Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

Author(s): Richard S. Mukisa

Source: Africa Today, Vol. 44, No. 1, International Relations and Human Rights (Jan. -
Mar., 1997), pp. 7-32
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187136
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Africa Today 44, 1 (1997), 7-32

Toward a Peaceful Resolution of

Africa's Colonial Boundaries

Richard S. Mukisa

Serious discussions on the arbitrariness with which Africa's national

boundaries were drawn during the colonial period started in the 1950s,
paralleling the decolonization process. By 1962, there were already thirty
independent African states, and as John Marcum reports, some African
leaders expressed concern that decolonization of other territories could
lead to "the compartmentalization of the continent into as many as 50
sovereign nations-more than twice as many as in Latin America."1 Such
fragmentation, observers feared, could lead to a number of problems,
including disputes over borders and mineral wealth. In 1996, there were
fifty-three states on the continent.
One of the first leaders to recognize the disruptive potential of the
colonial boundaries was President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who
championed the movement toward African unity. Under his leader-
ship, a number of Pan-African conferences were organized that to-
gether led to the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
in 1963. At both those conferences and the OAU summit meetings
during the early 1960s, the subject of colonial boundaries was an im-
portant issue.
Since the mid-1960s, however, there has been no serious discussion
of the matter as it affects the continent as a whole; attention has often
been focused on specific border disputes such as the Chad-Libya and
Tanzania-Uganda conflicts in the 1970s. As Peter Enahoro observed in
1972, "No one seriously contends today that the boundaries should be
re-drawn, and the OAU will not condone secession as the Biafrans had
to learn at such a tragic cost."2
But today, three factors-all recent developments-are rekindling
the discussion: (1) the determination of the African political leadership
to resolve the continent's current economic crisis, (2) Africans' increas-
ing realization that peace and security are prerequisites for the economic
development of the continent, and (3) the urgent need to curb political
crises. This article discusses these factors, as well as Africa's attitude
toward the colonial boundaries and how the problem might be resolved
peacefully.

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8 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

Factors Leading to Renewal

of the Discussion of Boundaries

Economic Crisis and Economic Integration

Africa is currently experiencing a major economic crisis, one indicator of

which is the international debt. In 1986, for instance, then-OAU Secre-
tary General Ide Oumarou called for greater understanding of Africa's
debt problems (which meant debt write-offs in some cases and better
payment plans in others) on the part of the international aid donor com-
munity. If the donors failed to understand, he warned,

Africa will continue to pay its debts, but our recovery will be slower,
and in the current situation, any delay in the achievement of economic
growth will translate into an extremely catastrophic situation on the
continent, because the crisis-and in particular the famine-which
afflicts the continent is not due solely to the drought.
There is also insufficient production and considerable population
growth. Thus Africa's situation will continue to deteriorate. In a few
years, the world shouldn't come again crying crocodile tears to tell us,
"Look, the situation is very serious," because it is already very serious.
All those who can act must do so now, for in a few years, it will be too
late.3

In 1987, Edward V. K. Jaycox, the World Bank's vice president for

Africa, characterized sub-Saharan Africa as "the economic crisis of our
planet" and urged the international community to "get realistic" about
Africa's mounting debt burden and steadily declining economic growth
rates.4 In 1989, he told a reporter that "we all wonder whether there is
any scenario that is going to work in Africa," adding, however, that "if we
delay getting started . . . because we are mesmerized by the crisis, will
there be anything to pick up with? Are we just losing valuable time?"5
Elsewhere, Jaycox stated that economic growth was "the sine qua
non-it's what African governments want to achieve, it's what donors
want to achieve, it's the very basis of sustainable development."6 But
by that year (1989), for the continent's thirty-four poorest countries,
the ratio of the debt service alone to exports averaged 50 percent. For
some countries such as Guinea and Mozambique, the ratio was over
100 percent.
Also in 1989, when the OAU met at the twenty-fifth Assembly of
Heads of State and Government (held at the organization's headquar-
ters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 24-26 July 1989), the member states
renewed their call for an international conference to discuss Africa's
debt situation, claiming the extent of the problem merited a global rather
than a case-by-case approach on the part of the creditor nations. By
1992, the debt had increased to U.S.$275 billion, and many countries

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 Richard S. Mukisa 9

were unable even to service their portions of it, let alone offer th
zens an acceptable standard of living. One visitor to Zaire claimed that
inflation in that country "is running at 10,000 percent. There is not even
enough money to print new banknotes."7 (Ironically, Zaire is potentially
one of the richest countries on the continent because of its natural
resources-copper, gold, diamonds, and so forth.) Trevor W. Parfitt and
Stephen P Riley have commented that "most of the states of Africa are
caught in a seemingly intractable debt trap."8 There are signs, therefore,
that the "Oumarou catastrophe"9 is about to occur.
Why has economic growth failed to occur in most parts of Africa?
Why is Africa, in material terms, probably worse off today than it was at
the time of independence? Much has been said about the mismanage-
ment of the economies, which the World Bank-approved structural
adjustment programs are attempting to correct. But the Bank's vice pres-
ident for Africa has also stated (by implication) that colonial national
boundaries are to blame for some of Africa's economic misfortunes. He
has suggested as a solution that

some progressive degree of integration will be important for the com-

petitiveness of Africa in the world economy. These small economies
cannot produce economies of scale. The infrastructure, to the extent it is
duplicated, is a waste if you can get the same production with nondupli-
cation. It is a very pragmatic question, but it obviously depends on
political will.10

Fortunately, Africa has already started to exercise its political will.

