SESSION 3 - CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CHAPTER 1: The Lawyer and Society

CANON 3 – Information on Legal Services that is True, Honest,

Objective, Fair, and Dignified

RULE 3.01 – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory of unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.

A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,

Public Information Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053               August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN,
JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in

the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of
the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to
be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her
husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and
can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will
not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said
that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time
of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the
August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
The Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant

Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come
to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that
the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer
advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he
prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is
not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice
of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be
dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on
November 11, 2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, 8 which

was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No.
5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest
whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating
that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting
the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on
June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a

business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and
to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration
of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and

in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice

involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He

himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he
professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings
hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he
pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services
in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten months
later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous
affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a

self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly
erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case,19 he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to
do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether

proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer
and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the
lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law
lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon,
of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement
of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists;
the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a
law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive
or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is

found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be

furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

Footnotes
1 
Rollo, p. 13.
2 
Id., pp. 14-15.
3 
Id., p. 9.
4 
Id., pp. 21-57.
5 
Id., p. 60.
6 
Id., p. 62.
7 
Id., p. 72.
8 
Id., p. 75.
9 
Id., p. 73.
10 
Id., p. 109.
11 
Id., p. 110.
12 
Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 253.
13 
Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 174.
14 
Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].
15 
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002.
16 
Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10; Pineda E.L. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].
17 
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41.
18 
Id., p. 110.
19 
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.
20 
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.
21 
Id., p. 65.
22 
Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 407.
RULE 3.02 – In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name
shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible
provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased.

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO,
VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L.
SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified
complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers,
asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of
Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the
letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As
admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a
professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members
and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being
members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker
& McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they
could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p.
115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova,

Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Plana, J.,  took no part.

Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.

RULE 3.02 – In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or

assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a
deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all
its communications that said partner is deceased.
July 30, 1979

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,

SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO.
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE
V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE

FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J.
ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S.
J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners
of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving
partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that
they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of
partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976,
both Petitions were ordered consolidated.

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business
under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article
1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the
last paragraph that: 

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the

partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part
thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the
deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership. 1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the

legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as
to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a
profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients
as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a
trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is
offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has
acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of
the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: 

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former

partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. ... 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their

respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and
international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners'
deaths. 5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a

professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at
least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted
practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this
Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of
including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter
was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their
firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-
11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The
law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before
acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would
like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E.
A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm
of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now
being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name
"Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: 

After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso

Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of
the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart
from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys
Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
 including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston,
deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal and
confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client,
and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional
ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys
are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their
firm name.

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far

enunciated by the Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid
down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,

Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their
partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article
1815 of the Civil Code which provides: 

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name,

which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners.

Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their

names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name

of a partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the
case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a
third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of
assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm
cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased
lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such
division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or
responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their
lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no
corresponding liability.

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by
law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use
of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in
the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to
make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can
join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by
deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title
IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily
deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the
individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name
of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a
hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to

protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual
members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a
commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting
of lawyers. 9

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial

partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry
on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a
partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60
Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, 

... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or;

the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm
asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill
and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in
the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ...
(ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed

by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy
specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a

mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is not
a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that
"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice
is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business
is that the law is a profession.
 Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of
the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p.
5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as
a common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public
service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from
business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct,
and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making
much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients. 13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the

American Bar Association" in support of their petitions.

It is true that Canon 33  does not consider as unethical the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership
when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the

continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of
petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm
names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the
partnership changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of
the partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by local
custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active
members. ...

There would seem to be a question, under the working of the

Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner and
at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never
 a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp.
207208) (Emphasis supplied).

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the
name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in
search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished
name appearing in a firm title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use
of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so
because it is sanctioned by custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733)

which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York
Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if
none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice
was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative
policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and

offends no statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association
and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows:
"The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner,
when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use."  There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use
the names of deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar
associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First
Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion
that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the
practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved
as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right
cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of
the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice
does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The
former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute.
Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the
legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its
Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no
custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to
speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the
death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public
policy shall not be countenanced. 24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of

justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.
£îhqwâ£

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of

public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a
profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in
the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self
assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in
order each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within
the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession does not
regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He
is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike.
The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no
equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what
he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no
expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the
profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of
sound administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a
learned art have their justification in that they secure and maintain
that spirit. 25

In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the
public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to
drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those
names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been
partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of
the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned
did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior
partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record,
the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of
petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the
listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J.,  dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to
continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of
the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo,
De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they
be allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of
two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1,
1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.

They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office
which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the
said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary
connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the
name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the
petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the
name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical"
as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be
indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander
Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when
they served as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of
their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the
legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill
attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is
a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed
before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of
Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso,
his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he
died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.

#Footnotes
1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 3.
2 Citing Sec, 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342; Sec. 39,
Commonwealth Act No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act No. 318; Sec. 39, Republic Act No. 184.
3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.
4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo, et al., pp. 3- 4.
5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.
8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18; Petition of Romulo. et al., p, 5.
9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630, affd 7 NY 2d 846, 196 NYS 2d 986, 164 NE
2d 860.
10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.
11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.
12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon 33, par. 2, Canons of Professional
Ethics.
13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.
14 7 C.J.S. 708.
15 Am Jur 270.
16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed., p. 8.
17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 were also
adopted by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. The American Bar Association adopted Canons
33 to 45 in 1928, Canon 46 in 1933 and Canon 47 in 1937. On April 20, 1946, when Canons 33 to
47 where already in effect, the Revised Constitution of the Philippine Bar Association was
approved and it provided that the Association "adopts and makes its own the Code of Ethics of
the American Bar Association." (Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed. p, 341).
18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.
19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law. Fourth Ed., Vol. I, p. 7
20 Article 12, Civil Code.
21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).
22 Art. 8, Civil Code
23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.
24 Art. 11, Civil Code. 25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern Times, (1953),
pp. 9-10.

RULE 3.02 – In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or

assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a
deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all
its communications that said partner is deceased.

A. C. No. 9896               March 19, 2014

MA. ELENA CARLOS NEBREJA, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN REONAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

For resolution is the administrative complaint for disbarment 1 filed by Ma. Elena
Carlos Nebreja (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin Reonal (respondent) for his
failure to file the contracted petition for annulment of marriage in her behalf; for
his misrepresentation on its status; and for his use of a fictitious office address.

On June 26, 2006, complainant filed a verified Complaint-Affidavit before the

Commission on Bar Discipline (CBP) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
against respondent. Complainant alleged in her complaint-affidavit and position
paper that sometime in March 2004, she engaged respondent's services to file her
petition for annulment. She paid in cash and in checks, 2 the various fees he asked
from her on several occasions which totalled ₱55,000.00.

After paying respondent, however, complainant did not receive any

word from him with regard to the status of her petition for
annulment other than his claim that they needed to wait for her
appointment with the psychologist evaluation.

On April 4, 2005, respondent told complainant that her petition for annulment
was dismissed for lack of evidence. He then again asked for sums of money, on
separate occasions, totalling ₱25,900.00, to pay for the psychological test, the
sheriff’s fee, the re-filing fee, and the publication.

Complainant again, despite respondent’s receipt of sums of money, failed to

receive any update from respondent. When complainant asked for the schedule
of her psychological test, respondent merely told her that the psychologist was
unavailable. When she tried to ask for the number of her case and to obtain
copies of the records, respondent just told her that the records were kept in a
cabinet, the key to which was in the possession of his law partner who was out of
town at that time.

On March 14, 2006, complainant met with respondent to secure copies of her
annulment case file. Respondent, however, merely handed to her photocopies of
her marriage contract and her children’s birth certificates. When she asked for
copies of her case files, he just told her that his law office could not let her use the
pleadings of the case. She then asked for his office address to appeal to his law
partners, but respondent refused to give it.
Complainant checked her records and found respondent’s demand letter
bearing the address of his claimed law office, "18/f Century Towers
Building, Legaspi St. corner de la Rosa, Makati." When complainant
tried to look for the said office, she discovered that there was no such
building. She also found respondent’s calling card bearing the address, "86
Magat Salamat Street, Project 4, Quezon City," which, complainant found out,
was respondent’s residential address.

When complainant tried again to obtain copies of her annulment case from
respondent, he did not give any and told her that her annulment case would just
be re-filed. When she asked him to write a letter to explain to the University of
Perpetual Help-Rizal the discrepancy between the surnames appearing in her
children’s NSO-issued birth certificates and the school records, respondent did
not mention any pending annulment case in the letter, which he filed in
complainant’s behalf. These circumstances made complainant suspect
that he did not file any petition for annulment at all.

In his answer and position paper, respondent denied having been engaged by
complainant to handle her petition for annulment and having been paid therefor.
In particular, respondent averred that complainant did not engage him to be her
lawyer because she was unemployed and could not afford his legal services; that
he was the retained counsel of one Desiree Dee, complainant’s associate, in the
prosecution of labor, civil and criminal cases, but not for her annulment; that in
the preparation of the affidavit for the University of Perpetual Help, he did not
mention her intention to pursue an annulment proceeding against her husband
upon her request; and that no psychological test was conducted because she
refused to allocate time to accommodate the schedule of the clinical psychologist.

There are two principal issues to be resolved in this case. First, whether indeed
respondent failed to file the requisite petition for annulment for complainant and
misrepresented its status; and second, whether or not he used a fictitious
office address.

With regard to the first issue, the CBD found that respondent was liable for
inexcusable negligence for failing to file her petition for annulment. There was no
dispute that the parties met to discuss about the filing of complainant’s intended
petition for annulment of marriage. They, however, disagreed on the
engagement of his services to file the petition.

On the matter, CBD found as sufficient the documentary evidence of payment

submitted by complainant to prove the engagement of his legal services. During
the clarificatory hearing, complainant answered the questions on the purposes
for which the payments were given in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank manner, which demeanor was a badge of credibility. 3

The CBD did not give credence to respondent’s denials, which prevailed over the
positive and categorical statement of the complainant. It cited the well-settled
rule that positive statement was stronger and attained greater evidentiary weight
than negative evidence.4 Moreover, he did not submit any evidence to support or
corroborate his denials and allegations or to refute complainant’s evidence. In
sum, his claims were merely supported by his allegations, which, by law, were
not equivalent to proof.5

With regard to the second issue, the CBD found that indeed,
respondent used a fictitious office address to deceive complainant.
He did not submit any proof that such building existed or that he
held office at said address. He also did not deny either the due
execution and authenticity of the letter with his printed office
address. By failing to controvert the evidence of the other party, the
truth of the said evidence was deemed to be admitted by the
litigant.6 Such act, as held by the CBD, was a violation of
respondent’s lawyer’s oath to do no falsehood and which
consequently rendered him administratively liable.

On September 25, 2008, the CBD found respondent guilty of both charges and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law and ordered him to return
the amounts taken from the complainant. The dispositive portion of its report
reads:

WHEREFORE, it is therefore respectfully recommended that respondent be: (a)

suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year; and (b) ordered
to return to complainant, within five (5) days from notice, the sum of ₱80,900.00
with 12% interest per annum from the date when this recommendation is
affirmed by the Supreme Court until the full amount shall have been returned.

On December 11, 2008, a resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the
IBP, which adopted and approved the recommendation of the CBD. The IBP
Resolution is hereby quoted as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVIII-2008-652

CBD Case No. 06-1767

Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja vs.

Atty. Benjamin Reonal

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his inexcusable
negligence by failure to file the annulment petition and for misrepresentation,
Atty. Benjamin Reonal is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and Ordered to return the amount of Eighty Thousand Nine Hundred
Pesos (₱80,900.00)* to complainant within five (5) days from notice with 12%
interest per annum from the date this recommendation is affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
Complainant and respondent filed their motions for reconsideration on April 25,
2009 and April 27, 2009 respectively, but both were denied in a resolution, dated
January 3, 2013.

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the resolution of
the IBP except with respect to the order to return the amount of ₱80,900.00.

Despite the engagement of his services, respondent did not file the contracted
petition. His conduct, as held in Vda. De Enriquez v. San Jose, 7 amounted to
inexcusable negligence. This was found to be contrary to the mandate prescribed
in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
enjoined a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the
rule on negligence and states:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

This Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of
the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a
violation.8 Thus, a lawyer was held to be negligent when he failed to do anything
to protect his client's interest after receiving his acceptance fee. 9 In another
case,10 this Court has penalized a lawyer for failing to inform the client of the
status of the case, among other matters. In another instance, for failure to take the
appropriate actions in connection with his client's case, the lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and was required
to render accounting of all the sums he received from his client.11

With regard to respondent’s misrepresentation of his office address, the case of

Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12 sets an example. In the said case, the
Court imposed a six-month suspension on the lawyer after it was established
that the said lawyer indeed claimed to be a lawyer of Porac Trucking, Inc. when,
in truth and in fact, he was not. Still, in another case, 13 the same six (6) month
suspension was inposed on the erring lawyer after it was established that he
claimed before the trial court to be a member of Citizens Legal Assistance Office
when in truth, he was not.

In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among others, and
then completely neglected his client’s cause. Moreover, he failed to inform
complainant of the true status of the petition. His act of receiving money as
acceptance fee for legal services in handling the complainant's case and,
subsequently, failing to render the services, was a clear violation of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.14

For all of respondent's acts - failure to file the contracted petition for annulment
of marriage in behalf of the complainant, his misrepresentation on its status and
his use of a fictitious office address, he deserves the penalty imposed upon him
by the IBP.
The Court, however, deletes the aforementioned order stated in the resolution of
the IBP, to wit, "To return the amount of Eighty Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos
(₱80,900.00) to complainant within five (5) days from notice with 12% interest per
annum from the date this recommendation is affirmed by the Supreme Court."
The Court has recently adopted the policy to let the complainant claim and
collect the amount due from the respondent in an independent action, civil or
criminal.1âwphi1

Nevertheless, the Court looks with disfavor at the non-payment by a lawyer of

his due obligations.

WHEREFORE, the December 11, 2008 Resolution of the IBP adopting and
approving the September 25, 2008 Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP that Atty. Benjamin Reonal be suspended from the practice
of law for one (1) year is hereby APPROVED. The order to return the amounts
received from complainant is hereby DELETED. This decision is immediately
executory and is without prejudice to the filing of any civil or criminal action
against respondent.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution
to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
 Rollo, pp. 1-5.
2
 Id. at 6-14.
3
 People v. Baltazar, 385 Phil. 1023 (2000).
4
 Republic v. Bautista, 559 Phil. 360 (2007).
5
 Sadhwani v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 54 (1997).
6
 Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 413 (1995).
7
 545 Phil. 379 (2007).
8
 Solidon v. Macalad, A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 472.
9
 Villafuerte v. Cortez, 351 Phil. 915 (1998).
10
 Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, 443 Phil. 479 (2003).
11
 Reyes v. Vitan, 496 Phil. 1 (2005).
12
 279 Phil. 736 (1991).
13
 Afurong v. Aquino, 373 Phil. 695 (1999).
14
 Reyes v. Vitan, supra note 11.

RULE 3.03 – Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from
the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law
allows him to practice law currently.
 PHIL. CONST.
ART. VI, SEC. 14

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may

personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

PHIL. CONST.,
ART. VII, SEC. 13

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

PHIL. CONST.
ART. IX, SEC. 2

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure,

hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of
any profession or in the active management or control of any business which, in
any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.

RULE 3.03 – Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from
the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law
allows him to practice law currently.
A.M. No. P-99-1292 February 26, 1999

JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent.

RESOLUTION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

The complaint filed by Julieta Borremeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula,

RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged
engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official
functions as Branch Clerk of Court.

Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister Flor
Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical
error was committed in the complaint which stated that the address of defendant
is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake
was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which was admitted by the
Court. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a
motion for execution. Complainant, however, was surprised to receive a
temporary restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220,
RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Clerk Court,
enjoining the execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Complainant alleges that the issuance of the temporary restraining order was
hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the application for preliminary
injunction.

Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon
City, to inquire about the reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining
order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing the
wrong address in the complaint for ejectment, and told her that if she wanted
the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law
office of respondent, at the same time giving his calling card with the name
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220
Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not
be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that
she could not decide because she was only representing her sister. To her
consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary
injunction as threatened by the respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Brach
37 had issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case No.
37-14552.

Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the antecedents in the

ejectment case and the issuance of the restraining order by the Regional Trial
Court, and claimed that contrary to complainant Samonte's allegation that she
was not notified of the raffle and the hearing, the Notice of Hearing on the
motion for the issuance of a Temporary Retraining Order was duly served upon
the parties, and that the application for injunctive relief was heard before the
temporary restraining order was issued. The preliminary injunction was also set
for hearing on August 7, 1996.

The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the hearing of
the motion for the issuance of the temporary restraining order, complainant
Samonte went to court "very mad" because of the issuance of the order stopping
the execution of the decision in the ejectment case. Respondent tried to calm her
down, and assured her that the restraining order was only temporary and that
the application for preliminary injunction would still be heard. Later the
Regional Trial Court granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The complainant went back to court "fuming mad" because of the alleged
unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.

Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his office,

and informed him that she wanted to change counsel and that a friend of hers
recommended the Law Firm of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle
her case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm,
although he was invited to join but he choose to remain in the judiciary.
Complainant returned to court a few days later and told him that if he cannot
convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary injunction, she will file an
administrative case against respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated
but the respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainant's
Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was denied. Respondent
Gatdula claims that the complainant must have filed this administrative charge
because of her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant lessee from
the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complainant against him.

The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for
investigation, report and recommendation.

In her report, Judge Estrada states that the case was set for hearing three times,
on September 7, 1997, on September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but neither
complainant nor her counsel appeared, despite due notice. The return of service
of the Order setting the last hearing stated that complainant is still abroad. There
being no definite time conveyed to the court for the return of the complainant,
the investigating Judge proceeded with the investigation by "conducting
searching question" upon respondent based on the allegations in the complaint,
and asked for the record of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation. The case
was set for hearing for the last time on October 22, 1997, to give complainant a
last chance to appear, but there was again no appearance despite notice.

The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the statements in his
Comment, and submitted documentary evidence consisting mainly of the
pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in RTC Civil Case No. Q-9628187
to show that the questioned orders of the court were not improperly issued.

The investigating judge made the following findings:

For failure of the complainant to appear at the several hearings

despite notice, she failed to substantiate her allegations in the
 complaint, particularly that herein respondent gave her his calling
card and tried to convince her to change her lawyer. This being the
case, it cannot be established with certainty that respondent
indeed gave her his calling card even convinced her to change her
lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the records of the Civil Case No. Q-
96-28187, complainant was duly notified of all the proceedings
leading to the issuance of the TRO and the subsequent orders of
Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of RTC, Branch 220.
Complainant's lack of interest in prosecuting this administrative
case could be an indication that her filing of the charge against the
respondent is only intended to harass the respondent for her failure
to obtain a favorable decision from the Court.

However, based on the record of this administrative case, the

calling card attached as Annex "B" of the complainant's affidavit
dated September 25, 1996 allegedly given by respondent to
complainant would show that the name of herein respondent was
indeed include in the BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON,
DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW OFFICES. While respondent denied
having assumed any position in said office, the fact remains that his
name is included therein which may therefore tend to show that he
has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not be actually
and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears
on the calling card as partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the impression that he is
connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and
private practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act.
No. 6713. It is to be noted, however, that complainant failed to
establish by convincing evidence that respondent actually offered
to her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation committed
by respondent in having his name included/retained in the calling
card may only be considered as a minor infraction for which he
must also be administratively sanctioned.

and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for

the minor infraction he has committed.

Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of an
infraction. The complainant by her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to
substantiate her allegation that it was the respondent who gave her calling card
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices" and that he tried
to convince her to change counsels. We find however, that while the respondent
vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his
name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which
admittedly came into the hands of the complainant. The respondent
testified before the Investigating Judge as follows:

Q: How about your statement that you even gave her

a calling card of the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo,
 Dimailig and Celera law Offices at Room 220
Mariwasa building?

A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the

complainant that I gave her a calling card. I was
surprised when she presented (it) to me during one of
her follow-ups of the case before the court. She told
me that a friend of hers recommended such firm and
she found out that my name is included in that firm. I
told her that I have not assumed any position in the
law firm. And I am with the Judiciary since I passed
the bar. It is impossible for me to enter an appearance
as her counsel in the very same court where I am the
Branch Clerk of Court.

The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is

an admission that it is his name appears on the calling
card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation
of legal services. 1 Respondent does not claim that the calling card
was printed without his knowledge or consent, and the calling
card 2 carries his name primarily and the name "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the left corner. The card clearly
gives the impression that he is connected with the said law firm.

The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an

act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act
No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for the Public Officials and Employees" which declares it unlawful for a
public official or employee to, among others:

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless

authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions.

Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must only be characterized
by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion. 3

WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC,

Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private
practice of law with the warning that a repetition of the same offense will be
dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his
name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.

SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378, Bar, Matter No. 553, June 17,
1993

2 Annex B, Complaint

3 Annang vs. Vda de Blas., 202 SCRA 635, Mirano vs. Saavedra, 225 SCRA
77.

RULE 3.04 – A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to

representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 205956               February 12, 2014

P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG
LA'O, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.

Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in G.R. No.

199462,1 a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the
disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng La'O (La ‘O) is one
of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno
(Atty. Diokno) is her counsel therein.

G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and
146415-PSG, entitled "People of the Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M. Marantan,
et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 (RTC),
where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The criminal
cases involve an incident which transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton
Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent La’O), Francis Xavier Manzano, and Brian
Anthony Dulay, were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold
Tower at Ortigas Center, which incident was captured by a television crew from
UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).

In G.R. No. 199462, La’O, together with the other petitioners, prayed, among
others, that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman downgrading the
charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set aside; that the
corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn; and that charges for
murder be filed.

In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay

Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, where Marantan was
the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the death of
thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to Marantan,
elicited much negative publicity for him.

Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident,

La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto Manzano, organized and
conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press
conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on
the conduct of the Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious
comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding Marantan
and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.

On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN
news program. Marantan quotes2 a portion of the interview, as follows:

Atty. Diokno

So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is very
long. Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa loob ng
sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero
ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.

Ernesto Manzano

Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga mahal
naming sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo na ang
nagbigay ng hatol.

Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o

Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa yong
kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant because they
protected him all these years. They let him get away with it. So even now, so
confident of what he did, I mean confident of murdering so many innocent
individuals.

Atty. Diokno

Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and company

have never been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their participation in the
Ortigas rubout, instead they were commended by their superiors and some like
Marantan were even promoted to our consternation and disgust. Ang problema
po e hangang ngayon, we filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6,
2011, humihingi po kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. – hangang
ngayon wala pa pong action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong
pag charge ng homicide lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na they were killed
indiscriminately and maliciously.

Atty. Diokno

Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the policemen
who killed them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man who is involved in
the Atimonan killings – still roam free and remain unpunished. Mr. President,
while we are just humble citizens, we firmly believe that police rub-out will not
stop until you personally intervene.

Ernesto Manzano

Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.

Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o

Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with us, I mean
everything shows that they were murdered.

(Emphasis supplied by petitioner)

Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making
them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending directly
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. He
argues that their pronouncements and malicious comments delved not only on
the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed, but also on the
merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he
and his co-accused are guilty of murder. It is Maranta’s position that the press
conference was organized by the respondents for the sole purpose of influencing
the decision of the Court in the petition filed before it and the outcome of the
criminal cases before the RTC by drawing an ostensible parallelism between the
Ortigas incident and the Atimonan incident.

The respondents, in their Comment, 3 argue that there was no violation of the sub
judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions of their desires, hopes
and opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way; that no
criminal intent was shown as the utterances were not on their face actionable
being a fair comment of a matter of public interest and concern; and that this
petition is intended to stifle legitimate speech.

The petition must fail.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the
judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court,
or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render
one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court,4 which reads:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – x x x a

person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or

degrade the administration of justice[.]

The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in

nature.5 This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be
punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it.6

For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really

appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-
important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case.8 The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.9

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct
their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair
the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present
danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional
boundary between these two rights.10

The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the
comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present
danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of
speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of
court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent,
not merely a likely, threat.11

The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the

merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the
Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.

As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an

expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan.
This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely
calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court
detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of
their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to,
influence the Court.

As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals

that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There
was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had
passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There
appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.

"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional

protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial
proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in such a case, it
must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of
justice."12 By no stretch of the imagination could the respondents' comments pose
a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. No criminal intent
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from
the comments of the respondents.

Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily

against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. 13 The power to punish for
contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to
unless necessary in the interest of justice. 14 In the present case, such necessity is
wanting.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

Footnotes
 1
 Jennifer Eloise V. Mazano and Monique Cu-Unjieng La’O v. Hon. Conchita Carpio-
Morales. in her capacity as Ombudsman: Hon. Orlando Casimiro in his capacity as
Overall Deputy Ombudsman: Hon. Danilo A. Buemio, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Branch 265; P/CSupt. Augusto P. Angcanan, Jr.:
P/Slnsp. Hansel M. Marantan: P/Sinsp. Samson B. Belmote: PO3 Rizalito SM Ramos, Jr.;
PO3 Lloyd F. Soria; P/lnsp. Henry R. Cerdan: PO2 Jesus M. Fermin: PO2 Dexter M.
Bernadas: PO2 Sonny R. Robrigado: PO2 Fernando Ray S. Gapuz: and PO1 Josil Rey
Lucena.

2
 Rollo, pp. 8-9.

3
 Id. at 297-306.

4
 Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 396, 403.

5
 Soriano v. CA, G.R. No. 128938, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 1, 7.

6
 People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 999 (1995).

7
 People v. Castelo, 114 Phil. 892, 900 (1962); citing People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265 (1939).

8
 People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265, 271 (1939).

 Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009, 583 SCRA 396, 403; citing Nestle
9

Philippines v. Sanchez, 238 Phil. 543 (1987).

10
 Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957).

11
 Id. at 161-162.

12
 Id. at 162.

13
 Id.

14
 Austria v. Masaquel, 127 Phil. 677, 691 (1967)

RULE 3.04 – A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to

representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business.

SECOND DIVISION

February 15, 2017

G.R. No. 214986

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., Petitioner

vs.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN.
GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, BRIG GEN. ARTHUR ANG, CAMP
AGUINALDO CAMP COMMANDER, and LT. COL. HAROLD CABUNOC,
AFP PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CHIEF, Respondents

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

We resolve a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt 1 filed by petitioner Atty.

Herminio Harry L. Roque, Jr. against respondents Gen. Gregorio Pio Catapang,
Brig. Gen. Arthur Ang, and Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, for violating Rule 139-B,
Section18 of the Rules of Court.

On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude, 26-year old Filipino, was
allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year old US Marine Private
Joseph Scott Pemberton.2 After nearly a month since the killing, police had not
been able to obtain Pemberton' s latent fingerprints and oral swabs, because he
was confined by his superiors on a ship and placed under their custody.3 Thus,
the question of custody over Pemberton was subject of public
discussions.4 Pemberton was eventually transferred from his ship to a facility in
the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 5 However, Philippine
authorities maintained that until a case was filed against Pemberton, custody
over him remained with the United States of America. 6

On October 22, 2014, news broke out that Pemberton had been flown into Camp
Aguinaldo, where a detention facility had been constructed for him, in the
premises of the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board. 7

Thus, petitioner, together with his clients, the family of the slain Jeffrey "Jennifer"
Laude, and German national Marc Sueselbeck, went to Camp General Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to demand to see Pemberton.8

Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients, forced their way
inside the premises of the Mutual Defense Board-Security
Engagement Board and gained entry despite having been instructed
by Military Police personnel not to enter the compound, and even
though the gates were closed.9

SSg Norly R. Osio PA ("Osio"), a guard who was detailed at Gate 6 Bravo of
Camp Aguinaldo, attested that he flagged down a BMW vehicle with Regulation
Plate Number UDR-628 sometime between 3 :00 and 4:00 p.m. for inspection,
and for the issuance of an appropriate Vehicle Pass, but the vehicle did not stop,
and sped directly into the Camp. 10 Immediately following the BMW vehicle was
a silver Toyota Innova with Regulation Plate Number AHJ-129, with the word
"MEDIA" displayed on the windshield. 11 Upon inquiry, the driver of the Innova
informed Osio that they were heading to the Public Affairs Office. 12

Cpl Walter Francisco 796690 (INF) PA attested that he had been posted at the
perimeter fence of the MDB-SEB, and was instructed that no media be allowed
inside.13 He narrated encountering petitioner at the MDB-SEB, in front of
members of the media:

....

3. Pagdating namin sa lugar ay pumuwesto ako sa perimeter fence ng MDB-SEB

compound. Naabutan naming maraming media na nakapwesto malapit sa Golf
Driving Range na humigit-kumulang 15 metro lamang sa tapat ng perimeter
fence na kinaroroonan ko. Binantayan na namin ang mga media na baka sila ay
makapasok sa loob ng MDBSEB compound.
4. Mga bandang alas tres ng hapon ay dumating si Atty. Harry Roque.
Sinalubong sya ng media at sya ay ininterview sa may parking area ng Golf
Driving Range at dumating na rin ang nanay ni Jennifer Laude.

5. Pagkatapos ay bigla silang tumawid, kasama ang media at galit na galit na

sumugod sa aking kinatatayuan malapit sa perimeter fence ng binabantayan
kong compound.

6. Noong sandaling iyon ay pinagsabihan ko sila na "Hanggang dyan lang po

muna kayo at wala pang advice ang taga PAO (Public Affairs Office, Armed
Forces of the Philippines)."

7. Nung makalapit na sila ay minura ako ni Atty. Roque ng "Putang ina, bakit
hindi taga PAO ang pumunta dito! [A]t hindi kami ang pupunta sa kanila!"

8. Pagkatapos ay napilitan akong umalis sa pwesto ko sa dami nila na sumugod

sa akin. Sa pagkakataong iyon ay sinabihan ko ang tropa sa pamamamagitan ng
handheld radio na isara at ilock ang gate ng AFRESCOM dahil papunta sila Atty.
Roque at pamilya Laude dyan kasama mga media sa loob ng compound.

9. Habang sila ay papunta sa gate ng AFRESCOM ay sinundan ko sila para

awatin ngunit sadya silang marami kaya nakaya nilang maitulak ang gate ng
AFRESCOM na sya naming pilit na pinigilan nina Cpl Abdulla at SSg Arica na
nasa likod ng gate ng AFRESCOM. Sa pagkakataong iyon, ay tuluyan nakapasok
ang grupo nila Mr. Sueselbeck at Atty. Roque kasama na rin ang media. 14

....

As narrated by respondents, petitioner fomented disorder by inciting his clients

to scale the perimeter fence, to see Pemberton. TSG Mariano C. Pamittan 787924
PA and SGT Alfonso A. Bungag 810943 PA attested:

Nakita ko na pinangunahan nina ATTY. ROQUE at nung German ang

pwersahang pagpasok sa Main Gate ng AFPRESCOM at MDB-SEB, at
pagkatapos tumapat sila sa Gate ng MDB-SEB na kung saan kami ay nakaduty
ng oras na iyon, at doon nagsisigaw si Marilou Laude, kapatid ni Jeffrey Laude,
na "ilabas nyo si PEMBERTON at gusto namin makita kung nandyan ba talaga!"

Pagkatapos magsisigaw ay biglang umakyat na si Marilou Laude sa bakod ng

MDB-SEB, at inawat namin itong dalawa. Pagkatapos makaakyat ni Marilou
Laude ay nakita namin yung German na umakyat na rin ng bakod, at pagbaba
nilang pareho ay sinabihan namin na bawal ang ginagawa nila.

Napansin din namin na habang umaakyat yung dalawa ay imbes na pigilin ni

ATTY. ROQUE ay ginagatongan pa niya sila at pinagsasalitahan din kami ng
masama.

Samantala ay dumating na si Camp Commander sa lugar. Pag dating niya ay

agad niyang pinakiusapan ang dalawang umakyat ng bakod na lumabas na.

Habang pinapakiusapan niya sila ay kung ano anong mga masasakit na salita
ang sinasabi ni ATTY. ROQUE kay Camp Commander at sa amin. Bagaman siya
ay sinasabihan ng masama patuloy parin na nakikiusap si Camp Commander.
Natigil lamang sa pagsasalita niya ng masama si ATTY. ROQUE ng
nagagsabihan ni Camp Commander na umalis muna ang media sa lugar. 15

Respondents allege that the foregoing events are of public knowledge, having
been subject of various national television, radio, internet, and print media
publications.16

In response to the events of October 22, 2014, respondents released a press

statement that they were considering filing disbarment proceedings against
petitioner.17 Thus, on October 30, 2014, respondent Cabunoc, the AFP Public
Affairs Office Chief, was quoted by the Philippine Daily Inquirer:

"The [ AFP Chief of Staff] is strongly considering the filing of a formal complaint
against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, if warranted. The bases
for this complaint are his inappropriate actions inside camp premises during the
intrusion incident on October 22," AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Lieutenant
Colonel Harold Cabunoc said on Wednesday night.18

The Inquirer also quoted petitioner's Twitter account:

Roque, in his Twitter account, said he was looking forward to responding

to the AFP's complaint.

"I look forward to answering the complaint of AFP before the IBP. They will
hopefully stop their tirades which I consider as a threat to my security," he said. 19

Similarly, on November 4, 2014, the Philippine Star reported:

AFP to proceed with disbarment case vs Laude lawyer

MANILA, Philippines - The military leadership will push through with its plan
to file a disbarment case against lawyer Harry Roque, counsel of the family of
Filipino trans gender Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude ...

Lt. Col. Harold Cabunoc, Armed Forces of the Philippines-Public Affairs Office
(AFP-PAO) chief, said military lawyers will file legal action against Roque at the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for his conduct when he and members of
the Laude family gate-crashed at Camp Aguinaldo in their bid to confront US
Marine Private First Class Joseph Scott Pemberton.

....

Roque, for his part, said that he is not at all threatened by the AFP move to have
him disbarred, saying that the military move will clarify a lawyer's role in
pushing the victims' rights and national sovereignty.

In return, Roque said he would also be filing graft charges against the AFP for
allowing the US to have custody over Pemberton at Camp Aguinaldo.

"It's graft when they allow the US to have custody over Pemberton. If they win, I
will be disbarred. If I win, they end up in jail," Roque said.
He added that his filing of charges against the AFP is without prejudice to the
filing of contempt charges against those who have repeatedly and publicly
threatened him with disbarment.20

On November 3, 2014, the Sun Star reported:

MANILA - The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) formally filed Monday a
disbarment case against Harry Roque, the lawyer of the slain transgender
Filipino Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), a military official said Monday.

AFP Public Affairs chief Lieutenant Colonel Harold Cabunoc said AFP chief of
staff Gregorio Catapang ordered the military's legal office to file the case against
Roque in relation to the inappropriate actions he displayed during the intrusion
of Laude's family in restricted areas at the AFP headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo
in Quezon City.

On October 22, United States authorities turned over alleged suspect, US Marine
Private First Class Joseph Scott Pemberton to Camp Aguinaldo, where he will be
detained temporarily while facing murder charges related to Laude's death last
October 11.

After attending the hearing of the Senate committee on foreign relations ...
Laude's family together with Roque went to Camp Aguinaldo to personally see
Pemberton and confront him.

The family were able to pass through the first gate of the facility where
Pemberton is being held. Marilou, sister of Laude, and German national Marc
Sueselbeck climbed over the fence of the second gate as they tried to move
closely to where the alleged suspect is detained.

The said facility was considered a restricted area, Cabunoc said.

He said Roque was apparently the one who pushed Laude' s family to violate the
camp rules and regulations.

"Ang isang abogado supposedly ay dapat sa aming paningin ay siyang dapat

ang mag-uphold sa law dahil sila ang nakakaalam kung ano ang batas," Cabunoc
said adding that Roque deceived the military police by dropping his name as the
person they will visit upon entering the camp.

In a text message, Roque said the case is a chance for him to "clarify a lawyer's
role in pushing victims' rights and sovereignty."

"On my part, I will file graft charges vs. AFP. Its (sic) graft when they allow the
US to have custody over Pemberton in Aguinaldo.  If they win, I will be
disbarred. If I win, they end up in jail. This is without prejudice to filing
contempt charges vs those who have repeatedly and publicly threatened me with
disbarment. AFP should be taught what a civilian officer of the court stands for,"
he said.21

On November 4, respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner,

before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. 22 On the same day, respondent
Cabunoc called a conference at Camp Aguinaldo, and publicly announced that a
disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner. 23 Respondent Cabunoc
also distributed a press statement, which reads:

Press Statement: AFP files disbarment complaint against Atty. Harry Roque

CAMP AGUINALDO, Quezon City - At about 2 p.m. today, the AFP has filed a
verified disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Harry Roque for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

As a lawyer, Atty. Roque is, at all times, subject to the watchful public eye and
community approbation.

He is bound to maintain and live up to the standards of the legal profession not
only in keeping a high regard of legal proficiency which he undoubtedly
possesses but also of distinct high regard for morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.

As a lawyer, he must bring honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing

his duties to society and he must refrain from doing any act that might lessen the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of the legal profession.

His unlawful conduct is clearly prohibited under the rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.24

Petitioner alleges that this press statement was reported on, and generously
quoted from, by media.25

Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section

18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 26 Further, petitioner claims that respondents'
acts put to question his professional and personal reputation.27

Respondents argue that the press statements are not among the contumacious
acts prescribed under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 28 The subject of the
disbarment case pertains to a serious breach of security of a military zone. 29 The
statements were official statements made in the performance of a public function
to address a public concern.30 The circumstances, which led to the filing of the
disbarment complaint and the acts alleged therein were witnessed by the public
and duly reported by the media. 31 The filing of the disbarment case was not
meant to malign petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to the events
that transpired at Camp Aguinaldo.32 Respondents also claim the issue is a
matter of public interest, which is a defense in contempt proceedings such as
this.33 With the Laude Murder case being of public concern, petitioner has
attained the status of a public figure, susceptible of public comment in
connection with his actions on the case.34 In any case, respondents instituted the
disbarment complaint against petitioner in good faith.35 They are laymen, and are
not familiar with the confidentiality rule. 36

The issues for this Court to resolve are:

1. Whether a violation of the confidentiality rule constitutes contempt of court;

2. Whether respondents' public pronouncements violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of

the Rules of Court;
3. Whether respondents may raise public interest as a defense; and

4. Whether non-lawyers may be punished for contempt.

We find for the respondents.

Generally, court proceedings are often matters of public discussion,

and the mere fact of publicity does not, in and of itself, influence or
interfere with them. In Webb v. De Leon:37

Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its
impartiality due to the prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast
media by the NBI.

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to

due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural
impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty
while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in
constitutional law where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of
the press, the public's right to information, and an accused's right to a fair and
impartial trial collide and compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing
where the balance should be struck has divided men of learning as the balance
keeps moving either on the side of liberty or on the side of order as the tumult of
the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The dance of the balance is a
difficult act to follow.

In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be

avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic
developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match
the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case
continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with
views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal
actors in the case - the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers - have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media
abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be
completely closed to the press and the public. In the seminal case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,  it was wisely held:

....

