CHIOK

appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the
party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the
State and not the private complainant.44 The interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited
only to the civil liability.45 In the prosecution of the offense,
the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed
by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only
by the State through the Solicitor General.46 The private
offended party or complainant may not take such appeal,
but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case.47
II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place
Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors,
guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.53 Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and
provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to
attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following
elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime
charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent.54
In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our
rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of
acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate
court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory
upon its promulgation.55 This is referred to as the "finality-
of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the rule was explained
in People v. Velasco:56
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an
acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of
the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of
the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the
State, x x x." Thus, Green expressed the concern that
"(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with sill its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repealed attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be
found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and
justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing
the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount
importance criminal justice system attaches to the
protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule,
confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy
to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to
know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of
repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection
lo insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence
rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in
his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.
This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or
innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial
jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the
heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents
for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is
prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its
voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed
in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet
animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the
State should not be able to oppress individuals
through the abuse of the criminal process." Because
the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by
a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively
presumes that a second trial would be unfair.
(Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
There were cases, however, where we recognized certain
exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy and its
resultant doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,57 we remanded a judgment
of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of mistrial. In
declaring the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder
of former Senator Benigno Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr.,
which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a
sham, we found that "the prosecution and the sovereign
people were denied due process of law with a partial court
and biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and
pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the
authoritarian [p]resident to assure the carrying out of his
instructions."58 We considered the acquittal as void, and
held that no double jeopardy attached.
In People v. Uy,59 we held that by way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court,
in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible
errors of judgment but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of
due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First,
the first jeopardy did not attach because the CA did not
have jurisdiction over the appeal; Chiok having lost his
right to appeal when the CA found him to have jumped
bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached, the
circumstances of this case is an exception to the rule on
double jeopardy.
A. The CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal.
Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft
of any factual or legal basis the CA resolutions in the bail
case which enjoined the cancellation of bail of Chiok and
his warrant of arrest by the trial court. The logical and legal
consequence of the nullification of the CA resolutions is to
automatically revive the CA's Resolution dated September
21, 1999 dismissing the appeal of Chiok. Accordingly, the
CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Chiok and
the proceedings therein are null and void.
We find no merit in Chua's claims.
At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over
Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice of Appeal on June
18, 1999 at the time when the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was still in effect. Section 6, Rule 120 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that
the right to appeal is not automatically forfeited when an
accused fails to appear during the promulgation of
judgment.60 Upon perfection of Chiok's Notice of Appeal
and the subsequent denial of the prosecution's Motion to
Deny Due Course to the Notice of Appeal by the RTC in
its Order61 dated July 15, 1999, the CA completely
acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.
After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took
cognizance of the unserved order of arrest. Exercising
jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal, the CA in its Resolution
dated September 21, 1999 dismissed his appeal in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to
prosecute. - The appellate court may, upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief
within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the
appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on
its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
the appeal. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to
dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees
to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
This authority to dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless,
