SJS vs LIM

Facts: 

During the second world war, the United States Army took control of the Pandacan Terminals.
The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration.

After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. The three major oil companies resumed the
operation of their depots. But the district was no longer a sparsely populated industrial zone; it
had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house
the oil companies’ distribution terminals and depot facilities. On 12 October 2001, the oil
companies and the DOE entered into a MOA. The stakeholders acknowledged that "there is a
need for a comprehensive study to address the economic, social, environmental and security
concerns to address and minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals without adversely affecting
the security and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum products to Metro Manila and
the rest of Luzon, and the interests of consumers and users of such petroleum products in those
areas."

Issue:

Is the amendatory Manila Ordinance No. 8187, which would allow the continued stay of the oil
depots in Pandacan, valid and constitutional?

Ruling: 

No. Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027.
Without a doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed
their desire for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny
and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors’ warnings of
doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.

The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains
a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason
to persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer
put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the
Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.

Zabal vs. Duterte

GR No. 238467

FACTS: Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made public his
plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao sometime February 2018.[5] This
was followed by several speeches and news releases stating that he would place Boracay under a
state of calamity. True to his words, President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in
a cabinet meeting held on April 4, 2018. This was confirmed by then Presidential Spokesperson
Harry L. Roque, Jr. in a press briefing the following day wherein he formally announced that the
total closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26, 2018.
[6]
Following this pronouncement, petitioners contend that around 630 police and military personnel
were readily deployed to Boracay including personnel for crowd dispersal management.[7] They
also allege that the DILG had already released guidelines for the closure.[8]
Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about, fewer tourists had
been engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough
to feed their families. They fear that if the closure pushes through, they would suffer grave and
irreparable damage.

ISSUE: Did Proclamation No. 475, which temporarily closed Boracay, intrude into local
government autonomy?

RULING: No. The activities proposed to be undertaken to rehabilitate Boracay involved

inspection, testing, demolition, relocation, and construction. These could not have been
implemented freely and smoothly with tourists coming in and out of the island not only because
of the possible disruption that they may cause to the works being undertaken, but primarily
because their safety and convenience might be compromised. In fine, this case does not actually
involve the right to travel in its essential sense contrary to what petitioners want to portray. Any
bearing that Proclamation No. 475 may have on the right to travel is merely corollary to the
closure of Boracay and the ban of tourists and non-residents therefrom which were necessary
incidents of the island's rehabilitation. There is certainly no showing that Proclamation No. 475
deliberately meant to impair the right to travel. Certainly, the closure of Boracay, albeit
temporarily, gave the island its much needed breather, and likewise afforded the government the
necessary leeway in its rehabilitation program. Note that apart from review, evaluation and
amendment of relevant policies, the bulk of the rehabilitation activities involved inspection,
testing, demolition, relocation, and construction. These works could not have easily been done
with tourists present. The rehabilitation works in the first place were not simple, superficial or
mere cosmetic but rather quite complicated, major, and permanent in character as they were
intended to serve as long-term solutions to the problem.[56] Also, time is of the essence. Every
precious moment lost is to the detriment of Boracay's environment and of the health and well-
being of the people thereat.

Lim vs Colet

Facts: 

The Manila Revenue Code was enacted on June 22, 1993 by the City Council of Manila and
approved on June 29, 1993 by then Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Lim). Shortly thereafter,
Ordinance No. 7807 was enacted by the City Council of Manila on September 27, 1993 and
approved by Mayor Lim on September 29, 1993, already amending several provisions of the
Manila Revenue Code. Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, imposed a lower
tax rate on the businesses that fell under it, and paragraph (B) thereof read as follows: B) On the
gross receipts of keepers of garages, cars for rent or hire driven by the lessee, transportation
contractors, persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and common carriers by land, air
or water, except owners of bancas and owners of animal-drawn two-wheel vehicle. Maersk, et
al., submitted for resolution by the Court a lone question of law, viz. :Whether or not Section
21(B) of Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the City of Manila, as
amended by Section 1(G) of Ordinance No. 7807, is valid and constitutional.17

Issue: 

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Is Section 21(B) of Manila City Ordinance No. 7794, aka Manila Revenue Code, as amended,
insofar as it imposes business tax on businesses already assessed with percentage taxes, valid and
constitutional?

Ruling:

Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, was null and void for being beyond the
power of the City of Manila and its public officials to enact, approve, and implement under the
LGC.
It is already well-settled that although the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not
true for the LGUs to whom the power must be delegated by Congress and must be exercised
within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide. Therefore, the power of a
province to tax is limited to the extent that such power is delegated to it either by the
Constitution or by statute. Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is
no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority
to levy taxes, fees and other charges." Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide". In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the
1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters.