On 3 June 1991, for instance, at Abuja, Nigeria, fifty-one heads of state
and government of the OAU signed the Treaty Establishing the African
Economic Community."1 The objectives of the community are to in-
crease economic self-reliance, promote endogenous and self-sustained
development, and raise the standard of living of all African peoples-in
other words, to promote economic development on the continent.
The Abuja Treaty mentions, inter alia, "the Division of Africa into
five (5) regions, namely North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East
Africa and Southern Africa";12 the coordination and harmonization of
"policies among existing and future economic communities in order to
foster the gradual establishment of the Community";13 and "the strength-
ening of existing economic communities and the establishment of other
communities where they do not exist."14 Therefore, current efforts in the
area of economic integration in Africa have been designed to involve the
creation or maintenance of economic communities at both the regional
(i.e., continental) and subregional levels.
Traveling with U.S. President Bill Clinton recently, National Secu-
rity Adviser Anthony Lake observed that whereas regions in Europe,

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10 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

Asia, and the Americas are integrating politically and economically to

compete effectively in the global trading system of the twenty-first
century, "there is a continent that is being left out and that is Africa.
And unless Africa can achieve greater regional integration and then
greater economic integration as a whole in the next century, it is going
to be even harder for African economies to compete."15 Emphasizing
that "that kind of integration has to begin now if Africa is to catch up,"
Lake has stated that "a significant barrier" to the integration process
is that "there are nations that are tearing themselves apart in internal
conflicts."16
In essence, therefore, this discussion indicates that Africans and non-
Africans alike are making two critical observations. First, the African
state, as created by the colonialists and inaugurated on the day of inde-
pendence, has proved inherently incapable of coping with the economic,
political, and security demands of the modern era. And second, the way
to overcome this problem is to integrate the African states into some
regional (i.e., continental) or subregional entities. Integration, one may
add, implies weakening or even eliminating at least some of the colonial
boundaries. This point will become clear when Africa's pursuit of what
Lake has called "a real zone of peace and security"17 is discussed in the
next section in the context of security crises on the continent.

The Security Crisis and Conflict Management

A year after the Abuja Treaty was signed, the twenty-eighth OAU As-
sembly met in Dakar, Senegal, from 29 June to 2 July 1992. President
Abdou Diouf of Senegal, who had just been elected OAU chairman,
informed the delegates that the OAU's priorities would include, inter
alia, the situations in Liberia, Somalia, and South Africa and the preven-
tion and management of further conflicts on the continent.18
At the 1992 presummit meeting of the OAU's Council of Ministers
(on 22 June), OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim had pre-
sented a document entitled "Proposals for an OAU Mechanism for Con-
flict Prevention and Conflict Resolution,"19 in which the secretary gen-
eral proposed that the OAU should develop within its existing structure
a comprehensive mechanism for preventing, monitoring, and resolving
interstate and intrastate conflicts on the continent. The assembly re-
solved to establish that mechanism in principle and asked the secretary
general to conduct a feasibility study and to report his findings at the
1993 ordinary session of the assembly.
The twenty-ninth Assembly of the OAU was held in Cairo, Egypt, on
28-29 June 1993 and approved several resolutions, including one to
establish a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the con-
tinent. Later that year (on 18 November), the foreign ministers of the

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 Richard S. Mukisa 11

OAU member states met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and agre

lish a peace fund, which the organization's secretary general d
"a practical manifestation of Africa's commitment to work fo
The ministers also approved the principles that would guide the estab-
lishment of the African Mechanism Apparatus for Preventing, Managing
and Resolving African Crises. Composed of a central committee, with
the states represented on the OAU summit bureau as members, the
mechanism would be responsible primarily for resolving and preventing
crises and performing peacekeeping tasks.
The thirtieth Assembly of the OAU, held 13-15 June 1994 at Tunis,
Tunisia, not only welcomed South Africa into the organization's mem-
bership and terminated the mandate of the OAU's Coordinated Com-
mittee for the Liberation of Africa; it also named nine states to the mem-
bership of the African Mechanism Apparatus for Preventing, Managing
and Resolving African Crises. The nine states are Benin, Chad, COte
d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia.
Thus, the mechanism was inaugurated.
On 23 January 1995, Egypt announced its intention to establish as
part of the mechanism a center for conflict management. The center,
which would be funded primarily by Egypt, would seek to train military
and civilian cadres in the art of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping.
More recently, the thirty-first Assembly of the OAU, held 26-28 June 1995
at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, passed resolutions on some of the major con-
flicts in Africa-including those in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, and Somalia-and on the continent's 7 million refugees.
But it has been reported that the delegates "failed to agree on the desir-
ability of a proposed OAU rapid reaction force."'21
Two facts should be noted. First, the OAU is attempting to transform
itself into a security organization-what can be referred to as a "security
community." But second, member states have not yet agreed on exactly
what kind of security community the organization should be. Back in the
1960s, when the OAU was created, Ghana's first president, Kwame
Nkrumah, had envisioned an African High Command. Africa Report is
not alone in holding the opinion that "such a command is an unlikely
scenario," because the African states cannot afford the financial cost of
such a proposition and because of the OAU's principle of noninterfer-
ence in the internal affairs of states.
A more practical route has been for the OAU to permit or encourage
subregional organizations such as the sixteen-member Economic Com-
munity of West Africa (ECOWAS), the twelve-member Southern African
Development Community (SADC), and the seven-member Inter-Gov-
ernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)-all
essentially economic communities-to perform what are essentially secu-
rity functions as well. In fact, according to Africa Report, "Conventional

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12 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

wisdom ... is that the OAU is a poor candidate for spearheading any con-
tinental initiative in conflict resolution."22 And although "South Africa's
elevation in status from world pariah to full member of the OAU raises
new and interesting possibilities,"23 the admission of South Africa to
OAU membership did nothing to change the organization's principle of
noninterference in the internal affairs of states or to modify African
states' attachment to the principle of national sovereignty. Therefore,
security efforts must be made at both the continental (or regional) and
subregional levels. That, indeed, is what has occurred.
In the wake of the Liberian civil war, for instance, ECOWAS de-
ployed an 11,000-officer West African peace force (ECOMOG) into that
country in August 1990. Beginning then, conflict resolution in the region
became a dominant issue in ECOWAS. The community's sixteenth regu-
lar summit, held at Cotonou, Benin, 22-24 July 1993, signed a revised
community treaty "which recognized the increasing political agenda of
ECOWAS by enshrining the prevention and control of regional conflicts
in its constitution."24 The new treaty also imposed a community tax on
the membership and provided for the establishment of (1) a regional
parliament, (2) an Economic and Social Council, and (3) an ECOWAS
Court of Justice. ECOWAS Chairman President Nicephore Soglo of
Benin is reported to have declared that the new treaty was a means to
achieve ECOWAS's main goal-namely, "real economic and political
union."25 The treaty came into effect on 30 July 1995.
The SADC is another example of an essentially economic community
taking on what are essentially security responsibilities. Originally known as
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC),
the organization was created in 1979 in reaction to South Africa's economic
destabilization schemes against its neighbors and to reduce those neigh-
bors' economic dependence on South Africa. In 1992, however, with the
prospect of the fall of apartheid in South Africa, SADCC was recon-
structed into SADC to prepare for South Africa's admission to the commu-
nity membership. At SADC's summit meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, on
29 August 1994, South Africa was formally admitted into SADC member-
ship. Africa Report reported that in August 1994, SADC "approved the for-
mulation of a sector on politics, diplomacy, international relations, defense,
and security"26 and is now "moving toward a common security regime
along the lines of the 52-member OSCE (formally the Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe)."27
A third example of an essentially nonmilitary subregional organiza-
tion assuming security functions in Africa is the IGADD, which was cre-
ated in 1986 to address environmental problems in eastern Africa. At its
fourth summit meeting held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6-7 September
1993, IGADD not only adopted a program that related to food security,
environmental protection, and desertification control; it also endorsed

