Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102

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Geoforum
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Eco-governmentality revisited: Mapping divergent subjectivities among

Integrated Water Resource Management experts in Paraguay
Lucas Ward
Rocky Mountain College, 1511 Poly Dr. Billings, MT 59102, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: In this paper I adopt Q methodology to engage critically, constructively, and empirically with Michael
Received 16 November 2010 Goldman’s (2004, 185) thesis that the introduction of standardized models of environmental governance
Received in revised form 13 November 2012 inscribes on developing county officials an ‘‘eco-governmentality’’ that is both ‘‘hegemonic’’ and ‘‘neolib-
Available online 23 January 2013
eral’’. In particular, I ask what it is that people trained in one of the more pervasive models of market-ori-
ented environmental rule-making – Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) – believe in when
Keywords: they indicate that they support an ‘‘integrated’’ approach to water management. More specifically, I am
Integrated Water Resource Management
interested in what it means to IWRM experts in Paraguay to be involved in a policy and planning envi-
Governmentality
Neoliberalization
ronment in which it is virtually impossible to avoid entanglement with discourses and technologies of
Boundary objects neoliberal rule. The combination of Q method with semi-structured interviews and participant observa-
Environmental zoning plans tion techniques permits an empirical examination of the processes of ecogovernmental transformation at
Paraguay multiple scales – from patterns of convergence and divergence in the conceptual mappings of local offi-
cials, to coping strategies that individuals adopt in order to sustain themselves and their projects in the
face of changing (ecogovernmentalizing) institutional and political contexts, to transformations in regu-
latory regimes.
Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
In this paper I adopt Q methodology to engage critically, con-
structively, and empirically with Michael Goldman’s (2004, 185)
thesis that the introduction of standardized models of environ-
mental governance inscribes on developing county officials an
‘‘eco-governmentality’’ that is both ‘‘hegemonic’’ and ‘‘neoliberal’’
(see also Agrawal, 2005a). In particular, I ask what it is that people
trained in one of the more pervasive models of market-oriented
environmental governance – Integrated Water Resource Manage-
ment (IWRM) – believe in when they indicate that they support
an ‘‘integrated’’ approach to water management. To address this
question, I use the findings from a Q study and semi-structured
interviews conducted with 24 Paraguayan state, NGO, and civil
society actors who have been trained in the IWRM approach (see
Stephenson, 1935a, 1935b; Brown, 1980; Robbins and Krueger,
2000 on Q method; see UNCED, 1992 on IWRM).1
Geographers have been at the forefront of efforts to use
grounded case studies to make sense of the procedures and path-
ways through which fragments of market-discipline infiltrate land-
scapes and governmental practices across the globe (McCarthy and
E-mail address: Lucas.ward@rocky.edu
1
Hereafter these individuals are referred to as ‘‘IWRM professionals’’, ‘‘IWRM
experts’’, and ‘‘IWRM actors’’.
Prudham, 2004, e.g. Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Valdivia, 2005;
Bakker, 2007; Himley, 2008; see Brenner et al., 2010a for summa-
ries). A recent turn in such scholarship is the repositioning of neo-
liberalism as an ongoing, messy and, hence, perpetually unfinished
process of regulatory reform versus a coherent style of government
(Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck and Theodore, 2012; Ong, 2006; Him-
ley, 2008; Brenner et al., 2010a; Bakker, 2010). The gist of this ‘neo-
liberalization approach’ is that the ways that neoliberal projects of
rule unfold in different places is a function of (a) ideologically pure
yet operationally vague projects which aim to integrate market-
discipline and environmental governance; (b) the sui generis so-
cio-natural and political economic attributes of the different sites
where these projects touch down; (c) the experimental translation
work that specific sociopolitical actors must do to produce, modify,
and cope with the terms of these market-oriented rule-making re-
gimes (Bakker, 2005; Ong, 2006; Himley, 2008; Brenner et al.,
2010a). One of the main themes of these studies is that much
can be learned about both neoliberalization processes and the
‘‘geographical nature of environmental governance itself’’ by
examining the practices and logics that guide this translation work
(Himley, 2008, 446; McCarthy and Prudham, 2004; Goldman,
2004; Bakker, 2007).
IWRM professionals are especially productive targets for such
an investigation because by design these actors play crucial roles
in shaping the endless cycles of translation, destruction and adjust-