discretionary.62 When an accused jumps bail during the
pendency of his appeal, the appellate court may exercise
its discretion whether to proceed with the appeal or
dismiss it outright.63 In several cases, we still proceeded to
acquit an accused who remained at large during the
pendency of the appeal.64
In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found
that Chiok jumped bail because the order of arrest was not
served. Subsequently, when Chiok moved for its
reconsideration, the CA again exercised its discretion, this
time to entertain the appeal. Notably, neither the
prosecution nor Chua attributed any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the appellate court when it
reinstated the appeal via a Resolution dated February 29,
2000. This resolution, which effectively replaces the
original resolution dismissing the appeal, has already
attained finality.
Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions
which set aside the CA resolutions enjoining Chiok's arrest
did not automatically revive the CA resolution dismissing
the appeal; the dismissal being a discretionary act on the
part of the appellate court. Consequently, we reject the
claim of Chua that the first jeopardy did not attach
because the whole proceedings before the CA, and the
CA acquittal, are null and void.
B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and
double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on
double jeopardy are present in this case. Particularly, she
submits that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a
sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through the
OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard and its
"day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and void
judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan65 to bolster her assertions.
Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks
cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as they have
resulted in acquittals."66 Chua anchors her claim on the
report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban that
there were unauthorized tamperings in the evidence in the
bouncing checks cases67 (BP 22 case) she filed against
Chiok, and that a TSN in the same BP 22 case, where
Chiok allegedly made an implied admission of guilt, has
been secretly removed from the record.
We do not see any exception to the rule on double
jeopardy in this case.
The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan68 is starkly
different from this case. In Galman, we concluded that
there was a mock or sham trial because of the
overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue pressures
made by former President Marcos on the prosecution and
the Justices who tried and decided the case, which
prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position
and offering all evidence. We recognized the intensity and
gravity of the pressure exerted by the highest official in the
land that resulted to a miscarriage of justice.
In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge
Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities in the BP 22
case against Chiok, including the loss of a TSN containing
an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok equivalent to his
implied admission of guilt. We, however, do not see the
same evils presented in Galman when the alleged
anomalies pointed out by Chua were in a different case
and when the main basis of the acquittal is not on the
credibility of the physical evidence but of the testimony of
Chua herself. Moreover, it is apparent from the CA
acquittal that the appellate court considered Chiok's offer
of settlement in arriving at the decision, having included it
in its statement of facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to
nullify the CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the
appellate court considered these pieces of evidence, it
would have convicted Chiok. These are purported errors
of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence
which cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of
due process in presenting its case. The OSG, in fact,
actively participated in prosecuting the case before the
CA. It was able to file an Appellee's Brief69 dated
December 23, 2003, as well as its Rejoinder Brief70 dated
October 6, 2004. As Chua even admits in her petition, the
OSG was able to present its case before the appellate
court as when "[t]he OSG's position in this case on the
merits is clear in the submissions it has filed, as most
eloquently expressed in the Rejoinder Brief..."71 Certainly,
no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where both
parties had the opportunity to present their case and even
required them to submit memoranda from which its
decision is based, as in this case.72
Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of
the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal,
the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate
that the appellate court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.73 Chua failed to do so.
III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of
₱9,563,900.00.
Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision74 dated November 27,
2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as Criminal Case No.
44739 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan,
Manila - Branch 58, which absolved Chiok from civil
liability, is res judicata on this case. On the other hand,
Chua. claims that the CA erred when it ordered Chiok to
pay only the amount of ₱9,500,000.00 when it was shown
by evidence that the amount should be ₱9,563,900.00.
We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of
₱9,563,900.00.
In Castillo v. Salvador75 and several cases before it, we
ruled that if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the
accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
In this regard, preponderance of evidence is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.76
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the
prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation of
Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction
between Chua and Chiok was proven by preponderance
of evidence.
Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated
June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account
in the amount of ₱7,100,000.00. She also testified that she
delivered to him in cash the amount of ₱2,463,900.00.
Chiok's admission that he issued the interbank checks in
the total amount of ₱9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming
that it was "for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure
her that she will be paid back her investment, corroborates
Chua's evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate
court, Chiok admitted that he received from Chua the
amount of "₱7.9" million in June 1995 and for "₱1.6"
million at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA
found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of ₱9,500,000.00
only.
However, we find that during the direct and cross-
examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and October
13, 1997, the reference to "₱9.5" million is the amount in
issue, which is the whole of ₱9,563,900.00:
TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred
Chiok)
ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are
being charged in the information is ₱9,563,900.00 covered
by the two (2) checks Exhibits "C" and "D" of the
prosecution. x x x77
TSN October 13, 1997 (cross examination of Wilfred
Chiok)
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs.
Chua is claiming from you [which is the] subject matter of
this case of estafa?
WITNKSK[:] Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] How much?
WITNESS[:] More or less 9.5.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] In peso or in dollar?
WITNESS[:] In Peso.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] 9.5 Million what?
WITNESS[:] Million Peso, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5
Million from Mrs. Chua?
WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.78 (Italics supplied)
Accordingly, the amount admitted should be
₱9,563,900.00.
There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution
from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving the same
transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the
doctrine of res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness
of judgment."
The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of
"conclusiveness of judgment" is found in paragraph (c) of
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under
this doctrine, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and
matters determined in the former suit.79 Stated differently,
facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former
suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different
cause of action.80 This principle of res judicata bars the re-
litigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action.81
In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,82 we explained that a civil
action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil action
in estafacase. In rejecting the theory of petitioner therein
that the civil action arising from the criminal case for
violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the
corresponding civil action in the criminal case
for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule 111
of the Rules of Court expressly allows the institution of a
civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP
22, without need of election by the offended party. There
is no forum shopping because both remedies are
simultaneously available to the offended party. We
explained that while every such act of issuing a bouncing
check involves only one civil liability for the offended party
who has sustained only a single injury, this single civil
liability can be the subject of both civil actions in
the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may
only be one recovery of the single civil liability.
We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,83 where we were
confronted with the similar issue of whether an accused's
civil liability in the estafa case must be upheld despite
acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in BP 22 cases.
We held that both estafa and BP 22 cases can proceed to
their final adjudication-both as to their criminal and civil
aspects—subject only to the prohibition on double
recovery.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be
simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the
doctrine of res judicata finds no application here.
Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment presupposes that facts and
issues were actually and directly resolved in a previous
case.84 However, the records show that in the BP 22 case,
the facts and issues proving the transaction were not
actually and directly resolved in the decision, viz:
The court is not persuaded.
First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the
check to be given to the accused after its dishonor. There
is no showing dial this requirement was complied by the
prosecution. Second, the drawer must be given at least 5
banking days from such notice of dishonor within which to
pay the holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make
arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such
check. Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor
established to have been furnished the accused and
therefore there is more reason that the accused was not
given the requisite 5-banking day to make good aforesaid
cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness
of the law in its application by giving the drawer an
opportunity to make good the bum check. And, it cannot
be said that accused was ever given that opportunity
simply because the prosecution failed to prove that
accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.
xxx
Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of
argument that accused was notified of the dishonor of the
checks in suit by the demand letter adverted to above, still
the prosecution cause must fail because there are more
reasons not to believe than to believe the theory of the
prosecution as compared with that of the defense as will
be explained hereunder.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
the court hereby absolves the accused from criminal as
well as civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED
for lack of evidence to support the charges levelled
against him.
Costs de officio.
No other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.85
The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's
failure to show that a notice of dishonor was first given to
Chiok. The discussion that the prosecution's version is
incredible was merely secondary, and was not necessary,
for accused's acquittal. There were no findings of fact on
the transaction which gives rise to the civil liability.
In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in
the concept of conclusiveness of judgment bars Chua
from recovering any civil claims.
Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery
Frames,86 the foregoing amount of ₱9,563,900.00 shall
earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum computed from October 25, 1995, the date of
Chua's extrajudicial demand, until the date of finality of this
judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from such finality
of judgment until its satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R.
No. 179814 and the special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED. The petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021 is GRANTED.
The Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and the
Resolution dated October 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Wilfred
Chiok is ordered to pay Rufina Chua the principal amount
of ₱9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995 until the
date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall
thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
No costs.
Acquittal double jeopardy

