-Legal Separation (Articles 55-67,FC)

1.
Doctrine:
Legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given
ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family
Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Case Title :
Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong vs. Lucita Ong, GR. No. 153206;
October 23, 2006
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G.
Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in
Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who
are now all of the age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation
under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was
marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conduct. RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, the CA
affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of abandonment thus the petition
for legal separation should be denied.
Held:
The argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family,
a decree of legal separation should not be granted is without merit,
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago,
Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
2.
Doctrine:
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved
and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of
Article 43(2);
Case Title :
Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, GR. No. 169900; March 18, 2010
Facts:
Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal separation
against her husband Alfredo Gozon.
Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of both parties,
Alfredo and Mario entered into Agreement of Buy and Sell involving their
conjugal property for the price of 18 million pesos. Mario pays the partial
payment of the said price and he took the possession of the property.
 When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their
property was dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending spouse, Alfredo
is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their
child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to Elvira.
On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter Dimensional
Realty Inc. for 18 million pesos in his favor by Winnifred. And the IDRI paid
it in full payment.
Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon for
specific performance and damages, annulment of donation and sale, with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.
The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI is null and
void for their attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts,
further alienating or disposing of the subject property. Also the agreement
of Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for the absence of written consent of
Elvira Gozon for her property rights to the undivided one-half share in the
conjugal property of this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to sell
their conjugal partnership without the consent of the other spouse, and
share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership.
Held:
The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire
sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s
written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. And the
offending spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of his share in
the net profits of the conjugal properties.
Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in
accordance with the provisions of article
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) We DELETE the portions regarding the
forfeiture of Alfredo Gozon’s one-half undivided share in favor of Winifred
Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to dispose
of her undivided share in the property; and (2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon
and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and
severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (₱18,000,000) which was the amount
paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest
computed from the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Associate Justice
3.
Doctrine:
Article 60 of the Family Code, provides No decree of legal separation
shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated
Case Title:
Enrico Pacete vs. Hon. Glicerio Carriaga, GR. No. 53880, March 17,
1994
Facts:
Enrico Pacete and Concepcion Alanis were married in 1938. Pacete
contracted another marriage to Clarita de la Concepcion, which Alanis
knew about only on August 1, 1979. During the marriage, Pacete acquired
properties that he registered either under his name or Clarita or in the
names of his children with Clarita or with other dummies. Thus, on October
29, 1979, Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Pacete and de la Concepcion as well as for legal separation
between her and her husband.
The defendants were served with summons on November 15, 1979.
They filed a motion for extension of 20 days, which the court granted. On
December 18, 1979, the defendants again filed a motion for extension
through a new counsel. The court granted the motion, setting the deadline
to January 9, 1980. Although the court’s order was mailed to the
defendants’ counsel on January 11, 1980, they again filed a motion for
extension on February 5, 1980. The next day, the court denied the motion
for extension and granted petitioner Alanis’ motion to declare the
defendants in default.
The Court of First Instance, in its decision on March 17, 1980,
decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis as well as declared null
and void ab initio the marriage between Pacete and de la Concepcion.
Issue:
 Did the Court of First Instance commit grave abuse of discretion?
Held:
Yes. A petition for certiorari is applicable when grave abuse of
discretion attended the declaration of the decision. Article 101 of the Civil
Code, which was later reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code,
provides
No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated
The court did not follow the procedure mandated by the said procedure.
Furthermore, Article 3 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
mandates that an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before
6 months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition to allow the
parties to have a cooling-off period.
In addition, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides
If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated.
The State is interested in the integrity of marriage as evidenced by
the provisions of law mentioned. There is no excuse for non-compliance
with the procedures required by statute.
 WHEREFORE ( copy the dispositive portion of SC Decision as your
last paragraph)

-Rights and Obligations of spouses (Articles 68-73,FC)