0016-7185/$ - see front matter Ó 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.12.004
92 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102
ment that accompany neoliberal reform projects like IWRM
(McCarthy and Prudham, 2004; Bakker, 2007; Peck and Theodore,
2012; Brenner et al., 2010a). The drive to train Paraguayan IWRM
professionals is motivated by international efforts to rationalize
the management and development of two related trans-boundary
water systems: (1) The Pilcamayo, Paraguay, and Parana rivers,
which define Paraguay’s borders on three sides and converge in
its southwest corner to form the La Plata River; (2) the Guaraní
aquifer, one of the world’s biggest reservoirs of fresh water, which
underlies much of eastern Paraguay and significant parts of Brazil,
Uruguay, and Argentina (GEF, 2001, 2004a; AlterVida, 2002). Not
only are IWRM experts those actors in whom one would most ex-
pect to see evidence of Goldman’s ‘‘eco-governmentalities’’, then,
they are also those charged with translating the IWRM policy mod-
el into a coherent, Paraguay-appropriates set of environmental pol-
icies and practices.
Below, following brief reviews of IWRM and neoliberalization
literature, I combine Q method-based mappings of IWRM experts’
environmental subjectivities with interview data to intervene in
ongoing debates regarding the governmentalizing effects of neolib-
eralization processes (Brenner et al., 2010a; Castree, 2008b). Star
and Griesemer’s (1989) concept of ‘‘boundary objects’’ – represen-
tational technologies that make it possible for social actors with
heterogeneous interests and backgrounds to work together on pro-
jects – informs my interpretation of the results of factor and ethno-
graphic analyses and my engagement with Goldman’s arguments
about eco-governmentality. Particularly in the Paraguayan case,
where IWRM officials represent both the agencies of the ‘‘rolled-
out’’ state and the organizations and interests supposed to fill the
resulting regulatory void (NGOs and private actors), knowing what
it means to these parties to be involved in IWRM projects can teach
us important lessons about how individuals interact with and
modify neoliberal programs (Ong, 2007; Li, 2007; Himley, 2008;
Brenner et al., 2010a; Bakker, 2010). The point here is not to con-
firm or deny that the markets have ‘‘won the war’’ or to challenge
Goldman’s concept of ‘‘eco-governmentality’’. Rather it is to call
attention to the different rationalities, interests, and technologies
involved in making market-oriented governance schemes forceful
– not necessarily ‘‘real’’ – in Paraguayan watersheds.
2. The IWRM policy model
Ineffective management of the world’s watersheds is regarded
as a grave threat to global biodiversity and human development
(UNCED, 1992; World Bank, 1993, 1994; GEF, 2004a). Since the
publication of Agenda 21, the so-called blueprint for global cooper-
ation on social and environmental problems that emerged from the
1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Develop-
ment, international efforts to promote sustainable development
have become more and more focused on developing and dissemi-
nating governmental technologies that will improve how water-
sheds are governed. As multilateral finance institutions like the
World Bank began to spin off environmentally-focused lending
agencies like the Global Environment Facility (established in
1991) and the Global Water Partnership (established in 1996)
throughout the 1990s, there arose a strong demand for manage-
ment techniques, measurement tools, and discourses that could
be applied in developing countries in order to ‘‘maximize. . .eco-
nomic and social welfare without compromising the sustainability
of vital environmental systems’’ (GWP, 2010). In this Post-Wash-
ington-Consensus context, IWRM has come to be regarded as the
best approach to dealing with contemporary water management
issues (UNCED, 1992; World Bank, 1993; GWP, 2010).
While the intent of introducing IWRM to a country like Para-
guay is to generate specific economic outcomes – ‘‘maximization
of economic welfare’’ – IWRM is first and foremost an actionable
rule-making model. Put simply, the IWRM model consists of a bun-
dle of concepts and methods intended to make resource manage-
ment and development planning more efficient, profitable,
environmentally benign, and equitable. At the core of the IWRM
concept-methods bundle is the assumption that projects to rule
and improve the environment must focus on watershed-scale
management and be science-based, market oriented, and partici-
patory (UNCED, 1992, Ch. 18; GEF, 2004a, 2004b).
In practice, adoption of the IWRM model entails modifications
to both the structure of existing governance arrangements and
the attitudes and behaviors of a range of social actors (UNCED,
1992; GEF, 2004b; GWP, 2009, 2010). Perhaps the most significant
of the structural modifications is the formal opening of govern-
mental processes to new actors, such as NGOs, scientists, and local
resource users, each of whom have unique and frequently conflict-
ing political-economic and environmental interests. Formation of
IWRM professionals is intended to reverse decades of politically-
motivated rule-making and development planning in Paraguay
and the other countries that share and rely on trans-boundary
watersheds for multiple and often competing purposes – e.g. iden-
tity, drinking, industry, irrigation, hydroelectricity, and transport
(Abbate, 2002; GEF, 2004a; World Bank, 2004). The imperative that
IWRM training places on integrating market discipline into wa-
tershed-scale, multi-sectoral governance arrangements versus
management according to political-administrative boundaries
can be understood as an effort to work around the covetous inep-
titude of state agencies and to neutralize the destabilizing effects
that unexpected swings in political power have on environmental
governance and development projects (World Bank, 2004; GWP,
2009; abcColor, 2012).
2.1. IWRM in Paraguay
For IWRM to take root in a Paraguay, a country whose name in
the indigenous Guaraní language means ‘‘from the water’’, has re-
quired work on two related fronts: (1) introduction of new rules
and planning regimes adapted from the IWRM-model; (2) training
and experimentation with IWRM-based measurement and repre-
sentational technologies. In 2002, the World Bank, GEF, and the
UNDP, the UNDP and their regional and Paraguayan subsidiaries
initiated the first in a series of projects designed to bring the man-
agement of Paraguayan watersheds into alignment with the core
precepts of IWRM (GEF, 2001, 2004a). A key element of the GEF’s
project, known as the ‘‘Global Environmental Facility/Intergovern-
mental Commission for the La Plata River Basin’’ project, or the
GEF/ICC initiative, was to train state, NGO, and civil society actors
involved in development and environmental planning in Paraguay
in the theory and methods of IWRM. Training included professional
conferences and workshops focused on IWRM concepts and tech-
niques, including a 2007 IWRM short course held in Luque, Para-
guay, which I participated in as part of this study, collaborative
work on GEF-funded reports about problems with existing wa-
tershed management arrangements (Abbate, 2002), and the prep-
aration of studies that called for the adoption of IWRM-based
political doctrines as the best way to secure a sustainable and pros-
perous future for Paraguay (GEF, 2004a, 2004b). The GEF/CIC initia-
tive also provided funding streams to support the preparation of
environmental zoning plans (POATs)2 and educational materials
aimed at municipal officials and Paraguayan citizens (AlterVida,
2002, 2005; Salas-Dueñas, 2003; SEAM, 2004).
2
POAT stands for ‘‘Plan de Ordenamiento Ambiental Territorial’’ or ‘‘environmental
zoning plan’’.
 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102
From GEF reports (GEF, 2001, 2004a; Abbate, 2002) it is clear
that the training of IWRM professionals in Paraguay under the
GEF/CIC project was intended to create in Paraguay a new class
of decision maker – the IWRM expert – who was capable of adapt-
ing standardized elements of the IWRM model to the Paraguayan
context. The expectation was that these IWRM professionals would
catalyze the emergence of new IWRM-based regulatory regimes
that would, in turn, formalize the realignment of political relations
between the Paraguayan state, civil society, and the market in a
way that expanded the role of non-state actors in government
and promoted science-based and market-oriented governance
(UNCED, 1992; GEF, 2004b; Moura et al., 2005; Bakker and Bridge,
2007).
In 2007, after 5 years of IWRM workshops and intensive lobby-
ing work from IWRM professionals from governmental and non-
governmental sectors, the Paraguayan government passed a com-
prehensive water law that called for the ‘‘integrated management
of Paraguayan hydraulic resources’’ (Paraguay, 2007). Just as IWRM
professionals were working collectively to create an IWRM-based
water law, they were simultaneously involved in individual (and
often competing) projects to create POATs for different watersheds
in Paraguay (SEAM, 2004; AlterVida, 2005; Fundación DesdelChac-
o, 2006; SAG/PY, 2009). In other words, by 2007 IWRM had man-
aged to insinuate its way into policy, planning, and socio-natural
landscapes in Paraguay.
2.2. Eco-governmentality in Paraguay?
IWRM’s rise to prominence in orthodox development and con-
servation discourse as well as its penetration of local regulatory
frameworks – e.g. Paraguay’s new IWRM-based water law and
the flurry of POAT projects – coincides with increasing concern
among academics and activists about the effects of such standard-
ized, market-oriented environmental rule-making models on insti-
tutions, people, and landscapes in developing countries (Goldman,
2004; Bakker, 2005; Perreault and Martin, 2005; Valdivia, 2005;
Himley, 2008; Castree, 2008b; c.f. UNCED, 1992; World Bank,
1993). The concept of ‘‘neoliberalization’’ has become indispens-
able to efforts to account for and critique two related phenomena:
(1) the processes and procedures through which marketized gover-
nance schemes like IWRM are translated into action in different
political economic and institutional settings and (2) hybridized,
unintended, and often contradictory socio-natural and governmen-
tal formations that crop up like weeds wherever such projects
touch down (Brenner et al., 2010a; Bakker, 2010; Springer, 2010).
Neoliberalization literature incorporates three distinct but often