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 Richard S. Mukisa 13

ongoing efforts to resolve the conflict in Somalia and agreed to establish

a committee that would work toward ending the civil war in the Sudan.
In fact, according to one report, "Some members, notably Sudan, called
for greater involvement in regional peace-making and the formal cre-
ation of a 'conflict resolving body financed by the continental organiza-
tion [the OAU] ... to avoid interference in the internal affairs of African
countries."'28 In May 1994, IGADD sponsored peace talks between the
Sudanese government and the southern rebel forces of the Sudan Peo-
ple's Liberation Army (SPLA).
Clearly, therefore, Africa's various types of subregional organiza-
tions not only have the potential to serve important security functions
but are already taking steps to perform those functions. Even within the
framework of the OAU, Africa can, if it wishes, establish an African
Security Community. That community, however, can best be established
on a step-by-step basis, beginning with or accompanied by the establish-
ment of security communities at the subregional level. And it appears
that Africa does not have a minute to lose. Anthony Lake, on his recent
trip with President Clinton to several African countries, had one impor-
tant message for the continent:

This is the last chance. I think especially in the wake of Somalia that the
willingness of the international community to forever make efforts to
support failed ceasefires, to forever provide a safety net for leaders who
are more concerned with their own welfare than [with] that of their
people, that patience is wearing thin. I hope that the message our gov-
ernment is sending-and I believe that the international community is
sending-will offer some shock of recognition and reality for them.29

But whereas Africa as a whole is confronted with the enormous and

urgent task of preventing, managing, and resolving security crises on the
continent, the individual African states are struggling with the thorny
issues of national sovereignty and colonial boundaries. Tenacious though
they have proved to be, the states are likely to lose the battle but, ironi-
cally, to emerge victorious, because the surrender of sovereignty by weak
states to create strong states and "zones of peace and prosperity" can
hardly constitute defeat.
Security integration, even more than economic integration, will lead
to the weakening or elimination of at least some of the colonial bound-
aries. With the current and recent political crises on the African conti-
nent, it appears no other direction should be taken.

Political Crisis and Statehood

Some of the pressure for political change in Africa lies in the area of
democracy, which many observers view as a prerequisite for economic

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14 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

development. In 1992, great jubilation greeted the news that Zambia's

Frederick Chiluba and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy
(MMD) had defeated incumbent President Kenneth Kaunda and his
United National Independence Party (UNIP) in a landslide electoral vic-
tory and that President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and his Kenya African
National Union (KANU) had accepted a multiparty political system for
that country. Several other African countries have been under pressure
from both within and abroad to follow suit.
Democracy has also been viewed as necessary because fundamental
changes in the political, economic, and social aspects of life are rarely
achieved by societies that have narrow bases for decisionmaking or in
which the formulation and implementation of public policies cannot be
discussed openly by all citizens. To prepare itself for the twenty-first cen-
tury, therefore, according to Adebayo Adedeji, head of the UN Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa (ECA), the continent "must undergo a
second liberation which will result in the birth of a continent where
democracy, political and economic empowerment, accountability, and
economic justice prevail.30 One of the conditions Adedeji suggests for
the sustainability of democracy on the continent is that

the democratic process must go beyond national borders in Africa and

be developed into a pan-African movement. Given the very artificial
nature of these borders and the imperative necessity of forming larger
polities in future years and of fostering regional and sub-regional co-
operation at the present time, the democratic culture must be sus-
tained not only within national borders but also across and beyond
such borders.31

In fact, Adedeji and his colleagues have stated that

the political Balkanization of Africa into arbitrary nation-states should

elicit from the continent and its people the impulse to restructure the
fragmented region into a more coherent and stronger economic and
political entity. The African sense of oneness and solidarity should be
the motor, and democracy and development should be the accelerator
to achieve this objective, thus enabling Africa to finally break the
umbilical cord from its unenviable colonial and precolonial past.32

Pressure for democracy has been given impetus by occurrences of

genocide (e.g., in Rwanda), civil wars (e.g., in Liberia), serious refugee
situations (e.g., in southern Sudan), starvation (e.g., in Ethiopia), lack of
a recognized government (e.g., in Somalia), and several other political
ills. All of these problems are raising doubts as to whether some African
countries have the capability for statehood.
The idea that the formation of larger polities in Africa is imperative
is not new; in fact, it dominated the thinking of the African leadership

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 Richard S. Mukisa 15

during the late 1950s and early 1960s. To put this point into historical
context, in the next section I review the emergence of Africa's colonial
boundaries and Africa's attitude toward those boundaries. I will also
argue that a disorganized approach to economic, security, and political
integration can do the African continent more harm than good.