1.
Doctrine:
The writ of habeas corpus will be issued only if there is an actual and
effective illegal restraint of liberty
Case Title:
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Potenciano Ilusorio
vs. Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner, GR. NO. 139789; July 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio and lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio married
in 1942. Potenciano owned extensive property and was Chairman of the
Board and President of the Baguio Country Club for many years. He died in
at the age of 86 in 2001, a year after this decision. His estimated net worth
was P2 billion. After living together for 30 years—a union that bore 6
children—they separated in 1972 for undisclosed reasons. Kids: Ramon
Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia
(age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39). Potenciano split his
time between Makati and Baguio, while Erlinda lived in Antipolo.
Potenciano later left for the United States, and upon his return in 1997,
stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo for 5 months. Their children allege that
during this time, Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of 200mg of
Zoloft(!!!), an anti-depressant drug prescribed by the latter’s doctor in New
York, instead of the recommended 100mg dose.
 Potenciano’s health consequently deteriorated. Erlinda then filed a
petition for guardianship over Potenciano’s person and property, due to his
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight, and impaired judgment. (Not
stated in the case whether the guardianship was granted.)
After a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano no longer returned to
Antipolo and instead lived in his condominium in Makati.
Erlinda thus filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus,
to have custody over her husband. She alleged that respondents, their
children, refused her demands to visit her husband and likewise prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for habeas corpus, but ordered
that visitation rights be allowed to Erlinda. Hence, the herein petitions: first,
by Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio, praying for the grant of the writ of habeas corpus,
and second, by her daughter Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, to annul the portion of
the CA decision granting visitation rights.
Issue:
WON the CA had authority to grant visitation rights.—NO. Erlinda
never even prayed for visitation rights, and it is inconsistent with the finding
that Potenciano is of sound mind.
Held:
The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights.
Potenciano was able to establish before the CA that he was of sound
and alert mind, having answered all relevant questions to the court’s
satisfaction. He made it clear before the court that he was not prevented
from leaving his house or from seeing people.
Given his full mental capacity and his right of choice, Potenciano may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free will. The CA exceeded
its authority in granting visitation rights in the petition for habeas corpus,
especially since Erlinda never even prayed for such right. Neither is the
grant of such rights consistent with the finding that Potenciano is sane.
Further, the CA stated that visitation rights should be enforced under
penalty of contempt, in case of violation or refusal to comply. This assertion
of power is unnecessary. The case does not involve the right of a parent to
visit a minor child, but the right of a wife to visit a husband: in case the
husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so,
without penalty.
[MAIN] WON the writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a married
person, in order to compel her spouse to live with her in conjugal bliss.—
NO. The writ is directed to a person detaining another to produce the body
of the prisoner.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to cases of illegal confinement or
detention. Potenciano was neither illegally detained nor confined.
The writ of habeas corpus is directed to a person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time
and place, with the day and cause of capture and detention. The purpose
of the writ is to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause. It is intended to inquire into all manner of voluntary restraint, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Hence, to justify the grant of the writ, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
restraint must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
In this case, however, there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty to justify issuance of the writ. The fact
that he is 86 years old or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not depend on age or
medical condition, but on the individual’s capacity to discern his actions.
The Court upheld the CA’s conclusion that there was no unlawful
restraint on Potentiano’s liberty.
Regardless, Potenciano made it clear before the CA that he never
requested the condominium administration to prohibit his wife and other
children from seeing or visiting him.
The petition for habeas corpus is thus dismissed, and the petition to
annul the CA decision with regard to visitation rights is granted.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the
petition for lack of merit. No costs.
2.
Doctrine:
The writ of habeas corpus is directed to a person detaining another to
produce the body of the prisoner. It extends to cases of illegal confinement
or detention. It is directed to a person detaining another, commanding him
to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the
day and cause of capture and detention. The purpose of the writ is to
liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is
intended to inquire into all manner of voluntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Case Title:
Nancy Go and Alex Go vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, GR. No.
114791, May 29, 1997
Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go
for the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired
about their wedding video but Nancy Go said it’s not yet ready. She
advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The
newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce
the said wedding video because the copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy’s husband, Alex
Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and
awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her
defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape
because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to
claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the
spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their
claim after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this
suit.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.
Held:
Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses
Ong made their claim after the wedding but were advised to return after
their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be
done abroad and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video
coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against
Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the
tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded – a wedding which in our
culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered – could
no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in
awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the mental
anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs
suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed
under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.
Anent the issue that Nancy Go’s husband should not be included in
the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the
wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business
without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was
only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence
only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the
Ongs.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 14, 1993 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Alex Go is
absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner Nancy
Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the judgment award.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
3.
Doctrine:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname,
or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as “Mrs.”
Case Title:
 Ma. Virginia V. Remo vs. The Honorable Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
GR. No. 169202; March 5, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose
Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being
married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her
passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name,
and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her
passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal
of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement passport. Petitioner’s request having been
denied.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President, which
dismissed the appeal and ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239
(RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 “offers no leeway for any
other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or
declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her
maiden name for passport purposes.” The Office of the President further
held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter
will control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since
the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which denied the petition and
affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President.  The Court of Appeals
found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d) of
RA 8239. The Court of Appeals held that for passport application and
issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman
applicant may exercise the option to revert to the use of her maiden name
such as in a case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner’s marriage to
Francisco Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree
has been granted to them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden
name in the replacement passport after she had adopted her husband’s
surname in her old passport.
Issue/s:
Whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her
expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.
Held:
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case
of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname,
or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as “Mrs.”
We agree with petitioner that the use of the word “may” in the above
provision indicates that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is
permissive rather than obligatory. Clearly, a married woman has an option,
but not a duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways
provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use
not only any of the three names provided in Article 370, but also her
maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using
her maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries,
she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this
interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate
descent.
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and
who opted to use her husband’s surname in her old passport, requested to
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law
prohibits her from using her maiden name.
The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable
provision in this case is Section 5(d), which states:
Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. — No passport
shall be issued to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative is satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has
complied with the following requirements: x x x
(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed
or whose marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy
of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or
annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and
authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in
case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of marriage as void, the
woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name: Provided,
further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the
Philippines; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA
8239 “limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert
to the use of her maiden name in her passport.” These instances are death
of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Significantly,
Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
8239 provides:
The passport can be amended only in the following cases:
1. a) Amendment of woman’s name due to marriage;
2. b) Amendment of woman’s name due to death of spouse, annulment
of marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
3. c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a
subsequent marriage of his parents.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case
outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when
a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. This prohibition,
according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied
repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between Article 370 of the Civil
Code and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA 8239,
including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a
married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in
recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a
passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not
required to adopt her husband’s surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either
adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she
chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA
additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden
name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously
using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden
name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These
instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4)
nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she
may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must
be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions
of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport
issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code
which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondent’s
competence to regulate any amendments intended to be made therein,
including the denial of unreasonable and whimsical requests for
amendments such as in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005
Decision and 2 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87710.
SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
4.
Doctrine:
 When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. Properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
this purpose, a party who did not participate in the acquisition of any
property by the other party shall be deemed to have contributed in the
acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Case Title:
Paterno vs. Paterno, GR. No. 213687, January 8, 2020
Facts:
Simon Paterno and Dina Marie Lomongo had been married for more
than ten years when Mr. Paterno left the family home in 1998, Mrs.
Lomongo alleging that he abandoned her for another woman. Simon filed a
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of his marriage two years
later, and it was approved, deeming both spouses psychologically
incapable of fulfilling their marital vows. The ruling became final, leaving
the question of the union's liquidation, partition, and distribution of assets,
as well as the delivery of their daughters’ presumptive legitime, to be
resolved. Ms. Lomongo testified about the assets she and Mr. Paterno had
amassed over their ten years of marriage. She wanted her ex-husband to
testify about his other claimed assets and earnings from 1998 to the formal
dissolution of their marriage. As a result, she asked the court to issue a
subpoena duces tecum and a subpoena ad testificandum for him to appear
as a hostile witness and present documents that mostly reflect his salaries
and acquired properties during the years of their de facto separation. As for
the latter defense, he primarily posited that the wages/properties he gained
subsequent to his separation from his former spouse are not part of the
common properties for a de facto Finding that Article 147 of the
Constitution applies in the case at hand (the couple being capacitated to
marry at the time they lived together). The petition for certiorari and the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration were both dismissed by the
CA. Hence, this appeal.
Issue/s:
Whether or not all properties acquired by the spouses prior to the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the
Family Code were co-owned by them pursuant to Article 147.2.)
Whether or not properties acquired by the spouses in a void marriage
under Art. 36 after their separation de facto were solely owned by the
earning spouse.
Held:
The parties do not claim that Article 147 applies to co-
ownership of properties acquired during the union. This was stated in
Valides case. Despite already being de facto separated, the petitioner's
argument implies that as long as a couple stays married (on paper)
pending a court declaration of nullity of their union, any property acquired
by bothbefore the judicial declaration will be included in the co-ownership
regime. The petitioner should be aware, however, of the legal consequence
of a confirmation of a void ab initio marriage: it is retroactive to the time of
the marriage ceremony. In summary, the marriage ceremony was nullified
as if no marriage had taken place when the trial court deemed her marriage
to Mr. Paterno void in 2005 due to both parties' psychological
incompetence. This means that Ms. Lomongo and Mr. Paterno only lived
together as common-law spouses during their ten-year relationship. This
is where Article 147 comes in, which deals with "properties acquired
while they lived together obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry..." Her assertion of common ownership of the moneys and
properties accumulated after the de facto separation would have been
correct if the properties had to be liquidated (such as in the event of a
spouse's death) and an official declaration of nullity of marriage was never
obtained. As a result, the Court DENIES the petition for certiorari review
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed October 31, 2013 Decision and the July 31, 2014 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124473 are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
This case is ordered remanded to Regional Trial Court, Branch 136,
Makati City for accounting, reception of evidence, and evaluation thereof
for the proper determination of the ownership and share of the parties in
the nine (9) properties mentioned above, which includes the Ayala Alabang
house and Rockwell condominium, based on the guidelines set forth in this
case, as well as the determination of arrears in support of the parties'
daughters, if any.
SO ORDERED. Peralta, C. J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, and Lazaro-
Javier, JJ., concur. Lopez, J., on official leave.

