Aur22 P

AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
Team Code: AUR 22
AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
8TH – 9TH MAY 2021
IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF ARYAVARTA
Writ Petition No. xxxx
In the Matter of
MR. VINCENT & ORS. ………………………..PETITIONER
VS.
THE UNION OF ARYAVARTA ……..…………RESPONDENT
ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF ARYAVARTA
UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARYAVARTA
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
0
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………….…. 1
2.LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………..……. 2
3.INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………………3
4.STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………………… 5
5.STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………………………...……… 6
6.ISSUES RAISED…………………………………………………………………………..…... 8
7.SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………………………………….… 9
8.ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………………… 11
{1} Whether the SLP admitted by the SC is maintainable……………………………………….11
1.1 The petitioner has the Locus Standi in the present case to file a SLP in the SC…. ……..11
1.2 The petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of SC under Art.136 when there is a question of
law of general public importance in the matter………… ……………………………….11
{2} Whether the present case attracts charges under section 498A of APC. …………….……...12
2.1 The respondent was not subjected to mental cruelty. …………………………….… 13
{3} Whether the anti-conversion ordinance is constitutional and valid under eyes of law……....16
3.1 The Ordinance was passed in haste to escape the democratic process…….……….. 17
3.2 The Ordinance is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. …………….…………18
3.3 The Ordinance is against the spirit of Basic Structure of the Constitution……….….19
3.3.1 Secularism………………………………………….…………………... 19
3.3.2 Personal liberty and autonomy and freedom of choice…………………. 20
3.3.3 Right to privacy………………………………………………………… 23
{4} Whether the conversion of respondent was legal………………………………… …………24
9. PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………………… 27
1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Full Form
& And
¶ Paragraph
§ Section
AIR All India Reporter
All ER All England Law Reports
Anr. Another
APC Aryavarta Penal Code
Art. Article
Const. Constitution
FIR First Information Report
HC High Court
Ibid. Ibidem
ICCPR International Covenant For Civil and Political Rights
IJPAM Indian Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics
IJR International Journal of Research
IPC Indian Penal Code
No. Number
Ors. Others
Rev. Reverend
Sec. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Case
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
SLP Special Leave Petition
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
V. Versus
Vs. Versus
2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAWS:
1. C.C.E v Standard Motor Products, (1989) AIR 1298 (SC). ...............................12
2. Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1. ...........................................21
3. Gollins v. Gollins, (1963) 2 All ER 966. ..............................................................14
4. Jamshed Hormusji Wadia Vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, AIR 2004 SC
1815. ......................................................................................................................12
5. Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and ors vs. State of Kerala and Anr, 1973 (3)
SCC 225. ................................................................................................................21
6. KS Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1. ............................................23
7. Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors, (2006) 5 SCC 475. .......................23
8. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248. ........................................24
9. N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss and Ors., (2007) 9 SCC 196. .............................12
10. N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534. .................................................15
11. Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666. ..................12
12. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, AIR 2006 SC 1675. .............................................16
13. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1. ....................................25
14. Praveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002) 5 SCC 706. .........................................16
15. Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667. ......................................15
16. Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169:1950 SCR 453. ..................................12
17. Ramgopal v. State of M.P, (2010) 13 SCC 540. .................................................17
18. Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, 1977 SCR (2) 611. ...........19
19. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1. ..............................................20
20. Savitri Pandey V. Prem Chandra Pandey AIR 2002 SC 591. ..............................16
21. Shafin Jahan vs Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368. ............................................22
22. Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Ors, (2018) 7 SCC 192. .........................21,22
23. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1. ............................................25
24. Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas, (2018) 2 SCC 197. ...............................................21
25. Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100. .............................16
26. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337. ..........................................................15
3
STATUTES:
1. Indian Penal Code, Act No. 45 of 1860 (India)…………………….. …9,12,16,27
2. Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, U.P.
Ordinance No. 21, 2020 (India)……………………………………… ….21,22,25
CONSTITUTION
1. INDIA CONST………………………………………………………………5,17,18,20
LAW COMMISSION REPORTS:
1. 243rd Law Commission, Report on Section 498A, IPC (2012),

https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report243.pdf. ………………………..14
JOURNALS:
1. Hashika and M. Kannappan, A Critical Study on Misuse of Section 498A of Indian
Penal Code, 1860, 119 IJPAM 1143, 1148 (2018)…………………………………13
2. Karan Godara, Misuse of section 498A IPC-Judicial trend, 4 Paripex IJR 213, 213
(2015)……………………………………………………………………………….16
ONLINE SOURCES:
1. Ashok KM, Mental agony of being arrested and detained in Section #498A IPC case
amounts to cruelty against husband: Allahabad HC, LiveLaw, (April 29, 2021, 19:21).
……………………………………………………………………………………..16
2. Australian Psychological Society,
https://www.psychology.org.au/getmedia/74e7a437-997c-4eea-a49c-
30726ce94cf0/20APS-IS-COVID-19-Public-Lockdown-fatigue.pdf (last visited
Apr.29, 2021)………………………………………………………………………..14
3. National Crime Record Bureau, Crime in India 2019,
https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/CII%202019%20Volume%201.pdf ………13
4. National Anti-conversion Law Not Tenable: Law Ministry, DECCAN CHRONICLE (Apr.
15, 2015), http://www.dec canherald.com/content/471944/national-anti-conversion-
law-not.html. …… ……..……….…………………………………………………17
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
1. International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, 1966…………..………….19,23

2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948……………………….……………...19
4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavarta to
hear the instant petition and appeal by virtue of:
Article 32 of the Constitution of Aryavarta, 19491 -
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

32. (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement
of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause
(1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise
within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by
the Supreme Court under clause (2)
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as
otherwise provided for by this Constitution
Article 136 of the Constitution of Aryavarta, 19492 -

Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
136. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in
its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by
any court or tribunal in the territory of India
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence,
or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any
law relating to the Armed Forces
The petitioners humbly submit to the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavarta
(pari materia to the laws of the Republic of India).
1 INDIA CONST. art.32.