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-
American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic
laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been
presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted
fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants,
or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant
community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking
crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows,
and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To
work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process 'satisfy the
appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11,
which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From
this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in
centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g.,
Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the
First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In
guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give
meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive
information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First
Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was
deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where
the people generally - and representatives of the media - have a right to be
present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the
integrity and quality of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms
guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental
rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the
enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in
the guarantees of the First Amendment, without the freedom to attend such
trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of
speech and of the press could be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under

certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial.
Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In
the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just
rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ
Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the
DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State
Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider
in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity.
Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does
not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence
properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness.
At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member
of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity.

It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as
petitioners will now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable
cause is not synonymous with guilt and while the light of publicity may be a
good disinfectant of unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an
accused's right to fair trial. Without imposing on the trial judge the difficult task
of supervising every specie of speech relating to the case at bar, it behooves her
to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile criminal cases to
control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The Court
reminds judges that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every
trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent
accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the
business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall
be done and is done - and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal
from the bar of public opinion.38

Publicity does not, in and of itself, impair court proceedings. Even in the highly
publicized case of Webb, where the parties, their sympathizers, and lawyers all
participated in a media blitz, this Court required proof that the fairness and
impartiality of the investigation was actually affected by the publicity.

II

Proceedings against lawyers, however, are treated differently, for several

reasons.

Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentiality

rule. This is laid down by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality.  - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and

confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published
like its decisions in other cases.

Law is a profession and not a trade. Lawyers are held to high standards as
officers of the court, and subject to heightened regulation to ensure that the legal
profession maintains its integrity and esteem. As part of the legal profession,
lawyers are generally prohibited from advertising their talents, and are expected
to rely on their good reputation to maintain their practice. In Ulep v. Legal Clinic,
Inc.:39

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise
his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R.
Bavot  an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding, was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, ... is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs
no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda. 40

Thus, a good reputation is among a lawyer's most valuable assets. In Santiago v.

Calvo:41

The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his

reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. 42

The confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment

proceedings as a tool to damage a lawyer's reputation in the public sphere.

Thus, the general rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment proceedings may be
punished with contempt.43

III

The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to

be applied under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature.

As a general principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be

restricted. This Court recognizes the fundamental right to information, which is
essential to allow the citizenry to form intelligent opinions and hold people
accountable for their actions. Accordingly, matters of public interest should not
be censured for the sake of an unreasonably strict application of the
confidentiality rule. Thus, in Palad v. Solis,44 this Court dismissed claims that the
confidentiality rule had been violated, considering that the lawyer therein
represented a matter of public interest:

A person, even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, could
validly be the subject of a public comment as long as he was involved in a public
issue. Petitioner has become a public figure because he is representing a public
concern. We explained it, thus:
But even assuming ... that [the person] would not qualify as a public figure, it
does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public
comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he
could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of
public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a
private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not
voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the
event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content,
effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or
notoriety.

As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential in

nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this
Court. However, in this case, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner
became a matter of public concern considering that it arose from his
representation of his client on the issue of video voyeurism on the internet. The
interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in his involvement and
participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary
proceeding against petitioner related to his supposed conduct and statements
made before the media in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
involving the controversy.45

Indeed, to keep controversial proceedings shrouded in secrecy would present its

own dangers. In disbarment proceedings, a balance must be struck, due to the
demands of the legal profession.

In Fortun v. Quinsayas,46 despite recognizing that the disbarment complaint was a

matter of public interest, it still declared the complainant therein in contempt for
violating the confidentiality rule:

Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as
a complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a
lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving
its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment
complaint against petitioner to members of the media which act constitutes
contempt of court. In Relativo v. De Leon, the Court ruled that the premature
disclosure by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment proceedings
is a violation of the confidentiality rule. In that case, Atty. Relativo, the
complainant in a disbarment case, caused the publication in newspapers of
statements regarding the filing and pendency of the disbarment proceedings.
The Court found him guilty of contempt.47

The complainant in Fortun bears the distinction of having distributed the actual

disbarment complaint to the press. This case is different.

The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be

kept private and confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be
kept private and confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of
actual disbarment complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend so
far that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions.

Some cases are more public than others, because of the subject matter, or the
personalities involved. Some are deliberately conducted in the public as a matter
of strategy. A lawyer who regularly seeks attention and readily welcomes, if not
invites, media coverage, cannot expect to be totally sheltered from public
interest, himself.

IV

Contempt power is not designed to insulate a lawyer from any publicity he may
deem undesirable.

On indirect contempt, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and Hearing. - After

charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or

in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a

court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from
any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or

degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such

without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an

officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from
issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in
custody pending such proceedings.

The power of contempt is exercised to ensure the proper administration of justice

and maintain order in court processes. In Re: Kelly provides:48

The summary power to commit and punish for contempt, tending to obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the
execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority, is a part of
the law of the land. (Ex parte Terry, supra.)
Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence
and submission to their lawful mandates, and as a corollary to this provision, to
preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and
pollution. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton [U.S.], 204, 226; Ex parte Terry, supra.)

The existence of the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is essential
to the observance of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due
administration of justice. (Ex parte Robinson supra; Ex parte Terry supra; In re
Durant, 80 Conn., 140; In re Davies, 93 Pa. St., 116; The People vs. Goodrich, 79
Ill., 148; Bradley vs.  Fisher, 13 Wallace [U. S.], 335; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S., 265; In
re Duncan, 64  S. C., 461; Fields vs.  State, 18 Tenn., 168; Brooks vs.  Fleming, 66
Tenn., 331, 337.)49

Similarly, in Villavicencio v. Lukban:50

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the

preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail.51

The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or promote
the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether to
declare as contumacious alleged violations of the confidentiality rule, we apply a
restrictive interpretation.

We decline to exercise our contempt power under the conditions of this case.

Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents'

supposed public threats of filing a disbarment case against him,
and second,  respondents' public statement that they had filed a disbarment
complaint.

Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep
private and confidential. Respondents' threats were made before November 4,
2014, and there was no proceeding to keep private.

As for the Press Statement made on November 4, 2014, a close examination

reveals that it does not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt.

The Press Statement declared only three (3) things: first, respondent AFP filed a
disbarment complaint against petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus,
must conduct himself according to the standards of the legal profession;
and third, petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is prohibited by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.52 As regards the disbarment, the Press Statement
only said:

At about 2 p.m. today, the AFP has filed a verified disbarment complaint before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Harry Roque for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.53

The Press Statement' s54 coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief,

unembellished report that a complaint had been filed. Such an announcement
does not, in and of itself, violate the confidentiality rule, particularly considering
that it did not discuss the disbarment complaint itself.

In any case, the Press Statement does not divulge any acts or character traits on
the part of petitioner that would damage his personal and professional
reputation. Although the Press Statement mentioned that a disbarment
complaint had been filed against petitioner, no particulars were given about the
content of the complaint or the actual charges filed.

Furthermore, prior to the filing of the complaint, petitioner even made his own
public statement regarding respondents' possible filing of a disbarment
complaint. Even before any case against him had been filed, media reported that
petitioner tweeted publicly that he looked forward to answering the complaint
before the APP.55 In the articles cited by petitioner as evidence of respondents'
violation of the confidentiality rule, he, too, is quoted, saying "the case is a
chance for him to 'clarify a lawyer's role in pushing victims' rights and
sovereignty."'56 It is unlikely that petitioner's reputation could be further
damaged by a factual report that a complaint had actually been filed. Petitioner
has made it even more public by filing the instant case against the entire Armed
Forces of the Philippines, instead of targeting only the individuals who
participated in the disclosure.

Even the events that led to the filing of the disbarment case transpired in front of
media. As alleged by petitioner, the question of custody over Pemberton was the
subject of public discussion.57 In relation to that issue, petitioner accompanied his
clients when they demanded to see Pemberton, when they were refused, and
when they forced themselves into Pemberton's detention facility, in a serious
breach of security of a military zone.

Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for
releasing a subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they
filed against petitioner. The statements were official statements made in the
performance of respondents' official functions to address a matter of public
concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to a serious
breach of security.58 Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should
not be punished for responding publicly to such public actions.

This Court will not freely infringe on the constitutional right to freedom of
expression. It may interfere, on occasion, for the proper administration of justice.
However, the power of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom
of expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on
public matters. Freedom of expression must always be protected to the fullest
extent possible. In In re: Lozano:59

The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to impede,

obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending
suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable
by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It is also regarded as
an interference with the work of the courts to publish any matters which their
policy requires should be kept private, as for example the secrets of the jury
room, or proceedings in camera (6 R. C. L., pp. 508-515).
An examination of the authorities discloses that little attention has been directed
to facts like those before us, and that in the few cases which have given
consideration to the question there exist divergence of opinions. The English
courts are more stringent in prohibiting the publication of their proceedings than
are the American courts. Thus where the petitioner and her solicitor published a
copy of the transcript of the official shorthand notes in a case of a very delicate
and private character in contravention of an order directing that the cause be
heard in camera, the presiding judge in England found the petitioner and her
solicitor in contempt of court but accepted their excuses and apologies (Scott vs.
Scott [1912], Am. Ann. Cas., 1912-B, 540). A decision of the Supreme Court of
Iowa inclines to the same view, for in this case it was said that if by general or
special rule the publication of testimony pending general or special rule the
publication of testimony pending an investigation has been prohibited, a willful
violation of such rule might amount to a contempt (State of Iowa vs. Dunham
[1858], 6 Iowa, 245). But in a California divorce case, although the trial court
ordered that no public report of the testimony should be made, and thereafter
punished the editor of a newspaper for publishing a report of the trial,
on certiorari the Supreme Court of California annulled the proceedings of the
court under review. As explanatory of this judgment, it should be said that a fair
and true report of the testimony was published and that the result was
influenced by the phraseology of the California Law (Re Shortridge [1893], 99
Cal., 526; 21 L. R. A., 755). Along similar lines is the case of Ex parte Foster
([1903], 60 L. R. A., 631), coming from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and
holding that merely publishing a true statement of the testimony adducted from
the witnesses in the course of a public trial in the courts of justice does not
authorize a finding of contempt. To conclude our review of the pertinent
decisions, we desire to quote from the decision of the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in Burns vs. State ([1911], 145 Wis., 373; 140 Am. St. Rep., 1081),
where, in referring to the commendation meted out to the courts of England, it
was said: "Judicial proceedings, in a case which the law requires to be conducted
in secret for the proper administration of justice, should never be, while the case i
son trial, given publicity by the press."

With reference to the applicability of the above authorities, it should be remarked

first of all that this court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely and
unqualifiedly. What is best for the maintenance of the Judiciary in the
Philippines should be the criterion. Here, in contrast to other jurisdictions, we
need not be overly sensitive because of the sting of newspaper articles, for there
are no juries to be kept free from outside influence. Here also we are not
restrained by regulatory law. The only law, and that judge made, which is at all
applicable to the situation, is the resolution adopted by this court. That the
respondents were ignorant of this resolution is no excuse, for the very article
published by them indicates that the hearing was held behind closes doors and
that the information of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen and
from comments in social circles. Then in writing up the investigation, it came
about that the testimony was mutilated and that the report reflected upon the
action of the complainant to his possible disadvantage.

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under given evidence
of its tolerant regard for charges under the Liberal Law which come dangerously
close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the
citizen must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty
of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true
sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free
exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to
scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such persons
are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts.

In a recent Federal case (U. S. vs. Sullens [1929], 36 Fed. [2d], 230, 238, 239), Judge
Holmes very appropriately said:

The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and
distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The
press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to
uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former
receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate
publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid
impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of
judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair
the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice,
this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for
contempt. ...

....

This court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional
functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a
last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to
preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. ... 60

The power to punish for contempt is not exercised without careful consideration
of the circumstances of the allegedly contumacious act, and the purpose of
punishing the act. Especially where freedom of speech and press is involved, this
Court has given a restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes contempt.

In Cabansag v. Fernandez,61 this Court was asked to review a charge of contempt,

which was based on a remark in a letter to the Presidential Complaints and
Action Commission. This Court emphasized the importance of freedom of
speech and press:

No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt
in relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech
and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. . . . A judge may not
hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him
unpopular or to belittle him. . . . The vehemence of the language used in
newspaper publications concerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of
the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an
imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice."
(Craig vs.  Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, syllabi.)

And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by

newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such
criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that
"freedom of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily
against a possible tendency to influence pending cases." (Pennekamp vs. Florida,
328 U.S. 331)

The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree (Schenck vs.  U.S.,
supra).

The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases
where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of
expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins.
There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule
lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition
for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute.
They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection
of the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs.  Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325.)

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.
It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to
incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New
York, 268 U.S. 652.)

It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of

the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right
to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. . . .
Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage cited this freedom is an
inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might
become the scourge of the Republic.

....

And, for yet more imperative reasons, a state may punish utterances
endangering the foundations of organized government and threatening its
overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own existence as a
constitutional state ....

....

. . . And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the
effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot
reasonably be required to measure the danger from every such utterance in the
nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire
that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive
conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably
when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the
public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it
has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be
required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the
revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or
imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the
exercise of its judgment suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In
People vs. Lloyd, supra  p. 35 (136 N. E. 605), it was aptly said: 'Manifestly the
legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine until there is a
present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the state
were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, than its
right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow
of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts
for the enforcement of the law.' [(]Gitlow vs.  New York, supra.)62

In Cabansag,  this Court reversed the contempt charges, considering that the
allegedly contumacious letter did not undermine or cause any serious imminent
threat to the fair administration of justice. This Court also noted that the intent
behind sending the letter was not to degrade the courts.

This was echoed in People v. Castelo,63 where this Court found that a news story,
which was a factual account of an investigation, and did not contain any words
tending to affect the administration of justice, was not contumacious. Although
this case involved the freedom of the press, it may be instructive in that, in
determining whether the subject publication was contumacious, this Court
scrutinized its content, apparent purpose, and effect:

It should however be noted that there is nothing in the story which may even in
a slight degree indicate that the ultimate purpose of appellant in publishing it
was to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in connection
with the Castelo case. The publication can be searched in vain for any word that
would in any way degrade it. The alleged extortion try merely concerns a news
story which is entirely different, distinct and separate from the Monroy murder
case. Though mention was made indirectly of the decision then pending in that
case, the same was made in connection with the extortion try as a mere attempt
to secure the acquittal of Castelo. But the narration was merely a factual
appraisal of the negotiation and no comment whatsoever was made thereon one
way or the other coming from the appellant. Indeed, according to the trial judge
himself, as he repeatedly announced openly, said publication did not in any way
impede or obstruct his decision promulgated on March 31, 1955. As this Court
has aptly said, for a publication to be considered as contempt of court there must
be a showing not only that the article was written while a case is pending
but that it must really appear  that such publication does impede, interfere with
and embarrass the administration of justice (People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil., 265).
Here, there is no such clear showing. The very decision of the court shows the
contrary.64

In deciding Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of Appeals, 65 this Court discussed various

publications that it deemed contumacious. This Court reiterated that an article
which does not impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice is not
contumacious:

With respect to the motion for contempt filed by Margarita Cojuangco against
Rina Jimenez-David, we believe that the article written by the latter is not such as
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The allegedly
contemptuous article merely restates the history of the case and reiterates the
arguments which Rina Jimenez-David, together with some other journalists have
raised before this Court in their Brief for Petitioner Vitug. We do not find in this
case the contemptuous conduct exhibited by the respondent in In re Torres where
the respondent, being a newspaper editor, published an article which anticipated
the outcome of a case in the Supreme Court, named the author of the decision,
and pointed out the probable vote of the members of the Court although in fact,
no such action had been taken by the court; and in In re Kelly where respondent,
having been convicted of contempt of court, published a letter during the
pendency of his motion for a re-hearing of the contempt charge. In said letter, he
severely criticized the court and its action in the proceeding for contempt against
him. In contrast to the aforementioned publications, Rina Jimenez-David's article
cannot be said to have cast doubt on the integrity of the court or of the
administration of justice. If at all, it was a mere criticism of the existing libel law
in the country. In view of the above considerations, we are constrained to deny
the motion for contempt.66

Given these circumstances, citing respondents in contempt would be an

unreasonable exercise of this Court's contempt power.

On a final note, this Court is more resilient than as projected by the petitioner.
We are aware of the attempts of some parties - perhaps upon advice of their
lawyers - to employ the media to gain public sympathies for their case.
Ultimately, this strategy is based on the hope that the members of this Court will
be swayed by the fear of vociferous criticism by columnists or popular
protagonists in social media. Unfortunately, such strategy is misguided.

Every resort to the media by one party invites the same effort from
the opposing party. Litigating cases in public may cause
misunderstanding of the issues by the public, especially since many
opinion writers will usually infer motives and standpoints closer to
fiction than reality. Furthermore, there exists the real danger of
slanting the focus of the public. Instead of the important question as
to whether our treaties allow custody of foreign military personnel in
transit through our territory, it has now become a battle of wits
between counsel and the spokesperson for the military. The public
becomes invested in that issue, which, while important for counsels,
may be tangential to the more important public concerns.

Seasoned practitioners tend to approach their cases with more sobriety, dignity,
and professionalism. After all, after their years of practice, they discover that this
Court is aware of machinations using public opinion.

When a lawyer chooses to conduct his cases in as public a manner as

in this case, it would be an abuse of our contempt power to stifle the
subject of his attention. A lawyer who uses the public fora as his
battleground cannot expect to be protected from public scrutiny.

Controversial cases of public interest cases can be challenging for lawyers. This
Court is cognizant of the hardships lawyers must face as they may continually be
pressed by media for details of their cases. Nonetheless, it must strike a balance
between protecting officers of the court from harassment on one hand, and the
 Given this case's factual
interests of freedom of speech on the other.
milieu, the balance is served by denying the petition . In any
case, this Court harbors no doubt that Atty. Roque is an able lawyer who can
carry himself with all the dignity this profession requires to defend himself in the
administrative proceedings against him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F.LEONEN
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
 Rollo, pp. 3-19.
2
 Id. at 4.
3
 Id.
4
 Id.
5
 Id. at 4-5.
6
 Id. at 5.
7
 Id.
8
 Id.
9
 Id.
10
 Id. at 136, Affidavit of SSg Norly R. Osio PA.
11
 Id.
12
 Id.
13
 Id. at 138, Affidavit of Cpl. Walter Francisco 796690 (INF) PA.
14
 Id. at 138-139.
15
 Id. at 140-141, Joint Affidavit of TSG Mariano C Pamittan 787924 PA
and SGT Alfonso A Bungag 810943 PA.
16
 Id. at 125, Comment.
17
 Id.
18
 Id. at 21. Francis Mangosing, AFP mulls filing disbarment case vs Laude
family lawyer Harry Roque, INQUIRER.NET, October 30, 2014, available at
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/647743/afp-mulls-filing-disbarment-
case-vs-laude-family-lawyer-harry-roque>.
19
 Id.
20
 Id. at 22. Jaime Laude, AFP to proceed with disbarment case vs Laude
lawyer, THE PHILIPPINE STAR, November 4, 2014, available at
<http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/11/04/1387860/afp-
proceed-disbarment-case-vs-laude-lawyer>.
21
 Id. at 23. Third Anne Peralta, AFP files disbarment case vs
Laude 's lawyer, SUN STAR, November 3, 2014.
22
 Id. at 125, Comment.
23
 Id. at 10.
24
 Id. at 24. Available at <http://www.afp.mil.ph/index.php/8-afp-
news/202-press-statement-afp-files-disbarment-complaint-against-atty-
harry-roque> (last visited on February 14, 2017).
25
 Id. at 11.
26
 Id. at 15-18. RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B, sec. 18 provides:
Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be
private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court
shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
27
 Id. at 15.
28
 Id. at 126-127, Comment. Rules of Court, Rule 71, sec. 3 provides:
Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and Hearing. -
After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official
duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs
the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1
of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such
without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the
custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by
him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court
from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding
him in custody pending such proceedings.
29
 Id. at 128, Comment.
30
 Id.
31
 Id. at 131, Comment.
32
 Id. at 127, Comment.
33
 Id. at 129-130, Comment.
34
 Id. at 131, Comment.
35
 Id. at 128.
36
 Id. at 130.
37
 317 Phil. 758 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
38
 Id. at 899-900.
39
 B.M. No. 553, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 378 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
40
 Id. at 406-407.
41
 48 Phil. 919 (1926) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
42
 Id. at 923.
43
 See Relativo v. De Leon,  128 Phil. 104 (1967) [Per J. Bengzon, J.P., En
Banc]; Fortun v. Quinsayas, 703 Phil. 578 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second
Division]; Murillo v. Superable, Jr.,  107 Phil. 322 (1960) [Per J.
Montemayor, En Banc].
44
 Palad v. Solis, G.R. No. 206691, October 3, 2016,
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence
/20l6/october2016/206691.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
45
 Id. at 8.
46
 703 Phil. 578 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
47
 Id. at 599-600.
48
 35 Phil. 944 (1916) [Per J. Johnson, Second Division].
49
 Id. at 950.
50
 39 Phil. 777 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
51
 Id. at 798.
52
 Rollo, p. 24.
53
 Id.
54
 Id.
55
 Id. at 21.
56
 Id. at 22.
57
 Id. at 4.
58
 Id. at 128-129.
59
 54 Phil. 801 (I 930) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
60
 Id. at 805-808.
61
 102 Phil. 152 (1957) [Per J. Bautista, First Division].
62
 Id. at 162-164.
63
 114 Phil. 892 (1962) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
64
 Id. at 899-900.
65
 302 Phil. 484 (1994) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
66
 Id. at 496.