Christian Halili vs. COMELEC 

GR NO. 231643 Jan 15 2019
FACTS:
Marino P. Morales was elected and served as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat,
Pampanga from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010. He was elected again as mayor during the 2010
elections. On 15 may 2012 or during Morales’ second term, Congress passed Republic Act
10164, converting the Municpality of Mabalacat into a component city. Thereafter, a plebiscite
was held. In the 2013 elections, Morales ran again and was elected as mayor of the new
Mabalacat City. On 8 December 2015, Morales filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
2016 elections for the position of mayor of Mabalacat City, as substitute candidate for Wilfredo
Feliciano of Aksyon Demokratiko Party. 

On January 4 2016, respondent Pyra Lucas filed a petition for Conacellation of the COC and/or
Disqualification of Morales for the Mayoral Position of Mabalacat City before the COMELEC.
Lucas alleged that the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City did not
interrupt Morales’ service for the full term for which he was elected.
ISSUES:
Was Morales second term as the mayor of the municipality of Mabalacat interrupted by the
conversion of the municipality into a component city? 
RULING: 
No. based on RA. 10164 or An Act Converting the Municipality of Mabalacat in the province of
Pampanga into a Component City to be known as Mabalacat City. Contrary to Morales
arguments, the territorial jurisdiction of Mabalacat City is the same as that the Municipality of
Mabalacat. Also the elective officials of the Municipality of Mabalacat continued to exercise
their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. Accordingly, there
is no factual or legal authority for Morales’ claim that the territorial jurisdiction of Mabalacat
City is different from that of the Municipality of Mabalacat.

NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. 177332, Oct. 1, 2014

3
FACTS: The City of Cabanatuan (the City) assessed the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1% of its gross
receipts for 1992. NAPOCOR refused to pay, arguing that it is exempt from paying the franchise
tax. Consequently, on November 9, 1993, the City filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City, demanding NAPOCOR to pay the assessed tax due plus 25%
surcharge and interest of 2% per month of the unpaid tax, and costs of suit.

The trial court sustained the City's computation of the surcharge totaling P13,744,096.69 over
NAPOCOR's claim of P2,571,617.14 only.

Petitioner submits that from Sec. 168 of Art. 7160, the surcharge should only be P2,571,617.14,
computed by applying the 25% surcharge against the total amount of taxes not paid on time,
which is the total amount of tax due from 1992 to 2002, or P10,286,468.57. In imposing a
surcharge of P13,744,096.69 instead of P2,571,617.14, the trial court allegedly "varied and/or
exceeded the terms of the judgment sought to be executed."

ISSUE 1: Can local governments impose interest and surcharges of taxes due?

RULING 1: I qualify. The law allows the local government to collect an interest at the rate not
exceeding 2% per month of the unpaid taxes, fees, or charges including surcharges, until such
amount is fully paid. However, the law provides that the total interest on the unpaid amount or
portion thereof should not exceed thirty-six (36) months or three (3) years. In other words,
respondent cannot collect a total interest on the unpaid tax including surcharge that is effectively
higher than 72%.

ISSUE 2: Did the City of Cabanatuan impose the correct surcharge?

RULING 2: No. Respondent's computation of the surcharge, as sustained by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, varies the terms of the judgment sought to be executed and contravenes
Section 168 of the Local Government Code.

When the taxpayer does not pay its tax due for a particular year, then a surcharge is applied on
the full amount of the tax due. However, when the taxpayer makes a partial payment of the tax
due, the surcharge is applied only on the balance or the part of the tax due that remains unpaid. It
is in this sense that the fallo of the Court of Appeals decision should be read, i.e., a 25%
surcharge is to be added to the proper franchise tax so due and unpaid for each year.

Mangune vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 182604, Sept. 27, 2016

Facts:
On July 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 78425 (R.A. No. 7842) was enacted establishing, under the
administration and supervision of the Department of Health (DOH), the Taguig-Pateros District
Hospital (TPDH). President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 on September 8, 2006, devolving the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. E.O. No. 567
provided that it was issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. No. 7160), otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (Local Government Code) and the President's
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under the executive department.

On January 26, 2007, petitioners filed an amended Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for Ex-Parte Issuance of 72-hour Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), 20-day TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The petition prayed
4
that E.O. No. 567 be declared unconstitutional, illegal and null and void for having been issued
in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers and with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. No. 567 is unconstitutional for amending Section 17( e ) of the Local
Government Code, which limits devolution of basic services and facilities to LGUs to only six
months after the effectivity of the law?

Ruling:
NO. E.O. No. 567 is not unconstitutional for amending Section 17( e ) of the Local Government
Code. The more reasonable understanding of the six-month period is that the framers of the law
provided for the period to prompt the national government to speedily devolve the existing
services to the LGUs. However, it was not intended as a prescriptive period, as to absolutely
prohibit the national government from devolving services beyond the period. Most especially so
in this case because the TPDH was created long after the lapse of the six-month period, thus
making its devolution within such period impossible.