2 INDIA CONST. art. 136.
5
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. The Union of Aryavarta, a peninsular, quasi-federal sovereign territory, is a secular
and democratic country with a number of fundamental rights, including the freedom
of religion, enshrined in its constitution. The majority of the population consist of
people of the Hindu religion, about 75%, and the rest comprise of people belonging to
Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.
II. The 2017 Central Government election brought to power, the Aryavartian People
Party (APP), a right-wing nationalist and populist party, who replaced a liberal,
inclusive, and pluralist Aryavartian Congretial Party (ACP) by a considerably large
margin.
III. At the start of 2019, a communicable and viral outbreak of the Corona virus wreaked
havoc on the day-to-day functions of the state, bringing a premature end to the
summer session of the parliament. During this time and in-light of the upcoming state
elections in a vital Uttam Desh, a highly controversial and socially divisive “Unlawful
conversion of religion Ordinance3” was promulgated by the President without
parliamentary vote on the 18th of May 2019. It brought in provisions to prohibit
unlawful conversions through misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion,
allurement or by any fraudulent means or by marriage, but was met immediately by
strong criticism through opposition parties and influential thinkers. The ordinance is
considered to be a political tool to gain an edge through such polarised policies, in the
upcoming Uttam Desh state elections. It is currently in-force across the nation, with
further notice pending.
IV. Mrs. Sukrati, a Hindu married Mr. Vincent, a Christian from an affluent family, who
was also her boss in an IT company, on February 14, 2019 under the Special Marriage
Act, 1956 in Zumbai, unaware of the soon to come anti-conversion ordinance.
Sukrati’s parents were not privy to her marriage. Days after the wedding, the couple
embarked to Vincent’s hometown in the Gemini district, upon invitation from his
parents.
V. Mr. Vincent’s mother expressed her willingness to hold a marriage ceremony
according to Christian rituals and she wanted to convert Sukrati to Christianity for the
33
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, U.P. Ordinance No. 21, 2020
(India).
6
same, to which Sukrati agreed, though initially hesitant. The conversion took place on
May 22, 2019 and subsequently the marriage, on May 25, 2019.
VI. Soon after, Sukrati planned to return to work back in Zumbai but this was postponed
due to the lack of transportation thanks to the Covid-19 pandemic. Her husband,
however, was able to make the journey back through hitchhiking and private services.
On July 25, 2019, a few private transportation services were given the go-ahead and
Sukrati expressed her will to make her way back to Zumbai. Vincent’s parents,
however, did not allow her to do so and preventing her from leaving the house in light
of the ongoing pandemic and general safety of the woman. This created a rift between
the couple and after 3 months of living at her in-laws’ house, Sukrati finally decided
to let her parents know about the on-going situation in her marriage which infuriated
her father. She also requested her father to take her away from the in-laws’ house.
VII. Sukrati’s father filed an FIR from the Zigjag district under the anti-conversion
ordinance. Sukrati herself filed another FIR from the Gemini district under Sec. 498A
of Aryavartian Penal Code, 1860. This led to the arrest of her in-laws by the police
forces of the Zigjag and Gemini districts, who worked together. The District
Magistrate of Gemini issued a non-bailable warrant against Vincent under Sec. 498A
and denied bail to Sukrati’s in-laws.
VIII. To counter, Sukrati’s in-laws filed a special leave petition before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Aryavarta at the admission stage, and a writ petition challenging
the constitutional validity of the ordinance.
IX. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Aryavarta, on account of the substantial question of
law, referred the petitions and applications to a constitutional bench, which scheduled
the first hearing.
7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Following are the issues to be considered by the SC of Aryavarta.
{1} Whether the SLP admitted by the SC is maintainable.
1.3 The petitioner has the Locus Standi in the present case to file a SLP in the SC.
1.4 The petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of SC under Art.136 when there is a
question of law of general public importance in the matter.
{2} Whether the present case attracts charges under section 498A of APC.
2.1 The respondent was not subjected to mental cruelty.
{3} Whether the anti-conversion ordinance is constitutional and valid under the eyes of law.
3.1 The Ordinance was passed in haste to escape the democratic process.
3.3 The Ordinance is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.
3.3The Ordinance is against the spirit of Basic Structure of the Constitution.
3.3.4 Secularism
3.3.5 Personal liberty and autonomy and freedom of choice
3.3.6 Right to privacy
{4} Whether the conversion of respondent was unlawful.
8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
{1} Whether the SLP admitted by the SC is maintainable
It is humbly submitted before the SC that the SLP filed is very much maintainable as the
judgment given by the Magistrate Court does not render substantial justice hence needs
intervention from the SC. The petitioners have the required locus standi as the SC can hear an
appeal from ‘any judgment in any cause or matter’ hence it can use its discretion to correct
the blatant injustice done in the case. Secondly, the case concerns question of law of general
public importance as the whole anti-conversion ordinance is in question hence the SC should
step in and hear the matter as it is of public interest. Therefore, the SLP was rightly admitted
by the SC and it should be held maintainable in this present matter.
{2} Whether the present case attracts charges under section 498A of APC.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble SC of Aryavarta that Sec. 498A of APC has been
wrongly invoked by the respondent. The counsel asserts that the law has been misused for the
respondent’s personal benefit and vengeance. It is established that there was no bad intention
in the restriction and the restriction was a mere condition which was reasonable in nature
considering the ongoing pandemic. The respondent has exaggerated the events which was
done for her own wellbeing. The issue is also an ordinary wear or tear and the respondent
filing the FIR had acted sensitively to the issue. Thus, this is a clear misuse of sec.498A that
is well prevalent in our society which is not new for the judiciary as well.
{3} Whether the impugned ordinance is Constitutionally valid?

