Proceedings of the ASME 2022

14th International Pipeline Conference

IPC 2020
September 26-30, 2022, Calgary, Alberta

IPC2022-86815

RISK-BASED HOOP STRESS FACTORS FOR PRESSURE DESIGN

Riski Adianto, Maher Nessim, Balek Ngandu

C-FER Technologies, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

ABSTRACT rh = ratio between the hit rates before and after

A risk-based pressure design approach has been developed implementation of enhanced mechanical damage
as an alternative to the class location approach currently used prevention
in the Canadian Standard Association’s (CSA’s) Standard Z662. t = wall thickness (mm)
Similar to the current approach, the new approach uses a set of 𝐵𝐵 = basic class factor
hoop stress factors to calculate the minimum wall thickness from Cv = minimum full-size Charpy V-notch energy (J)
the pressure, diameter, and specified minimum yield strength. CF = class factor
The hoop stress factors, termed class factors, are calibrated to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = upper limit on the class factor
keep the failure probability below an allowable value for the D = outside diameter (mm)
limit states representing burst of undamaged pipe under the F = design factor
operating pressure and failure due to equipment impact loading. FC = fracture toughness factor
Yielding under the strength test pressure is addressed as a G = maximum hoop stress factor
separate limit on the class factor. To achieve a consistent safety 𝐻𝐻 = hit rate factor
level for all pipelines, the allowable failure probabilities are J = joint factor
inversely proportional to the magnitude of failure consequences, L = location factor
as implied by a safety class determined according to the P = design pressure (MPa)
approach described in a companion IPC paper. 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = minimum required test pressure (multiple of
This paper describes the calibration process used to define maximum operating pressure)
the class factors and provides a comparison between the wall S = specified minimum yield strength (SMYS) (MPa)
thicknesses resulting from the risk-based approach and those 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = maximum permissible test stress (multiple of
obtained from the current hoop stress factors in CSA Z662. SMYS)
SLS = serviceability limit state
Keywords: risk-based design, pressure design, hoop stress T = temperature factor
factor, safety class ULS = ultimate limit state
Y/T = yield-to-tensile ratio
NOMENCLATURE ∆P = maximum test pressure differential due to
a# = class factor coefficients hydrostatic head (ratio of Pmin)
cr = ratio between large leak consequences and rupture λ = rate of equipment impact events (hits) per km-year
consequences
crave = class factor calibration weighted average 1. INTRODUCTION
crg = class factor for gases or vapours The Technical Committee for the Canadian Standards
crl = class factor for liquids Association’s (CSA’s) Standard Z662 on oil and gas pipeline
n = number of pipe joints per km systems (the “Standard”) formed a class location task force
pf-ULS = annual probability of ULS failure per km-year (CLTF) to review and propose improvements to the class
pfbi = annual probability of burst failure for defect-free location system and location factors used in Clause 4 of the
pipe per joint Standard. In addition to making a proposal for short-term
pfe = equivalent rupture probability incremental changes, the CLTF developed a longer-term plan for
pfeh = probability of failure per hit a more fundamental change from the current class location
pru = probability of a rupture system to a new risk-based safety class system and a new set of
pll = probability of large leak pressure design hoop stress factors.