Historical Context of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

The Haphazard Emergence of Africa's Boundaries

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Britain, France, and
Portugal were the only European countries that were firmly entrenched
in the African continent, and they occupied only a few parts of it. By
1885, however, these countries and other European powers had claimed
possession of the entire continent. How did this happen?
After meeting in Berlin in 1884, the European powers issued the
Berlin Act in 1885, which contained the guidelines for the partition of
Africa. That act, according to Semakula Kiwanuka, "emphasized the doc-
trine of effective occupation of claimed territories."33 Historians have
recorded the partition as a haphazard event, a "scramble."34 At one
point, in fact, the Germans resorted to a proposal that stated that
whichever power occupied a coastal area was entitled to claim exclusive
rights to exercise political influence "for an indefinite" distance inland.
Thus was born the "hinterland theory" in response to the Berlin Confer-
ence's failure to instill a sense of order in the partition. Kiwanuka writes,
"In the wake of the rush to apply the hinterland clause and almost in
mad haste, European powers began to declare spheres of influence. It
was in this fashion that the Scramble in Africa began in a rapid and con-
fused manner."35
The hinterland theory was not practiced for long because France
soon made an alternative proposal, arguing that "effective occupation"
alone could confer title to colonial lands. The proposal was accepted in
1887 by all the signatories of the Berlin Act-hence the haphazard
nature of the colonial partition of the continent. The Berlin Conference,
Kiwanuka writes, "was followed by a period of rapid and confused activ-
ity, a rush forward rather similar to that of gold speculators."36 What, one
may ask, did Africans think of the colonial boundaries?

Africa's Attitude Toward Colonial Boundaries

As colonial territories began to achieve independence during the 1950s,

the leaders of the independent states began to meet and discuss matters
of mutual interest. Thus, a series of All-African People's Conferences fol-

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16 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

lowed. The first of these conferences met in Accra, Ghana, in 1958 and
was attended by Ethiopia (the only African state that had escaped colo-
nialism) and the seven states that had achieved independence thus far-
Egypt (the United Arab Republic), Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco,
Sudan, and Tunisia. According to V. Bakpetu Thompson, they discussed
"common problems, with a view to working out common policies con-
cerning political, economic, cultural and social matters."37
The second Accra conference, held in December 1958, is of greater rel-
evance here. Since the conference was a meeting not of governments but of
nationalist parties and the delegates came from all parts of Africa, free or
not (except from French Africa and northern Nigeria), it is safe to assume
that the conference resolutions were a genuine expression of the common
will of the African people. The conference declared, inter alia, that

1. as an initial step toward the creation of an African Common-

wealth, "the independent States should amalgamate themselves
into groups on the basis of geographical contiguity, economic
inter-dependence, linguistic and cultural affinity";
2. the "amalgamation, federation, or groupings should only take
place between independent States governed by Africans";
3. "each State should decide to which group it wishes to adhere by a
referendum based on universal suffrage";
4. the people of North Africa had taken steps toward the creation of
a North African Federation, and there was a "strong desire" in
West Africa to form a similar grouping; it was "desirable that
other groups should emerge in Africa";
5. "countries which do not appear to fall naturally into any geo-
graphical group should after their attainment of independence
decide by democratic processes whether to adhere to existing
groups or to evolve different groups."38

The conference described the colonial boundaries as "artificial barri-

ers and frontiers" that operated "to the detriment of Africans" because
they "cut across ethnic groups or divide peoples of the same stock"; they
were "unnatural" and "not conducive to peace and stability."39 Conse-
quently, the conference resolved, inter alia, (1) to denounce the bound-
aries; (2) to call upon the African states to resolve the problem perma-
nently, based "upon the true wishes of the people"; (3) to abolish
"passport requirements and other travel restrictions for bona fide African
visitors, tourists, and students"; (4) to reciprocate "rights of citizenship for
Africans from other territories"; (5) to reciprocate the "teaching of the
English and French languages and the history of other African nations in
the Secondary Schools of each territory"; and (6) to organize "inter-terri-
torial enterprises."140

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 Richard S. Mukisa 17

The threefold thrust of the conference should be noted. First,

Africans rejected the colonial boundaries in the strongest terms possi-
ble, believing they were divisive and that Africa would never be able
to develop economically, politically, or socially until the boundaries
had been changed. Second, the boundaries should be changed not by
hiring expert cartographers who would draw new ones consistent with
the geographical, ethnic, and other "natural" features of the continent
but through the amalgamation, federation, or grouping (i.e., integra-
tion) of the already existing states into subregional sovereign entities
(referred to here as "political communities"). Although the confer-
ence had as its ultimate goal the achievement of "a Commonwealth of
Free African States," subregional political integration was viewed as
strongly desirable and was encouraged. Third, decisions on subre-
gional integration were to be made democratically, "based on univer-
sal suffrage."
The All-African People's Conference that was held at Tunis,
Tunisia, in January 1960 recommended that regional organizations
should be set up to study the specific problems facing different parts of
the continent.41 The conference also recommended "strongly" that the
independent states should "facilitate movements of citizens by abolish-
ing visas."42
Another All-African People's Conference, held in Cairo, Egypt, in
March 1961 confirmed the resolutions of the previous conferences and,
having considered that "unity must emanate from the freely expressed
will of African peoples" and "that economic unity is indispensable for
the viability of any political organization," recommended that the gov-
ernments of independent African states should create

a Commission of African Experts to elaborate a common economic

policy in order to promote and consolidate African political unity, pro-
vided that the basis of such an economic community is founded upon
the co-ordination of development plans in each State with a view to
transforming and unifying the present structures.43

From the very beginning, therefore, Africans felt subregional economic

communities could and should be transformed into political communities.
But the time for the transformation and unification of the structures
had not yet arrived. Only two months after the Cairo conference, some
African states met in Monrovia, Liberia, and adopted, inter alia, the fol-
lowing principles:

1. Absolute equality of African and Malagasy States whatever may be

the size of their territories, the density of their populations, or the
value of their possessions

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18 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States

3. Respect for the sovereignty of each State and its inalienable right to
existence and development of its personality
4. Unqualified condemnation of outside subversive action by neigh-
bouring States
5. Promotion of co-operation throughout Africa, based upon toler-
ance, solidarity, and good-neighbour relations, periodic exchange of
views, and non-acceptance of any leadership
6. The unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the
political integration of Sovereign African States, but unity of aspira-
tions and of action considered from the point of view of African
social solidarity and political identity44

