Enlarging the European Union: Challenges to and from Central and Eastern Europe:

Introduction
Author(s): Luciano Bardi, Martin Rhodes and Susan Senior Nello
Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique
, Jul., 2002, Vol. 23, No. 3, Enlarging the European Union: Challenges to and from
Central and Eastern Europe. L'élargissement de l'Union européenne (Jul., 2002), pp. 227-
233
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601308

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International Political Science Review (2002), Vol 23, No. 3, 227-233

Enlarging the European Union: Challenges to and

from Central and Eastern Europe-Introduction

LUCIANO BARDI, MARTIN RHODES, AND SUSAN SENIOR NELLO

The European Union's enlargement towards Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries is a highly complex issue and one that has dominated the politics of
Europe's pan-regional relations for the last decade. The process that could
eventually lead to EU accession by ten or more states of the former Eastern bloc
and Yugoslavia informally began with the first manifestations of Euro-enthusiasm
from the new-born CEE democracies (particularly Poland and Hungary) in the
early 1990s. It was officially inaugurated in June 1993 at the Copenhagen
European Council when the European Union officially set out its definition of EU
membership criteria in response to CEE country requests to join the EU club.
Formal EU accession applications started shortly thereafter: Hungary and Poland
applied in March and April 1994, respectively, followed by the Slovak Republic,
Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic
(see Henderson, 1999).
From early on, the enthusiasm of those in the queue for membership was met
with encouragement from those already inside the Union. Initially, and
throughout the first half of the 1990s, EU member states exhibited generally
positive attitudes towards enlargement, but mainly for reasons of stability and
international security. Economic motives then were of secondary importance. The
mood surrounding enlargement at the time was captured by Kaiser and Bruning
(1996: 11) who described it as "the most extensive piece of unfinished business in
the grand European project [ . .] fundamentally changing the nature of interstate
relations in Europe conceived by the pioneers of European unification in the late
1940s and early 1950s." For the first time, the notion of a finally secure and united
Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" appeared to be an attainable objective and
not just an instrumental slogan used by Eurosceptics to criticize the limited,
"Western" EU. These stability and security considerations were to dominate the
political debate until 1997, while the practicalities of enlargement were barely
broached, with only some EU member states expressing concern at their
implications. But at the Amsterdam European Council held in June that year, the
principle that enlargement was now inevitable seemed to be accepted-even by

0192-5121 (2002/07) 23:3, 227-233; 023895 ? 2002 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

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228 International Political Science Review 23(3)

those countries (Belgium, Italy, France) that saw it as an impediment to the

reforms they deemed essential for the strengthening of the EU itself. Some EU
members (France, Italy, and Spain) were also concerned that enlargement would
drain resources from other priorities, such as the EU's structural funds. The UK, on
the other hand, favoured enlargement because the EU'S territorial "widening"
would probably take place at the expense of its institutional "deepening," to which
it was opposed (Hayward, 1996: 148).
The first six countries (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland
and Slovenia) began negotiations in 1998; and a further six (Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia) began to negotiate EU entry in 2000. In
the meantime the leverage exercised by the prospect of EU membership, and the
conditionality of the actual process of accession, had triggered fundamental
changes in CEE economic systems. For many observers, the pace of the
enlargement process was still linked to-and overwhelmingly justified-by EU
external policies, especially towards the troubled South-Eastern European
countries. But in the last five years, positions in the EU candidate countries and EU
members alike have become more diversified and cautious, with regard both to
the political and economic dimensions of enlargement (Grabbe, 2001). Because
the CEE candidates have now largely achieved stability and security, some countries
and EU politicians have focused more closely on the implications for the existing
member states. In May 2000, the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, shook
the EU'S political circles by presenting a very comprehensive proposal for the
reform of EU institutions. In the spring of 2001 his initiative was followed by
different but similarly ambitious projects presented by the British prime minister,
Tony Blair, spokesmen for the German Social Democrats (SPD), and the French
prime minister, LionelJospin.
There is also a concern in some quarters that the accession of so many
countries in a relatively short time-span will delay if not altogether prevent the
already difficult process of further EU political integration. Moreover, the
budgetary implications of extending regional funds and the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) to CEE countries has led to a focus on limiting the overall costs. In the
meantime, the membership criteria have become more exacting. Indeed, because
member states have continually added new conditions to the list, it has sometimes
seemed as if the entry requirements for EU candidates are being used to slow down
rather than hasten enlargement. Meanwhile, in the CEE countries themselves,
some sectors of public opinion and of the economy are beginning to consider the
potential price of EU accession in terms of the costs of implementing reforms
and EU standards (see Stebe, 2001 for a survey). In sum, if the modernizing and
democratizing interests of the CEE countries initially met with the security and
stability concerns of the EU states, by the late 1990s the practicalities of
enlargement had rendered the issue of membership much more complex for all
involved.
This change in the nature and the tone of the debate has defined the central
questions addressed in this issue:
* How has EU institutional development proceeded in order to accommodate an
expanded number of member states?
* How have the accession criteria (conditionality) for Central and Eastern
European (CEE) applicants been applied and with what effect?