1 © 2022 by ASME
 This paper describes part of the work carried out under a
joint industry project to develop a pressure design approach that
achieves acceptable and consistent public safety and
environmental protection levels for all pipelines within the scope
of the Standard. Similar to the approach currently used in the
Standard, a hoop stress factor (the “class factor”) is used in the
Barlow equation to calculate the minimum wall thickness from
the pressure, diameter, and specified minimum yield strength
(SMYS). The class factor is defined as a function of the
consequence-based safety class that is defined according to the
approach in Nessim et al. [1]. Risk consistency is achieved by
calibrating the class factors to keep the failure probability below
an allowable value that is inversely proportional to the severity
of the failure consequences for each safety class.
2. DESIGN FORMULA
The new pressure design approach for steel pipe will use
new factors that replace those in the design formula in
Clause 4.3.5.1 of the 2019 edition of the Standard [2]. The
current Clause 4.3.5.1 formula is as follows:
𝑃𝑃 =
2∙𝑆𝑆∙𝑡𝑡
× 𝐹𝐹 × 𝐿𝐿 × 𝐽𝐽 × 𝑇𝑇 (1)
𝐷𝐷
where
P = design pressure (MPa),
S = specified minimum yield strength (MPa),
t = wall thickness (mm),
D = outside diameter (mm),
F = design factor (0.80 per Clause 4.3.6),
L = location factor (see Clause 4.3.7 and Table 4.2),
J = joint factor (see Clause 4.3.8 and Table 4.3), and
T = temperature factor (see Clause 4.3.9 and Table 4.4).
The J and T factors are material related and are applicable
to a limited subset of pipelines. Accordingly, the effort involved
in a risk-based calibration of these factors is not warranted and
their values were not changed in the new design approach.
The location factor, L, is defined in Table 4.2 and
Clause 4.3.7.4 of the Standard as a function of the service fluid,
pipeline category (i.e. general, road, railway, stations, or ‘other’),
class location, and environmental impact (as indicated by the
designated geographic area (DGA) characterization in
Clause 2.2 of the Standard). The design factor, F, has a constant
value of 0.8, which serves as an upper bound on the total hoop
stress factor. Since a subjective upper bound is not required in
the risk-based approach, F and L are replaced by a single factor
referred to as the “class factor”, leading to the following design
equation:
2∙𝑆𝑆∙𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃 = × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐽𝐽 × 𝑇𝑇 (2)
𝐷𝐷
where CF is the class factor. CF is defined as a function of the
safety class, which is based on the parameters governing release
consequences, including pressure, diameter, fluid properties,
population density, and sensitivity to environmental damage [1].
3. APPROACH
The class factors were developed using the following
process:
1. Design cases. Define a set of design cases covering the
ranges of diameters, pressures, and grades within the scope of
the design clause of the Standard (Clause 4), which covers steel
pipe for upstream, midstream, and high-pressure gas distribution
pipelines (where high-pressure distribution pipelines are those
with an operating stress greater than 30% or an operating
pressure greater than 860 kPa).
2. Reliability-based design. Use reliability-based design
to calculate the wall thickness required to match the allowable
failure probability for each design case in each of the six safety
classes, and then use Equation (2) to calculate the class factor
from the wall thickness. (The reliability-based design approach
is illustrated in Fig. 1 and described in detail in Annex O of CSA
Z662 [1].)
3. Class factors. Use regression analysis over the class
factor data from Step 2 to develop a formula defining the class
factor for each safety class as a function of pipeline attributes. As
a regression-based solution, the class factor resulting from this
step does not result in an exact match to the allowable failure
probability for all designs and, therefore, an iterative process (see
Step 4) is used to produce the best overall match.
4. Optimization. Use the class factors from Step 3 in
Equation (2) to calculate the wall thicknesses and associated
failure probabilities for all design cases, and compare them to the
allowable failure probabilities. Repeat Steps 3 and 4 until a set
of class factors is found that matches the allowable failure
probability, on average, and minimizes deviations from it.
Identify Limit States
Select Wall Thickness
Calculate Failure Probability
Less than No
Allowable Failure Probability
Allowable ?
Yes
Acceptable Design
FIGURE 1: RELIABILITY-BASED DESIGN PROCESS
4. DESIGN CASES
The design cases were based on the basic pipeline design
parameters used in Equation (2), including design pressure,
nominal pipe size, and steel grade. In addition, the equipment
impact hit rate and Charpy toughness were included to allow
inclusion of equipment impact limit states in the design
approach. The rationale for including the equipment impact limit
states is described in Section 5 below. The specific values used
in the analysis are shown in Table 1, which resulted in a total of
10,290 design cases analyzed. Wide ranges that bracket all
2 © 2022 by ASME
existing and foreseeable pipeline designs were used. Specific from the test pressure requirements and limits specified in
pressure, grade, and diameter values within each range were Clause 8 of the Standard.
chosen to coincide with the most common values of these The limit states in Table 3 apply over the entire length of a
parameters in a proprietary database representing 62,700 km of pipeline and are, therefore, appropriate as a basis for initial wall
liquid pipelines and 96,700 km of natural gas pipelines. While thickness selection. Supplementary design conditions can be
grade 690 was not represented in the database, it was added added to address limit states associated with other loads that may
because of the potential for future use. Cases with PD/SMYS apply at specific locations (e.g. geotechnical deformations).
greater than 40 were not included as they correspond to cases
that use unrealistically low grades for large-diameter, high- TABLE 2: MINIMUM DAMAGE PREVENTION
pressure pipe. REQUIREMENTS
Damage Population Population Density ≥1.8
TABLE 1: DESIGN CASES Prevention Density People/ha
Parameter Range Values Method <1.8 People/ha Option 1 Option 2
Design pressure, P (MPa) 0.86 to 17.5 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 13, 16
Nominal pipe size, D (NPS) 2 to 52 2, 4, 8, 16, 24, 36, 48 0.6 (see 0.6 (see
Minimum cover
Steel grade, SMYS (MPa) 241, 290, 359, 448, 550, Table 4.9 of CSA Table 4.9 of 1.2
241 to 690 depth (m)
690 Z662) CSA Z662)
Equipment impact hit rate 0.0002, 0.0004, 0.0006, One-call system Member of a one-call system
0.0002 to Locate, mark, Locate, mark,
(per km-year) 0.0008, 0.001, 0.002, Dig notification
0.004 Locate and mark and supervise and supervise
0.004 response
Mean Charpy toughness (J) ≥20 20, 40, 60, 100, 150 excavations excavations
Education program to inform the public of the presence
Public awareness of the pipeline, one-call system, dig notification
The default hit rate used in the calibration was 0.004 per requirements, and damage prevention precaution
km-year, which is representative of both developed and Signage
undeveloped areas because the higher activity rates in developed According to
according to
Clause 10.5.3
areas are offset by more stringent damage prevention measures. Clause 10.5.3
with the
The minimum damage prevention measures required to justify plus permanent,
According to signage placed
Signage or markers continuous
the default hit rate of 0.004 per km-year are shown in Table 2 Clause 10.5.3
above-ground
at a spacing
(from CSA Z662 Annex C). Lower hit rates were considered to that ensures
markers such as
continuous
allow for potential wall thickness reductions based on enhanced fencing or
visibility
damage prevention measures. concrete blocks
Surveillance
It was found that wall thickness is sensitive to the mean interval
Quarterly Monthly Monthly
Charpy toughness up to 60 J, and it becomes nearly independent
of toughness beyond that value. This means that the design TABLE 3: LIMIT STATES CONSIDERED
approach can be used for a mean Charpy toughness exceeding Limit
Primary Companion
the largest value of 150 J shown in Table 1. State Limit State
Load Load
Category
Burst of Internal
5. RELIABILITY-BASED DESIGN 1 N/A
defect-free pipe pressure
5.1 Limit States ULS(1)
Puncture or burst Equipment Internal
The pressure design clause of the Standard (Clause 4.3.5) 2
of gouged dent(3) impact load pressure
defines the minimum wall thickness based on limiting the hoop SLS(2) 3
Excessive plastic Strength test
N/A
stress under the design pressure in the undamaged pipe to a given deformation(4) pressure
fraction of the specified minimum yield stress. While this is a (1) Ultimate limit states, which include large leaks and ruptures with major
potential safety or environmental consequences (detailed definition in
traditional stress-based design approach, the implied limit state Annex O of CSA Z662).
is that of pipe yielding under the operating pressure. The actual (2) Serviceability limit states, which include deformations with potential to
limit states associated with pressure loading and used in the risk- affect service or durability without loss of containment (detailed definition
based design approach are listed in Table 3. Limit states in Annex O of CSA Z662).
associated with time-dependent deterioration mechanisms, such (3) Small leaks that can result from equipment impact failures are conservatively
as corrosion and stress corrosion cracking, were not included in treated as large leaks because they represent a small percentage of the total
and because no models are available to distinguish between small leaks and
developing the pressure design approach because they are large leaks for an equipment impact failure.
normally managed by in-service inspection and repair rather than (4) Also applicable under operating pressure; however, calibration is limited to
wall thickness design. hydrostatic test pressure as the governing case.
The ultimate limit states (ULSs) in Table 3 were used in a
reliability analysis to derive the class factors needed to meet the 5.2 Failure Probability Calculation
ULS reliability targets. The serviceability limit state (SLS) is The probability of a ULS failure, 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓−𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 (per km-year), was
incorporated as a separate check, which was derived directly calculated as follows:

