comprehensive
and more detailed. He, likewise, noted, that there were no signs
of violence or resistance, or any external injuries except a very
slight and artificial injury of nearly 5 cm among the toes of
Danilo's right leg.18
Here, it should be noted that the Medical Examiner appointed by

the Italian Court was not merely limited to the autopsy of the
remains of Hernani. The findings of the Italian Medical Examiner
were made after he personally and carefully examined the place
immediately after the incident. The medical examiner had the
luxury ofinvestigating the crime scene, the rope used for hanging,
type of knot, temperature and position of the body when found.
As aptly found by the LA: Moreover, this Office is more than
convinced that the death of the seafarer is due to his hanging
himself which would disqualify his heirs from entitlement to
death benefits under the POEA Contract and the CBA. The
forensic report issued by the Italian authorities proves this fact. In
said forensic report issued by the Italian Medical Examiner from
the Public Prosecutor's Office, it was found that the (sic) based on
the evidence that he personally examined everything points to
Mr. Pedrajas hanging himself to commit suicide. As sufficiently
argued by the respondents (petitioners herein) the findings of the
Medical Examiner appointed by the Italian Court was made after
he personally and carefully examined the place of the incident
immediately after the body of Mr. Pedrajas was found. x x x19
Apparent from the foregoing, the report of the Italian Medical

Examiner, which stated that Hernani committed suicide is more
categorical and definite than the uncertain findings of the PNP
Crime Laboratory and the NBI that homicide cannot be totally
ruled out. Excerpts from the PNP and NBI reports would disclose
that both agencies were unsure if homicide or suicide was the
underlying cause ofHernani's death. Hence, the Court agrees with
the findings of the LA and his judgment to give weight and
credence to the evidence submitted by the petitioners proving
that Hernani committed suicide.
Anent the suicide notes left by Hernani to his wife and to the
vessel's crew, the CA did not appreciate the notes due to the
petitioner's alleged failure to prove that the notes were written by
Hernani. On their part, the respondents alleged that since the
original copies of the notes were not presented, but mere
photocopies, the same should not be considered by the Court. We
cannot find merit in respondents' protestations against the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners because they
were mere photocopies.
It is settled that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by

the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the
regular courts.20 The LA and the NLRC are directed to use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedilyand objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice.21 In this
light, the LA need not resort to the technical rules of evidence, in
order to ascertain whether the notes were written by Hernani. In
the present case, the LA found that:
x x x The handwriting and the terminologies used in the suicide

notes (Annex "1" and "2" of respondents’ reply) and that
presented by the complainants as Annex "D" of their position
paper are identical which would lead to the conclusion that the
author of both are [one and] the same. Mr. Pedrajas wrote two
suicide notes where he admitted his participations as a lookoutin
the operation in Spain and implicated Deck Boy Harder who
eventually confessed as to his participation in the operations and
eventually led the Italian authorities to where the other cocaine
[were] being hidden on-board the vessel. x x x 22-CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS TRUTH BECAUSE IT LEAD TO THE
CONFESSION OF DECK BOY HARDER WHO WAS
IMPLICATED PURSUANT TO HIS HANDWRITTEN
SUICIDE NOTES.
BOTH THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NLRC ARE ONE IN

FINDING THAT THE LETTER WAS IN THE HANDWRITING
OF HERNANI.
Since the Labor Arbiter had, after comparing the suicide notes
and the letters presented by the respondents, concluded and
determined that the letters were of the handwriting of Hemani,
the CA ·should have considered these pieces of evidence, in
determining whether Hemani committed suicide, as it explained
the reason why Hemani took his life. Further, the petitioners
were able to explain why the original copies of the documents
were not presented during the proceedings before the LA. The
reason for its nonproduction is that the notes were in the
possession of the Italian Authorities as part of the evidence in
their investigation and will not be released until such time as a
final determination in said proceedings is made.23 HINDI PA
TAPOS ANG KASO. Petitioners' failure to submit the original
copy of the suicide notes is, thus, not a ground for disregarding
such note. THEREFORE THERE WAS NO GROUND FOR
DISREGARDING.
Moreover, the credibility and authenticity of Hemani's suicide

notes are also beyond doubt. In fact, the statements contained in
the notes led to the investigation and arrest of Deck Boy Harder,
who confessed as to his participation in the drug operations
which eventually led the Italian authorities to where the
remaining cocaine and proceeds thereof were being hidden on-
board the vessel. Since the information in the notes proved to be
informative and useful to the Italian authorities, it would only
lend more credence to its genuineness and truthfulness. Verily, it
could only lead to the conclusion that the notes were written by
no other person except Hemani.
Since. the petitioners were able to prove that Hemani committed

suicide, Hemani' s death is not compensable and his heirs are not
entitled to any compensation or benefits. It is settled that when
the death of a seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on
his own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such
death is not compensable.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 102499, dated February 11,
2010, and the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's Decision dated March 31, 2006 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
5. People v. Turco, 337 SCRA 714 (2000)
RAPE
G.R. No. 137757 August 14, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG", accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was

charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 2349-272,
Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Basilan of the 9th Judicial
Region, stationed in Isabela, Basilan, under the following
Information:
That on or about the 8th day of July, 1995, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Km. 6, Begang
Barangay, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan,
Philippines, the above-named accused, by the use of force, threat
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab the undersigned complainant by her neck, cover
her mouth and forcibly make her lie down, after which the said
accused mounted on top of her and removed her short pant and
panty. Thereafter, the said accused, by the use of force, threat and
intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the
undersigned complainant and finally succeeded to have carnal
knowledge of her, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 6, Rollo.)
At his arraignment on November 8, 1995, accused-appellant

entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial ensued.
The prosecution's version of the generative facts, as gathered

from the testimony of its witnesses - Alejandra Tabada, mother of
the victim; PO3 Celso Y. Tan Sanchez, the police officer who
investigated the case; Orlando Pioquinto, brother-in-law of the
victim; Escelea Tabada, the 13-year-old victim; and Felicitas delos
Santos Timorata, the medical record clerk who used to be the
medical officer under Dr. Rimberto Sanggalang, the physician
who physically examined the victim after the incident - is
abstracted in the Appellee's Brief in this wise:
Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in

lower Begang, Isabela, Basilan, their houses being only about
sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.; August 19, 1996).
Escelea was then staying with her father, Alejandro and her deaf
grandmother, Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years
and six (6) months old at the time of incident, having been born
on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).
The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At

around seven o'clock (7:00 p.m.) in the evening, Escelea, after (pp.
11-12, id) [sic]. She was accompanied by a certain Cory Macapili,
the granddaughter of her neighbor, Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
Cory left upon reaching Escelea's home. Escelea went upstairs to

join her grandmother who was already sleeping in the room.
About to enter the said room, Escelea heard a call from outside.
She recognized the voice and when she asked who was it, the
party introduced himself as the appellant, viz:
Q. After you heard your named was mentioned, what did you
say if any?
A. I answered: "Who is that?"
Q. Did the person calling your name answer you?
A. I heard, sir, "me Totong".
Q. When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was
"Totong" you are referring to whom?
A. Rodegelio, sir.
(p. 15, id; Underscoring supplied)
She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known

him for four (4) years and appellant is her second cousin (p. 34,
id). Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea
forthwith opened the door. Appellant Turco, with the use of
towel, covered Escelea's face. Appellant, aside from covering the
victim's mouth, even placed his right hand on the latter's neck.
Appellant bid Eseelea to walk. When they reached a grassy part,

near the pig pen which was about twelve (12) meters away from
the victim's house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on
the grass, laid on top of the victim and took off her shortpants
and panty (pp. 17-19, id). Escelea tried to resist by moving her
body but to no avail. Appellant succeeded in pursuing his evil
design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Escelea's private part.
The victim felt terrible pain (p. 20, id). Still dissatisfied, after
consummating the act, appellant kissed and held the victim's
breast. Thereafter, appellant threatened her that he will kill her if
she reports the incident to anybody, thus:
"He threatened me, that if you will reveal the incident to anybody
I will kill you.
(p. 21, id; Underscoring supplied)
Finally, after having satisfied his lust, appellant hurriedly went

home. Escelea, on the other hand, upon reaching home,
discovered that her shortpants and panty were filled with blood
(p. 23, id). For almost ten (10) days, she just kept to herself the
harrowing experience until July 18, 1995 when she was able to
muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando
Pioquinto, about the said incident. Orlando in turn informed
Alejandro, the victim's father, about the rape of his daughter.
Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to
see a doctor for medical examination (p. 27, id).
Escelea was accompanied by her sister Clairlyn Pioquinto to the

Provincial Hospital. She was examined by Dr. Rimberto
Sanggalang. After the issuance of the medical certificate, they
went to Isabela Municipal Station and filed Escelea's complaint
against appellant (pp. 30-33, id).
(pp. 97-100, Rollo.)
The defense presented Leonora Cabase, neighbor of accused-

appellant; her granddaughter Corazon Macapili, and accused-
appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied the charge. The
defense that the victim and him were sweethearts was also
advanced. Leonora Cabase mentioned this in her direct
testimony.
In reaching a moral certainty of guilt, the trial court held:
While the accused denies the charge of rape, his witness, Mrs.
Leonora Cabase was trying to project that the complainant
Escelea Tabada and the accused Rodegelio Turco, Jr. are
sweethearts. In the case of People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285, the
Supreme Court agrees with the trial court that the "sweetheart
story" was a mere concoction of appellant in order to exculpate
himself from criminal liability. The claim of voluntary love affair
is an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair needed
proof. Nowhere in the record of the case that the same was
substantiated, though mentioned by Mrs. Leonora Cabase. The
accused and/or his witnesses must present any token of the
alleged relationship like love notes, mementos or pictures and the
like. Such bare allegation of the defense, not to mention its utter
lack of proof, is incredulous. It is hard to understand how such a
relationship could exculpate a person from the rape of a terrified
young child barely a little over the age of twelve (12) years old.
Indeed, a love relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule
out force (People vs. Sergio Betonio, G.R. No. 119165, September 26,
1997, Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 36, No. 3,
September 1-29, 1997, pp. 695-697).
There are guiding principles in rape cases as cited in People vs.
Victor Abrecinoz, G.R. No. 122474, October 17, 1997, Case Digests
of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 37, No. 1, October 2-31, 1997,
pp. 157-160, and they are: (1) an accusation for rape can be made
with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense. Thus, the credibility of the complainant is a
paramount importance, and if her testimony proves credible, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
It should be noted that the complainant and the accused are

second degree cousin or they are sixth civil degree relatives. The
mother of the accused is a first degree cousin of the father of the
complainant. In the culture of the Filipino family on extended
family, the relationship between the complainant and the accused
being only second degree cousin, it becomes the duty of an older
relative (the accused) to protect and care for a younger relative
(the complainant). It is very hard to understand or comprehend
why a cousin files a case of rape against her cousin, unless it is
true. There is no showing that there was compelling motive why
the case be filed against the accused, except that the rape really
happened.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is noted that there was no underlying reason why the
complainant and/or her father would bring an action against the
accused, except that the accused had raped Escelea Tabada on
July 8, 1995, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. If it were not true
that she was raped by the accused, why would she expose herself
to an embarrassment and traumatic experience connected with
the litigation of this rape case. We are aware of the Filipino
culture especially on virginity. We likened it as a mirror, once
dropped and broken, it can no longer be pieced together ... not
ever. This is true among the Filipino folks that the complainant
belonged, poor and helpless and everything is entrusted to God.
The complainant is a young girl, a little over twelve (12) years old
and almost illiterate, having attended school up to Grade III only.
So poor that her family cannot even buy the cheapest television
set and she has to go to a house of a neighbor for the meager joy
of seeing a television show ... and expose herself to the danger of
the dark night. All said, it is very difficult to be poor. Going to the
court is a shout for help ... let us try to hear it.
xxx
xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, under the above circumstances and evaluation,

this court finds the accused "GUILTY" of rape and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for
moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(pp. 33-37, Rollo.)
In accused-appellant's brief, he assigns the following alleged

errors:
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE
BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANT
ESCELEA TABADA AND HER WITNESS.
II

ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION, BASED
ON THE AFFIDAVITS AND ORAL TESTIMONIES OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND ITS WITNESSES WAS ABLE TO
PROVED [sic] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE
AGAINST THE COMPLAINANT.
III

ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER
THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO
INDEMNIFY THE COMPLAINANT THE AMOUNT OF
P50,000.00 REPRESENTING MORAL DAMAGES BASED
ON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
(p. 101, Rollo.)
He particularly argues that his conviction is not supported by
proof beyond reasonable doubt considering that other than the
written statement of the complainant before the Police Station of
Isabela and before the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial
Court, and her testimony during direct examination, no other
evidence was presented to conclusively prove that there was ever
rape at all; that she only presumed that it was accused-appellant
who attacked her since she admitted that immediately upon
opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered her face with a
towel; that nothing in her testimony clearly and convincingly
shows that she was able to identify accused-appellant as the
perpetrator; that complainant implicated accused-appellant only
because her father forced her to do so; and lastly, that no actual
proof was presented that the rape of the complainant actually
happened considering that although a medical certificate was
presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was
not presented in court to explain the same.
We agree with the trial court.
As aptly recalled by the trial court, there are three guiding

principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only
two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense (People vs. Gallo, 284 SCRA 590 [1998]; People vs.
Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 [1998]; People vs. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75
[1998]; People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).
Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination
concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant's
testimony.
The trial court described complainant as "a young girl, a little

over twelve (12) years old and almost illiterate, having attended
school up to Grade III only. So poor that her family cannot even
buy the cheapest television set and she has to go to a house of a
neighbor for the meager joy of seeing a television show ... and
exposes herself to the danger of the dark night." But verily, age,
youth, and poverty are not guarantees of credibility. Hence,
thorough scrutiny must be made by the Court.
Complainant narrated the incident in this wise:
Q While you went upstairs and about to enter the room of your
grandmother, did you hear anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A I heard a call, sir.
Q How was the call made?
A It is just by saying: "Lea".
Q After you heard your name was mentioned, what did you say
if any?
A I answered: "Who is that?"
Q Did the person calling your name answer you?
A I heard, sir, "me Totong".

Q When you say the person who called your name "Lea" was
"Totong", you are referring to whom?
A Rodegelio, sir.
Q When you say "Rodegelio", you are referring to Rodegelio

Turco, Jr., the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q After the person calling your name "Lea" identified himself as

"Totong", what did you do?
A I opened the door, sir.
Q And when you opened the door, what happened next?
A Totong with the use of towel covered my face, sir.
Q Aside from covering your face with a towel, what else did he
do?
A He covered my mouth, sir.
Q Aside from covering your mouth, what else did he do?
A He placed his right hand on my neck, sir.
Q Aside from placing his right hand ... when he placed his right
hand on your neck, where was he? Was he infront or behind?
A He was at my back, sir.
Q After placing his right hand on your neck behind you, what did
"Totong" do next with that position?
A He covered my mouth, sir.

Q After covering your mouth and face, what did he do next?
A He told me to walk, sir.
Q Where did he bring you?
A I don't know exactly where he brought me, sir.
Q But you know very well that he brought you to a certain place?
A I don't know exactly the place where he brought me, sir.
Q Is it far from your house where you were forcibly taken?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have a copra kiln?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:
The witness already answered that she does not know where she
was brought, leading, Your Honor.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q According to you, from your house you were brought by the

accused to a place which you do not know?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What place?
A Pig pen, Your Honor.
Q Do you know the owner, of that pig pen?
A Our pig pen, Your Honor.

Q Who owned that pig pen?
A My father, Your Honor.
Q How far is that pig pen to your house?
A (From this witness stand to that road outside of this building).
COURT:
It is about 12 meters. Alright, continue.
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO: (Continuing)
Q You stated in answer to the question of the Honorable Court

that you were brought to the pig pen or the place where you were
sexually abused, were you place inside or outside?
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III:
Leading, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR M.L. GENERALAO:
I will withdraw.
Q Will you please explain to the Court what particular place of

the pig pen that you were brought by the accused?
A Inside the grasses, sir.
Q When you were already inside the grasses near this pig pen,
what did the accused do to you?
A He put me down, sir.

Q When you were already down on the ground, what did the
accused do next?
A He mounted on me, sir.
Q And when the accused was already on top of you, what did he
do next?
A He molested me, sir.
Q Before he molested you, did he remove anything from your

body?
A Yes, sir.
Q What?
A My shortpants and panty, sir.
Q You stated that the accused while on top of you removed your
pants and panty, did he totally remove it from your body?
A Yes, sir.
Q After removing your shortpants and panty, what else did the
accused do?
A He abused me, sir.
Q You said that he abused you, how did he abuse your?
A He put his private part inside my private part, sir.
Q When the accused was on top of you and he forcibly abused

you, what did you do?
A I tried to move my body, sir.

Q While you were trying to move your body and while the
accused was on top of you, what did the accused do?
A He tried to insert his private part to my private part, sir.
Q And was he able to insert his private part?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you feel when his private part was already inside
your private part?
A I felt pain, sir.
Q Will you please explain why you felt when the private part of
the accused was already inside your private part?
A I felt pain when he already finished, sir.
Q By the way, before July 8, 1995, were you had been raped? Will
you please tell us whether you have already experienced or you
have already your menstruation at that time?
A No, sir.
Q Now you stated to the Honorable Court ... after the accused
had sexually abused you and you said you felt pains after he
consumated the sexual act, after that what did he do next after
consumating the act?
A After consumating his desire, he raised my panty and

shortpants then he kissed me and hold my nipple, sir.
Q After the accused had raised your shortpants and panty,

embraced you, kissed you and hold your breast, did he tell you
anything?
A He threatened me, "that if you will reveal the incident to
anybody I will kill you."
Q In what dialect? In Chavacano, sir.
A After the accused embraced you, kissed you and hold your
nipple and threatened you in Chavacano dialect, what happened
next after that?
No more, sir.
(tsn, Aug. 19, 1996, pp. 14-22.)
On cross-examination, the victim did display some apparent

confusion when the defense counsel asked her about the events
that transpired before the ill-fated July 8, 1995. The query
prompted her to narrate the incident prior to said date when she
also watched television at the home of Leonora Cabase, and that
when she arrived home, accused-appellant came and called her
"Lea" and when she asked who was it, he answered "so Totong".
When she asked what he wanted, he said he wanted to borrow a
guitar. She said that she could not lend him the guitar since her
father was not yet around. He insisted but to no avail, and hence
he just went home. She went to sleep afterwards. On re-direct
examination, she clarified that when accused-appellant came to
borrow the guitar on July 8, 1995, it was about 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon. Lastly, she said that the incident of the borrowing of
the guitar and the incident that transpired at 7 o'clock in the
evening on July 8, 1995 were separate incidents.
Significantly, three things could be perceived: complainant's

youth, her apparent confusion concerning the events that
transpired, and her fear of both accused-appellant and her father.
At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on
the witness stand of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence (People vs. Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]).
Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature
girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only
their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if
the matter about which they testified were not true (People vs.
Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 [1998]). In addition, we take cognizance of
the trial court's observation on the segment of the Filipino society
to which the victim belongs - almost illiterate, having attended
school up to the third grade only, and so poor that she had to go
to a neighbor's house to watch television, yet one who values her
virginity which like a "mirror, once dropped and broken ... can no
longer be pieced together ... not ever," this being "true among the
Filipino folks [to which] complainant belonged, poor and helpless
everything is entrusted to God" (p. 35, Rollo).
The victim's relatively low level of intelligence explains the lapses