CANON 4 - Participate in improvement of the Legal Systems: Support Law

Reforms and Administration of Justice.

CANON 5 - Participate in Legal Education Program

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

B.M. No. 850     August 22, 2000

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)
ADOPTING THE RULES ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES

EN BANC

RESOLUTION

Considering the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court
Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to adopt, as it hereby adopts,
the following rules for proper implementation:
 RULE 1
PURPOSE

Section 1. Purpose of the MCLE

Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance
the standards of the practice of law.

RULE 2
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

Section 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee

Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court
En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted in accordance with these
Rules.

Section 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE

Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three (3)
years, at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities
approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:

(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.

(b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.

(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute

resolution.

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and
procedural laws, and jurisprudence.

(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy.

(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions.

(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be
prescribed by the MCLE Committee.

RULE 3
COMPLIANCE PERIOD

Section 1. Initial compliance period

The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the
constitution of the MCLE Committee. Except for the initial compliance period for
members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all
compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day
after the end of the previous compliance period.
Section 2. Compliance Group 1.

Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be

permanently assigned to Compliance Group 1.

Section 3. Compliance Group 2.

Members in Luzon outside NCR shall be permanently assigned to Compliance

Group 2.

Section 4. Compliance Group 3.

Members in Visayas and Mindanao shall be permanently assigned to

Compliance Group 3.

Section 5. Compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after establishment of

the program.

Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the

program shall be permanently assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group
based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission.

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the
first day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same
day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.

(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period
after admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply
with the program requirement for the initial compliance.

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to
complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education
activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance
period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member
shall be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal
ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance
period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.

x x x x x x x
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

B.M. No. 1922             June 3, 2008

RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF
COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated  June
3, 2008

"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the
Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. – The
Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and
Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the members of
the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on

Legal Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar
to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate
of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance
period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal
of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation." Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.
(adv216a)

Very truly yours,

MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA(sgd)

Clerk of Court

CANON 4 - Participate in improvement of the Legal Systems: Support Law

Reforms and Administration of Justice.

CANON 5 - Participate in Legal Education Program

EN BANC

A.C. No. 11641 March 12, 2019

MARILU C. TURLA, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. JOSE M. CARINGAL, Respondent

DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 dated October 8, 2010

filed by Marilu C. Turla (Turla) against the respondent, Atty. Jose Mangaser
Caringal (Caringal), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Turla is the petitioner in Special
Proceedings No. Q09-64479 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 222, wherein Atty. Caringal is the counsel for the oppositor.

In July 2010, Turla discovered that Atty. Caringal 2 had not attended the
required Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars
for the Second (MCLE II) and Third (MCLE III) Compliance Periods,
which were from April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007 and April 25, 2007 to April 14,
2010 respectively. Turla confirmed such information when she received a
Certification3 dated August 2, 2010 issued by the MCLE Office. Yet, Atty.
Caringal signed the pleadings and motions in several cases on which he
indicated the following information after his signature and other personal
details: "MCLE Exemption II & III Rec. No. 000659126 Pasig 8.10.10."4 These
pleadings and motions are particularly identified, viz.:

A. In Special Proceedings No. Q09-644 79 (RTC Quezon City, Branch 222)

1) Motion to Remove Marilu Turla as Special Administratrix dated 2 September

2010;

2) Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Re-Schedule the Collection of Biological Sample

dated 12 September 2010;

3) Motion to Issue Order Authorizing the National Bureau of Investigation to

Examine the Birth Certificate of Petitioner dated 11 October 2010;

B. In Civil Case No. Q09-64850 (RTC Quezon City, Branch 221)

1) Comment On/Opposition to Motion to Expunge Pleadings dated 15 August

2010;

C. In Civil Case No. 09-269 (RTC Makati, Branch 59)

1) Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated 16 July 2010 dated 10 August 2010;5

2) Motion for Indefinite Suspension of Proceedings dated 17 July 2010;

3) Comment On/Opposition to Motion to Expunge Pleadings dated 15 August

2010;

D. In CA-G.R. SP No. 115847 (Court of Appeals)

1) Compliance dated 24 September 2010;

2) Comment On/Opposition to Petition for Certiorari dated 26 September 2010;

E. In CA-G.R. SR No. 117943 (Court of Appeals)

1) Petition for Certiorari dated 15 December 2010; and

F. In the Present Case

1) Answer to Complaint dated 13 November 2010.6

As it turned out, the receipt Atty. Caringal pertained to was not for his MCLE
exemption, but for his payment of the MCLE non-compliance fee. 7

Consequently, in her Complaint, Turla charged Atty. Caringal with

(1) failure to take the MCLE seminars for the MCLE II and III
compliance periods as required under Bar Matter (BM) No. 850; and
(2) violation of his lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood .8 She further
alleged that even if Atty. Caringal was already confronted with his deception, he
continued to flaunt such duplicity since he still filed pleadings with the courts
afterwards.

Turla contended that under Section 2, Rule 139 of BM No. 850, Atty. Caringal's
non-compliance resulted in his being listed as a delinquent member. She likewise
argued that Atty. Caringal violated Rule 139-A10 of the Rules of Court.

Although Turla admitted that Atty. Caringal had already complied with the
MCLE requirement as of March 10, 2011, she asserted that he had already
committed a gross infraction, and hence should be sanctioned accordingly. All
the same, Turla averred that she did not file the instant complaint in order to
harass Atty. Caringal since Special Proceedings No. Q09-64479 had nothing to do
with the latter's violation of the MCLE requirement.

Atty. Caringal, in his Answer, 11 countered that Turla's Complaint was a form of
harassment since as the counsel for the oppositor in Special Proceedings No.
Q09-64479, he had filed motions in the said case for Turla to undergo DNA
testing to prove her filiation with the deceased over whose estate she was
claiming rights.

In any case, Atty. Caringal averred that he had taken several units for the First
(MCLE I) Compliance Period, which was from April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004,
but was unable to complete the required units. During the months of March and
April 2008, he supposedly completed the required units for MCLE II at the Halls
of the Philippine Senate in Pasay City. However, the MCLE supervising officer
erroneously applied the said units to his MCLE I instead. Thereafter, on January
7, 2009, he paid an "exemption fee"12 of PhP1,000.0013 for his uncompleted MCLE
I. Afterwards, on January 19, 2009, a Certificate of Compliance 14 was issued to
Atty. Caringal for his completion of MCLE I.

Upon verification,15 Atty. Caringal was informed that he still had some units left
before the completion of his MCLE II. On August 10, 2010, Atty. Caringal paid
the non-compliance fees for his MCLE II and III in the total amount of
PhP2,000.00.16

In his Report,17 the Investigating Commissioner18 of the CBD held that Turla's

motives are unimportant to a disbarment case since the issue is mainly to
determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court. He
found that there was no question that Atty. Caringal failed to complete the
MCLE requirements for the MCLE II and III compliance periods, but noted that
Atty. Caringal paid the non-compliance fee of PhP2,000.00, evidenced by Official
Receipt No. 0659126, pursuant to Rule 13, Section 1 of BM No. 850, which then
served as his penalty for said infraction.

The Investigating Commissioner added that according to Rule 13, Section 2 of

BM No. 850 (on listing as a delinquent member), the sixty (60)-day period for
compliance only begins to run once notice of non-compliance is sent. Yet, Turla
did not allege the date of receipt by Atty. Caringal of such notice, nor did she
present any certification from the MCLE Office attesting to Atty. Caringal's non-
compliance even after due notice. In any case, he noted that Atty. Caringal had
already complied with the MCLE requirements as of March 11, 2011, thereby
making the issue of his supposed status as a delinquent member moot.

As to Turla's contention that Atty. Caringal should still be penalized because he

had already committed the infraction, the Investigating Commissioner stated
that "[c]omplainant only proved that Respondent failed to comply with the
MCLE requirements within the Second and Third Compliance Periods.
Respondent was already penalized for the same pursuant to B.M. 850, Rule 13,
Section 1."19

Still, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Caringa breached his oath
to do no falsehood by stating that he was exempted from complying with the
MCLE requirements when what he really paid for was the non-compliance fee
and not any exemption fee. The Investigating Commissioner reasoned that:

Respondent should have known that he could not merely pay to be exempted
from the MCLE Requirement. First, as a lawyer he is obligated to keep abreast of
legal developments. Second, Respondent's experience in the completion of
MCLE for the First Compliance should have put him on notice that he had to
complete thirty-six (36) hours per compliance period. Respondent narrated that
after attending an MCLE course for the Second Compliance Period, the officer-in-
charge applied the subjects to his uncompleted units [for] the First Compliance
Period. Last, Complainant had raised the matter of MCLE in several pleadings.
This should have forced Respondent to check the MCLE Requirements as
provided in B.M. No. 850.20

The Investigating Commissioner likewise noted that Atty. Caringal's failure to

report his MCLE information placed the pleadings he signed on behalf of his
clients at risk of expunction. Notwithstanding this, Atty. Caringal's liability is
mitigated since he belatedly complied with the MCLE requirements. Even so,
whether or not Atty. Caringal intended to mislead the court, he still had a duty to
faithfully report his MCLE status but he failed to do so.

Ultimately, the Investigating Commissioner made the following findings and

recommendations:

1. Respondent failed to comply with the MCLE Requirements in a timely

manner;

2. Respondent falsely asserted he had an exemption from the MCLE requirement;

and

3. Respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that repetition of same or

similar acts or conduct shall be dealt with more severely. 21

In a Resolution22 dated April 18, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to

adopt and approve the foregoing Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that Atty. Caringal be suspended
from the practice of law for three years due to his failure to comply with the
MCLE requirements and because of his misrepresentation that he had an MCLE
exemption.

Atty. Caringal asked for a reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution 23 dated
August 26, 2016.

Discontented, Atty. Caringal filed a Petition for Review by Certiorari24 before the

Court.

In its Resolution25 dated August 1, 2017, the Court referred the case to the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
The OBC, in its Report and Recommendation 26 dated October 29, 2018,
determined that Atty. Caringal's Petition for Review was a mere rehash of the
matters already passed upon by the Investigating Commissioner in his Report. It
highlighted that Atty. Caringal wrongfully stated that he was exempt from
complying with the MCLE requirements in 11 different pleadings. The
significant number of pleadings which he signed indicating such wrong details
completely negated any defense of good faith since it demonstrated negligence in
the performance of his duties towards his client and the courts. Hence, the OBC
agreed with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to impose a
three-year suspension on Atty. Caringal from the practice of law.

Atty. Caringal's Petition for Review is without merit.

The directive to comply with the MCLE requirements is essential for

the legal profession, as enshrined in BM No. 850. The purpose is "to
ensure that throughout [the IBP members'] career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and
enhance the standards of the practice of law."27

Turla was able to secure a Certification dated August 2, 2010 from the MCLE
Office that Atty. Caringal, as of said date, had not yet complied with the
requirements for MCLE II and III compliance periods. Despite being confronted
with such Certification by Turla, Atty. Caringal continued to sign and submit
pleadings and motions before various courts in several cases, indicating therein
that he was "exempt" from the MCLE requirements and referring to the Official
Receipt for his payment of the non-compliance fees.

In case a lawyer fails to comply with the MCLE requirements within the
compliance period, Rule 13 of BM No. 850 lays down the following
consequences:

SEC. 1. Non-compliance fee. - A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-

compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.

SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. - A member who fails to comply with the
requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be
listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be
conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the
MCLE Committee.

Section 12(c) to (e) of the MCLE Implementing Rules further provide as follows:

SEC. 12. Compliance Procedures

xxxx

c. If a lawyer fails to comply with any requirement under the Rules, the
Committee will send him/her a notice of non-compliance on any of the following
deficiencies:

1) Failure to complete the education requirement within the

compliance period;
 2) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

3) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including

evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;

4) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence

of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of a non-
compliance notice; and

5) Any other act or mission analogous to any of the foregoing or

intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.

d. A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement

will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be
given sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency
or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall be
written in capital letters as follows:

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-

COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE, SHALL
BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL
NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE
COMMITTEE.

The member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the
MCLE requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted
toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in
excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted
toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

e. A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall

pay a non-compliance fee of P1,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member
of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the
MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court shall apply.

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions, which are simply and clearly worded,
that a non-compliant lawyer must pay a non-compliance fee of PhP
1,000.00 and still comply with the MCLE requirements within a sixty (60)-day
period, otherwise, he/she will be listed as a delinquent IBP member after
investigation by the IBP-CBD and recommendation by the MCLE Committee.
The non-compliance fee is a mere penalty imposed on the lawyer who fails to
comply with the MCLE requirements within the compliance period and is in no
way a grant of exemption from compliance to the lawyer who thus paid.

It is worthy to note that Atty. Caringal could not be declared a delinquent

member as the sixty (60)-day period for compliance did not commence to run.
There was no showing that he was ever issued and that he had actually received
a Non-Compliance Notice as required by the MCLE Implementing Rules. In
addition, by March 11, 2011, 28 he had already complied with the MCLE
requirements for MCLE II and III compliance periods, albeit belatedly.
Nevertheless, Atty. Caringal is being held liable for knowingly and willfully
misrepresenting in the pleadings he had signed and submitted to the courts that
he was exempted from MCLE II and III.

BM No. 1922, issued on June 3, 2008, required the practicing members of the IBP
to indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate
of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance
period. It also explicitly stated that "[f]ailure to disclose the required information
would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
the records." In a Resolution dated January 14, 2014, in BM No. 1922, the Court
amended the rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE compliance/exemption
number in the pleadings, to wit:

(a) AMEND the June 3, 2008 resolution by repealing the phrase "Failure to
disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to
disclose the required information would subject, the counsel to appropriate
penalty and disciplinary action"; and

(b) PRESCRIBE the following rules for non-disclosure of current MCLE

compliance/exemption number in the pleadings:

(i) The lawyer shall be imposed a fine of ₱2,000.00 for the first offense, ₱3,000.00
for the second offense and ₱4,000.00 for the third offense;

(ii) In addition to the fine, counsel may be listed as a delinquent member of the
Bar pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of Bar Matter No. 850 and its implementing
rules and regulations; and

(iii) The non-compliant lawyer shall be discharged from the case and the client/s
shall be allowed to secure the services of a new counsel with the concomitant
right to demand the return of fees already paid to the non-compliant lawyer.

Prior to its amendment on January 14, 2014, BM No. 1922 imposed a stiff penalty
for a practicing lawyer's failure to indicate the details of his/her MCLE
Compliance/Exemption in the pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies, i.e., the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the
records, which, in effect, ultimately penalized said lawyer's clients, too. Atty.
Caringal, in this case, not only failed to indicate the necessary MCLE details in
his pleadings and motions, but purposely stated therein the false information
that he was exempted from MCLE II and III. As he had filed the subject
pleadings in 2010, prior to the amendment of BM No. 1922 on January 14, 2014,
he risked the dismissal of the cases and expunction of the pleadings and motions
by the courts, to his clients' detriment. In fact, as Turla mentioned, the pleadings
which Atty. Caringal filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 59, in Civil
Case No. 09-269, were indeed expunged from the records per the Order 29 dated
March 4, 2013 because of the false MCLE information he indicated therein.

Considering the foregoing, Atty. Caringal violated his sworn oath as a lawyer to
"do no falsehood"30 as well as the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO

THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT

AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE

AND DILIGENCE.

When Atty. Caringal indicated that he was MCLE-exempt in the pleadings and
motions he filed, although in fact he was not, he engaged in dishonest conduct
which was also disrespectful of the courts. He undoubtedly placed his clients at
risk, given that pleadings with such false information produce no legal
effect31 and can result in the expunction of the same. Undeniably, he did not stay
true to the cause of his clients and actually violated his duty to serve his clients
with competence and diligence.

The Court had previously pronounced that "[t]he appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts."32 Considering Atty. Caringal's willful statement of false
MCLE details in his pleadings to the prejudice of his clients, aggravate, by his
lack of diligence in fully and promptly complying with the MCLE requirements
within the compliance period, and his seemingly defiant and unremorseful
attitude, the Court deems it apt to adopt the recommendations of both the IBP
Board of Governors and the OBC, and imposes upon Atty. Caringal the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for three years.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal

is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.1âшphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Atty. Jose M. Caringal as an attorney; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their guidance and
information.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza,

Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1
 Rollo, pp. 2-6.

 Roll Number 25207 of IBP Pasay-Parañaque-Las Piñas-Muntinlupa

2

Chapter.
3
 Rollo, p. 7.
4
 Id. at 191.
5
 Typographical error in the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
6
 Rollo, p. 192.
7
 Id. at 4.
8
 Id. at 2.
9
 SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. — A member who fails to comply
with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has
expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member
for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar
Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.

 Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of

10

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
11
 Rollo, pp. 22-26.
12
 This is actually a non-compliance fee.
13
 Rollo, p. 16.
14
 Id. at 17; MCLE Compliance No. 1-0016256.
15
 Id. at 18.
16
 Id. at 19.
17
 Id. at 190-201.
18
 Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
19
 Rollo, p. 198.
20
 Id. at 200.
21
 Id. at 201.
22
 Id. at 189; CBD Case No. 10-2772.
 23
 Id. at 236-237.

24
 Id. at 282-298A.

25
 Id. at 313.

 Id. at 323-331; Penned by Atty. Maria Celina S, Carungay-Sevillano and reviewed by

26

Atty. Rosita M.R. Nacional, noted by Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, Deputy Clerk of Court
and Bar Confidant.

27
 Bar Matter No. 850, Rule I, Section 1, October 2, 2001.

 As found by the Investigating Commissioner. Complainant though alleged that the
28

date is March 10, 2011.

29
 Rollo, pp. 223-224.

30
 Lawyer's Oath.

 Mapalad, Sr. v. Atty. Echanez, A.C. No. 10911, June 6, 2017, 826 SCRA 57, 64
31

citing Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari III, 768 Phil. 10, 35 (2015).

32
 Saunders v. Atty. Pagano-Calde, 766 Phil. 341, 350 (2015).

CANON 4 - Participate in improvement of the Legal Systems: Support Law

Reforms and Administration of Justice.