3 © 2022 by ASME
 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓−𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑛𝑛 × 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜆𝜆 × 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓ℎ (3) used for all locations because the new class factors are based on
safety classes and cannot be a function of the class location.
where n is the number of pipe joints per km (82 for a 40-foot
joint length), pfbi is the annual probability of burst failure for TABLE 4: PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF INPUTS
defect-free pipe per joint, λ is the rate of equipment impact USED TO CALCULATE EQUIPMENT IMPACT FAILURE
events (hits) per km year, and pfeh is the probability of failure per PROBABILITY
Distribution Standard
hit. This equation calculates the failure probability as the sum of Parameter Units
Type
Mean
Deviation
Source
the failure probabilities due to burst of the defect-free pipe under Operating
MPa Deterministic MOP (1)
0.0 N/A
internal pressure and failure due to equipment impact. Burst of Pressure
CSA Z662
the defect-free pipe is assumed to occur at any joint where the Diameter mm Deterministic Nominal 0.0
Annex O
applied pressure exceeds the pressure capacity, and failures of Wall
mm Normal Nominal
1.5% ×
C-FER
Thickness mean
individual joints are assumed to be independent events. Hoop Yield 1.1 × 3.5% × CSA Z662
Equipment impact failures are assumed to occur during any MPa Normal
Strength SMYS(2) mean Annex O
equipment hit that results in a load exceeding the pipe load Hoop
1.12 × 3.5% × CSA Z662
Tensile MPa Normal
capacity, and failures due to individual hits are assumed to be Strength
SMTS(3) mean Annex O
independent events.
The probabilities of failure per joint, pfbi, and per equipment Notch
J Lognormal
Variable 0.0421 × CSA Z662
Toughness (see Table 1) (mean)1.29 Annex O
impact hit, pfeh, are calculated from mechanistic failure models
that compare the applied load to the corresponding pipe Excavator Wolvert et al.
tonne Gamma 15.2 10.8
resistance and the probability distributions of the model input Mass [11]
Excavator
parameters using Monte Carlo simulations. The mechanistic Tooth mm Rectangular 90 28.9
models and calculation approach described in Clause O.2 of CSA Length
Chen and
Nessim
Z662 [2] were used. The burst model is a standard hoop stress Excavator
[12]
Tooth mm Rectangular 3.5 0.87
model that uses a flow stress definition developed by Jiao et al. Width
[3] to predict rupture failures. The equipment impact failure Gouge
mm Weibull 1.2 1.1
CSA Z662
Depth Annex O
model is based on the governing failure mechanism of two limit Based on
state functions representing puncture under the excavator tooth Gouge data from
mm Lognormal 201 372
load [4-6] and failure under internal pressure of the resulting Length ISO 16708
[13]
dent-gouge feature [7,8]. The model classifies an equipment (1) MOP = maximum operating pressure
impact failure as either a leak or a rupture (see Clause O.2.6.3.3 (2) SMYS = specified minimum yield stress
of CSA Z662 for definitions of these failure modes). To be (3) SMTS = specified minimum tensile stress
conservative, all leaks due to equipment impact are considered
large leaks. 5.3 Comparing to the Allowable Failure Probability
The local failure mechanisms assumed in the above- The safety classes and allowable failure probabilities
mentioned equipment impact model are relevant for pipe with a described in Nessim et al. [1] are shown in Table 5, which shows
relatively large diameter compared to the dimensions of the that one-half of the allowable failure probability was assigned to
indenter, and validation studies indicate that models are the limit states considered in pressure design. This is based on
applicable for pipes with nominal pipe size (NPS) greater than 6. incident data indicating that ULS failure rates are spilt
To perform the necessary calculations for pipe sizes between approximately equally between design-related limit states
NPS 2 and NPS 6, a comparison was made between the failure (predominantly equipment impact) and in-service-related limit
probabilities resulting from the models and those observed in the states (including deterioration mechanisms, such as corrosion
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and various types of cracking). The design approach ensures that
incident database [9,10] for different pipe sizes. This comparison the failure probability for design-related limit states is less than
showed that the model overestimates the failure probabilities by one-half of the total allowable failure probability, leaving the
an increasing factor between 1.5 for NPS 12 and 7.9 for NPS 4 other half available for in-service limit states.
or less. Based on this, the model was conservatively used to While both large leaks and ruptures are in the ULS category,
calculate the failure probabilities for all pipe sizes. While it is the consequences of a large leak are less severe than the
recognized that the failure mechanisms underpinning the model consequences of a rupture. Since the allowable failure
are not applicable to small-diameter pipe, this conservative probabilities in Table 5 assume that all failures are ruptures,
approach has enabled the calibration of a unified design demonstrating compliance was based on the equivalent rupture
approach for all pipe sizes. probability as permitted by Annex O. The equivalent rupture
The input parameter distributions used in the failure probability, pfe, which is defined as the rupture probability that
probability calculations are shown in Table 4. The excavator results in the same risk level associated with a given combination
mass distribution in the table is representative of class of large leak and rupture probabilities, can be calculated from:
locations 1 and 2. While smaller excavators are used in class
location 3 and 4, the distribution in the table was conservatively 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 × 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (4)