in her testimony, having intermingled two incidents.
Nonetheless, it can easily be gathered from the record that the
defense counsel may have contributed to this confusion when he
asked the victim what transpired "before" the incident (tsn,
August 19, 1996, p. 37). Minor lapses in a witness' testimony
should be expected when a person recounts details of an
experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape (People
vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 [1998]).Rape, as a harrowing
experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an
offense is not something which enhances one's life experience as
to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which
causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the
victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious
mind would prefer to forget (People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463
[1997]). These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming
testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the
malefactor (People vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Further, the
testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its
entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated
passages therein (People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355 [1991]).
The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify
against accused-appellant. Her testimony deserves the credence
accorded thereto by the trial court (People vs. Luzorata, 286 SCRA
487 [1998]). Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to
a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have
the culprit apprehended and punished (People vs. Taneo, 284
SCRA 251 [1998]).
Another point to consider is the blood relationship between

accused-appellant and the victim. At this juncture, we reiterate
the trial court's observation thereon - the mother of accused-
appellant being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that
makes the victim and accused-appellant second degree cousins or
sixth civil degree relatives. Filipino culture, particularly in the
provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit and
recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and take
care of a younger one. On the contrary, in the instant case, the
victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If the charge were
not true, it is indeed difficult to understand why the victim would
charge her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she having no
compelling motive to file said case against accused-appellant, the
conclusion that the rape really happened is logically reinforced.
As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape
incident, suffice it to state that the delay and initial reluctance of a
rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is not
uncommon (People vs. Gallo, supra). In the case at bar, the victim's
fear of her father who had moral ascendancy over her, was
explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the incident to her
father because of fear both of her father as well as of accused-
appellant (tsn, August 19, 1996, pp. 23-24). Such reaction is typical
of a twelve-year-old girl and only strengthens her credibility.
The issue of credibility of the victim having been settled, there are
a few points presented by the defense that must be passed upon:
1. Other than their blood relationship, was there an intimate

relationship between accused-appellant and the victim? The
theory initially advanced by the defense in the proceedings before
the court a quo is the "sweetheart theory". In this regard, .we agree
with the trial court that the "sweetheart story" was a mere
concoction of accused-appellant in order to exculpate himself
from criminal liability. In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15
[1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was
unavailing and self-serving where he failed to introduce love
letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair
with the victim. Hence, the defense cannot just present
testimonial evidence in support of the theory that he and the
victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as
tokens, mementos, and photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a
confession possibly of the bankruptcy of this theory that accused-
appellant has not insisted on this defense in his brief, seemingly
abandoning this line.
We, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed

closeness there was between accused-appellant and the victim, is
explained not by an intimate relationship but by their blood
relationship. Hence, it is noticeable that on the day of the incident,
when accused-appellant called upon the victim and the latter
asked who he was, the victim knew right away that her caller was
accused-appellant when the latter replied "Si Totong".
Accused-appellant, in his direct testimony, tried to deny any

blood relation with the victim Escelea Tabada and touched on the
apparent friendship between them, as follows:
Q You mentioned earlier that you know the complainant, why do

you know the complainant Escelea Tabada?
A I only know her when I was already in jail, sir.
Q You mean to say that you never knew the complainant before
you were arrested?
A I do not know her, sir.
COURT: (Questioning the witness)
Q Why, are you not related to the Tabadas?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. G.V. DELA PENA III: (Continuing)
Q Have you ever seen the complainant in Begang?
A The complainant is at Begang, sir.
Q And you mentioned that you were not related with the
complainant, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.

Q So, in other words, Mr. Witness, you and the complainant
Escelea Tabada were already friends?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, June 16, 1998, pp. 42-43.)
However, on cross-examination, he notably crumbled:
Q Now, you stated in your direct examination that you are not
related to the Tabadas in San Antonio Begang, Isabela, Basilan, is
that right?
A Yes, sir, we are only close.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that your mother is the first cousin
of the father of Escelea Tabada?
A They are cousins, sir.
Q So, indeed you are related to the Tabadas?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, when you said that you are not related to the Tabadas, you
were not telling the truth?
A Yes, sir.
(ibid, p. 51.)
2. Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented

that the rape actually happened since the medico-legal officer
who prepared the medical certificate was not presented in court
to explain the same.
In People vs. Bernaldez (supra), the court a quo erred in giving
weight to the medical certificate issued by the examining
physician despite the failure of the latter to testify. While the
certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
since entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Rules
of Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since
it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an
expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the
doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications. We place emphasis on the distinction between
admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of
Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is
determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is,
therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the
weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133
and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while
evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no
weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary
weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its
reception (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1998
ed., p. 550).
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the

hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to the absence of the examining physician.
Nevertheless, it cannot be s aid that the prosecution relied solely
on the medical certificate (stating that there was "[h]ymen
rupture, secondary to penile insertion" as well as "foul-smelling
discharges." The diagnosis was "[r]uptured hymen secondary to
rape" [p. 68, Record]). In fact, reliance was made on the testimony
of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical
examination, is sufficient to convict (People vs. Topaguen, 369
SCRA 601 [1997]). It is well-settled that a medical examination is
not indispensable in the prosecution of rape (People vs.
Lacaba, G.R. No. 130591, November 17, 1999; People vs. Salazar, 258
SCRA 55 [1996]; People vs. Venerable, supra). The absence of
medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the
occurrence of rape (People vs. Taneo, supra). It is enough that the
evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is
proper (People vs. Auxtero, supra). In the instant case, the victim's
testimony alone is credible and sufficient to convict.
As a final observation, it must be said that the amount awarded

by the trial court in favor of Escelea Tabada as indemnification
(P50,000.00 for moral damages) for the rape is incomplete based
on established jurisprudence and must be modified. In People vs.
Betonio (279 SCRA 532 [1977]), we held that the award of
P50,000.00 to the victim as indemnity for rape not committed or
qualified by any of the circumstances under the Death Penalty
Law, needs no proof other than the conviction of the accused for
the raped proved. This is different from the P50,000.00 awarded
as moral damages which also needs no pleading or proof as basis
thereof (People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with

the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr.
aka "Totong" is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Escelea
Tabada, in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in
addition to the sum of P50,000.00 already awarded by the trial
court as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
PEOPLE V TURCO 7 NOV G.R. No. 137757 | August 14, 2000 | J.

Melo
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka “Totong”) was

charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada.
Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling
her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco
immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her
second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall
her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel,
covered Escelea’s face, placed his right hand on the latter’s neck
and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the
pig pen which was about 12 meters away from the victim’s house,
appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on
top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and
succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his
penis inside Escelea’s private part despite Escelea’s resistance.
Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports
the incident to anybody.
For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she
was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law,
Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victim’s
father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste
time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical
examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of
the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and
Escelea were sweethearts.
The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof
was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened
considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the
medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in
court to explain the same.
Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape
W/N the appellant’s contention that the medical certificate may

not be considered is with merit
Held:
1. No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower court’s finding
of credibility in the testimony and evidence presented by the
victim, and finds the appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Yes. With regards to appellant’s argument on the proof of

medical certificate, while the certificate could be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records
constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it
involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an
expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the
doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction
between admissibility of evidence and the probative value
thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue
and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since
admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law.
On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once
admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the
Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled
to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception.
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the

hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to the absence of the examining physician.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely
on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the
testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even
without medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-
settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the
prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-
legal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough
that the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is
proper. In the instant case, the victim’s testimony alone is credible
and sufficient to convict.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
People v. Gapay, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008
G.R. No. 179940 April 23, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NORBERTO DEL MONTE y GAPAY @ OBET, accused-
appellant.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007 which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02,
finding accused-appellant Norberto del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, guilty
of violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."
On 11 December 2002, accused-appellant was charged with

Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December 2002, in the

municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law and legal
justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit
and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride weighing 0.290 gram.4
The case was raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan

and docketed as Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02.
When arraigned on 20 January 2003, appellant, assisted by

counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge.5 On 17
February 2003, the pre-trial conference was
concluded.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M.

Tolentino, Jr., the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation
conducted against appellant, and a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) assigned with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 3/Special
Enforcement Unit (SEU) stationed at the Field Office, Barangay
Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a

confidential informant went to the office of the PDEA SEU in
Barangay Tarcan, Baliuag, Bulacan and reported that appellant
was selling shabu. Upon receipt of said information, a briefing on
a buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted. The team
was composed of SPO2 Hashim S. Maung, as team leader, PO1
Gaudencio Tolentino, Jr. as the poseur-buyer, and PO1 Antonio
Barreras as back-up operative. After the briefing, the team,
together with the confidential informant, proceeded to Poblacion
Dike for the execution of the buy-bust operation.
When the team arrived at appellant’s place, they saw the

appellant standing alone in front of the gate. The informant and
PO1 Tolentino approached appellant. The informant introduced
PO1 Tolentino to appellant as his friend, saying "Barkada ko, user."
PO1 Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three
marked P100 bills.7 The bills were marked with "GT JR," PO1
Tolentino’s initials. Upon receiving the P300.00, appellant took
out a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it over to PO1
Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, PO1 Tolentino lit a cigarette
signifying that the sale had been consummated. PO1 Barreras
arrived, arrested appellant and recovered from the latter the
marked money.
The white crystalline substance8 in the plastic sachet which was

sold to PO1 Tolentino was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan, for laboratory examination
to determine the presence of the any dangerous drug. The request
for laboratory examination was signed by SPO2 Maung.9 Per
Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002,10 the substance bought from
appellant was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
The testimony of Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, Forensic Chemical

Officer who examined the substance bought from appellant, was
dispensed after both prosecution and defense stipulated that the
witness will merely testify on the fact that the drugs subject
matter of this case was forwarded to their office for laboratory
examination and that laboratory examination was indeed
conducted and the result was positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.11
For the defense, the appellant took the witness stand, together
with his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza; and nephew,
Alejandro Lim.
From their collective testimonies, the defense version goes like

this:
On 10 December 2002, appellant was sleeping in his sister’s house

in Poblacion Dike when a commotion woke him up. His nephew,
Alejandro Lim, was shouting because the latter, together with
appellant’s common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and a niece, was
being punched and kicked by several police officers. When
appellant tried to pacify the policemen and ask them why they
were beating up his common-law wife and other relatives, the
policemen arrested him, mauled him, punched him on the chest,
slapped him and hit him with a palo-palo. He sustained swollen
face, lips and tooth. His common-law wife was likewise hit on the
chest with the palo-palo.
The policemen then took appellant and his common-law wife to a
house located in the middle of a field where the former
demanded P15,000.00 for their liberty. The next day, appellant
was brought to the police station.
Amelia Mendoza identified PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Barreras as

the police officers who manhandled them and who
demanded P15,000.00 so that she and appellant could go home.
The following day at 6:00 a.m., she said her child and cousin
arrived with the P15,000.00. She was released but appellant was
detained. She does not know why the police officers filed this case
against appellant. What she knows is that they were asking
money from them.
Alejandro Lim merely corroborated the testimonies of appellant

and Amelia Mendoza.
On 8 March 2004, the trial court rendered its decision convicting

appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P5,000,000.00. The dispostive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby

finds accused Norberto del Monte y Gapay @ Obet GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of
Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine
of P5,000,000.00. With cost.
The drugs subject matter of this case is hereby ordered

forfeited in favor of the government. The Branch of this
Court is directed to turn over the same to the Dangerous
Drugs Board within ten (10) days from receipt hereof for
proper disposal thereof.12
The trial court found the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M.
Tolentino, Jr. to be credible and straightforward. It established the
fact that appellant was caught selling shabu during an entrapment
operation conducted on 10 December 2002. Appellant was
identified as the person from whom PO1 Tolentino
bought P300.00 worth of shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report
No. D-728-2002. On the other hand, the trial court was not
convinced by appellant’s defense of frame-up and denial.
Appellant failed to substantiate his claims that he was merely
sleeping and was awakened by the screams of his relatives who
were being mauled by the police officers.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 March 2004.13 With the

filing thereof, the trial court directed the immediate transmittal of
the entire records of the case to us.14 However, pursuant to our
ruling in People v. Mateo,15 the case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.16
On 28 May 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

decision but reduced the fine imposed on appellant
to P500,000.00. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision

dated March 8, 2004 of the RTC, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3437-M-02, finding accused-
appellant Norberto del Monte guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No.
9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine imposed upon
him is reduced from P5,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.17
A Notice of Appeal having been timely filed by appellant, the
Court of Appeals forwarded the records of the case to us for
further review.18
In our Resolution19 dated 10 December 2007, the parties were

notified that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if
they so desired, within 30 days from notice. Both appellant and
appellee opted not to file a supplemental brief on the ground they
had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in their respective
briefs and the filing of a supplemental brief would only contain a
repetition of the arguments already discussed therein.
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM FOR FAILURE OF THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 21
OF R.A. 9165.20
Appellant anchors his appeal on the arresting policemen’s failure

to strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. He
claims that pictures of him together with the alleged
confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his arrest as
shown by the testimony of the lone prosecution witness. He adds
that PO1 Tolentino and PO1 Antonio Barreras, the police officers
who had initial custody of the drug allegedly seized and
confiscated, did not conduct a physical inventory of the same in
his presence as shown by their joint affidavit of arrest. Their
failure to abide by said section casts doubt on both his arrest and
the admissibility of the evidence adduced against him.
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police
officers’ alleged non-compliance with Section 2121 of Republic Act
No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too
late in the day for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria22 in which
the very same issue was raised, we ruled:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds.

However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the
police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case
from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown,
because appellant did not question during trial the
safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police
officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic
Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were
instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance
did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there
were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that
affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal;
when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without
such objection he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
In People v. Pringas,23 we explained that non-compliance with

Section 21 will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case
at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of
the drug that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the
drug subject matter of this case was forwarded to PNP Regional
Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for laboratory
examination which examination gave positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We thus
find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized
from appellant not to have been compromised.
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said

law, particularly the making of the inventory and the
photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not
render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it
is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or
rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the
evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight
that will accorded it by the courts. One example is that provided
in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein a party
producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to be altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to
do so shall make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is
clearly provided for in the rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any

rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated
and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-
compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight
– evidentiary merit or probative value – to be given the evidence.
The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on
the circumstances obtaining in each case.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs

are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.24 What is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of corpus delicti.25
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The
prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually
happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and
identified in court. The poseur buyer positively identified
appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-
728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria,
the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1
Tolentino from appellant in consideration of P300.00, was
examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu).
In the case before us, we find the testimony of the poseur-buyer,

together with the dangerous drug taken from appellant, more
than sufficient to prove the crime charged. Considering that this
Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the
proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial
court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct
and demeanor of the witnesses during trial. It is a fundamental
rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature
and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no
glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative,
arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide the credibility of witnesses having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.26
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said

findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.27 Finding no
compelling reason to depart from the findings of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, we affirm their findings.
Appellant denies selling shabu to the poseur-buyer insisting that

he was framed, the evidence against him being "planted," and
that the police officers were exacting P15,000.00 from him.
In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that appellant was
the subject of a buy-bust operation. Having been caught
in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer
be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, appellant’s plain denial of the offenses charged,
unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must
simply fail.28 Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with
caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense
in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.29 For
this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
government officials have performed their duties in a regular and
proper manner.30 This, appellant failed to do. The presumption
remained unrebutted because the defense failed to present clear
and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly
perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper
motive.
The presentation of his common-law wife, Amelia Mendoza, and

his nephew, Alejandro Lim, to support his claims fails to sway.
We find both witnesses not to be credible. Their testimonies are
suspect and cannot be given credence without clear and
convincing evidence. Their claims, as well as that of appellant,
that they were maltreated and suffered injuries remain
unsubstantiated. As found by the trial court:
The accused, on the other hand, in an effort to exculpate
himself from liability raised the defense of frame-up. He
alleged that at the time of the alleged buy bust he was
merely sleeping at the house of his sister. That he was
awakened by the yells and screams of his relatives as they
were being mauled by the police officers. However, this
Court is not convinced. Accused failed to substantiate these
claims of maltreatment even in the face of his wife’s and
nephew’s testimony. No evidence was presented to prove
the same other than their self-serving claims.31
Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the

Solicitor General that the witnesses for the defense cannot even
agree on what time the arresting policemen allegedly arrived in
their house. It explained:
To elaborate, appellant testified that it was 3 o’clock in the

afternoon of December 10, 2002 when he was roused from
his sleep by the policemen who barged into the house of his
sister (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 2). His common-law wife,
however, testified that it was 10-11 o’clock in the morning
when the policemen came to the house (TSN, Oct. 13, 2003,
p. 6). On the other hand, Alejandro Lim testified that he
went to sleep at 11 o’clock in the morning and it was 10
o’clock in the morning when the policemen arrived (TSN,
Feb.2, 2004, p. 6). He thus tried to depict an absurd situation
that the policemen arrived first before he went to sleep with
appellant.32
Having established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements

constituting the illegal sale of drugs, we are constrained to
uphold appellant’s conviction.
The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. Said section reads:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation,

Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its
quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death
and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.290 gram
of shabu to PO1 Tolentino, and there being no modifying
circumstance alleged in the information, the trial court, as
sustained by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty
of life imprisonment in accordance with Article 63(2)33 of the
Revised Penal Code.
As regards the fine to be imposed on appellant, the trial court

pegged the fine at P5,000,000.00 which the Court of Appeals
reduced to P500,000.00. Both amounts are within the range
provided for by law but the amount imposed by the Court of
Appeals, considering the quantity of the drugs involved, is more
appropriate.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal

is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02070 dated 28 May 2007, sustaining the conviction of
appellant Norberto Del Monte, a.k.a. Obet, for violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008

People vs. NORBERTO DEL MONTE Y GAPAY alias “OBET”
Facts:
Accused-appellant questioned his conviction, contending that the
evidence against him should have been rendered inadmissible for
failure to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165.
Ruling:
Accused-appellants claim that police failed to take pictures of him
with the evidence and that the police, who had initial custody,
failed to conduct physical inventory was raised only during
appeal.
The court held that it is already late for accused-appellant to do

this.
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds.

However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because
appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the
items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged
violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not
raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first
time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the
trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized
items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
The Court also added that, non-compliance with Section 21 of

said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the
photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not
render the drugs inadmissible in evidence.
Afterall, all the elements necessary to prosecute sale of illegal

drugs had been established. The prosecution clearly showed that
the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject
of the sale was brought and identified in court.
The court sustained accused-appellant’s conviction.