Acquittal alleged misappropriation was not proven but only the monetary transaction.

BP 22

AND ESTAFA

THEY BOTH CAN PROCEED SUBJECT TO THE CAVEAT OF DOUBLE RECOVERY

XXXXX

BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS,

MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO,
MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO
AND GERVY B. SANTOS, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BP 22 CASES

CONVICTED AND IT REACHED THE COURT OF APPEALS

SUBSTITUTED

WHETHER THE DEATH OF THE ACCUSED EXTINGUISHED CIVIL LIABILITY EX-DELITO AND REQUIRE THE
INSTITUTION OF A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION

We explained that Bernardo's civil liability survived

her death as it is based on contract. Moreover, we
observed that it would be costly, burdensome, and
time-consuming to dismiss the present case and
require the Bumanglags to file a separate civil
action.
In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil actions.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a
single suit is filed and tried.40 This rule was enacted
to help declog court dockets, which had been
packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the
courts as collectors. As we observed in Hyatt v.
Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.:41cralawlawlibrary
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in
criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses
the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to
collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being
paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof.
The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case
is expected to significantly lower the number of
cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite
the disposition of these cases. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and
another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed
and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid
down by the Rules is to discourage the separate
filing of the civil action.chanrobleslaw

As a necessary consequence of this special

rule, the civil liabilities arising from the
issuance of a worthless check are deemed
instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22;
the death of Bernardo did not automatically
extinguish the action. The independent civil
liability based on contract, which was deemed
instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22,
may still be enforced against her estate in the
present case. We thus rule on the present
action to determine Bumanglag's civil
liability.
XXXX

In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to

include the corresponding civil actions. Instead of
instituting two separate cases, only a single suit is filed and
tried.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to

reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may
institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI Employees has
allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however,
the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation
or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil
liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check
upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
No. There is no independent civil action to recover the
civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded
check prohibited and punished under BP Blg 22.
Section 1 (b) Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides
that the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.

Muñoz argues that Co misunderstood Section 2, Rule 111

of the ROC because, as its title suggests, the provision
presupposes the filing of a civil action separately from the
criminal action. Thus, when there is no reservation of the
right to separately institute the civil action arising from the
offense, the extinction of the criminal action extinguishes
the civil action.
In contrast, Co claims that Muñoz’ acquittal of the crime of
libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because
Muñoz’ utterance of the libelous remarks remains
undisputed. We reject Muñoz’ claim. The last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to
claim civil liability arising from the offense charged,
regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately
from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111
of the ROC governs situations when the offended party
opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal
action; hence, its title "When separate civil action is
suspended." Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by
its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto.
The offended party may also choose to waive the civil
action.27
This dual mode of enforcing civil liability ex delicto does
not affect its nature, as may be apparent from a reading of
the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 120 of the ROC,
which states:
Section 2. Contents of the judgment. – x x x In case the
judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence
of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.(Emphasis ours)
If, as Muñoz suggests, the extinction of the penal action
carries with it the extinction of the civil action that was
instituted with the criminal action, then Section 2, Rule 120
of the ROC becomes an irrelevant provision. There would
be no need for the judgment of the acquittal to determine
whether "the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist." The Rules precisely require the
judgment to declare if there remains a basis to hold the
accused civilly liable despite acquittal so that the offended
party may avail of the proper remedies to enforce his claim
for civil liability ex delicto.
Xxx
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THAT
THE RTC-BRANCH 16 OF DAVAO CITY HAS
JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN AN APPEAL
INTERPOSED WHICH WAS VIOLATIVE OF SECTION
2, RULE 111 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE WHEN THE TRIAL COURT (MTCC-
BRANCH 6 OF DAVAO CITY) HAD ALREADY RULED
THAT THE ACT FROM WHICH THE CIVIL LIABILITY
MAY ARISE DID NOT EXIST.
(b)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING

PETITIONER'S REQUEST TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE
ON THE CIVIL ASPECT AND RULED THAT THE
PETITIONER HAS WAIVED THAT RIGHT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
FILED WAS WITH PRIOR LEAVE OF COURT.8

The petition lacks merit.