The Cold War was already taking its toll on Africa. By 1961, the
newly independent African states were already divided into two antago-
nistic camps, depending on from which side of the iron curtain they
received (or appeared to be receiving) economic or political support.
The Casablanca powers-Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and
the United Arab Republic (Egypt)-were in one camp; the Monrovia
powers-Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Braz-
zaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, Cote
d'Ivoire, Liberia, the Malagasy Republic, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Sene-
gal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanganyika, Togo, and Upper Volta-were in
the other. The Casablanca powers were viewed by Western nations as
leaning toward the Soviet Union, whereas the Monrovia powers-who
argued that Pan-African unity should be understood primarily in terms
of technical and functional cooperation and who favored the mainte-
nance of the status quo with respect to colonial boundaries and contin-
ued economic ties with the West-were supported by the Western
nations. Since the latter group constituted the majority, Article III of the
OAU Charter that was signed in 1963 contained the following (among
other) principles: "the sovereign equality of all African and Malagasy
States"; "non-interference in the internal affairs of States"; and "respect
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its
inalienable right to independent existence."45
When the first OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and Govern-
ment met in Cairo in 1964, it considered "that the frontier problem con-
stitutes a grave and permanent factor of dissension."46 The unanimity of
the early conferences had been lost. The general attitude had also
changed dramatically; the colonial boundaries were now considered to
constitute "an intangible reality." The assembly "solemnly" reaffirmed
"the strict respect of the principles laid down in Article III paragraph 3
of the Charter" and "solemnly" declared "that all Member States pledge
themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of
national independence."47 Since then, the OAU has consistently reaf-
firmed the principles of the sovereign equality of all independent

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 Richard S. Mukisa 19

African states, noninterference in the internal affairs of states, and re-

spect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state.
But the issue of colonial boundaries continues to haunt the orga-
nization and the peoples it represents, and at times voices call for a
reexamination of the matter. In 1965, for instance, Julius K. Nyerere,
then president of Tanzania, which was one of the Monrovia powers,
stated that there was "no reason why the present nation-states should
be regarded as the necessary units of unity" and called for "the merger
or federation of any two or more of them into one new sovereign
entity."48 This was not mere rhetoric; on 26 April 1964 the Republic of
Tanganyika had united with the Republic of Zanzibar to create the
United Republic of Tanzania, and on 6 June 1967 Tanzania signed the
Treaty for East African Cooperation (with Kenya and Uganda) that
created the East African Community (EAC)-an economic and tech-
nical arrangement that had political integration as its long-range
objective.
In 1973, Kodwo E. Ankrah, then secretary of the Eastern Africa
Refugees office of the World Council of Churches, accused African
governments of turning Africans into aliens in their own continent and
of causing many hardships and much human misery through the strict
enforcement of immigration rules and expulsion of the "alien
Africans" under the pretext that the governments were "taking
charge" of their economies while jealously guarding the colonial fron-
tiers-which, in fact, constituted an obstacle to economic development.
Ankrah wrote:

Europe, which introduced into Africa the strict observation of bound-

aries, is herself having serious [i.e., second] thoughts about it. Free
movement of labour forms a major aspect of current discussions in the
European Economic Community talks. Indeed, Europe and the West-
ern world have the most liberalized rules of movement of their people,
while Africa still clings to conservative regulations outlined in a bygone
era. Even more astounding is the fact that non-Africans find it easier to
travel on the African continent now than the indigenous Africans. They
are made more "aliens" than non-Africans by some of the immigration
rules on the continent.49

Not just writers are fighting the colonial boundaries; mass popula-
tions are doing so as well. Somali irredentism, for instance, is based on
the rejection of the colonial boundaries that artificially divide the Somali
people into three camps-one in Somalia itself, one in Kenya, and one in
Ethiopia. Over the years, millions of dollars have been diverted away
from development efforts and spent instead on the suppression of such
boundary-related struggles; in the process, millions of people (human
resources) have either lost their lives or been converted into unproduc-

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20 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

tive refugees (economic liabilities). But the borders continue to be

guarded jealously by all states concerned, and the OAU continues to
uphold Article III of its charter.
Why were the colonial boundaries retained after independence? Ian
Brownlie explains that the boundaries, which intersected ethnic territo-
ries "based on historical accident and the bargains of external inter-
ests,"50 were retained after independence to avoid "disputes and threats
to the peace in Africa."'51 Today, however, it is in the interest of peace and
security on the continent that discussion on those same boundaries has
been revived. The OAU has recognized that peace and security are pre-
requisites to economic development,52 a view that is supported by the
international community.53
Furthermore, African and foreign powers alike now recognize that
their overall interests cannot be served satisfactorily by economic catas-
trophes. Today, in fact, what was preached by African nationalists well
over three decades ago-that true economic, political, and social devel-
opment could not take place in Africa until changes in the colonial
boundaries had been made-is reemerging as new insight in the work of
development experts. If a necromancer were to call up Nkrumah and
some of his associates, the dead might ask the living, "We proclaimed the
truth. Why did you not listen?" The living might blame the Cold War and
anti-imperialism rhetoric. Since the Cold War is over and there is a fear
that the "Oumarou catastrophe"54 is eminent, the conversation could
end with a promise to act on the truth and the prospect for the dead to
rest-at long last-in eternal peace. Thus, the discussion would shift from
the need to achieve integration (which, in effect, would mean weakening
or eliminating at least some of the colonial boundaries) to the means by
which such integration might be achieved.
At the most general level, the problem of colonial boundaries can be
approached in two ways. One possible approach is to leave everything to
evolution-that is, to submit the continent's destiny to undirected devel-
opments, to chance. Historically, this approach has been the norm. Events
such as the coming of colonialism and the demarcation of national bound-
aries have overtaken the continent-usually by surprise-and Africans
have spent lifetimes trying to find appropriate ways of coping with the
effects of those events, often in an ad hoc fashion and at great cost, as
Somali irredentism, the Biafran war, and Rwandese genocide amply illus-
trate. The danger in this approach is its total absence of predictability; the
future brings whatever it desires, and ongoing processes remain suscepti-
ble to the vagaries of further future chance occurrences. Evolution has
already brought the Berlin Conference, colonialism, irredentism, border
conflicts, and other such ills; who knows what else it may bring-perhaps
another "rush forward rather similar to that of gold speculators"? If a sec-
ond scramble is to be avoided, an alternative approach must be pursued.

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 Richard S. Mukisa 21

The alternative approach is to attempt to direct the developmental

process with an overall goal in mind. This proactive approach is rational
in the sense that goals and objectives can be set, clearly defined, and then
vigorously pursued. The approach involves a degree of empowerment-
the notion that Africans are not doomed to some predestined fate but
can, if they wish, control their destiny. With regard to colonial bound-
aries, one must avoid the temptation to view the present patchwork of
countries on the map of Africa as unchangeable and indispensable.
Instead, the focus should be on how to peacefully reorganize the patch-
work to maximize the prospects for Africa to become "a zone of peace
and prosperity."