7. Knapp v. State, 79 NE 1076 (1907)
COLLATERAL MATTER-
Knapp v. State, 168 Ind. 153 (1907)

Feb. 8, 1907 · Supreme Court of Indiana · No. 20,765
168 Ind. 153
Knappv.The State
1. Evidence.—Presumptive.—Relevancy.—Evidence of a
collateral fact is admissible to prove the controverted fact,
provided a logical and reasonable inference of the existence of the
controverted fact can be drawn from the existence of such
collateral fact. p. 156.
2. Same.—Reports of Dangerous Character of Decedent.—Denial by
Showing True Character.—Where defendant testifies that he had
heard, from unknown persons, reports that the decedent had
killed a man in arresting him, the State may prove, in rebuttal,
that the man supposed to have been killed died from natural
causes and had no marks of violence upon him. p. 156.
3. Trial. — Instructions.—Phrasing of.—It is not reversible error to
refuse to give a requested instruction, where the court gives one
substantially covering the points involved, though the requested
instruction was more appropriately phrased than the one given,
p. 157.
4. Same.—Instructions.—Reasonble Doubt.—Individual Views
of Jurors.—An instruction, in a criminal case, that “each juror
should act for himself and form his own judgment uninfluenced
by and independent of the judgment of others, and thus
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant from his own
standpoint,” is not harmful to defendant because it lays too much
stress upon the decisions arrived at by the jurors individually. p.
158.
*1545. Trial.—Instructions.—Nondirection as to Consultation to
Arrive at Verdict.—Effect.—An instruction, in a criminal
case, .■which charges the jury as to their individual duties in
arriving at the guilt of defendant, but which fails to direct them,
in terms, to consult in arriving at their verdict, is not bad, since,
there being nothing in such instruction to forbid such
consultation, the jury would understand that it was their duty to
consult. p. 159.
6. Same.—Instructions.—Verbal Criticisms.—Misleading Jury.—
Mere verbal criticism, hypercritical objections and strained
constructions of instructions will not lead to the reversal of a case,
p. 159.
7. Same. — Instructions. — Construction.—Misleading Jury.—An
instruction, open to two interpretations, will not be cause for a
reversal, unless it can.be said that the jury was misled thereby, p.
159.
8. Same.—Instructions.—Misleading Jury.-—Presumptions in favor
of Jury.—Whether an instruction misled the jury is a practical and
not an academic question, jurors being presumed to be possessed
of good common sense, p. 159.
9. Same.—Instructions.—Nondirection.—Duty of Parties to Present
Applicable Instructions.—Where a given instruction fails to direct
the jury to consult in determining their verdict, no complaint can
be made thereof, unless the complaining party tenders to the trial
judge a proper instruction covering such point. p.° 160.
10. Same.—Instructions.—Reasonable Doubt.—Individual Opinions
of Jurors.—An instruction which tends to cause the jurors to think
it would be improper to render a verdict of guilty if any of them
individually should have a reasonable doubt of ■ defendant’s
guilt, is improper, since, upon consultation, a juror may become
convinced of his error in such opinion, p. 160.
11. Same.—Instructions.—Singling out Facts.—Intoxicated Witnesses.
—Credibility.—It is not reversible error, in a criminal case, to
refuse to charge that the jury may, in weighing the testimony,
consider whether any of the witnesses were intoxicated, since the
jurors are presumed to be fully informed upon such question, p.
160.
12. Same.—Instructions.—General Rules Preferable to Special.—
General instructions that the jury should consider all matters in
connection with the witnesses which would, in their.judgment,
throw light upon their credibility, are preferable to special. p. 161.
*15513. Appeal.—Briefs.—Points and Authorities.—A failure to
refer to a question in the “points and authorities” portion of the
brief, is a waiver of such question, p. 163.
14. Same.—Briefs.—Failure to Set out Evidence to Show Instruction
Asked was Applicable.—A failure, by appellant, to set out in his
brief the evidence to show that a requested instruction was
applicable thereto, is a waiver of such alleged error, p. 163.
Erom Wayne Circuit Court; Henry C. Fox, Judge.
Prosecution by the State of Indiana against John Knapp. From a
judgment of conviction and a sentence of life imprisonment,
defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Bobbins & Starr, for appellant.

Charles W. Miller, Attorney-General, William C. Geahe, C. C.
Hadley, H. M. Dowling and Wilfred Jessup, for the State.
Gillett, J.
Appellant appeals from a judgment in the above-entitled cause,

under which he stands convicted of murder in the first degree.
Error is assigned on the overruling of a motion for a new trial.
Appellant, as a witness in his own behalf, offered testimony

tending to show a killing in self-defense. He after-wards testified,
presumably for the purpose of showing that he had reason to fear
the deceased, that before the killing he had heard that the
deceased, who was the marshal of Hagerstown, had clubbed and
seriously injured an old man in arresting him, and that he died a
short time afterwards. On appellant’s being asked, on cross-
examination, who told him this, he answered: “Some
people around Hagerstown there. I can’t say as to who it
was now.” The State was permitted, on rebuttal, to prove
by a physician, over the objection and exception of the
defense, that the old man died of senility and alcoholism,
and that there were no bruises nor marks on his person.
Counsel for appellant contend that it was error to admit
this testimony; that the question was whether he had; in
fact, heard the story, and not as to its truth or falsity.
*156 1. While it is laid down in the hooks that there must be an
open and visible connection between the fact under inquiry and
the evidence by which it is sought to be established, yet the
connection thus required is in the logical processes only, for to
require an actual connection between the two facts would be to
exclude all presumptive evidence. 1 Best, Evidence (Morgan’s
ed.), §90. Within settled rules, the competency of testimony
depends largely upon its tendency to persuade the judgment. 1
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Ev., 71, et seq.; Chicago, etc., R.
Co. v. Pritchard (1907), post; 398. As said in 1 Wharton, Evidence
(3d ed.), §20 : “Relevancy is that which conduces to the proof of a
pertinent hypothesis.” In Stevenson v. Stewart (1849), 11 Pa. St.
307, it was said: “The competency of a collateral fact to be used as
the basis of legitimate argument, is not to be determined by the
conclusiveness of the inferences it may afford in reference to the
litigated fact. It is enough if these, may tend, in a slight degree,
to elucidate the inquiry, or to assist, though remotely, to a
determination probably founded in truth.”
2. We are of opinion that the testimony referred to was

competent. While appellant’s counsel are correct in their assertion
that the question was whether appellant had heard a story to the
effect that the deceased had offered serious violence to the old
man, yet it does not follow that the testimony complained of did
not tend to negative the claim of appellant as to what he had
heard. One of the first principles of human nature is the impulse
to speak the- truth. “This principle,” says Dr. Reid, whom
Professor Greenleaf quotes at length (1 Greenleaf, Evidence
[Lewis’s ed.], §7, note) “has a powerful operation, *157even in the
greatest liars; for where they lie once they speak truth a hundred
times.” Truth speaking preponderating, it follows that to show
that there was no basis in fact for the statement appellant claims
to have heard had a tendency to make it less probable that his
testimony on this point was true. Indeed, since this court has not,
in cases where self-defense is asserted as a justification for
homicide, confined the evidence concerning the deceased to
character evidence, we do not perceive how, without the
possibility of a gross perversion of right, the State could be denied
the opportunity to meet in the manner indicated the evidence of
the defendant as to what he had heard, where he, cunningly
perhaps, testifies that he cannot remember who gave him the
information. The fact proved by the State tended to discredit
appellant, since it showed that somewhere between the fact and
the testimony there was a person who was not a truth speaker,
and with appellant unable to point to his informant, it must, at
the least, be said that the testimony complained of had a tendency
to render his claim as to what he had heard less probable.
3. Appellant, by instruction three, asked the court to charge, “that

every individual member of the jury must act upon his own
responsibility, and no one is bound by the conclusion of the
majority, if such conclusion does not agree with his own,-
deliberately formed after a careful consideration of the evidence
and consultation with his fellow jurors.” This instruction was
refused, but, in lieu thereof, the court gave the following: “In
deliberating upon the evidence for the purpose of finding a
verdict, each juror should act for himself and form his own
judgment, uninfluenced by, and independent of, the judgment of
others, and thus determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant from his own standpoint.” It may be conceded that in
appellant’s instruction above set forth there is found a correct
statement of the law, and it may *158also be conceded concerning
the court’s instruction that, although its fundamental idea is right,
it is unhappily phrased, but as was said by this court
in Shenkenberger v. State (1900), 151 Ind. 630, 612: “The form of
expression in the special instruction proposed by counsel may be
much more forcible and expressive than that adopted by the
court; but, it does not follow that such form is to be preferred, or
that it states the law more accurately. When a special instruction
is presented, the material point is the idea embodied in it, and not
the language used to express that idea. In every case, the court
has the right to choose its own mode of expression, and to clothe
its ideas in such words as it deems suitable.”
1. Concerning appellant’s instruction three, his counsel merely

assert in argument that it is plainly the law, and that the refusal to
give it was material error. They fail to point out wherein, upon
the point instructed on, the instruction given falls short of the
instruction tendered. Indeed, it appears that counsel’s complaint
of the instruction given is that it carried the idea of individual
responsibility so far as to err in the other direction. Concerning
said instruction appellant’s counsel say: “It, in effect, tells the jury
that each juror should act independently of others, and not be
influenced in any way by the judgment of others. . It lays down
the proposition that each individual member of the jury must go
into a corner by himself and deliberate on the cause and come to
his own conclusions; that he must not consult with his fellow
jurors or discuss the evidence. It forbids the interchange of
views.” Surely, in view of these claims, we are not called on to
analyze the instruction given to show that it contains the essential
elements of the point on which appellant sought, by instruction
three, to have the court instruct the jury.
*160 10. Instructions twenty-eight and twenty-nine tendered by

appellant were erroneous. While a juror should refuse to join in a
verdict of guilty so long as he entertains a reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the defendant, yet an instruction would be improper
which was calculated to lead a juror to infer that the mere
entertaining of a reasonable doubt, after a careful weighing of the
evidence and full consultation, amounted to a limitation upon the
right of the juror to join in a verdict of guilty. Euller deliberation
and consultation might clear away the juror’s doubt, and render it
proper for him to concur in the conclusion of his associates.
11. *16112. *160The last objection urged for reversal is based on

the refusal of the court to give instruction five tendered by
appellant. That instruction is as follows: “If the jury believe from
the evidence that any of the witnesses who have testified in this
cause were intoxicated at the time of the facts about which they
testified, the jury may consider this fact in weighing the
testimony *161of such witnesses, and in determining to what
extent, if at all, such intoxicated condition might probably affect
the accuracy and clearness of the recollection of such witnesses of
the facts to which they testified.” According to Red-field, J., in
order to predicate error upon the refusal of an instruction, it must
be couched in such terms as to be sound to the full
extent. Vaughan v. Porter (1844), 16 Vt. 266. As far back
as Lawrenceburg, etc., R. Co. v. Montgomery (1856), 1 Ind. 474, 477,
it was said: “It is not error to refuse an instruction, unless it ought
to be given precisely in the terms prayed.” This declaration has
frequently been approved by this court. Roots v. Tyner (1857), 10
Ind. 87; Goodwin v. State (1884), 96 Ind.
550; Ricketts v. Harvey (1886), 106 Ind. 564; Diamond Block Coal
Co. v. Cuthbertson (1906), 166 Ind. 290. It appears to us that the
subject-matter of the instruction in question had so far to do with
matters of fact that it might properly be refused. It was said
in Garfield v. State (1889), 74 Ind. 60, 64: “The teachings of
experience on questions of fact are not, however, doctrines of law
which may be announced as such from the bench.” But without
going even thus far, it may be affirmed that there was no error in
refusing the instruction before us. What a court may do in
instructing upon matters of fact, and what it is compelled to do,
are quite different propositions under the criminal code. §1901
Burns 1905, Acts 1905, pp. 584, 641, §260. There are some matters,
such as the inferences which may be drawn from the failure to
produce evidence which is solely under the control of the
opposite party, as to the testimony of accomplices, and the like,
where there may be real occasion for the court to advise the jury
as to their authority in the premises, but concerning matters of
ordinary experience and observation, general, rather than
concrete rules, are preferable in instructing the jury. The effect of
intoxication upon the perceptive faculties is so well
understood *162that no one need he instructed upon it, and the
question as to the extent to which such faculties have been
dimmed by the indulgence may safely be left to the argument of
counsel in the concrete case. It will, upon thought, be appreciated
that a special instruction concerning possible elements of
weakness in the testimony of any class of witnesses can scarcely
be framed without seeming to discredit the witnesses to whom it
applies, or at least to place them in an unfavorable light as
compared with witnesses whose testimony is not thus singled
out. Should the principle be recognized that the court must give a
special instruction upon the subject of intoxication, there would
be no stopping place, and, the circumstances making the
instruction apposite, it would, by the same token, have to be
affirmed that upon request the court would have to instruct upon
many such primary matters, as that the jury may consider
whether the sight of any witness who has testified was in such
condition as to affect his powers of observation, or whether the
hearing of any witness was so deficient as to make it possible that
he might have misunderstood, or whether any witness was so
lacking in memory as to render it possible that he might have
forgotten. It is altogether fairer to . deal with these subsidiary
matters by a general instruction, as was done in this ease by the
court’s instruction seventeen, wherein it informed the jury,
among other things, that they had a right to consider the
opportunity that a witness had of knowing and understanding
the things about which he testified, and that it was their duty to
consider all matters in connection with the testimony of a witness
which would, in their judgment, throw any light upon his
credibility. Here was an instruction, cast into the form of a rule of
law, that met the matter. We regard a general instruction as
altogether a more appropriate way of dealing with questions
wherein the jury has only to be advised of its right in the premises
in order to deal with testimony as it should.
*159 5. 6. 7. 8. *1609. *158Referring to what appears to be counsel’s

real objection to the action of the court, as indicated by their
language *159above quoted, we pause to consider whether there
should be a reversal because of the instruction given.
Notwithstanding the strictures of counsel, we nevertheless feel
warranted in asserting that the instruction falls far short of stating
to the jury that its members must not discuss the evidence or
indulge in an interchange of views concerning the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Independence of judgment in the
reaching of a conclusion is the fundamental idea of said
instruction. There is not á word in it which would forbid the
fullest consultation. The cause will not be reversed merely
because it is open to verbal criticism. Cleveland, 'ele., B.
Co. v. Miller (1905), 165 Ind. 381, and cases cited. The general
effect of a charge is to be considered, and hypercritical objections
thereto will not avail. 1 Blashfield, Instructions to Juries, §382. The
language should receive a reasonable construction, under all of
the circumstances, and not a strained or forced
one. Davenport v. Cummings (1863), 15 Iowa 219. If the language
used is capable of different constructions, the construction is to be
preferred which will lead to an affirmance, unless it can
reasonably be said, that the instruction was calculated to mislead
the jury. Cleveland, etc., B. Co. v. Miller, supra; Caldwell v. New
Jersey Steamboat Co. (1871), 47 N. Y.
282; People v. McCallam (1886), 103 N. Y. 587, 9 N. E. 502. The test
question in every case is: Was the jury misled? Cleveland, etc., B.
Co. v. Miller, supra; Indiana, etc., Traction Co. v. Jacobs (1907), 167
Ind. 85. In determining this we do not have an academic question
to deal with. The question is a concrete one. This is not a question
concerning the matter of laying down as a rule of law a
proposition that presumptively jurors would know nothing of,
but it is a question whether we are to strain after an inference, the
essential thought being right, that the jurors were led to do a
thing that no man of common sense *160would, think was
required. It would be no less than preposterous to suppose that
the instruction, worded as it was. was calculated to lead the jurors
to refuse to consult. Appellant’s instruction three contains the
idea of jurors consulting, but we do not understand that his
counsel are on this ground complaining of the refusal of said
instruction. If they were, it would be enough to say that the
necessity of consultation was not put forward as a substantive
proposition in the instruction, but was mentioned as a mere
limitation upon its former language. If counsel deemed it
expedient that there should be a direction to the jury to consult—
a course which finds no parallel in our individual experience—
fairness to the trial court required that the demand to have the
jury so instructed should be brought forward in a substantive
way, and not merely as a part of the setting of an instruction upon
some other proposition.
*163 13. 14. We may. further observe that appellant’s counsel have

not brought themselves within the rules of this court, so far as
their instruction five is concerned, in that the failure to give said
instruction is not referred to in the “points and authorities”
portion of their brief, and also because they have failed to point
"out what witness, other than Charles Bertram, said instruction
could have applied to, thus leaving us to go through nearly a
thousand pages of record in order to determine whether, since the
instruction refers to “witnesses,” it was not refused on the ground
that it was inapplicable.
We have now considered all of the points urged for a reversal,

and we find no error. It is not urged that the verdict was not
supported by the evidence, but, in view of the burden of
punishment which the judgment carried, we have been at the
pains to familiarize ourselves with the testimony. Having done
so, we feel that we may add, without impropriety, that it appears
to. us the right result was reached.
Judgment affirmed.
Knapp v. State
168 Ind. 153, 79 N.E. 1076 (1907)
 Kanpp was accused of murdering a police officer.

o In his defense, he offered testimony that it was self-
defense.
 Knapp stated that he'd heard a story (from some
unidentified person) about how the police officer
had beaten an old man to death.
o In rebuttal, the State offered evidence that the old man
died of "senility and alcoholism" not from being beaten
by the police officer.
 The Trial Court found Knapp guilty. He appealed.
o Knapp argued that the testimony about what really
killed the old man should not have been admitted.
 He argued that the facts of the old man's death
were not relevant, only whether Knapp had heard
and believed the story about the old man's death.
 The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction.
o The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with Knapp that
the true question was whether Knapp had heard the
story, not the actual facts of the old man's death.
o However, the Court felt that the testimony about the
old man's death was relevant because it showed that
somewhere between the fact and the testimony there
was a person who was not a truth speaker.
 Since Knapp couldn't point to who told him the
story, the implication was that Knapp's claim
wasn't probably telling the truth.
 Even if there had been a witness that testified that they
personally told Knapp that the old man was beaten to death,
evidence about whether the cop actually killed the old man
is still relevant, because it is for the jury to decide how much
weight to give to the witness' testimony.
o The jury was free to believe that Knapp had genuinely
thought that the cop killed the old man. The job of the
jury is to listen to opposing arguments and make a
decision on who to believe.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Knapp v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, 1907, 168 Ind. 153, 79
N.E. 1076
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. At the trial,
the defendant attempted to show self defense by indicating
his fear of the deceased, saying that he had heard that the
deceased, a marshall, had clubbed and injured an old man
while arresting him, and that the man had died later. The
prosecution showed evidence that the old man had died
from senility and alcoholism, not from violence. The
defendant urged that it was error to include this testimony,
because the issue was whether the defendant had heard the
marshall killed the man, not whether it was true. Held The
evidence was properly admitted. Evidence that a supposed
rumor is not true makes it less probable the defendant heard
the rumor, because in human nature there is an "impulse to
speak the truth." [But this assumes that people besides
officials knew about the coronor's report. It would only be
relevant to submit that the condition of the old man had
been made public; otherwise, the "truth" about the old
man's death is not relevant to the rumor unless the "truth"
is known to those who could spread rumors.]
KNAPP VS STATE
-
8. Tating v. Marcella, 519 SCRA 79 (2007) TMJA
IS GENERALLY HEARSAY
DEED OF SALE
ANNULMENT OF SALE AND CANCELLATION OF TCTS
22 YEARS TO FILE
WHETHER OR NOT ADMISSIBLE ANG JA- YES BUT IT CANNOT BE GIVEN PROBATIVE WEIGHT.
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007
NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by
SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT
OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court

are the Decision1 dated February 22, 2002 and the Resolution
dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of

land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan Psd-31182,
located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The
subject lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned
by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her

granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena).
The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of
Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferred in the name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her
name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon
for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.6 However, the
land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement

claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the property;
the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer
title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to
obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose
of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered
that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she
wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her.7
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs,

namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who
predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when
Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed
on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding
from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject
property as heirs of Daniela.9 Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle
the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented

by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the RTC of Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification
of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor,
cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance
of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of
Daniela.10 The complaint also prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint with leave of court for the purpose of excluding
Ricardo as a party plaintiff, he having died intestate and without
issue in March 1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as
his sole heirs.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation

attended the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale.
She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.
She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her
counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the award of actual,
exemplary and moral damages as well as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.12
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment

with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and
hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969
(Exh. "Q") executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and
Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID and further ordering:
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No.