overlapping theorizations of neoliberalism: as a hegemonic politi-
cal economic project, as governmental reform, and as a technology
of power (Springer, 2010; Brenner et al., 2010a). As a hegemonic
project and as governmental reform, neoliberalism infiltrates local
socio-natures via the introduction of standardized clusters of poli-
cies (e.g. Hale, 2002; Perreault and Martin, 2005), processes of
institutional and governmental transformation (e.g. Heynen and
Robbins, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2004; Goldman, 2005; Bakker,
2005) and social and environmental projects (e.g. Valdivia, 2005;
Dubash, 2004; Castree, 2008a). Under the hegemony model, critical
attention is directed to how neoliberal projects hollow out the
authority of central governments and install global advocates of
free-market rule in positions of authority over territory and popu-
lation in developing countries (Harvey, 2003). Under the govern-
mental reform model, governments adopt neoliberal policies in
an effort to ‘‘remain economically competitive within a transna-
tional playing field’’ (Springer, 2010: 1033–4; Bridge, 2004; Ong,
2007; Himley, 2008; Bakker, 2010) or to comply with the terms
of structural adjustment loans (Willis, 2005; Brenner et al.,
2010b). These reforms are intended to reconfigure governmental
93
arrangements in a way that transfers ownership and regulatory
authority over public goods and services to non-state actors with
the stated goal of making governance (and, hence, production)
more economically efficient (Bridge, 2004; Himley, 2008; Bakker,
2005; Daly and Farley, 2011).
As a technology of power neoliberalism is cast as a form of gov-
ernmentality (Lemke, 2001; Brenner et al., 2010a). The governmen-
tality model is frequently employed in conjunction with the
hegemony and governmental reform models to make a case that
introduction of neoliberal ‘‘procedures, institutions, and legal
forms’’ (Lemke, 2001, 192) compels local people to internalize
ways of knowing and conduct that reproduce and extend the influ-
ence and constitutive force of neoliberal doctrines – marketized
regulation, participation, and rational (science-based) decision-
making – within and between local socio-natures (Goldman,
2004; Agrawal, 2005a; Castree, 2008b). The resulting ‘‘eco-govern-
mentalities’’ are ‘‘modalities of knowledge/power’’ in which views
of nature, governance, and development are rooted to ‘‘neoliberal
notions of market value’’ (Goldman, 2004, 167).
Bank- and GEF-funded regulatory reform programs like the
GEF’s (2004b) IWRM initiative in Paraguay are key sites where
these marketized ‘‘eco-rationalities’’ are cultivated and circulated
(Goldman, 2004; Dubash, 2004). In addition to workshop and
short-course-style classes in neoliberal developmentalist jargon
(e.g. ‘‘demand-oriented management’’; ‘‘stakeholders’’ ‘‘POAT’’),
such programs provide participants with the hands-on training in
the form of contract work preparing and disseminating reports
on the need to adopt market-oriented policy reforms (GEF,
2004b; Abbate, 2002; Goldman, 2004). They also give local officials
opportunities to experiment with using new technologies like
POATs (environmental zoning plans) to parse up and assign mean-
ing and value to the landscape (Goldman, 2004; Abbate, 2002; Alt-
erVida, 2002, 2005; Fundación DesdelChaco, 2006).
For Goldman, there are two main consequences of these pro-
jects. First, local officials learn that in order to ‘‘speak with exper-
tise’’ on development and planning issues they must adopt the
neoliberal eco-rationalities and technologies foisted upon them
during workshops, planning sessions, and projects (Goldman,
2004, 181). This leads to Goldman’s second point: The imperative
to use neoliberal concepts and tools in order to be taken seriously
compels local officials to advance policies and projects that re-or-
der institutional, biogeophysical, and human landscapes in ways
that are amenable to market-forms of government and develop-
ment (see also Agrawal, 2005a).
In truth, however, little is known about how stable neoliberal
principles are in the minds of the Laotian officials Goldman de-
scribes. For Goldman, it doesn’t seem to matter what the targets
of sustainability initiatives like IWRM think or say: Their rational-
ities are a function of the parameters imposed by a rapidly neolib-
eralizing institutional context. Consequently, the eco-rationalities
that are at the center of Goldman’s analysis are constituted more
by Goldman’s capacity to filter keen and insightful observations
of the changing institutional and discursive context of government
in Laos through governmentality theory then through actual anal-
ysis of Laotian worldviews.
Recent geographical analyses of neoliberal transformation (Bak-
ker, 2005; Valdivia, 2005; Kellog, 2007; Geddes, 2010) remind us
that the assemblages of actors, ideas, and technologies that consti-
tute the modern ‘‘neoliberal’’ reform project and the modern self-
governing individual ‘‘co-determine each other’s emergence’’
(Lemke, 2001, 191; see also Ong, 2007; Brenner et al., 2010a;
Springer, 2010). From this perspective, neoliberalism takes root
not simply through hegemonic force, but by provoking govern-
mental practices and discourses that disrupt local arrangements
and ways of knowing and then mutate to reemerge in various
scales of unsettled belief, rule, institutional organization, and prac-
94 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102
tice as manifold solutions to the very problems their introduction
summoned into existence (Ong, 2007; see also Ferguson, 1994;
Escobar, 1995, 2001; Peck and Tickell, 2002). This process gives rise
to a proliferation of hybrid assemblages of neoliberal ‘‘procedures,
institutions, and legal forms’’ (Lemke, 2001, 192) which, through
experimentation and adjustment, ‘‘co-evolve’’ with local institu-
tional landscapes, socio-natures, and subjectivities (Brenner et al.,
2010a, 189; see also Ong, 2007; Radcliffe, 2007; Mansfield, 2007;
Sader, 2008; Swyngedouw, 2004; c.f. Ferguson, 1994; Goldman,
2004).
Such scholarship suggests that to truly understand ‘‘variega-
tion’’ in how neoliberal processes unfold (Peck and Theodore,
2007) requires us listen to and take seriously the statements and
claims made by the targets of eco-governmental projects (Himley,
2008). In the Paraguayan context this means asking how IWRM ex-
perts cope with being caught up in a policy and planning environ-
ment in which, thanks to promulgation in 2007 of an IWRM-based
water law and ongoing availability of financial support to develop
POATs for Paraguayan watersheds, it is nearly impossible to avoid
entanglement with these ‘‘global forms’’ (Ong, 2007, 5,7)?
3. Methods – exploring governmentality with Q method, factor
analysis, and interviews
One of the main precepts of governmentality approaches to
neoliberalism is that to comprehend a governmental regime like
IWRM, one must first understand the political rationalities that
reproduce and extend its reach (Lemke, 2001; Agrawal, 2005a).
Focusing on the dialectic between governmental discourse and
changing institutional contexts is one way to do this (Foucault,
1991; Goldman, 2004; Agrawal, 2005a, 2005b; Li, 2007). Studying
what people think and say is another (Robbins and Krueger, 2000).
Q method is a useful methodological tool for geographers inter-
ested in such questions because it provides a quantitative method-
ology for the essentially qualitative study of political subjectivity
(Brown, 1993a). In short, Q method aims at uncovering the ways
in which respondents bundle together different attitudes, beliefs,
and understandings rather than allowing the interviewer to im-
pose a priori assumptions about these relationships (Robbins and
Krueger, 2000).3
During a Q study, respondents assemble a model of their own
subjectivity by ranking a concourse of statements regarding a par-
ticular issue, such as environmental rule-making. Powerful statisti-
cal technologies of correlation and factor analysis of respondents’
rankings or ‘‘cases’’ are then used to generate quantifiable mea-
sures of the salience of particular statements in the minds of differ-
ent people (Schmolck, 2002; Webler et al., 2009). For this study, I
used PQ method software (Schmolck, 2002) to bundle the most
salient correlated statements into different factors or ‘‘social per-
spectives’’ and to generate a statistical measure of respondents’
agreement or disagreement with these perspectives (Webler
et al., 2009, 5; Brown, 1997). By scaling individual responses to
the Q statements (n = 50 tests, in this case) Q method reveals the
‘‘structure and form’’ of IWRM experts’ subjective viewpoints on
these distinguishing statements in a format that is amenable to
analysis (Brown, 1986, 58, cited in Webler et al. (2009: 5)).
Q studies are grounded in the concourse of statements that
respondents are asked to rank (Brown, 1993b; Webler et al.,
2009). The set of statements is inductive and structured, and natu-
ralistic: drawn from the literature and policy debates; structured
by a factorial design to cover comprehensively the relevant view-
3
The history of Q method, including discussions of researcher bias in interpreting
factor analysis results, has been well documented elsewhere (Brown, 1993, n.d.;
Robbins and Krueger, 2000; Webler et al., 2009).
points, and using the language of local respondents (Webler
et al., 2009; Robbins and Krueger, 2000). Statements represent
the range attitudes and beliefs regarding an issue – in this case
development and conservation – not ‘‘facts’’ or ‘‘truths’’ per se
(Brown, 1980). The 50 item Q concourse for this study was ex-
tracted from hundreds of statements drawn from newspaper arti-
cles, NGO publications, arguments presented at workshops, and
from semi-structured interviews. Based on discussions with key
informants, the original pool of potential Q-statements was pared
down to a set of 50 statements. These final 50 statements were
paraphrased where necessary to represent differing policy priori-
ties, different ideological approaches to resource management
and development, and different types of environmental knowledge
that characterize the current state of policy and planning discourse.
The 50 statements can be grouped into the following four
categories:
 Local management and development conditions.
 The role of science in governance.
 The IWRM policy model.
 Developmental and environmental values.
It is important to note that many of the Q statements are laden
