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Asha MOOT Memorial
Asha MOOT Memorial
Asha MOOT Memorial
BEFORE SUBMISSION TO
OF
BEFORESUPREME
THE HONOURABLE SUBMISSION TO OF INDICA
COURT
OF
PETITIONER
THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA
V.
PETITIONER
RESPONDENT
V.
RESPONDENT
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Paragraph
Art Article
Const. Constitution
Hon’ble Honourable
Ors. Others
Pet Petitioner
Res Respondent
Sec Section
Vs/V Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES REFERRED
1) State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bom 84
2) Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir (AIR 1980 SC 707)
3) Maharshi Avdhesh v. Union of India (1994 Supp (1) SCC 713)
4) Ahmedabad Women Action Group & Ors. v. Union of India (1997 3 SCC 573)
5) Reynold Rajamani v. Union of India (1982 2 SCC 474
6) Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah
7) Harvinder Kaur v.Harmander Sing, AIR 1984 Delhi 66
8) Suchita Srivastava & Anr vs. Chandigarh Administration (2009)
STATUTES REFERRED
1) Constitution of india
2) Hindu Marriage Act,1955
BOOKS REFERRED
1) Basu D.D, Constitutional of India (22nd ed.)
2) Dr. J.N Pandey, Constitutional Law of India (56th ed.)
3) MP Jain, Constitution of India (8th ed.)
4) Flaviaagnes, Family Law II : Marriage,Divorce nd Matrimonial Litigation
5) Mulla's Hindu Law-15th Edn.
6) Hindu Law (with Exhaustive Case Law) by Universal's Concise Commentary
ONLINE SOURCES
1) https://www.manupatrafast.com/
2) https://advance.lexis.com/
3) www.scconline.com/
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is most humbly submitted that the Petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court through
this Court’s own Motion under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
32. (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
(3) (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1)
and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other Court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause (2)
(4) (4) The right guaranteed by this Article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. Sham aged 25 and Ms. Gauri aged 24 registered their marriage under the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 on 23rd November, 2021 also by following the necessary Hindu
Ceremonies. The partners lived together happily in Delhi along with the husband’s
parents.
2. After a few months, Ms. Gauri under the influence of her parents who had not given
assent for their daughter’s marriage with Mr. Sham and was in disagreement
throughout the whole term since the solemnization of their marriage, returns back to
her parents in Bangalore by completely disconnecting all contacts with her husband in
Bangalore without any reasons.
3. Mr. Sham made repetitive efforts to reunite with his wife by asking her to return to his
place of residence but the same was turned down by Ms. Gauri each time. Following
this Mr. Sham files a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1995 for
restituting his conjugal right to the marriage with Ms. Gauri.
4. The Hon’ble Court granted the prayer in favor of Mr. Sham but Ms. Gauri was
displeased and therefore files a PIL through the organization ‘KRIPA’ – an
organization which works for women’s rights and equality, of which Gauri was also a
member, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica in March 2022. The petition
challenged the Constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
claiming it to be violative of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
5. The petitioners emphasized on the matter that although the law was gender neutral it
indirectly enforced a burden on women in general. The fact that the law of conjugal
remedy was imbibed from the English laws where women were considered as a
chattel, substantiates their contention. The petitioners also argue that it is a matter of
personal choice to decide whether whom to live with or not and this should not be a
matter of enforcement by law.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
ISSUE 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Section 9 of The Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Indica. This Contention
will be dealt with majorly in two parts. Firstly, personal laws are not susceptible to Part III of
the Constitution and therefore cannot be challenged in the court for infringement of
fundamental rights under Articles 14. Secondly, Section 9 is a gender neutral provision and it
does not intend to put the burden on any particular gender. The provision was inculcated to
respect the institution of marriage progressively and yet imbibe a sense of responsibility
undertaken by the partners voluntarily, while marrying, not just to each other but also to the
families and the society at large.
