Political Instability in Africa - The Case of Rwanda and Burundi

Political instability in Africa : the case of Rwanda and Burundi / L'INSTABILITE POLITIQUE
EN AFRIQUE : LE CAS DU RWANDA ET DU BURUNDI

Author(s): René Lemarchand
Source: Civilisations, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1966), pp. 307-337
Published by: Institut de Sociologie de l'Université de Bruxelles
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in Africa:
Politicalinstability
the case of Rwanda and Burundi
René Lemarchand (*)
I. Introduction
In a continentwhereethnicviolencehas become endemic,and political
instabilitytheruleratherthantheexception, thecase of Rwandaand Burundi
is not untypical. Since it recoveredits independence, in July,1962, the
Kingdom of Burundi has seen its entrusted
destinies to seven governments,
each claimingan averagelongevityof sevenmonths,and the latestgovern-
mentalcrisishas been compoundedby a protracted constitutionalcrisisthat
on
began July 8 of this year, when the son of the reigning Mwami (king)
accededto the throneunderthe protective wing of a civilian-military junta,
evidentlyagainstthe wishesof his fatherMwami Mwambutsa. Although
Rwandaclaimsa greater measureof stability,withonlythreecabinetreshuffles
sinceindependence, it is well to remember thatthiswas accomplished at the
cost of an extremelyviolent racial heaval, culminatingin 1962 in the
formalabolitionof monarchicinstitutions and the proclamationof the
Republic. The Rwandese experiment, however,consistingin the super-
of
imposition republican institutionson what feudal
is afterall an essentially
society,is not withoutcertainliabilities;in its effortto promoterapid social
changesthe republicanregimehas laid itselfopen to the same bitterattacks
whichbroughtthe downfallof the Rwandesemonarchy, (and which may
yet have a similareffect in Burundi).
Lookedat fromtheoutside,thereis nothingparticularly unusualabout the
rate or formsof instability experiencedby each country: the Zanzibar
Revolutionof January 1964 offersa striking parallelwiththe kindof ethnic
violencethatled to the proclamation of the RwandeseRepublic,and one
(*) The presentarticleis a revisedversionof a paperdeliveredat the 1966 annual

meetingof the SouthernPoliticalScienceAssociation in Gatlinhurg, Tenn. I wish to
takethisopportunity to recordmyindebtedness to the Social ScienceResearchCouncil
fora researchgrantwhichenabledme to conductfieldworkin Rwandaand Burundi
in thesummer and fall of 1964.
Editor'snote : Since this articlewas writtena coup d'Etat has proclaimedthe
of King NtareV and the establishment
destitution of a republican systemin Burundi.
307

RENE LEMARCHAND
onlyneedsto look at theRepublicof theCongo (Kinshasa)to findthe same

bewildering changesof government, eventuating in a seizureof powerby the
army,as in Burundi. But as one moves from the realm of surface
manifestations to thatof etiology,the case of Rwanda and Burundiappears
to be a veryspecialone. While being moresimilarto each otherthanany
two othersocietiesin Africa- at least fromthe standpointof theirethnic
make-upand traditional politicalstructure - theyseem to provideradically
different answersto certainfundamental questionsaboutthe rootsof political
instabilityin Africa,and on possiblewaysof comingto termswithproblems
of politicalchangeand modernization.
While the exampleof Rwandasuggeststhatthereare no otherwaysshort
of a revolutionary upheavalfor modernizing traditional,caste-likesocieties,
Burundipointsto preciselythe opposite;whereasthe formeruses a single
party systemto bring about necessarysocial changes,the latter relies
principallyon the legitimacyof monarchicinstitutions; one is heavilyim-
pregnatedwith republicanideas and slogansborrowedfromthe arsenalof
theFrenchrevolution, and theotheris clearlyneo-traditionalist in orientation.
More significantly, they are each under the control of a differentethnic
stratum, the Hutu of Rwanda occupyingthe same positionof power and
influencewhichin Burundihas been reservedto the Tutsi minority, albeit
withsome notableexceptions.
This last point gives us a clue to at least one major variablethat has
affectedthe stabilityof theirpoliticalsystems.Althoughthe tendencyhas
been to play downthe relevanceof the conceptof class as a tool of analysis
forexplainingprocessesof social changein Africa,the case of Rwanda and
Burundishouldprovidea usefulcorrectiveto this approach(1). For the
Rwandeserevolutionwas not merelyan ethnicphenomenon,involvinga
head-oncollisionbetweenHutu and Tutsi,but a class struggleas well, in
which a traditionally subjugatedpeasantryrevoltedagainst the exactions
and privilegesof a rulingaristocracy (2). Conversely, the absenceof such
violentupheavalsin Burundi(at least for the time being) is attribuable to
thefargreaterfluidity and diversity of its traditionalsystemof stratification;
becauseof the greateropportunities for social and politicalmobilitywhich
this implied,in Burundithe task of initialpoliticalmodernization was a
comparatively easy one. This is not to say that Burundi has always been
immuneto social conflict,or thata Rwanda-type of situationis not likely
to developat some futuredate,but merelythatsuchconflictsas have arisen
beforeindependencedid not pose the same threatto the stabilityof its
traditionalinstitutions.
Beforegoing any further, however,severalimportant caveatsoughtto be
entered,the firstone pertainingto the use of the word "class". Because
" ' '
(1) See K. Gundy, The Class Strugglein Africa: An Examination of Conflicting
Theories", Journalof ModernAfricanStudies,II (October1964), pp. 379-394.
(2) For a further on thistheme,see JacquesMaquet," La participation
elaboration
de la classe paysanneau mouvement d'indépendanceau Rwanda", Cahiersd'Etudes
IV (1963-64),pp. 552-568.
Africaines,
308