-Property Relations between spouses (Articles 74-87, FC)

1.
Doctrine:
 Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
Case Title:
Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, GR. No. 205487, Nov. 12, 2014
Facts:
That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No.
536 and Parking Slot No. 42; That the mortgage in favor of Orion
supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No.
10186 dated June 16, 2000; That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never
annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118; That Orion only paid the
appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged
Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003; That Parking Slot No. 42, covered
by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and That when Suzuki
bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the
conjugal property of spouses Kang?
Held:
RTC in favor of Suzuki; The court found that Suzuki was an innocent
purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s.
Court of appeals in favor of Suzuki; The Court may inquire into conclusions
of fact when the inference made is manifestly mistaken
Supreme Court in favor of Suzuki; petition denied due to lack of merit
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a
“Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea” to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it
was properly authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase “Yung Sam Kang ‘married to’ Hyun
Sook Jung” is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words,
the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the
properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married
to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate
the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In those cases,
however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name
of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties.
Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in
favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
 The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due
execution of the Dacion en Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have
first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack
of merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
2.
Doctrine:
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. 
Case Title :
Agapay vs. Palang, GR. No. 116668, July 28, 1997
Facts:
 Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 with
private respondent Carlina Vallesterol in Pangasinan. A few months after
the wedding, Palang left to work in Hawaii and had attempted to divorce
Carlina. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private
respondents, instead stayed alone in a house in Pangasinan.
On 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second
marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay. The two jointly purchased
a parcel of agricultural land located at Pangasinan issued in their names. 
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina’s
complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina Palang and her daughter
instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against petitioner. Private respondents wants to get the riceland
back allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. 
Issue/s:
Whether or not the riceland in question is owned by petitioner Erlinda
Agapay?
Held:
No, the riceland is not owned by Agapay and should revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired
by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. 
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she
is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but
failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject
riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17,
1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang
was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the
purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis
to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur. Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

Property Relations
1.
Doctrine:
The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested.
Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute,
unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. From the foregoing, it is clear that while one
may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
Case Title:
Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, GR. No. 176556; July 4, 2012
Facts:
Respondent Rita C. Quiao filed a complaint for legal separation
against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
Decision granting the same and custody of the minor children were
awarded to Rita. Their property as enumerated was to be divided among
the spouses equally subject to the respective legitimes of the children and
the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigido’s share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children.He was further ordered to reimburse the sum of
[P]19,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of P 5,000.00.