How to Reorganize the Patchwork

First, Africans must moderate their idealism with a sense of realism.

Today, for instance, only divine intervention could cause the fifty-four
states of Africa to agree to relinquish simultaneously their separate sov-
ereignties and unite into a United States of Africa. Further, one cannot
instruct states A, B, and C to unite in a subregional state. But African
states have already demonstrated their enthusiasm toward economic
integration, notably through the establishment in 1991 of the African
Economic Community and the existence of several subregional eco-
nomic communities (ECOWAS, SADC, and so on). African states have
also demonstrated the desire and willingness to cooperate in matters
relating to peace and security-notably through the establishment in
1992, within the OAU framework, of the African Mechanism Apparatus
for Preventing, Managing and Resolving African Crises and through var-
ious peace efforts undertaken by subregional organizations.
Furthermore, the creation of Tanzania out of Tanganyika and Zan-
zibar has demonstrated that regional political integration can be
achieved on the continent and attempts by the EAC states (Kenya, Ta
zania, and Uganda) and by Senegal and The Gambia to achieve similar
unions have demonstrated the continued desirability of subregional po-
litical integration. It is also noteworthy that, as has been mentioned,
some ECOWAS members are beginning to point at political union as an
ultimate goal of their community, and SADC has already approved the
formulation of a sector on political, diplomatic, and international rela-
tions, among other things. These are signs that Africa is ready to move,
albeit cautiously, toward political integration.
A proactive approach to the problem of colonial boundaries, there-
fore, can realistically work from three fronts: (1) economic integration
through the creation and maintenance of economic communities, (2)
security integration through the creation and maintenance of security

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22 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

communities, and (3) political integration through the creation and

maintenance of political communities. This transformation of the African
continent should not be ad hoc or haphazard but systematic, following a
planned course that will guard against the prospect of a second scramble.
A second scramble can take the form of, say, severe competition
among integrating blocks for a still unaffiliated state, a situation that can
erupt or threaten to erupt into armed conflict or even wars against
annexation by overzealous neighboring states. But even if the scramble
does not reach such severity, a chaotic approach to economic, security,
and political integration could lead to undesirable results. Further, the
potential for a conflict of interest on the part of states with multiple
memberships in subregional organizations should not be taken lightly.
For instance, because of the potential for such conflict, SADC has
already expressed the desire to have the Preferential Trade Area (PTA)
of eastern and southern Africa split into two parts-namely, a southern
part consisting of only SADC members and a northern part consisting of
only non-SADC members.55
Whatever approach to integration is taken, however, conflict of
some kind will probably arise between states that desire change and
those that prefer the status quo or between those that prefer one type of
change and those that prefer another. What Africa must do at this point
is to formulate, adopt, and apply specific principles whose total effect will
be to permit the effective prevention, management, or resolution of such
conflicts. Six such principles are proposed here.

1. Overlapping communities: This principle applies to political units

that intend to integrate into one subregional block. The principle states
that the integrating units should plan to constitute an economic commu-
nity, a security community, and ultimately a political community-even if
these communities are to be achieved in succession, one at a time.
2. Commonality of interests: The reasoning behind this principle is
that the potential for conflict will be minimized and the likelihood of
success increased if, as the saying goes, "birds of a feather flock to-
gether." In the context of regional integration, commonality of interests
among states manifests itself through, for instance, common membership
in the existing African subregional organizations.
3. Geographical contiguity and proximity: This principle states that
the integrated blocks should consist of contiguous units in the case of
mainland territories or of territories that are in proximity to one another
in the case of islands. Pakistan (which in 1947 was partitioned from India
and lost its eastern half that then became Bangladesh in 1971), Northern
Ireland, Berlin, and other historical cases have demonstrated sufficiently
that it is difficult to administer distant lands.

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 Richard S. Mukisa 23

4. Nonencirclement: If the objective of integration is to create

strong and lasting states that constitute "zones of peace and prosper-
ity," then an integrated block must be a true sovereign-an indepen-
dent actor on the international scene-with the same rights, duties, and
responsibilities as the other blocks and with the capacity to fulfill all of
its international obligations. The principle of nonencirclement warns
that if a subregional block is fully or partially encircled by a neighbor-
ing block, the encircled state will inevitably experience insecurities that
may lead to paranoia, conflict, or loss of the power to act independent
of the encircling state. Puppet states can also be used by unfriendly
powers to create other insecurities in the region and, therefore, are to
be avoided.
5. Direct access to the sea: The sea (i.e., seas and oceans) is a source
of food, mineral, and other resources; can be used to transport people
and commercial goods; can provide a means for military defense and
social activities such as sports and recreation; and can be useful in
many other ways. The principle of direct access to the sea states that
each integrated block of political units must have direct access to the
sea-in other words, each block must have its own share of the seacoast
and territorial waters and, thus, must have direct access to international
waters.
6. Limited size: This principle assumes that the greater the number of
units integrating into a single subregional block, the greater the potential
for conflict among the integrating units, the harder it will be to balance
conflicting interests and reach corporate decisions, and the harder it will
be to administer the integrated block. No magical number or size (in
geographical area) can be prescribed; nevertheless, the integrating
blocks-if their ultimate goal is political integration-should avoid the
temptation to be too expansive, at least in the initial stages of the
process. Once the blocks have been fully established, they can integrate
further into larger political communities. That, indeed, was one of the
visions of the African political leadership during the 1960s.