Issue 2: That Section 9 of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not
violate Article 21 of the Constitution of Indica.
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Section 9 of The Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 does not violate Article 21 of the Constitution of Indica. This Contention
will be dealt with majorly in three parts. Firstly, personal laws are not susceptible to Part III
of the Constitution and therefore cannot be challenged in the court for infringement of
fundamental rights under Articles 21. Secondly, section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not
restrict the freedom of the individual towards his/her choice but instead gives him/her a
chance to reinstate the mutual relationship under reasonable grounds. The law merely exerts a
support towards cohabitation which necessarily does not intend to force physical or mental
reunion, if the nature of the relationship between the partners is as such. Thirdly, the
provision also entitles a right upon the partners in a married relationship to lead a dignified
life wrt to their exposal to the society and the individual autonomy of a person should be
dealt in parallel with that of the society at large to enable a harmonial living standard.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1
That Section 9 of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not violate
Article 14 of the Constitution of Indica.
1. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Sec.9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 does not violate Art.14 of the Constitution of Indica. This
Contention will be dealt with majorly in two parts. Firstly, personal laws are not
susceptible to Part III of the Constitution and therefore cannot be challenged in the
court for infringement of fundamental rights under Art. 14. Secondly, Sec 9 is a
gender neutral provision and it does not intend to put the burden on any particular
gender. The provision was inculcated to respect the institution of marriage
progressively and yet imbibe a sense of responsibility undertaken by the partners
voluntarily, while marrying, not just to each other but also to the families and the
society at large.
conclusion that the Personal laws doesn't come under the definition of 'Law in Force'
under Art 13 and therefore cannot be subjected to the Judicial Review under the
Indian Constitution .
4. There can be no doubt that the personal laws are in force in a general sense ; they are
in fact administered by the Courts in India in matters falling within their purview. But
the expression ' laws in force" is used in Article 13(1) not in that general sense. This
expression refers to what may compendious be described as statutory laws. There is
no doubt that laws which are included in this expression must have been passed or
made by a Legislature or other competent authority, and unless this test is satisfied it
would not be legitimate to include in this expression the personal laws merely on the
ground that they are administered by Courts in India. It is the statutory law which is
intended to be included in the expression "laws in force' in Article 13(1) and since the
personal laws do not derive their validity on ground of being made by the legislature,
they cannot be included under the expression 'Law in force' in art 13(1).
5. In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir 2a two judge Bench of the Supreme Court was
considering weather a shudra could become a sanyasi. While holding that if the
custom and usage permitted he could so become, the Court held that in the absence of
such usage or custom he could not be so ordained. The High Court had held that any
handicap suffered by a Shudra according to the personal law would be in violation of
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. It would be violative of the equality clause as
also it would be discrimination on the basis of caste. Frowning upon this observation
the Supreme Court state.
" In our opinion, the learned judge failed to appreciate that part III of the
Constitution does not touch upon the personal laws of the parties. In applying the
personal laws of the parties, he (the High Court judge) could not introduce his own
concepts of modern times but should have enforced the law as derived from
recognised and authoritative sources of Hindu laws, i.e. Smritis and commentaries
referred to, as interpreted in the judgments of various High Courts, except where such
law is altered by any usage or custom or abrogated by statute."
6. In Maharshi Avdhesh v. Union of India3 the Petition was filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution seeking (a) enactment of the Uniform Civil Code; (b) for a declaration
2
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir (AIR 1980 SC 707)
3
Maharshi Avdhesh v. Union of India (1994 Supp (1) SCC 713)
that Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was void as being in
violation of Art 14 and 15 of the Constitution and (c) For a direction against the
Respondents from enforcing the Shariat Act. The Petition was dismissed by a two-
judge Bench of the Supreme Court with an observation that these are issues for the
legislature. Therefore the Supreme Court held that even codified personal law cannot
be tested on the touchstone of fundamental rights.