POLITICAL IN AFRICA: THE CASEOF RWANDAAND BURUNDI
INSTABILITY
of theproteanqualitiesof thisterm,used alternatively to referto differences

of income,ethniccleavages,occupationalvariations, power cliques,etc.,an
attemptat a morerigorousdefinitionis in order. On the otherhand,by
givingtoo precisea definition of the class systemof one countryone runs
the risk of excludingits applicability to the other. For our purposeit is
sufficient to understand class as referring to a typeof stratificationin which
individualsand groupsare rankedhierarchiacally on the basis of certain
criteria.As theseare notuniversally sharedby all societiesour firsttaskwill
be to tryto identify themby reference to such othervariablesas the norms
sanctioned by the politicalculture,and the role structure whichtheysustain.
Only then can one begin to understand not only the politicalimplications of
different kindsof class systems, but the changeswhichmay affectthe class
structure fromtimeto time.
This bringsus to our next point, namelythat a class structure never
remainscompletelystatic. A given class systemcan be modifiedin one
of two ways: (1) throughthe actualoperationof objectiveeconomicforces,
as happenswhenthe introduction of new techniquesand modesof economic
productiongives rise to new referencegroups,and (2) when individuals
subjectively redefinetheirpositionin relationto othergroupsor individuals
in sucha way thattheyeventually feel the urge to bringtheiractualstatus
positionin line withtheiraspirations.To put it somewhatdifferently, social
changetendsto be a function of a perceiveddiscrepancy betweenobjectiveand
subjectivestatuses(3). One could carrythe argumenta step furtherand
hypothesize thatthe widerthe gap betweenobjectiveand subjectivestatus,
and the greaterthe obstaclesin the way of a peacefuladjustment of status,
the greaterthe chancesof a violentsocial upheaval (4). This, indeed,is
preciselywhat has happenedin Rwanda. What needs to be stressedhere,
however,is thata person'sawarenessof a gap betweenhis objectiveand
subjectivestatusesdependsnotonlyon factorsinherent in one's psychological
make-upand social environment but on externalfactorsas well. As we
shall see, whateverelementsin the sociopoliticalstructure of Burundidid
promote social integrationhave been more than offsetin recent timesby the
counterpull of divisiveforcesoperativein Rwanda,a factwhichis not too
surprisingif one considersthe ethnicand culturalaffinitieswhich exist
betweenthepopulations of Rwandaand Burundi. But if thepresenttrendin
Burundibearsa striking resemblance withwhatcouldbe observedin Rwanda
somesix or sevenyearsago, thereis no certainly thatthe race issue will be
resolvedalongthe samelines: althoughthe rootsof instability are the same
as in prerevolutionary Rwanda,the antidotesavailableare farmoreeffective.
"
(3) See HerbertH. Hyman, The Psychology of Status", Archivesof Psychology,
No. 269 (June,1942), pp. 5-91.
(4) This does not necessarily contradict
Hyman'scontention that " wherethereis
rigidformal status
there would probably be a small discrepancybetweenobjectiveand
"
subjectivestatus (Ibid., p. 81), but merelyassumesthat new values have already
begunto undermine the traditional systemof stratification.
For a further discussion
and valuessee, David Apter,The Politics
betweensocial stratificaion
of relationships
ofModernization (Chicagoand London: The University of ChicagoPress),p. 123 ff.
309

RENE LEMARCHAND
A finalwordor cautionabout the meaningof the terms" stability " and

" ". When can it be said thata politicalsystemis stable? How
instability
muchstresscan a systemendurebeforeit reachesthe point of instability ?
Many conceptualdifficulties standin the way of an adequatedefinitionof
politicalstability.Stability, like otherformsof politicalequilibrium, can be
or or
partial general;perfect imperfect; or
spontaneous enforced; realizable
on a short-term basis but highlyproblematic when viewed in a long range
perspective.As oftenhappenswhen a word is transferred fromeveryday
languageinto the vocabularyof social science,its meaningmay becomeso
ambiguousas to set seriouslimitations as a tool of analysis.
on its usefulness
For the purpose of this discussion,however,the followingpreliminary
observations will suffice. One is thatthereare severalways of lookingat
theproblemof politicalstability, dependingon the level of analysisthatone
wishesto adopt. Withdrawalof supportfroman incumbent elitegroupmay
lead to a changeof government but not necessarilyto a changeof regime;
the reverse,on the otherhand,is less likelyto occur since withdrawalof
supportfromregimevaluesordinarily entailsa changeof politicalpersonnel
as well. Likewise,whethera regimecan successfully cope withthe demands
thatare madeupon it dependsbothon thenatureand volumeof thedemands,
and on thecharacter of thepoliticalsystem.Stabilitymayhingeon a broad
consensusof opinionamongdifferent ethnicgroupsas to the legitimacy of
the constitutional order,and ways of influencing the formulation of public
policy;or it may referto the abilityof a politicalsystemto meet popular
demandsforeconomicdistribution; or to the degreeof compatibilitybetween
a givensetof politicalinstitutions and theculturalnormsand pre-dispositions
of the societyto whichtheyapply. And it maymean each and all of these
things,and in additionthesheercapacityof a regimeto ensureitsown survival
regardless of themeansemployedto achievethisgoal. In orderto determine
whichof thesedefinitions is best suitedto the politicalcontextsof Rwanda
and Burundiit maybe usefulto look at the problemof politicalstabilityin
eachcountry in a broadhistorical perspective,and to examinetherelationship
betweenthe methodsused in the past to ensurestabilityand thosecurrently
employedby the governingelites.
II. The TraditionalRoots of Stability