4 © 2022 by ASME
 conservative class factor with respect to variations in pipe grade.
where pru is the probability of a rupture, pll is the probability of Lower pipe grades were not considered because they lead to high
large leak, and cr is the ratio between large leak consequences hoop stress factors that cannot meet the pressure testing
and rupture consequences. requirements described in Section 7. Figure 2 shows that class
factors governed by equipment impact can be accurately
TABLE 5: ALLOWABLE FAILURE PROBABILITIES BY represented as an increasing function of PD/SMYS up to a
SAFETY CLASS maximum value determined by burst of the defect-free pipe.
Safety Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Failure
Very Very TABLE 6: RATIO BETWEEN LARGE LEAK AND
Consequence Low Medium High Extreme RUPTURE CONSEQUENCES
Low High
Severity
Service Fluid cr
Allowable Min. Avg. Max.
Failure 10-5 10-6 Gas 0.0006 0.1360 0.7276
10-3 to 10-4 to
Probability 10 -3
to to <10 -7
LVP – Low Flammability 0.8888 0.9522 1.0389
10-4 10-5
Range 10-6 10-7
LVP – High Flammability 0.8978 0.9605 1.0604
(per km-year)
HVP – Ethane Dominant 0.0019 0.1905 0.9300
Characteristic
HVP - Propane/Butane 0.0031 0.1921 0.7801
Allowable
3× 3× 3× Multiphase 0.0002 0.0932 1.0354
Failure 10-3 3 × 10-5 3 × 10-8
10-4 10-6 10-7 CO2 0.0027 0.2016 1.6295
Probability
(per km-year) Sour Gas - Buried <0.0001 0.3314 5.7466
Allowable Sour Gas - Surface 0.0003 0.2106 5.2667
Failure Steam - Buried 0.0142 0.1719 0.8568
Probability for 0.5 × 1.5 × 1.5 × 1.5 × 1.5 × 1.5 × Steam - Surface 0.0006 0.0761 0.4473
Design 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 10-7 10-8
(per km-year)

Annex O specifies the value of cr for natural gas pipelines

(crg = min (7.5 × 105 / D3,1.0), where D is in mm) and low vapour
pressure (LVP) liquid hydrocarbon pipelines (crl = 1.0). Table 6
summarizes the results of a comparative analysis of large leak
and rupture consequences for all other service fluids within the
scope of CSA Z662 that was performed as part of the release
consequence model development described in Nessim et al. [1].
Except for LVP liquids, which have a narrow range of cr, all
fluids have wide cr ranges and average cr values between 0.0761
and 0.3314. To simplify the class factor calibration, crl was used
for all liquids and crg was used for all fluids that are released as
gases or vapours. To develop a single set of class factors for all
service fluids, the calibration was based on the weighted average,
crave, given by

105
𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 0.70 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 0.3 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = min (5.25 × , 0.7) + 0.3 (5)
𝐷𝐷3

where D is the diameter in mm, and the weighting factors of 0.7

for gases and 0.3 for liquids are approximately equal to the
relative lengths of gas and liquid pipelines in Canada from the
Canada Energy Regulator [14] and the Alberta Energy Regulator
[15].