5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a new title in the names of
Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion
of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso
owner of one-fourth (¼) portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso
owner of one-fourth (¼) portion and Nena Lazalita Tating,
Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion, all of lot 56
after payment of the prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax

Declaration No. 143-00672 and in lieu thereof issue a new
Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, ¼ Pro-
indiviso portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, ¼ Pro-indiviso
portion; Julio Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; and Nena
Lazalita Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well
as the house standing thereon be likewise declared in the
names of the persons mentioned in the same proportions as
above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the

sum of ₱20,000.00 by way of moral damages, ₱10,000.00 by
way of exemplary damages, ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s
fees and ₱3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA
rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.14
Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated August 22, 2002.15
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that

the CA "has decided the instant case without due regard to and in
violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable
Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the
evidence on record."16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the case, the proper
remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as

a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there
is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, the petition actually avers errors of judgment,
rather than of jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a
petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
justice, the Court decided to treat the present petition
for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially
considering that it was filed within the reglementary period for
filing the same.17
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for
the private respondents rests on the proposition that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because
Daniela’s actual intention was not to dispose of her property but
simply to help petitioner by providing her with a collateral.
Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the
RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated
was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977.
However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should
have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that
Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in
evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine
her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed
on October 14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was purportedly
executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only
after the death of Daniela in 1994.18 Petitioner argues that if the
deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would have taken action
against the petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact
remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after
the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a word
of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in

departing from the doctrine held time and again by the Supreme
Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a
notarial document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC and the
CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between
Daniela and petitioner created a trust relationship between them
because of the settled rule that where the terms of a contract are
clear, it should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents

contend that petitioner failed to show that the CA or the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed
judgments; that Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence
to prove that the contract of sale by and between her and
petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the
agreement between petitioner and Daniela created a trust
relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the
parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or
if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively
simulated).19 The primary consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract is the intention of the parties.20 Such intention
is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well
as from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.21
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private

respondents in proving their allegation that the subject deed of
sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the
sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial
court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private
respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also
accorded great probative weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn

statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. 22 The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency
to convince and persuade.23 Thus, a particular item of evidence
may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but
by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them.25 Moreover, the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.26 For
this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay,
unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the
CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative
weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness
stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have
given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes
of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner
was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship
was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to

sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no
intention of disposing of her property when she executed the
subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and
not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside
from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to
present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim.
Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract
of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most

protuberant index of simulation is the complete absence, on the
part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his
rights of ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present
case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared
the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name.
Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid
the real estate taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in
1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax
receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.31 The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title
to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government.32 Such an act
strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.33 On the other hand, private respondents failed to
present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that
Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she
claims ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in the name
of Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence,
refers only to the house standing on the lot in controversy.34 Even
the said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner
owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject

Deed of Absolute Sale did not really reflect the real intention of
Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she
never told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in
executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make known her
true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on
December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from
her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she is
appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from
petitioner until her death more than ten years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property
even after she executed the subject Absolute Deed of Sale and
even after title to the property was transferred in petitioner’s
favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in
dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner
continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that
ownership and possession are two entirely different legal
concepts.35 Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership,
neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first
paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the
sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object
of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with ownership, is
transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance.36 Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present
case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take
actual possession or occupation of the disputed property after the
execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she was already
able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the
subject property.
As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by

petitioner, which confirmed the validity of the sale of the
disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the
sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally,
private respondents were not able to cross-examine the deceased-
affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.
However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is

disregarded, the fact remains that private respondents failed to
prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance of evidence37 that the contract of sale between
Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption is
in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns
its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation. 38 Since
private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving
their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela was simulated, the presumption of regularity and
validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale

between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or
simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to
whether or not a trust relationship was created between them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C,
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private
respondents is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
KEY POINTS IN EVIDENCE:
 The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with

weight of evidence. Affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant
but by another who uses his own language in writing the the
affiant’s statements, which may thus by either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them
 The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade
9. People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402

MV WILCON9 ILOILO
BILL OF RIGHTS WAS IGNORED ALTOGETHER
NO VALID ARREST; SEARCH MADE WAS NOT
PURSUANT TO A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST
UNDER THE CONSITUTION, WHAT THEY DID IS
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF A PERSON TO BE
SECURED
THUS THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED ARE INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
NOT EVEN A CASE OF WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A
MOVING VEHICLE-LACKING THE ELEMENT OF
EXPEDIENCY OR URGENCY.
REGULAR INFORMER WHO HAD GIVEN THEM A TIP
G.R. No. 74869 July 6, 1988 PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y
AHNI, defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches

but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of
illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him,
held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after

disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting
for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include
Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that
same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement
of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded
only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted
.6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received

a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was
on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they
waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached
him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had
pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who
testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring
that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket,
two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in
the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana
looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and
could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of
the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own

examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo
City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time,
traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for
fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified
that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but,
strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched
by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for
P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged
not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said
did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations
of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the
injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings,

considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate access
to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to
weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice,
meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in
the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this,
discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's
conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up
because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible
Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time
under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No
bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and

it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched
without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his
possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of
Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part,
the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came
under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful
arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who

testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they
arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their
only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it
was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third
"weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the
declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol,
Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you

mean with respect to the coming of Idel
Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence

report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was

supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the

Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984

when we received this information from that
particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular
operation which was being participated by
Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence

report two days before June 25, 1984 with
respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside

from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but
not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For
instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information

which you said two days before June 25,
1984, did you also receive daily report
regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received

reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a

required sheet of information, maybe for
security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.
Q But you received it from your regular

informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more

or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming
with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel

Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana
was received by you many days before you
received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of

Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on

June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you

did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did

not know that he was coming but on June 23,
1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding
the reports on his activities, we have reports
that he was already consummated the act of
selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him

under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of

Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the

woman.
Q So that even before you received the

official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the effect
that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on
June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant

for the seizure or search of the subject
mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our

operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it

will yield positive result you do not need a
search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it

comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court
cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of
laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search

warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked
to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of
Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and
aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting

declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least
two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to
arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they
had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law.
The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the hea d of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the

warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has
always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result
of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the
narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment

of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our

country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship, when
any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if
that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt
its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill
of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for

indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact
alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The
constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be
so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution
is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from

Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence
cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by
the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized
illegally. It I s the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by
the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal
and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government

against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-
enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth.
But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so
than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the
liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order.
Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It
is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana

as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and

the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in

flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the
moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from
the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian
hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act
No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be
lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of
Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana
leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule
126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial
court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in

flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the
moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from
the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian
hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act
No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be
lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of
Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana
leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule
126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial
court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
PEOPLE v AMINNUDIN (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 74869
163 SCRA 402
July 06, 1988
TOPIC – Criminal Procedure, Criminal Law, Constitutional Law

II, Bill of Rights, Warrantless Arrest, Warrantless Search and
Seizure, Dangerous Drugs Act
FACTS
Idel Aminnudin was arrested after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting
for him accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked
like marijuana leaves, took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated and tested by the NBI laboratory. They were verified
to be 3 kilos worth of marijuana leaves. An information for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against
him. Accused-appellant was eventually convicted.
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received

a tip from one of their informers naming accused-appellant and
adding that he was on board said vessel, and was carrying
marijuana. The PC waited for him and approached him as he
descended after the informer had pointed to him.
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana. He alleged that he was

arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit. He insisted he did not
even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. He also argued that the
marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the
stock room of the PC headquarters.
The trial court was unconvinced. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the arrest was legal, and the evidence admissible.
RULING
No and no.
It is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution,

that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and
seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip
they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer
who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by
boat with marijuana.
There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a

judge after personal determination by him of the existence of
probable cause. The accused-appellant was not caught
in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant. The
present case presented no urgency to apply the ruling that vessels
and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear

that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was
coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. From the information they
had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet
they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law.
The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether.
The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will

be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the
prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from

Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence
cannot be admitted. The marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit
of the poisonous tree. The search was not an incident of a lawful
arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by
the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal
and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
With the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence

against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on
the presumption that he is innocent.
The decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-

appellant is ACQUITTED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
Facts:
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip
from one of their informers that the accused was on board a
vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was
identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening and approached him as he descended from the
gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him
and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained
three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the
NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Issue:
Whether or not accused constitutional right against

unreasonable serach and seizure is violated
Ruling:
The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed

under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified unless the
accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be
committed or had just been committed.
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and

seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles
may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the

PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within
which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his
arrival was certain. And from the information they have received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine
on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a

judge and not law enforcement agents.
10. People v. Laguio, Jr., 518 SCRA 393-PARKING LOT-

PALABAS NG APARTMENT PAPUNTANG PARKING LOT.
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE
WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has

directly come to this Court via this petition for review on
certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution1 dated 13 March
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal
Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private
respondent Lawrence C. Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely:
(1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of Section 16,
Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal Case No. 96-
149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for
Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No.
7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C.

Wang in the court of origin respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline
substance known as SHABU contained in thirty-two (32)
transparent plastic bags weighing approximately 29.2941
kilograms, containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription
therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic
pistol with one loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm
automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions
without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol
with one loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with
ammunitions, carrying the same along Maria Orosa St., Ermita,
Manila, which is a public place, on the date which is covered by
an election period, without first securing the written permission
or authority from the Commission on Elections, as provided by
the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to

all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection
to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police
operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not
Guilty" be entered for him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3)
consolidated cases followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the

Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department
of Interior and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo,
Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal,
arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain
Arellano, for unlawful possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as shabu. In
the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons,
Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as
the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set
after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and
pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another
bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned,
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives
that they were working as talent manager and gymnast
instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by
Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose
their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for
Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled
delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996,
and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria
Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives
decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug
activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector
Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa
Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that

at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to
the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked
towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness)
together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers
approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as police
officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence
Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked, there was found
inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him
an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol
loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members
of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were
the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing
white crystalline substance with a total weight of 29.2941
kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally
known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of ₱650,000.00; (c) one
electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed
Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang
resisted the warrantless arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon

motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within
which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. 9 On 19
December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation 10 to the
effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for
Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-
149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for Illegal
Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation
of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly,
trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to

Evidence,11 praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three
(3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants
and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him.
Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition
to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of
Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the
prosecution filed its Opposition13 alleging that the warrantless
search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it
has proven its case, so it is now time for the defense to present
its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto
A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution14 granting
Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges
for lack of evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence

is hereby granted; the accused is acquitted of the charges against
him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and
Violation of Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of
shabu with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two
unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal.
9mm. are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the
branch clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the
Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the two
firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the officer-in-charge of
PARAC, Department of Interior and Local Government, is
ordered to return the confiscated amount of P650,000.00 to the
accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered owner,
David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People,

submitting that the trial court erred -
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND

CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III
OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE
SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS

SEARCH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN
ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE

ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS
HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING

WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION AND FAILURE
TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE

SEIZED AND OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT
DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving

due course to the petition, required the public and private
respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice.
Private respondent Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file
a reply,18 which the Office of the Solicitor General did on 5
December 1997, after several extensions.19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to

the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda,20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the

prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution granting
Wang’s demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the
charges against him without violating the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether there was
lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this
case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an

appeal filed directly with this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of
law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being
allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. Then, too, it
bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor a part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege
which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law
(Velasco v. Court of Appeals21). Although Section 2, Rule 122 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may
appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same
provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition against
putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal
in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open
for review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a
judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double
jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, disallows appeal by the People
from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a

resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an
acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after
an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has
previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan 22 presents

one exception to the rule on double jeopardy, which is, when the
prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or

suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory
decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on
November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the
Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatorily
required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses
committed by military men) made it possible to refer the cases to
the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very
essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote,
"jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by
preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily
transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of
individual cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and
treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months
by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent
Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot
and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents
accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those
categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or
witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions
of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of
the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will
be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and
considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein
ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict
and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all
alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and
removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in
the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had
pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of
law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and
sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for
due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the
sham trial a mock trial — the non-trial of the century — and that
the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void
ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double

jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of
the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal
cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case
of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to

prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby
violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic

constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus,
the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered
in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen
vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs.
Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or
decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be
regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw
and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head"
(Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null

and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa,
supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)

before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand
of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the
lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s
demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of People
v. Uy,23 which involved the trial court’s decision which granted
the two separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused
therein, both with leave of court, resulting in their acquittal of
their respective charges of murder due to insufficiency of
evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed directly with
this Court, we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal

is final and unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the
rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard

against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first
enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts of
acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.
The cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v.
Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to
name a few, are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy
behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy
is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose
and safeguard him from government oppression through the
abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v.
United States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the
State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring
supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to

evidence is granted. As held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at

bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the
same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the
case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such
dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence
may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused
in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case
ends there. (Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute.
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case
may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the
lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial
of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a

decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the
accused’s acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused with leave of court, the CA ruling that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing the
prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity
of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which supposedly
"positively identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the
crime charged." The Court, in a petition for certiorari, sustained
the CA’s power to review the order granting the demurrer to
evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In
resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound

discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not
be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order
amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the
dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.
The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v.
Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an

acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the "humanity of the
laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens,
when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green
expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice,

an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy
underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals
is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a
need for "repose", a desire to know the exact extent of one’s
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has
built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in
a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double

jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of
evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy
will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari
may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner
in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review

dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result
in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set
aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via
certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not
violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through

then Secretary of Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then
Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in the
present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is
different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings

Corporation,25 we have enumerated the distinction between the
two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are
substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the

correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure
Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for
the rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while

so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised
when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not survive such a rule.
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the
original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ

of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the
intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the
basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court
are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where
the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact --
a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its

appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the
higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while
a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that
was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the
original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition
for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the
petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and
the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents,
respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and

those that the Rules of Court so declared are appealable. Since the
issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to
an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed

within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order.
A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen
days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the
petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be
filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final
order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not

later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or
resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of
the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a
petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this
motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under
the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment
or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of

certiorari and appeal are two different remedies mutually
exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of
a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not
available as such an appeal will put the accused in double
jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the

Philippines in this case, this petition is outrightly dismissible. The
Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court
by appeal without violating private respondent’s right against
double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special

civil action of certiorari, which definitely this Court has the power
to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, the instant petition will
nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will
show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the
warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no
question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident
to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed.26 However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful
search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is
currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully
arrested in flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless

search in the case at bar, the trial court granted private
respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the
three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest
resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an
invalid warrantless search. The trial court’s ratiocination is
quoted as follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to

Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful
as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the
defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace

officer may arrest a person without a warrant:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed,

and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it,
and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of these circumstances were present when the
accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking
from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to
enter the parked BMW car when the police officers
arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The
accused was not committing any visible offense at the
time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that
he was about to commit a crime or that he had just
committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380
9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in
his possession was concealed inside the right front
pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and
slim in size that it would not give an outward
indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's
side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting
officers had no information and knowledge that the
accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did
they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to
his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo

Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from
the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view.
The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the
Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver’s seat of the car. The
police officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned
articles were inside the car, or that the accused had placed them
there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion that
there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police

Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03 Reynaldo are hereunder
quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL’S TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along

Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen
effected the arrest of the accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by

one of those whom we have previously apprehended in
connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita,
Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa,

what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself
during that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were

positioned in that place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr.

Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him

and we asked him to open the back compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one

loaded magazine and likewise when the compartment was
opened several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another

firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at the place under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?

A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for
further investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did
you do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the

NBI for laboratory examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

(TSN, pp. 3-8, November 15, 1996).
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged

transporting of shabu on May 16, 1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the

Glenmore Modeling Agency, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence

Wang, is it not?
A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that
he is an employee of the Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by
Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your companions look for
Lawrence Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by

Redentor Teck as Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions

at the same time searched the BMW car described in your
affidavit of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same
was searched, is it not?
A. He was outside, Sir.
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and
search were made, is it not?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is

it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no
search warrant, is it not?
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)
SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBAL’S TESTIMONY
PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. What is you role or participation in this case?
A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so

that you arrested him, Mr. Witness?
A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his

possession placed inside his car.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of
the accused, please tell us the antecedent circumstances which led
you to recover or confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested

one Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
COURT: The same date?

A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they
were investigated, Teck mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang
as his employer.
COURT: Why were these people, arrested?
A. For violation of R.A. 6425.
COURT: How were they arrested?
A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or

handling shabu to another previously arrested person. It was a
series of arrest.
COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested

three (3) persons, SPO2 Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a
certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they divulged
the name of the source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?
A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they

divulged to us the name of the person from whom they get
shabu.
COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and

Joseph Junio. We let them call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
thru the cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of
shabu.
COURT: So there was an entrapment?

A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to

Noble and company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to

you as to the source of the shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: What was the information?
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu

on that morning.
COURT: When?
A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.
COURT: At what place?
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck

lead us to Maria Orosa Apartment where we conducted a stake
out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: What happened during the stake out?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw

him opening his car together with his driver.
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
A. Probably, Sir.
COURT: What did you do?
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there
was a shabu inside the compartment of the car.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car,
what did you do?
A. We approached him.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of
the car, what did you do with that?
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt.

Coronel while I was the one who inspected and opened the
compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24,
December 16, 1996).
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY

THE COURT
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito

Coronel, this Court has gathered that prior to the arrest of the
accused there were three (3) men that your team arrested. One of
whom is a police officer.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men

shabu were confiscated from them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you

were able to discover that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were
the source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the
three men that you have arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were

able to apprehend also these two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were
also investigated by your team?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
A: I was the one whom investigated them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you
confiscated from them at the time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me
that they were working for the accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was
another delivery of shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it
May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask
him to shed light on the matter concerning the arrest of these two
employees in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team
suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead
(led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you
know whether he was carrying a gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was
in possession of the gun is when he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when
Capt. Margallo handed to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing
anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he

was intending to do something unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to
prevent your team from searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the

search of his person and the car were without probable cause and
could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any
of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and
derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that
the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in
favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is
likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a
consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial
court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however,
now posits that "inasmuch as it has been shown in the present
case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and
unlicensed firearms in the accused’s possession had been validly
made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then
the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be
regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission
of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally
and statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the People
now contends that the warrantless search preceded the
warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the
general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and
seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private
respondent to open his BMW car’s trunk to see if he was carrying
illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the

search or vice versa, is a matter of credibility of evidence. It
entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal
of a criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for
review, but not in the case of a petition for certiorari where the
factual findings of the trial court are binding upon the Court.
Since a dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is
not subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the factual
finding that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this
Court. The only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and
set aside the dismissal order of the trial court upon demurrer to
evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no
legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal

Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless

arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that
said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been
committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto

under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.291awphi1.nét
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case
did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private
respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car,
which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee.
He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there
can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information"
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest.30
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under

paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the
testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested
mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged
for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even
categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they
were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo’s declaration
that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the
following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and
that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria
Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance"
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person
which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the
employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on
personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under
paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is

that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless
search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in

evidence the marijuana found in appellant’s possession during a
search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in
disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment

of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification of the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officer
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against

unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we
agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted
his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. 32 The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.33 Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of
the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment
bolsters Wang’s claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and
search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those

who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order.
Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
once said, "I think it is less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Crim Pro Digest: PEOPLE V. LAGUIO
Topic: ARREST
PEOPLE V. LAGUIO
Facts:
Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review

to nullify and set aside the resolution of RTC in criminal case,
granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer to
Evidence and aquitting him of 3 charges filed against him.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings
that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule
in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is
likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a
consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial
court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however,

now posits that inasmuch as it has been shown in the present case
that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and
unlicensed firearms in the accused possession had been validly
made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then
the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be
regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission
of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and
statutorily permissible and lawful. In effect, the People
now contends that the warrantless search preceded the
warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the
general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and
seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private
respondent to open his BMW cars trunk to see if he was carrying
illegal drugs.
Issue: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the
police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of
arrest and/or a search warrant.
Held:
NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case

did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private
respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car
when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car,
which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David
Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore,
there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that reliable information
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph
(b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies
of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for
illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even
categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they
were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration
that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the
following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and
that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria
Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted surveillance
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person
which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the
employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on
personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under
paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is
that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless
search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
Xxxxxxxxx
Summary:
Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the assailed Resolution
granting Lawrence Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting
him of all charges for lack of evidence. The prosecution seeks to
set aside the resolution, rejected by the SC because the
prosecution only raised a question of law.
Doctrine:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of
acquittal is final and unappealable. The right of the People to
appeal is expressly made subject to the prohibition against
putting the accused in double jeopardy.
Facts:
 RTC granted Lawrence C. Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence,

acquitting him of 3 charges filed against him (Violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms and
COMELEC Gun Ban)
o Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck (unimportant ppl)
were arrested while they were about to hand over a
bag of shabu to a police officer. When questioned, the
two told the officers that there will be a scheduled
delivery of shabu by their employer Wang,and
described the place where he can be found and that
was in an apartment building in Malate Manila. Wang
was placed under surveillance.
o When Wang came out of the apartment, two officers

approa ched him, introduced themselves as police
officers, and asked him his name. Upon hearing that
he is Wang, he was immediately frisked and asked
him to open the back compartment of the car. The
officers found an unlicensed firearm in his pocket, and
shabu, cash, electronic and mechanical scales, and
another unlicensed firearm in the compartment. Wang
resisted the arrest.
o
 On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to
Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the
cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search
warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s
evidence against him.

