The Indian Journal of Labour Economics (2021) 64:1115–1134

https://doi.org/10.1007/s41027-021-00346-6

RESEARCH NOTE

Is Work Organisation Causing Precariousness? Insights

from Textile Industry in South India

Nandini Ramamurthy1 

Accepted: 24 September 2021 / Published online: 16 November 2021

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Indian Society of Labour Economics 2021

Abstract
This article illustrates workers’ precarity in the textile industry using economic
and social upgrading, underscoring the difference in work organisations-buyer and
supplier, reorganizing work, and applying socio-demographic features. The study
uses exploratory-based framework to understand the root causes of precariousness
in 12 suppliers’ work organisations in Tiruppur, Tamil Nadu. The research shows
that intensity of economic upgrading is high across all suppliers’ work organisa-
tion, which are, large, medium, small, micro, power table, collective self-help group
(SHG) for women. The national buyers shields their behavior under the interna-
tional buyers. Distinction in buyers practices could result in social upgrading, but
suppliers’ work organisation continue to extract profits and improve profit margin-
exacerbating workers’ precariat conditions. Analysis of the re-organisation of work
and socio-demographic features probes into precarisation. The precariat spectrum
depicts that suppliers’ work organisation is the recipient of precarity, and the agents
that transfer precariousness to the workers.

Keywords  Work organisation · Precariousness · Economic and Social upgrading ·

Textile industry

JEL Codes  D23 · J51 · L22 · L23

1 Introduction

This article intends to explain precarity using economic and social upgrading,
explore work organisations, reorganizing work, and apply workers’ socio-demo-
graphic features. It is important to note that the precariat discussion falls under
the fast-fashion premise. The existing literature describes buyers’ as a homogene-
ous group (Gereffi, 1994; Schüßler et al., 2018; Anner, 2019). However, this paper

* Nandini Ramamurthy
nandini.rtiss@gmail.com
1
Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Guwahati Campus, Tetelia Road, Jalukbari, Assam, India

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identifies buyers based on their practices, which divide buyers as international and
national. It can help us understand which buyer is aiding what type of precarity
in the suppliers’ work organisation and how it permeates. Similarly, in suppliers’
work organisation the assessment of precarity is imperfect. Therefore, Table 1 high-
lights that ranking can explain varying shades of precariousness using the analytical
framework of economic and social upgrading. Economic upgrading is intense, thus
causing restructuring of work, dismantling trade unions, and changing the patterns
of recruitment and employment. It also determines the power relations between buy-
ers’ and suppliers’ work organisation. Consequently, economic upgrading empow-
ers suppliers’ work organisation to establish control, intensify surveillance, and thus
easy to monitor workers socio-demographic (age, gender, and migration) features.
Buyers seeks three distinctive approaches to understand precariousness. First,
the buyers’ squeeze on FoB price and apply footloose sourcing practices to weaken
workers’ rights (Taplin, 2014; Anner & Dutta, 2019). Second, governance and regu-
lation mechanisms illustrate precarity through non-compliance with core labour
standards or factory safety (Seidman, 2007; Barrientos & Smith, 2007; Amen-
gual, 2010; Anner, 2019; Distelhorst & Locke, 2018; Anner, 2018). Finally, power
imbalances, consolidation of buyers’ leverage, mergers, acquisitions, and market
concentration have always been significant characteristics of global supply chain
asymmetries (Gereffi, 1994; Gereffi & Memedovic, 2003; Dicken, 2015). Gereffi &
Frederick (2010) argue that the combination of consolidated buyers and dispersed
suppliers provides an insightful exploration into the study of precariousness. Thus,
the study argues that buyers alone are not responsible for precariat conditions, but
suppliers also play an equal role. And this is why the analysis of work organisations
assumes importance in the literature of global supply chain.
An emerging body of literature measures suppliers’ work organisation precarious-
ness by exploring the relationship between buyers, first-tier and extended suppliers
networks (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Mena et al., 2013; Grimm et al., 2014; Tachizawa &

Table 1  Work organisation structure

W.O. literature clas- W.O. ranking Textile and garment Selected firms Organised W.O Unor-
sification units ganised
W.O

FOB 1 Large 2 Yes No

ODM 2 Medium 2 Yes No
Assembly/OBM 3 Small 2 Yes No
Assembly 4 Micro 2 No Yes
CMT 5 Power table 2 No Yes
CMT 5 Collective groups 2 No Yes
Total 12
Source: Based on Primary Survey
FOB Free on Board; ODM original design manufacturing, OBM original brand manufacturing, CMT Cut
Make Trim