Unlike mostotherindependent AfricanstatesRwanda and Burundiboth
had a more or less continuousexistenceas discretepolitical entitieslong
beforetheinceptionof colonialrule. While theybothcameto be administered
unit afterWorld War I, firstas a mandatedterritoriy
as a singleterritorial
and thenas a trusteeship,at no timeduringthis perioddid theylose their
sense of nationalidentity.HistoricallyRwanda and Burundiwere archaic
kingdomsin whichauthority flowedhierarchicallyfromthe Mwami to the
chiefsand fromthechiefsto thesubchiefs.As happenedamongotherAfrican
societiestheydevelopedtheirpresentterritorialbase partlythroughconquest
and partlythroughpeacefulassimilation.The patternof expansionappears
to have been the same in each case : underthe leadershipof a royalclan
310

INSTABILITY
successivewaves of Hamide pastoralistsspead their dominationover the

indigenoustribes,whosecustomsand traditions theyproceededto assimilate
intotheirown.
Out of this amalgamation of differentpeoples and tribeshave emerged
two surprisingly well integrated societies,each comprisingthreedistinctive
racialgroupings : Tutsi,Hutu and Twa. The Tutsi pastoralists stoodat the
apex of the social pyramid and constitutedthe reservoir from which members
of the rulingoligarchywere drawn. Accordingto an all too prevalent
stereotype theirtall stature,light skin pigmentation and Ethiopidfeatures
offera sharpcontrastwiththe physicalappearanceof the indigenousHutu
tribes,describedby the Duke of Mecklemburg as a "medium-sizedtypeof
people, whose ungainly figures betoken hard toil and who patientlybow
"
themselves in abjectbondageto thelaterarrivedbutrulingrace,theTutsi (5).
Althoughthe densityof the Hutu populationvarieda greatdeal fromone
regionto the next,and, to a lesserextent,fromone kingdomto the other,
theyare believedto representbetween80 and 85 per cent of the total
populationof each country.A thirdgroup is represented by the Pygmoid
Twa, who account for only one percentof the total populationand stand
at theverybottomof thesocialhierarchy.While each of thesegroupscould
be conceivedof as a separatecaste,inasmuchas theycan be identified with
separateracial,culturaland occupationalmembershipgroups,it must be
notedat theoutsetthatin Rwandaas in Burundithe social systemdid make
allowancefora certaindegreeof mobilityacrosscastelines,thoughon this
point,as we shallsee,Burundisocietydiffered markedly fromthatof Rwanda.
In bothcountries kingshipwas clearlythe centralelementin the political
structure.By traditionthe bami were divine kings,in the Frazeriansense,
and theirsacrednesswas made manifestby the symbolsand ceremonies
associatedwiththeirrank: by theroyaldrums(knownas Karingain Rwanda
and Karyendain Burundi),the supremeinsigniaof kingship, by the fertility
ritesperformed each yearbeforethe plantingof sorghum, by the practiceof
royalself-destruction at the approachof death,etc. The bami assumedthe
dynastic names prescribed by traditionand chosetheirsuccessors fromamong
theirsons,and theyalone had the authority (thoughnot alwaysthe power)
to appointtheirownpeopleto ruleas theirdeputiesin thedifferent provinces
and chiefdoms.
What gave cohesionand meaningto theirpoliticalsystems, however,was
not onlythe unifying symbolof the Crown,or the ritualin whichit was
embedded, but the factthatmonarchic rule operatedwithina certainframe-
workof expectations, or role relationships.These are perhapsbest defined
by reference to the clientagesystem,an institution throughwhich a client
askedtheprotection of a morewealthypatronin exchangeforwhatever goods
and serviceshad beenagreeduponbeforehand. Clientship, however,involved
more than a mere economictransaction; it also involveda close personal
(5) FrederickDuke of Mecklemburg,In the Heart of Africa (London : Cassei and