 On 13 March 1997,the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued
the assailed Resolution granting Wang’s Demurrer to
Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of
evidence.
Issues Ratio:
1. Whether the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s

resolution granting Wang’s demurrer to evidence and
acquitting him of all the charges against him without
violating the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy[1]. – NO.
 Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal

Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the
People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly
made subject to the prohibition against putting the
accused in double jeopardy.
 Appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the
case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is
why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily
puts the accused in double jeopardy.
 An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an
acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.
 Exception: when the prosecution is denied due process of
law
o Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right
to due process is thereby violated.
o But the prosecution in this case raised a pure question
of law under rule 45, and not on rule 65.
1. [OBITER] WON there was a valid arrest. – NO.

 There was no suspicious behavior on the part of Wang that
would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was
merely walking from the apartment and was about to enter
a car parked when the officers arrested him.
 Absence of any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise
in the presence and within the view of the officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an
in flagrante delicto arrest.
[1] Double jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment,

(b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
11. Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA 611
Bus
Approached by a barangay tano
Varangay tanods-
Did not raise any objection as to the invalidity of the arrest-
Waiver of illegality of the arrest is not a waiver of
inadmissibility of the evidence seized.
G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid
warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.1 Any evidence obtained in violation of said
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.2
On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July

2005, affirming the Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding
petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No.
9165)5 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of
₱350,000.00.6
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section

11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information7 which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality

of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more
or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing the
necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper
government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on

the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting the three (3)
barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely,
Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo
Ordoño (Ordoño), who arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March

2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the National
Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union
together with Aratas and Ordoño when they noticed petitioner,
lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that
petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be
looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter
purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him
under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay
Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by
Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s
bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of
eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police
station for further investigation.9
Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s testimony on most

material points. On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted
that he himself brought out the contents of petitioner’s bag before
petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado. 10 Nonetheless, he
claimed that at Mercado’s house, it was petitioner himself who
brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado.
For his part, Ordoño testified that it was he who was ordered by
Mercado to open petitioner’s bag and that it was then that they
saw the purported contents thereof.11
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano

Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist who conducted the
examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from
petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him
for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and
contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He
disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge
neither of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of
how the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he
could not identify whose marking was on the inside of the
cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.12
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense’s sole

witness, he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he
arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union.
After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to
the house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk
to his brother’s house. As he was walking, prosecution witness
Ordoño, a cousin of his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him
and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was
going to his brother’s house. Ordoño then purportedly requested
to see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this
point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all
the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was
restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It
was Aratas who carried the bag until they reached their
destination.13
Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag was
opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item
wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana
leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have
been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not
give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for
them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was
brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense.
Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took
out the contents of his bag at his friend’s house, he averred that it
was one of the tanod who did so at Mercado’s house and that it
was only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time.14
e. replied that he was going to his brother'en proceeded to walk to

his brother'w
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioner’s guilt beyond

reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him and
sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00.15
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the

Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 On 28 July 2005, the appellate court
affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals, finding
no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of regularity in
favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-
motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was
probable cause to arrest petitioner. It observed further:
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the

seized marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance finds
prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited
drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified
that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his
bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the
marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven by
accused-appellant Valdez’s own testimony.16
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that
his guilt of the crime charged had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal,
that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the
barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of
his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.
Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly
seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit
of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great
respect and weight, in the absence of any clear showing that some
facts and circumstances of weight or substance which could have
affected the result of the case have been overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied.17
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on

hand, however, the Court finds and so holds that a reversal of the
decision a quo under review is in order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find

any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in
the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person.18 Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself,
be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized

drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or
not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is
justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. 19 Evaluating
the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the
reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a
warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached

by the tanod and asked to show the contents of his bag, he was
simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the
barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried
his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly
found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the
barangay captain’s house.
Even casting aside petitioner’s version and basing the resolution

of this case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the
unlawfulness of petitioner’s arrest stands out just the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides

the only occasions on which a person may be arrested without a
warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer

or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has

escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting

barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was obtaining at
the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted
from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an
offense.20 The tanod did not have probable cause either to
justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court
has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.21 Here, petitioner’s act of
looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he
was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly
attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant
and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod
with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal
activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not
run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the truth, in

line with our assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be
any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner,
walking the street at night, after being closely observed and
then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to
flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with
guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness
of guilt.22 Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when
it ruled in People v. Shabaz23 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight
alone is inherently ambiguous." Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitioner’s flight lends itself just as
easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24 "[t]he phrase ‘in

his presence’ therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of
the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against
any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and
any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental
one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of
a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be
extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law."25
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they

appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless
arrest.26 If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to
conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-
and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based
on petitioner’s behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation,
following Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a warrantless arrest, be
limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded
upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.28
Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest

notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the
search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were
seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. 29 As we
pronounced in People v. Bacla-an —
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a

waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are
deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving
vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver
or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search)
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of
Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests
in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners.30
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither

caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest
effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably
argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that
apart from the warrantless search being incidental to his lawful
arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not
convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals31 —
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable

searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.
The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment
in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9)
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given.32
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution— albeit

based on conflicting testimonies on when petitioner’s bag was
actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under
the coercive control of the public officials who had custody of him
when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the
consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words
spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even
granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when
Ordoño asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at
all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is
considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the
constitutional guarantee.33 As a result, petitioner’s lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver
of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search and seizure.34
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana

leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone
cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We
likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the
identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from
petitioner’s bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the

following elements must concur: (1) proof that the transaction
took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug as evidence.35 The existence of dangerous drugs is
a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.36
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecution’s case

its failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly seized from the
accused.37 There can be no crime of illegal possession of a
prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the
item confiscated was the same specimen examined and
established to be the prohibited drug. 38 As we discussed in People
v. Orteza39 , where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in
establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of appellant
for illegal sale of shabu –
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police

officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of
seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending
team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia
should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same
physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement
raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory
examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the

confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the
accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard
procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the
origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the

Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized
marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the

material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on
the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the
corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the
prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the
shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay

tanod, the records only show that he was taken to the house of
the barangay captain and thereafter to the police station. The Joint
Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely states that they
confiscated the marijuana leaves which they brought to the police
station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt 41 issued by
the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the
suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of

when petitioner’s bag was opened, they also gave conflicting
testimony on who actually opened the same. The prosecution,
despite these material inconsistencies, neglected to explain the
discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was the admission
by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know how the
specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police
authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane wrapping
of the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable
reason, of the police officers who conducted the inquest
proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the case, is
fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish
the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
leaves from the time they were first allegedly discovered until
they were brought for examination by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the

prosecution to establish the chain of custody over the seized
marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only when the existence of
the seized prohibited drug is denied."42 We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on

petitioner’s testimony that the marijuana was taken from his bag,
without taking the statement in full context.43 Contrary to the
Court of Appeals’ findings, although petitioner testified that the
marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied
ownership thereof.44 Furthermore, it defies logic to require a
denial of ownership of the seized drugs before the principle of
chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon

the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers and public
officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of
custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and
recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found
until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes
possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was
cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control
to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This
guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an
accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty

invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 45 Among the
constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial
yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This
elementary principle accords every accused the right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused rests upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and

uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this "[c]annot be used to advance
the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on
its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense."46 Moreover, where the circumstances
are shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with
the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with the
finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason
that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is
inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.47
Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially

vicious crime,"48 and "one of the most pernicious evils that has
ever crept into our society,"49 for those who become addicted to it
"not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse,
they become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding
members of society,"50 whereas "peddlers of drugs are actually
agents of destruction."51 Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous
effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be
underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous
campaign of the government to eradicate the hazards of drug use
and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod
over an accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven to
the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation
to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to

overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys.
The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the
offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in
petitioner’s exoneration from criminal liability.
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the

courts to exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in
deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought before
them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake. Here,
we note that the courts a quo neglected to give more serious
consideration to certain material issues in the determination of
the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in
some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
evidence to extract information or even harass civilians.
Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties for drug offenses."52 In the same vein,
let this serve as an admonition to police officers and public
officials alike to perform their mandated duties with commitment
to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for
the law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to cause the immediate release of petitioner, unless the
latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the
Court of
the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued

confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Xxxxxx
ALDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170180
November 23, 2007 Warrantless Arrest, Search and Seizure, Fruit
of a poisonous tree
OCTOBER 25, 2017
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid

warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be

necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights
of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of

R.A. No. 9165.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented three

barangay tanods namely, Bautista, Aratas and Ordoo, who
arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March

2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the National
Highway in the said barangay together with Aratas and Ordoo
when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-
bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They
thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run
away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter
brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Mercado, where
he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his
bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants,
eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped
in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was
taken to the police station for further investigation.
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most

material points. However, Aratas admitted that he himself
brought out the contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was
taken to the house of Mercado. Nonetheless, he claimed that at
Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the
contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part,
Ordoo testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to
open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the
purported contents thereof.
The forensic chemist conducted the examination of the marijuana

allegedly confiscated from petitioner. He disclosed on cross-
examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the
marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the said
substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he could not
identify whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane
wrapping the marijuana leaves.
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was

opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item
wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana
leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have
been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not
give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for
them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was
brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense.
The RTC rendered judgment against him.
The CA affirmed the challenged decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest effected against him by the

barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of
his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.
Whether or not the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him

are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous
tree.
RULING:
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it

is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which
yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted
as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental
to a lawful arrest. Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality,
as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of
petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides

the only occasions on which a person may be arrested without a
warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting

barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was obtaining at
the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted
from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense.
The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners
warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court
has ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating

that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus
was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That
he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached
him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to
charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had
just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified
that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay
tanod when they approached him.
It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street

at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by
three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always
be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.
Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in

People v. Shabaz that flight alone is not a reliable indicator of
guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is
inherently ambiguous. Alone, and under the circumstances of this
case, petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent
explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud, [t]he phrase in

his presence therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of
the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against
any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and
any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental
one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of
a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be
extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they
appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless
arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to
conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-
and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based
on petitioners behavior.
However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,

must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer
clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light
of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest

notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during
the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they
were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.
As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a

waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are
deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of
moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs
searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant
to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in
hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither

caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest
effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably
argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable

searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.
The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of

the person giving consent and the environment in which consent
is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a
public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search
or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the
defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in
which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given.
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit

based on conflicting testimonies on when petitioners bag was
actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was already under
the coercive control of the public officials who had custody of him
when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the
consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words
spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged “consent.” Even
granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo
asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered
no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional
guarantee. As a result, petitioners lack of objection to the search
and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional
right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana

leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone
cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We
likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the
identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from
petitioners bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the

following elements must concur: (1) proof that the transaction
took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug as evidence. The existence of dangerous drugs is a
condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case

its failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused.
There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug
when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated
was the same specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug. As we discussed in People v. Orteza, where we
deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the
elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of
shabu.
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police

officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of
seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending
team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia
should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same
physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement
raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory
examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the

confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the
accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard
procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the
origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded
that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the

Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized
marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the

material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on
the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the
corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the
prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the

seized drugs before the principle of chain of custody comes into
play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon

the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers and public
officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of
custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and
recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found
until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes
possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was
cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control
to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This
guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an
accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Among the
constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial
yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This
elementary principle accords every accused the right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused rests upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and

uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this [c]annot be used to advance
the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on
its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense. Moreover, where the circumstances are
shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence and the other compatible with the
finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason
that the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is
inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to

overcome the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys.
The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the
offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in
petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.
Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

12. People vs. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761 (1998)
Expert opinion- they provided various reasons as to how the
laceration was made.
Absence of spermatozoa
Conclusions based on everyday experience and human nature.
G.R. No. 123546 July 2, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOERAL

GALLENO, Accused-Appellant.
PER CURIAM:
What could be more compelling than deciding a case which

involves the sexual abuse of a five-year old child? Equally
important is the fact that the case before us involves the highest
penalty imposable by law. Being the guardian of the most
fundamental liberties of every citizen, the Court must pass upon
every intricate detail of the case at bar to determine whether or
not accused-appellant committed the gruesome act imputed
against him.
Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment

of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region
stationed in Roxas City, relying on the defense of denial. Since the
case involves the death penalty, the matter has been elevated to
this Court for automatic review.
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information docketed as

Criminal Case No. C-4629 for the crime of Statutory Rape,
reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, upon prior

authority and approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, and the
original complaint filed by the guardian of the offended party,
accuses JOERAL GALLENO of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE,
committed as follows:
That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 16, 1994,

at Brgy. Balighot, Maayon, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of
this Court, the said accused did, then and there, wilfully and
feloniously, and without the permission of anyone, enter the
house of EVELYN OBLIGAR, a five-year old child, and succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of her thereby inflicting upon the
latter a vaginal laceration which caused continuous bleeding and
her admission of five (5) days at the Roxas Memorial Hospital.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 9, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on

the merits ensued, resulting in a judgment of conviction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING ESTABLISHED FACTS,

the Court finds accused JOERAL GALLENO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused JOERAL GALLENO is sentenced to suffer

the supreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim
Evelyn Obligar Garganera the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS.
Let this DECISION serve as clear signal, warning the perverts, the
misguided elements of our society, especially their lackadaisical
parents in their innate moral obligation and responsibility in
educating their children that in this corner of the world the
wheels of justice is not asleep and its unforgiving hands and
watchful eyes are as vigilant as ever.
(pp. 44-45, Rollo.)
In flashback, let us visualize the events.
Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita

Obligar Garganera who had to leave the province to find work in
Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn, together with
her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under the
care and custody of their uncle, Emeterio Obligar, and aunt,
Penicola Obligar.
Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence lived

accused-appellant, 19-year old Joeral Galleno, known well to
Evelyn's family due to his frequent visits at the Obligars' abode as
he was paying court to Emeterio's eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emeterio and Penicola left their residence to

work at the sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar.
Their three children had all earlier left for school. The only
persons left in the house were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on

his way to his Lola Esing to have his pants tailored. Since it was
drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence and found the two
children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense
presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said residence.
However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration
in her vagina which resulted in profuse, and to our mind, life-
threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars'

residence is based on the testimony of Evelyn herself, her uncle
Emeterio, and the doctors who examined and treated her. The
Solicitor General summarized the same in this wise:
2. Appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually

molesting Evelyn. After lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit
on his lap, facing him. Then he forcibly inserted his penis into her
vagina. As Evelyn was only five-years old while appellant was a
fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's vagina to
bleed, making her cry in pain. (pp. 10-11 and 18-25, tsn,
Garganera, January 10, 1995).
3. Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his

finger, the sap of "madre de cacao" leaves on her vagina.
Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn grimacing and crying
in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn, Garganera, January 10, 1995; pp. 6-7, tsn,
Obligar, February 7, 1995).
4. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The

spouses were laborers in a sugarcane plantation about two
kilometers away from their house. They arrived to find Evelyn
crying. Emeterio noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress
and she was pressing a rug against her genital organ. (pp. 11-12,
tsn, Obligar, January 10, 1995; pp. 8-9, tsn, Obligar, February 7,
1995).
5. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but she did not answer.
Emeterio spread the child's legs and saw that her vagina had been
lacerated and blood was oozing therefrom. He summoned a
"quack" doctor who applied herbal medicine on Evelyn's vagina
but this did not stop the bleeding. (pp. 12-14, tsn, Obligar, January
12, 1995).
6. The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn

to the clinic of Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician
of Maayon, Capiz. Dr. Orosco reported, upon examining Evelyn,
that he found (1) clotted blood, about 1 centimeter in diameter, in
her vaginal opening, and (2) a vaginal laceration, measuring 1.0
centimeter x 0.5 centimeter, between the 3:00 o'clock and 6:00
o'clock position. He also affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration
could have been caused by a blunt instrument inserted into the
vagina, that it was possible that a human penis in full erection
had been forcibly inserted into her vagina and that a human penis
in full erection is considered a blunt instrument. (pp. 4-7, tsn,
Orosco, November 28, 1994; p. 14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
7. While he was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco asked Evelyn what

caused her injuries. The child told him that a penis was inserted
into her vagina and that its insertion caused her pain. (pp. 9-10, 14
and 18-19, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994).
8. Since his clinic lacked the proper medical facilities needed to

treat Evelyn, Dr. Orosco, after dressing the victim's wound which
continued to bleed, advised Emeterio and Penicola to bring the
child to the hospital for further medical treatment (p. 8, tsn,
Orosco, November 28, 1994; pp. 14-16, tsn, Obligar, January 12,
1995).
9. On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas

Memorial General Hospital where she was examined by resident
physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, Dr. Lañada, upon examining
Evelyn, found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left
anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the presence of about 10-15
cc of blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Lañada recommended that
Evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the
wound in her vagina, which was still bleeding, had to be
repaired. Due to financial constraints, Evelyn was not admitted
into the hospital that day and went home with Emeterio to
Barangay Balighot. (pp. 6-8, tsn, Lañada January 4, 1995; pp. 15-
16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
10. Upon her examination of the victim on August 18, 1994, Dr.
Lañada opined that "a lot of things will cause the lacerated
wound in the vagina." (p. 9, tsn, Lañada, January 4, 1995).
According to Dr. Lañada, the vaginal laceration may be caused (1)
by trauma to the area, when a girl falls and hits her genital area
on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like the
insertion of a speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of a
blunt foreign object into the vagina, like a finger of a penis of a
man in full erection. (pp. 8-10, tsn, Lañada, January 4, 1995).
11. On August 19, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn back to the

Roxas Memorial General Hospital where she was attended to by
Dr. Machel Toledo, the resident physician on duty, who found
blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo ".
. . pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) . . .
admitted the patient for possible repair of that laceration and
blood transfusion because she has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding."
Two hundred five (255) cc of blood was transfused to Evelyn and
she was given antibiotics to prevent infection. However, she was
no longer operated on because the laceration had healed. Five
days later, Evelyn was discharged and sent home with
medication. (pp. 11-13, 17 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
12. Upon his examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr.