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Wong, 2014; Gereffi and Lee, 2016; Alexander, 2019). Although the supplier struc-
ture is profound, there is a problem of traceability, which involves tracking the inter-
mediary stages (Han, 2018; Barrie, 2014). This problem arises because of informal-
ity in trading relationships. Therefore, it is a challenge to assess precariousness at
the suppliers’ work organisation level. Most South Asian countries, such as China,
Bangladesh, India, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka, exhibit these characteristics.
Such work organisation structures are flexible and fragmented, thus typical to many
developing countries (Schüßler et al., 2018). Yet, there is hardly any information on
how each supplier work organisation produces varying shades of precariousness (see
Table 1). Therefore, the study argues that the knowledge on suppliers’ work organi-
sations is incomplete, as their identities are masked between first-tier and lower-tier
suppliers. Hence, by applying economic and social upgrading, the study can address
the problems of traceability and provide an in-depth exploration precarity (see
Table 1). Consequently, it is essential to unpack both forms of work organisations
(buyer and supplier) to study the magnitude of precariousness.
In this article, the analysis of precariousness unfolds in two manners. At the
buyer level, the article hypothesises that the international buyer is the root cause
of precariousness compared to the domestic buyer. At the supplier level, the paper
hypothesises that the lower the supplier work organisation structure, the higher the
precarity. Thereby, the research uses upgradation framework to substantiates these
hypotheses. Based on this, the article’s flow is as follows: Section  2 describes the
debates of fast-fashion, precariat spectrum, and suppliers’ work organisation, while
Section 3 illustrates data, methods, and analytical framework. Sections 4 and 5 pre-
sent the analysis on reorganization of work and workers socio-demographic factors
to understand the process of precarisation in the textile industry. And Section 6 is on
concluding remarks.

2 Fast Fashion and Precariat Spectrum in the Global Supply Chain

Fast fashion is a business model that thrives in a hyper-competitive environment

with the shortest lead-time and relies on hyper-consumerism and hyper-production
rules (Agnis, 2007; Mihm, 2010; Anner, 2019). It leads to flexibilisation of sup-
pliers’ work organisation structures, which is an essential criterion for fast fash-
ion. Thus, the analysis of precariousness in the textile industry and garment sector
became crucial after the collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh, killing
more than 1000 workers. It is one of the worst industrial tragedies (Manik & Yard-
ley, 2012). After the aftermath, most of the precariat research dwells on the behav-
iour of international buyers (ILO, 2017).
Precariousness has two main camps. First, depicting precariousness as a general-
ised social malaise, condition of broader life, experiences of social groups, and cir-
cumstances that are always dependent on others’ actions (Hofstetter, 2018; Mallett,
2020). Second, precariousness as a form of economic insecurity. However, Stand-
ing (2009) argues precariousness as a bundle of insecurities on a specific socio-eco-
nomic group to sustain a precariat class in the making. These studies point that the
research on precariousness undermines the process of precarisation, and hence, it is

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narrow. Thus, in this article, the emphasis is on the process that gives rise to precar-
ity (Bodnar, 2006; Alberti et al., 2018; Strauss, 2018; Mallett, 2020). To truly under-
stand this, a comparison of work organisation is essential. In this case, it is between
suppliers and buyers and within suppliers’ and buyers’ work organisations.
Figure 1 implies that precariousness is passed from implementing trade policies
or by the removal of it. Buyers use such approaches to their advantage and create
a fast-fashion business model. Buyers have impunity to regulation and governance
mechanisms, while suppliers’ work organisations must be indifferent to regulation
and governance structures. Thus, Fig.  1 indicates that supplier work organisations
are the recipients of precariousness from several stakeholders (regulators, global
governance, buyers, trade policies, and fast-fashion mechanism), and are the agents
of precariousness. In this study, the conceptual framework of precariousness depends
on economic upgrading, reorganisation of work, workers socio-demographic charac-
teristics, and differentiating between buyer and supplier work organisations.

2.1 How Buyers Operate to Perpetuate Precariousness?

The literature suggests the analysis of buyers’ precarisation has three stages: spa-
tial patterns of commodity chains in the world system, organisation of buyers, and
consumption pattern (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994). In the first stage, precarious
assumption stems from the interzonal movement of commodities between periph-
ery-to-core countries. The macro-debate that arises from this stage is monopolisa-
tion, redefining organisational boundaries because of technological changes, degree
of geographic spread, reduction in transaction costs, and protections received from
subcontracting. The second stage describes precariousness through the debates of
producer-driven and buyer-driven organisational innovations (Gereffi, 1994). A pro-
ducer-driven organisation involves transnational corporations (TNCs) or other large
integrated industries that play a central role in controlling production systems. In
this period, international subcontracting became crucial, and the study of precari-
ousness arises from backward/forward linkages and their impact on suppliers’ work
organisation. A buyer-driven organisation represents a pool of retailers, merchandis-
ers, and trading companies. In this phase, the production is carried out by independ-
ent contracts in emerging markets.
In terms of precariousness, the primary difference is that producer-driven buyers
are manufactures, but buyer-driven are not. Another distinction between them is that
producer-driven organisations apply mass production, while buyer-driven organisa-
tions seek flexible specialisation. However, both of them indicate varying degrees of
precariousness. Subsequently, the discussion on precariousness is alongside textile