with techno-scientific jargon and arbitrary divisions between state
and market, public and private. While such language reflects the
degree to which governmental discourse in Paraguay has indeed
been influenced by what Goldman would likely call ‘‘green neolib-
eral’’ thinking (2004, 186), the existence of such language does not
tell us much about how IWRM experts organize and explain their
views on the key precepts of neoliberal developmentalism.
In this paper I use Q method to explore two issues: (1) how dif-
ferent IWRM professionals perceive factors that affect the perfor-
mance of environmental rule-making in Paraguay and (2) how
different topics – such as ways of knowing and visions of authority,
IWRM, and sustainable development – are connected within and
between the worldviews of different groups of IWRM professionals
(Webler et al., 2009; Robbins, 2006; Robbins and Krueger, 2000).
The focus is on the ways that these matters are perceived by the
group of actors – IWRM professionals – in whom we would most
expect to see evidence of the neoliberal ‘‘eco-governmentality’’ of
which Goldman speaks. The assumption is that these actors’ differ-
ent worldviews significantly shape the ways in which neoliberal
programs like IWRM unfold in the different settings (Brenner
et al., 2010a; Li, 2007; c.f. Goldman, 2004). Hence analysis of these
worldviews provides a window into the coping strategies that indi-
viduals adopt as they navigate the sticky micropolitical and institu-
tional arrangements that characterize the variegated processes of
neoliberal infiltration and mutation (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Ong,
2007).
Fieldwork for this study was conducted in three overlapping
phases in Paraguay. Phase 1: From August to October of 2007,
archival research, snowball sampling, and participant observation
during IWRM workshops and short courses were used to identify
24 individuals who actively participate in (and derive part of their
livelihoods from) IWRM initiatives in Paraguay. Phase 2: From Sep-
tember to October 2007, the Q concourse was assembled, tested,
and printed out in Spanish on 3  5 laminated cards. A reference
questionnaire was also developed to guide semi-structured inter-
views that took place during ranking activities. Phase 3: From Octo-
ber 2007 through January of 2008, Q-sorts were conducted with
the non-random sample of 24 IWRM professionals. During the
study, each of the 24 IWRM professionals was asked to rank the
50 Q statements along a Likert scale (Likert, 1932). Respondents
were instructed to think of positive values (+3) as representing
‘‘most like how I think’’ and of negative values ( 3) as representing
‘‘least like how I think’’ (Webler et al., 2009). Each respondent’s
 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102
rankings were recorded and subjected to factor analysis using
PQMethod software (Schmolck, 2002; Webler et al., 2009). Ranking
activities generated a rich dialog as respondents reacted to Q state-
ments and questions from the reference questionnaire. Dialog was
recorded and later transcribed and translated. This type of qualita-
tive data added context to the results of the factor analysis and per-
mitted me to use respondents’ own words to flesh out the more
nuanced dimensions of their worldviews (Webler et al., 2009;
Brown, 1997, 2009; Robbins and Krueger, 2000).
4. Findings – three perspectives on how governance should be
configured
This study used Principal Component Analysis, Varimax Rota-
tion, and then manual rotation of factors to analyze the conceptual
maps (Q sorts) representing IWRM experts’ worldviews. After sta-
tistical and theoretical considerations, a three-factor structure of
the data was obtained with at least two IWRM professionals load-
ing significantly (greater than .40 at p < .01) on each factor (Rob-
bins and Krueger, 2000; Schmolck, 2002; Brown, 1997; Webler
et al., 2009).4 Each of the three factors represents a distinctive social
perspective/subjectivity regarding watershed management, exper-
tise, the IWRM policy model, and development and environmental
values. The statements that distinguish each factor and the factor
scores are shown in Tables 1–3. Factors scores represent the
weighted sum of rankings assigned to a Q statement by respondents
who shared a common perspective on the views embodied by the
statement (Anderson, 2005, 44). For readability and to clarify the
main differences between them, the three factors are referred to be-
low and in the remainder of the text as ‘‘IWRM Acolytes’’, ‘‘Selective
IWRM’’, and ‘‘Centralized IWRM.’’
4.1. IWRM acolytes
The ‘‘IWRM acolyte’’ factor (Table 1) is constituted by Q sorts
from four respondents: Representatives of the NGOs GUYRA Para-
guay and IDEA, a research hydrologist who also serves as a coordi-
nator of the NGO ForoAgua as well as IWRM workshops in and
around Asunción, and an official from the Environmental Division
of the Municipality of Encarnación (southern Paraguay). The IWRM
acolyte perspective is unique in its commitment to market-ori-
ented governance and technically driven, NGO-led participatory
planning and governance. Cases associated with the IWRM acolyte
perspective were extremely critical of the capacity of existing Par-
aguayan governmental agencies to effectively manage Paraguayan
watersheds. Likewise, IWRM acolytes viewed expanding the
authority of NGOs and representatives of the private sector in both
national and local-scale governmental operations as critical.
It is important to point out that the neutral (0) ranking that the
IWRM acolytes perspective assigned to the notion that Paraguay
needs less government and more market mechanisms in charge
of its water resources (statement #4) is somewhat misleading in
that it suggests that those respondents who share the IWRM aco-
lyte perspective were not willing to take a firm stance regarding
market-oriented governance. In fact, the factor score of zero for
statement #4 is a result of strong negative ranking ( 3) assigned
4
Brown (1980) notes that the number of respondents loaded on any one factor is
inconsequential; it only requires two to three respondents to establish a common
factor. All of the IWRM professionals who participated in this study have different
levels of commitment to each factor (Robbins, 2006). Seven respondents loaded
significantly (at 0.4 or above) on more than one factor. This does not undermine the
significance of the three factors. Rather it indicates that these non-loading respon-
dents have significant commitments to more than one of the three factors. Because
these respondents are not the best representatives of any single factor, standard
protocol is to exclude these respondents from the final stage of factor analysis
(Brown, 2010, personal communication).
95
to the statement by a single respondent – an official from the
NGO GUYRA Paraguay.5 The three other respondents whose sorts
define the IWRM acolyte factor ranked the statement positively
(+1, +2, +2).
Roger, Paraguay’s best known hydrologist, co-author of the GEF-
funded ‘‘Vision of Paraguay’s Water Resources’’ report (GEF,
2004a), and co-founder of the IWRM-oriented NGOs ForoAgua
and the Paraguayan Association of Water Resources explained his
positive (+2) ranking of the statement this way: ‘‘Everything that
doesn’t have a price is poorly cared for. You see this here in Para-
guay. People think water is abundant and they waste it like crazy.
If you don’t place an economic value on water, you give an incen-
tive to waste that water.’’
Roger was also adamant that it was crucial to have individuals
from NGOs and the private sector in leadership positions in wa-
tershed commissions and during POAT preparation. When public
officials occupy positions of power on watershed commissions, Ro-
ger claimed, it was impossible to maintain any sort of continuity or
to promote efficient policies or projects. This was because public
officials were political appointees whose positions of authority de-
pended on their ties to the political party in power – not on their
technical or economic expertise. Instead of working to achieve long
term goals, Roger asserted, public officials tended to concern them-
selves with extracting maximum personal benefit – in the form of
bribes, favors, or consulting contracts – from their positions of
authority before the next election cycle could threaten their jobs.
In contrast, Roger argued, NGO and private sector actors tended
make management and planning decisions aimed at achieving effi-
cient, sustainable use of water resources over the long haul.
These comments help us interpret the results of Q factor analy-
sis (Robbins and Krueger, 2000). Simultaneously, they clarify that
despite an apparently luke-warm position on market-oriented
management, the IWRM acolyte viewpoint is characterized by
enthusiasm for the adoption of all aspects of the IWRM rule-mak-
ing model – particularly the hollowing out of central government
authority.
4.2. Centralized IWRM
The centralized IWRM perspective (Table 2) represents the
shared vision of three highly placed government officials who per-
ceive aspects of IWRM as displacing their authority and power.
Two are public officials from Paraguay’s Secretary of the Environ-
ment (SEAM) and one is from the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce (MIC). One of the SEAM officials is the former director of
SEAM’s Water Division while the other is a similarly ranked official
in the Parks Division. The third sort was completed by a high rank-
ing official in the Division of Environmentally Sustainable Produc-
tion in the MIC.
The Centralized IWRM viewpoint is rooted in an insistence that
central government agencies should play a strong role in oversee-
ing and managing the participation of civil society and local gov-
ernment actors in resource management settings. Cases
associated with the centralized IWRM factor gave little credence
to statements that were critical of government agencies’ capacity
to effectively develop and execute sustainable environmental pol-
icies. In fact, they rejected out of hand the notion that state author-
ity over natural resources and policy making processes should be
in any way diminished either by new (or existing) environmental
policies or by the involvement in government arrangements of
‘‘new’’ actors – NGOs or watershed management commissions
(#7).
5
Aside from this particular statement, this GUYRA official’s sort aligned strongly
with the IWRM acolyte viewpoint.
96 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102

