City of Springfield v. Kenney, 104 N.E.

2d 65 (1951)
62 Ohio Law Abs. 123

104 N.E.2d 65
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Clark County.

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD
v.
KENNEY.

Nov. 5, 1951.

The City of Springfield sued Vernon E. Kenney for tax due under income tax ordinance. The Municipal Court, Springfield,
entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Clark County, Miller, J., held, inter alia, that
since defendant lived within the corporate boundaries of the city, he was a resident thereof and was subject to the tax,
although he lived in a public housing project owned by the United States and operated as a Federal Housing Area by the
Public Housing Authority.
 
Affirmed.
 

West Headnotes (8)

[1]
Municipal Corporations Persons and Property Taxable

Where person lived within corporate boundaries of City of Springfield, he was subject to city income tax, though he
lived in a public housing project owned by United States and operated as a Federal Housing Area by Public Housing
Authority. 4 U.S.C.A. § 106 (a); Lanham Act, § 10, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1547; U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[2]
Municipal Corporations Persons and Property Taxable

Income of resident of City of Springfield was subject to city income tax though such income was earned entirely
outside the corporate limits of the city.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]
Taxation Classification and Discrimination in General

City income tax excluding from taxation all persons having income of $1,040 or less, but taxing total income of
those residents who had income exceeding that amount, was not unconstitutional on the ground that it created a
classification which was artificial, arbitrary, unreasonable, and which discriminated between those similarly
situated.

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City of Springfield v. Kenney, 104 N.E.2d 65 (1951)
62 Ohio Law Abs. 123

Cases that cite this headnote

[4]
Municipal Corporations Presumptions and Burden of Proof

The presumption that City of Springfield in enacting income tax ordinance acted upon sound consideration of policy
would prevail until overcome by evidence.

Cases that cite this headnote

[5]
Taxation Classification and Discrimination in General

In determining whether income tax ordinance excluding from taxation those residents who earned less than a stated
minimum constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable classification, the court could consider the hardship and
administrative complexity in the collection or measurement of the tax from such residents.

Cases that cite this headnote

[6]
Taxation Classification and Discrimination in General

City income tax, excluding from taxation those residents who earned less than a stated minimum, created a
reasonable classification and operated equally upon each member of the classes created, in view of facts that
servicing of returns of excluded group would increase administrative work by approximately 30 per cent and would
probably produce little or no additional revenue.

Cases that cite this headnote

[7]
Municipal Corporations Effect of Partial Invalidity

Generally, where a by-law or ordinance consists of several and independent parts, which have no general influence
over each other, and a part is valid and a part is void, the part which is valid is operative and will be carried into
effect, and whether invalid provision is severable is largely a matter of legislative intent.

Cases that cite this headnote

[8]
Municipal Corporations Effect of Partial Invalidity

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City of Springfield v. Kenney, 104 N.E.2d 65 (1951)
62 Ohio Law Abs. 123

Severability clause in Springfield income tax ordinance showed that city commission intended that ordinance would
be adopted even without provision excluding from taxation those residents whose income was below a stated
minimum, and therefore even if such exclusion provision created an arbitrary classification, the whole ordinance
would not be invalidated.

Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*66 Thomas D. Hodge, Law Director, Richard T. Cole, Asst. Law Director, Springfield, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

William T. Gillie, Urbana, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion

MILLER, Judge.

This is a law appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court of Springfield, Ohio, wherein the defendant-appellant was
found to be indebted to the plaintiff-appellee in the sum of $69 and interest under the provisions of City ordinance No. 4741,
which is better known as the City Income Tax Ordinance. The case was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts which
are a part of the record and will not be fully restated.
 
The first question presented is whether the defendant is a resident of the City of Springfield, the ordinance in question having
placed a one per cent tax on all salaries, wages, commissions and other compensation earned by residents of the City. It is
admitted that the defendant lives within the corporate boundaries of the City of Springfield in a public housing project owned
by the United States and operated as a Federal Housing Area by the Public Housing Authority. The area within which he
lives is known as Wheldon Park. We think that the answer to the question here presented is found in Section 106(a), of Title
4, U.S.C.A., which reads as follows: ‘No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State, or by
any duly constituted taxing authority therein, having jurisdiction to levy such a tax, by reason of his residing within a Federal
area or receiving income from transactions occurring or services performed in such area; and such State or taxing authority
shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect such tax in any Federal area within such State to the same extent and
with the same effect as though such area was not a Federal area.’
 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has had occasion to pass upon this point in the case of Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio St. 431. The
case involved the question whether the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over the asylum for disabled soldiers located
*67 within Ohio, upon the answer to which question rested the determination whether inmates were eligible to vote. The
Court held that the United States did not possess exclusive jurisdiction and in syllabus one stated: ‘Where the United States,
without the consent of the State, purchases and uses land for any of the purposes specified in Sec. 8, Art. I, of the Federal
Constitution, it acquires no jurisdiction over the land.’
 