It is submitted that the President of Aryavarta cannot promulgate the Ordinance on a subject of
“public order” as it is a state subject according to Schedule 7. This ordinance has been passed
only to escape democratic process of the parliament and further the propaganda of the ruling
party for the coming elections. The impugned ordinance, in pith and substance, is violative of
the basic structure doctrine as it is against the secular fabric of the nation and infringes
individual dignity by depriving them of liberty, autonomy, right to choose and right to privacy.
Further, it violates freedom of conscience guaranteed by Article 25 on arbitrary grounds. The
act is unjust, unfair, and unreasonable and hence, must be struck down.
{4} Whether the religious conversion was unlawful?
The counsel submits that the petitioners were arrested under the provisions of the arbitrary and
unconstitutional ordinance and were deprived of their right to life and liberty. There was no
9
fraud, force, coercion, misrepresentation, or allurement for the conversion. The couple knew
each other very well and had took enough time before deciding to get married under Special
Marriage Act, 1954. The in-laws by asking Ms. Sukrati to change her religion were just
practicing their right to propagate and it was up to her to take the decision. She is independent
and educated enough to take decisions for herself in such situation. Hence, there is no evidence
of any forced or unlawful conversion in this case and the FIR must be quashed.
10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
{1} WHETHER THE SLP ADMITTED BY THE SC IS MAINTAINABLE.
(¶1.) It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble Supreme Court [hereinafter mentioned SC] that
the Special Leave Petition [hereinafter mentioned SLP] filed against the judgment given by the
Magistrate Court is maintainable because the judgment is not given on sound judicial lines
hence substantial justice has not been rendered.
(¶2.) The petitioners shall prove that the SLP filed is maintainable by proving that they have
the necessary locus standi and that the matter involves a substantial question of law of general
public importance.
1.1 The petitioner has the Locus Standi in the present case to file a SLP in the SC
(¶3.) It is humbly submitted before this very hon’ble SC that the petitioners have the necessary
locus standi to file a SLP under Art.136 of the constitution. In Pritam Singh v. State4, the court
observed that the SC can look into “appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order"
which occur therein, and which obviously cover a wide range of matters and secondly the
phrase ‘in any cause or matter’”. The power is permitted to be invoked not in a routine fashion
but in very exceptional circumstances as when a question of law of general public importance
arises or a decision sought to be impugned before this Court shocks its conscience.5 Therefore,
the petitioner can bring in criminal appeal from the magistrate court as the SC has the residual
provision which enables it to interfere with the judgment of any court or order in its discretion.6
1.2 The petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of SC under Art.136 when there is a
question of law of general public importance in the matter.
(¶4.) The SC, under Art.136, is conferred with a corrective jurisdiction and not a restrictive
one. It has the power to settle a wronged judgment right and in line with the constitution. It is
the residuary power of the SC where the court is convinced that injustice has been done. 7 In
matters where there is a question of law of general public importance, SLP can be filed to
invoke its jurisdiction. In this present matter, the rights of many person willing to convert
4 Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169:1950 SCR 453.

5 Jamshed Hormusji Wadia Vs. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, AIR 2004 SC 1815.
6 N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss and Ors., (2007) 9 SCC 196.
7 C.C.E v Standard Motor Products, (1989) AIR 1298 (SC); Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority,
(2002) 4 SCC 666.
11
religion out of their own will are in a question. It is of a public interest and national importance
as the constitutionality and validity of the whole anti-conversion ordinance is a question.
(¶5.) Hence, it is proven before the court that the case at hand involves question of law of
general public importance and the necessary locus standi is fulfilled thus making the SLP filed
by the petitioners maintainable under Art.136 of the Constitution. The SC should also interfere
into this matter to take care of the blatant injustice done to the petitioners which otherwise
would cause an irreparable damage to them.
{2} WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE ATTRACTS CHARGES UNDER SECTION