Table 1
Distinguishing statements for IWRM acolyte cases – rolled-back state, market-oriented governance.

No. Statement Factors

Acolytes Centralized Selective
47 We need more systematic information about what the average water users know and feel about water and watersheds 3 0 1
19 Privatization of land and management is a more effective means of protecting natural resources than reforming 0 3 1
environmental policy
4 Paraguay needs less government and more market mechanisms in charge of its water 0 2 3
28 Water can’t be subject to the principles of any specific sector or market logic 1 2 3
32 The IWRM approach ought to strengthen the State’s direct control of water resources 2 1 2
30 Placing an economic value on all water uses is best way to resolve conflicts and manage effectively 1 0 0
23 In resolving water conflicts, legal and bureaucratic knowledge is more useful than scientific knowledge about ecosystem 1 3 0
dynamics and the water cycle

Table 2
Distinguishing statements for Centralized IWRM cases – state is capable of governing, science-based decision-making, wary of market.

No. Statement Factors

Acolytes Centralized Selective
36 Not enough scientific information exists to support implementation of IWRM 1 3 1
9 Paraguayan scientists should seek political positions in order to ensure that water laws are implemented adequately 1 2 1
27 Paraguay has many problems (poverty) that are more significant than improving resource management 1 1 2
17 Since government officials and NGO technicians who participate in river basin organizations are paid to do so, local water 2 1 2
users should also be compensated for their participation
12 On river basins shared with Brazil, Paraguayan officials enforce environmental policy better than Brazilians 3 0 3
34 Without interventions from civil society, the Paraguayan government would not have come up with a truly integrated Water 2 0 3
Law
45 SEAM has sufficient resources and knowledge to effectively manage Paraguay’s water and implement the new Water Law 3 0 3
11 Widespread poverty is an obstacle to implementation of environmental policy 0 2 0
39 Coordination between existing state institutions responsible for water management is getting worse/more difficult 0 2 0
24 Environmental conflicts and crimes in Paraguay are typically resolved through bribes/political favor versus through 1 3 1
negotiations or legal institutions
23 In resolving water conflicts, legal and bureaucratic knowledge is more useful than scientific knowledge about ecosystem 1 3 0
dynamics and the water cycle
19 Privatization of land and management is a more effective means of protecting natural resources than reforming 0 3 1
environmental policy