6. CLASS FACTORS FIGURE 2: CLASS FACTOR AS A FUNCTION OF

6.1 Calculation PD/SMYS FOR THE TEST CASES WITH A HIT RATE
Figure 2 shows the class factor data produced using the OF 0.004 PER KM-YEAR AND MEAN CHARPY
approach described in Section 3 for the two ULSs governing ENERGY ≥ 60 J
pressure design. For burst of the defect-free pipe, Fig. 2 shows
only the design cases with the highest pipe grade, Grade 690. Based on the data in Fig. 2 the class factor, CF, can be
Since it was observed that the class factor for this limit state is a calculated from
decreasing function of pipe grade, this subset produces the most

5 © 2022 by ASME
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = min�(𝐵𝐵 × 𝐻𝐻 × 𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐 ) , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � (6)
where rh is the ratio between the hit rates before and after
where implementation of enhanced mechanical damage prevention, and
B = basic class factor (see Equation (7)), coefficient ah is given in column 6 of Table 7. The factor, H ≥
H = hit rate factor (see Equation (8)), 1.0, accounts for reductions in the hit rate due to the
FC = fracture toughness factor (see Equation (9)), implementation of enhanced mechanical damage prevention
and measures. It can be used, for example, if mechanical protection
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = upper limit on the class factor (see column 8 is installed, depth of cover exceeds the minimum requirement, or
of Table 7). more frequent signage is installed. Guidance for the estimation
of hit rate reductions due to these actions can be found in
The basic class factor, B, is based on regression analysis of Corder [16] for mechanical protection based on experimental
the equipment impact limit state and can be calculated from data; Chen and Nessim [17] for common damage prevention
approaches based on a fault tree model; and
�
𝑃𝑃∙𝐷𝐷 3
�� +𝑎𝑎2 �log10 �
𝑃𝑃∙𝐷𝐷 2
�� +𝑎𝑎3 log10 �
𝑃𝑃∙𝐷𝐷
�+𝑎𝑎4
IGEM/TD/2 Section 8.2 [18] for slab cover, burial depth
𝐵𝐵 = 10𝑎𝑎1�log10 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (7) increases, and surveillance interval decreases based on data
analysis.
where coefficients a1 through a4 are given in columns 2 through The fracture toughness factor, FC, is given by
5 of Table 7.
1 + 𝑎𝑎f ∙ [𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 − 40]/1000 , 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 < 40
TABLE 7: COEFFICIENTS OF THE CLASS FACTOR 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 = � (9)
1, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 ≥ 40
FORMULAS
Safety 𝒂𝒂𝟏𝟏 𝒂𝒂𝟐𝟐 𝒂𝒂𝟑𝟑 𝒂𝒂𝟒𝟒 𝒂𝒂𝐡𝐡 𝒂𝒂𝐟𝐟 CFmax where Cv is the minimum full-size Charpy V-notch energy (J)
Class
1 -0.0213 -0.0318 0.899 -0.805 1.57 8.5 0.85(1) and coefficient af is given in column 7 of Table 7. The factor, F
2 -0.0253 -0.0538 0.918 -0.927 0.90 9.8 0.85(1) ≤ 1.0, accounts for the reduced resistance to equipment impact
3 -0.0572 -0.0485 0.975 -1.104 0.42 10.7 0.85(1) of low toughness pipe. While the mean Charpy toughness was
4 -0.0465 -0.0540 0.998 -1.234 0.29 11.7 0.75(1) used as a basis for defining the analysis cases (see Table 1), the
5 -0.0394 -0.0549 0.995 -1.326 0.22 11.9 0.75(1) adjustment factor is defined in terms of the minimum toughness
6 -0.0545 -0.0235 1.005 -1.423 0.19 12.5 0.75(1)
(1) Governed by the hydrostatic test pressure limit described in Section 7.
to facilitate application. The relationship between the mean and
minimum toughness assumes a 0.2% probability that the actual
Table 8 shows an alternate format for specifying B. The toughness of a randomly selected specimen will be less than the
factor can be defined using interpolation between the factors for specified minimum toughness, which equals the probability that
the two nearest values of PD/SMYS. Since the consequences of the yield strength will be less than the SMYS for a normal yield
small-diameter pipelines are unlikely to justify the higher safety strength distribution with a mean of 1.1 × SMYS and a standard
classes, the values in the bottom-left corner of the table are deviation of 3.5% × SMYS. This value was used based on the
highly unlikely to be used. The values in the top-right corner assumption that steel mills will produce material with
exceed 1.0 because the wall thickness required for the equipment approximately the same probability of being rejected for not
impact limit state is smaller than the wall thickness required for meeting the minimum requirements for either the yield strength
the defect-free pipe burst limit state. These values are required or fracture toughness.
for the correct calculation of CF from Equation (6); however,
they will not govern any designs as the final class factor is 6.2 Accuracy
capped at CFmax in Table 7 and the values resulting from the Figure 3 shows the log of the ratio between the actual and
pressure test check described in Section 7. allowable failure probabilities for the design cases with a hit rate
of 0.004 per km-year and mean Charpy toughness of 60 J or
TABLE 8: BASELINE CLASS FACTOR IN TABLE greater (corresponding to a minimum Charpy toughness of 40 J
FORMAT or greater). The figure shows that the points cluster around zero,
Safety PD/SMYS (mm) indicating that the average actual failure probability
Class 0.5 2 4 8 12 18 24 32 40 approximately matches the allowable failure probability. It also
1 0.08 0.29 0.52 0.92 1.26 1.70 2.09 2.53 2.92 shows that the actual failure probabilities for all but a few cases
2 0.06 0.22 0.40 0.69 0.93 1.23 1.48 1.76 2.00 in safety class 6 are within one order of magnitude of the
3 0.04 0.15 0.28 0.50 0.66 0.85 1.00 1.14 1.25
allowable failure probability, which was chosen as a reasonable
4 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.39 0.53 0.69 0.83 0.97 1.08
5 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.32 0.43 0.57 0.69 0.82 0.92 benchmark for the maximum deviation between actual and
6 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.27 0.37 0.49 0.60 0.71 0.80 allowable failure probabilities. A similar analysis for all test
cases (including hit rates between 0.0002 and 0.004 per km-year
The hit rate factor, H, is given by and mean Charpy toughness values between 20 and 150 J) shows
that the deviations are within one order of magnitude for almost
𝐻𝐻 = 1 + 𝑎𝑎h ∙ [log10 (𝑟𝑟ℎ )]1.3 , 1 ≤ 𝑟𝑟ℎ ≤ 20 (8) all cases in safety classes 1 through 4. For safety classes 5 and 6,