498A OF APC.
(¶6.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble SC Of Aryavarta that Sec. 498A8 of APC has
been wrongly invoked by the respondent in the present matter and the denial of bail to in-laws
and the issue of a non-bailable warrant against Mr. Vincent must be revoked. Ultimately the
FIR should be quashed in the present matter.
(¶7.) It is clear that the respondent has falsely slapped charges under Sec.498A and has misused
it for her own benefit. Such misuse has been seen and heard in many hon’ble courts including
this SC and the counsel for the petitioners asserts that this too is one of the kinds.
(¶8.) The law under Sec. 498A states that:
“Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman
to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb, or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman; or
8 Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 498A.
12
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is
on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
(¶9.) In 2012, the NCRB released a report which showed that the rate of filing a charge sheet
under Sec. 498A was as huge as 93.6% while the conviction rate for the same was as low as
15%. This is sufficient to show that there are many false cases filed and the same are being
disposed of by various courts in this country. Recently, cases under Sec. 498A were found to
have the lowest conviction rate, at merely 12.1%, among all cases of crimes against women.9
The present matter is also of the same issue and the counsel for the petitioners assert that the
FIR filed under sec.498A, is a clear misuse of the law by the respondents. To portray the
severity, there are various instances of such misuse that have prompted social organisations
such as Harassed Husbands Association, to protect harassed husbands from false allegations
by their wife.10
2.1 The respondent was not subjected to mental cruelty.
(¶10.) In this present matter, the counsel for petitioners put forth that there was no mental
cruelty inflicted on the respondent by them. The mere condition, that the in-laws’ politely
prevented the respondent to not leave the house to travel alone without her husband, does not
amount to mental cruelty. In the age where crimes against women are increasing with a total
of 4,05,861 cases of crime against women were registered during 2019, showing an increase
of 7.3% over 2018 (3,78,236 cases).11 In this, around 17.9% of the crimes are registered under
‘Kidnapping & Abduction of Women’ and 7.9% under ‘Rape’. The statistics mentioned above
are from government agency and are sufficient to show that the world outside is unsafe for
women and if Sukrati had stepped outside her in-law’s house and had travelled alone, she would
have risked experiencing one of the crimes, especially in an environment where law
enforcement officers were made extremely busy by the impeding pandemic. The condition
enforced by the in-laws was just to keep the respondent in a safe environment as opposed to
subjecting her to mental cruelty.
9 A. Hashika and M. Kannappan, A Critical Study on Misuse of Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860, 119
IJPAM 1143, 1148 (2018).
10 Id.
11 National Crime Record Bureau, Crime in India 2019,
https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/CII%202019%20Volume%201.pdf
13
(¶11.) As said in the case Gollins v. Gollins12 by Lord Reid, cruelty depends on the intention
and knowledge of the petitioners and the nature of their conduct towards the respondent. The
counsel for petitioners strongly asserts that the condition of restraint was merely for the safety
purpose of the respondent from both the crimes in the society and from the ongoing pandemic.
The in-laws, in good faith, strictly did not allow the respondent because of their love and care
for their daughter-in-law. This issue is very trivial in nature and has been exaggerated by the
respondent in this present matter. Sukrati has said that “she was feeling like a prisoner in her
in-law's house” It is a matter of common knowledge that exaggerated versions of the incidents
are reflected in a large number of complaints13 . The court took note of the common tendency
to implicate husband and all his immediate relations. 14The respondent, in using words like
‘prisoner-like’ is very much only exaggerating her feelings, as she was not experiencing
anything close to what the environment is like in the prison and could also be a case of
lockdown fatigue.15
(¶12.) To further strengthen the arguments, that the statements made by the respondent is
exaggerated, and that there was no mental cruelty, it is important to understand the term mental
cruelty. Although there is not any explicit definition of mental cruelty, various famous case
laws and judgments have elaborated on the concept which can be borrowed to find a solution
to the present matter.
(¶13.) To begin with the case N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane16 in which the hon’ble apex court
laid down the test of cruelty as which is “of such a character as to cause in the mind of the
petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with
the spouse”. In the present matter the respondent has an unreasonable apprehension that the
restriction on her will continue forever and will be harmful and injurious to her. It is
unreasonable because this restriction was imposed because of the temporary prevailing
scenario of the ongoing pandemic and the restriction, or say the mere condition, itself was so
that she can avoid the harm out there. There is no inference that this condition will make the
12 Gollins v. Gollins, [1964] AC 644: (1963) 2 All ER 966.

13 Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667.
14 Page 3, 243rd Law Commission Report at https://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report243.pdf.
15 Australian Psychological Society, https://www.psychology.org.au/getmedia/74e7a437-997c-4eea-a49c-
30726ce94cf0/20APS-IS-COVID-19-Public-Lockdown-fatigue.pdf (last visited Apr.29, 2021)

16 N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534.
14
situation more injurious and harmful for the respondent to live with the petitioner and the
petitioner does not intend the same as well.
(¶14.) What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case and it is a matter
to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case 17. The
facts and circumstances in this case, which is the on-going pandemic, made it necessary for the
in-laws to restrict the respondent for her own good. There is no wrong found in the in-laws’
expectation that their son should only bring his wife, the respondent, outside their house at this
point in time. There is no mental cruelty intended by the in-laws and the respondent was only
kept inside the house for her own safety. She was not deprived of anything else and was not
kept inside the house like a ‘prisoner’ as the respondent had called it. She was treated well and
taken care of by her in-laws.
(¶15.) The court in Parveen Mehta vs. Inderjit Mehta18, held that “in case of mental cruelty it
will not be a correct approach to take an instance of misbehaviour in isolation and then pose
the question whether such behaviour is sufficient by itself to cause mental cruelty.” The in-
laws’ condition might have been viewed as strict for a temporary period of time, but it is
definitely not sufficient to say that it has caused mental cruelty to the respondent. The
restriction was due to the on-going pandemic and this is just one instance and it will not be a
continuing act for it to cause mental cruelty to the respondent.
(¶16.) The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed
to or their economic and social conditions and their culture and human values to which they
attach importance19. The important aspect that is to be considered, is the social condition that
the parties are residing in. The social condition, influenced by the ongoing pandemic had
prompted the in-laws to restrict the respondent for quite some time with a justified reason. If
the social condition is not to be considered, then definitely the behaviours of the in-laws will
seem to be like mental cruelty to the respondent.
(¶17.) In the case of Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey20, the apex court held that,
17 V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337.