Toledo disclosed that the child suffered severe compound
laceration which could have been caused by a normal and fully
developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was forcibly
inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina
to hemorrhage which thus required the transfusion of 255 cc of
blood. (pp. 14-16 and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
13. Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General
Hospital on August 19, Emeterio and Penicola Obligar brought
Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station on August 18, 1994, where
they reported the crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That same day,
appellant was apprehended in a house near the Balighot
Elementary School and brought to the police station. (pp. 17-19,
tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995; pp. 5-9, 16-17 and 21, tsn, Durana,
January 16, 1995).
(pp. 164-171, Rollo.)
Denial is presented as the defense. Accused-appellant testified

that when he arrived at the Obligar residence that afternoon of
August 16, 1994, he found the two children, Evelyn and Eleazar
(also referred to in the record as Pilfo). While seated at the
balcony, accused-appellant was approached by Evelyn, who
knew him (tsn, April 5, 1995, pp. 5 and 8). He cajoled her by
throwing her up and down, his right hand holding the child and
his left hand covering her vagina (Ibid., p. 21). Upon lifting up the
child the first time, his left ring finger was accidentally inserted
into the vagina of the child since his fingernail was long and the
child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn
began to cry because her vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing
this, he immediately went down the house and got some bark or
leaves of a madre de cacao tree and applied the sap on the child's
wound. The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying.
Thereafter, accused-appellant went home. (Ibid., pp. 9-10).
Accused-appellant further testified that on August 18, 1994, at

around 9 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested. On the same
day, Emeterio Obligar asked him to admit the offense so that he
could be released the next day, but accused-appellant did not do
so (Ibid., pp. 26-27).
Accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno was also called to the
witness stand and he testified that he learned about the arrest of
his son on August 18, 1994 (tsn, May 12, 1995 p. 6). The following
day, he went to the house of the Obligars to ask Evelyn what
happened to her. The child allegedly answered that a finger was
accidentally inserted into her genital organ, but that Penicola who
was then present, butted into the conversation and told Raul
Galleno that the penis of accused-appellant was likewise inserted
(Ibid., p. 8).
The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the
defense, pointing out in its decision that accused-appellant's
defense of denial hinged on the argument that the statement of
Evelyn as to how she sustained her vaginal laceration was a mere
concoction and a plain distortion of facts by her guardian. The
trial court called this a "desperate attempt of the defense to
becloud the charge of rape."
The trial court believed and accepted the testimony of Police

Officer Paulino Durana that during the interrogation of Evelyn
which he conducted at the PNP Station of Maayon, Emeterio and
Penicola Obligar did not interfere with the responses of Evelyn,
although, true enough, it was difficult to obtain answers from her
because of her tender age.
The trial court deemed the following circumstances significant in

finding accused-appellant culpable:
1. Accused-appellant failed to explain how his left ring finger

accidentally came in contact with Evelyn's vagina, while in the
process of throwing her up and down. Besides, the prosecution
was able to establish that Evelyn was wearing shorts. And
assuming for the sake of argument that Evelyn was not wearing
any pants or underwear at that time, accused-appellant failed to
explain how his finger could possibly penetrate the victim's
vagina by about one-fourth of an inch (p. 23, tsn, April 5, 1995).
2. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left the victim with

her 3-year old brother, in pain and bleeding.
3. Evelyn's statement given to Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, the

physician who examined her at the Roxas Memorial General
Hospital, that it was accused-appellant's finger which injured her,
was a consequence of the victim's confusion.
4. The formal offer of settlement made by accused-appellant's

father Raul Galleno militates against the cause of the defense.
Hence, the instant appeal and review, with accused-appellant

assigning the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE MEDICAL
DOCTORS WHEN THE SAME FAILED TO CONCLUSIVELY
AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE
LACERATION IN THE OFFENDED PARTY'S VAGINA
THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST BIAS THEREBY

DEPRIVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRIAL AND DISREGARDED THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, WHEN HE
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CROSS EXAMINATION
OF THE ACCUSED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE

WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AS UNJUSTIFIED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE EXTENDED BY THE PARENTS OF
THE ACCUSED TO THE OFFENDED PARTY AS AN IMPLIED
ADMISSION OF GUILT.
(pp. 81-82, Rollo.)
One can not escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any rape
victim, and more especially so for a 5-year old statutory rape
victim. However, in our consideration of the matter before us, we
set aside emotion and observe impartiality and coldness in
drawing conclusions.
Under the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that

the testimony of the three expert witnesses presented by the
prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes
Lañada, and Dr. Machael Toledo, which convinced the trial court
that rape was committed against the offended party, is not
impeccable considering that they found that there was no
presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what
caused the laceration in the victim's vagina; that Dr. Lañada
herself testified that Evelyn told her that it was the finger of
accused-appellant which caused the laceration. In addition,
accused-appellant banks on the victim's testimony on cross-
examination, that it was the finger of accused-appellant which
caused the laceration; and that she even disclosed this to accused-
appellant's father, Raul Galleno.
We are not persuaded.
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw

conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw
conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved (Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. 1, 1989 ed.,
pp. 889-890). However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are
received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony,
based on the principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the
subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the
testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment (Ibid., p. 886).
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only
with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their
opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but
also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially
the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely
solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert
testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its
judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts
enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration
does not mean that the trial court's inference is wrong.
The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not

negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in
the victim's vagina (People vs. Cañada, 253 SCRA 277 [1996]). In
rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen
but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ
(People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]). Verily, it is entirely
probable that climax on the part of accused-appellant was not
reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and the profuse
bleeding of her vagina.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declarations,

particularly as to what really caused the laceration, we are
convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused.
This is best exemplified by the testimony of Dr. Lourdes Lañada
on cross-examination, as follows:
Q Now, Doctor, at the time that you conducted your examination,

you were aware that this child was only five years old?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at that tender age, Doctor, is it possible that the child may
not know the difference or distinction between fingers of the
hands and a finger protruding between the legs of a person?
A Yes, sir, it is possible.
Q So that it is possible, Doctor, that the child may have referred to

a finger that is between the legs?
WITNESS
You mean the penis?
PROSECUTOR OBIENDA
Yes.
WITNESS
It is possible.
(tsn, p. 27 March 30, 1995.)
Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if

not the outright incredulity of the version of accused-appellant
which is not in accord with ordinary human experience. We thus
can not help expressing sentiments similar to those of the trial
court when it said:
The contention of accused Joeral Galleno raises serious doubts to

his credibility. He failed to explain how his ring finger
accidentally came in contact with the genitalia of Evelyn, while in
the process of throwing her up and down, when it was
established by the prosecution that at that time Evelyn was
wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex gratia argumente" that Evelyn
was pantyless, how could it be possible for his finger to penetrate
the vagina for about one-fourth of an inch . . . when she was in
shorts. The Supreme Court, in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20
SCRA 451, (held that) evidence, to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact
of events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of
the mind. No better test has yet been found to measure the value
of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and
common experience of mankind.
(pp. 42-43, Rollo.)
Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that

"(e)vidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence."
This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the
rules of logic and human experience (Regalad o,
Remedial law Compendium, Vol. II, 1988 ed., p. 434).
There is no precise and universal test of relevancy
provided by law. However, the determination of
whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at
the discretion of the court, which must be exercised
according to the teachings of logic and everyday
experience (Sibal and Salazar; Compendium on
Evidence, 1995 ed., p. 6, citing Alfred Asmore Pope
Foundation vs. New York 138 A. 444, 106 Conn. 432).
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with a
long fingernail) of accused-appellant penetrated the victim's
vagina by a depth of one fourth of an inch. Admittedly, accused-
appellant's right hand held the child while his left hand
supposedly held her in the vagina area. Why would he hold the
child's vagina if his only intention was to frolic and kid around
with her?
Accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring

Evelyn (and after applying to the wound the sap of madre de
cacao), he left her in the company of an even younger child, the
victim's 3-year old brother. He did not even make an effort to
immediately inform Emeterio and Penicola of what had
happened. Instead, he went home and kept mum about the
incident.
Accused-appellant also said that after the alleged accident, before

going home, he removed El eazar's shorts and put them on
Evelyn. Assuming this to be true, this only shows that the child
was still bleeding. Why then would he leave the child considering
that there was no adult to attend to her? Significantly, his act of
immediately leaving the place, when considered in the light of the
other evidence, reflects his fear because of what he had done.
The proverb "the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, but
the innocent are as bold as a lion" was correctly adopted by the
trial court in drawing its conclusions.
All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly

work against the credibility of accused-appellant's story on which
his defense is based.
Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the testimony

of accused-appellant's own witness, Dr. Lourdes Lañada (who
was earlier presented during the trial as a prosecution witness),
who testified that a laceration is caused by a blunt instrument
and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument (tsn,
pp. 32-33, March 30, 1995).
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's
testimony is just a concocted story of what really happened, we
apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose
chastity was abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto, 253
SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the fact that her uncle
and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support her
story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as
an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarrassment and even stigma (People vs. Dones, supra.).
Accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno, tried to destroy the

credibility of Evelyn when he took the stand and testified that the
child disclosed to him that it was accused-appellant's finger
which was inserted into her vagina. Nevertheless, this testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of the victim, to wit:
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q You said that Joeral Galleno the accused in this case hurt you
while you were in the farm, can you tell the Honorable Court
which part of your body was hurt by Joeral Galleno?
A (Witness pointing to her vagina)
Here.
Q When you said you were hurt did you bleed?
WITNESS
A Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q What was used by Joeral Galleno in hurting your sexual organ?
A His (Pitoy). Penis.
COURT
Make the translation of "Pitoy" into Penis. Do you agree that the
translation of Pitoy is Penis in English?
ATTY. DISTURA
Agreeable, Your Honor.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q What did Joeral Calleno do with his Pitoy (Penis) to your

vagina (Putay)?
A It was inserted (ginsulod) to my vagina (Putay).
Q When Joeral Galleno inserted his penis (Pitoy) to your vagina

(Putay), that was the reason why it bleed?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was very painful?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you cried because of the pain?
A Yes, Sir.
FISCAL OBIENDA
Q And you were brought to the Doctor and admitted to the
hospital because of that?
A Yes, Sir.
(tsn, pp. 10-12, January 10, 1995.)
Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant alleges that

he was deprived of a fair and impartial trial since the trial court
showed bias by discounting his testimony, and by actually
participating in the cross-examination of accused-appellant.
We recently pronounced in People vs. Malabago (265 SCRA 198

[1996]) that a judge may properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time and
clarify obscure and incomplete details after the witness has given
direct testimony. And such discretion to question witnesses in
order to clear obscurities in their testimony cannot be assailed as a
specie of bias.
Of course, we are aware of Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or

clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that
undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the
cause or the ascertainment of truth.
And there is undoubtedly undue interference if the judge

extensively propounds questions to the witnesses which will have
the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the case for one of the
parties. We have, however, carefully examined the record and
transcript of stenographic notes of the instant case. The trial court
judge, the Honorable Salvador S. Gubaton, did propound
questions but this was done only for clarification purposes and
not to build the case for one of the parties. For instance, accused-
appellant, in his brief, refers to the questions propounded by the
trial court on his act of cajoling the child. A perusal of the line of
questioning referred to hardly shows bias on the part of the trial
court, but pure clarification.
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant questions the

validity of his arrest.
It is settled jurisprudence that any objection involving a warrant

of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before
he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived
(People vs. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95 [1995]). An accused should
question the validity of his arrest before he enters his plea in the
trial court (Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996]).
He is estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his
arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information
before the trial court (People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 [1995]) or
if he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
entering a plea and by participating in the trial (People vs. De
Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; People vs. Lopez, Jr., supra).
It does not appear in the record that accused-appellants raised

this matter before entering his plea of "not guilty" to the charge
(pp. 63 & 67, Record). Further, this issue was not even touched
during the trial.
Lastly, accused-appellant, in his fourth assigned error, argues that

the trial court misinterpreted the financial assistance extended by
his parents as an attempt to settle the case. Accused-appellant
even banks on the alleged close relationship between Emeterio
Obligar and Raul Galleno as compadres, and the fact that Emeterio
borrowed forty pesos from Raul Galleno, despite the fact that
Emeterio already knew that accused-appellant caused the
laceration in Evelyn's vagina.
Accused-appellant also draws attention to two incidents

involving alleged financial assistance extended by Raul Galleno
to the spouses Emeterio and Penicola Obligar. First, Emeterio
Obligar, whom Raul Galleno said is his compadre, borrowed
P40.00 for fare going to Roxas City where Evelyn was confined.
Second, on August 20, 1994, Raul Galleno and his wife and one of
the brothers of Penicola Obligar went to Roxas Memorial General
Hospital. There he gave P400.00 financial assistance to Penicola
Obligar. Raul Galleno later admitted that the sum of P440.00 was
returned to him by the spouses. Accused-appellant insists that
these offers of financial assistance were not attempts at an
amicable settlement but were prompted out of a sincere desire on
the part of Raul Galleno to help the offended party.
We find no merit in me above-stated argument. It may be inferred

that Raul Galleno wanted to settle the case by offering an amount
to the spouses Obligar, to wit:
Q Now, according to you, you were paid in the amount of Four

Hundred Pesos (P400.00) then you expected your Comareng
Pening as financial assistance to Evelyn Garganera, isn't it?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How long after August 19, 1994, that your Comareng Pening
returned to you the amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
A A week after when Evelyn had already checked up from the

hospital.
Q It was given by you or as voluntary financial assistance, why
did you receive the amount or the payment returned to that
amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?
A That was telling me that they refused already for the settlement
of the case.
Q And that is why they returned the amount of Four Hundred

Pesos (P400.00).
(tsn, pp. 29-30, May 12, 1995.)
From the above-stated clarificatory questions by the trial court, it

may be gleaned that Raul Galleno no longer had any interest in
aiding the victim when he found that the Obligar spouses would
still pursue the case against his son, accused-appellant, and hence
he found that his offer for settlement was unavailing. Hence, on
this point we likewise agree with the trial court when it took the
financial assistance to mean an act of settling the case. This act
does manifest a father's attempt to rescue his guilty son from sure
incarceration.
The nightmare that was forced into the tender mind of 5-year old
Evelyn Obligar Garganera may unfortunately haunt her all her
life. Justice may not be able to save her from this nightmare but it
can calm and assure her that her tormentor and abuser shall
undoubtedly face retribution.
Four members of the Court - although maintaining their

adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs.
Echegaray (G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997) that Republic Act
No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty is
unconstitutional - nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court,
by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the
death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant
justified by the evidence on record, the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,

amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
this decision, let the record of the case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for the possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxx
[G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOERAL GALLENO,
Facts:
The victim Evelyn Obligar Garganera a 5-year old together
with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, live under the care
and custody of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola
Obligar.The accused-appellant, is 19-year old Joeral Galleno. On
August 16, 1994, Emetario and Penicola left their residence to
work at sugarcane plantation and the only persons left in the
house were Evelyn and Eleazar.
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Galleno passed by the
Obligars' residence and found the two children left to themselves.
The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions
on what occurred at said residence. However, the result is
undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina which
result in profuse, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
For the prosecution, the victim herself testified that Galleno
took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting her. After
lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him.
The penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her
cry in pain. Emeterio and Penicola also testified that when they
came home from work, they arrived to find Evelyn crying.
Emetario noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she
was pressing a rug against her genital organ. Dr. Alfonso D.
Orosco, the Rural Health Physician reported, upon examining
Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood, and (2) a vaginal
laceration.
On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas
Memorial General Hospital were she was examined by resident
physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada. Dr. Lañada, testified that she
found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior
one-third of the vagina" and "the pressence of about 10-15cc of
blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Lañada recommended that
evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the
wound in her vagina, which was bleeding, had to be repaired.
The following day, Evelyn was examined at Roxas Memorial
General Hospital again where she was attended to by Dr.
Machael Toledo, the resident physician on duty, who found blood
clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo " …
pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) …
admitted the patient for possible repair of the laceration and
blood transfusion because she has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding."
The trial deemed the following circumstances significant in
finding accused-appellant culpable for the crime of Statutory
Rape.
Hence, the instant appeal and review.
Issue:
The Trial Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the
testimonies of the medical doctors.
Ruling:
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw
conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw
conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are
received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony,
based on the principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the
subject matter under observation, of for other reasons, the
testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not
only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave
their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration,
but also the testimony the victim herself. In other words, the trial
court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses.
Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise
of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts
enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration
does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declaration,
particularly as to what really caused the laceration, we are
convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused.
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's
testimony is just a concocted story of what really happened, we
apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose
chastity was abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto, 253
SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the fact that her uncle
and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support her
story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an
engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarrassment and even stigma (People vs. Dones,supra.)
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant

justified by the evidence on record, the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
Xxxx
People v. Galleno
291SCRA 761
Topic:
Expert Testimony as Evidence; Evidence in Criminal Cases
Facts:
Joeral Galleno was charged with statutory rape committed
againstEvelyn Obligar, a five year old girl. The prosecution
presented three expertwitnesses namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco,
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr.Machael Toledo, whose
testimonies convinced the trial court that rape wascommitted
against Obligar. Galleno contended that he should be
acquittedsince the expert testimonies were not impeccable
considering that thedoctors found that there was no presence of
spermatozoa, and that theywere not sure as to what caused the
laceration in the victim's vagina.
Issue:
Whether or not the lacking testimonies of the expert witnesses
as tothe occurrence of carnal knowledge should result to the
acquittal of theaccused.
Ruling
: As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not
drawconclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw
conclusions fromthe evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved. However, conclusionsand opinions of witnesses are
received in many cases, and are not confinedto expert
testimony, based on the principle that either because of the
specialskill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of
the nature of thesubject matter under observation, or for other
reasons, the testimony will aidthe court in reaching a
judgment.In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its
conclusions not only with theaid of the expert testimony of
doctors who gave their opinions as to thepossible cause of the
victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the
otherprosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other
words, the trialcourt did not rely solely on the testimony of the
expert witnesses. Suchexpert testimony merely aided the trial
court in the exercise of its judgmenton the facts. Hence, the fact
that the experts enumerated various possiblecauses of the
victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interferenceis
wrong. The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does
not negatethe conclusion that it was his penis which was
inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape, the important
consideration is not the emission of semen but thepenetration
of the female genitalia by the male organ.
13. People vs. Calumpang, 291 SCRA 761 (2005)
G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG, appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated November 29, 2002, of the

Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 36, in Criminal
Case No. 10152, convicting appellants Rico Calumpang and
Jovenal Omatang of two counts of murder and sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them
to pay damages to the heirs of the victims.
Appellants were charged under an Information which reads:
That on or about July 14, 1991 at 7:00 o’clock in the evening, more
or less, at Pamplona Coconut Plantation, Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation
and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack ALICIA CATIPAY and
SANTIAGO CATIPAY with the use of bolos, with which the said
accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon
ALICIA CATIPAY, the following injuries:
1. Hacked Wound - located at the Right Temporal area involving

the temporal bones 4 inches in length
2. Hacked Wound - located at the left occipital area involving the

occipital bone and the brain tissues
3. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left hand
4. Incised Wound - located at the medial part of the left wrist joint
5. Incised Wound - located at the middle medial part of the left

forearm
and upon SANTIAGO CATIPAY, the following injuries:
1. Hacked Wound - located at the left side of the face extending

from the ear to the lateral part of the orbital bones.
2. Stabbed Wound - located at the antero-lateral part of the left

chest wall measuring 4 inches in depth 2 inches in width
3. Stabbed Wound - located at the abdomen 2 inches above the

navel protruding the intestines
4. Stabbed Wound - located at the sternal area 3 inches in depth

and 1 inch in width
5. Stabbed wound - located at the left lateral part of chest wall 6

(six) inches below the armpit 5 inches in depth, 3 inches in width
6. Incised Wound - located at the left dorsal part of the little and
the ring finger.
which wounds or injuries caused the death of said ALICIA

CATIPAY and SANTIAGO CATIPAY shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.2
On arraignment, appellants entered a plea of not guilty.

Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Magno Gomez, Dr.