Precariat Spectrum

Economic upgrading Socio-Demography Distinguishing Buyer/Supplier WO

Fig. 1  Precarity in the global supply chain precariat spectrum

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versus garment producers, requiring different organisational inputs, capabilities, and

labours. Besides, precariousness in standard versus fashion emerges from variations
in the production cycle, which increase from 4 to 54. Producers need organisations
that can accommodate flexibility, low wages, and inadequate regulatory frameworks.
Finally, in the third stage, hyper-consumption patterns and discount strategies
demonstrate the need for upgradation in organisational capabilities (Anner, 2018).
Therefore, the literature discusses three stages of volatility that typically describe
the reorganisation of work leading to precarity.
The international buyer can incite precariousness through a penalty approach. If
there is a delay in the production process, the international buyers levy a financial
penalty on the suppliers work organisation. It inadvertently causes loss to everyone
in the supply chain and, at times, results in the closure of small and micro-compa-
nies. The article suggests that the liability of penalty within suppliers’ work organi-
sations is a one-way process. For instance, when a small unit receives direct orders
from international buyers, the jobs are under subcontract to large, medium, and
micro-units. If there is a delay, the small units cannot transfer the liability upwards.
However, the penalty share is even amongst firms when the delay is from top to bot-
tom. This process indicates that large and medium companies are the least precariat,
and the most affected are the micro- and small units. Nevertheless, this arrangement
does not affect the power-table and collective groups. For international buyers, the
lead time is 30 to 45 days, and for national buyers it is 90 days. The national buyer
is flexible and does not impose penalty. Similarly, the FoB prices of national buyers
(Rs 350) are two times higher than international buyers (Rs 175). The order crite-
rion for international buyers are auditing, certification, and ranking, while there is
no order criterion for national buyers. It is evident that suppliers work organisation
gain from these differences yet exploitation of workers are prevalent to increase the
profit margin.

2.2 Suppliers’ Work Organisation: Global and Local Contexts

In recent years, Sri Lanka could achieve original design manufacture (ODM) status
and has become a niche supplier in the South Asian context. This transition is pos-
sible because of the liberal trade and investment regime (Kelegama & Wijayasiri,
2004). From 1980 to 1990, the suppliers’ work organisation was assembly-based,
with low-product differentiation. However, from 2000 onwards, product and func-
tional upgrading become prominent by establishing strong linkages with global buy-
ers, and the government collaborates with the private sector to develop joint apparel
associations (Wijayasiri & Dissanayake, 2008; Kelegana, 2009). However, the litera-
ture does not suggest the precariousness comes from upgrading in the supplier work
organisations. This argument is relevant in all three cases (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh,
and India).
Bangladesh starts its apparel exports in the late 1970s. Foreign investment plays a
central role in establishing the apparel export, and the locally owned firms dominate
the industry. Bangladesh has three types of garment manufacturers: (1) integrated
manufacturing, where factories import cotton and do the rest of the production

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process; (2) factories importing yarn and then completing the rest of the manufac-
ture; and (3) factories importing fabric and sewing the garment in CMT factories.
From 2000 onwards, Bangladesh moves from CMT to the FOB model of produc-
tion. The first stage of CMT is from the mid-1980s to 1990. Bangladesh garment
export flourishes under the multi-fibre agreement (MFA) framework. During this
period, the country could establish export processing zones (EPZs), giving them an
early advantage to access the EU market. From 2000 onwards, textile production is
under expansion from knitted fabric to yarn and finally woven fabrics. It is possi-
ble because of investment in R&D, human resources, and infrastructure, and imple-
ments policies to encourage domestic and foreign investment. These factors result
in economic upgrading, but the development is not equivalent to that of Sri Lanka.
This section highlights the case of India and the context of Tiruppur. Till 1974,
much of Tiruppur export was indirect and uses layers of agents in Calcutta (now
Kolkata), Bombay (now Mumbai), and Delhi (Cawthrone, 1990). In India, Tiruppur
is the largest producer and exporter of knitwear. Tiruppur’s supplier work organi-
sation has undergone transitions. They start as home-based producers (pre-1970s),
move on to micro-workshops and factory systems (1970–1980), and currently
use the fast fashion from 2000 onwards. The growth of the textile industry seems
organic because of the characteristics of the Gounder community. This communi-
ty’s people thrive due to intrinsic qualities such as work ethic, hard work, honesty,
and trust (Chari, 2000; Banerjee & Munshi, 2000). They assist financially, transfer
operational knowledge, and support business development and skills from that com-
munity (Das, Wadhwa & Kalita, 2009).
Large units adopt integrated production, which means firms can produce ready-
made garments without outsourcing or subcontracting. It is also known as in-house
production. Despite this, large units make only 1% of the total output and subcon-
tract 99% to the medium units, partially integrated, and small, micro, and power-
table forms of work organisations that specialise in a single activity. Power table is
a complex work organisation and is informal. Power table carries out subcontract
works and has an indirect relationship with buyers. Many large and medium work
organisations invite contractors (power table) through advertisement to carry out a
particular job for a specific time. The company provides raw materials and instru-
ments; workers come and complete the job. They come as a group of (10 and 15)
and hop from one work organisation to another, searching for work. Thus, a power-
table work organisation is a formidable workforce in Tiruppur. This work organisa-
tion’s sustenance depends on the contractor’s capacity to get jobs from various work
organisations. The final form of work organisation in the Tiruppur textile industry is
the collectives (SHG groups). They are women groups. The group consists of 15 and
20 women. They are eligible to take loans from both nationalised banks and micro-
finance institutions (MFIs). Most women purchase second-hand sewing machines,
pool their assets, and rent a shed to carry out the work with this money. The Tirup-
pur district profile, which is in Tamil Nadu, suggests that the district has about
13,515 SHG groups. Thus, the fast fashion directly or indirectly uses all modes of
work organisation structures to escalate productivity.
This study indicates that micro, power-table, and collective groups are assembly
or CMT forms of work organisations. The ranking of these work organisations is

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low, which means that they have the highest precarity. The medium and small units
fulfil the criteria of original design manufacture (ODM) and original buyer manu-
facture (OBM) categories. The ranking of these work organisations is better than
assembly and CMT. Therefore, the work organisation’s precarity is better than CMT.
The large units follow the Free on Board (FOB) or OBM categories of work organi-
sation. Based on this, the large unit has the best work organisation ranking. There-
fore, this work organisation experiences the lowest form of precarity in the supply
chain.