18 Praveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002) 5 SCC 706.
19 Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, AIR 2006 SC 1675.
20 Savitri Pandey V. Prem Chandra Pandey AIR 2002 SC 591.
15
“Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It
cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the
basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with
the other.”
Here, the counsel asserts that the respondent has acted very sensitively in filing a FIR under
Sec. 498A for such a trivial issue that happens on a common basis. This restriction was only
due to the unforeseen scenario of the pandemic and is an ordinary wear and tear that will
dissolve by itself after sometime.
(¶18.) Since, Sec. 498A is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable offence, the law
has become a handy tool for many women to get their personal revenge on and unleash any
sort of harassment from their side as well. In the famous case of Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union
of India21, the court remarked that “by misuse of the provision (498A APC), a new legal
terrorism can be unleashed”. It is the duty of the court in which the case is in front of them to
dispose of frivolous cases and provide relief to the harassed husbands and their relatives. In
Ramgopal v. State of M.P 22 , the Apex court recommended that Sec. 498A be made
compoundable so that amicable settlement can be reached between the parties. 23 Further, the
Law commission’s 243rd report suggested to make the offence under Sec. 498A Non-
cognizable and Bailable, so that misuse of the law can be mitigated because recently, the
Allahabad HC had observed that false allegation of husband and his relatives under Sec. 498A
itself causes mental cruelty and agony.24
(¶19.) Thus, it is sufficiently proven that the respondent had exaggerated a trivial matter and
has falsely accused her in-laws of mental cruelty and filed a FIR under Sec. 498A which should
be quashed as there exists no strong grounds of mental cruelty that the respondent has alleged
being subjected to.
{3} WHETHER THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONALITY

VALID.
21 Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100.

22 Ramgopal v. State of M.P, (2010) 13 SCC 540.
23 Karan Godara, Misuse of section 498A IPC-Judicial trend, 4 Paripex IJR 213, 213 (2015).
24 Ashok KM, Mental agony of being arrested and detained in Section #498A IPC case amounts to cruelty
against husband: Allahabad HC, LIVELAW, (April 29, 2021, 19:21).
16
(¶20.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Apex Court that the Ordinance for “Unlawful
Conversion of religion” that was promulgated on May 18, 2019 by the President of Aryavarta
must be held Constitutionally invalid because it is in contravention to the law, the Constitution
and many of the judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. To prove the same, the submissions
of the petitioner are as follows
3.1 The Ordinance was passed in haste to escape the democratic process.
(¶21.) Firstly, the counsel submits before this Hon’ble Court that the Parliament does not have
legislative competence to pass such a legislation. A National legislation cannot be brought in
this regard as the law relates with “public order” which comes under Entry 1 of the State list in
the Seventh Schedule25. Hence, the President cannot promulgate an Ordinance on a subject that
is outside the legislative competence of the Parliament.
(¶22.) Secondly, the President under Article 123 of the Constitution has been given the
legislative power and an Ordinance can be promulgated in the absence of legislative sittings,
in the wake of circumstances demanding swift legislative action26. However, three conditions
must be fulfilled before exercising this power:
“(a) either House of Parliament is not in session;
(b) circumstances exist which require the President to act immediately; and
(c) the President is satisfied as to the existence of these circumstances.” 27
(¶23.) The first question which should be asked here is whether the circumstances existed
which rendered it necessary for the President to issue the Ordinance without awaiting the next
Parliamentary session. Factually, such situation does not exist.
(¶24.) It should be noted that no reliable data or material shows that the problem of unlawful
religious conversion has become widespread or has been increasing at a rapid rate that it can
be considered as an emergency to promulgate an Ordinance. During such hard times, such a
hasty act by the ruling government to bring an Ordinance on an issue which is not even
alarming at present, raises many questions.
25 National Anti-conversion Law Not Tenable: Law Ministry, DECCAN CHRONICLE (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.dec canherald.com/content/471944/national-anti-conversion-law-not.html.
27 Ibid.
17
(¶25.) It will not be out of place to mention here, that the present government’s track record
with respect to protection of minorities has not been good. Violent communal incidents, human
rights violation and crimes against minorities have been increasing in the recent years but not
much has been done to prevent them. There have been allegations that the Ordinance is just
another move to target the minorities and entice the votes of majority in the coming Uttam
Pradesh election.
(¶26.) Hence, it would not be far-fetched to say that taking the advantage current pandemic,
the Ordinance has been used as a tool just to escape from the democratic parliamentary process
and propagate the anti-minority agenda of the ruling party for the coming elections. This can
be a step to eliminate their party’s negative publicity to mitigate chances of losing the elections.
Therefore, by passing such an ordinance, the provisions and principles of the Constitution have
been compromised.
3.2 The Ordinance is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.
(¶27.) Article 25 of the Constitution gives us the freedom to of conscience and free profession,
practice, and propagation of religion28. This right is subject to public order, morality and health
as has been provided under Article 25 (1). The definition of the word conscience, according to
the Merriam-Webster dictionary is the sense or consciousness of the moral goodness or
blameworthiness of one's own conduct, intentions, or character together with a feeling of
obligation to do right or be good. Every citizen the right to choose or not to choose a faith and
exercise their freedom of conscience. Further, the term “propagate” was included by the
Constituent Assembly which indicates that the right also includes to persuade others to join
their faith.
(¶28.) In Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors 29 case, the Hon’ble SC while
upholding the two state anti- conversion laws The Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 and
Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam, 1968 observed that the fundamental right
to “propagate” religion does not include the right to convert a person to another religion. It was
held that:
“The Acts therefore clearly provide for the maintenance of public order for, if forcible
conversion had not been prohibited, that would have created public disorder in the States” 30
28 INDIA CONST. art. 25, cl. 1.

29 Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, 1977 SCR (2) 611.
30 Ibid.
18
(¶29.) It is of great importance to note here what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) says on the issue. Article 18 protects right to convert from one religion to another
stating,
“the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion…….includes freedom to change

[one’s] religion or belief….”31
(¶30.) Further, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in General
Comment No. 2232 elaborates on the right to convert:
“The Committee observes that the freedom to ‘have or to adopt’ a religion or belief necessarily
entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current
religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s
religion or belief.”
(¶31.) The problem with such a law is that here, the Fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution is becoming subordinate to a public order that can be disturbed due to intolerance
of a community or society. If each isolated case of religious conversion will be seen as illegal
or forced and even the burden of proof is also on the accused, the freedom of conscience under
this article will have no meaning. It should not be the matter for the state to try and determine
the “correct intentions” and validity in everyone’s personal beliefs and decisions. Choosing to
follow any religion either after getting influenced by reading the scriptures or converting to
one’s spouse’s religion is a matter of individual autonomy and not “public order”. The
impugned Ordinance gives power to the state to regulate the citizens from practicing their
freedom of conscience. The state intervention in such matter is completely unnecessary and
arbitrary.
3.3 The Ordinance is against the spirit of Basic Structure of the Constitution
3.3.1 Secularism
(¶32.) It is submitted before this Hon’ble court that the government through the impugned
ordinance is trying to assume the role of protecting the religious identities of the people while
showing intolerance towards the religious choice of the people which in itself is an attack on
31 Article 18, UDHR.