The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the

Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist.9

Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule

120 of the same Rules states
that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.10

In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated

October 25, 2001 and November 23, 2001, did not
contain any such finding or determination. The
Court agrees with the CA that in acquitting
petitioner in its Order dated October 25, 2001, the
MTCC did not rule on the civil aspect of the case.
While it subsequently held in its November 23,
2001 Order that "the act from which the civil
liability of the accused in favor of the private
complainant may arise does not exist in this case,"
the MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence,
factual circumstances or any discussion in its
October 25, 2001 Decision which would warrant
such ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since
the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of
the offense charged, then the act from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. The MTCC
held that its observations and ratiocinations in its
October 25, 2001 Order justified its conclusion.
However, after a careful review of the
abovementioned Orders, the Court finds nothing
therein which the MTCC could have used as a
reasonable ground to arrive at its conclusion that
the act or omission from which petitioner's civil
liability might arise did not exist.

On the contrary, the tenor of the Orders of the

MTCC is that the dismissal  of the criminal case
against petitioner was based on reasonable doubt. 
As may be recalled, the MTCC dismissed the
criminal case on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove the second and third elements of BP
22, i.e., (2) the check is applied on account or for
value and (3) the person issuing the check knows
at the time of its issuance that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for the
full payment of the check upon its presentment.
This only means, therefore, that the trial court did
not convict petitioner of the offense charged, since
the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence
required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of
evidence to prove the aforesaid elements of the
offense charged does not mean that petitioner has
no existing debt with respondent, a civil aspect
which is proven by another quantum of evidence, a
mere preponderance of evidence. Moreover, from
the above pronouncement of the MTCC as to the
prosecution's failure to prove the second and third
elements of the offense charged, it can be deduced
that the prosecution was able to establish the
presence of the first and fourth elements, i.e., (1)
a person draws and issues a check and (4) the
check is dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit. Hence, the fact that petitioner was
proven to have drawn and issued a check and that
the same was subsequently dishonored for
inadequate funds leads to the logical conclusion
that the fact from which her civil liability might
arise, indeed, exists. On the basis of the foregoing,
the RTC correctly entertained respondent's appeal
of the civil aspect of the case.
With respect to the second argument, the Court
finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of
the CA in its Resolution dated May 26, 2006 that
for petitioner's failure to invoke her right to
present evidence, despite the clear ruling by the
RTC that she is civilly liable, she is deemed to have
waived such right. Petitioner may not argue that
her right to due process was violated, because she
was given the opportunity to raise this issue a
number of times both in the RTC and the CA. 
Petitioner does not dispute that neither in her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the
RTC nor in her Petition for Review, as well as in her
Memorandum filed with the CA, did she raise the
issue of her right to present evidence on the civil
aspect of the present case. As correctly observed
by the CA, it was only in her Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision that she
brought up such matter. Where a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law.11 The essence of due process is to
be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support
of one's defense.12 Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of due process.13 The
question is not whether petitioner succeeded in
defending her rights and interests, but simply,
whether she had the opportunity to present her
side of the controversy.14

In the instant case, petitioner was able to

participate in all the proceedings before the lower
courts, and, in fact, obtained a favorable judgment
from the MTCC. She also had a similar opportunity
to ventilate her cause in the CA. Simply because
she failed to avail herself of all the remedies open
to her did not give her the justification to complain
of a denial of due process. She cannot complain
because she was given the chance to defend her
interest in due course, for as stated above, it was
such opportunity to be heard that was the essence
of due process.

Equally settled is the rule that no question will be

entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in
the proceedings below.15 Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention
of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-
judicial body, need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the
first time at that late stage.16 For her failure to
timely invoke her right to present evidence,
petitioner is already estopped.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August
12, 2005 and May 26, 2006, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27090, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FACTS:
FR Cement Corporation (FRCC) issued several withdrawal
authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders,
Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt (FCCT).
FCCT then sold the withdrawal authorities covering
50,000 bags of cement to respondent Co for the amount
of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag.
Co then sold the same withdrawal authorities to petitioner
Lily Lim for the alleged amount of P3.2 million or P64.00
per bag.
Lim, using the withdrawal authorities, withdrew 2,800 bags
of cement from FRCC. He then sold some of the
withdrawal authorities covering 10,000 bags back to
respondent Co. (Remaining: 37,200 bags)
Sometime within the same year, FRCC no longer allowed
Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the
withdrawal authorities. According to Co and the manager
of FCCT, the plant implemented a price increase and would
only release the goods once Lim paid for the price
difference or agreed to receive a lesser quantity of cement.
Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal
authorities were not subject to price fluctuations.