Co., Ltd., 1910), p. 47.
311

RENE LEMARCHAND
relationship betweenclientand patron,in some waysreminiscent of the ties

of loyaltywhichlinkedthe medievallord to his vassaland vice versa. The
same bondsof reciprocalloyaltyexistedbetweenthe Mwami and the chiefs,
chiefsand sub-chiefs, patronsand clients,and thusthe chainof vassalageran
through structure
theentiresocio-political likea seamlessweb,blurring beyond
all recognitionthe boundariesbetween the social and political systems.
Sincebirthwas equatedwithwealth,and wealthwithpower,membership in
a particularcasteor clan becamethe sole criteriaforholdingpoliticaloffice.
Several importantqualificationsmust be introducedat this point : to
begin with,the social structure of Rwanda differedfromthat of Burundi
in thattheformer camemuchcloserto the ideal definition of a class culture,
i.e. one in whichdifferent social or ethnicgroupingscan be identified with
distinctivewaysof lifeand modesof behavior(6). Thus theTutsiof Rwanda
werefarmoreconsciousof theirpatricianoriginsand privileges, and insistent
upon maintaining a propersocialdistancebetweenthemselves and the Hutu,
thantheirBurundicounterparts.This does not mean thatin Burundisocial
relationswereentirely freeof theobeisances,taboosand condescensions which
characterizea highlystratifiedsociety,but ratherthat such distinctions
tendedto operateat a different level. In Burundithe main line of cleavage
was betweenthe princesof the blood, or ganwa,and the commoners, the
lattercomprising bothHutu and Tutsi. That theganwaand theirdescendents
came to be regardedas a distinctive ethnicgroup,along with the factthat
withinthe samecastewerefounddifferent levelsof social ranking,based on
one's membershipin a particularlineage or kinshipgroup,gave Burundi
societya degreeof flexibility unmatched by Rwanda.
Moreover,the politicalstructure of Burundi,with its highlydecentralized
patternof authority and different levelsof segmentation, differed fromthatof
Rwanda to the same extentthat a "pyramidal" authoritysystemdiffers
froma " hierarchical " one
(7). UnlikeRwanda,wherepoliticalcentralization
was carriedto an extreme, Burundilookedlike a clusterof semi-independent
" a kingdomin miniatureand with only
territorialunits, each constituting
conditional allegianceto the largerunitof whichit formeda part" (8). In
practicethismeantthattheMwamiof Burundistoodin relationto theganwa
not unlikea primusinterpares;by contrastthe Mwami of Rwanda enjoyed
almostabsolutepowers. In part becauseof the strength of theirarmies-
for which therewas no equivalentin Burundi- , and partlythrougha
consistentand skillfullapplicationof the principleof divide and rule, the
bamiof Rwandaenjoyeda security of tenureand a plenitudeof powersthat
werewithoutparallelin Burundi. The centralized character of the Rwandese
(6) This is also themajorsourceof socialdifferendoti

betweenRwandaand Buganda;
see Lloyd A. Fallers," Social Class in Modern Buganda", Paper deliveredat a
conference of the East AfricanInstituteof Social Researchat Moshi, Tanganyika,
June,1957.
(7) See David Apter,The Politicsof Modernization, op. cit.,esp. Ch. 2.
(8) LloydFallers,ed. The King's Men (London: OxfordUniversity Press,1964),
p. 64.
312

INSTABILITY
monarchy, and thefactthatit stoodas a symbolof Tutsi supremacy, help to

explainbothits intransigeance in the faceof populardemandsfordemocrat-
ization,and its vulnerabilityto the thrustof new social forces;on the other
hand, the fragilityof the Burundi monarchyhas operatedto enhancethe
position of the ganwa in the politicalsystemand thus to focusconflicton
dynastic ratherthanethnicrivalries.
Thirdly, Burundidiffered fromRwandafromthestandpoint of thevolume
and contentif its traditionalmythology. If thereis anytruthin Malinowski's
argument that" the function of a mythis to strengthen traditionand endow
it with greatervalue and prestige,by tracingit back to a higher,better,
"
moresupernatural realityof initialevents (9) one can easilysee why the
Tutsiof Rwandashouldhave been moreconsciousof theirculturaldistinct-
ivenessthanthoseof Burundi: whetherone looks at the ritualcode of the
monarchy (ubwiru),dynasticpoems (ibisigo),or popularlegends,the innate
superiority of the Tutsi over all othercastes is the centralthemearound
which all traditionsseem to revolve. The absence of such traditionsin
Burundigave the social systemmore opennessand malleability, and made
theTutsiminority less fearfulof the implicationsof majorityrule.
(a) Burundi: Conflictas a source of Stability

One possiblestarting pointfromwhichto examinetheproblemof stability
in precolonialtimesis suggestedby Max Gluckman'sobservationthat "in
certaintypesof societywhensubordinates turnagainsta leadertheymayonly
turnagainsthimpersonally, withoutnecessarilyrevoltingagainsttheauthority
"
of the officehe occupies". " This is rebellion ", Gluckman adds, not
revolution,(for) a revolutionaims to alterthe natureof politicalofficesand
of the socialstructure in whichtheyfunction, and not merelyto changethe
incumbents in persistingoffices" (10). Thus if by stabilityis meant a
normative consensusabout the legitimacy of monarchicinstitutions one can
safelyconclude that both did
regimes enjoy considerable :
stability but if we
take stabilityto referto popular acceptanceof particularofficeholders,
includingthoseholdingthe officeof kingship,thenneitherone can be said
to have knowna greatdeal of stability, thoughin thisrespectRwanda did
experience a fargreaterdegree of thanBurundi. This facthas more
stability
thanjust a historicalsignificance.As we shall see, a traditionof instability
(in the lattersense) mayconditionthe politicalsystemin such a way as to
make it relatively less vulnerableto subsequentthreatsof instabilitydespite
thefactthatthesemaybe quite different fromthoseexperienced
in character
in thepast.
Examplesof rebellionsdirectedagainstparticularoffice-holders abound
in thehistory of bothRwandaand Burundi,and thecase of Rwandaprovides
(9) B. Malinowski,Magic, Scienceand Religion and otheressays (New York:

Doubleday,n.d.), p. 146.
(10) Max Gluckman, Customand Conflict
in Africa(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1963),
p. 28.
313

RENE LEMARCHAND
a dramaticillustration of the difference notedabove betweenrebellionand

revolution.By the same token,however,the exampleof Rwanda seemsto
contradict Gluckman'scentralargumentthat " theserebellions,so far from
destroying the establishedsocial order,workso thattheyeven supportthis
order... For rebellioustendenciesagainstauthorityare restrainedby the
structureof thepoliticalsystemitself. They are controlled by customwhich
gives men allegiancesto variousleaders, so that when they attackone leader,
they do it by supporting another leader of the same kind,in the name of the
idealsof leadership... Over a widerspan of space and timethesedivisions
mayresultin social cohesion" (11).
The crux of the problem,I would suggest,is not whetherin the past
conflictdid or did not occur; conflict,afterall, is inherentin all social
structures regardlessof their internalorganization. It lies ratherin the
answersthathistorymaygive to suchquestionsas : At whatlevel and how
frequently did conflictoccur? What particularindividualsor groups of
individualshappenedto be involvedin theseconflictsituations ? And how
did conflictresolveitself?
Since evaluationsmust necessarilybe made on the basis of unwritten
materials,and at timesin thelightof contradictory evidence,preciseanswers
to these questionsare difficult.Nonethelessenough is known about the
precolonialhistoryof Rwanda and Burundi to support the following
propositions :
1. Becauseof a greateruncertainty regarding therulesof succession, internal
feudsamongtherulingelite,and especially amongthegwana,occuredwith
greaterfrequency in Burundithanin Rwanda.
2. Althoughintra-Tutsirivalrieswere not unknownin Rwanda, thereis
considerable evidenceto suggestthata more typicalconflictsituationis
thatwhichinvolveda straight Hutu-Tutsiconfrontation. One shouldadd,
however,thatthis kind of confrontation was more in the natureof an
externalwar than of an internalconflictand came about largelyas a
resultof theperiodicexpansionof thenuclearkingdombeyondits initial
boundaries. Furthermore, this typeof conflictoccurredboth duringthe
precolonialand colonial periods and at this later stage came to be
associatedwiththe thrustof Tutsi invasionsagainstthehithertoindepen-
dentHutu kingdomof northern Rwanda.
3. Whereasin Burundiprincelyrivalrieseventuatedin a fragmentation of
territorial authorityamongthe ganwa,therebyreducingthe authority of
theCrownto a fewscattered areas,in Rwandaconflictinevitably resolved
itselfto the advantageof the rulingoligarchy.In part thiswas due to
the effectiveness of the Rwandesemilitaryestablishment which incor-
poratedwithinits rankselementsof different ethnicorigins,and operated
as an extremely powerfulinstrument of social cohesion,and in part to
the relativeweaknessof theiradversaries.During the initial stage of
(11) Ibid.
314

POLITICALINSTABILITY IN AFRICA : THE CASE OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI
German colonization,however,most of the northernHutu kingdoms

were broughtinto the fold of the Rwandesemonarchywith the help
of theSchutztruppe, and notwithoutconsiderable bloodshed(12).
Fromtheforegoing observations one can betterunderstandwhyGluckman's
argument does not applywith equal validityto Rwandaand Burundi. The
notion that " (dynastic)struggleskept componentsectionsof the nation
unitedin conflicting allegianceaboutthesacredkingship"has littlerelevance
to a situationinvolvinga conflictof allegianceover different sets of ethnic
as seemsto havehappenedat varioustimesin thehistory
loyalties, of Rwanda;
if conflictservedany integrative it
purpose clearlybelonged to the typeof
integration achievedthroughthe impositionof imperialcontrols- whether
cultural,economicor political- over an alien community.
Quite different was the case of Burundi,if only because of the special
positionoccupiedbyrivalclaimants, and thenatureof theirclaims. As noted
earlier,the chief competitors were the ganwa. Competitionamong them
usually reached its peak at the deathof a king,when the latter'ssons saw
theirprivilegesthreatened by the accessionof a new dynasty. In their
attemptto resistthe encroachments of new aspirantstheyfrequently thrust
chaosand civilwaruponthenation,as happenedaftertheaccessionof Mwezi
Kisabo to the throne(ca. 1852), when the Batarefoundthemselves locked
in a bitterstruggleagainsttheircousinsthe Bezi. The absenceof a strong
centralized militaryapparatusmade it not only possiblebut mandatory for
theincumbent ganwa to recruittheirown personal :
militia butthiscompetitive
gatheringof supportdid not involve a fundamentalconflictover the
legitimacy of office. All it involvedwas a conflictoverthe personnelof the
office.
In Burundithe institutionalization of rebellionoperatedto give the social
systema fargreatermeasureof cohesionat the local and regionallevelsthan
in Rwanda. One is remindedin this connectionof Simmel'sobservation
that" conflict mayalso bringpersonsor groupstogether whichhave otherwise
nothingto do witheach other" (13). For,in effect, ganwa rivalriescaused
the contestants, includingthe bami,to seek the supportof both Hutu and
Tutsi in an effortto counterthe threatsof theiropponents,and this could
hardlyhavehappenedin a situationof unadulterated harmony.Since neither
theMwaminortheganwacouldhope to exercisea monopolyof power,their
securitydependedultimatelyupon their ability to generatesupportfor
themselves frombelow,and forthisreasontheytendedto adopta farmore
conciliating attitudetowardsthe " lowerorders" thanmighthave been the
case otherwise.In Rwanda,on the otherhand,therewas no need forsuch
alliancesbecausethe armywas not onlypowerfulbut entirelyloyal to the
Tutsi cause.
(12) See for exampleWilliam Roger Louis, Ruanda-JJrundí 1884-1919 (Oxford:

ClarendonPress,1963), esp. Ch. XIV.
trans.KurtH. Wollf(Glencoe,HI : The FreePress,1955),
(13) G. Simmel,Conflict,
p. 98. See also Lewis Coser,The Functionsof Social Conflict(Glencoe: The Free
Press,1956).
315

RENE LEMARCHAND
Althoughone mightbe tempedat this point to explain the stabilityof

Rwanda solely in termsof militarycapabilities,repressionof threatsof
werenot theonlysourceof socialcohesion.
repression
(b) Rwanda: The Functionalvs. Power Interpretations

of Stability
In thelightof thecurrentinterpretations offeredby social anthropologists,
one can approachthe problemof stabilityin Rwanda fromat least two
differentangles - from the vantage point of the functionalist school,
exemplified by JacquesJ. Maquet in The Premiseof Inequality,and from
theperspective of what,forwantof a betterterm,can be referred to as the
"power interpretation" of Rwandesesociety.
In the mindsof the functionalists the key to an understanding of past
stabilitylies in the existenceof built-incompensatory mechanismsthrough
whichdifferent typesof rewardsand sanctionscame into play to produce
compliancewith the social system. Throughthe institution of clientage,
for example,the average Hutu peasant could secure the protectionof a
superioras well as some cattle;throughthe unifiedclan structure the army,
and certainreligioussects (like the Ryangombe),the Hutu were given
opportunities to participatein,and identifythemselves with,theTutsiculture;
and the triplehierarchy of politicaloffices,concretizedby the existenceof
cattlechiefs,land chiefs,and armychiefs,introduceda kind of balance of
power situationwhich tendedto mitigatethe more oppressivefeaturesof
Tutsidomination." The politicaland clientagestructure ", concludesMaquet,
" at the same time securedthe economic
exploitationof the Hutu and
protectedthem against an exaggeratedpressurewhich could have had
disastrousconsequencesfor the upper caste" (14).
A rathersharpdisagreement is expressedby ProfessorHelen Codere in
herarticleon " Powerin Rwanda" in whichshe makesa valiantattemptto
demonstrate thatonlythrough theuse of nakedforcecouldtheTutsioligarchy
maintainitselfin power(15). Afterflatlydismissing Maqueťs thesisas "a
Panglossianstateof affairs",she goes on to observe,with the same perem-
toriness,thatin traditional Rwanda " the morepowerfuloppressedthe less
powerful or the powerless,powerwas used to thehiltby thosewho possessed
it and fearand insecurity perpetuatedthe system ". From this standpoint,
traditional Rwandesesocietyappearsto have been in no way different from
Hobbes' stateof nature,with thisqualification, however,thatthe veryscale
and arbitrariness withwhichpowerwas used withinthe Tutsi stratumwas
in itselfa sourceof stability, inasmuchas it acted as a deterrentagainst
"
possibleHutu revolts: The brutaland relentless struggleforpoweramong
(the Tutsi) kept them harshand undistracted in theiruse of power and
thereby maximizedthepowertheyheld as a group". By inference one is led
(14) JacquesMaquet,The Premiseof Inequality(London: OxfordUniversity Press,

1961), p. 155. "
(15) H. Codere, Powerin Ruanda", Anthropologien, IV (1962), pp. 45-87.
316

IN AFRICA: THE CASEOF RWANDAAND BURUNDI
POLITICALINSTABILITY
to assumethatthe Pax Belgica,by virtueof the limitationsit imposedon