The way that Elena, the former director of SEAM’s Water Re-
sources Division, whose sort was strongly aligned with the central-
ized IWRM perspective, explained her lukewarm position on
decentralization helps illuminate some of the nuances of the cen-
tralized IWRM perspective. In Elena’s view, conflicts and failures
regarding environmental governance stemmed from the fact that
most Paraguayan social actors, and especially NGOs, ‘‘don’t under-
stand what their roles are’’ under Paraguay’s new IWRM-based
water law. Governance is achieved, Elena argued, when the gov-
ernment ‘‘sets the path for action’’ and everyone else follows along.
She explained that if the Paraguayan government set a national
policy, as it had done with the new water law, it was the responsi-
bility of civil society to ‘‘get on board’’ and support the govern-
ment. Elena was adamant that government agencies like SEAM
did have the capacity to implement such legislation. Unfortunately,
she lamented, SEAM lacked the resources to do so. This was partly
due to the fact that NGOs – who she viewed as ‘‘sponges’’ for inter-
national support for water policy reform and study – preferred to
work against SEAM instead of supporting SEAM. ‘‘I don’t have any-
thing against NGOs,’’ Elena explained, echoing the sentiments of
the other two centralized IWRM cases; ‘‘everyone has their own
business.’’ ‘‘However,’’ she continued, ‘‘I don’t think that they
[NGOs] have done their job. Their job is not to define policy. They
can’t define policy. Their job is to support the government where it
is weak, based on policies created by the government.’’
‘‘In Paraguay,’’ Elena clarified, ‘‘the whole world wants to be the
owner of water’’ and, ‘‘there is a lot of money available for water
management.’’ NGOs, she explained, ‘‘have their own ways of
accessing this money.’’ This was fine with her, Elena insisted. Sig-
nificant problems arose, however, when NGOs used money from
foreign donors to politicize environmental planning issues and to
create local policies and ordinances that conflict with those en-
acted by central government. This had happened recently, she la-
mented, with the outburst of NGO projects to create POATs for
sub-basins throughout Paraguay (Ward, 2010, Ch. 3). Elena argued
that in producing POATs without SEAM oversight, NGOs were
explicitly seeking to ‘‘destabilize the government’s policy-making
process.’’ The government, she clarified, had to play a stronger role
at all scales of POAT creation. Central government intervention and
oversight, Elena insisted, was crucial to ensuring that POATs and
the resulting governance arrangements were technically valid,
politically feasible, and participatory.
Elena’s comments call attention to both the state-centric, hier-
archal view of environmental governance and the calculated stand-
offishness towards the IWRM policy model that characterize the
centralized IWRM factor. The gist of this perspective is that IWRM
ideas and techniques (e.g. POATS and decentralized management
entities (river basin commissions)) are tolerable as long as central
government agencies like the SEAM supervise their implementa-
tion. Put simply, the centralized IWRM view essentially dispenses
with decentralization, pure market-oriented management, and
POAT creation as they are presented in the IWRM model (and in
orthodox neoliberal ideology (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004))
while simultaneously proposing adjusted, state-centric interpreta-
tions of these principles and techniques (Ong, 2007).
4.3. Selective IWRM
The selective IWRM factor (Table 3) represents the viewpoints
of nine respondents: Three are public officials and six are NGO
 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102
Table 3
Distinguishing statements for selective IWRM cases – few unique positions – critique of state capacity, rejection of market mechanisms.
No. Statement
41 Water for ecosystem needs is more important than water for economic development
44 We already know enough about our water resources to make good decisions
23 In resolving water conflicts, legal and bureaucratic knowledge is more useful than scientific knowledge about ecosystem
dynamics and the water cycle
3 Water is the most important priority for economic development
36 Not enough scientific information exists to support implementation of IWRM
19 Privatization of land and management is a more effective means of protecting natural resources than reforming
environmental policy
8 Rural people lack the culture/history to participate in resource management/development commissions
técnicos (NGO employees with technical skills rather than adminis-
trative duties). Of three public officials, one is employed in the
SEAM Water Resources Division. The remaining two are employed
at the Environmental Attorney’s office in the Ministry of the Public
and at the Paraguayan Auditor General’s Environmental Manage-
ment division. The NGO técnicos whose sorts constitute the Selec-
tive IWRM perspective represent the following NGOs: two técnicos
and one senior official from the NGO GEAM/AlterVida; one técnico
from the NGO REMA, an NGO that focuses on urban environmental
issues, one current técnico and one former técnico from the NGO
IDEA, and finally a técnico from the NGO Sobrevivencia.
One of the most striking aspects of the selective IWRM perspec-
tive is that it is defined not by strongly held unique positions but
rather by lukewarm attitudes towards statements that the other fac-
tors ranked strongly. In fact, at first glance, there is only one state-
ment about which the selective IWRM factor manifests strong
views that are not shared by either of the other two factors: Strong
disagreement ( 2) with the notion that rural people lack the cul-
ture/history to participate in resource management/development
commissions (#8). Other than that, the selective IWRM viewpoint
is distinguished by moderately- (±1) or neutrally-ranked (0) state-
ments that were ranked strongly (>±2) by IWRM acolytes and cen-
tralized IWRM cases. This pattern of low-ranked defining
statements suggests that selective IWRM cases are wary of mar-
ket-oriented governance (#30, #19) and uncomfortable with the
notion that there is not currently enough scientific information
or knowhow to begin to manage Paraguayan watersheds effec-
tively (#44, #23, #30, #36).
Side-by-side comparison of the factor scores for each of the 50 Q
statements reveals, however, that the selective IWRM worldview
does have a number of strong views. In some cases, these strongly
held views converge with either the IWRM acolyte or the Central-
ized IWRM viewpoint, while in others they diverge. Table 4 shows
how the selective and acolyte perspectives share strong disagree-
ment with the notion that government agencies possess the
knowledge, resources, and will to sustainably manage Paraguayan
watersheds.
However, when it comes to views on the role of the market,
Selective IWRM cases break from the Acolytes and align closely
with the centralized IWRM perspective. As shown in Table 5, selec-
tive IWRM and centralized IWRM cases strongly reject the notion
that state power over water should be rolled back or diminished
under IWRM (#4, #32).
At the same time, both are vehemently opposed to filling the
resulting regulatory void with market mechanisms (privatization
#19; economic valuation of water #30).
Together, examination of the distinguishing statements for the
Selective IWRM viewpoint (Table 3) and comparative analysis of
raw factor scores for all three factors (Tables 4 and 5) show that
the selective IWRM viewpoint is unique for the way it combines
(1) a critique of the government agencies’ capacity with (2) a call
for a stronger local participation in watershed management and
97
Factors
Acolytes Centralized Selective
0 0 1
1 1 0
1 3 0
2 3 0
1 3 1
0 3 1
0 1 2
(3) a pronounced wariness of the market-oriented governance.
Comments made by a two individuals – Ticio and Leo—whose cases
were strongly associated with the selective IWRM factor help illu-
minate the gradations of this perspective.
Ticio, a hydrologist for the NGO GEAM, explained that there
were two main ways that the IWRM policy model was useful to
GEAM’s effort to promote local control of watersheds. First, the
IWRM model opened up a space in the discursive field of environ-
mental rule-making – a realm that had previously been the exclu-
sive domain of the officials in Paraguay’s central government
agencies (and their cronies in the private sector) – for debate about
how local people and other civil society actors should participate in
environmental governance. Likewise, the strong international sup-
port for IWRM-based projects gave GEAM access to foreign money,
technology, and knowledge. GEAM, he explained, worked to secure
and redeploy such resources to ensure that those who determined
how Paraguay’s natural resources were governed would be the
very people who occupied and depended upon Paraguayan water-
sheds for their livelihoods – not the central government or ‘‘the
market’’. ‘‘Local management before anything else,’’ Ticio clarified,
was key to sustainable development of Paraguay’s water resources.
Ticio rejected the IWRM-based assertion that placing an eco-
nomic value on all water uses was the best way to manage water
and watersheds sustainably. The problem was, he argued, that
markets allocate water on the basis of supply and demand. Conse-
quently, in instances where clean water supplies were limited or
expensive to access, water might wind up being allocated to high
value industrial users – who were capable of paying top dollar
for it – and away from poor people in need of the water for subsis-
tence purposes but without the means to pay for it. For these rea-
sons, Ticio clarified, he regarded the IWRM policy model as a
‘‘toolbox’’ that should be drawn from selectively and mixed freely
with other theories and methods in order to improve local people’s
control over resources.
Leo, a técnico for the NGO Sobrevivencia who has worked exten-
sively on watershed management issues with several poor com-
munities along the Río Apá watershed in northeastern Paraguay,
was troubled by the implication under IWRM that the creation of
environmental zoning plans (POATs) was a silver bullet that would
resolve all local problems, including environmental degradation,
pervasive poverty, social and political inequality. In practice, he ar-
gued, the development of a community-scale POAT often exacer-
bated the very problems the POAT was intended to solve by,
ironically, including unsustainable forms of production in the list
of ‘‘most adequate’’ uses for each zone (AlterVida, 2005). This hap-
pened, Leo explained, because the supposedly public meetings
regarding local interests and the ‘‘most adequate use’’ of water-
sheds were typically dominated by cattle and soy producers. These
wealthier and more powerful actors tended to be better equipped
to marshal a representation of their interests in the techno-bureau-
cratic language of IWRM than local subsistence farmers, fishermen,
and other less well-off occupants of Paraguayan watersheds. Along
98 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102

Table 4
Selective – acolyte convergence: Critique of central government capacity.

No. Statement Factors

Acolytes Centralized Selective
34 Without interventions from civil society, the Paraguayan government would not have come up with a truly integrated Water 2 0 3
Law
24 Environmental conflicts and crimes in Paraguay are typically resolved through bribes/political favor versus through 1 3 1
negotiations or legal institutions
39 Coordination between existing state institutions responsible for water management is getting worse/more difficult 0 2 0
45 SEAM has sufficient resources and knowledge to effectively manage Paraguay’s water and implement the new Water Law 3 0 3
12 On river basins shared with Brazil, Paraguayan officials enforce environmental policy better than Brazilians 3 0 3

Table 5
Selective – centralized convergence: Rejection of market mechanisms; embrace of science-based decision-making.

No. Statement Factors

Acolytes Centralized Selective
28 Water can’t be subject to the principles of any specific sector or market logic 1 2 3
46 Scientific knowledge gives credibility and validity to resource management decisions 0 2 2
32 The IWRM approach ought to strengthen the State’s direct control of water resources 2 1 2
30 Placing an economic value on all water uses is best way to resolve conflicts and manage effectively 1 0 0
7 It doesn’t matter how the Water Law is written or enforced, it won’t be implemented in rural areas 1 2 2
19 Privatization of land and management is a more effective means of protecting natural resources than reforming 0 3 1
environmental policy
4 Paraguay needs less government and more market mechanisms in charge of its water 0 2 3

Table 6
Consensus statements.