6 © 2022 by ASME
the deviations are within one order of magnitude for most cases,
but can be up to two orders of magnitude in some cases. While
this does not meet the deviation benchmark mentioned earlier,
further improvements were not possible due to the diversity of
the design cases, the added variability introduced by the low
fracture toughness cases, and the small allowable failure
probabilities. Overall, these levels of accuracy were considered
acceptable in the context of a simplified risk-based approach.
FIGURE 3: COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ACTUAL
AND ALLOWABLE FAILURE PROBABILITIES FOR
DESIGN CASES WITH A HIT RATE OF 0.004 PER
KM-YEAR AND MEAN CHARPY TOUGHNESS ≥60 J
7. PRESSURE TEST CHECK
The serviceability check associated with Limit State 3 in
Table 3 is based on the strength test requirements in Clause 8 of
the Standard and does not add any new requirements specific to
risk-based design. The current Standard makes no explicit
connection between test requirements in Clause 8 and pressure
design in Clause 4, likely because there is a sufficient margin in
the hoop stress factors in Clause 4 to accommodate the minimum
specified test pressures for most pipeline test sections.
Specifically, the 0.80 cap on the hoop stress factor based on F
and L values in the current Standard for class location 1 ensures
that the hoop stress associated with the minimum test pressure of
1.25 MOP will not exceed 100% SMYS and, since the maximum
hoop stress permitted in the test section is 110% SMYS for
grades up to 555 and 107% SMYS for grades greater than 555,
there is a 7% to 10% margin to accommodate hydrostatic
pressure resulting from elevation variations for a liquid testing
medium. Since the 0.80 cap is not used in the risk-based design
approach, it is necessary at the design stage to ensure that the
wall thickness is sufficient to meet the minimum pressure test
requirements in Clause 8.
The maximum hoop stress factor, G, associated with this
limit state can be derived by ensuring that the minimum test
pressure is reached at the highest point of the test section without
exceeding the maximum allowable hoop stress at the lowest
point in the test section. This leads to:
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ×(1+∆𝑃𝑃 )×𝑃𝑃×𝐷𝐷
≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (10)
2×𝑆𝑆×𝑡𝑡
where
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = maximum permissible test stress (multiple of SMYS),
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = minimum required test pressure (multiple of MOP),
∆P = maximum test pressure differential due to hydrostatic
head (ratio of Pmin),
P = design pressure,
D = diameter,
S = specified minimum yield strength, and
t = minimum wall thickness.
Rearranging Equation (10) and comparing it to Equation (2)
leads to
2∙𝑆𝑆∙𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃 ≤ × 𝐺𝐺 (11a)
𝐷𝐷
where
𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝐺𝐺 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 × 𝐽𝐽 × 𝑇𝑇 ≤ (11b)
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ×(1+∆𝑃𝑃 )
The value of G is plotted in Fig. 4 for all combinations of
minimum test pressure and maximum test hoop stress for a liquid
testing medium in Table 8.1 of the Standard. The applicable
minimum test pressure (125%, 140%, or 150% MOP) is a
function of class location and service fluid. Figure 4 shows that
the highest possible hoop stress factor for testing pipe with a
liquid medium on completely level ground is 0.88.
The G value for completely level test sections (∆𝑃𝑃 = 0) was
reduced by 0.03 to account for potential variabilities in executing
the hydrostatic test. This creates a reasonable margin to achieve
the minimum test pressure prior to reaching the pressure-volume
plot test termination criterion. For example, application of this
reduction to pipelines with grades up to 555 and with ∆𝑃𝑃 = 0
results in G values equal to 0.85, 0.75, and 0.70 for minimum
test pressures of 125%, 140%, and 150% MOP, respectively.
Based on the mapping of safety class to equivalent class location
summarized in Table 9, application of the required minimum test
pressures from Clause 8 with a 0.03 reduction leads to CFmax
values of 0.85 and 0.75, as shown in Table 7.
For a gaseous testing medium, ∆P is zero and the maximum
hoop stress during the test is 100% SMYS, for which G is the
inverse of Pmin and has a maximum value of 0.8 in class
7 © 2022 by ASME
locations 1 and 2. No reduction for G on a completely level • Stations and ‘other’. This risk-based approach was not
gaseous test section is necessary since the permissible maximum developed for this category due to the relatively small length of
hoop stress is only 100% SMYS. piping involved and the potentially large development effort
required to address the different design conditions for both
1.00 buried and above-ground piping in these facilities. The class
0.95
125% MOP - 110% SMYS
factors for this category were selected to provide a direct match
140% MOP - 110% SMYS
to current designs produced by the Standard (see Table 9). Since
150% MOP - 110% SMYS
0.90
125% MOP - 107% SMYS
this approach is based on the safety class and does not require
0.85 140% MOP - 107% SMYS definition of a class location, the match is based on approximate
Hoop Stress Factor, G