theuse of poweramongtheTutsi,deprivedthemat thesametimeof themost
effectiveinstrumentof stabilitytheyhad at theirdisposal.
Neitherone of the foregoing necessarily
interpretations excludesthe other;
as Coderecorrectly points out,her analysisof powerrelationsin traditional
Rwanda is no less " functional " than
Maquet's in its overall implications.
What mustbe stressedhereis thateach theoryfocuseson a different aspect
of the social system.WhereasMaquet tendsto lay major emphasison the
positivefactorswhich encouragedHutu compliancewith Tutsi domination
(rewards),Codere concentrates her analysison those factorswhich tended
to discouragenon-compliance (sanctions). Whetherone set of factorscan be
said to have prevailedover the otherdependson considerations of time and
space. What is certainis thatif the threatof sanctionsprobablyreinforced
the dominantpositionof the Tutsi caste over the Hutu, forcealone could
not have achievedstability.Indeed,historyshows that it was preciselyin
thoseareas wherethe applicationof coercionwas most systematically and
frequently reliedupon that stabilitywas most precarious- that is in the
peripheralareas and in the northin particular.Elsewherestabilitystemmed
primarilyfrompopular acceptanceof what Maquet felicitously calls the
"premise of inequality",which inevitablyimplied popular acceptanceof
the Tutsi as a rulingcaste. Certainly, toleranceof inequalitywas deeply
rootedin the politicalcultureof Rwandesesociety(i.e. in its belief system
and value structure);but it also stemmedfrom the very natureof the
mechanisms whichCodereso categorically
" a networkof rejects,i.e. fromthe existenceof
in whichpowercarriedobligationsand lack of
reciprocities
powerhad its real compensations"(16).
The obvious conclusionto be drawn fromthe precedingdiscussionis
that if Burundiexperienceda higherrate of instability than Rwanda this
mustbe attributed to the absenceof thoseveryelementswhich in Rwanda
made for stability:(1) to the relativeabsenceof a class cultureas well as
of traditionspurporting to show the innatesuperiority of one clan over the
other;(2) to the factthatno singleethnicgroup could claim a legitimate
monopolyof physicalcoercionover the entirenationalterritory; and (3) to
a highermeasureof subsystem autonomy, thisbeingin parta consequenceof
the foregoing.The net resultof this situation,as noted earlier,has been
to promotesocial integration to an extentthat was almostunheardof in
Rwanda. Whereasin Rwandamajorityrule struckat the veryrootsof the
traditionalsystemof stratification and directlythreatened the elitistnature
(16) To the extentthat each of these interpretations emphasizesthe functional

requirementsof the social systemof Rwandatheybothsharethe same weakness: by
focussingattention
exclusively on an alreadyexisting,
ongoingsocialsystemtheyneces-
sarilymakeshortshriftof the historical dimensions.Thus theyleave unansweredthe
questionof the initialmechanisms throughwhichthe systemestablisheditself. An
important corrective
to the functionalist is furnished
interpretation by Jan Vansinain
L'Evolutiondu Royaumedu Rwandades originesà 1900, ARSOM, Tome XXVI, Fase.
2 (Bruxelles:1962).
317

RENE LEMARCHAND
of thepoliticalsystem, in Burundi,wherecleavageswere less consistent,the

forcesof traditionand modernity coalescedin relativeharmony.
The paradox,however,is thattodayeach systemis to someextenttributary
of the past. In each statecleavageswhichat the timeof independence had
not yet been broughtto light,but whichwere inherentin the traditional
social structure,
have becomeincreasingly apparentas a resultof the rapid
extensionof politicalparticipation;and in each statethe methodsadopted
by the incumbent elitesto cope withthesenew demandsare in partrooted
in tradition.
III. Rwanda: The ThermidorianSyndrome

Centralto an understanding of contemporary Rwanda is a phenomenon
whichmightbe describedas the thermidorian syndrome; it involvesa partial
restoration of theveryorderof thingswhichtherevolution at firstproposed
to destroy,or, to quote fromHanna Arendt," a movementof revolving
back to somepre-established pointand,by implication, of swingingback to a
pre-ordained order" (17). Historyshowsthateveryrevolutionary movement
is liable to undergoat leastsome sloughingoffof its originalgoals,and this
processinevitablytendsto lay bare the remnantsof the pre-existing social
order. But in Rwandathisis perhapseven moreconspicuousthanone could
normally expect,in partbecauseof the essentially ethnicnatureof the Hutu
revolution, and in part because of the special circumstances underwhichit
was conducted. Althoughtherecan be littlequestionthat the revolution
received its initial impetus from the egalitarianaspirationsof certain
Westernized Hutu elements, onlythrough the exploitationof ethniccleavages,
thatis throughthe politicization of clientship, could theyhope to rallythe
supportof thepeasantry; but even so, thistaskprovedan extremely arduous
one, and thosewho have had occasionto familiarizethemselveswith the
" " " " knowthatit probablywouldnot have
why and how of therevolution
occurredso early,if at all, if it had not been for the veryactive support
the Hutu leadershipreceivedfromboth the CatholicChurchand the local
administration. Becauseof theseand otherfactors, the ideologicalguidelines
of the revolutionhave had relatively littleeffecton Rwandesesociety,and
thus,the evictionof the Tutsi caste fromits dominantposition,has not
been accompaniedby the fundamental change of social relationsthat one
might have expected. There has been a reversalof role relationships but no
majoralterations of the structuringof roles.
But once thisis said,one also needsto look at the otherside of the coin:
not only has the leaden oppressionof the dominantcaste been abolished
but electoralprocesseshave been introduced at both the local and national
levels, therebyprovidingcertain institutionalsafeguardsagainst further
oppression;attemptsare being made at substituting civil servicenormsof
and
neutrality efficiency forthe ascriptive criteriaassociated with the ancien
(17) H. Arendt,On Revolution(New York: The VikingPress,1963), p. 35.
318