Rogelio Kadili, and Alexander Ebias.3 Their testimonies constitute
the version of the case according to the prosecution’s point of
view.
Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he
was at Talay, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, walking home to Sitio
Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. He was with his neighbors, the
spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their way, they stopped
at the store of Ana Andagan, located near the Pamplona Coconut
Plantation, and decided to have some beer. Magno added that
Santiago saw appellants drinking tuba inside Ana’s store, and
offered them a glass of beer, but appellants refused. Santiago just
drank the glass of beer he was offering.4 After that, Magno and
the spouses left the store and took a shortcut through the coconut
plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants

were planning something sinister because they followed too
closely and were concealing something at their backs. Magno
cautioned Santiago, but the latter just told him not to worry about
appellants.5 Magno and the spouses simply continued walking for
another half-kilometer until they reached the narrow waterway
that let water from the river into the plantation. Magno removed
his slippers and started to cross ahead of the spouses. Santiago
and Alicia stayed slightly behind because Santiago had to remove
his shoes.6
When Magno had crossed five feet of the waterway, Magno

turned around to wait for his companions and saw appellants
attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant Calumpang hacked
Santiago on the head and stabbed his abdomen. At the same time,
appellant Omatang attacked Alicia.7
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away.
After 50 meters, he reached Alexander Ebias’s house. He asked
Alexander for a torch then continued walking towards Sitio
Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. After a kilometer, however, he saw
the house of his cousin Rolando Retada.8 He decided to spend the
night there.9
Magno further testified that he did not tell either Alexander or
Rolando about what he saw at the waterway because he was
afraid. Magno added that he left Rolando’s house around 6:30 the
next morning to report the incident at the municipal hall in
the poblacion of Pamplona, but was arrested for questioning by
members of the Philippine Army on his way out of the store of
Picio Yan, where he had to attend to some personal business.
Magno declared that he did not report to them that appellants
killed the spouses.10 It was only after he was turned over to the
police authorities of Pamplona and brought to the police station
that he reported what he saw the day before at the waterway in
the plantation.11
Dr. Rogelio M. Kadili, Municipal Health Officer of the Rural

Health Unit, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, testified that he
conducted the post-mortem examination of the victims at around
7:00 a.m. on July 15, 1991.12 The results of his examination showed
the wounds on Santiago and Alicia Catipay as follows:
[Santiago Catipay]

from the ear to the lateral part of the orbital bones



and 1 inch in width

the ring finger;13
[Alicia Catipay]



forearm.14
Dr. Kadili likewise identified the death certificates of Santiago

and Alicia Catipay which showed the cause of death as
hemorrhage shock.15
Alexander Ebias, who lives near the waterway at the Pamplona

Coconut Plantation, testified that around the time Santiago and
Alicia were murdered, he heard noise from the direction of the
waterway, but did not do anything to investigate. Moments later,
he heard Magno calling from outside the house. Magno wanted
some dried coconut leaves to make a torch. He gave Magno
what he wanted then asked about the noise from the waterway.
Magno said he did not know.16
For its part, the defense contradicted the version of the

prosecution and presented Analyn Andagan, Conchito
Nilas,17 Joseph Rabor and appellants to prove that appellants
were nowhere near the waterway at the precise time that Santiago
and Alicia Catipay were murdered.
Analyn Andagan testified that on July 14, 1991, she was tending
the store of her mother, Ana Andagan, at Talay, Pamplona,
Negros Oriental. Around 3:00 p.m. appellants Calumpang and
Omatang arrived with one Conchito Nilas. The three ordered a
gallon of tuba and started drinking. Around 6:30 p.m., Magno and
the spouses arrived. They each had one bottle of beer and
immediately left after finishing their beers. Analyn further
testified that appellants did not follow Magno, Santiago and
Alicia when the three left her mother’s store. Appellant Omatang
stayed until 7:00 p.m. and continued talking with his two
companions, appellant Calumpang and Conchito Nilas. He left
when his 12-year-old nephew, defense witness Joseph Rabor,
came to fetch him for supper. Appellant Calumpang, for his part,
stayed until 8:00 p.m. and helped her close the store. He walked
home with her and Conchito Nilas.18
Conchito Nilas’s testimony dovetailed Analyn Andagan’s

testimony. He added that he saw his friend appellant Calumpang
go inside the latter’s house.19
Joseph Rabor corroborated Analyn’s testimony that he fetched his

uncle, appellant Omatang, from the store around 7:00 p.m. upon
the order of his mother. He added that he and appellant Omatang
slept in the same room that night.20
Appellant Omatang likewise corroborated Analyn’s testimony

that he left around 7:00 p.m. with Joseph. He also claimed he had
nothing to do with the killing of the spouses and averred that he
was at home in the same room with Joseph, sleeping, when the
spouses were murdered. He claimed that he learned of the
murders only upon his arrest the next day.21
Appellant Calumpang vehemently denied killing the spouses. He

declared that Santiago and Alicia had no known enemies and
were good people. He corroborated all of Analyn’s testimony,
and added that Magno and Santiago were arguing when the two
came into the store. Appellant Calumpang likewise averred that
after helping Analyn close the store, he went home, ate supper,
and went to bed.22
In addition to the above witnesses, the defense presented Rolando

Retada and Visitacion Rabor. Rolando confirmed that Magno
spent the night at his house on July 14, 1991, and left very early
the next morning without drinking coffee. Visitacion Rabor, on
the other hand, testified that she overheard Santiago berating
Magno when they passed her store around 6:30 p.m. on July 14,
1991. Santiago was mad at Magno because Magno did not want to
help Santiago clean the dam at Mangoto, Pamplona, as Magno
was supposed to. She added that Santiago continued calling
Magno useless at Ana’s store until Alicia prevailed upon Santiago
to go home. When Santiago and Alicia left, Magno followed
them.23
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez

and accepted his account of the murders. Said the trial court:
The testimony of the lone eyewitness describing vividly the

events prior, during and after the killing offers a complete picture
of the incident that only an eyewitness could supply. Moreover,
the actuation of witness Magno Gomez of not telling other people
of the crime he just experience[d] for fear of his life, and his
coming back to town after sunrise. Even declining Retada’s offer
of a cup of coffee [and] to report to the authorities the incident
that he witnessed the night before, is consistent with human
behavior and should be accorded great respect and given more
weight. (sic) His conduct after the incident added more credibility
to his testimony. As to the fear he exhibited after the killing of the
spouses, the Supreme Court has this to say "there is no standard
form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident
especially if the assailant (assailants in this case) is physically
near. No standard form of behavioral response, quite often said,
could be expected from everyone when confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful occurrence.24
In its judgment dated November 29, 2002, the trial court

convicted appellants as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, each accused, RICO

CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG are hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and further ordered to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay the amount
of PhP100,000.00, and to pay moral damages in the amount of
PhP100,000.00. The bail bond posted by both accused for their
temporary liberty during the trial of this case is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.25
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant now assigns the following as errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY

OF MAGNO GOMEZ SINCE HE WAS A PRINCIPAL SUSPECT
HIMSELF. HIS TESTIMONY IS REPLETE WITH MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES, AND MANY OF HIS CLAIMS ARE
CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING

THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE; AND
III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE IN

CONCENTRATING ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI BY THE
ACCUSED, INSTEAD OF LOOKING INTO THE VAGUENESS
AND WEAKNESS OF THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY
OF THE PROSECUTION’S LONE EYEWITNESS.26
Essentially, for our resolution is the issue of whether the

appellants’ guilt for double murder has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in giving credence to

Magno Gomez’s testimony, which is false and unbelievable. They
stress that Magno’s testimony that he never saw Santiago try to
escape during the attacks contradicts his statements in his
affidavit, executed during preliminary examination, that Santiago
tried to escape but was overtaken by appellants.27 They suspect
that Magno was himself the killer, and posit that because he was
already a prime suspect, Magno accused appellants of the murder
to save himself.28 Appellants likewise argue that the trial court
erred in dismissing their defense of alibi on the ground that it was
a weak defense.29
Significantly, for the State, the Office of the Solicitor General

contends that reasonable doubt concerning the guilt of the
appellants exist in this case. The OSG stresses that material
inconsistencies exist between Magno’s testimony in court and his
affidavit, which he executed during the preliminary
examination.30 The OSG cites that Magno testified that the
spouses were simultaneously attacked by appellants, with
appellant Calumpang attacking Santiago and appellant Omatang
attacking Alicia. However, during the preliminary examination,
Magno declared that both appellants attacked Alicia first and that
Santiago was hacked because Santiago attempted to save his
wife.31 Further, the fact that Magno was a principal suspect and
that he did not choose to exonerate himself right away when he
was arrested for questioning by members of the Philippine Army,
render his credibility suspect.32 In addition, the OSG stresses that
it was not shown in this case that appellants had any ill motive to
kill Santiago and Alicia Catipay.33 The OSG concludes that
appellants deserve acquittal on reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that the
trial court overlooked pertinent pieces of evidence favorable to
the accused and disregarded several significant facts and
circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the testimony of
the prosecution’s lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a
departure from the settled rule that factual findings of the trial
court bind this Court.34
While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings,

the records show that serious discrepancies attended Magno’s
testimony in court and his sworn statement,35 executed during the
preliminary examination conducted by Judge Ananson E. Jayme
on July 15, 1991, at the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose, Negros Oriental.
In his sworn statement, Magno narrated that both appellants

"hacked Alicia Catipay first" and that Santiago was attacked after
"he attempted to save his wife." Magno declared that Santiago
"attempted to run away but he was chased" and "was overtaken
and was hacked by both accused." Magno also claimed that
appellants tried to hack him after they had hacked Santiago.
Magno said,
Q How did the hacking incident happen?

A At first, it was Alicia who was hacked and followed by
stabbing immediately Santiago was also hacked and when he
attempted to flee by crossing the [waterway] both accused
stabbed Santiago and he fell to the river.
Q When Alicia Catipay was hacked was she hit?
A Yes.
Q What part of her body was hit?
A On [the] left side of her ear.
Q And who hacked her?
A Both accused hacked her.
Q And who stabbed Alicia Catipay?
A [Jovenal] Omatang.
Q Was Alicia Catipay hit?
A Yes.
Q What part of her body was hit?
A At the stomach.
Q What weapon did Jovenal Omatang use in hacking and

stabbing Alicia Catipay?
A Bolo.
Q You said both accused hacked Alicia Catipay first, what did
Santiago Catipay do?
A He attempted to save his wife and instead he was hacked.
Q You said Santiago Catipay was hit what part of his body was
hit when he was hacked by the accused?
A He was hit on his arm.
Q After he was hit on his arm what did he do?
A He attempted to run away but he was chased.
Q Did Santiago Catipay succeed in escaping?
A No, he was overtaken and was hacked by both accused.
Q When [Santiago] was overtaken by the accused what part of his

body was hit when he was hacked?
A I know he was hit but I do not know what part of his body was
hit.
Q When both accused hacked and stabbed Santiago Catipay

while running, what happened to Santiago Catipay?
A He fell to the edge of the river.
Q When Santiago Catipay fell to the water, what did the accused
do?
A They also hacked me but I ran away.36
On the witness stand, however, Magno gave a different version of

how the murders happened. Magno testified at direct
examination that only appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago and
that Alicia was hacked only by appellant Omatang. More
important, he averred that the victims were attacked
simultaneously. Magno testified:
Q According to you, Santiago Catipay and Alicia Catipay were
quarreled by Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang. How was
Santiago Catipay quarreled?
A He was hacked at the head.
Q Who hacked him at the head?
A Rico Calumpang.
Q What did Rico Calumpang use in hacking Santiago Catipay?
A A bolo.
Q How many times did Rico Calumpang hack Santiago Catipay?
A Santiago Catipay was stabbed once and he was hacked also

once.
Q And where was Santiago Catipay hit by the hacking of Rico

Calumpang?
A Head.
Q Will you please point to the portion where Santiago Catipay

was hit by the hacking of Rico Calumpang?
A Witness pointing at the left side of his head.
Q And according to you, he was also stabbed by Rico

Calumpang, where was Santiago Catipay hit by the stabbing?
A Here – witness pointing to this abdomen which is the lower

part on the right side to the breast.
...
Q You testified that Alicia was killed, how was she killed?
A She [was] hacked and stabbed.
Q Who hacked and stabbed her?
A It was Jovenal Omatang.
Q According to you Alicia Catipay was hacked and stabbed by

Jovenal Omatang, was Alicia hit by the hacking of Jovenal
Omatang?
A Yes, she was hit.
...
Q Was the attack of Santiago Catipay by Rico Calumpang and the

attack of Jovenal Omatang on Alicia Catipay simultaneous or
they were hacking and stabbing almost at the same time by these
two accused performing their own individual acts? (sic)
A Yes, it was simultaneous.
Q After seeing Santiago Catipay hacked and stabbed by Rico

Calumpang and Alicia Catipay hacked and stabbed by Jovenal
Omatang, what did you do?
A I ran.
Q You ran after they were killed or they were still under attack?
A They were still attacking when I ran away.37
Magno never said that appellants also tried to hack him and even
claimed that they were still hacking the victims when he ran
away. Magno also never mentioned that Santiago tried to save his
wife or that Santiago was chased or even that Santiago tried to
run. In fact, during cross-examination, he averred that he never
saw Santiago run away. Magno testified,
Q During that hacking of Santiago Catipay, was Santiago Catipay

able to run?
A I do not know whether he was able to run or not. What I saw

is that he was hacked and stabbed.
Q And you are very sure of that, Mr. Gomez, that you did not see
Santiago Catipay run?
A That is what I can say. What I saw was he was hacked and
stabbed. After that, I ran away.
Q That is why you told this Honorable Court that you did not see
Santiago Catipay run when he was being hacked and stabbed by
Rico Calumpang?
A Regarding that question, what I can say is that I saw the

hacking and stabbing incident. After that, I ran away.38
Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost

always incomplete and often inaccurate or lacking in details and
is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court.
Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious and
inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed
sworn statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations,
with respect to a person’s participation in a serious imputation
such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of
the witness’ account.39
The trial court believed that Magno’s accusations against

appellants are true, basing on the fact that Magno was able to
testify on direct examination as to the precise location of the hack
wound on Santiago’s head and the stab wound on his
abdomen.40 But the court failed to consider that at the preliminary
examination, barely a day after the incident, Magno was asked
the same questions asked in court, but could not even recall
where Santiago was hit when appellants hacked him. No
explanation was given how Magno was able to supply during the
trial the precise location of Santiago’s wounds 19 months after the
incident.41
Similarly, several portions of Magno’s testimony are unworthy of

belief. There seems to be no explanation as to why appellants
ignored Magno and did not chase him 42 considering that he was
only five feet away when he allegedly got an unobstructed view
of appellants murdering the spouses. Likewise, it makes no sense
why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that
appellants might also attack him, Magno chose to run only a short
distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure that appellants
did in fact not run after him, Magno took the time to stop by
Alexander Ebias’s house, called out to Alexander, asked for some
dried coconut leaves, and made a torch to light his path. Magno’s
actions were certainly not the actions of someone seeking to avoid
peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling
out to Alexander would have revealed his location to the very
people he said he was running from. Magno’s claim that he
intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw
appellants kill the spouses is far from credible, considering that
he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating himself right
away when members of the Philippine Army arrested him for
questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but must be credible in itself—such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.43
Finally, no convincing proof could show that appellants had any
reason to kill Santiago and Alicia in cold blood. As the OSG
points out, the supposed grudge, which Magno claimed could
have motivated appellants to kill the spouses, is too flimsy to be
believed. It is highly improbable that appellants would murder
the spouses because Santiago had offered appellants a glass of
beer and they refused him.44 If anybody should harbor a grudge
from such an incident, it should have been Santiago whose offer
appellants refused. But there is no evidence of any grudge
between Santiago and the appellants, and as Magno testified,
Santiago simply drank the glass of beer himself.45
Appellants’ defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis

were corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was
not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the
incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily
prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden
of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.46 Unless the prosecution
overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an
accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.47 There being
no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants’ presumed
innocence stands.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 2002, of the

Case No. 10152 is REVERSED. Appellants Rico Calumpang and
Jovenal Omatang are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. They are
ordered released from custody immediately, unless they are
being lawfully held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Penned by Judge Cesar Manuel U. Cadiz, Jr.; Records, pp.
318-329.
2
Id. at 1-1-A.
3
"Ybias" in some parts of the Records.
4
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), pp. 15-16, 23.
5
Id. at 13-14, 17, 21-22; TSN, 22 February 1993 (afternoon
session), p. 8.
6
TSN, 22 February 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 5-7.
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), pp. 8-12; TSN, 4

7
March 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 5, 7-8, 28-29.

8
"Ritada" in some parts of the Records.
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), pp. 11, 27-29;

9
TSN, 4 March 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 10-11.

10
TSN, 4 March 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 41, 50-51.
Id. at 46, 49-53.
11
TSN, 4 March 1993 (morning session), pp. 6-7.

12
Records, p. 6.
13
Id. at 17.
14
Id. at 7, 18.
15
TSN, 11 March 1993, pp. 4-5.

16
Sometimes spelled as "Nillas" in the Records.

17
TSN, 14 July 1993, pp. 4-8, 10-12, 17-18.

18
Id. at 23-25, 29.

19
TSN, 28 July 1993, pp. 4-6, 10-11, 13.

20
TSN, 10 December 1993, pp. 5-10, 12, 15-16.

21
TSN, 3 December 1993, pp. 5-7.

22
TSN, 28 July 1993, pp. 23-24, 26-27.

23
Records, p. 326. [Citations omitted.]

24
Id. at 329.
25
Rollo, pp. 69-70.

26
Id. at 77-81.
27
Id. at 84-85.
28
Id. at 82.
29
Id. at 305.
30
Id. at 316-317.
31
Id. at 308-311, 313.

32
Id. at 317.
33
See People v. Hugo, G.R. No. 134604, 28 August 2003, 410

34
SCRA 62, 71-72.
Exhibits "2", "2-a" and "2-c", Records, p. 21.

35
Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)

36
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), pp. 7-11.

37
TSN, 4 March 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 30-32.

38
See People v. Parreno, G.R. No. 144343, 7 July 2004, p. 17.

39
Records, p. 328; TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session),

40
p. 8.
Records, p. 21 (see back page).

41
TSN, 4 March 1993 (afternoon session), p. 8.

42
People v. Garin, G.R. No. 139069, 17 June 2004, p. 14.

43
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), p. 23.

44
Ibid.
45
People v. Cabalse, G.R. No. 146274, 17 August 2004, p. 15.

46
People v. Jubail, G.R. No. 143718, 19 May 2004, p. 32.
47
Xxxx
[G.R. NO. 158203. March 31, 2005]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. RICO

CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG, Appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated November 29, 2002, of the

Case No. 10152, convicting appellants Rico Calumpang and
Jovenal Omatang of two counts of murder and sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them
to pay damages to the heirs of the victims.
Appellants were charged under an Information which reads:
That on or about July 14, 1991 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, more
or less, at Pamplona Coconut Plantation, Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation
and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack ALICIA CATIPAY and
SANTIAGO CATIPAY with the use of bolos, with which the said
accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon
ALICIA CATIPAY, the following injuries:


forearm
and upon SANTIAGO CATIPAY, the following injuries:

from the ear to the lateral part of the orbital bones.



and 1 inch in width

the ring finger.
which wounds or injuries caused the death of said ALICIA

CATIPAY and SANTIAGO CATIPAY shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.2

On arraignment, appellants entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Magno Gomez, Dr.