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 BARDI/RHODES/SENIOR NELLO: Introduction

* What changes have there been in the linkages between Western and CEE
political party organizations? and
* What are the economic implications of enlargement?
The articles by De Witte and Grabbe (in this issue) provide concise and
comprehensive treatments of the processes and problems in adapting the
European Union and its prospective new member states to the challenge of
greater union. This is, after all, an historically unprecedented transformation of
the EU'S regional political system-much more so than in previous enlargements
because of the large number and diversity of the potential new members. Its very
scale and complexity mean that the process of adjustment, perhaps inevitably, has
been hesitant and uneven. In fact, the Union has been more successful in coaxing
reform in those countries furthest advanced in preparation for membership than
in getting the same in its own house in order to admit them. While there has been
a bold approach to enlargement as a political and economic imperative for the
accession countries, the European Union has only timidly embraced its own
institutional reform.
Reform and change in the CEE countries have been particularly impressive, and
the Union has played a key role in this process of adjustment. Vachudova (2001)
has shown that via the combination of "passive" and "active" leverage (the first
refers to the attraction of membership, the second to its extensive requirements)
the European Union has shaped almost every area of domestic policy-making in
candidate and aspiring candidate countries. It has also had a profound effect on
the politics and party systems of former communist states by empowering non-
nationalist, EU and reform-oriented elites and in helping shift electoral support in
their favour. Within the EU itself, however, the process of reform required for
enlargement has been slow and discontinuous. The vagaries of intergovernmental
bargaining and member state hesitancy have limited the Amsterdam and Nice
Treaties to staging posts on the path to a more conclusive and adequate
institutional adjustment. As De Witte argues, EU institutions that were originally
designed for a much more restricted membership (as well as a degree of political
and economic integration) in the 1950s were only modestly reformed at Nice.
Although some reforms were made to the Commission, the Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament in anticipation of expanded numbers of
representatives, these will have to be revisited at a future date if a Europe of twenty
or more member states is to function effectively. Regardless of those reforms
already made and planned, there may yet be serious problems of governability
(and the threat of policy dilution) posed by the sheer administrative overload and
complexity of everyday political and bureaucratic life in a larger Union.
Meanwhile a degree of self-interested politics has begun to emerge among
certain member states vis-a-vis their Eastern neighbours. This may well be
exacerbated if, as Grabbe argues, conditionality becomes a means of stalling
membership, with all the attendant risks of undermining democratic and
economic reform and endangering the stability of the EU's Eastern borders. The
conditionality requirements themselves are very demanding-and this in itself is
causing adjustment problems in some CEE countries. But as Grabbe points out,
there can also be inconsistencies in EU advice and demands that risk undermining
the reforms of accession country governments. There is also a rather inflexible
view of which economic policies are appropriate for a transition economy seeking
membership. And while the process of moving through the various stages of

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230 International Political Science Review 23(3)

meeting conditionality requirements has proven effective for enc

domestic reform, hesitancy on the part of the Union in completing th
could fuel Euroscepticism even in those countries most advanced in tra
For even if it only rarely translated into support for "hard" Euroscept
there are currently higher levels of "soft" Euroscepticism (that is, qu
opposition to the EU) in the CEE candidate countries than in the presen
states (see Taggart and Szezerbiak, 2001).
The issue of Euroscepticism or "Euro-indifference" has frequently be
to the EU's "democratic deficit." Although this expression has several m
each stressing different aspects of the EU'S deficiencies as a polity (Ma
1979, provides one of the earliest definitions) in recent years it has also bee
to indicate the absence of organic links between European civil societ
institutions. A discussion of this problem implies the identificatio
assessment of the development of a genuine European demos and of t
played by political parties in driving this process forward. The literatu
confused on the relationship between the two: in particular it is unclear
proper Europarties remain undeveloped because of the absence of
European social cleavages; or because of the overpowering compet
national political parties that act effectively in the EU'S intergovern
institutions (the Council of Ministers and the European Council). Acc
the latter view, the institutional imbalance between the EU'S intergove
and supranational bodies (the European Parliament and the E
Commission) is responsible for the so far defective development of Eu
This implies that institutional reforms capable of redressing this imbal
create conducive conditions for Europarties and the more direct expre
development, in turn, of a European demos. Europarty development cou
facilitated by less sweeping reforms, such as the one implicit in the r
regulation for European party financing and a Europarty statute, as dis
the article by Giorgia Delsoldato in this issue.
Institutional wishful thinking aside, this question is particularly rel
relation to Eastern enlargement. As Delsoldato indicates, the ability of
transnational party federations to attract Central and Eastern Europ
parties could be a significant factor in the recognition of common pan
societal characteristics and in the integration of candidate countries
European Union. On the other hand, given the different nature of the
structures that produced the parties of the CEE countries, their integration
EU party system may prove rather problematic. It remains to be seen
"Europeanization" of the CEE countries will affect the longer run develo
their party systems and the future of the Euro-polity itself.
Turning to economic issues, the main justification usually advan
European integration has been the promise of the prosperity and political s
that it offers. And prosperity has in fact increased, with rapid economic g
all of the Central and Eastern European countries since the early 199
case of those that have applied for EU membership, a combination of gr
EU leverage has compelled governments to stay committed to difficult
reforms and to find political solutions to ethnic problems. As Uvalic points
conditionality was a major factor behind the creation of the Central
Free Trade Agreement, the Baltic Free Trade Area and the various init
promote cooperation in Southeastern Europe. The main aim of such i
was to encourage good neighbourliness and an improved treatment of m