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Because of this, Lim filed an information for Estafa through
Misappropriation or Conversion before the RTC of Pasig
City. The criminal case was dismissed. The civil liability was
subsequently dismissed as well after the reception of the
evidence.
Lim appealed the dismissal of the civil liability before the
CA. While the appeal before the CA was pending, she filed
a complaint for specific performance and damages before
the RTC of Manila. The complaint asserted two causes of
action: breach of contract and abuse of rights.
In his defense, Co maintained that the two causes of action
raise the same issue, which was Co’s liability to Lim for her
inability to withdraw the bags of cement, and SHOULD BE
DISMISSED ON THE GROUNDS OF LIS PENDENS AND
FORUM SHOPPING.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lim committed forum shopping in filing the
civil case for specific performance and damages during the
pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of Estafa.
HELD:
Lim did not commit forum shopping in filing the civil case
for specific performance and damages during the pendency
of her appeal on the civil aspect of Estafa.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended
party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender:  (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability
arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code,− and (2) independent civil liability, that is,
civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal
proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as
for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act
or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of
Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries”).
The filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the
estafa cases against the offender did not amount to forum-
shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by
the offended party arose from the same act or omission of
the offender, they are, however, based on different causes
of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa
criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on
culpa contractual.
Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant
case because the law expressly allows the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of
the criminal action.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Laroya vs casupan and capitulo