Rogelio Kadili, and Alexander Ebias.3 Their testimonies constitute
the version of the case according to the prosecution's point of
view.
Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he
was at Talay, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, walking home to Sitio
Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. He was with his neighbors, the
spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their way, they stopped
at the store of Ana Andagan, located near the Pamplona Coconut
Plantation, and decided to have some beer. Magno added that
Santiago saw appellants drinking tuba inside Ana's store, and
offered them a glass of beer, but appellants refused. Santiago just
drank the glass of beer he was offering.4 After that, Magno and
the spouses left the store and took a shortcut through the coconut
plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants

were planning something sinister because they followed too
closely and were concealing something at their backs. Magno
cautioned Santiago, but the latter just told him not to worry about
appellants.5 Magno and the spouses simply continued walking for
another half-kilometer until they reached the narrow waterway
that let water from the river into the plantation. Magno removed
his slippers and started to cross ahead of the spouses. Santiago
and Alicia stayed slightly behind because Santiago had to remove
his shoes.6
When Magno had crossed five feet of the waterway, Magno

turned around to wait for his companions and saw appellants
attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant Calumpang hacked
Santiago on the head and stabbed his abdomen. At the same time,
appellant Omatang attacked Alicia.7
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away.
After 50 meters, he reached Alexander Ebias's house. He asked
Alexander for a torch then continued walking towards Sitio
Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. After a kilometer, however, he saw
the house of his cousin Rolando Retada.8 He decided to spend the
night there.9
Magno further testified that he did not tell either Alexander or

Rolando about what he saw at the waterway because he was
afraid. Magno added that he left Rolando's house around 6:30 the
next morning to report the incident at the municipal hall in
the poblacion of Pamplona, but was arrested for questioning by
members of the Philippine Army on his way out of the store of
Picio Yan, where he had to attend to some personal business.
Magno declared that he did not report to them that appellants
killed the spouses.10 It was only after he was turned over to the
police authorities of Pamplona and brought to the police station
that he reported what he saw the day before at the waterway in
the plantation.11
Dr. Rogelio M. Kadili, Municipal Health Officer of the Rural

Health Unit, Pamplona, Negros Oriental, testified that he
conducted the post-mortem examination of the victims at around
7:00 a.m. on July 15, 1991.12 The results of his examination showed
the wounds on Santiago and Alicia Catipay as follows:
[Santiago Catipay]

from the ear to the lateral part of the orbital bones


and 1 inch in width

the ring finger;13
[Alicia Catipay]



forearm.14
Dr. Kadili likewise identified the death certificates of Santiago

and Alicia Catipay which showed the cause of death as
hemorrhage shock.15
Alexander Ebias, who lives near the waterway at the Pamplona

Coconut Plantation, testified that around the time Santiago and
Alicia were murdered, he heard noise from the direction of the
waterway, but did not do anything to investigate. Moments later,
he heard Magno calling from outside the house. Magno wanted
some dried coconut leaves to make a torch. He gave Magno what
he wanted then asked about the noise from the waterway. Magno
said he did not know.16
For its part, the defense contradicted the version of the

prosecution and presented Analyn Andagan, Conchito
Nilas,17 Joseph Rabor and appellants to prove that appellants
were nowhere near the waterway at the precise time that Santiago
and Alicia Catipay were murdered.
Analyn Andagan testified that on July 14, 1991, she was tending
the store of her mother, Ana Andagan, at Talay, Pamplona,
Negros Oriental. Around 3:00 p.m. appellants Calumpang and
Omatang arrived with one Conchito Nilas. The three ordered a
gallon of tuba and started drinking. Around 6:30 p.m., Magno and
the spouses arrived. They each had one bottle of beer and
immediately left after finishing their beers. Analyn further
testified that appellants did not follow Magno, Santiago and
Alicia when the three left her mother's store. Appellant Omatang
stayed until 7:00 p.m. and continued talking with his two
companions, appellant Calumpang and Conchito Nilas. He left
when his 12-year-old nephew, defense witness Joseph Rabor,
came to fetch him for supper. Appellant Calumpang, for his part,
stayed until 8:00 p.m. and helped her close the store. He walked
home with her and Conchito Nilas.18
Conchito Nilas's testimony dovetailed Analyn Andagan's

testimony. He added that he saw his friend appellant Calumpang
go inside the latter's house.19
Joseph Rabor corroborated Analyn's testimony that he fetched his
uncle, appellant Omatang, from the store around 7:00 p.m. upon
the order of his mother. He added that he and appellant Omatang
slept in the same room that night.20
Appellant Omatang likewise corroborated Analyn's testimony

that he left around 7:00 p.m. with Joseph. He also claimed he had
nothing to do with the killing of the spouses and averred that he
was at home in the same room with Joseph, sleeping, when the
spouses were murdered. He claimed that he learned of the
murders only upon his arrest the next day.21
Appellant Calumpang vehemently denied killing the spouses. He

declared that Santiago and Alicia had no known enemies and
were good people. He corroborated all of Analyn's testimony, and
added that Magno and Santiago were arguing when the two came
into the store. Appellant Calumpang likewise averred that after
helping Analyn close the store, he went home, ate supper, and
went to bed.22
In addition to the above witnesses, the defense presented Rolando

Retada and Visitacion Rabor. Rolando confirmed that Magno
spent the night at his house on July 14, 1991, and left very early
the next morning without drinking coffee. Visitacion Rabor, on
the other hand, testified that she overheard Santiago berating
Magno when they passed her store around 6:30 p.m. on July 14,
1991. Santiago was mad at Magno because Magno did not want to
help Santiago clean the dam at Mangoto, Pamplona, as Magno
was supposed to. She added that Santiago continued calling
Magno useless at Ana's store until Alicia prevailed upon Santiago
to go home. When Santiago and Alicia left, Magno followed
them.23
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez
and accepted his account of the murders. Said the trial court:
The testimony of the lone eyewitness describing vividly the

events prior, during and after the killing offers a complete picture
of the incident that only an eyewitness could supply. Moreover,
the actuation of witness Magno Gomez of not telling other people
of the crime he just experience[d] for fear of his life, and his
coming back to town after sunrise. Even declining Retada's offer
of a cup of coffee [and] to report to the authorities the incident
that he witnessed the night before, is consistent with human
behavior and should be accorded great respect and given more
weight. (sic) His conduct after the incident added more credibility
to his testimony. As to the fear he exhibited after the killing of the
spouses, the Supreme Court has this to say "there is no standard
form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident
especially if the assailant (assailants in this case) is physically
near. No standard form of behavioral response, quite often said,
could be expected from everyone when confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful occurrence.24
In its judgment dated November 29, 2002, the trial court

convicted appellants as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, each accused, RICO

CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG are hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and further ordered to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay the amount
of PhP100,000.00, and to pay moral damages in the amount of
PhP100,000.00. The bail bond posted by both accused for their
temporary liberty during the trial of this case is hereby cancelled.
SO ORDERED.25
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant now assigns the following as errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY

OF MAGNO GOMEZ SINCE HE WAS A PRINCIPAL SUSPECT
HIMSELF. HIS TESTIMONY IS REPLETE WITH MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES, AND MANY OF HIS CLAIMS ARE
CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING

THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE; AND
III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE MISTAKE IN

CONCENTRATING ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI BY THE
ACCUSED, INSTEAD OF LOOKING INTO THE VAGUENESS
AND WEAKNESS OF THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY
OF THE PROSECUTION'S LONE EYEWITNESS.26
Essentially, for our resolution is the issue of whether the

appellants' guilt for double murder has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in giving credence to

Magno Gomez's testimony, which is false and unbelievable. They
stress that Magno's testimony that he never saw Santiago try to
escape during the attacks contradicts his statements in his
affidavit, executed during preliminary examination, that Santiago
tried to escape but was overtaken by appellants.27 They suspect
that Magno was himself the killer, and posit that because he was
already a prime suspect, Magno accused appellants of the murder
to save himself.28 Appellants likewise argue that the trial court
erred in dismissing their defense of alibi on the ground that it was
a weak defense.29
Significantly, for the State, the Office of the Solicitor General

contends that reasonable doubt concerning the guilt of the
appellants exist in this case. The OSG stresses that material
inconsistencies exist between Magno's testimony in court and his
affidavit, which he executed during the preliminary
examination.30 The OSG cites that Magno testified that the
spouses were simultaneously attacked by appellants, with
appellant Calumpang attacking Santiago and appellant Omatang
attacking Alicia. However, during the preliminary examination,
Magno declared that both appellants attacked Alicia first and that
Santiago was hacked because Santiago attempted to save his
wife.31 Further, the fact that Magno was a principal suspect and
that he did not choose to exonerate himself right away when he
was arrested for questioning by members of the Philippine Army,
render his credibility suspect.32 In addition, the OSG stresses that
it was not shown in this case that appellants had any ill motive to
kill Santiago and Alicia Catipay.33 The OSG concludes that
appellants deserve acquittal on reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that the
trial court overlooked pertinent pieces of evidence favorable to
the accused and disregarded several significant facts and
circumstances that cast doubt on the veracity of the testimony of
the prosecution's lone eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a
departure from the settled rule that factual findings of the trial
court bind this Court.34
While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings,

the records show that serious discrepancies attended Magno's
testimony in court and his sworn statement,35 executed during the
preliminary examination conducted by Judge Ananson E. Jayme
on July 15, 1991, at the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Pamplona-Amlan-San Jose, Negros Oriental.
In his sworn statement, Magno narrated that both appellants

"hacked Alicia Catipay first" and that Santiago was attacked after
"he attempted to save his wife." Magno declared that Santiago
"attempted to run away but he was chased" and "was overtaken
and was hacked by both accused." Magno also claimed that
appellants tried to hack him after they had hacked Santiago.
Magno said,
Q How did the hacking incident happen?cralawlibrary
A At first, it was Alicia who was hacked and followed by

stabbing immediately Santiago was also hacked and when he
attempted to flee by crossing the [waterway] both accused
stabbed Santiago and he fell to the river.
Q When Alicia Catipay was hacked was she hit?cralawlibrary
A Yes.
Q What part of her body was hit?cralawlibrary
A On [the] left side of her ear.
Q And who hacked her?cralawlibrary
A Both accused hacked her.
Q And who stabbed Alicia Catipay?cralawlibrary
A [Jovenal] Omatang.
Q Was Alicia Catipay hit?cralawlibrary
A Yes.
Q What part of her body was hit?cralawlibrary
A At the stomach.
Q What weapon did Jovenal Omatang use in hacking and

stabbing Alicia Catipay?cralawlibrary
A Bolo.
Q You said both accused hacked Alicia Catipay first, what did
Santiago Catipay do?cralawlibrary
A He attempted to save his wife and instead he was hacked.
Q You said Santiago Catipay was hit what part of his body was
hit when he was hacked by the accused?cralawlibrary
A He was hit on his arm.
Q After he was hit on his arm what did he do?cralawlibrary
A He attempted to run away but he was chased.
Q Did Santiago Catipay succeed in escaping?cralawlibrary
A No, he was overtaken and was hacked by both accused.
Q When [Santiago] was overtaken by the accused what part of his

body was hit when he was hacked?cralawlibrary
A I know he was hit but I do not know what part of his body was
hit.
Q When both accused hacked and stabbed Santiago Catipay
while running, what happened to Santiago Catipay?cralawlibrary
A He fell to the edge of the river.
Q When Santiago Catipay fell to the water, what did the accused
do?cralawlibrary
A They also hacked me but I ran away.36
On the witness stand, however, Magno gave a different version of

how the murders happened. Magno testified at direct
examination that only appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago and
that Alicia was hacked only by appellant Omatang. More
important, he averred that the victims were attacked
simultaneously. Magno testified:
Q According to you, Santiago Catipay and Alicia Catipay were

quarreled by Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang. How was
Santiago Catipay quarreled?cralawlibrary
A He was hacked at the head.
Q Who hacked him at the head?cralawlibrary
A Rico Calumpang.
Q What did Rico Calumpang use in hacking Santiago Catipay?

cralawlibrary
A A bolo.
Q How many times did Rico Calumpang hack Santiago Catipay?

cralawlibrary
A Santiago Catipay was stabbed once and he was hacked also
once.
Q And where was Santiago Catipay hit by the hacking of Rico

Calumpang?cralawlibrary
A Head.
Q Will you please point to the portion where Santiago Catipay

was hit by the hacking of Rico Calumpang?cralawlibrary
A Witness pointing at the left side of his head.
Q And according to you, he was also stabbed by Rico

Calumpang, where was Santiago Catipay hit by the stabbing?
cralawlibrary
A Here - witness pointing to this abdomen which is the lower

part on the right side to the breast.
...
Q You testified that Alicia was killed, how was she killed?
cralawlibrary
A She [was] hacked and stabbed.
Q Who hacked and stabbed her?cralawlibrary
A It was Jovenal Omatang.
Q According to you Alicia Catipay was hacked and stabbed by

Jovenal Omatang, was Alicia hit by the hacking of Jovenal
Omatang?cralawlibrary
A Yes, she was hit.

...
Q Was the attack of Santiago Catipay by Rico Calumpang and the

attack of Jovenal Omatang on Alicia Catipay simultaneous or
they were hacking and stabbing almost at the same time by these
two accused performing their own individual acts? (sic)
A Yes, it was simultaneous.
Q After seeing Santiago Catipay hacked and stabbed by Rico

Calumpang and Alicia Catipay hacked and stabbed by Jovenal
Omatang, what did you do?cralawlibrary
A I ran.
Q You ran after they were killed or they were still under attack?
cralawlibrary
A They were still attacking when I ran away.37
Magno never said that appellants also tried to hack him and even
claimed that they were still hacking the victims when he ran
away. Magno also never mentioned that Santiago tried to save his
wife or that Santiago was chased or even that Santiago tried to
run. In fact, during cross-examination, he averred that he never
saw Santiago run away. Magno testified,
Q During that hacking of Santiago Catipay, was Santiago Catipay

able to run?cralawlibrary
A I do not know whether he was able to run or not. What I saw

is that he was hacked and stabbed.
Q And you are very sure of that, Mr. Gomez, that you did not see
Santiago Catipay run?cralawlibrary
A That is what I can say. What I saw was he was hacked and
stabbed. After that, I ran away.
Q That is why you told this Honorable Court that you did not see
Santiago Catipay run when he was being hacked and stabbed by
Rico Calumpang?cralawlibrary
A Regarding that question, what I can say is that I saw the

hacking and stabbing incident. After that, I ran away.38
Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is considered almost

always incomplete and often inaccurate or lacking in details
and is deemed inferior to the testimony given in open court.
Jurisprudence, however, forewarns that when serious and
inexplicable discrepancies exist between a previously executed
sworn statement of a witness and his testimonial declarations,
with respect to a person's participation in a serious imputation
such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of
the witness' account.39
The trial court believed that Magno's accusations against

appellants are true, basing on the fact that Magno was able to
testify on direct examination as to the precise location of the hack
wound on Santiago's head and the stab wound on his
abdomen.40 But the court failed to consider that at the preliminary
examination, barely a day after the incident, Magno was asked
the same questions asked in court, but could not even recall
where Santiago was hit when appellants hacked him. No
explanation was given how Magno was able to supply during the
trial the precise location of Santiago's wounds 19 months after the
incident.41
Similarly, several portions of Magno's testimony are unworthy of

belief. There seems to be no explanation as to why appellants
ignored Magno and did not chase him 42 considering that he was
only five feet away when he allegedly got an unobstructed view
of appellants murdering the spouses. Likewise, it makes no sense
why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that
appellants might also attack him, Magno chose to run only a short
distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure that appellants
did in fact not run after him, Magno took the time to stop by
Alexander Ebias's house, called out to Alexander, asked for some
dried coconut leaves, and made a torch to light his path. Magno's
actions were certainly not the actions of someone seeking to avoid
peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling
out to Alexander would have revealed his location to the very
people he said he was running from. Magno's claim that he
intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw
appellants kill the spouses is far from credible, considering that
he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating himself right
away when members of the Philippine Army arrested him for
questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself'such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.43
Finally, no convincing proof could show that appellants had any

reason to kill Santiago and Alicia in cold blood. As the OSG
points out, the supposed grudge, which Magno claimed could
have motivated appellants to kill the spouses, is too flimsy to be
believed. It is highly improbable that appellants would murder
the spouses because Santiago had offered appellants a glass of
beer and they refused him.44 If anybody should harbor a grudge
from such an incident, it should have been Santiago whose offer
appellants refused. But there is no evidence of any grudge
between Santiago and the appellants, and as Magno testified,
Santiago simply drank the glass of beer himself.45
Appellants' defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis

were corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was
not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place of the
incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily
prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the burden
of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.46 Unless the prosecution
overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an
accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.47 There being
no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants' presumed
innocence stands.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 2002, of the

Case No. 10152 is REVERSED. Appellants Rico Calumpang and
Jovenal Omatang are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. They are
ordered released from custody immediately, unless they are
being lawfully held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to

implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and

Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1
Penned by Judge Cesar Manuel U. Cadiz, Jr.; Records, pp. 318-
329.
2
Id. at 1-1-A.
3
"Ybias" in some parts of the Records.
4
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), pp. 15-16, 23.
Id. at 13-14, 17, 21-22; TSN, 22 February 1993 (afternoon session),

5
p. 8.
6
TSN, 22 February 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 5-7.
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), pp. 8-12; TSN, 4

7
March 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 5, 7-8, 28-29.

8
"Ritada" in some parts of the Records.
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), pp. 11, 27-29; TSN, 4

9
March 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 10-11.

10
TSN, 4 March 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 41, 50-51.
11
Id. at 46, 49-53.
12
TSN, 4 March 1993 (morning session), pp. 6-7.
13
Records, p. 6.
14
Id. at 17.
15
Id. at 7, 18.
16
TSN, 11 March 1993, pp. 4-5.
Sometimes spelled as "Nillas" in the Records.
17
TSN, 14 July 1993, pp. 4-8, 10-12, 17-18.

18
Id. at 23-25, 29.

19
TSN, 28 July 1993, pp. 4-6, 10-11, 13.

20
TSN, 10 December 1993, pp. 5-10, 12, 15-16.

21
TSN, 3 December 1993, pp. 5-7.

22
TSN, 28 July 1993, pp. 23-24, 26-27.

23
Records, p. 326. [Citations omitted.]

24
Id. at 329.
25
Rollo, pp. 69-70.

26
Id. at 77-81.
27
Id. at 84-85.
28
Id. at 82.
29
Id. at 305.
30
Id. at 316-317.
31
Id. at 308-311, 313.

32
Id. at 317.
33
See People v. Hugo, G.R. No. 134604, 28 August 2003, 410 SCRA

34
62, 71-72.
Exhibits "2", "2-a" and "2-c", Records, p. 21.

35
Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
36
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), pp. 7-11. (Emphasis

37
supplied.)
TSN, 4 March 1993 (afternoon session), pp. 30-32. (Emphasis

38
supplied.)
See People v. Parreno, G.R. No. 144343, 7 July 2004, p. 17.

39
Records, p. 328; TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), p. 8.

40
Records, p. 21 (see back page).

41
TSN, 4 March 1993 (afternoon session), p. 8.

42
People v. Garin, G.R. No. 139069, 17 June 2004, p. 14.

43
TSN, 22 February 1993 (morning session), p. 23.

44
Ibid.
45
People v. Cabalse, G.R. No. 146274, 17 August 2004, p. 15.

46
People v. Jubail, G.R. No. 143718, 19 May 2004, p. 32.

47
Lastly, below is the Zoom link for our next class:
Topic: PLS Evidence, Sunday, 6-10PM

Time: Sep 18, 2022 06:00 PM Asia/Manila

First Part Evidence

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First Part Evidence

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ear Class,

I am still in the process of updating and finalizing our syllabus.

For the upcoming class, please refer to the coverage of our

A. Definition of evidence; truth as purpose

B. Proof and evidence

C. Scope and applicability of the rules on evidence

D. Requisites for admissibility of evidence

Rule 128, Rules of Court

G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C.

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good

Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits

Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole

Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was

On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as

In its decision dated December 27, 2006,25 the RTC decided in

Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally

Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.

Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision

The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit"

Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to

Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale,

Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from

We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.

Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a

This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to

Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for

We uphold the CA's finding.

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the

We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid

It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the

The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its

The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the

It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the

While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the

It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence

An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis

The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily

The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima

The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima

Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive

As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit

The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Bognot v. RRI Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 180144, September

24, 2014, 736 SCRA 357, 366.

First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Peñaranda, G.R. No.

166616, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 504.

New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.