3 Data, Methods, and Analytical Framework

This study uses primary and secondary sources of data collection. For the primary
data, the researcher visited 12 suppliers’ work organisations: large, medium, small,
micro, power-table, and collective—self-help groups, for women. The selection of
units is purposive, and two units was selected from each category. This study uses
random sampling to select workers and applies purposive sampling for selecting
owners, management staff, trade unions, and supervisors. To gain insight into buy-
ers’ work organisations, the researcher collected secondary data from supplier work
organisations. It includes order sheets, terms and conditions, FoB pricing, lead time,
production costs, and reports to explain the difference in practice between interna-
tional and national buyers. The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended
questions. Table 1 indicates that large units are vertically integrated, medium units
are partially integrated, while small, micro, power-table, and collective groups are
specialised units. The sample data for this study are 200, out of which 180 are work-
ers, (12) owners, (5) trade union, management (1), and supervisor (2) (Table 2).
A large supplier unit receives regular orders from international and national buy-
ers, deal with multiple brands, and product differentiation is high. In a medium
unit, the order frequency is sporadic from both international, national buyers give
regular orders, they also deal with numerous brands, and product differentiation is
high. Both are export-oriented units, produce their brands, and deal with multiple
countries such as America, Spain, Germany, Netherlands, UK, Unites Arab Emir-
ate, South Africa, Australia, and Sweden. Buyers do not give direct orders beyond
medium units. It is essential to note that large, medium, and small suppliers work
organisations are also buyers. In small units, the order frequency is sporadic, high
dependency on international buyers, they deal with single brands, and production
differentiation is low. Micro, power-table, and collective groups are primarily sub-
contracting units, and they do not receive direct orders from international or national
buyers. Their order frequency is dependent on large, medium, and small work organ-
isations, and there is no scope to increase product differentiation. From Table 1, it is
evident that the ranking of these units depends on the economic upgrading abilities
of suppliers’ work organisation.
Table 1 ranks suppliers’ work organisation based on upgrading and identifies
precariousness. Thus, upgrading is imperative, not only to capture value-added
but ultimately survive (Frederick, 2010; Psilos & Gereffi, 2005). Upgrading is
of two types: economic and social. Economic upgrading has two dimensions

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Table 2  Contractors’ commission—large unit scenario
Contractor Worker supplied Commission per worker Commission per day Monthly commission Subcontractors commission* Expenses***

CI 100 Rs 10* Rs 1000 Rs 30,000 Rs 500 Rs 20,000/–

C II 200 Rs 2000 Rs 60,000 Rs 5000/– pm
C III 300 Rs 3000 Rs 90,000 None

Source: Computed from Fieldwork, 2019

*
 Fixed rate of commission among all large units
**
 One-time payment. The subcontractors below receive Rs 250 per labour supplied, and the lowest commission received by the subcontractor at the village level is Rs 50
per worker provided
***
 Two kinds of expenses emerge—welfare for the labour supplied, in terms of picnic to a nearby hill station (two picnics allowed). For instance, if 20 migrant workers
decide to stay outside the factory premises, then the contractor to take care of food and stay expenses
The Indian Journal of Labour Economics (2021) 64:1115–1134
The Indian Journal of Labour Economics (2021) 64:1115–1134 1123

capital (investing in advanced technology) and labour (skill development). Social

upgrading is improving workers rights’ and entitlements of workers (enhancing
the quality of employment and better work) as social actors (Barrientos, Gereffi
and Rossi, 2011). Knorringa and Pegler (2006) argue that economic upgrading
often results in social upgrading in the global supply chain. Developing coun-
tries enter into the lowest segments of the value chain and gradually upgrade.
Fernandez-Stark et  al. (2011) argued that for suppliers’ work organisation to
upgrade, developing countries must have favourable trade agreements, domestic
or regional textile industry presence, and a strong commitment to industry growth
by both public and private sectors.
However, countries such as China and Morocco demonstrates why economic
upgrading has not necessarily led to social upgrading (Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi,
2011). For instance, in India, a large unit has the highest economic upgrading, but
the skill development is lowest, as majority of the workers are low skilled (73 per
cent). Medium unit has moderate level of economic upgrading, the skill develop-
ment is moderate, as majority of the workers are skilled (47.33 per cent). In small,
micro, and power table units, the economic upgrading is low, but skill development
is highest, as majority of the workers are super skilled (20 per cent) and multi skilled
(70 per cent). In collective forms, the economic upgrading and skill development of
workers are the lowest, as workers are low skilled (100 per cent). International buy-
ers insist on economic upgrading rather than national buyers. This study indicates
that skill development has no direct relationship to social upgrading. Thus, these
factors cause a decline in social upgrading across all suppliers work organisation.
In this article, the study of upgrading uses distinguishing work organisations (buyer
and supplier), socio-demography, and re-organisation of work.
Humphery & Schmitz (2002) identify four stages in industrial upgrading: func-
tional, product, process, and intersectoral. Functional upgrading means purchasing,
production, and distribution. Product upgrading refers to design and marketing and
is inclusive of functional upgrading. Process upgrading means research and develop-
ment and services activities, and includes functional, product, and process upgrad-
ing elements. Intersectoral upgrading, the application of competencies acquired
in a specific sector and moving horizontally to another sector (Barrientos, Gereffi
and Rossi, 2011). Based on this, the Tiruppur suppliers’ work organisations such as
small, micro, power-table, and collective groups fall under tangible activities (pro-
duction), while large and medium work organisations fall under the pre- and post-
production intangible activities (R&D, design, purchasing, services, marketing, and
distribution).