CANON 5 - Participate in Legal Education Program

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8954               November 13, 2013

HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal

Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in
Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold
Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of
San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth
Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1863, Judge Manahan issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she
voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in
part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of
dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession,
but also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a
malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of the
bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline

Committee, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for
appropriate investigation and sanction.2

Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) deemed the pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal
administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the
case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for
investigation, report and recommendation.3

In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge

Josephine Zarate Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the
case as follows:

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs.
Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P.
Censon represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared as
counsel for the defendant.

x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered

his appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE
compliance hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the
filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x
Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.

The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for
failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief
indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders
dated September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a last
chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall
be considered a waiver on his part.

Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated

September 14, 2010 stating among others, the following allegations:

xxxx

4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve
truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and
fair by serving a cheater?

5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan.  But even worse is a lawyer who violates
the law.
 6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine
Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by
the plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE
number which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and
place of compliance. During the preliminary conference on November 24, 2010,
respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of
his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores
again failed to appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE
compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date
stating as follows:

If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I
am hereby filing the attached Motion which you may once more assign to the
waste basket of nonchalance.

With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for
another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because
I feel I cannot do anything right in your sala.5

The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to
the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his
compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.6

The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge. 7

Our Ruling

There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s
order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the
several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected
not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but
because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to
the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our
Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had
not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that
vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the
Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the
judicial system."8

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer

of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to
abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.

At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to
his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
client's rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must
do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his c1iticism
within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which
must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be
pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be
done within the confines of reason and common sense. 9

However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate
with the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first
infraction committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the
respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons.
Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the
practice of law for half a century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years.
Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine respondent in the amount
of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey
and respect court processes.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of

₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo. pp. 2-5.

2
 Id. at 5.

3
 Id. at 1, 7.

4
 Id. at 28-31.

5
 Id. at 28-30.

6
 Id. at 31.

7
 Id., unpaginated.

8
 Lt. Villaflor v. Sarita, 367 Phil. 399, 407 (1999), citing De Leon v. Torres, 99 Phil. 462, 466 (1956).

9
 Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel Sorreda, 502 Phil. 292, 301 (2005)

10
 Rollo, p. 37.
 Canon 6
Canons Apply to Lawyers in Government Service

What Makes a Good Government Lawyer

R.A. 6713, Section 4

Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public
official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal
conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always
uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government
resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage
in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and

discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their
roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to
the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They
shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on
account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity
except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered
strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are
coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to
everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or
preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend
prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise
provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and
employees shall provide information of their policies and procedures in clear
and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public
consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions,
simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and
develop an understanding and appreciation of the socio-economic conditions
prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times
be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally
produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation and
pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend
Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit

themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of
public accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian authority
over the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty
to country above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead
modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in
extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.

(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1)
observance of these standards including the dissemination of information
programs and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular
progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their office
colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2)
continuing research and experimentation on measures which provide positive
motivation to public officials and employees in raising the general level of
observance of these standards.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN
GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.

A.C. No. 4018             March 8, 2005

OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition for disbarment 1 filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong
for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of
Register of Deeds of Marawi City.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative

case earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was
initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant
charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona
Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli
Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of
respondent.3

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The
investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges
brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his
case but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong.
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the
complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. 4
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a
report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon
exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the
custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the
criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding,
Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from service.

On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative

Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and
ordering respondent's dismissal from government service. Respondent
subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming that the Office of the
President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office.
He also insisted that respondents 6 in that petition violated the laws on security of
tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the
LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority
to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).

In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition "for failure

on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order." 7 Respondent
thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in
our Resolution of 15 November 1994.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now

before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has
become obvious that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further
entrusted with the duties of an attorney" 8 and that he poses a "serious threat to
the integrity of the legal profession."9

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing

irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the
Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law10 and jurisprudence
support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on
the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the
case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented
to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue
TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.

Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji
Serad Abdullah and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains that his
participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by
the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles
involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal
case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the
parties. Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of
the case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, 11 this Court referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation
of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The
pertinent portion of this order provides:

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent
appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the
reception of evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur
before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly,
transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate
action.12

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving

Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation for the transfer of venue of this
administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to
designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report,
and recommendation.13 The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C.

Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the
Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP
Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.

Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar

Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George
C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the
evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as
directed by the IBP Board of Governors.14

In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato

Chapter15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the
investigating panel16 had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a
series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP
Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five years.

On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the
transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter
of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner
Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.

Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP

Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent's motion.17 Complying with this
directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondent's motion for the
transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.18 On 25 September
1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi
City for the reception of respondent's evidence. 19 This order of referral, however,
was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268
issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the

transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather
he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter
and report the same to the Board of Governors.20

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08

October 1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato
Chapter be stricken from the records. 21 Respondent insists that the investigating
panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the
investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner
Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the
power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of
any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby
depriving him of his right to due process.

Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches.

According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP
Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the
hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did
nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to
submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent
is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the
presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends
that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the
process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.

In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP

Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the
investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly
received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP
Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with
a copy of the panel's order dated 4 August 1997.24 Attached to said order was
Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of
the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."

On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo,

Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the
report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive
had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-
2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez

for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD
Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice. 25

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her
father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed
away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she
was requesting the withdrawal of this case.26
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to
direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to
designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct
an investigation of this case.27 This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro
S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002.28 According to Atty. Castillo –

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made
on the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-
Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further
investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the
Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City,

Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report
to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days
from date hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto  the findings
and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office
of the President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein
herein respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:

a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi
City. In the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his
defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the
charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting
law, which by the way, was filed against respondent's relatives. Going over the
Decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the
undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully
explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding
of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was
fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in
considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.

In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or
disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South
Cotabato.29

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted

and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation
of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension
from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent – whereas
Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter
for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year
suspension to be proper.

On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP
which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to
this Court.30
The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether respondent may be
disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer

simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express
provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks."
Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may
be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. 31 Although the general
rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may,
however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of
his oath a member of the legal profession.32

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,33 we ordered the

disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government
service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, we declared –

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to
impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an " officer of the
court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts
in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of
the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion
the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has
given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer,
to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-
speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the centuries,
have been compendiously described as moral character.34

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,35 this Court found
sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated
while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on
Higher Education. As we had explained in that case –

… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.36 (Emphasis
supplied)

In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of

the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his
qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register
of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent
had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on
this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position
to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with
his public duties.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the

public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal
profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law
calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's daughter,
requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on
the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by
reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." 37 As we have
previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack

of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative
of justice.39

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and

his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

Footnotes
1
 Filed by Police Supt. Omar P. Ali; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 4-5.
2
 Also known as Mona Abdullah Bauduli Datu.
3
 Respondent's Answer-Affidavit, Annex "4" of Respondent's Comment dated 16
February 1995; Rollo, Vol. I, p. 64.
4
 Annex "14" of Respondent's Comment dated 16 February 1995; Rollo, Vol. I, p.
117.
5
 G.R. No. 112839.
6
 Named as respondents in the petition were former President Fidel V. Ramos;
Hon. Antonio T. Carpio and Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing (formerly of the
Office of the President; now members of this Court; Hon. Franklin Drilon (then
the Secretary of Justice); and Hon Reynaldo V. Maulit (then the Administrator of
the Land Registration Authority); and Major Omar P. Ali (complainant in the
present disbarment case).
7
  Supra, note 2; Rollo, p. 173.
8
 Rollo, p. 5.
9
  Ibid.
10
 Presidential Decree No. 1529, Sections 50, 51, and 58.
11
 Rollo, Vol. I, p. 156.
12
 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 40.
13
 Resolution No. XII-96-153; Rollo, Vol. II, p. 3.
14
 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 13.
15
 Sometimes referred to as Cotabato City Chapter or South Cotabato Chapter.
16
 Composed of Attys. Edgardo A. Camello, Carlos Valdez, Jr. (Chairman),
Mando Sinsuat, Jr., Renato Eugenio, and George C. Jabido.
17
 Order dated 14 August 1998; Rollo, Vol. III, p. 49.
18
 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 46.
19
 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 56.
20
 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 78.
21
 Rollo, Vol. III. pp. 57-58.
22
 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 60-66.
23
 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 82.
24
 Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 86-87.
25
 Rollo, Vol. III, p. 193.
26
 Rollo, Vol. V, p. 12.
27
 Dated 27 July 2001; Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 185-187.
28
 Rollo, Vol. V, pp. 17-18.
29
 Rollo, Vol. V, p. 127.
30
 Resolution No. XV-2003-56.
31
 Reyes v. Atty. Salvador M. Gaa, A.C. No. 1048, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 64;
citing Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, A.M. No. R-705-RTJ, 23 August 1989, 176
SCRA 634.
32
 Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, 1 April 2003,
400 SCRA 172.
33
 A.C. No. 3056, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 584.
34
  Id. at 589-590.
35
  Supra, note 32.
36
  Id. at 180.
37
 Rule 139-B, §139-B, Revised Rules of Court.
38
 A.C. No. 2884, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
39
  Id. at 100-101.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN
GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.

A.M. No. P-99-1287       January 26, 2001

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the
Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro
bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No.
84885, entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of Public
Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
40.1 While respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa
Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885,
sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998,
requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's authority to
appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. 2 On
September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to
respondent for comment.3

In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had

appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned
out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him
to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire
the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant
was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin.
Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not
prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage
of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave
applications approved by the presiding judge.

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying

respondent's request for authorization to appear as counsel and
directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal
charges against him for appearing in court without the required
authorization from the Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court
Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for
violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which
provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x      x      x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

x      x      x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions;

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment

on the administrative complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood
cousins" who belong to a "powerless family" from the impoverished town of
Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree,
Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as
a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought
respondent's help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885
for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only
purpose in filing the said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin.
He explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's
husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms.
Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga
begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of
the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the
only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to
be her counsel since she not have enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted
government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now
with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and
that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged
for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance
for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his position as branch
clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He
stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown
by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and
referred the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following
findings and recommendation:

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in
behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No.
84-885 for "Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City.
It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without
the previous permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that

the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon
City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge,
Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-
client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not
receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the
only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and
high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent
ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister
to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as
counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in
government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as

counsel for his cousin without first securing permission from the Court, and
considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said
appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge,
it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely. 6

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is
found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows
certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The
said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee

of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically

the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an
isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term
"private practice" prohibited by the said section, to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law
to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services."

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.8

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not
constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a

private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the
head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:

Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,

vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That
if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it
will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided,
finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an
officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his
private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge
of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors.9

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on

numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August
5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave
applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed
to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding
judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the
Department contemplated by law.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is

hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act
would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes:
1 Rollo,  p. 16.

2 Id., p. 10.

3 Id., p. 9.

4 Id., pp. 6-7.

5 Id., at 20.

6 Id., at 57-58.

7 121 Phil. 894 (1965).

8 Id., at 897.

9 Emphasis supplied.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not
to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused
is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26222             July 21, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte; and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO
BORRES, respondents.

Dominador L. Padilla for petitioner.

Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Borres for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted
before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5)
separate cases, four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de

Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.

The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting
attorney from his investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be
tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits.

The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:

On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo
Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were
asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun)
were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell
dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered
therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, — all minor
children of the couple — and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas
Narbasa and Tambak Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1)
criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and
motivated by one impulse."
Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May
13, 1966, directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file
one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases,
Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof,
upon the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was
fired and more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the
position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts
on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by
one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of
shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple
murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of
one."

Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966,
as having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.

This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.

The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information,
either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex
crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should
the five indictments remain as they are?

1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which reads:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo).1

Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results
in the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual
setting, the complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds
application.2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon
pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. The first died
instantaneously; the second, seven days later. This Court convicted the assailant
of double murder.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb
explodes, with the result that a number of persons are killed, that single act again
produces a complex crime.4

A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number
killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 5 Thus, where the
six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine
gun and Garand rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding
several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as
there were deaths (eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple
murder — with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo
— of a man, his common-law wife, and their two children in cold blood. The
accused were found guilty by the trial court of such offense. This Court, in
reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a
single act but by various acts committed on different occasions and by different
parties"; that such acts "may not be regarded as constituting one single crime";
and that "[t]hey should be held as separate and distinct crimes." 7 And a third. At
the commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out"
followed by a "series of shots" — from a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third
seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court there ruled that there
were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan
Mones.8 And finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses
Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by
one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of machinegun fire,
two of the couple's children — also asleep — were killed. The accused, Tomas
Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal,
this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders." 9

The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30,
1955. There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of
home guards. It was held that there was only one complex crime. In that case,
however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing. In the case at bar,
defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge conspiracy
amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all.10 Not material
here, therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the
individual deaths caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne
in mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted,
there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminal impulse  is not written into the law.11

The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation
of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity
of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless,
the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such
that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied. 12

Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City
correctly presented the five separate informations — four for murder
and one for frustrated murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an

affidavit of one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the
culprits was to commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and
frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If true,
this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48,
which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.

A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been
regularly performed.13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to
said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties
(transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits after
the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion
thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing,
there is the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense — robbery. For
another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill.
Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations charged evident
premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard
a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on
this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the
nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the
averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of
the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney
should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt,
we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts
being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal
suspect's right to due process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be
transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the
pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the
one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information
to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party."14

3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to

be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime
is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is
one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The
information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about
by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of
views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to
dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may
not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it
purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly
administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to
afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases,
because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.'
"15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into
any of the situations just recited.1äwphï1.ñët

And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance,
we are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing
separate cases for murder and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the
complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the
provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for
multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's
discretion should not be controlled.

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari  prayed for is hereby granted;
the orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set
and declared null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of
the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby
directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were
commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.

Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So
ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1
Tomo I, Cuello Colon, Derecho Penal, 1960 ed., p. 635.
2
In People vs. Pama (C.A.), 44 O.G. No. 9, pp. 3339, 3345-3346, where four
bullets were fired causing four mortal wounds to a person, but one of
which also struck a child resulting in the latter's death, the Court of
Appeals held that, by the one single shot, a single information should have
been filed to cover both deaths, and a single penalty should be imposed.

In People vs. Buyco, 80 Phil. 58, 67-69, where the accused fired
several bullets in succession from a submachine gun with a single
pull of the trigger, killing one person with treachery and another
only accidentally, this Court, citing II Viada, 5th ed., p. 629,
categorized the facts as constituting one single act — a complex
crime of murder and homicide. Cf. People vs. Gatbunton, infra.

In People vs. Deveza (C.A.), 44 O.G. No. 5, pp. 1501, 1507-1511, one

shot  from a pistol caused the death of a person and serious physical
injuries to another; the court considered the factual situation as a
complex crime of homicide and serious physical injuries.
3
People vs. Balotol, 84 Phil. 289, 290-291.
4
People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061-1062. In pari materia, see: People vs.
Fulgencio, L-5370, November 10, 1952; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307,
318-319. See also: Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, 152.
5
People vs. Pardo, 79 Phil. 568, 577-578; People vs. Buyco, supra, at p. 69;
People vs. Ordonio, 82 Phil. 324, 334; People vs. Chan, 90 Phil. 1, 5; People
vs. Basarain, L-6690, May 24, 1955; People vs. Moro, L-6771, May 28, 1957;
People vs. Remolino, L-14008, September 30, 1960. See also: People vs.
Torres, L-4642, May 29, 1953.
6
People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828.
7
People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598, 615.
8
People vs. Mones, 86 Phil. 331, 333, 339.
9
To the same effect: People vs. Desierto, (C.A.) 45 O.G. No. 10, pp. 4542,
4549-4550.
 People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757, 767, citing cases; People vs. Timbang, 74
10

Phil. 295, 299; People vs. Santos, 84 Phil. 97, 104; People vs. Domenden L-
17822, October 30, 1962; People vs. Ambran, L-15581, April 29, 1963.
11
See  I Padilla, Criminal Law, 1964 ed., p. 548, at footnote.
12
Section 15, Rule 119, Rules of Court, reads:

"SEC 15. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. — Charges for

offenses founded on the same facts, or which form or are a part of a
series of offenses of the same or similar character may, in the
discretion of the court, be tried jointly."
13
Section 5 (m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

See: Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 63 Phil. 846,

14

855, citing cases; Zulueta vs. Nicolas 102 Phil. 944, 946, citing People vs.
Liggayu, 97 Phil. 865, and People vs. Natoza 100 Phil. 533; Bagatua vs.
Revilla, L-12247, August 26, 1958.
15
Hernandez vs. Albano, L-19272, January 25, 1967, citing cases.

Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not
to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused
is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995

EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment 1 affirming his
conviction for violation of the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115)
was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated February 9, 1994, 2 petitioner filed
on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" 3 setting forth, in
relation to the motion for new trial:

6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly

discovered evidence and excusible (sic) negligence, and shall be
supported by affidavits of:

(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who

will exculpate petitioner;

(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of

the owner of Ultra Corporation (the Corporation that
employed petitioner), which actually exercised
control over the affairs of Ultra; and

(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for

the first time and explain why he was unable to do so
earlier.

The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution,4 among other things, granted the
substitution but denied the motion for leave to file motion for new trial,
"the petition having been already denied on February 9, 1994."

Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT

ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL",5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND
SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. 6 The Court thereafter
required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation
within ten (10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.7

In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the
Court,8 the Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be
entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a
certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is
an admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate
petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's
"Affidavit"9 reads:

RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence

at Urdaneta Village, Makati, Metro Manila, after being duly sworn
and (sic) state that:
1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President
and Chief Executive Officer of Construction Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the

voting shares of stock of CDCP.

3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its

affiliated companies, organized a number of wholly-owned service
corporations. One of these was Ultra International Trading
Corporation, whose purpose was to serve and supply the needs of
CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower value goods and using
Ultra's financial resources.

4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and

received the instructions directly from me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez,
Chairman of CDCP.

5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was

appointed President and Chief Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I
instructed Ultra through my brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to
purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These materials were
received by CDCP and are covered by the trust receipts which are
the subject of this case.

6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously

omitted payment to Ultra for the delivery of the said steel
materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca merely
acted as agent for CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the
guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to issue the said trust
receipts. On the basis of such guarantees, along with informal
assurances issued by CDCP to China Bank that the transactions of
Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and CDCP
Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities,
among which included the trust receipts subject of this case.

7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the

payment of said trust receipts because the common Treasurer and
controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under
my control and I did not allow her to make the appropriate
payments.

8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts

corresponding to the materials covered by the trust receipts subject
of this case.

9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic)
served in 1984, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca was no longer president of
Ultra Corporation and could not have possibly cause (sic) Ultra
Corporation to pay.

10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal

responsibility for the trust receipts subject of this case and to
exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal charges which he
has asked this Honorable Court to review.
 11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising
from the subject trust receipts.

(Sgd.)

RODOLFO
M. CUENCA

Affiant

And the Solicitor General had this to say:

Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.

However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration

against his own interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules
of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother
Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of
guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.

The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the

genuineness and due execution of his brother's affidavit in the
interest of justice and fair play.

Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the People of the
Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction
of the accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of
Canon 6 states:

Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in

government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.

Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in

public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is
done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for
disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)

The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S.

Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that
prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose obligation to govern
impartially is compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution,
by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July
31, 1994). (Emphasis supplied.)10

Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20)
years ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered
evidence the rationale of which being:
 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts,
and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no
jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are involved therein.

the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in

subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v. People" 11 and "People v.
Amparado".12

In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the
opposition of the Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused
concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the
Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to
reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no
nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It
becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances considering that the
"People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor
General ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such
statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the
case be RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of
petitioner's evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex "E" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 49-63.