32 General Comment No.22, ICCPR.
19
the secular fabric of the country that holds us together. In the case of S.R. Bommai v. 33, it
was observed that
“.. while the citizens of this country are free to profess, practice and propagate such religion,
faith or belief as they choose, so far as the state is concerned i.e., from the point of view of the
State, the religion, faith or belief of a person is immaterial. To it, all are equal and all entitled
to be treated equally.”
(¶33.) The term “secular” is the part of the preamble of our Constitution which represents the
basic structure. The presumption should always be that religious matters are not for the state to
interfere with. Therefore, such attempts of religious policing by the state must not be ignored
as they directly attack the basic structure of the Constitution itself.
3.3.2 Personal liberty and autonomy and freedom of choice.
(¶34.) Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads,
“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law.”34
In Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and ors vs. State of Kerala and Anr35, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the basic structure of the Constitution is built on the basic foundation,
i.e., the dignity and freedom of the individual and the duty of the State is not limited to the
protection of individual interest but extends to acts for the achievement of the general welfare
in all cases where it can safely act.
(¶35.) However, the impugned ordinance violates an individual’s freedom of choice, personal
liberty and right to privacy.
(¶36.) In Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas36, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the adult citizens
are capable of making their own choices and they have the right to do so. Further, the Hon’ble
Apex court in Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Ors37 has emphasized on the true meaning
of the right of choice of an individual which is inextricably linked to his/ her dignity as under:
33 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

35 Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru and ors vs. State of Kerala and Anr, 1973 (3) SCC 225.
36 Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas, (2018) 2 SCC 197.
37 Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Ors, (2018) 7 SCC 192.
20
“The choice of an individual is an inextricable part of dignity, for dignity cannot be thought of
where there is erosion of choice. True it is, the same is bound by the principle of constitutional
limitation but in the absence of such limitation, none, we mean, no one shall be permitted to
interfere in the fructification of the said choice. If the right to express one's own choice is
obstructed, it would be extremely difficult to think of dignity in its sanctified completeness.”
(¶37.) Similarly, in Common Cause v. Union of India38, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme
Court held:
“346. … Our autonomy as persons is founded on the ability to decide: on what to wear and
how to dress, on what to eat and on the food that we share, on when to speak and what we
speak, on the right to believe or not to believe, on whom to love and whom to partner, and to
freely decide on innumerable matters of consequence and detail to our daily lives.”
(¶38.) However, it is quite clear from the wordings of the impugned ordinance that while
framing the provisions, it has been assumed that all the religious conversions that take place
are illegally forced upon the individuals who may already have attained the age of majority.
While disregarding individual’s freedom, the Ordinance assumes the doctrine of “parens
patriae” and it is automatically assumed that every religious conversion is brought about by
any influence or coercion. No exception of any kind is given in case of a voluntary conversion.
In fact, even if the conversion is not forced and the person willingly decides to convert, a very
long, unreasonable procedure has to be followed for it to become a lawful conversion.
(¶40.) The Sections 8 and 9 of the impugned Ordinance39 lays down the procedure for the
declaration before any religious conversion and pre-report about the conversion along with the
punishment for violation of the provision. The provisions clearly interfere with the personal
liberty of every individual who willingly chooses to convert from one religion to another. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shafin Jahan vs Asokan K.M. 40, has emphasized on the ill effects of
such state intervention as under:
“The superior courts, when they exercise their jurisdiction parens patriae do so in the case of
persons who are incapable of asserting a free will such as minors or persons of unsound mind.
The exercise of that jurisdiction should not transgress into the area of determining the
38 Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.