No. Statement Factors

Acolytes Selective Centralized
40 Improved water management should enhance solidarity and reduce poverty 3 3 3
43 Strategies to address water challenges should link land use planning to water planning 3 3 2
38 The local level is where national political policy satisfies the needs of the community 2 2 3
48 Local resource management plans accompanied by actions 2 3 1
37 Improving local access to technical tools (maps, G.I.S., internet) is essential to effective decision-making and implementation 2 1 2
of IWRM policy
18 Paraguay did not need a new ‘‘integrated’’ Water Law. Instead, the state should have better enforced existing policies 2 1 1
26 Improved enforcement of environmental policies will have a negative impact on the lives of poor Paraguayans 2 2 2
14 Environmental laws are too strictly enforced in Paraguay 3 3 3

the Río Apá and its tributaries, he explained, the end result was typ-
ically a POAT that sanctioned intensive, agro-export oriented soy and
cattle production techniques which, in turn, threaten local ecosys-
tems and livelihoods. Despite his wariness of POATs, Leo was ada-
mant local people had to know what POATs were. Given the
enthusiasm among governmental and non-governmental actors for
POATs, he explained, it was crucial for local people to have the capac-
ity to either shape POATs through active participation in planning or,
better yet, to pressure local officials to enact local-scale ordinances
that would protect against POATs’ potentially destructive effects.
Leo and Ticio’s comments help us flesh out the nuances of the
selective IWRM perspective, namely recognition of the utility of cer-
tain aspects of IWRM combined with a critique of state capacity and
a firm rejection of IWRM’s underlying market-oriented ideology.
While they see IWRM as useful for achieving certain goals (e.g. local
participation), Selective IWRM cases also believe that without careful
oversight from local government officials in particular, the IWRM
policy model will give rise to serious social and ecological problems.
4.4. Areas of Consensus
As shown in Table 6, all three groups of IWRM professionals fa-
vored statements that calling for the transformation of existing
environmental governance arrangements in Paraguay.
For example, all respondents agreed that enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations needed to be improved and all favored in-
creased local participation in governance processes (#38, #37,
#48, #18). Likewise there was consensus on the importance of
training local people to participate in POAT development (#48)
and supplying them with requisite technology, such as computers
and G.I.S. software (#37). Further, there was strong agreement that
the policies and governance arrangements that emerged from
these technical, participatory decision-making processes should
increase conditions for poverty alleviation, solidarity, and sustain-
able development (#40, #14, #16).
5. Interpretation – what does it mean to be involved in
neoliberal processes?
Findings from Q method and interviews reveal that individuals
trained in IWRM cut up and remold various viewpoints and mean-
ings associated with development and the environment into three
distinctive social perspectives: IWRM acolytes, centralized IWRM,
and selective IWRM (Foucault, 1990 cited in Robbins and Krueger
(2000)). There are two points to make regarding these findings.
First, Paraguayan IWRM professionals share similar views about
what some of the general outcomes of environmental governance
in Paraguay should be – poverty reduction, empowerment, and im-
 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102
proved public participation. Likewise, there is agreement across
the three factors that local-scale environmental zoning plans
(POATs) are critical to Paraguay’s achievement of these outcomes.
This leads to the second point: Despite agreement that environ-
mental governance should address poverty, empower local people,
and involve standard bureaucratic forms (POATs) IWRM actors dis-
agree about how to achieve such outcomes. In particular, there is a
marked disagreement regarding the appropriate roles for non-gov-
ernmental, State, and local actors as well as the market in a decen-
tralized watershed management scheme (Brenner et al., 2010a).
These conflicting viewpoints are bound up in historical struggles
among expert actors for power within the discursive field of envi-
ronmental rule-making. As a consequence, even those aspects of
the IWRM model which are viewed favorably (e.g. POATs) function
as matters of heated dispute during normative struggles over nat-
ure, identity, and rule.
For Michael Goldman (2004), standard bureaucratic forms like
POATs index an eco-governmental subjectivity that is extremely
compatible with neoliberal developmentalism. Goldman warns
that ‘‘the cumulative effect of these mechanisms is to scientize,
depoliticize, and institutionalize certain notions of global environ-
mentalism and citizenship, regulation and subjectivity’’ (2004,
184). Be that as it may, Goldman does little to examine the political
ecological rationalities of the people who use these technologies;
the inference is that use indicates adoption of neoliberal views
on nature, power, development and the environment. What I have
shown above is that regardless of the degree to which we, as
researchers, choose to view POATs as neoliberal, agreement among
Paraguayan IWRM professionals about the importance of POAT
creation does not translate into an ideological commitment to
the market as the optimal framework for resource allocation and
management (c.f. Goldman, 2004, 184).
In making this point, my goal is not to suggest that ‘‘eco-govern-
mentality’’ is an empty signifier. Instead, I wish to point out that
Goldman’s theorization of ‘‘green neoliberalism’’ tends to overem-
phasize neoliberal programs and the spread of markets at the ex-
pense of a more granular, detailed investigation of what it means
to the people whose subjectivities are the targets of neoliberal pro-
jects to be involved in these projects (Prudham, 2010; see also
Springer, 2010). Consequently, Goldman’s perspective offers local
officials experts little wiggle room or agency to work around, mod-
ify, and adapt neoliberal policy models, projects, and technologies
to fit either local conditions—including what Brenner et al. (2010a,
196) refer to as the ‘‘inherited institutional landscape’’—or their
own need to secure the funding, power, and technology necessary
to self-reproduce in the cash-strapped, corruption-laden context
that characterizes environmental rule-making in Paraguay. In what
follows, I use the concept of ‘‘boundary objects’’ (Star and Griese-
mer, 1989) to inform my analysis of how and why the notion that
POATs are crucial crosscuts the distinct conceptual maps assem-
bled by IWRM professionals during this study.
6. Discussion – boundary objects, POATs, and collaboration
6.1. Boundary objects, POATs, and collaborative work
Building on Mara Goldman’s recent work on conservation corri-
dors in Tanzania (2009) I argue that POATs act a flexible concept, or
‘‘boundary object’’, that makes it possible for social actors with het-
erogeneous interests and backgrounds to appear to work together
on governmental reform projects without sacrificing their own
agendas or stalling progress on policy reform and implementation
(see Star and Griesemer, 1989; Fujimura, 1992 on boundary ob-
jects). Boundary objects are representational technologies, such
as texts and maps, which ‘‘inhabit multiple social worlds simulta-
99
neously. . .meeting the demands of each one’’ (Star and Griesemer,
1989, 388).
Boundary objects like maps and texts are central to translation
work because they represent the contested terrain that is the tar-
get of collaborative work in formats that have concrete meaning
in multiple social worlds yet which simultaneously have ‘‘different
identities in each’’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989, 409). As ideas, or
learned concepts, boundary objects have material force, both in
the consequences of their implementation and in their subsequent
practical use as a medium of communication among actors (Bow-
ker and Star, 2000, 398). Hence the production and practical use of
boundary objects like POATs during a project – whether it be a sci-
entific endeavor or a resource management initiative – permits ac-
tors from different social worlds to engage in a form of abstract
communication about the objectives and methods of work being
done without ever completely resolving differences of opinion or
potential conflicts of interests regarding the project.
The plasticity ‘‘in meaning and function’’ of boundary objects
like POATs facilitates their widespread use as both a standard con-
cept and a doable project that can be used to support multiple, of-
ten contradictory approaches to political ‘‘reform’’ (Mara Goldman,
2009, 338; see also de Laet and Mol, 2000). Chief among the con-
ceptually specific yet operationally vague guidelines that POATs in-
stall on environmental governance is the requirement that
planning be both participatory and science-based. Of course, IWRM
professionals interpret and act on the concepts of participation and
science-based planning in different and at times contradictory
ways. This is reflected in the different ways that IWRM profession-
als structure their views on how participation should work and the
capacity of different parties to contribute to a POAT. It can also be