Petitioner posits that he has a vested right over his shares of the property
in the conjugal partnership which was violated by the Court’s order of the
forfeiture of the same to his children.
Issue/s:
What is “vested right” from the perspective of the due process
clause? Was petitioner’s “vested right” over half of the common properties
of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in
favor of his children pursuant to Article 63 (2) and 129 of the Family Code?
Held:
No. In the en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA
Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,it was held that:
The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become
vested.
Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable. From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be
deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process
and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process.
First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint
that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
Second, when the Decision was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as
“net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for
Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.
2.
Doctrine:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be
declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the
parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus,
what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
Case Title :
Alain M. Diño vs. Ma. Caridad L. Diño; GR. No. 178044; January 19,
2011
Facts:
Petitioner – Alain Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño got married on 14
January 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. Petitioner
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.The
RTC granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated tocomply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared their
marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code.Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of
petitioner, modified its decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Issue/s:

Whether or not the trial court

erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties'
properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
Is there a need for prior liquidation, etc before decree of nullity be
issued? 
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner’s marriage to
respondent was declared void under article 36 of the family code, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership.
In the case at bar, Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code because the ground for
the declaration of marriage is Article 36 of the Family Code.
No. Prior liquidation, etc. is required only in the event the marriage is
voided or annulled under Arts. 40 and 45 of the FC where the marriage is
covered either by ACP or CPG. In DIÑO vs.  DIÑO,  the SC held:
 Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a
second or bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, “[t]he
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.” 
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable
marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by
final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. In both
instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the
parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties
is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of
gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties
before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall
be issued upon finality of the trial court's decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
2.
Doctrine:
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage
settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage. 
Case Title:
Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Jr., GR. No. 164201; December
10, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were
accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person
was found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay
each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and
damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC
ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties
registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of
levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil
liability in the murder case.
Held:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them
be charged to the partnership.
 The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the spouses
may be enforced against the partnership assets if the spouse who is bound
should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no
exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that
the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against
their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of
the Family Code have been covered. 
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198 dated January
29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the
conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction
of the indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in
Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities enumerated in Article
121 of the Family Code have been covered.
SO ORDERED. ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
3.
Doctrine:
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the
Family Code.
Case Title:
Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon
City, GR. No. 122749; July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They
begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court
granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also
directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. 