39 Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020, §8 & §9, U.P. Ordinance No.
21, 2020 (India).
40 Shafin Jahan vs Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 368.
21
suitability of partners to a marital tie. That decision rests exclusively with the individuals
themselves. Neither the state nor society can intrude into that domain. The strength of our
Constitution lies in its acceptance of the plurality and diversity of our culture. Intimacies of
marriage, including the choices which individuals make on whether or not to marry and on
whom to marry, lie outside the control of the state. Courts as upholders of constitutional
freedoms must safeguard these freedoms.”
(¶41.) Clearly, the impugned Ordinance gives encroaching and scrutinizing power to the state
in the matter very personal to any individual and is a grave assault to an individual’s liberty. In
fact, giving such excessive administrative power in the hands of the state increases the threat
of abuse of such power which may have catastrophic impact on the personal space of many
individuals. It places very unnecessary restrictions on an individual adult’s personal decision,
that it has to be approved by the state.
(¶42.) The Ordinance even prohibits “conversion by marriage” as is provided under Section 3.
Further, Section 6 invalidates any marriage done “for the sole purpose of conversion” and
makes it mandatory to follow Section 8 and 9 to solemnize such inter-faith marriages41. This
may have drastic consequences for inter-faith couples. This is against the precedent set by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Ors42 giving right to every adult
to choose whoever they want to marry and infringes the right of choice of adults.
(¶43.) It is the bitter truth that even today, many inter-castes and inter-faith couples face
harassment and torture by the hands of their own family members and in some cases even
death, popularly known today as “Honour Killings”. The Apex Court in Lata Singh vs State of
Uttar Pradesh and Ors 43, while strictly criticizing such acts of honour killings held that it is
the right of an adult individual to marry whoever he/ she likes irrespective of the caste and
religion and also directed to protect such couples while instituting criminal proceedings against
the perpetrators.
(¶44.) However, as per the Section 4 of the Ordinance44 in question, any aggrieved person,
his/her parents, brother, sister, or any other person who is related to him/her by blood, marriage,
or adoption may lodge an FIR of such conversion which contravenes the provisions of Section
41 Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020, §6,8 & §9, U.P. Ordinance No.
21, 2020 (India).
42 Shakti Vahini v. Union of India and Ors, (2018) 7 SCC 192.
43 Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors, (2006) 5 SCC 475.
44 Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020, §4, U.P. Ordinance No. 21,
2020 (India).
22
3 (which provides what is prohibited). In case two adults belonging to different faiths, decide
to marry each other and one of them willingly converts his/ her faith, they will become
vulnerable under this law if the family members don’t agree to the same. This Ordinance gives
arbitrary powers to the family members, who can simply file false and frivolous complaints
and subject any innocent person to be charged under an offence which is cognizable and non-
bailable as has been provided under Section 7.
(¶45.) Such provisions will act as legal cover and incentive to commit further honour crimes
against such couples who try to break community barriers to marry and co-habit. These
provisions are clearly in violation of the precedents set by the Hon’ble Apex Court time and
again that every adult individual have the right to make their own choices and marry whoever
they want.
3.3.3 Right to privacy
(¶46.) The Supreme Court in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India 45 has declared that every person
has the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Privacy is
the constitutional core of human dignity and the disrespect of such a right makes human
existence worthless and powerless. It was held that:
“In the Indian context, a fundamental right to privacy would cover at least the following three
aspects:
1. Privacy that involves the person i.e., when there is some invasion by the State of a
person's rights relatable to his physical body, such as the right to move freely;
2. Informational privacy which does not deal with a person's body but deals with a
person's mind, and therefore recognises that an individual may have control over the
dissemination of material that is personal to him. Unauthorised use of such information
may, therefore, lead to infringement of this right;
3. and the privacy of choice, which protects an individual's autonomy over fundamental
personal choices.”
(¶47.) Further, The Human Rights Committee of ICCPR made it quite clear in General
Comment No. 22 that no one should be compelled to reveal the religion to which he adheres. 46
45 KS Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

46 General Comment No. 22, ICCPR.
23
(¶48.) Asking the individuals to approach the District Magistrate to validate their religious
conversion and involving the police to decipher the real intention, cause and purpose of the
conversion forces those individuals to disseminate their personal information. Disseminating
personal information about oneself before selecting a particular faith impinges on one’s life to
take control of his/ her own life and take charge of fundamental personal choices. The right to
be left alone is also fundamental to the right to privacy and to have to inform the State about
family matters, violates the exercise of liberty and this must not be allowed.
(¶49.) In the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India47 judgement, the test of reasonableness was
explained has been provided as:
“The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential

element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and
the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to
be in conformity with Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful
or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21
would not be satisfied.”
(¶50.) The impugned Ordinance fails to pass this test as what the state wants to achieve (i.e.,
the public order) is not proportional to the means it is applying which involves interference
which rights provided under Article 14, 21 and 25. The whole procedure is arbitrary compelling
a person to be enquired and left at the state’s discretion that whether the conversion is lawful
or not. It is clear that the state wants the power to approve the personal choices and decisions
of the individual citizens on what faith to follow and whom to choose as life partner.
(¶51.) The Hon’ble Supreme Court struck down the laws on the grounds that they suffered
from manifest arbitrariness and there could be potential misuse of those laws, in cases Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India48 and Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India49. Enough arguments
have been presented before this Hon’ble court to support that the ordinance that it is completely
arbitrary and is against basic structure of our Constitution. Therefore, this ordinance must be
held unconstitutional.
{4} WHETHER THERE WAS ANY UNLAWFUL CONVERSION.
47 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