seen in Elena’s argument that NGO-led POAT projects undermine
government sovereignty over Paraguay’s national resources and
her suggestion that the solution to this problem for government
officials to supervise future POAT creation. Meanwhile, Leo’s asser-
tion that local participation in POAT development is frequently
dominated by commercial farmers and industrial producers pro-
vides a similar example of how, as boundary objects are translated
from concept into action, they shape and politicize later dialog and
action (c.f. Ferguson, 1994; Goldman, 2004). What is important in
both cases is the way that Elena and Leo use POATs as starting
points to explain their contrary views on how participatory, sci-
ence-based governance should unfold in Paraguayan watersheds.
The fact that IWRM actors with very different ideological com-
mitments view POATs as a precondition for any possible collective
dialog and action is a function not simply of workshops or training
seminars, but of the utility of POATs for achieving multiple, and at
times contradictory objectives. In practice POATs provide a discur-
sive and practical artifact that IWRM professionals can use to both
demonstrate their capacity to participate in IWRM-based environ-
mental rule-making and to harness materials and supporters to
their particular efforts to shape how such rule-making plays out.
This can be seen in the following account of inter-NGO skirmishes
regarding the USAID-funded POAT that the NGO DesdelChaco
developed for the departments of Alto Paraguay and Boquerón
(Fundación DesdelChaco, 2006).6 Many groups were skeptical of
how this POAT deemed a significant amount of territory inside of
the biological diversity-rich eco-tone between the dry and wet Cha-
co ecosystems as ‘‘apt for grazing’’. NGOs like GUYRA Paraguay, the
Paraguayan subsidiary of Birdlife International, quickly labeled Des-
delChaco’s work the ‘‘POAT for cows’’. GUYRA’s response was to se-
cure money and equipment from international donors to develop a
6
Alto Paraguay and Boquerón are the northernmost, most biologically diverse, and
because of an encroaching cattle frontier and petroleum exploration, most ecolog-
ically vulnerable of Paraguay’s sub-national administrative units.
100 L. Ward / Geoforum 46 (2013) 91–102
new, sub-departmental-scale POAT for the municipality of Bahía Ne-
gra (GUYRA, 2008). While GUYRA never did get around to developing
an actual POAT, GUYRA was able to leverage its capacity to raise
funds for the POAT project to beat out DesdelChaco and other rival
environmental NGOs which were competing to secure from the Par-
aguayan government a co-management agreement to manage the
four public parks that lie within Bahía Negra’s municipal boundaries.
Vis a vis the POAT boundary object, then, GUYRA won de facto con-
trol over the parks and forestalled efforts by rival NGOs to protect
cattle-ranching interests in the region. For the purposes of this pa-
per, the take-away point of this saga is that Paraguayan officials
seem to prefer dealing with problems and disruptions that POATs
create by developing new POATs.
This is because POATs help IWRM professionals assert their
capacity and right to positions of power. This, in turn, translates
into access to the global pools of money, technology and informa-
tion associated with the abundant water resources that make Par-
aguay a frequent target of international development and
conservation agencies. Experts in IWRM are also experts in maneu-
vering within and around Paraguay complex institutional and
political-economic landscapes. They understand that demonstrat-
ing that the ability and will to work with tools supplied by the
‘‘transnational development apparatus’’ (Li, 2007, 16) is what
keeps the apparatus coming back to Paraguay with more training,
money, governmental technologies. As illustrated by the POAT for
cows v. birds example, groups like GUYRA are skilled at using these
technologies to enlist support for individual projects and, simulta-
neously, to thwart competing schemes.
Conveniently, POATs also provide a medium of communication
through which IWRM actors can temporarily set aside, or at least
work around those aspects of the IWRM policy model that provoke
intractable confrontations – principally IWRM’s emphasis on
marketized government. This is important because just as being
able to demonstrate technical and institutional ‘‘capacity’’ helps se-
cure access to resources, so does being able to appear to be work-
ing cooperatively. Historically in Paraguay, conflicts of interest
between government officials, international ‘‘experts’’, and NGO
actors have resulted in Bank and USAID officials putting projects
on hold or diverting funds away Paraguayan agencies (World Bank,
2004; USAID, 1999). Under these circumstances, the concept of the
POAT – as both an idea and a project – provides an abstract, discur-
sive channel through which conflicting views on governance and
ideology can be articulated. Moreover, because the POAT is associ-
ated with the IWRM rule-making model, POAT-related debates and
conflicts can be construed as progress, or at least as legitimate
struggles among IWRM professionals to pursue a common objec-
tive: sustainable development. By incorporating POATs into their
vernacular and practices, then, Paraguayan IWRM professionals
avoid stalling or impeding policy debates, projects, or the flow of
international aid.
Therein lays the utility of boundary objects: they allow hetero-
geneity and cooperation to ‘‘coexist’’ in an otherwise contentious
work environment (Star and Griesemer, 1989, 414). Despite the
controversies and ruptures they may provoke, these technologies
mediate subsequent communication and action aimed at re-con-
figuring how power over territory and population is and ought to
be organized (Bowker and Star, 2000, 398). Hence just as POATs
‘‘build on, enhance, and intensify’’ rifts over normative issues such
as market-oriented rule and development (Brenner et al., 2010a),
they simultaneously facilitate work on multiple and even contra-
dictory projects to deal with this disorder. In this light, it is not sur-
prising that IWRM experts, whose outlooks diverge – or at least fail
to converge in a coherent fashion – on other aspects of environ-
mental rule-making, view POATs as useful to their various and of-
ten conflicting projects. These technologies help individuals cope
with the uneven and messy processes of neoliberal entanglement
and ‘‘mutation’’ as well as the plasticity of policy models like IWRM
(Ong, 2007; Bakker, 2007; Dunn, 2008; Brenner et al., 2010a).
7. Conclusion – coping with neoliberal disruption
Conceptual maps assembled by Paraguayan IWRM experts re-
mind us that governmentalities – be they neoliberal, socialist, hy-
brid, or eco – do not simply materialize when standardized rule-
making models like IWRM are introduced. Rather they emerge as
individuals engage strategically with and push back against the
boundary objects that (a) hold these rather vague models together
and (b) facilitate maneuvers within and around existing and
emerging political-economic, institutional, and policy frameworks
(Bakker, 2007; Ong, 2007). In such an environment, local officials –
who share vague goals regarding the ends of government (sustain-
able development) but disagree about means – are constantly on
the lookout for new ways calculate and represent their own (and
other social actors’) relative indispensability to ongoing efforts to
care for territory and population (Li, 2007; Peck and Tickell,
2002). This is done as much in the service of competing political
agendas as it is in the service of the collaborative goal of sustain-
able development (Bakker, 2010; Brenner et al., 2010a).
By helping individuals work around, modify, and amplify the
constantly shifting material and subjective conditions of rule,
boundary objects like POATs tie together different assemblages of
neoliberal governmentality. While the proliferation of POATS as
projects and matters of debate certainly installs certain constraints
on struggles over Paraguayan watersheds (Goldman, 2004), in the
hands of different actors, these boundary objects are used simulta-
neously to disrupt and order subjectivities, institutional arrange-
ments, and political–ecological landscapes. Simultaneous acts of
tactical adoption and modification of neoliberal boundary objects
(to suit individual needs and the changing governmental context)
generate the unstable conditions that make it possible for different
parties’ particular twists on these technologies to take root and ex-
pand in local socio-natures (Goldman, 2004; Brenner et al., 2010b).
The combination of Q method with semi-structured interviews
and participant observation techniques permits an empirical
examination of the processes of neoliberalization at multiple scales
– from patterns of convergence and divergence in the conceptual
mappings of local officials, to coping strategies that individuals
adopt in order to sustain themselves and their projects in the face
of changing (ecogovernmentalizing) institutional and political con-
texts, to transformations in regulatory regimes. Such accounts pro-
vide an important window into the unsettled and often
contradictory nature of the interactions between individuals,
places, projects, and technologies of rule as they unfold in the con-
text of rival efforts to rule and improve nature and society (Brenner
et al., 2010b; Bakker, 2010).
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