7. in Ahmedabad Women Action Group & Ors. v. Union of India. 4Different
organisations had challenged through various Petitions a number of discriminatory
aspects of personal laws - both codified and uncodified across religions. The Court,
relying on the earlier decisions held that the matters pertained to legislative action and
the Court could not interfere.
8. In Reynold Rajamani v. Union of India5.The excerpts of this judgment on which
reliance was placed upon by the Supreme Court in the AWAG case pertain to prayers
by the parties to increase the grounds available for divorce under the Indian Divorce
Act. It was also argued in that Petition that divorce by mutual consent should be
available even under the Indian Divorce Act. It was in this context that the Supreme
Court observed that adding provisions to a Statute was a legislative act.
there has been enormous efforts made to recognise and respect the idea of promoting
a gender neutral legislature. The law in question as per Sec.9 of HMA, 1955 is no
exception as the words itself does not bias any particular gender or class.
11. The remedy of conjugal rights is gender neutral in the constitution and gender neutral
in its operation, and in reality the remedy is availed of by spouses of both sexes and
no evidence has been led to establish any discrimination in the operationalisation of
the remedy. The remedy enables both sexes to enforce their marital rights within a
reasonable framework and in no way does it create an unequal playing field.
12. Section 9 of the HMA, 1955 not only restores conjugal rights but also allows the
petitioner to claim maintenance under sec 25 of the HMA 1955 it is important to
know that maintenance under these rules.
13. may be requested even if the maintenance activity is still in progress as a result a wife
who does not want her marriage to be disrupted must obtained maintenance from her
husband so these rules even though the marriage is not dissolving.
14. Even in the case of T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah6 although the judges gave an
opinion as to decide that the sec.9 of HMA was violative of Art.21 of the Indian
Const., the Learned judge further observed that though Section 9 of the said Act did
not in form offend the classification test, inasmuch as it made no discrimination
between a husband and wife, on the other hand, by making the remedy of restitution
of conjugal rights equally available both to wife and husband, it apparently satisfied
the equality test.
15. It may be mentioned that conjugal rights may be viewed in its proper perspective by
keeping in mind the dictionary meaning of the expression "Conjugal"7notes the
meaning of 'conjugal' as "of or pertaining to marriage or to husband and wife in their
relations to each other". In the Dictionary of English Law, 8Earl Jowitt defines
'conjugal rights' thus: "The right which husband and wife have to each other's society
and marital intercourse." There occurs no distinguishment s to men or women being
given an advantage over the other.
16. The current era is not such that women have enormous difficulties and needs to be
given any special status inroder to treat them as equals. The status of women have
uplifted and they have their own wilful choice to make. Marriage is a voluntary action
6
T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah
7
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edn. Vol. I page 371
8
English Law, 1959 Edn. at page 453,
nd once committing to the same it can be no play as to withdraw as per the whims and
fantasies of either of the spouse. The provision does not inherently put any burden on
a specific gender but only allows equal rights to both men and women as partners in
a marital relationship with and among each other.
ISSUE 2
That Section 9 of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not violate
Article 21 of the Constitution of Indica
17. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Sec 9 of The HMA,
1955 does not violate Art 21 of the Constitution of Indica. This Contention will be
dealt with majorly in three parts. Firstly, personal laws are not susceptible to Part III
of the Const and therefore cannot be challenged in the court for infringement of
fundamental rights under Art 21. Secondly, sec 9 of the HMA does not restrict the
freedom of the individual towards his/her choice but instead gives him/her a chance to
reinstate the mutual relationship under reasonable grounds. The law merely exerts a
support towards cohabitation which necessarily does not intend to force physical or
mental reunion, if the nature of the relationship between the partners is as such.