Notably, there is nothing in Section 17(e) or in the Local Government Code which provides for
what would happen after the six-month period. Therefore, it cannot be said that the law clearly
and unequivocally prohibits devolution after the six-month period.

MANDANAS VS. OCHOA, 

G.R. No. 199802, July 3, 2018

FACTS#1:
In G.R. No. 208488, Congressman Enrique Garcia, Jr., the lone petitioner, seeks the writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents thereat to compute the just share of the LGUs on the basis
of all national taxes. His petition insists on a literal reading of Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution. He avers that the insertion by Congress of the words internal revenue in the phrase
national taxes found in Section 284 of the LGC caused the diminution of the base for
determining the just share of the LGUs, and should be declared unconstitutional

ISSUE#1: 
Is Section 284 of the LGC unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section 6, Article X of the
1987 Constitution?

RULING#1:
Yes, Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional
lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase national
internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term
national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the
1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which the just share of the
LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words
of a statute there should be no departure). Equally impermissible is that Congress has also
thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987
Constitution.

FACTS#2
The foregoing constitutional provisions (Sec. 5 of Art IX, Sec. 14 of Art XI, and Sec. 17(4) of
5
Article XIII) share two aspects. The first relates to the grant of fiscal autonomy, and the second
concerns the automatic release of funds. The common denominator of the provisions is that the
automatic release of the appropriated amounts is predicated on the approval of the annual
appropriations of the offices or agencies concerned.

ISSUE#2:
Can the LGUs’ just share in the national taxes be automatically released without the need of an
appropriation?

RULING#2:
Yes. Section 6 does not mention of appropriation as a condition for the automatic release of the
just share to the LGUs. This is because Congress not only already determined the just share
through the LGC's fixing the percentage of the collections of the NIRTs to constitute such fair
share subject to the power of the President to adjust the same in order to manage public sector
deficits subject to limitations on the adjustments, but also explicitly authorized such just share to
be "automatically released" to the LGUs in the proportions and regularity set under Section
28579 of the LGC without need of annual appropriation.

 Umali vs. Comelec, Ermita, GR 203974, April 22, 2014 

Facts:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-
2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component
city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). the President issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an
HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in
Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No.
12-0797 which reads: WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to
highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in
the said plebiscite.
Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and
directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the
LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that
while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an
existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local
government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material
change in their rights and responsibilities.

Issue:
In the plebiscite for the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City to a highly urbanized city, who
are qualified to cast their votes: the registered voters of Cabanatuan City only or the registered
voters of the province of Nueva Ecija?

Rulling:

The Registered voters of the Province of Nueva Ecija. Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the
phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should be construed in a manner that will
avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of the phrase in relation to
6
the declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with
the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political units directly affected"
shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view of the supremacy
of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453
to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the
voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453
with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. The court ruled that that the phrase "political units
directly affected" necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of
Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province are qualified to cast their votes in
resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.

Ferrer vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015

Facts:
On October 17, 2011,1 respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-
2011,2 or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City. Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized
Housing Tax ( SHT ) shall be utilized by the Quezon City Government for the following
projects: (a) land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized housing
facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction of core houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise
buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public-private partners hip agreement
of the Quezon City Government and National Housing Authority ( NHA ) with the private
sector.3 For petitioner, it is noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon
City Government is in dire financial state and desperately needs money to fund housing for
informal settlers and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its revenue
collection in 2012 is in the sum of ₱13.69 billion. Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the
garbage fee cannot be justified by the Quezon City Government as an exercise of its power to
create sources of income under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.47 According to
petitioner, the constitutional provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax everything under
its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself admits of guidelines and limitations.

Issue:

Are Quezon City Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized
Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:

I qualify. The Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Petition. . SP-2095, S-2011 is considered as
Valid. It is consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to implement in their
respective localities in coordination with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council, the national housing agencies, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, the
private sector, and other non-government organizations.98 It is the declared policy of the State to
undertake a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program that shall,
among others, uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas
and in resettlement areas, and provide for the rational use and development of urban land in
order to bring a bout, among others, reduction in urban dysfunctions, particularly those that
adversely affect public health, safety and ecology, and access to land and housing by the
underprivileged and homeless citizens. However, and SP-2235, S-2013 is Invalid. The garbage
fee is not a tax. We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does
not decide whether the imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee.1awp++i1 Although a
7
special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a municipal corporation, it must be
reasonably commensurate to the cost of providing the garbage service.143 To pass judicial
scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation
because such fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the regulation
exceeds the cost of the regulation.144