Conclusion

The five regions proposed by the Abuja Treaty56 seem to be too big to
form a realistic basis for subregional political integration in Africa. The
eight regions used by the World Today Series57-North Africa, South
Saharan Africa, Eastern Africa, Islands, Southern Africa, Equatorial
West Africa, Central West Africa, and Coastal West Africa-would be of
little more help. The principle of limited size argues against having both

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24 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

too few and too many political communities on the continent. A balance
between those two extremes is desirable.
What I have stated so far is that it is desirable for a group of African
states to band together into an economic community that will also be a
security community and, eventually, a political community with sovereign
rights. The goal of that process is to create subregional states (see Figure 1).
Six principles that should guide the integration efforts were suggested in
the previous section. What remains is to propose a means by which it can be
determined that state A should be encouraged to join one integration block
and not another. That issue has been tackled through examination of the
states' membership in Africa's existing subregional organizations.
Today, Africa has at least seventeen subregional organizations that
can have a significant impact on future integration efforts. These organi-
zations are listed in Table 1. Now, suppose the first principle (overlapping
communities) has been accepted. The next task is to examine member-
ships in subregional organizations to identify states that tend to flock
together to form new subregional communities. Burundi, Rwanda, and
Zaire, for instance, not only share a common colonial history and are
part of Francophone Africa but also belong to the same subregional
organizations-namely, the Economic Community of Central African
States (CEEAC), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Coun-
tries (CEPGL), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA)-with Burundi and Rwanda also belonging to the
Kagera Basin Organization (see Table 2). Furthermore, the three states

Figure 1 Subregional State as the Long-Range Goal

Economic Integration SecurityIntegration l----litcalIntegration

Economic Security Political

Community Community Community

SUBREGIONAL STATE
Member of the Organization of
African Communities (OAC)

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 Richard S. Mukisa 25

Table 1 Africa's Subregional Organizations

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)
Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA)
Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC)
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL)
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Franc Zone (Franc Z)
Gambia River Development Organization (OMVG)
Indian Ocean Commission (IOC)
Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)
Kagera Basin Organization (Kagera)
Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)
Mano River Union (Mano RU)
Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS)
Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS)
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
West African Economic Community (CEAO)

Source: Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 41 (1995),Annual Reference Supplement,

pp. R37-R38.
Note: Some of the acronyms used in Tables 1 and 2 (e.g., Franc Z and Mano RU) are used
for reasons of page space limitations and are not standard acronyms for the organizations
listed.

would form a block that satisfies all six principles stated earlier. They
could, therefore, integrate into an Equatorial Central African Commu-
nity. In the same way, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland-all of which
belong to COMESA and SADC (see Table 2)-could integrate into a
South African Community. (Today, Lesotho is fully encircled, and Swazi-
land is largely encircled, by their powerful neighbor, South Africa.)
Another example of the application of the principles stated earlier
involves Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and
Uganda-all of which are members of COMESA and IGADD but one
of which is also a member of the Kagera Basin Organization (see Table
2). The principle of limited size suggests that this block of countries
should be split into separate parts. Since Sudan is almost as big as the six
other countries put together, it can be selected to fall into its own block.
The remaining six states can then integrate into a New East African
Community (NEAC). (The word New helps to account for the absence
of Tanzania from the block and also differentiates the block from the
defunct East African Community.) There are other reasons for taking
Sudan out of the NEAC block. Recently, for instance, Sudan was accused

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26 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

Table 2 Membership in Africa's Subregional Organizations

Country COMESA CEMAC UEMOA CEEAC CEPGL ECOWAS Franc Z

Algeria
Angola /
Benin / /
Botswana
Burkina Faso / /
Burundi / $ /
Cameroon / / /
Cape Verde /
Central African
Republic / / /
Chad / /
Comoros Islands /
Congo / /
Cote d'Ivoire /
Djibouti /
Egypt
Equatorial
Guinea / / /
Eritrea /
Ethiopia /
Gabon / /
The Gambia /
Ghana /
Guinea /
Guinea-Bissau /
Kenya /
Lesotho /
Liberia /
Libya
Madagascar /
Malawi ,
Mali / / /
Mauritania $
Mauritius /
Morocco
Mozambique /
Namibia /
Niger / / /
Nigeria /
Rwanda / / /

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 Richard S. Mukisa 27

OMVG JOC IGADD Kagera LCBC Mano RU CILSS OMVS SADC CEAO

/
/
/ /
/
/
/

,1

,,1 /

/
,1

/ /

/ / /
/ /
/
/
/

/
1
/ / /
/ / /
/ /

/
/
/ / /
/ /
/

(continues)

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28 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

Table 2 (continued)

Country COMESA CEMAC UEMOA CEEAC CEPGL ECOWAS Franc Z

Sao Tome and

Principe /
Senegal / / ,
Seychelles /
Sierra Leone /
Somalia $
South Africa /
Sudan /
Swaziland /
Tanzania /
Togo / / /
Tunisia
Uganda /
Western Sahara
Zaire / / $
Zambia /
Zimbabwe V/

Source: Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 41 (1995),Annual Reference Supplement,

pp. R37-R38.

by Uganda of causing political and security instability in northern

Uganda, and Uganda broke diplomatic relations with Sudan. Eritrea has
had similarly strained relations with Sudan.
The point here is not to side with or against Sudan but to suggest
that the grouping of states into integrated blocks must take into
account a multiplicity of factors; the six principles stated earlier
together constitute only a starting point, albeit a good one. Further-
more, these principles are reflected in the resolutions of the second All-
African People's Conference (held in December 1958).58 Additional
principles-say, linguistic and cultural affinity-can also be extracted
from the resolutions of the All-African People's Conferences held dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s.
Using those principles, the African patchwork can be transformed as
depicted in Figure 2. As Figure 2 illustrates, the number of colonial
boundaries can be reduced considerably and peacefully through the
process of subregional integration, a process that will benefit not only
the integrating units but also the African continent as a whole.
It is interesting that there are no real losers in the integration process.
The existing subregional organizations, for instance, will gain through the

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 Richard S. Mukisa 29

OMVG IOC IGADD Kagera LCBC Mano RU CILSS OMVS SADC CEAO

/~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I

/~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

membership of strengthened states. In the case of

Community, for instance, Lesotho, South Africa,
become one member of the SADC, which does not hurt the organization
but instead strengthens it. The regional (continental) organizations will
also benefit from having members that can-finally-afford to pay their
dues in a timely fashion. The strength of a body depends upon the
strength of its individual member parts. Weak states create weak interna-
tional organizations.
The OAU will not escape the impact of this kind of transformation.
First, it will become an Organization of African Communities, with a new
image and new objectives, and will perform functions that are consistent
with the needs of all Africans for the remainder of the 1990s and beyond.
How can such a situation constitute loss? Second) as Patrick Smith of
Africa Confidential is reported to have stated recently, it is "4clear that the
territorial division of Africa into nation-states based on colonial parti-
tion, with boundaries sanctified by the OAU as inviolable, is under the
greatest pressure since independence."591If the OAU is to lead the trans-
formation of the African continent, it must itself be willing to undergo
transformation.