Thirdly, the provision also entitles a right upon the partners in a married relationship
to lead a dignified life wrt to their exposal to the society and the individual autonomy
of a person should be dealt in parallel with that of the society at large to enable a
harmonial living standard.
enabling coexistence of the people belonging to the various sectors, the courts and the
legislatures have relied on keeping the personal laws intact with not much of
amendments.
19. Any law in force at the time of coming into force of the Constitution of India or
enacted after that which is in conflict with the chapter on fundamental rights will be
void to that extent. This is with regard to all the laws in India with the exception of
Personal Laws. If the personal laws were also covered by Articles 13 and 372 of the
Const, they would be void to the extent that they are in contravention of Articles 14,
15 and 21 of the Const; however this is not the case.Over the years, the Supreme
Court has taken different views while dealing with personal laws. In a number of
cases it has held that personal laws of parties are not susceptible to Part III of the
Const dealing with fundamental rights. Therefore they cannot be challenged as being
in violation of fundamental rights, especially those guaranteed under Articles 14, 15
and 21 of the Constitution of India.
9
Mulla's Hindu Law-15th Edn. p. 567-Para 443.
10
Law Commission-71st Report on the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955- "Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage as a Ground of
Divorce, Para 6.5
21. Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with decree for specific
performance for restitution of conjugal rights or for an injuction. Sub-rule (1) of Rule
32 is in these terms:
"Where the party against whom a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or
for restitution of conjugal rights or for an injunction, has been passed, has had an
opportunity of obeying the decree and has willfully failed to obey it, the decree may
be enforced in the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment
of his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or
for an injuction by his detention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his
property, or by both."
22. It is significant to note that unlike a decree of specific performance of contract, for
restitution of conjugal rights the sanction is provided by court where the disobedience
to such a decree is willful i.e. is deliberate, in spite of the opportunities and there are
no other impediments, might be enforced by attachment of property. So the only
sanction is by attachment of property against disobedience of a decree for restitution
of conjugal rights where the disobedience follows as a result of a willful conduct i.e.
where conditions are there for a wife or a husband to obey the decree for restitution of
conjugal rights but disobeys the same in spite of such conditions, then only financial
sanction, provided he or she has properties to be attached, is provided for.
23. This is so as an inducement by the court in appropriate case when the court has
decreed restitution for conjugal rights and that the court can only decree if there is no
just reason for not passing decree for restitution of conjugal rights to offer inducement
for the husband or wife to live together in order to give them an opportunity to settle
up the matter amicably. It serves a social purpose as an aid to the prevention of break-
up of marriage.
24. The provision in question therefore is not intended to restrict a person's liberty of
choice but to confer certain duties to uphold the institution of marriage. India is a
country wherein laws are enacted within the frontiers of moral backing. Unlike
western countries the very inception of the concept of marriage was invoked inorder
to give women a dignified status as gainst the notion of considering them as a
property or Chattel. The concept of marriage was introduced to recognise that women
cannot be bought like a product or a property, instead they were valuable and needs
to be respected and not traded. Extending from these cultures until now, the various
laws even the one in question also has dealt with securing the ties of marriage as a
respectful one that is accompanied by its own rules and rights.
11
Harvinder Kaur v.Harmander Sing, AIR 1984 Delhi 66
decision for procreating child. It is possible only when the statue permits. So to
make decision to have or not to have child, is discretion of woman. Because she is the
best judge of her and she has liberty to do so due to Article 21 of Indian Constitution
33. There has been a misinterpretation with the term Conjugal where it actually means to
confer the right of the spouses to the society of each other. The nature of the right is
as such as it is already inherent in the institution of marriage. Therefore when one
person voluntarily marries another, it does come along with various other
responsibilities to be taken account for. One cannot simply withdraw from these
without any justifications or reasonable causes and the allowing of these actions in
turn would also infringe the right to dignity of the other spouse irrespective of gender.
PRAYER
In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to hold,
adjudge and declare that
The petition be dismissed.
Or pass any other order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of justice.
For this act of kindness, the Counsel for the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.
Sd/-