4 Structure of Work Organisation and Precariousness

The literature suggests that buyers inflict power asymmetries in the supply chain
(Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994; Dickens, 2015; Anner, 2019). The buyers gain
autonomy through mergers, acquisitions, market concentration, and consolidation
processes (Abernathy, Dunlop, Hammond & Weil, 1999). The analysis indicates that

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power imbalance has not always been in favor of buyer until the 1990, but in favor of
supplier work organisation.

4.1 Power Imbalance between Buyer and Suppliers’ Work Organisation

The literature emphasises that international buyers produce precarity but under-
mine the role of the domestic buyer (Fitter & Kapinsky, 2001; Starmanns, 2017).
However, domestic buyers maintain the disproportionate power already in exist-
ence. Thus, the study highlights the practices of both buyers by reviewing the case
of large, medium, small, micro, power-table, and collective groups. The factors that
determine the practices of international and domestic buyers are pricing, regulation,
orders, cost of governance, auditing, certification, terms and condition, ethics, lead-
time, penalty, and code of conduct. Therefore, there is a need to outline the differ-
ences between the two types of buyers.
International buyers invite large suppliers from various countries to decide on the
price. A senior management person narrated his experience.
Every year I go to US and Europe to present our pricing. Many suppliers from
various countries come, buyers give them a cubical to present their pricing,
and buyers select those suppliers that provide the least FoB price. Last eight
years, I have been doing this, and every year, the pricing gets rigid and com-
petitive. In the last five years, we have reduced our price by 44%. Our com-
pany has stopped doing business with the U.S. because there is a difference in
pricing expectation. Currently, our company is doing business with European
buyers.
Domestic buyers, for instance, do not pressure suppliers on pricing. Suppliers
have the freedom to fix a higher margin. In export-oriented production, the margin
is between 8 and 12% if they are Europe-based buyers. If the companies deal with
America, the margin is 7%, and in the domestic market, the margin is between 25
and 30%. Unlike international buyers, domestic buyers do not impose mandatory
regulation, governance (auditing or certification), which can significantly impact the
cost. Suppliers said that domestic buyers are liberal when it comes to lead time, cer-
tification, and no auditing, and there is no need to follow a different code of conduct.
Thus, the suppliers conclude by saying, “Thirty years before, people did this
business with pride and passion, and there was a charm, but now I cannot feel any of
it”. Therefore, the study indicates that suppliers cannot negotiate with international
buyers on any of these aspects irrespective of economic upgrading.
The study suggests a direct relationship between buyer and supplier through-
out the 1970s and 1980s. It consists of three parties—buyer, supplier, and work-
ers. During this time, the leading player is the suppliers (with the highest power
order); workers and buyers follow. It is because of information asymmetry that the
supplier could control. An ex-owner, male with 15 years of experience, said that
“…. We could maintain a steady order rate because Tiruppur was the first to enter
into garment production in the Asian market”. The supplier work organisation had
complete knowledge of raw material prices. The buyers had no idea about how we

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arrive at a price, and the process is difficult for them to understand. The buyers have
to take suppliers’ prices at face value. “…. I still remember when buyers came to
Tiruppur to understand our successful process”. They gathered information about
raw material cost, wastage details, costing of each process stage, and auction proce-
dure of cotton. “… they visited about 150 factories in three months and continued
to do it for a couple of years”. It was our mistake to give insight into every process,
which allows them to create price restrictions. Tiruppur owners thought declining
the orders may bring the buyers back. After accumulating the loss and losing busi-
ness to China, the Tiruppur suppliers accepted the price of buyers. During that time,
the Tiruppur suppliers receive duty drawbacks up to 9 percent, which make up for
the losses. The dollar exchange rate also play a crucial role in improving suppliers’
profits. A retried male owner with 27 years of experience narrates the following.
“…. During the 1970s and 1980s, we are the price makers and not price takers”.
“….the profit margin was about 40 to 45 percent in those days, and after globali-
sation, the profits gets thinner and thinner. Nowadays, it difficult to maintain a 25
percent profit”. Thus, the notion of being precariat is not just limited to the working-
class or the proletariat, but corporations enforce policies that favoured them, thereby
forcefully pushing many suppliers’ work organisations into the precariat conditions,
making workers vulnerable. An owner with 35 years of experience recount that “….
In the 1980s, my feeling is a proud entrepreneur, and now I do not feel like that any-
more. I feel I am being pushed down to the subcontractors’ role”. The owner’s feel-
ing is that the export of garments is losing its charm.
A small supplier work organisation in Tiruppur has a relationship with interna-
tional buyers from Germany, Sweden, the USA, and Spain. The unit’s annual turno-
ver was about 20 million Indian Rupees (INR). A male owner with 25 years of expe-
rience unfolds the following:
… in the beginning, the unit is profitable, and I am happy, the way the busi-
ness is growing. Since 2008, my son is running the business. Order variations
result in the closure of our ancillary units by 2015. Recently, in 2018 my son
decided to take orders from national buyers. Such an alliance brings stability
to the business and improves profitability, and reduces dependency on interna-
tional buyers. In our portfolio, 35 percent of the orders are from national buy-
ers, 25 percent from international buyers, and 40 percent of the order is from
our brand.
This article suggests that if the suppliers work organisations relies on interna-
tional buyers, then the impact of precariousness could be higher. Thus, a shift in
power imbalances from suppliers to buyers impacted social upgrading of workers.