0.80
150% MOP - 107% SMYS mapping of the safety class to an equivalent class location
(shown in column 2 of Table 9). To match the approach used in
0.75 the Standard, the class factors are capped at the values of the
0.70 factors used for the adjacent ‘general’ pipe.
0.65
TABLE 9: CLASS FACTORS FOR THE STATIONS AND
0.60 ‘OTHER” PIPING CATEGORIES
0.55 Safety Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Equivalent Class
Increase in Hydrotest Pressure from Minimum, ∆P 1 1 2 3 4 4
Location
FIGURE 4: MAXIMUM HOOP STRESS FACTOR TO Gas/HVP/Sour
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.40
ENABLE PRESSURE TESTING WITH A LIQUID (Stations)
MEDIUM ACCORDING TO CLAUSE 8 Gas/HVP/Sour
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.40
(Other)
8. APPLICATION CO2
0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
The risk-based pressure design approach requires (Stations & Other)
Low-flammability
calculation of the class factor for ULS associated with operating
LVP 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
pressure and equipment impact as described in Section 6.1, then (Stations & Other)
applying the SLS limit associated with the strength test pressure High-flammability
as described in Section 7. It is recognized that pressure testing LVP 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.64 0.64 0.64
plans may not be fully defined at the wall thickness design stage (Stations & Other)
and, if this is the case, conservative estimates of the test
parameters (including the hydrostatic head differential in the 9. COMPARISON WITH CLAUSE 4
case of testing with a liquid medium) must be made. Once used 9.1 Baseline Designs
in the design, these testing parameters must be treated as The total hoop stress factors from the risk-based approach
mandatory constraints on actual pressure testing, unless the were compared to those from current Clause 4 of the Standard
design is revised to address any deviations. for all pressure and diameter combinations in Table 1. The most
The pressure design clause of CSA Z662 (Clause 8) commonly used steel grade, as identified from the proprietary
categorizes pipe as “general’ and cased crossings; uncased pipe database mentioned in Section 4, was used for each pressure and
under roads and railways; and station and ‘other’, where ‘other’ diameter combination. The comparison was made for natural gas
includes pipe supported by a bridge, and pipe within and between and low-flammability LVP liquid pipelines using a hit rate of
fabricated assemblies. The proposed design approach for each of 0.004 per km-year and a mean Charpy toughness greater than
these categories is as follows: 60 J. Four class locations were considered for natural gas, and
• ‘General’ and cased crossings. These two categories the average population densities for the different class locations
have the same location factors, presumably because the casing in Table C.3 of Annex C of CSA Z662 were used to calculate the
carries all external loads and, therefore, the carrier pipe requires corresponding safety classes. For low-flammability LVP liquids,
no wall thickness changes from ‘general’. The risk-based design both DGAs and non-DGAs were included. All designs account
approach is directly applicable to this category based on the for the minimum wall thickness requirement in Table 4.5 of the
general safety classes defined according to Nessim et al. [1]. Standard. A liquid pressure test medium was assumed.
• Uncased roads and railways. The risk-based design The results are shown in Fig. 5 for natural gas class
approach is directly applicable to this category based on the locations 1 and 3, and Fig. 6 for low-flammability LVP liquids.
adjusted road and railway safety class defined according to The black stepped line represents Clause 4 results, and the bars
Nessim et al. [19]. This safety class adjustment considers the represent the risk-based results. Higher values of the final hoop
additional risk factors associated with this category, including stress factor presented in the figures correspond to thinner walls.
safety of road users, societal costs of traffic interruption, and The figures show that the risk-based approach is generally more
increased construction activity rates. conservative than Clause 4 for smaller-diameter pipelines up to
approximately NPS 8. For pipelines larger than NPS 8, risk-