2 Rollo, p. 186.

3 Rollo, pp. 187-190.

4 Rollo, p. 191.

5 Rollo, pp. 193-208.

6 Rollo, pp. 224-227.

7 Rollo, p. 229.

8 Per Resolutions dated October 17, November 16 and

December 14, 1995. Rollo, pp. 232, 235 and 238, respectively.
 9 Rollo, pp. 220-222.

10 Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 244-245.

11 112 SCRA 573 (1982).

12 156 SCRA 712 (1987).

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

A.C. No. 4984            April 1, 2003

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J.

RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA
NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE
RABALO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S.

Dasig,1 an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge
involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for
having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the
dignity and reputation of the CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the
CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4,
1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section
27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondent’s

designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded
from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center
in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to
P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of

Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED,
she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending
before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED…

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of

Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED,
she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms.
Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior
registration…

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of

Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED,
she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which
was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or
less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before
the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to
Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate
the application for correction of name.3

Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law

by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed. 4

Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22),

Section 365 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts
owing to "Borela Tire Supply" and "Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced
by the dishonored checks she issued, 6 the complaint sheet, and the subpoena
issued to respondent.7

Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime

against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when
she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on
the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave
threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052,
was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.8

Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President
Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and
reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill
motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an
appointment for herself.9

In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment

on the charges.10 A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her
address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to
be returned to this Court with the notation "Unclaimed."11

On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be

served by registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.

In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office
informed the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by,
and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on
August 27, 1999.12

On November 22, 2000, we granted complainant’s motion to refer the complaint

to the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
directed respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she
would be considered in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to
heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file
her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the
Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer
to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents
submitted and on record.

In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline stated as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that

respondent in violation of her oath as a government official and as a
member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to
extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to
act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent
unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to
the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on
Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years
with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for
disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
393, the full text of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and
considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission
on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) years.13

At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-

in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for
her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the
complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development
Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED."

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not

be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge
of his duties as a government official. 14 However, if said misconduct
as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the
Bar.15

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during
her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C.
Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of
money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or
requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the
respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that
respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to
affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have
known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of
money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting
action by her office.

The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer
and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other
disciplinary action. The Attorney’s Oath imposes upon every member of the bar
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in
Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 16 Respondent’s demands for
sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests
before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when
admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June
21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but
of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon
617 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the
ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or

requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging
or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 19 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests
includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of
his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good
moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high
public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from
any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession
at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of
Canon 120 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three
years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her
name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross

misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on

the records of the respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
 Admitted to the Bar, May 30, 1986. Per 1998 LAW LIST, p. 232.
2
 SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
3
 Rollo, p. 3.
4
 These include: Felina S. Dasig and Victor Alba v. Celedonia R. Coronacion. Rodrigo
R. Coronacion, Jr., and Jose R. Rabalo, I.S. No. 96-19974 for Perjury, False
Testimony: Felma S. Dasig and Victor Alba v. Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo
R. Coronacion, Jr., I.S. No. 96-25879 for Oral Defamation and Unjust
Vexation; Felina S. Dasig and Victor Alba v. Francis Lacandazo, Mark Imperio and
Michael Namoca, l.S. No. 96-27189 for Libel; Felma S. Dasig and Victor Alba v.
Celedonia R. Coronacion, Rodrigo R. Coronacion, Jr., and Jose R. Rabalo, I.S. No. 96-
19974 for Libel; Felina S. Dasig v. Celedonia Coronacion, I.S. No. 97-3026 for Grave
Oral Defamation; Felina S. Dasig v. Celedonia Coronacion, Francis Lacandazo, Mark
Imperio, and Michael Namoca, I.S. No. 96-27189, for violation of Art. 290, Rev. Penal
Code; Felina S. Dasig v. Asuncion Lacandazo and Francis Lacandazo, I.S. No. 96-
27189 for Grave Oral Defamation; Felina S. Dasig and Victor Alba v. Ma. Teresa
Galdon Lingal, I.S. No. 96-25870 for Oral Defamation, Threat; Felina S. Dasig v.
Ruel Martin and Jean Martin, I.S. No. 97-348 for Libel; Felina S. Dasig v. Celedonia
Coronacion, I.S. No. 97-7218 for Perjury, Libel; and Felina S. Dasig v. Francis
Lacandazo. Michael Namoca. and Mark Imperio. I.S. No. 97-8864 for Perjury.
5
 SEC. 36. Discipline: General Provisions. x x x

(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due to the
government.

xxx
6
 Rollo, pp. 22-24.
7
 Id. at 26-27.
8
 Id. at 28-30.
9
 Id. at 32-35.
10
 Id. at 36.
11
 Id. at 47.
12
 Id. at 57.
13
 Id. at 61.

 Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, A.M. No. R-705-RTJ, 23 August 1989, 176 SCRA 634,
14

649.
  Dinsay v. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995, 27 November 1996, 264 SCRA 703, 706; Collantes
15

v. Renomeron, A.C. No. 3056, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 584, 589.

 Rule 1.03. – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
16

any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

 CANON 6. – These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the

17

discharge of their official tasks.

 Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or

18

deceitful conduct.
19
 Rule 6.02. – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties.

 CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
20

and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

A.C. No. 6788               August 23, 2007

(Formerly, CBD 382)

DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension 1 against Atty. Jose R. Imbang

for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Complaint

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty.
Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and
Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter
issued a receipt for ₱5,000 only.3

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and
always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to
inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. 4 This happened
six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her ₱350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She

personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and
San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never
filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact
employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).5

Respondent's Defense

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government

service from the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still
a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO)
of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter. 6

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages
against the Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the PAO and aware that the
complainant was not an indigent, he declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the
complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private
practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as
she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon.10 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly
remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might
spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000
while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee. 11

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt

because one of her daughters asked her to account for the ₱5,000 she had
previously given the respondent for safekeeping. 12 Because the complainant was
a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.13

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few months later or
in September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing
the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent
agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost
contact with the complainant.15

Recommendation of the IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received
evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report
and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.16

The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent
was still with the PAO.18 It also noted that respondent described the
complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned
trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a
spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected
respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's
request.19 It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government
lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their
salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three
years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of
₱5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.21

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that
respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to
the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from
1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional
suspension of six months.22

The Court's Ruling

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and

integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be
more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They
are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity
to public service.24

Government employees are expected to devote themselves

completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of
profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of

public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
x x x           x x x          x x x

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their
official function.25

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the complainant

and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected
with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship.26 Respondent's admission that he accepted
money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an
attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the
receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a
government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private
practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The

PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent
litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free
legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and
other quasi-judicial cases.28

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission. 29 Respondent
violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. 30 This undertaking includes the
observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by
respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's
fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance
of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession
disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private

cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously
deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint
against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have
done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really
filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that
the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his
"appearance fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts
constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any
falsehood.31

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but
also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public
faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his
brethren in private practice.321avvphi1

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the
money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He
neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount
delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the
client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for
filing fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as
he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to
accept them.35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer’s

oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered
to return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in

the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* No part.
1
 Dated August 22, 1995.
2
 Rollo (Vol. I),  p. 1.
3
 Id., pp. 1, 4.
4
 Id., p. 1.
5
 Id., pp. 1-2.
6
 Id., p. 11.
7
 Id.
8
 Id.
9
 Id.
10
 Id., pp. 11-12.
11
 Id., p. 12.
12
 Id.
13
 Id., p. 4.
14
 Id., p. 12.
15
 Id., p. 13.
16
 Report and Recommendation of the CBD penned by Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco dated November 22,
2004. Rollo (Vol. III), p. 3-14.
17
 Id. (Vol. I), p. 4. The document contains the text below:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
RECEIVED from Mrs. Diana Ramos the amount five thousand pesos (₱5000.00) in connection with her case entitled
"DIANA RAMOS vs. ROQUE & ELENITA JOVELLANOS for damages in the total amount of ₱150,000.00.
Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna,
July 15, 1992.
(Sgd.) ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
Rec'd. original:
(signature illegible)
18
 Id. (Vol. III), p. 11.
19
 Id., p. 11-12.
20
 Id., p. 12.
21
 Id. (Vol. III), p. 14.
22
 Id., p. 2.
23
 De Guzman v. De Dios, A.C. No. 4943, 26 January 2001, 350 SCRA 320, 324.
24
 Vitrolio v. Dasig,  A.C. No. 4984, 1 April 2003, 400 SCRA 172, 179.
25
 Compare with Revised Rules on Civil Service, Rule XVIII, Sec. 12. The section provides:
[N]o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department.
See also Lorenzana v. Fajardo, A.C. No. 5712, 29 June 2004, 462 SCRA 1.
26
 Amaya v. Tecson, A.C. No. 5996, 7 February 2005, 450 SCRA 510, 515.
27
 Mandate of the PAO.
28
 See RA 9407, Sec. 2.
29
 The mission of the PAO is:
"To provide indigent litigants free access to courts, judicial and quasi-judicial agencies by rendering legal assistance in
consonance with the constitutional mandate that 'free access to court shall not be denied by reason of poverty.'"
30
 Lawyer's Oath. See also  Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20(a).
31
 Lawyer's Oath. See also  Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
32
 Supra note 24 at 180.
33
 See Manalang v. Angeles, A.C. No. 1558, 10 March 2003, 398 SCRA 687.
34
 See Businos v. Ricafort, A.C. No. 4349, 22 December 1997, 283 SCRA 407.
35
 Civil Code, Art. 2154. The article provides:
Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it and it was unduly delivered through mistake,
the obligation to return it arises.
Also  Civil Code, Art. 2159. The article provides:
Art. 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment shall pay legal interest if a sum of money is involved, or
shall be liable for fruits received which should have been received if the thing produces fruits.
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of the thing from any cause, and for damages to the
person who delivered the thing, until it is recovered.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,

accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.

Republic Act No. 6713

CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx xxx.

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee,

consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise
regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by

the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions; or
 (3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which
has a regular or pending official transaction with their office.

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year
after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the
case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot
practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to
be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a

private enterprise which has pending official business with him during
the pendency thereof or within one year after its termination.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,

accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC               August 19, 2009

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court -

BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON - ON THE PROHIBITION FROM
ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty.

Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court
Administrator, which query the latter referred to the Court for consideration. In
the course of its action on the matter, the Court discovered that the query was
beyond pure policy interpretation and referred to the actual situation of Atty.
Buffe, and, hence, was a matter that required concrete action on the factual
situation presented.

The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees). This provision places a limitation on public officials
and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from
government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in
engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713 provides:

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions; or

xxx

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in
which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: "Why may an incumbent
engage in private practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or
tend to conflict with his official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot,
as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former
allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that he is liable to
exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a position of
possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?"1

The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her
position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of
prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the
private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before
RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential
treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private
practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend to
conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who
has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is
prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the office
where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her
separation from government employment.

Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to
remove the exercise of clout, influence or privity to insider information, which
the incumbent public employee may use in the private practice of his profession.
However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since she had already resigned
as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she
could engage in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so
long as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with
her former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.

Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez

made the following observations when the matter was referred to him:

The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is "to uphold the time-
honored principle of public office being a public trust." Section 4 thereof provides
for the norms of conduct of public officials and employees, among others: (a)
commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity.
Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism that "[t]hey
[public officials and employees] shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions
of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in any
transaction between the retired government employee and his former colleagues,
subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or
undue influence, as the case may be.2

Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer

this case to the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.3 The OCAT took the view that:

The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2)
as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law .
Clearly, there is a misreading of that provision of law. 4 and further observed:

The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term "such practice"
after the phrase "provided that." It may indeed be misinterpreted as
modifying the phrase "engage in the private practice of their profession" should
be prefatory sentence that public officials "during their incumbency shall not" be
disregarded. However, read in its entirety, "such practice" may only refer to
practice "authorized by the Constitution or law" or the exception to the
prohibition against the practice of profession. The term "law" was intended by
the legislature to include "a memorandum or a circular or an administrative
order issued pursuant to the authority of law."

xxx

The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public
officials and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared
therein a prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on
accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution …

xxx

The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public
service so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter
should take precedence over the former.5[Footnotes omitted]
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel – the rule that deals with outside
employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which limits such outside
employment to one that "does not require the practice of law." 6 The prohibition
to practice law with respect to any matter where they have intervened while in
the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the
government service.7

In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued

an En Banc Resolution dated November 11, 2008 directing the Court
Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular on the practice of
profession during employment and within one year from resignation, retirement
from or cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We likewise required the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i) verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared
as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of court and after her resignation in
February 2008, and (ii) submit to the Court a report on his verification.8

In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of

RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon reported the following appearances made by Atty.
Buffe:

(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus
Leonardo M. Macalam, et al. on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April
10, 2008 and July 9, 2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs;

(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo
Malasa, et al., on (sic) February, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;

(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor,
on February 21, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff; and

(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps.
Mariano and Olivia Silverio, on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel
for the defendants.

Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11,

2008 En Banc Resolution and she filed a Manifestation (received by the Court on
February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our November 11, 2008 Resolution.
She likewise stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81 records. As well,
she informed the Court that she had previously taken the following judicial
remedies in regard to the above query:

1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC Manila,
which had been dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D) –
a recourse taken when undersigned was still a private practitioner;

2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the RTC of
Manila, which had been also dismissed (with or without prejudice) on
December 4, 2008 (Annex B) – a recourse taken when undersigned was
already a public prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after she
took her oath of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis supplied]

She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases "so
that eventually, the Honorable Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s
presented in the above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)
(2) and last par. thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition (valid or
invalid) on the private practice of undersigned’s law profession, before Branch
81, while on the other hand not containing a similar, express prohibition in
regard to undersigned’s practice of profession, before the same court, as a public
prosecutor – within the supposedly restricted 1-year period?"

OUR ACTION AND RULING

Preliminary Considerations

As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely
with the task of determining how the Court will respond to the query, both with
respect to the substance and form (as the Court does not give interpretative
opinions9 but can issue circulars and regulations relating to pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts 10 and in the exercise of its administrative supervision
over all courts and personnel thereof 11), but also with the task of responding to
admitted violations of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses
on the same subject.

After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on
the subject of the query for the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we
consider this aspect of the present administrative matter a finished task, subject
only to confirmatory closure when the OCA reports the completion of the
undertaking to us.

Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and
immediately after her resignation, is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to
and that she cannot run away from under the cover of the letter-query she filed
and her petition for declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested she would
pursue up to our level. We note that at the time she filed her letter-query (on
March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least
three (3) cases. The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in
any way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot excuse any
resulting violation she committed. In other words, she took the risk of appearing
before her own Branch and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took.

Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of
which were dismissed, and her intent to elevate the dismissal to this Court for
resolution. The first, filed before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on
July 23, 2008 because the "court declined to exercise the power to declare rights
as prayed for in the petition, as any decision that may be rendered will be inutile
and will not generally terminate the uncertainty or controversy." 12 The second,
filed with the RTC, Branch 17, Manila, was dismissed for being an inappropriate
remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, on December
4, 2008.13 Under these circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from ruling on
Atty. Buffe’s actions, as no actual court case other than the present administrative
case, is now actually pending on the issue she raised. On the contrary, we see
from Atty. Buffe’s recourse to this Court and the filing of the two declaratory
petitions the intent to shop for a favorable answer to her query. We shall duly
consider this circumstance in our action on the case.

A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffe’s actions
relates to possible objections on procedural due process grounds, as we have not
made any formal directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should not be
penalized for her appearance before Branch 81 soon after her resignation from
that Branch. The essence of due process is the grant of the opportunity to be
heard; what it abhors is the lack of the opportunity to be heard. 14 The records of
this case show that Atty. Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions.
She was notified, and she even responded to our November 11, 2008 directive for
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to report on Atty. Buffe’s
appearances before Branch 81; she expressly manifested that these appearances
were part of the Branch records. Her legal positions on these appearances have
also been expressed before this Court; first, in her original letter-query,
and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due process consideration needs
to deter us from considering the legal consequences of her appearances in her
previous Branch within a year from her resignation.

The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713

Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and
transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them
from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private
practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice
will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.

The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the
public official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which
can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an
exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect
to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.

The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a
public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may
occur in government transactions between a former government official or
employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The
prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment
of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.15

Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is
not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter provision provides the
definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an incumbent court official or
court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:

Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies

with all of the following requirements:

(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices
law before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;

(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working

hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the court
personnel’s duties and responsibilities;

(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law;
Provided, however, that court personnel may render services as professor,
 lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or continuing
education centers or similar institutions;

(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court
personnel to disclose confidential information acquired while performing
officials duties;

(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive
branch of government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme
Court.

Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the
outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court
personnel shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]

In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the
practice of law is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while
Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of
law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,16 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and
out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. 17 Under both
provisions, a common objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of
the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use confidential information
acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with court personnel
still with the previous office.

After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but
Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent
discussed above. Atty. Buffe’s situation falls under Section 7.

Atty. Buffe’s Situation

A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe’s admission

that she immediately engaged in private practice of law within the one-year
period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it
noteworthy, too, that she is aware of this provision and only objects to its
application to her situation; she perceives it to be unfair that she cannot practice
before her old office – Branch 81 – for a year immediately after resignation, as she
believes that her only limitation is in matters where a conflict of interest exists
between her appearance as counsel and her former duties as Clerk of Court. She
believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential treatment to incumbent public
officials and employees as against those already separated from government
employment.

Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she
interprets Section 7 (b)(2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court
to practice law. We reiterate what we have explained above, that the general rule
under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public officials and employees from the practice of
their professions; it is unlawful under this general rule for clerks of court to
practice their profession. By way of exception, they can practice their profession
if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist
between their current duties and the practice of their profession. As we also
mentioned above, no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their
profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so. Under both the general rule
and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffe’s basic premise is misplaced.

As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the

practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and
without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions
under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is that
she cannot practice her profession within one year before the office
where he or she used to work with . In a comparison between a resigned,
retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent
official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because the
limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only
for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where
specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no
conflict of interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe’s basic
premises.

A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness

of the law and her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she
perceives in the law. We find it disturbing that she first violated the law before
making any inquiry. She also justifies her position by referring to the practice of
other government lawyers known to her who, after separation from their judicial
employment, immediately engaged in the private practice of law and appeared
as private counsels before the RTC branches where they were previously
employed. Again we find this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe’s part and, to our
mind, only emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)
(2) of R.A. No. 6713.

By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe
contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES

xxx

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall," this provision must be
strictly complied with. Atty. Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil
intent, considering the misgivings she had about Section 7 (b)(2)’s unfairness.
Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily
require the element of criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include
it.18 Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential
to bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it
specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct. 19 Thus, we
find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted Rule.

We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and
thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she
blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by
appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]

By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the
models she cited and wanted to replicate – the former court officials who
immediately waded into practice in the very same court they came from. She,
like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying and
disrespecting the law.20 By her irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public
confidence in the law and in lawyers. 21 Her offense is not in any way mitigated
by her transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a
letter-query, which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory
relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope
perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable to her cause. These
are acts whose implications do not promote public confidence in the integrity of
the legal profession.22

Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the

principle of res ipsa loquitur finds application, making her administratively
liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.23 In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers
without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on
record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro,24 the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any

further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his
unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of
both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare.
In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the
errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in
circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums
they claimed in their cases.25 The Court held that those cases sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability,
without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa
loquitur.26

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, 27 that no

evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for
professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.