4.2 Trade Union and Work Organisation: Resistance and Asymmetries

The majority of the industrial disputes manifest through strikes and lockouts. It
is a legitimate tool that labourers use to vent out their resentment and grievances.
Cawthorne’s (1993), Chari’s (2004), and Ota’s (2014) studies indicate that Tirup-
pur’s industrial relations play a substantial role in establishing a vibrant work

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organisation. It is evident from the history of unionism and popular struggle from
the 1940s to the 1980s. Workers’ mobilisation can hold suppliers’ work organisa-
tions accountable for violations. In this period, the cause for precariousness is not
from buyers. Anner (2016 and 2018) argues that employers’ regime has undoubtedly
remain the reason for strikes and lockouts. In this period, the production structures
are fragmented but not subcontracted. The majority of the workforce are locals and
not migrants. Hence, it can create a hindrance in workers’ mobilisation.
Nevertheless, it leads to creating a resilient work organisation structure. Most of
the work organisation problems are suppliers’ centric. Therefore, suppliers in the
global supply chain fear that raising strikes and lockout can lead to insecurities,
resulting in a loss of market share. For a strike or lockout to be successful, the trade
union must get the attention of the government and employers. A trade union mem-
ber and an ex-worker in Tiruppur narrate the following incident.
… during our time, if I have any problem I can talk to my owner. When we
participate in strikes, it impacts the owners and the government. I am a par-
ticipant in127 days of strike!!! Do you know about it? I can tell the story with
pride that changes the system. It is no less than a bloodbath. The chief minister
has to hear our grievances. Now I do not see such intensity or the need for it
because it will not make any difference. It is indeed a sad state of affairs for the
trade union.
The analysis suggests that workers know-who is causing precariousness and how
to seek the attention of their owners. In the current framework, employers became
subcontractors. They have no say in the supply chain as the production is mainly
buyer-driven. Even if workers go on a strike, it cannot make a difference because
suppliers will not explain the situation for fear of losing orders. One of the suppliers
with 12 years of experience narrates the following.
… the buyer wants to reduce the price, and they do it through window shop-
ping, and we accept the exploitative terms and conditions. If I do not process
the order, someone else will do, if not in this country, some other country.
After the economic liberalisation, there is a shift in asymmetries from suppliers
to buyers. The trade unions are not allowed to enter the factories. Therefore, they
conduct ten-minute “gate meetings” every month to educate workers’ on rights.
With the advent of buyers’ code of conduct, ethical practices, and core labour stand-
ard, the factories are replacing trade unions with workers’ committees, thus pushing
trade unions to the fringes. Since trade unions experience precariousness, it effects
the work organisation structure.

4.3 Recruitment Mode and Employment Nature

In this study, the analysis of recruitment and employment is from 1940 to 1970,
1971 to 1999, and 2000 onwards. In the first stage, suppliers’ work organisation is
primarily home-based. Therefore, recruitment and employment are not visible. In
this stage, suppliers use family labour, including children. Micro-workshops and

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factory systems begin from 1950 onwards. Thus, recruitment and employment
become prevalent. Suppliers use labourers from their own community within a
radius of 30 km. In the second stage, migrant workers come from Kerala, and chil-
dren form a significant part of the labour force. The geography slowly expands into
other districts of Tamil Nadu. By 1980, intra-state migration becomes rampant. Even
though child labour is against labour law, suppliers continue to employ them. How-
ever, intervention from trade unions reduces the numbers. In this stage, the worker
receives employment benefits and social security, permanent employment is high,
and 90% are in the unions.
As the value of the industry export grows, the demand for labour increases. Work-
ers from Odisha start to come for livelihood from 2000 onwards. Currently, workers
from 17 states come to Tiruppur in search of employment. The study argues that
contractors play a significant role in filling this gap. Due to this, local and migrant
workers receive temporary employment, working hours from 8 to 12 h, workers do
not receive social security and employment benefits, and the union rate is about 5%.
The study suggests that contractors’ and firms’ relationship is informal, as the con-
tractors are not registered. For instance, a large unit can employ anywhere between
4500 and 10,000 workers. In such a case, the company appoints several contractors.
The main contractor relies on subcontractors. Again, each subcontractor can have
layers of subcontractor, which is impossible to trace. Each contractor can supply up
to 300 workers. If there is an additional requirement, then the number of contractors
increases. For the service, the contractor receives a monthly commission from the
management (see Table 2).
Another method of recruitment in practice by HR is to visit the railway station
and bus stand. They carry pamphlets in Oriya, Bengali, and Hindi. After the Nav-
arathri festival, large units experience a severe shortage of labour, which hampers
the production targets; therefore, they take these steps as a precaution. The manager
recounts the following:
…. during these days, the HR department manager says that we form three
to five groups under my supervision. A group will consist of four staff, and
we will split between the railway station and bus stand in Tiruppur. We will
explain the details and stay at the railway station and bus stand for at least
8 hours, and we will continue this exercise for one week. We will also go to
other districts in Tamil Nadu to identify needy families, and we offer them
advance money so that they can work with us for one year.
In a medium, small, and micro-units, the relationship between contractor, man-
agement, and the worker is not as intricate in the large unit, be it economically or
socially (see Table 2). The contractors’ supply labour and management make a one-
time payment. If there are any problems, migrant workers and management have to
resolve them. If they do not resolve, the contractor brings another set of workers to
the unit. The replacement happens within three days.
Tables 3 and 4 highlights the changes in recuritment and employment patterns.
The analysis is divided into two phases, before (1970 to 1990) and after (1991
onwards) globalisation. In the first phase, an ex-worker indicated that local workers