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30

Figure 2 What a New Map of Africa Could Look Like

MediterraneanSea

~~ J P ~~~~Algeria

Western a lta

g 1 Mali mNiger J 9 J 1Niger

G iat Chd i Sudan -

Sierra one t r O ethiopia

Atlantic Ocean (ANGOLA) \} \-S-| l8keTNangr'anta A Indian Ocean

Equatorial G~~ine LZimabw My aasa

\ SouthAflica / ~ ~ ~ Smal

different map. Also, Cabinda (Angola) violates Principles 3 (geographical contiguity and
proximity) and 4 (nonencirclement), and would, therefore, call for a negotiated solution-
say, exchange of land (of equivalent value) between Subregional State 13 and Subregional
State 15.

Notes

Richard S. Mukisa taught political science at Kent State University, Kent, Ohio,
before joining Ohio's Office of Criminal Justice Services, where he is director of
the state's law enforcement task analysis research project.
1. John Marcum, "How Wide Is the Gap Between Casablanca and Mon-
rovia?" Africa Report, vol. 7 (January 1962), p. 3.
2. Peter Enahoro, "The Problem of Unity," Africa, no. 11 (July 1972), p. 13.

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 Richard S. Mukisa 31

3. Margaret A. Novicki, "Ide Oumarou, Secretary-General of the Organiza-

tion of African Unity," an interview, Africa Report, vol. 31 (July-August 1986), p. 10.
4. World Bank, "An Interview with Edward V. K. Jaycox," Africa Update
(1988-1989), p. 1.
5. Margaret A. Novicki, "A New Scenario for Africa," an interview with
Edward V. K. Jaycox, Africa Report, vol. 34 (November-December 1989), p. 18.
6. World Bank, "An Interview with Edward V. K. Jaycox," p. 1.
7. Mark Huband, "The Revolving Door," Africa Report, vol. 37 (Janu-
ary-February 1992), p. 26.
8. Trevor W. Parfitt and Stephen P. Riley, The African Debt Crisis (London:
Routledge, 1989), p. 159.
9. See note 3.
10. Novicki, "A New Scenario for Africa," p. 19.
11. Organization of African Unity, "Treaty Establishing the African Eco-
nomic Community" (hereafter referred to as the "Abuja Treaty"), in Interna-
tional Legal Materials, vol. 30 (September 1991), pp. 1241-1282. See also African
Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 3 (December 1991), pp.
792-839.
12. Abuja Treaty, Article 1, item (d).
13. Ibid., Article 4, paragraph 1(d).
14. Ibid., paragraph 2(a).
15. Anthony Lake, "U.S. and 'Afro-Realism,"' Africa Report, vol. 40, no. 2
(March-April 1995), p. 22.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. "OAU: Dakar Summit Meeting," Keesing's Record of World Events, vol.
38, nos. 7-8 (1992), p. 38992.
19. Refer also to Organization of African Unity (OAU), Resolving Conflicts
in Africa: Proposals for Action, OAU Press and Information Series (1), Addis
Ababa, 1992.
20. Quoted in Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 39, no. 11 (1993), p.
39725.
21. Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 41, no. 6 (1995), p. 40588.
22. Peter da Costa, "Keeping the Peace," Africa Report, vol. 40, no. 3
(May-June 1995), p. 28.
23. Ibid.
24. Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 39, no. 7-8 (1993), p. 39548.
25. Ibid.
26. da Costa, "Keeping the Peace," p. 28.
27. Ibid.
28. Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 39, no. 9 (1993), p. 39628.
29. Lake, "U.S. and 'Afro-Realism,"' p. 23.
30. Adebayo Adedeji, "Sustaining Democracy," Africa Report, vol. 37 (Janu-
ary-February 1992), p. 29.
31. Ibid., p. 32.
32. Ibid.
33. Semakula Kiwanuka, From Colonialism to Independence:A Reappraisal
of Colonial Policies and African Reactions, 1870-1960 (Nairobi: East African Lit-
erature Bureau, 1973), p. 15.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 17.
36. Ibid.

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32 Toward a Peaceful Resolution of Africa's Colonial Boundaries

37. V. Bakpetu Thompson, as quoted in Basil Davidson, Modern Africa

(London: Longman, 1983), p. 213.
38. Resolutions of the All-African People's Conference, Accra (5-13
December 1958), resolution on Frontiers, Boundaries, and Federations, part 2.
The resolutions are reproduced in Gideon-Cyrus M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio,
eds., Readings in African Political Thought (London: Heinemann, 1975), pp.
361-368.
39. Ibid., part 2.
40. Ibid., part 3.
41. Resolutions of the All-African People's Conference, Tunis (25-30 Janu-
ary 1960), resolution on African Unity, point 9.
42. Ibid., point 11.
43. Resolutions of the All-African People's Conference, Cairo (23-31
March 1961), resolution on African Unity and Solidarity, point 3. See also par
of the resolution.
44. The Monrovia Conference Communique (8-12 May 1961), paragraph A.
45. Resolutions of the First OAU Assembly (July 1964), resolution on Bor-
der Disputes Among African States.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Julius K. Nyerere, "The Nature and Requirements of African Unity," in
Mutiso and Rohio, Readings in African Political Thought, p. 331.
49. Kodwo E. Ankrah, "Africa's Aliens," Africa, no. 17 (January 1973), p. 61.
50. Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on African Affairs (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971), p. 360.
51. Ibid., p. 60.
52. See, for instance, OAU, Resolving Conflicts in Africa, p. 2.
53. See, for instance, Lake, "U.S. and 'Afro-Realism,"' p. 22.
54. See the section "Economic Crisis and Economic Integration."
55. Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 40, no. 7-8 (1994), p. 40131.
56. See the section "Economic Crisis and Economic Integration," in this
article.
57. See, for example, Pierre Etienne Dostert, Africa 1993, 28th annual edi-
tion, the World Today Series (Washington, D.C.: Stryker-Post Publications, 1993).
58. See note 38.
59. Cited in da Costa, "Keeping the Peace," p. 28.

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