48 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
49 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
24
(¶52.) The petitioners have approached this Hon’ble court because they have been accused of
unlawfully converting the religion of Sukrati from Hinduism to Christianity under the
impugned ordinance. The counsel most humbly submits that this allegation is baseless and
without any evidence and there has been no illegal conversion.
(¶53.) Vincent’s mother had expressed her willingness to conduct the marriage according to
the Christian rituals in their hometown and she also expressed her willingness for Sukrati to
get converted. Sukrati is an adult woman who is educated enough and was independently
working and living in a city like Zumbai. It was for her to decide that whether to convert or not
because she knew the situation beforehand. Section 3 of the impugned Ordinance50prohibits in
the following manner:
“No person shall convert or attempt to convert, either directly or otherwise, any other person
from one religion to another by use or practice of misrepresentation, force, undue influence,
coercion, allurement or by any fraudulent means or by marriage nor such any person abet,
convince or conspire such conversion”
These terms have been defined under Section 2 of the impugned ordinance 51. It is submitted
that there is nothing to suggest that the conversion was done unlawfully by any of the wrongful
act defined in this section.
(¶54.) The question of any misrepresentation or fraudulent activity doesn’t arise as both Mr.
Vincent and Ms. Sukrati knew each other very well. Mr. Vincent had not hidden his identity or
religion and in fact, both of them had given enough time i.e., almost two months for
introspection and discussion before deciding to get married.
(¶55.) “Allurement”, as has been defined in Section 2(a) of the ordinance was also not done
because the couple was already married under Special Marriage Act, 1954 and the given facts
nowhere suggest that any kind of offer had been made to Miss Sukrati before the conversion
took place.
(¶56.) There is no evidence to suggest that Sukrati was forced or coerced in any way for getting
converted. No threat of any physical or psychological injury was made and neither was any
force injuring person or property was used as far as the question of marriage is concerned, it
2020 (India).
2020 (India).
25
will be wrong to interpret that the sole purpose of the marriage between them was to convert
her religion. They both had known each other for a long time and knew each other’s
background before the marriage. Then, they married under Special Marriage Act, 1954 after
thinking thoroughly. Both the boy and the girl are mature enough to take the decisions for
themselves and to choose to marry whoever they like.
(¶57.) The offence under this Ordinance is categorized as cognizable and non-bailable and even
the burden of proof is on the accused. Any blood-relative of the person whose religion is being
converted can come and file a complaint and an assumption of a forced conversion will be
made by the state. The provisions of the ordinance are very arbitrary and unnecessary state
intervention is being made without the consent of the individuals or their family.
(¶58.) It is further submitted before this Hon’ble court that while asking Ms. Sukrati to convert
to Christianity, the in-laws did not commit any wrong and were just practicing their freedom
of conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate their own religion which is
guaranteed to everyone under Article 25 of the Constitution. When the right to propagate
religion is itself a fundamental right under the Constitution, going through a complicated
bureaucratic process is completely unreasonable and unnecessary condition.
(¶59.) Hence, the facts do not satisfactorily suggest that Ms. Sukrati was coerced, forced,
defrauded misrepresented or allured for getting converted and just the fact that Mr. Vincent’s
mother wanted her to be converted is not sufficient enough to deduce that there has been any
unlawful conversion. However, the FIR was filed against petitioners and they were arrested for
the offences which clearly, they didn’t commit as can be deduced from the facts present. They
have been denied their fundamental right to life and liberty which is gross injustice. Therefore,
it is humbly submitted that the FIR filed against the appellants must be quashed.
26
PRAYER
Wherefore in light of the measure of issues, legal pleadings, reasons given, and authorities
cited, the respondents respectfully request the panel to declare that:
1. The SLP filed by the petitioners is maintainable under Article 136 of the constitution
of India, 1950.
2. The anti-conversion ordinance promulgated on May 18, 2019 is unconstitutional,
invalid and clearly violates the basic structure of the constitution.
3. The conversion of the Respondent is legal and done out of the Respondent’s free choice.
4. The FIR filed under the anti-conversion ordinance against the in-laws and under Section
498A of the APC should be quashed as there exists no infringement of these laws.
5. The Magistrate had made an error in denying bail to the in-laws and issuing a non-
bailable warrant against the Petitioner.
6. There is no valid justification to accuse the petitioners of the alleged crimes hence
should be immediately acquitted without further delay.
And pass any other order, direction, or relief that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the
interests of justice, equity, and good conscience.
All of which is humbly and respectfully prayed.
S/D______________________
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS
27

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AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021

Team Code: AUR 22

AMITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

8TH – 9TH MAY 2021

IN THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF ARYAVARTA

Writ Petition No. xxxx

MR. VINCENT & ORS. ………………………..PETITIONER

THE UNION OF ARYAVARTA ……..…………RESPONDENT

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF ARYAVARTA

UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARYAVARTA

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

2.1 The respondent was not subjected to mental cruelty. …………………………….… 13

3.2 The Ordinance is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. …………….…………18

{4} Whether the conversion of respondent was legal………………………………… …………24

Abbreviation Full Form

26. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337. ..........................................................15

LAW COMMISSION REPORTS:

1. 243rd Law Commission, Report on Section 498A, IPC (2012),

1. International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, 1966…………..………….19,23

Article 32 of the Constitution of Aryavarta, 19491 -

Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

Article 136 of the Constitution of Aryavarta, 19492 -

1 INDIA CONST. art.32.

Following are the issues to be considered by the SC of Aryavarta.

{1} Whether the SLP admitted by the SC is maintainable.

2.1 The respondent was not subjected to mental cruelty.

3.3 The Ordinance is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.

3.3The Ordinance is against the spirit of Basic Structure of the Constitution.

{4} Whether the conversion of respondent was unlawful.

{1} Whether the SLP admitted by the SC is maintainable

{3} Whether the impugned ordinance is Constitutionally valid?

{4} Whether the religious conversion was unlawful?

{1} WHETHER THE SLP ADMITTED BY THE SC IS MAINTAINABLE.

4 Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169:1950 SCR 453.

(2002) 4 SCC 666.

{2} WHETHER THE PRESENT CASE ATTRACTS CHARGES UNDER SECTION

(¶8.) The law under Sec. 498A states that:

Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—

8 Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 498A.

2.1 The respondent was not subjected to mental cruelty.

12 Gollins v. Gollins, [1964] AC 644: (1963) 2 All ER 966.

30726ce94cf0/20APS-IS-COVID-19-Public-Lockdown-fatigue.pdf (last visited Apr.29, 2021)

17 V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337.

{3} WHETHER THE ANTI-CONVERSION ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONALITY

21 Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100.

against husband: Allahabad HC, LIVELAW, (April 29, 2021, 19:21).

“(a) either House of Parliament is not in session;

(c) the President is satisfied as to the existence of these circumstances.” 27

3.2 The Ordinance is violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.

28 INDIA CONST. art. 25, cl. 1.

“the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion…….includes freedom to change

31 Article 18, UDHR.

3.3.2 Personal liberty and autonomy and freedom of choice.

(¶34.) Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads,

33 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.

38 Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.

3.3.3 Right to privacy

45 KS Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

“The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential

{4} WHETHER THERE WAS ANY UNLAWFUL CONVERSION.

47 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.