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still

given the option to file a separate civil action to recover
civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution presents its
evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make
such reservation if he files a separate civil action before
filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet
commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the
criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not
apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or
omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code.11
In most cases, the offended party will have no reason
to file a second civil action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent
civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but
may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The commencement of the criminal action
does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil
action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers
only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil
action is reserved or filed before the commencement of
the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the
same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict -
without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two
cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of
each other. The commencement or prosecution of the
criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-
delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against
his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-
delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a
separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in
the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to
litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended
party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since
the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-
delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same
way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which
is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal
case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately
by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of
dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the
ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the
decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary
with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil
action. This possibility has always been recognized ever
since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code,
expressly provides that the independent civil action "may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs.
Potenciano,13 the Court declared:
"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or
acquittal — would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.’"
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code
introduced the concept of a civil action separate and
independent from the criminal action although arising from
the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to
encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and
the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more
apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient
remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such
remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
took effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued
the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the
amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the
well-settled rule that -
"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent."14
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner
Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on
December 23, 2011 due to "multiorgan failure" as
evidenced by a copy of death certificate.33 Thus, the effect
of death, pending appeal of his conviction of petitioner Dr.
Ynzon with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities
should be in accordance to People v. Bayotas,34 wherein
the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies
prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,civil
liability ex delictoin senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation
fromwhich the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either
againstthe executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
 prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitationson
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.35
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the
accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of
civil liability subsists as the same is not based on delictbut
by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.1âwphi1 For
this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based,36 and in accordance with Section
4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we quote:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted
under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted
to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may besubstituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in
these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the
deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased.
(Emphases ours)
In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the
offended party desires to recover damages from the same
act or omission complained of, the party may file a
separate civil action based on the other sources of
obligation in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111.37 If the
same act or omission complained of arises from quasi-
delict,as in this case, a separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate of the
accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court:38
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. — No action
upon a claim for the recovery of money or debtor interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or
an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him. (Emphases ours)
Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of
arising from contract, the filing of a separate civil action
must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If
not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money
against the decent, arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent,
all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against
the decent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they
may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
Where an executor or administrator commencesan action,
or prosecutes an action already commenced by the
deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by
answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each
other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in
favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though
the claim had been presented directly beforethe court in
the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
As a final note, we reiterate thatthe policy against double
recovery requires that only one action be maintained for
the same act or omission whether the action is brought
against the executor or administrator, or the estate.39 The
heirs of JR must choose which of the available causes of
action for damages they will bring.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR.
ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTEDof the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the
disposition of this case, his criminal liability is
extinguished; however, his civil liability subsists. A
separate civil action may be filed either against the
executor/administrator, or the estateof Dr. Ynzon,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same are based.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO v. PEOPLE AND SPS.
RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F. PALMA, GR No.
163879, 2014-07-30
Facts:
ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of
abdominal pain... brought JR to the clinic... of accused Dr.
Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general practitioner, specializing
in family medicine gave medicines for the pain and told
Palma's parents to call him up if his stomach pains
continue.
Due to persistent abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the early
morning of June 15, 2000, they... returned to Dr. Cabugao,
who advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth General
Hospital in Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was
admitted at the said hospital... referred the case to his co-
accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.
By midnight, JR again vomitted twice, had loose bowel
movements and was unable to sleep.
JR's condition worsened, he had a running fever of 38o C.
JR's condition continued to deteriorate that by 2 o'clock in
the afternoon, JR's temperature... soared to 42oC, had
convulsions and finally died.
ACUTE APPENDICITIS
Information was filed against accused for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide.
Issues:
whether or not petitioners' conviction of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an
alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence
on record.
Ruling:
The... elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without
malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable... lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
all the requisites of the offense have been clearly
established by the evidence on record.
Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required standard of care
expected from doctors.
it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death,
it was necessary to perform surgery on JR immediately.
t is clear that if JR's condition remained unchecked it
would ultimately result in his death, as what actually
happened in the present case.
he would perform a personal and thorough physical
examination of the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6
hours
Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert
opinion.
Dr. Ynzon revealed want of reasonable skill and care in
attending to the needs of JR by neglecting to monitor
effectively the developments and changes on JR's
condition during the observation period, and to act upon
the situation... after the 24-hour period when his
abdominal pain persisted and his condition worsened...
most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his
voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of
precaution.
To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of
care observed by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind... the
advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment
or the present state of medical science.
In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that,
having the needed training and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will
employ... such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients.
He, therefore, has a duty to use at least the same level of
care that any other reasonably competent doctor would
use to treat a condition under the same circumstances.
Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the
failure to perform appendectomy on JR, or the failure to
determine the source of infection which caused the
deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the
records fail to show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position... to
perform the required appendectomy.
Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon, but a general practitioner
specializing in family medicine... thus, even if he wanted to,
he cannot do an operation, much less an appendectomy on
JR.
It is precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr.
Ynzon after he suspected appendicitis.
Here, Dr. Cabugao has shown to have exerted all efforts to
monitor his patient and under these circumstances he did
not have any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzon's competence and
diligence.
We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when
JR's condition began to deteriorate.
Even so, before he left, he made endorsement and notified
the resident-doctor and nurses-on-duty that he will be on