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted

that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage".
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal
shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their
other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and
partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant,
the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied.
Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does
not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2)
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where
a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming
arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be
read consistently with Article 129.
Issue/s:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of
property in the case.
Held:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the
Family Code. 
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under
this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits
of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and
wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and
in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under
a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed. 
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement
of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently
nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a
nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and
52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spouses. 
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit
terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. 
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30
October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs. Padilla,
Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
4.
Doctrine:
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void,... Article 147. When a man and a
woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the... property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The term "capacitated" in the first... paragraph of the provision
pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.
The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the... certificate
of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the
spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains
even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the
spouses."
Case Title:
Virginia Ocampo vs. Deogracio Ocampo, GR. No. 198908; August 3,
2015
Facts:
 Petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio)
before Regional Trial Court... the trial court rendered a Decision[4]
declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio as null and void...
null and void from the beginning under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Having failed to agree on a project of partition of... their conjugal
properties, hearing ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support
of their respective stand.
the trial court rendered the assailed Order[6] stating that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
Virginia filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
Deogracio filed a Motion to Deny and/or Dismiss the Notice of
Appeal... the trial court denied the aforesaid motion to deny and/or dismiss
the notice of appeal for lack of merit.
Deogracio filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
the trial court denied anew the motion... the Court of Appeals denied
Virginia's appeal.
Issue/s:
Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
Held:
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family
Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws.
 Under the Family Code, if the properties... are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.
The applicable law, however, in so far as the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership assets and liability is concerned, is Article 129[8] of
the Family Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void
under Article 36[10] of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code.
For Article 147 to... operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void,... They lived exclusively with each other as husband
and wife. However, their marriage... was found to be void under Article 36
of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the
parties will share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove
that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts,... Likewise, we
note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired
the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage.[17]  The
certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome
the... presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties
acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose name
the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August
11, 2010 and the Resolution dated October 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318 are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the
trial court for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,
Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
5.
Doctrine:
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . .
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said
provision?
 On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context
of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The contract of
loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is
“for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Case Title:
Ayala Investment vs. CA, G.R. No. 118305, Feb. 12, 1998 (FCD)
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
Respondent Alfredo Ching made himself jointly answerable to the debt as
added security. Upon PBM’s failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for
sum of money against PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI of Pasig.
After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM
and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of
the loan with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a
writ of execution and thereafter, the deputy sheriff caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on three of
their conjugal properties.
Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject
loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Nevertheless, a certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only
bidder for the property.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone is considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
Held:
No. Petition is DENIED. The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC
was for the benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of Ching.
PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Ching’s family
despite their being stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by
Ching is a corporate debt and the right of recourse to respondent as surety
is only to the extent of his corporate stocks.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself,
alone be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.”
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.  No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.”  Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to
the conjugal partnership.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is hereby,
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
6.
Doctrine:
 Mortgage of property within the community or the conjugal
partnership is void if done without the consent of the other spouse.
Nevertheless, the execution of special powers of attorney perfects the
contract of mortgage. In other words, the SPA cures the defect of the
mortgage.
Case Title:
Flores vs. Sps. Lindo, GR No. 183984, April 13, 2011
Facts:
On the 31st day of October in the year 1995, the woman was able to
obtain a loan secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a real proper under
her and his husband's name but without the consent of the former. Partial
payments were made by her through checks but the same were
dishonored. As a result, the creditor filed a complaint against her for
foreclosure of the mortgage with damages.
The second-level court dismissed the case as the mortgage was, in
the eyes of the court a quo, void for having been executed without the
necessary consent of the husband, despite the SPA executed later by the
husband for the wife. It must be noted that the SPA was executed only a
few days after the wife entered into the contract of loan with mortgage.
The second-level court however ruled that the subsequent execution of the
SPA cannot be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the real
estate mortgage.
Issue/s:
Did the court commit any error in dismissing the case for foreclosure
against the wife for the mortgage entered into without the husband's
consent despite the fact that a subsequent SPA was executed in her favor?
Held:
 Yes, the court acted in error. The execution of the SPA can be
considered as acceptance of the mortgage by the other spouse that
perfected the contract or continuing offer.
Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers
of the administration do not include disposition or encumbrance without the
written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also
state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003 are SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to
proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04-110858.
SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
7.
Doctrine:
The Administration of the Conjugal Property shall be Exercised
Jointly by the Spouses; The Sale of Conjugal Partnership Property
Requires the Consent of Both Husband and Wife; The Default System of
Property Relations Before the Family Code, in the Absence of Marriage
Settlement, is the Conjugal Partnership of Gains; The Rules on Contract of
Partnership are Applicable in so far as it does not Conflict with the Rules on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains; The Conjugal Partnership shall be liable for
Debts and Obligations Contracted by either Spouse without the Consent of
the other to the Extent that the Family has been Benefitted; The Burden of
Proof that the Debt was Contracted for the Benefit of the Partnership is on
the Credito
Case Title:
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs.Dailo, GR. No. 153802,
March 11, 20058. Nobleza vs. Nuega, GR. No. 193038, March 11, 20151.
Facts:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8,
1967. During their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot
situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was
declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale,
however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the
spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo
executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the
subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions,
including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property.
After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor
of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the
property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by
executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the
subject property, Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a
certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was
razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the
subject property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with
the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage
and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of
Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim,
petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring
the said documents null and void and further ordered the defendant is
ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff,  to
pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was
burned, the attorney’s fees, moral and exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the
award for damages and attorney’s fees for lack of basis. Hence, this
petition
Issue/s:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-
OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
 2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF
THE FAMILY.
Held:
The petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the
absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967.
In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of
gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
 The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations
of respondent and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The
regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-
ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be
governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property
relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost,
by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the
spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner
that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus,
both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity
of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondent’s
consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership
shall be liable for: . . .
(1)       Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited; . . . .”
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as
such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units
without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during
the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that the subject property was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer
filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never
claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be
unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process. A party may change his legal theory on
appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation
of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.,
and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.