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Table 3  Work organisation and Unit classification Permanent Casual Spot contract Contract
employment status
Employment status from 1970 to 2000
Large √ √ NA NA
Medium √ √
Small √ √
Micro √ √
Employment status from 2001 onwards
Large NA √ √ √
Medium √ √ √
Small √  ×  √
Micro √  ×  √
Power table √  ×   × 
Collective  ×  √  × 

Source: Based on Fieldwork, 2019

√ = Yes; ×  = No; NA = Not Applicable

Table 4  Mode of recruitment in Unit classification Recruitment mode

textile industries
Direct Social Formal/infor- Contractor
network- mal advertise-
ing ment

Recruitment mode from 1970 to 2000

Large Yes Yes NA NA
Medium Yes Yes
Small Yes Yes
Micro Yes Yes
Recruitment mode from 2001 onwards
Large Yes No Yes Yes
Medium No Yes No Yes
Small No Yes No Yes
Micro No Yes No Yes
Power table Yes Yes No No

Source: Based on Fieldwork, 2019

received permanent employment, while migrant workers from Kerala received tem-
porary employment. And the recuritment mode was direct.
Table  3, indicates no evidence of contractural mode of employment from 1970
to 1990. In Tiruppur, contractural employment started after 1995, and by 2000 it
became popular. In 1995, a second wave of migration began from Odisha, Bihar,
Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh. Sopt contract method of
employment became popular after 2005. In large unit, 80 of the employment is
contractural, 20 per cent is spot contract. In medium unit, 60 per cent is contrac-
tural, and 40 per cent is spot contract. In small and micro units, 100 per cent of the

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employment is contractual. And in power table and collective SHG, 100 per cent of
the employment is spot contract. The evidence suggests that there is no relationship
between economic and social upgrading in the fast fashion mode of production.
Table  4, highlight that, from 1970 to 1990, recuritment mode was direct and
through social networking. After globalisation, suppliers work organisation started
to explore various methods. In large units, the HR sattfs went to railways stations
to distribute pamphlets in various languages. They went to villages offered loans to
gain employment. Medium, small, and micro units hanged cardboards on eletrical
pole, stickers on bus stand and railway station. Power table and collectives are based
on social networking.
In the textile industry, the recruitment mode in the years between 1970 and 2000
has been direct and through social networking. From 2001 onwards, other methods
include formal and informal advertisement and through contractors. While walking
in the lanes of Tiruppur’s city, one can find cardboards hanging on the electricity
poles the need for employees. Some of the popular places where the cardboard is on
display are railway stations, bus depots, and bus stops. In the newspaper, there is a
separate page for the recruitment of workers.

5 Socio‑Demographic Features as Sources of Precariousness

This study identifies certain social factors that help us in understanding precarious-
ness. Some of them are age, migration, education, social group, and gender. The
textile workers’ data on schooling indicate four categories: graduation, high, middle,
and primary education. The data set suggests that 63.33 percent and 33.33 percent
of the workers did not have formal education beyond the 8th and 10th classes. In
both these categories, the female representation is higher than the male. The data
highlight that female (37.17 percent) workforce participation is lower than males
(62.83), suggesting that most of the jobs in the textile industry are male-centric.
Examples of such occupations are knitting, printing, compacting and calendaring,
ironing, packing, fusion, cutting, and elastic production. However, female employ-
ment is restricted to sewing, spinning, and embroidery. When it comes to employ-
ability according to skills, males are in a better position than females. The social
group data show that 93.50 percent of the workers belong to the other backward
caste (OBC), 4.17 percent are from the scheduled tribe or Adivasi category, and 2.33
percent are from the general class (GC).

5.1 Age

Our data on age suggest that many workers start their job at a very young age. In the
current scenario, about 81.33 percent of the workers fall between 15 and 35 years.
The minimum and maximum age of the labour market pool in Tiruppur’s textile
industry is 15 and 60. Many textile owners encourage their workers to provide false
information on age. The study estimates that about 50 percent of the workers are
below 20 years and are primarily migrant workers. During my visits, I observe that

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a group of young female workers arrive at the small unit in a bus. Most of them are
below the age of 18 years. A few days later, the owner visits our uncle’s house on a
Sunday, asking about the new workers.
….. When I started the factory 15 years ago, I intend to give jobs to locals. I
was against giving employment to outsiders as I am a follower of Preyar (influ-
ential political leader). For me, the prosperity of the Tamil people is impor-
tant. I employ young (15–30 years) male and female workers in my factory
and middle-age or old female workers (35–45). I do not appoint middle age or
old male workers because their productivity is low. He quoted me the statistics
from a local newspaper. Some of my friends suggest that I can use migrant
workers to improve productivity. If I can look after them well, then I can retain
them. If this works out well, then I will bring 50 more. In this way, I can cut
my cost.