8 © 2022 by ASME
based design transitions from more conservative designs in high
consequence areas to less conservative designs in low
consequence areas. Significant differences between the two
approaches are evident, with the largest differences occurring in
higher consequence areas.
9.2 Enhanced Damage Prevention
The wall thickness results for both gas and liquid pipelines
indicate that most cases for which the risk-based approach
requires a reduction in design factor (i.e. an increase in wall
thickness) are governed by equipment impact, and that the wall
thickness increases are significant for smaller-diameter gas
pipelines in high consequence areas. To demonstrate the wall
thickness reductions that can be justified by introducing
additional damage prevention measures, the natural gas cases for
class location 3 were re-analyzed for two enhanced damage
prevention scenarios, one involving doubling the depth of cover
to reduce the hit rate by a factor of 4 based on Chen and Chebaro
[17], and the other involving adding mechanical protection in the
form of a concrete slab over the pipeline to reduce the hit rate by
a factor of 10 based on IGEM/TD/2 [18]. The results are shown
in Fig. 7, which shows that enhanced damage prevention results
in significant reductions in the wall thickness obtained from risk-
based design. The impact of the actions considered depends on
the specific pipeline case; however, the wall thickness increases
required by the risk-based design approach over Clause 4 designs
can be eliminated or reversed in almost all cases.
10. SUMMARY
A set of risk-based pressure design class factors were
developed as an alternative to the design factor and the location
factor currently used in Clause 4 of CSA Z662. The class factors
are based on the safety class system described in Nessim et al.
[1]. The class factors for ‘general’ were calibrated to meet the
reliability targets associated with each safety class, thereby
maintaining a consistent risk level for all pipelines. The design
conditions considered included burst of the defect-free pipe
under operating pressure, burst of a dent-gouge feature caused
by equipment impact, and yielding under the strength test
pressure.
With the appropriate safety class definition, the class factors
are applicable to general pipe and cased crossings, as well as
uncased pipe under roads and railways. A basic set of factors is
defined for pipelines that meet minimum requirements with
respect to mechanical damage prevention and use pipe with a
minimum Charpy toughness exceeding 40 J. These factors can
be calculated from a simple formula or by interpolation from a
table. Adjustment factors are also defined to reduce the wall
thickness for pipelines with enhanced damage prevention
measures and increase it for pipelines with lower toughness.
Because the class factors are such that the maximum allowable
hoop stress under pressure testing can be exceeded in some
cases, an additional check is included to confirm feasibility of
the pressure test. This check is based on Table 8.1 of the Standard
and does not include any new design criteria. The class factors
for stations and ‘other’ piping are defined as a direct match to
current designs produced by the Standard based on an
approximate mapping between the safety class and class
location, and are capped at the values of the factors used for the
adjacent ‘general’ pipe.
The risk-based approach is generally more conservative
than Clause 4 for smaller-diameter pipelines, as the Clause 4
design would have prescribed smaller wall thicknesses that are
less resistant to equipment impact. For pipelines with larger
diameters, risk-based design transitions from more conservative
designs for low pressures and high consequence areas to less
conservative designs for high pressures and low consequence
areas. As expected, the degree of conservatism associated with
the approach increases with failure consequence severity. These
differences arise primarily from including equipment impact as
a design load because resistance to equipment impact loads is
more highly correlated to the wall thickness than it is to the hoop
stress. The thicker walls resulting from the risk-based design
approach can be reduced to the same (or lower) wall thicknesses
required by Clause 4 by implementing enhanced mechanical
damage prevention measures.
The class factor approach has the following benefits:
• The approach achieves consistent risk levels for all
pipelines by ensuring that the allowable failure probability for
each safety class is inversely proportional to the magnitude of
the failure consequences.
• The class factor is based solely on the safety class and
is not an explicit function of the service fluid or site attributes.
This is much simpler than the approach used in the current
version of the Standard, wherein the location factors are defined
separately for groupings of service fluids.
• Adjustments factors are available to reduce the wall
thickness based on enhanced damage prevention measures (such
as deeper burial or mechanical projection) and to increase the
wall thickness for low-toughness pipe.
9 © 2022 by ASME
 Gas Pipeline Class Location 1 Design Cases
1.4

1.2 1 MPa 4 MPa 6 MPa 8 MPa 10 MPa 13 MPa 16 MPa

Total Hoop Stress Factor

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
NPS 2 NPS 4 NPS 8 NPS 16 NPS 24 NPS 36 NPS 48
Diameter

Gas Pipeline Class Location 3 Design Cases

1.4

1.2 1 MPa 4 MPa 6 MPa 8 MPa 10 MPa 13 MPa 16 MPa

Total Hoop Stress Factor

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
NPS 2 NPS 4 NPS 8 NPS 16 NPS 24 NPS 36 NPS 48
Diameter

FIGURE 5: CLASS FACTOR AND CLAUSE 4 DESIGN COMPARISON FOR GAS PIPELINES

LVP Pipeline non-DGA (β = 1.5) Design Cases

1.4

1.2 1 MPa 4 MPa 6 MPa 8 MPa 10 MPa 13 MPa 16 MPa

Total Hoop Stress Factor

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
NPS 2 NPS 4 NPS 8 NPS 16 NPS 24 NPS 36 NPS 48
Diameter

LVP Pipeline DGA (β = 4.5) Design Cases

1.4

1.2 1 MPa 4 MPa 6 MPa 8 MPa 10 MPa 13 MPa 16 MPa

Total Hoop Stress Factor

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
NPS 2 NPS 4 NPS 8 NPS 16 NPS 24 NPS 36 NPS 48
Diameter

FIGURE 6: CLASS FACTOR AND CLAUSE 4 DESIGN COMPARISON FOR LVP PIPELINES IN DGAS AND NON-
DGAS

10 © 2022 by ASME
 Gas Pipeline Class Location 3 Design Cases
1.0
Total Hoop Stress Factor

1 MPa 4 MPa 6 MPa 8 MPa 10 MPa 13 MPa 16 MPa

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
NPS 2 NPS 4 NPS 8 NPS 16 NPS 24 NPS 36 NPS 48
Diameter
Gas Pipeline Class Location 3 Design Cases - Deeper Cover Depth
1.0
Total Hoop Stress Factor

1 MPa 4 MPa 6 MPa 8 MPa 10 MPa 13 MPa 16 MPa

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
NPS 2 NPS 4 NPS 8 NPS 16 NPS 24 NPS 36 NPS 48
Diameter
Gas Pipeline Class Location 3 Design Cases - With Mechanical Protection
1.0
Total Hoop Stress Factor

1 MPa 4 MPa 6 MPa 8 MPa 10 MPa 13 MPa 16 MPa

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
NPS 2 NPS 4 NPS 8 NPS 16 NPS 24 NPS 36 NPS 48
Diameter
FIGURE 7: CLASS FACTOR AND CLAUSE 4 DESIGN COMPARISON FOR GAS PIPELINE IN CLASS LOCATION 3
WITH ENHANCED DAMAGE PREVENTION METHODS TO REDUCE HIT RATE

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[15] “About pipelines.” Alberta Energy Regulator, Calgary, AB.
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12 © 2022 by ASME