Rene Ronulo v.

People of the PH
Facts:
The officiating priest refused to solemnize marriage between Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen,
on the day of their marriage learning that they failed to secure a marriage license. The couple went then
to an Independent Church of Filipino Christians, aka Aglipayan church where an Aglipayan priest agreed
to solemnize marriage despite having been informed that they had no marriage cert. After that event,
the priest was served an information for violating Art 352 of the RPC for allegedly performing an illegal
marriage ceremony. All lower courts found him guilty using Act 3613 or Marriage law to rule the case
and imposed upon him a fine of P200.00.

Issue: W/N he is guilty

Held:
Yes. Art 6 of the Family Code provides for the minimum standards in determining whether
marriage ceremony had been conducted. Undoubtedly, petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony
despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The
marriage ceremony therefore is illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements
negates defense of good faith.

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO

Facts:

This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been
converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument for
religious activities. He believe that such practice violated the constitutional provisions on the separation
of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money and
property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further
averred that the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the
Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the employees;
and that court functions are affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the
afternoon.

Issue:
Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the
constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition
against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution or system of religion.
Ruling:

The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church and State.
The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be inviolable; if further
provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the
principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with
each other. The Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these would
be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion.

It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation wherein the
government recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the
population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be
shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

Estrada vs. Escritor A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003 Benevolent Neutrality

FACTS:

Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent
Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly
have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. He filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she
is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

ISSUE:

What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto? Is the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality consistent with the free exercise clause?

RULING:

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded
the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the
case is remanded to the RTC.
 In Re: Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta and Contempt Preoceedings Against Eva
Maravilla Illustre GR No 68635 12 March 1987
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A.
Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language
claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap
failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty
Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no
reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated
as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of dismissal was issued on 14 May
1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of
exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of
the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s Complaint

Issue:

Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of
grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.

Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the
same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme
Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks
and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of
government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can
interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.

People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)

FACTS: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a forester.
Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the killing.

The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and accused
Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested.

Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated therein that
he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of
the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.”
Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a letter to
Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera
was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead.

Later the accused were convicted of murder.

ISSUE: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged
unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy?

HELD: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and
seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted
having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the
same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the
letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his
(Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in
arriving at a determination of his culpability.

Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994 235 SCRA 111 (1994)

Facts: On 2 May 1990, private respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with
damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally
formally offered in evidence Exhibits. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3)
cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral offer of evidence; on the
same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence. A motion for
reconsideration from petitioner was denied. A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the
CA assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. The CA dismissed the said
petition. From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review.

Issue: Whether “Tape Recordings” obtain in violation of RA 4200 is admissible as evidence in court

Held: No, RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations
of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence.
5. Navarro vs. Villegas
31 SCRA 371

FACTS: The petitioner has applied for a permit to conduct an assembly in Plaza Miranda during a
weekday. Respondent Mayor has offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative, guided by a lesson gained
from the events of the past few weeks. The Mayor appraised that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as
compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of
public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such
assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent mayor violated Article 131 in not granting the petition to hold an
assembly in Plaza Miranda.

HELD: Respondent Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;
Respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza
Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great
disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an
alternative to Plaza Miranda.

6. Ignacio, et al. vs. Ela

99 Phil. 347

FACTS: A permit to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the
kiosk, was sought on behalf of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (commonly known as Jehovah’s
Witnesses). The respondent mayor gave them permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza,
instead of the section of the plaza near the kiosk. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk,
is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk
has caused some concern on the part of the authorities regarding peace and order. This is especially so
considering that the tenets of petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to those of the Roman Catholic
Church.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent mayor violated Article 131 by not granting the petition to hold the
public meeting in the part of the public plaza as was requested.

HELD: The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our
Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be “injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the right of the community or society,” and this
power may be exercised under the “police power” of the state, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Thus, the action taken by the respondent who refused to allow the use of the kiosk, part of the public
plaza, by the members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, whose tenets and principles are
derogatory to those professed by the Catholics, is not unconstitutional as an abridgement of the
freedom of speech, assembly, and worship, considering that in view of the proximity of the kiosk to the
Catholic church, such meeting, if allowed, might result in the happening of untoward incidents and
disturbance of peace and order.

BAYAN VS ERMITA G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006 “Moot and Academic” Principle
OCTOBER 30, 2017
FACTS:

Rallies or the right to peaceably assemble to express freedom of expression, to petition for redress of
grievances hounding the government which was co-organized by various mass based groups, and as
Bayan and KMU sometime in September 26 and October 4-6 2005 has been violently preempted and
and forcibly dispersed causing injuries by police and peace keeping authorities under the “no permit, no
rally” policy whereby enforcing the Batasang Pambansa Blg 880, otherwise known as the “Public
Assembly Act of 1985” and the Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) Policy recently in force “in lieu of”
maximum tolerance under the directive of the office of the Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita.

ISSUE:

Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can immediately dissuade the courts in
resolving the case?

RULING:

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. During the
eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal
acts in implementing it. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
present petitions moot and academic.

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts
in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
CASE DIGEST: TAÑADA V. TUVERA
Facts:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they we to become effective and immediately upon their approval.

The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not, that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith the Official Gazette.

Issue:

Whether or not the Presidential decrees are covered by the provisions of Article 2 of the New Civil Code,
on the necessity of publication for its effectivity.

Held:

The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. The term “laws” should refer
to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws related to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Valmonte vs Belmonte

G.R. No. 74930

February 13, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, GSIS General Manager,
requesting that he be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan. Belmonte replied through the Deputy General Counsel
of the GSIS whose opinion is that is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those
who borrow from it; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right
to information

HELD: The information sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS. The
GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with
the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. The public
nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

No. L-72119
May 29, 1987

Cortes:

Facts: Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi files for Mandamus to compel respondent Civil Service Commission
to release information on the civil service eligibilities of persons employed as sanitarians (Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas) in the Health Department of Cebu City.

OSG contends that petitioner has no locus standing as he failed to show his actual interest. The Court
ruled however that the petition on mandamus is anchored upon the right of the people for information
on matters of public concern which is a public right.
1. The petitioner being a citizen (hence, part of the public) warrants standing in his part; and
2. The State and its agents are mandated by the Constitution by virtue of Sec. 7 Article III and Sec. 28,
Article II.

Issue: WON respondent should release the information.

Held: Yes.
• The constitutional right to information on matters of public information is grounded on Sec. 7,
Article III and Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These are self-executory.
In the case at bar, the government agency Civil Service Commission does not have the discretion to
prohibit the access to information sought. It only has the authority to regulate the manner of
examination (e.g. ensuring that the records are not damaged or destroyed).
• These constitutional guarantees, however, are not absolute as they are “subject to the
limitations as may be provided by law” (Art. III Sec. 7 2nd sentence). The information sought must be not
be exempted by law.
In the case at bar, the information is within the enumerations provided by law. Why/ How?
1. the information sought relates to a public office which can be considered as a legitimate concern
of citizens (public office as public trust);
2. Respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner’s
right to know who are, and who are not civil service eligible; and
3. Civil service exams results are released in the public.