leave.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR.
ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the
disposition of this case, his criminal liability is extinguished
Principles:
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Appellant’s Death Prior to Final Judgment
This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted
the records forwarded by the CA and required the Bureau
of Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the confinement of
appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012,
informed this Court that there is no record of confinement
of appellant as of date. In a Resolution dated 10
September 2012,15 this Court required the Quezon City
Jail Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison
and to report compliance within ten days from notice. The
Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October
2012,16 informed this Court that appellant passed away on
13 February 2011. The former Quezon City Jail Warden
wrote to the RTC about appellant’s demise in a letter
dated 23 February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012
letter were photocopies of appellant’s death certificate and
medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon City Jail
Warden’s letter.17 In a Resolution dated 7 January
2013,18 this Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from
the Quezon City Jail Warden, and required the parties to
submit their supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the
case if they so desire.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
dated 18 March 2013,19 which stated that it had already
exhaustively argued the relevant issues in its appellee’s
brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a supplemental
brief on 26 March 2013.20
In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the
CA’s decision, this Court issued a Resolution dated 25
September 2013 which ordered the PAO "(1) to
SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the
deceased appellant as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the
civil liability of appellant within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution."21
The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil
Liability of the Deceased Appellant on 29 November
2013.22 According to the Public Attorney’s Office-Special
and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the
deceased appellant have not communicated with it since
the case was assigned to its office on 29 September 2010.
The PAO sent a letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia Lipata,
who was appellant’s next of kin per official records.
Despite receipt of the letter, the relatives of appellant still
failed to communicate with the PAO.
In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:
xxxx
9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case
arose from and is based solely on the act complained of,
i.e. murder, the same does not survive the death of the
deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited
ruling [People v. Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25
August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People v. Rogelio
Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA
239], the death of the latter pending appeal of his
conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon.
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the
necessity to substitute the legal representatives of the
estate of the deceased as party does not arise.23
On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which
declared that "the [PAO] shall continue as the legal
representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for
purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of
this case."24
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, we declare that because of appellant’s death
prior to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, there is no
further need to determine appellant’s criminal liability.
Appellant’s death has the effect of extinguishing his
criminal liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. –
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxxx
What this Court will discuss further is the effect of
appellant’s death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994,
this Court, in People v. Bayotas,25 reconciled the differing
doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil
liability. We concluded that "[u]pon death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."26
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he
must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then
applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated
not on the felony previously charged but on other sources
of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom
the same shall be enforced."27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the
different causes of action. If the act or omission
complained of arises from quasidelict or, by provision of
law, results in an injury to person or real or personal
property, the separate civil action must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to Section
1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28 On the other hand, if the
act or omission complained of arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.29
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death
of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
 as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
deprivation of right by prescription.30 (Emphases
supplied)
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect of the death of
the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of
the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from
the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted
under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is
instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of
obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or
against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.1âwphi1
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in
these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the
deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased.
Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the
Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died
because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to
Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellant’s civil
liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because
appellant’s death on 13 February 2011, before the
promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability
for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than
delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our
subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal
representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for
purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of
this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our
pronouncement in
Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs,
in this case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue
their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant.
The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other
than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal
action but may be filed separately by the offended party
even without reservation.35 The separate civil action
proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and
requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil
action which may thereafter be instituted against the
estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken
from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 337 in
relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his
estate in Rules 86 and 87.38
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found
that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the
criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a
separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno
should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial
retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case
for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to
the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his
heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts
awarded by the CA.
However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study
and recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate
amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive
resolution of such similar cases with the objective of
indemnifying the private offended party or his heirs in
cases where an accused dies after conviction by the trial
court but pending appeal.
In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law
recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from
civil liability ex delicto which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence. This Court’s pronouncement
in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion
of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should
be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based
upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
We also turn to the Code Commission’s justification of its
recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in
these cases:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal
case also releases him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given
rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the
mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when
the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads
to unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such
reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is
for the punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different
from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish)
Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon
the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purpose of
the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense
should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should
the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is
not the invasion or violation of every private right to be
proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the
adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice – a cause for disillusionment on the part
of innumerable persons injured or wronged.40
In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases
to be recommended by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules of Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved
parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to
indemnity. This reform is of course subject to the policy
against double recovery.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated
on 31 May 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and civil liabilities ex
delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are
declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final
judgment.
Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules of Court.
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Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v.
Olaco and People v. Paniterce,20 it is already unnecessary
to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal was still
pending and no final judgment had been rendered against
him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not
appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become
irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were
totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions
of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Court’s
ruling in People v. Bayotas.
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C.
No. 00269 – finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages – had become ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson
Bayot y Satina, the Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 is
SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the
RTC of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
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