In further support of the appellee’s contention we refer to Section 1547 of Title 42, U.S.C.A., which is part of the Federal
Statute popularly known as the Lanham Housing Act. It provides as follows: ‘Notwithstanding any other provisions of law,
the acquistition by the administrator of any real property pursuant to this act shall not deprive any State or political
subdivision thereof * * * of its civil and criminal jurisdiction in and over such property, or impair the civil rights under the
State or local law of the inhabitants on such property. * * *’
 
[1]
In view of the foregoing authorities we hold that the City of Springfield was not deprived of its jurisdiction over the area in
which the defendant resided and that he is amenable to the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance.
 
[2]
It is next urged that since the defendant’s income was earned entirely outside of the corporate limits of the City of
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City of Springfield v. Kenney, 104 N.E.2d 65 (1951)
62 Ohio Law Abs. 123

Springfield, that he is not subject to the provisions of the ordinance. We held otherwise in the case of City of Springfield v.
Kurtz, Ohio App., 104 N.E.2d 64. We adhere to our former ruling on this question.
 
[3] [4] [5]
It is next urged that the ordinance is unconstitutional for the reason that it excludes from taxation all persons having an
income of $1,040 or less for a year and does not grant this exemption to those whose income is more than the minimum. In
other words, those having an income of more than $1,040 per year pay the tax based upon the total income and not only upon
the excess over and above the $1,040. This, appellant claims, constitutes a classification which is ‘artificial, arbitrary,
unreasonable and discriminates between those similarly situated.’ If the appellant were correct in his factual conclusions we
would agree within him that the section of the ordinance under consideration is in violation of the Constitution. However, we
differ upon the finding of fact. We are of the opinion that it operates equally upon each member of the class since it provides
that all persons making less than $1,040 per year are in one class and pay no tax, while all persons making more than $1,040
per year pay a tax upon their total income. In considering whether or not the tax is arbitrary or unreasonable the burden of
proof is upon the appellant and upon the record submitted we cannot come to such a conclusion. The presumption is that the
City of Springfield in enacting the ordinance acted upon sound consideration of policy and until this presumption is
overcome by the evidence it must prevail. It is well settled that hardship and administrative complexity may be considered by
the court in its consideration of the constitutionality of the provision in question. 51 Amer.Jur. 242, Section 182. A leading
case on this question is Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed.2d 1245, which
involved an Alabama Unemployment Compensation Act, which provided a payroll levy upon the payroll of certain
employers while exempting others. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Act was violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution of the United States because it excluded employers who employed less than eight
individuals and excluded certain particular classes of employers. The contention was rejected by the Court, Justice Stone
saying at page 510 of 301 U.S., at page 873 of 57 S.Ct.:
 
‘It is argued here, and it was ruled by the court below, that there can be no reason for a distinction, for purposes of taxation,
between those who have only seven employees and those who have eight. Yet, this is the type of distinction which the law is
often called upon to make. It is only a difference in numbers which marks the moment when day ends and night begins, when
the disabilities of infancy terminate and the status of legal competency is assumed. *68 It separates large incomes which are
taxed from the smaller ones which are exempt, as it marks here the difference between the proprietors of larger businesses
who are taxed and the proprietors of smaller businesses who are not.
 
‘Administrative convenience and expense in the collection or measurement of the tax are alone a sufficient justification for
the difference between the treatment of small incomes or small taxpayers and that meted out to others.’
 
[6] [7]
The record in the case at bar discloses that the additional administrative work required to service the returns of this
excluded group would be increased approximately 30 per cent and the additional amount collected would in all probability
produce little or no additional revenue, or may even cause a loss. The maximum amount that could be collected from this
excluded class would be only $10.40 per year and in many instances it would no doubt be necessary to use pressure to
enforce the collection or even to resort to suits at law. We are therefore of the opinion that the classification is reasonable and
operates equally upon each member of the classes created. Even though the exclusion clause were unconstitutional it is
severable from the other parts and would not invalidate the whole ordinance. The basic rule for determining this question is
set forth in 28 O.Jur. page 496, Section 301, as follows: ‘It is a general rule that where a by-law or ordinance consists of
several and independent parts, having no general influence over each other, and a part is valid and a part is void, the part
which is valid is operative and will be carried into effect.’
 
Whether the invalid provision is severable or not is largely a matter of legislative intent. 8 O.Jur. page 200, Section 99. Upon
this matter the City Commission has spoken by including in the ordinance Section 16 which reads: ‘This ordinance shall not
apply to any person, firm, corporation, association, business, or to any property, as to whom or which it is beyond the power
of the City Commission to impose the tax herein provided for. If any sentence, clause, section or part of this ordinance, or
any tax against any individual or any of the several groups specified herein is found to be unconstitutional, illegal or invalid,
such unconstitutionality, illegality or invalidity shall affect only such clause, sentence, section or part of this ordinance and
shall not affect or impair any of the remaining provisions, sentences, clauses, sections or other parts of this ordinance. It is
hereby declared to be the intention of the City Commission of the City that this ordinance would have been adopted had such
unconstitutional, illegal or invalid sentence, clause, section or part hereof not been included herein.’
 

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4

City of Springfield v. Kenney, 104 N.E.2d 65 (1951)
62 Ohio Law Abs. 123

It is apparent therefore that the intent of the City Commission was that the ordinance would be adopted even without the
[8]

exclusion provision.
 
Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.
 

HORNBECK, P. J., and WISEMAN, J., concur.

All Citations

104 N.E.2d 65, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 123

End of Document © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

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