5.2 Migration

This study categorises three waves of migration—the first wave is in the early 1950s,
workers from nearby areas of Tiruppur came for employment. In the 1960s, workers
from Kerala came to Tiruppur in search of jobs. Initially, they worked in the textile
units, but now, they own tea stalls and bakery shops near the textile units. Nowadays,
most of them migrate to gulf countries for better opportunities. The second wave
of migration started from the 1970s to the 1990s; migration from other districts of
Tamil Nadu is rampant. The third wave of migration began from 2000 onwards as
people from other states came to work in Tiruppur. Currently, Tiruppur hosts work-
ers from 16 regions. They include Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur,
Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha. The study reveals
that workers from Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Delhi are seasonal migrants. Their
migration duration in Tiruppur is for five months.
An owner said that 87.5 percent of the workers are migrants in my unit, all from
North India. Out of 80 workers, 40 are from North East (Assam, Arunachal Pradesh,
Nagaland, and Manipur), 20 are from Uttar Pradesh, 10 are local workers, and ten
are from Rajasthan. From these analyses, it is evident that migration to Tiruppur is
not a recent phenomenon. Some of the experience migrant workers from Assam and
Tamil Nadu shared the following.
……. She spoke fluent Tamil. I asked for many years, have you been staying?
She replied I am working here for more than 15 years. When I came to Tirup-
pur, I overworked and earning a lot of money. Seeing this, my sisters, cousins,
and friends join me. When I came here, our family was alone, and now I live
with 50 other families. With COVID, most of them left for Assam. I am still
here hoping to get a job soon…..
….. I am from Thiruvannamalai, Tamil Nadu. I started to work because my
husband left me after two children were born. I have two children-boys: the
first, ­10th, and the second, 8th class. My mother and father look after them,

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and I came to Tiruppur to earn. I came in the year 2005, I started as a kaimaddi
(folding) worker, and now I am a tailor. Up to 2015, work was everything, but
in the last five years, jobs are irregular. Once upon a time, Tiruppur has a pop-
ular saying, “vandhor vazhya vakkum ooru Tiruppur”. It translates as Tiruppur
is a city which can give livelihood to all who come in seacrh of employment.
Now, everday I go to the factory to know whether I can earn or not. Living is
challenging. Previously I could buy my kids whatever they ask for, and now I
say no to everything. I feel like a failure. I eat rice with pulikozhambu (tramind
based gravy) for three days. I cannot afford vegetables, egg, or meat. I am stay-
ing here in the hope of getting a job tomorrow…..
Most of the local female workers who work are widows, divorced, male runaways,
or their husbands spend most of the time in Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corpora-
tion (TASMAC), a government-owned liquor shop. All the workers receive a weekly
wage on Saturday, and the local male workers directly go to TASMAC shop. We can
find a long queue outside Tiruppur’s designated TASMAC shops from Saturday eve-
nings to Sunday mornings. Since they drink for two days, they cannot come to work
on Monday mornings. So their earning is restricted to three days a week. The high
consumption rate is due to the lower price of liquor. It is an inexpensive commodity
than essential items such as rice, cereals, and vegetables. It has put female worker in
a vulnerable position. Therefore, this section elaborates how suppliers’ work organi-
sations can use social factors to cause precariousness.

6 Concluding Remarks

The perspectives of economic and social upgrading, work organisations, re-organ-

izing work, and workers socio-demography offers critical reflections on precarious-
ness. The article explores two root causes for workers precarity; first, the supplier
work organisations are forced to adopt rigorous economic upgrading by interna-
tional buyers that systematically dismantles trade unions. At one point, they were
the backbone of every work organisation in Tiruppur, and the presence of trade
unions improved social upgrading. Second, buyers’ work organisations outline
precariousness through pricing, regulation, orders, cost of governance, auditing,
certification, terms and condition, ethics, lead time, penalty, and code of conduct.
Despite the differences in buyers practice, the suppliers’ work organisation are not
willing to change their exploitative behavior. Due to excessive emphasis on eco-
nomic upgrading, the recruitment and employment patterns in suppliers’ work
organisation changed, leading to a decline in social upgrading. This gives suppliers’
a free hand to control workers socio-demography to cause precarity. Nevertheless,
upgrading debate does not consider these factors. International buyers’ assume that
economic upgrading will automatically lead to social upgrading, however, the evi-
dence suggests that upgrading concept is favorable to buyers and suppliers, but not
the workers. The study argues that by applying buyers’ and suppliers’ perspectives,
the understanding of precariousness can expand from macro- and micro-viewpoints.

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 1132 The Indian Journal of Labour Economics (2021) 64:1115–1134

Thus, this article explores how varying shades of buyers’ suppliers’ contribute to the
debate of workers’ precarisation in the fast-fashion framework since 2005.

Funding  The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.

Declarations 

Conflict of interest  The author(s) declare no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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