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 BARDI/RHODES/SENIOR NELLO: Introduction 231

and to reduce the risks of border disputes in an enlarged European Union. The
free trade area set in place between the Union and these countries through the
Europe Agreements has contributed to rising prosperity by permitting a rapid
reorientation of trade. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played an important
role, with firms investing in Central and Eastern Europe with a view to using the
region as a base for operating in an enlarged EU single market.
But if peace and prosperity are being achieved through measures already
adopted, where does that leave the formal step of enlargement? When the CEE
countries join the European Union they will be able to participate in the decision-
making process, and in policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the
Structural Funds, and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, as several
articles in this issue point out, the terms on which the applicant countries will
participate in these policies have yet to be clearly defined. The limits so far agreed
on transfers through the CAP and Structural Funds are unlikely to be politically
acceptable for politicians in candidate countries. Uncertainties also remain with
regard to the institutional arrangements of EMU in an enlarged Union, and as to
what transitional arrangements will be allowed (currency boards, unilateral
"Euroization") before full EMU membership occurs. As the Senior Nello article
suggests, it seems likely that debate on these "political" issues will continue long
after enlargement has taken place.
If the institutional arrangements of the greater Union are still uncertain, how
sure can we be that enlargement will continue to promote economic gains for all?
Although certain aspects of EU economic integration, such as monetary union, are
well covered by theory (in work that stems from Mundell, 1961), this is not true of
the topic as a whole. For many years, analysis of the trade aspects of integration
relied on customs union theory. But early empirical research based on that
approach found the growth effects of integration to be surprisingly limited-in
the order of 1-2 percent of GDP (Harrop, 2000: 65). Recognition that this was
implausibly small gave rise to the view that integration might also involve dynamic
effects, the most comprehensive studies of which (for example, Emerson et al.,
1988), promised huge benefits through increased competition, specialization,
technology transfer, and economies of scale.
More recently, a new literature on regional cooperation (Bhagwati, Greenaway,
and Panagariya, 1998) has been applied to EU enlargement, yielding various
insights. Uvalic (in this issue) refers to the domino effect described by Baldwin
(1993). According to this model, outsiders want to become insiders, increasing the
incentives to add members to the integration bloc. Alternatively, according to
Ethier (1998), regionalism (an enlarged EU) is the means by which new countries
enter the multilateral system and attempt to attract FDI. The new regionalism
approach may also help to identify the characteristics of such groupings which are
likely to lead to success (or failure). Uvalic quotes a study by the World Bank
(2000) which argues that a strong liberalizing arrangement with the right partner
(preferably rich, large, and open) may lead to a virtuous circle of increased
credibility, investment, growth, and political stability. This presumably helps
explain why most applicant countries are more interested in cooperation with the
European Union than with each other.
This last point brings us back to the linkage between political and market
integration. In theory, the two are intrinsically connected, and in the case of the
European Union, the virtuous circle can be conceived of as follows. The reduction
of exchange rate uncertainties under EMU and pan-European regulatory reform

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232 International Political Science Review 23(3)

boost trade and investment; the negative effects of market liberalization are
softened by the Structural Funds; and the consolidation of pluralist democracy in
an enlarged Union promotes further returns to market integration. Markets,
however, have to be institutionally embedded and politically legitimated. But in
the contemporary European Union, while the notion of market integration by
now is relatively uncontroversial, the articles in this issue of the International
Political Science Review reveal that the political and institutional side of the equation
is still the subject of considerable debate. This is likely to remain the case for quite
some time to come as the European Union and its new member states engage in
an extended process of complex and negotiated mutual adjustment.

References

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Biographical Notes
LUCIANO BARDI is Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at
the University of Pisa. He is the author and co-author of several books in Italian on
the European Parliament and the European Commission, and of numerous
articles in English on, among other topics, Italian parties, EU parties, and party

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 BARDI/RHODES/SENIOR NELLO: Introduction 233

systems. ADDRESS: University of Pisa, Dipartimento di Scienze della P

Serafini 3, I-56126 Pisa, Italy. [e-mail: luciano.bardi@iol.it]
MARTIN RHODES is Professor of Public Policy in the Department of S
Political Sciences at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy
author of numerous books and articles on European politics and
economy. ADDRESS: European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini 9,
San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy. [e-mail: rhodes@datacomm.iue.it]
SUSAN SENIOR NELLO is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Economi
University and teaches courses on European integration, EU enlargeme
agricultural economics. Her books include The New Europe: Changing
Relations between East and West, and (with Karen E. Smith) The European Un
Central and Eastern Europe: The Implications of Enlargement in Stages. ADD
University, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Facolta di Economi
Goodwin, Piazza San Francesco 7, I-53100 Siena, Italy. [e-mail: senior@un

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