We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao
Laureta28 where we punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely
based on his answer to a show-cause order for contempt and without going into
a trial-type hearing. We ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the
opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined. 29
Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,30 the respondent was disciplined and punished
for contempt for his slurs regarding the Court’s alleged partiality, incompetence
and lack of integrity on the basis of his answer in a show-cause order for
contempt. The Court took note that the respondent did not deny making the
negative imputations against the Court through the media and even
acknowledged the correctness of his degrading statements. Through a per
curiam decision, we justified imposing upon him the penalty of suspension in
the following tenor:

The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of
the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power
of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer
of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility
of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which
visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.31

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or
formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from
immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or
judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty.
Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter
through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.

A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his
office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 33

In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCAT’s
observation that Atty Buffe’s letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of
the parameters of the prohibition on the practice of the law profession under
Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse,
particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after
one’s separation from the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she
cited, it is time to ring the bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot
allow this practice to continue.1avvphi1

As we observed earlier, 34 Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use
of various fora in expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of
Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a query with the Office of the Court
Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions for declaratory relief.
Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and
confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed.
Although this is not strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit,
what she has done is something that we cannot help but consider with disfavor
because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could
have spawned. This is a point against Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we
might have exercised because of the OCAT’s observation about her ignorance of
and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after separation from the service.
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of
₱10,000.00, together with a stern warning to deter her from repeating her
transgression and committing other acts of professional misconduct. 35 This
penalty reflects as well the Court’s sentiments on how seriously the retired,
resigned or separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should regard and
observe the prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they used
to work with.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe

GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of professional
misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffe’s record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

* On official leave.

1
 Rollo, p. 2.
2
 Id., p. 3.
3
 Id., p. 8.
4
 Id., p. 12.
5
 Id., pp. 12-13.
6
 The last paragraph of Section 5 states: Where a conflict if interest exists,
may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects
adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not
accept the outside employment; see rollo, p. 16.
7
 Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in said service.
8
 Rollo, p. 23.

 Province of North Cotabato, etc. v. The Government of the Republic of the

9

Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. No. 183591,

October 14, 2008.
10
 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5(b).
11
 Id., Section 6.

 Rollo, pp. 57-58; attachment "D" to Atty. Buffe’s Manifestation of

12

February 2, 2009.

 Id., p. 59; attachment "B" to Atty Buffe’s Manifestation of February 2,

13

2009.

 Prudential Bank v. Castro, A.C. No. 2756, November 12, 1987, 155 SCRA
14

604; Richards v. Asoy, A. C. No. 2655 , July 9, 1987, 152 SCRA 45; In re:
Wenceslao Laureta, G.R. No. L-68635, May 14, 1987, 149 SCRA 570; Zaldivar
v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-80578 , October 7, 1988, 166 SCRA 316.

 Aquino-Simbulan v. Zabat, A.M. No. P-05-1993, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA

15

23.
16
 G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210.
17
 Ibid.

 Re: Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Accounts of Atty.
18

Raquel G. Kho, Clerk of Court IV, Regional Trial Court, Oras, Easter Samar,
A.M. No. P-06-2177, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 22.
19
 Id., p. 29.
20
 Catu v. Rellosa,, A .C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 209
21
 Id., pp. 202-221.
22
 Id., p. 221.

 Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of

23

Judicial Conduct (2004 edition), pp. 457-458; and Pineda, Legal and Judicial

Ethics (1999 edition), pp. 338-339.
24
 Supra note 14.
25
 Id., p. 622.
26
 Id., p. 623.
27
 Supra note 14.
28
 Supra note 14.
29
 Ibid.
30
 Supra note 14.
31
 Id., pp. 331-332.
32
 Catu v. Rellosa, supra note 20, p. 221.
 33
 Lim-Santiago v. Saguico, A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 10.
34
 See 2nd paragraph of page 8 of this Decision.

 Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of

35

Judicial Conduct, supra note 23, p. 408; Section 12 (c), Rule 139 of the Rules
of Court in connection with Section 15 of the same Rule; and Visbal v.
Buban, G.R. No. MTJ-02-1432, September 3, 2004, 437 SCRA 520.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,

accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.

A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:

In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine

National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-
President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank with violation of
Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or

employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.

by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant

bank in which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had
intervened.

Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he

participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and
55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes
issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy
authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division
Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong
Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146,
respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as
one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.

Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative

case filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan,
for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for
Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s
Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of
the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing
demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant
bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were
represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which
respondent is one of the Senior Partners.

In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as

counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal
of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the
case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses,
respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended
that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as
counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer.
Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty.
Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the
aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not
partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each
one of them handles their own cases independently and individually receives the
revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.

In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and
recommendation.

During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that

respondent was previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in
connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador
Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for
petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and
Associates."

The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the
Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of
the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the
hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his
partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was
practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court.
Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the
same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer,
when it was made of record that respondent was working in the same office as
Atty. Ferrer.

Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm
is true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and confidential
records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff
members at all times.

From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent
to devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant
bank since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former
employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service.
In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in
consideration of the money he expected to earn.

The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for 3 years.

The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4,
1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the
recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors.
On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing"
before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this
case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.

In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate
to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of
conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs.
Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of
PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against
Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same
anti-graft case, this Court, citing  Nombrado vs. Hernandez  (26 SCRA 13 119681)
ruled:

The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with
him, that even if respondent did not use against his client any information or
evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become
privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was
later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that
triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical
injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:

"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of

litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant,
secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of
dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would
lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only
further prejudice the complainant's cause."

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his

former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of
their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as
counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado vs. David,
supra, this Tribunal further said:

Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule
is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good
taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the
rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.

The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and
effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant
bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case
against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled
while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express

conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when,
in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY.

TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective
immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in said service.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016

ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, COMPLAINANT,

VS. ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case concerns the respondent, a retired judge who took on
the case that he had intervened in during his incumbency on the Bench. The
complainant was the counsel of record of the plaintiff in the case. The charge
specified that the respondent was guilty of "representing adverse interest, illegal
practice of law, conduct and (sic) becoming as a former member of the bench and
conduct unbecoming in violation of the canons of legal ethics with prayer for
disbarment"[1]

Antecedent

The antecedents summarized in the Report and Recommendation submitted by

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
[2]
 are as follows:

Complainant alleged that respondent was the former Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Branch 35, Ozamis City and retired as such. But before
his appointment as RTC Judge, he was the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities 10th Judicial Division, Tangub City where he presided [over] a
Forcible Entry case docketed as Civil Case No. 330 entitled "Ronald Rupinta vs.
Sps. Pacifico Conol and Malinda Conol." Complainant was the counsel of
Rupinta and the decision was rendered against him by respondent.

Sometime on 24 November 1994 and while respondent was still the Presiding
Judge of MTCC, Tangub City, another civil complaint was filed by Ronald
Rupinta with his mother, Anastacia Rupinta, as co-plaintiff, against Carmen
Alfire and Pacifico Conol, docketed as Civil Case No. 357, for Declaration of
Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of Ownership, Accounting of
Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and Damages with Petition for the
Appointment of a Receiver. Complainant represented the plaintiffs and the
complaint was heard by respondent as Presiding Judge of MTCC, 10th Judicial
Region, Tangub City. When the case was already scheduled for trial on the
merits, respondent suspended the scheduled hearing "motu proprio" for reason
that there was still affirmative defenses raised by the defendants, like the issue of
lack of jurisdiction which prompted the plaintiff to file a Manifestation and
Memorandum which made respondent to (sic) inhibit himself from trying the
case.

Since 17 January 1996, the aforesaid case hibernated and respondent was
appointed Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 35, Ozamis City. Sometime on 23
March 2006, the newly appointed Presiding Judge of MTCC 10th Judicial Region,
Tangub City, Judge Rodolfo L. Vapor, issued an Order informing the parties on
the aforesaid case whether they were amenable for him to render judgment on
the case of which complainant's client agreed and filed their Memorandum.
However, complainant was surprised when he received a Manifestation from the
defendants that they are now represented by respondent, the former judge who
once presided over the aforesaid case.

Plaintiffs, through complainant, filed their Memorandum within 30 days.

However, Judge Vapor, instead of rendering judgment based on the merits and
evidences (sic) already presented, issued an Order dated 26 May 2006,
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the complaint being denominated
as an annulment of a Deed of Sale, is by nature a claim beyond pecuniary
estimation, hence the court has no jurisdiction. xxx

The Decision dismissing the complaint was appealed to the RTC, Branch 16,
Tangub City presided by Judge Sylvia Singidas-Machacon who directed the
appellant to submit their Memorandum. Despite the warning of the complainant
that the appearance of respondent is highly illegal, immoral, unethical and
adverse to the interest of the public, respondent, being the previous presiding
judge, continued on with his appearance for the appellees by filing a Motion for
Extension of Time to Submit Memorandum. On appeal, Judge Machacon,
reversed the Decision of Judge Vapor sustaining the stand of the client of
respondent that the original jurisdiction of the case is vested with the MTCC,
Tangub City.

While the aforesaid appealed case was pending before Judge Machacon,
complainant filed a Motion to Expunge from the Court Records the
Memorandum filed by the Defendants-Appellees through their counsel Ex-MTC
and RTC Judge Felipe G. Zapatos, on the ground that as the former presiding
judge of the MTCC, Tangub City, he is, disqualified to appear as counsel for the
defendants. For allegedly failing to attend the hearing of the above-mentioned
Motion, the same was denied by Judge Machacon despite the fact that
respondent admitted in his Comment to the said Motion the allegations of
complainant. Respondent raised as his defense that he cannot be charged nor
penalized of any violation as the counsel of the defendants because when he
rendered the first judgment in the Forcible Entry case, he believes he was
completely in absolute neutrality. Respondent, likewise, justified his appearance
as counsel for the defendants on the ground that he is encountering extreme
poverty due to the absence of adequate income and as a source of livelihood he
was constrained to handle the aforesaid case.

Respondent admits that complainant filed Civil Case No. 330 entitled "Rupinta
vs. Conol" before the MTCC, Tangub City where respondent was the presiding
judge. As a result of that case, respondent rendered a decision dismissing the
same on 23 September 1993. After the aforesaid case was dismissed, complainant,
as counsel of Anastacia Rupinta Largo and Ronald Rupinta, filed Civil Case No.
357 for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of
Ownership, Accounting of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and Damages
with [Petition for the] Appointment of a Receiver and Civil Case No. 356 entitled
"In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Perfecto Rupinta, Petition
for Letters of Administration, Mrs. Anastacia Rupinta Largo, Petitioner".
Respondent as Presiding Judge inhibited himself from conducting the trial of the
two (2) cases as provided for in his Order dated 17 January 1996 on the ground
that complainant as counsel for the plaintiffs and petitioner in the aforesaid cases
have doubted the absolute neutrality or impartiality of respondent.

After inhibiting himself from these cases, respondent was promoted as Regional
Trial Court Judge of Branch 35, Ozamis City on 28 October 1997 until he retired
from the Judiciary on 14 November 200 I. Thereafter, on account of the fact that
respondent needs income in order to survive or he would die of starvation, he
engaged in the private practice of law. Four (4) years after he retired from the
judiciary and more than ten (10) years after he inhibited himself from conducting
trial on Civil Case No. 357, respondent filed a Manifestation for the defendants in
Civil Case 357.[3]

Ignoring the warnings of the complainant, the respondent persisted in his

representation of the defendants in Civil Case No. 357. Hence, the complainant
commenced this administrative case.

After being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his comment, to
which the complainant filed a rejoinder. Thereafter, the Court referred the case to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.

Report and Recommendation

of the IBP-CB

After the parties submitted their position papers, the IBP-CBD issued its Report
and Recommendation dated July 9, 2008,[4] whereby it found and held the
respondent guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
and as a member of the Bar for one (1) month. It observed that under Rule 6.03,
"a lawyer shall not, after leaving the government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service;" and that the words or phrases any matter and he had
intervened qualifying the prohibition were very broad terms, and included any
conceivable subject in which the respondent acted on in his official capacity. [5]

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403 adopted on August 14, 2008,[6] the IBP Board of

Governors approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-
434[7] denying the respondent's motion for reconsideration, and affirming
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403.

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the records to the Court in accordance
with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, to wit:
If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice or law or disbarred, it
shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

Ruling of the Court

We adopt and affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.

This rule, according to  Presidential Commission on Good Government v.

Sandiganbayan,[8] traces its lineage to Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the
merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ
should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the

respondent must be shown to have accepted the engagement or employment in
relation to a matter that, by virtue of his judicial office, he had previously
exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. [9]  That showing
was sufficiently made herein. The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the
MTCC of Tangub City, presided over the case before eventually inhibiting
himself from further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted intervention
within the meaning of the rule whose text does not mention the degree or length
of the intervention in the particular case or matter. It is also plain and
unquestionable that Canon 36, supra, from which the canon was derived,
prohibited him as a former member of the Bench from handling any case upon
which he had previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this context, he not only
exercised the power to influence the outcome of the proceedings but also had a
direct hand in bringing about the result of the case by virtue of his having the
power to rule on it.

The restriction extended to engagement or employment. The

respondent could not accept work or employment from anyone that
would involve or relate to any matter in which he had intervened as
a judge except on behalf of the body or authority that he served
during his public employment.[10] The restriction as applied to him
lasted beyond his tenure in relation to the matters in which he had
intervened as judge.[11] Accordingly, the fact that he was already
retired from the Bench, or that he was already in the private practice
of law when he was engaged for the case was inconsequential.

Although the respondent removed himself from the cases once his neutrality and
impartiality were challenged, he ultimately did not stay away from the cases
following his retirement from the Bench, and acted thereon as a lawyer for and in
behalf of the defendants.

The respondent has pleaded for the sympathy of the Court towards his plight of
"poverty." Although we can understand his current situation and symphatize
with him, his actuations cannot be overlooked because they contravened the
express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
any case, his representing the defendants in the civil cases was not the only way
by which he could improve his dire financial situation. It would not be difficult
for him, being a lawyer and a former member of the Bench, to accept clients
whom he could ethically represent in a professional capacity. If the alternatives
open to him were not adequate to his liking, he had other recourses, like serving
as a notary public under a valid commission. His taking on of the defendants'
civil cases despite his previous direct intervention thereon while still a member
of the Bench was impermissible. He should have maintained his ethical integrity
by avoiding the engagement by the defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES ATTY. FELIPE G.

ZAPATOS guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of ONE
(1) MONTH effective immediately upon receipt of this decision, with warning
that a similar offense by him will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of the respondent
and be entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant; and be furnished to
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all lower courts in the
country, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, p. 4.

[2]
 Id. at 482-487.

[3]
 Id. at 483-485.

[4]
 Id. at 482-487.

[5]
 Id. at 486.

[6]
 Id. at 481.

[7]
 Id. at 536.

[8]
 G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 526,569-570.

[9]
 Olazo v. Tiñga, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 1, 15.
 JURISDICTION OF OMBUDSMAN OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 11550 June 4, 2018

MANUEL B. TROVELA, COMPLAINANT,

VS. MICHAEL B. ROBLES, ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR;
EMMANUEL L. OBUNGEN, PROSECUTOR II; JACINTO G. ANG, CITY
PROSECUTOR; CLARO A. ARELLANO, PROSECUTOR GENERAL; AND
LEILA M. DE LIMA, FORMER SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) has no jurisdiction to investigate

government lawyers charged with administrative offenses involving the
performance of their official duties.

The Case

The complainant initiated this disbarment complaint against Pasig City

Assistant Prosecutor Michael B. Robles (Robles) of Pasig City for issuing a
resolution dated September 29, 2011 recommending the dismissal of his
complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code against Carlo L. Katigbak (Katigbak), Carlos Pedro C. Salonga (Salonga) and
Barbara B. Reyes (Reyes) for insufficiency of evidence; and against Prosecutor II
Emmanuel L. Obuñgen (Obuñgen) and City Prosecutor  Jacinto G. Ang (Ang),
both of Pasig City, for approving the recommendation of dismissal.

The complainant also seeks the disbarment of former Prosecutor General Claro
A. Arellano (Arellano) and former Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima (De
Lima) for allegedly incurring inordinate delay in issuing their resolutions
resolving his petition for review and motion for reconsideration before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

Antecedents

On May 25, 2011, the complainant criminally charged Katigbak, Salonga and
Reyes with estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant stated that he became the Employee

Relation Director of Sky Cable on November 1, 2004; that he later on received a
termination letter dated July 6, 2006 signed by Salonga informing him of his
relief from work and of his compensation being paid until the effective date of
his termination; that his payslips for the periods from July 16, 2006 to July 31,
2006 and from August 1, 2006 to August 15, 2006 still reflected deductions of his
savings contributions to the Meralco Employees Savings and Loan Association
(MESALA) amounting to P2,520.00 per payday period; that withholding taxes of
P4,509.45 and P4,235.70, respectively, were also deducted from his
compensation; that he discovered that such deductions were not remitted to
MESALA when he closed his account on September 6, 2006; and that Sky Cable
did not reimburse the amounts of his unremitted deductions despite demand. [1]

In his resolution dated September 29, 2011,[2] Robles recommended the dismissal

of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

Obuñgen and Ang approved the recommendation of dismissal on October 11,

2011.

The complainant filed his petition for review dated November 3, 2011 to appeal
the dismissal of his complaint.[3]

On February 12, 2013, Arellano issued his resolution finding no reversible error
in the September 29, 2011 resolution of Robles, hence, affirming the dismissal of
the complaint.[4]

The complainant moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
Secretary De Lima on April 21, 2015.[5]

Consequently, the complainant initiated disbarment proceedings against the

respondents, insisting thusly:

I.
THE PREMISES CONSIDERED BY THE OPCP IN NOT FINDING PROBABLE
CAUSE IN THE CASE ARE VERY MUCH CONTRARY TO LONG
STANDING JURISPRUDENCE HOLDING THAT DEMAND IS NOT A
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE CRIME OF
EMBEZZLEMENT WHICH MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY OTHER PROOF AND
THAT FAILURE TO ACCOUNT, UPON DEMAND, FOR FUNDS OR
PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
MISAPPROPRIATION.[6]

II.
BUT WHILE THE APPLICATION OF THESE RULINGS HAS BEEN
CONSISTENTLY, REPEATEDLY AND UNEQUIVOCABLY MADE IN MORE
RECENT CASES, IN ACTING ON MY 3 NOVEMBER 2011 PETITION FOR
REVIEW AND ON MY 13 MARCH 2013 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
RESPECTIVELY, RESPONDENTS ARELLANO AND DE
LIMA STILL SUSTAINED THE WRONG PRESUMPTIONS MADE BY THE
OPCP, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.[7]

III.
TOGETHER WITH SUCH OMISSIONS, THE INORDINATE DELAYS ON THE
PART OF RESPONDENTS ARELLANO AND DE LIMA IN COMING OUT
WITH THEIR SEPARATE RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE MERELY ANCHORED
ON THE GROSSLY ERRONEOUS FINDINGS OF THE
OPCP NEGATE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THEY ACTUALLY EXAMINED
THE RECORDS OF THE CASE AND THE EVIDENCE THAT I HAVE
PRESENTED AND INDICATED THEIR LACK OF RESOLVE TO SEE
THAT JUSTICE IS DONE.[8]
 IV.
WHILE THE PRESENCE OF THE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
CORRUPTION AND OTHER ANOMALOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IN
THE PERJURY AND UNJUST JUDGMENT CASES, THE MANIPULATIVE
SCHEMES EMPLOYED BY SKY CABLE IN CERTAIN OF ITS PLEADINGS (sic)
AND THE INORDINATE DELAYS IN ALL THE RELATED CASES ARE VERY
OBVIOUS, RESPONDENT DE LIMA, DESPITE BEING THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE THEN, TOTALLY IGNORED THE SAME.[9]

V.
ABOVE ALL, RESPONDENT DE LIMA TOOK ACTION ON
THE ESTAFA CASE AHEAD OF THE OTHER CASES WITHOUT
CONSOLIDATING THEM DESPITE THE FACT THAT ALL INDICATIONS
CLEARLY POINT TO SUCH CONSOLIDATION.[10]

VI.
THAT SAID, IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT ALL OF THE RESPONDENTS
HAD NOT ONLY RENEGED ON THEIR SWORN DUTY TO UPHOLD THE
LAWS OF THE LAND, BASICALLY AS LAWYERS AND AS PROSECUTORS
OR DISPENSERS OF JUSTICE, WHICH COMPROMISED THE EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, BUT THEY ALSO COMMITTED GROSS
VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN LAWS THEMSELVES.[11]

Should the respondents be administratively disciplined based on the allegations

of the complainant?

Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the administrative case against the respondents for lack of

jurisdiction.

In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant has posited that Robles, Obuñgen

and Ang committed grave errors of facts and law that require an inquiry into
their mental and moral fitness as members of the Bar; and that Arellano and
Secretary De Lima be declared guilty of dereliction of duty or gross inexcusable
negligence for belatedly resolving his petition for review and motion for
reconsideration. He specifically prays that the Court grants the following reliefs,
namely:

xxxx

1. Finding prima facie cases against them for violation of Art. 208 of the RPC
and R.A. No. 3019, as amended, a.k.a. the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,  and
referring the matter to the appropriate governmental agency for the prosecution
thereof;

2. Imposing appropriate disciplinary action against them, including

their disbarment and/or removal from office, for gross violation of the canons
of the legal profession or for unprofessional conduct that casts serious doubt
upon their mental and moral fitness as members of the Bar and as prosecutors;

3. Awarding costs of suit hereof in such amounts as may be commensurate with

the extent and degree of misconduct committed by each of them and
recommending that I be awarded corresponding actual, as well as moral,
exemplary and compensatory damages; and

4. Providing such other reliefs as this Honorable Court may deem just and
equitable under the premises.[12]

xxxx

The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents'

performance or discharge of official duties as prosecutors of the
Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline respondents
Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and Arellano exclusively pertained to their
superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the
authority to discipline pertained to the President. In either case, the authority
may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises
disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15,
paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the
accountability of respondents as officials performing or discharging their official
duties as lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated from their
accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate them as such lawyers.

The Court has recently made this clear in Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay[13] by holding
as follows:

Republic Act No. 6770 (R.A. No. 6770), otherwise known as "The Ombudsman
Act of 1989," prescribes the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section
15, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.

The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the
administrative disciplinary authority to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of any government official when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman is the
government agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil, and criminal
liability of government officials "in every case where the evidence warrants in
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people." In Samson
v. Restrivera,  the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance committed
by any public officer or employee during his or her tenure. Consequently, acts or
omissions of public officials relating to the performance of their functions as
government officials are within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Office of the Ombudsman.
In Spouses Buffe v. Secretary Gonzales, the Court held that the IBP has no
jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged with administrative
offenses involving their official duties. In the present case, the allegations in
Alicias' complaint against Atty. Macatangay, Atty. Zema, Atty. Ronquillo, and
Atty. Buenaflor, which include their (1) failure to evaluate CSC records; (2)
failure to evaluate documentary evidence presented to the CSC; and (3) non-
service of CSC Orders and Resolutions, all relate to their misconduct in the
discharge of their official duties as government lawyers working in the CSC.
Hence, the IBP has no jurisdiction over Alicias' complaint. These are acts or
omissions connected with their duties as government lawyers exercising official
functions in the CSC and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of
their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint filed against all

the respondents for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Jurisdiction of OMBUDSMAN over Administrative Cases

 Exception? Private Dealing by a Government Employee

[G.R. No. 178454. March 28, 2011.]

FILIPINA SAMSON, petitioner, vs. JULIA A. RESTRIVERA,

respondent.
DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision 1 dated October 31, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422 and its Resolution 2 dated June
8, 2007, denying her motion for reconsideration. The CA affirmed the
Ombudsman in finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4 (b) 3 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. CTHDcS

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the

Population Commission with office at the Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez
City, Cavite.

Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia
A. Restrivera, to have the latter's land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered
under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the expenses would reach
P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for
the titling of respondent's land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task
because it was found out that the land is government property. When petitioner
failed to return the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent also filed
an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a
public officer against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4 (b) of R.A.

No. 6713 and suspended her from office for six months without pay. The
Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to abide by the standard set in Section 4
(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of committed
service when she embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a
certificate of title over the latter's land.

Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in an Order 5 dated March

15, 2004, reduced the penalty to three months suspension without pay.
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner's acceptance of respondent's payment
created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short of the standard of
personal conduct required by Section 4 (b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public officials
shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage. The Ombudsman held:

. . . [petitioner] admitted . . . that she indeed received the amount of P50,000.00

from the [respondent] and even contracted Engr. Liberato Patromo, alleged
Licensed Geodetic Engineer to do the surveys.

While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other
government agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property, we
believe, however, that her mere act in accepting the money from the [respondent]
with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of the title is already
enough to create a perception that she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of [R.A.] No. 6713
mandates that public officials and employees shall endeavor to discourage
wrong perception of their roles as dispenser or peddler of undue patronage.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [petitioner's] act to . . . restore the amount of [P50,000] was to avoid possible

sanctions.

. . . [d]uring the conciliation proceedings held on 19 October 2002 at the barangay

level, it was agreed upon by both parties that [petitioner] be given until 28
February 2003 within which to pay the amount of P50,000.00 including interest. If
it was true that [petitioner] had available money to pay and had been persistent
in returning the amount of [P50,000.00] to the [respondent], she would have
easily given the same right at that moment (on 19 October 2002) in the presence
of the Barangay Officials. 6 . . . . (Stress in the original.)

The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman's Order dated March 19, 2004.
The CA ruled that contrary to petitioner's contentions, the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction even if the act complained of is a private matter. The CA also ruled
that petitioner violated the norms of conduct required of her as a public officer
when she demanded and received the amount of P50,000 on the representation
that she can secure a title to respondent's property and for failing to return the
amount. The CA stressed that Section 4 (b) of R.A. No. 6713 requires petitioner to
perform and discharge her duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of her role as a dispenser and peddler of undue patronage. 7
cdasiajur

Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:

1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private

dealing by a government employee or where the act complained of is not related
to the performance of official duty?

2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner

administratively liable despite the dismissal of the estafa case?

3. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower

penalty in view of mitigating circumstances? 8

Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the
performance of official duty, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also
imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for holding her
administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case was dismissed upon a
finding that she was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence misconduct cannot be
attributed to her. And even assuming that she is guilty of misconduct, she is
entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstances such as the fact that this is the
first charge against her in her long years of public service. 9

Respondent counters that the issues raised in the instant petition are the same
issues that the CA correctly resolved. 10 She also alleges that petitioner failed to
observe the mandate that public office is a public trust when she meddled in an
affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered
work. 11

We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is

administratively liable. We hasten to add, however, that petitioner is
guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.

On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction over respondent's complaint against petitioner although
the act complained of involves a private deal between them. 12 Section
13 (1), 13 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can
investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any
public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, or improper. Under Section 16 14 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses
all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public
officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 19 15 of R.A. No. 6770 also
states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited,
to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint
concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected,
the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify
the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be
related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.
Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. 16 DTcACa

On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case
against her was dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is
settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges. 17

For proper consideration instead is petitioner's liability under Sec. 4 (A) (b) of
R.A. No. 6713.

We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:

SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. — (A) Every

public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal
conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. — Public officials and employees shall

always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All
government resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed
and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid
wastage in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. — Public officials and employees shall perform and

discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their
roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. — Public officials and employees shall remain true
to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They
shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on
account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity
except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered
strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are
coterminous with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. — Public officials and employees shall provide service
to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or
preference. ICHcTD

(e) Responsiveness to the public. — Public officials and employees shall

extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise
provided by law or when required by the public interest, public officials and
employees shall provide information on their policies and procedures in clear
and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public
consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions,
simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and
develop an understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions
prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. — Public officials and employees shall at all
times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of
locally-produced goods, resources and technology and encourage appreciation
and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend
Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. — Public officials and employees shall

commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the
principle of public accountability, and manifest by deed the supremacy of
civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the
Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.

(h) Simple living. — Public officials and employees and their families shall
lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not
indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.

(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote
(1) observance of these standards including the dissemination of information
programs and workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular
progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their office
colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2)
continuing research and experimentation on measures which provide positive
motivation to public officials and employees in raising the general level of
observance of these standards.

Both the Ombudsman and CA found the petitioner

administratively liable for violating Section 4 (A) (b) on
professionalism. "Professionalism" is defined as the conduct, aims, or
qualities that characterize or mark a profession. A professional refers to a person
who engages in an activity with great competence. Indeed, to call a person a
professional is to describe him as competent, efficient, experienced, proficient or
polished. 18 In the context of Section 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No. 6713, the observance of
professionalism also means upholding the integrity of public office by
endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage." Thus, a public official or employee should avoid
any appearance of impropriety affecting the integrity of government services.
However, it should be noted that Section 4 (A) enumerates the standards of
personal conduct for public officers with reference to "execution of official
duties." cSIACD

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out
the standard of professionalism by devoting herself on her personal interest to
the detriment of her solemn public duty. The Ombudsman said that petitioner's
act deprived the government of her committed service because the generation of
a certificate of title was not within her line of public service. In denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman said that it would have
been sufficient if petitioner just referred the respondent to the persons/officials
incharge of the processing of the documents for the issuance of a certificate of
title. While it may be true that she did not actually deal with the other
government agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property,
petitioner's act of accepting the money from respondent with the assurance that
she would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a
perception that she is a fixer.

On its part, the CA rejected petitioner's argument that an isolated act is

insufficient to create those "wrong perceptions" or the "impression of influence
peddling." It held that the law enjoins public officers, at all times to respect the
rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good customs, public
order, public policy, public safety and public interest. Thus, it is not the plurality
of the acts that is being punished but the commission of the act itself.

Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4 (A) of R.A. No.
6713 as broad enough to apply even to private transactions that have no
connection to the duties of one's office. We hold, however, that petitioner may
not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No. 6713. The reason
though does not lie in the fact that the act complained of is not at all related to
petitioner's discharge of her duties as department head of the Population
Commission.

In addition to its directive under Section 4 (B), Congress authorized 19 the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to
implement R.A. No. 6713. Accordingly, the CSC issued the Rules Implementing
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(hereafter, Implementing Rules). Rule V of the Implementing Rules provides for
an Incentive and Rewards System for public officials and employees who have
demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of
the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713, to wit: DHIETc

RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM

SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees

who have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their
observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of the Code, namely:

(a) Commitment to public interest. — . . .

(b) Professionalism. — . . .

(c) Justness and sincerity. — . . .

(d) Political neutrality. — . . .

(e) Responsiveness to the public. — . . .

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. — . . .

(g) Commitment to democracy. — . . .

(h) Simple living. — . . .

On the other hand, Rule X of the Implementing Rules enumerates grounds for
administrative disciplinary action, as follows:

RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

DISCIPLINARY ACTION

SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action

prescribed under existing laws, the acts and omissions of any official or
employee, whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary,
hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared unlawful or prohibited by the
Code, shall constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary action, and
without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities provided herein, such as:

(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any

transaction requiring the approval of his office. . . . .

(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer,

employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private
enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by his office, unless expressly
allowed by law; cDHCAE

(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the
Constitution, law or regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with his official functions;

(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which

has a regular or pending official transaction with his office, unless such
recommendation or referral is mandated by (1) law, or (2) international
agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of the functions of his office;

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially

known to him by reason of his office and not made available to the public, to
further his private interests or give undue advantage to anyone, or to prejudice
the public interest;

(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor,

entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of his
official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of, his office. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose
contrary to morals or public policy or any commercial purpose other than by
news and communications media for dissemination to the general public;

(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation

or preference;

(i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;

(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from
receipt, except as otherwise provided in these Rules;

(k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and

papers within a reasonable time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise
provided in these Rules; CSIcTa

(l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of
the office, or to act promptly and expeditiously on public personal transactions;

(m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and
disclosure of business interests and financial connections; and

(n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise
within thirty (30) days from assumption of public office when conflict of interest
arises, and/or failure to divest himself of his shareholdings or interests in private
business enterprise within sixty (60) days from such assumption of public office
when conflict of interest arises: Provided, however, that for those who are
already in the service and a conflict of interest arises, the official or employee
must either resign or divest himself of said interests within the periods herein-
above provided, reckoned from the date when the conflict of interest had arisen.

In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 20 this Court had the occasion to rule
that failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No.
6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action,
to wit:

The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further
comment. The provision commands that "public officials and employees shall
perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said provision merely enunciates
"professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public servants,
in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment
to democracy and simple living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the
Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission
mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to officials and employees who
demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their observance of the
norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated
incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply with the
high standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot
expect the same favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not
provide that they will have to be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of
conduct. Indeed, Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for
administrative disciplinary action only acts "declared unlawful or prohibited by
the Code." Rule X specifically mentions at least twenty three (23) acts or
omissions as grounds for administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by
the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them.
(Emphasis supplied.) DHECac

Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4 (A) (b) of
R.A. No. 6713 in that case.

We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo.

Thus, we reverse the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is
administratively liable under Section 4 (A) (b) of R.A. No. 6713 . In so
ruling, we do no less and no more than apply the law and its implementing rules
issued by the CSC under the authority given to it by Congress. Needless to
stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written in
the law itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. 21

But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for

disciplinary action under R.A. No. 6713?

We also rule in the negative.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be
proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. 22
Conversely, one cannot be found guilty of misconduct in the absence of
substantial evidence. In one case, we affirmed a finding of grave misconduct
because there was substantial evidence of voluntary disregard of established
rules in the procurement of supplies as well as of manifest intent to disregard
said rules. 23 We have also ruled that complicity in the transgression of a
regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes simple misconduct only
as there was failure to establish flagrancy in respondent's act for her to be held
liable of gross misconduct. 24 On the other hand, we have likewise dismissed a
complaint for knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law,
and grave misconduct, since the complainant did not even indicate the particular
acts of the judge which were allegedly violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
25

In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner's violation of an established

and definite rule of action or unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any
of the aggravating elements of corruption, willful intent to violate a law or to
disregard established rules on the part of petitioner. In fact, respondent could
merely point to petitioner's alleged failure to observe the mandate that public
office is a public trust when petitioner allegedly meddled in an affair that
belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered work.
HEaCcD

True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in
the Constitution that public office is a public trust. However, respondent's
allegation that petitioner meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency is a
serious but unproven accusation. Respondent did not even say what acts of
interference were done by petitioner. Neither did respondent say in which
government agency petitioner committed interference. And causing the survey
of respondent's land can hardly be considered as meddling in the affairs of
another government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population
Commission. It does not show that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal
with any government agency. Even the Ombudsman has recognized this fact.
The survey shows only that petitioner contracted a surveyor. Respondent said
nothing on the propriety or legality of what petitioner did. The survey shows
that petitioner also started to work on her task under their agreement. Thus,
respondent's allegation that petitioner received an amount for undelivered work
is not entirely correct. Rather, petitioner failed to fully accomplish her task in
view of the legal obstacle that the land is government property.

However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any
administrative liability.

But first, we need to modify the CA finding that petitioner demanded the
amount of P50,000 from respondent because respondent did not even say that
petitioner demanded money from her. 26 We find in the allegations and counter-
allegations that respondent came to petitioner's house in Biñan, Laguna, and
asked petitioner if she can help respondent secure a title to her land which she
intends to sell. Petitioner agreed to help. When respondent asked about the cost,
petitioner said P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the
initial expenses. 27

We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the
aftermath of the aborted transaction, petitioner still failed to return
the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by the Ombudsman, if
petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of P50,000 until the
preliminary investigation of the estafa case on September 18, 2003, 28 there
would have been no need for the parties' agreement that petitioner be given until
February 28, 2003 to pay said amount including interest. Indeed, petitioner's
belated attempt to return the amount was intended to avoid possible sanctions
and impelled solely by the filing of the estafa case against her. ECaHSI

For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid

amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming
a public officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the
respondents therein were guilty of conduct unbecoming of government
employees when they reneged on their promise to have pertinent documents
notarized and submitted to the Government Service Insurance System after the
complainant's rights over the subject property were transferred to the sister of
one of the respondents. 29 Recently, in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia
J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that unbecoming
conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical
procedure or prescribed method. 30

This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting
standards for public office shall not be countenanced. 31 The Constitution
categorically declares as follows:

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. — Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. 32
Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to
respondent after failing to accomplish the task she had willingly accepted.
However, she waited until respondent sued her for estafa, thus reinforcing the
latter's suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money. Although the
element of deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed against
the petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated basic social
and ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a
public officer, petitioner's transgression could erode the public's trust in
government employees, moreso because she holds a high position in the service.

As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine

in Jamsani-Rodriguez. Under the circumstances of this case, a fine of P15,000 in
lieu of the three months suspension is proper. In imposing said fine, we have
considered as a mitigating circumstance petitioner's 37 years of public service
and the fact that this is the first charge against her. 33 Section 53 34 of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that
mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be considered. And since
petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of P50,000 including interest,
we find it proper to order her to comply with said agreement. Eventually, the
parties may even find time to rekindle their friendship. EAHDac

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals and its Resolution dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as
well as the Decision dated January 6, 2004 and Order dated March 15, 2004 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F, and ENTER a new judgment as follows:

We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose

upon her a FINE of P15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within
five (5) days from finality of this Decision.

We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P50,000.00 with

interest thereon at 12% per annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall
have been fully paid. ADTEaI

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, Brion, Bersamin and Sereno, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 126-142. Penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired Member of this
Court) with the concurrence of Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
2. Id. at 145-146.
3. SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. — (A) Every public official and
employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of
official duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Professionalism. — Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties
with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public
service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
4. Rollo, pp. 37-38.
5. Id. at 40-45.
6. Id. at 42-43.
7. Id. at 141.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 13-16.
10. Id. at 73.
11. Id. at 74.
12. See Santos v. Rasalan, G.R. No. 155749, February 8, 2007, 515 SCRA 97, 102.
13. Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.
xxx xxx xxx
14. SEC. 16. Applicability. — The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in
Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
15. SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but
not limited to acts or omissions which:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Are . . . unfair . . .;
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Are otherwise irregular . . . .
16. See Santos v. Rasalan, supra note 12 at 102, citing Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio, G.R. Nos. 118813-14,
April 8, 1997, 271 SCRA 67, 74.
17. Bejarasco, Jr. v. Buenconsejo, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 212, 221.
18. Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc., G.R. No. 154499, February 27, 2004, 424 SCRA
135, 144, citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
19. SEC. 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations, Administration and Enforcement of this Act. —
The Civil Service Commission shall have the primary responsibility for the administration and enforcement
of this Act. . . . .
The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations necessary
to carry out the provisions of this Act, . . . .
20. G.R. No. 176127, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 476, 484.
21. See Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251, 288-
289, citing Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 161, 175, Sierra
Madre Trust v. Sec. of Agr. and Natural Resources, Nos. L-32370 & 32767, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 384
and People v. Maceren, No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450.
22. See Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589,
603.
23. Roque v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179245, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 660, 675.
24. Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Organo, G.R. No. 149549, February 26, 2004, 424 SCRA 9, 17.
25. Diomampo v. Alpajora, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1880, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 534, 539-540.
26. Rollo, pp. 20-21, 73-76.
27. Id. at 27-28.
28. Id. at 23.
29. A.M. No. P-02-1591, June 21, 2002, 383 SCRA 403, 406-407.
30. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010, p. 22.
31. Pablejan v. Calleja, A.M. No. P-06-2102, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 562, 569.
32. Sec. 1 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
33. Rollo, p. 44.
34. Sec. 53. . . . Mitigating . . . Circumstances. —
xxx xxx xxx
j. Length of service in the government
xxx xxx xxx