regime;a structure of accountabilityhas been established, in the formof a

NationalAssembly, whichmakesthe government presumably answerableto
groups other than itself;finally,the interests of the populationare being
aggregatedthrougha "mass" type of political party (the Parmehutu),
intendedto serve both as a channel of political recruitment and as a
connectinglink betweenthe massesand the elite. Though none of these
institutional
arrangements is solidlyanchoredin the traditionalnormsof
Rwandesesociety,theynonetheless symbolizea majorattemptat eliminating
theresidualvalues,normsand structures of the ancienregime. It is precisely
fromthesestructural and normative incompatibilities betweenthe survivalor
resurgence of certain features of the old feudal order and the jacobine
aspirationsof the revolutionary elite (or at least of one segmentthereof)
thatconflicthas arisen. But in orderto assess the dimensionsof conflict,
one mustfirsttryto identifyits boundaries,that is the extentof the gap
betweenthe leaders'aspirationsand the limitationsinherentin theirsocial
environment.
(a) The Resurgenceof the TraditionalRole Structure

One of the moststrikingfeaturesof republicanRwanda is the extentto
whichnewlyinstitutionalized politicalroles tendto approximate to the role
structure of the ancienregime. In manycases,the positionsof burgomaster
and prefecthave been redefinedin the light of the values and norms
associatedwiththe officeof chiefand subchief;and the Presidency, likewise,
has taken on some of the qualities of Mwamiship. This resurgenceof
traditionalrolesmanifests itselfin severalways,and withvaryingdegreesof
forcefulness dependingon the regionalcontextwithinwhich it operates;
at a broad level of generalization, however,one could argue that the role
structure of contemporary Rwanda approachesthatof the ancienregimein
that(1) it has undergone littledifferentiation
relatively sincepre-revolutionary
times; (2) recruitment to politicalroles remainsto some extentbased on
ascriptivecriteria;(3) and it embodiesa set of normsand expectations that
are clearlyborrowedfromthe value systemof feudalRwanda.
Just as in traditionalRwanda the officesof chief and subchiefwere
inseparablefromthe ties of clientship,todaythe tenureof local officials
dependson how successful theyare in buildingup a personalfollowing-
one mightsay clientele- amongtheirconstituents.This is not just a case
of buildingup supportforparticular policies,or a reflection
of a bargaining
relationbetweenvotersand politicians;what is involvedhere is a personal
commitment on the of a groupof potential" clients" to do for their
" " whateverpart be needed to serve his personalinterests.Local
patron may
officialsin turn tend to acknowledgethis commitment throughprebends,
i.e. throughtax exemptions,the allocationof landed propertypreviously
ownedby Tutsielements, and suchotherfavorsas maybe expectedof them.
One is remindedof the "prebendaiorganization"describedby Max Weber,
in which" everysortof assignments of usufructs, and serviceswhich
tributes,
319

RENE LEMARCHAND
are due to thelordhimselfor to theofficial...meansa surrender of thepure

typeof bureaucratic organization"(18). The resulthas been a blurringof
boundariesbetweenthe administrative and politicalspheres,as well as a
tendency foreach set of rolesto finda commondenominator in the survival
of feudalrelationships.
"
Moreover,just as in feudaltimesaccess to officedependedon proper
connections ", and on a perpetualprobingof power relations,todaylocal
"
officialsappear to be constantly maneuveringfor position", in a way
re-enacting the traditional play forpower" so excellently
" describedby P.B.
Gravelin his studyof Remera(19). The parallelemergeswithstriking clarity
fromhis discussionof the methodsemployedby a certainIjeri,burgomaster
of Remera: by showinghow Ijeri " gatheredhis forcesaroundhim", firstby
enlistingthe supportof a groupof trustedhenchmen"who behavedmuch
like a gang rulingthe streetof a largecity", and ultimately by resorting to
open threats,Gravel points to some striking similaritiesbetween traditional
formsof political manipulationand the style of behaviorof the newly
appointedburgomasters.
But thispatternof behavior,howeverprevalentin centralRwanda,is far
less noticeablein the north,becauseof the determining influenceof kinship
tieswhichtendsto set definitelimitations on the extentto whichthe " play
forpower" can regulatepoliticallife; all the more so in view of the fact
that in most cases officeholdersare not only drawn from among the
descendants of traditionalHutu rulingfamiliesbut are also the ownersof
large tractsof land,whichenablesthemto relyon the continuingsupport
of a landed clientele. (Ironically,the so-calledukubondesystem,which is
merelya formof clientshipbased on the ownershipof land, is so deeply
rootedin the traditional cultureof the northern populationsthat so far no
seriousattemphas been made to bringit to an end). Thus a majoraspect
of the systemof local government in the northis the perpetuation of an
indigenous form of clientagein which power and authority depend not only
on clan affiliations but on thelandedprivilegesinherent in theclan structure.
A more universalfeatureof the contemporary political systemis the
extentto which orientations to political action reflectsthe incidenceof
traditional norms,i.e. of traditionaldirectives to politicalaction. The notions
of guhakwa (paying court) and ingonore(tribute)are still basic to an
understanding of the politicalcultureof Rwanda. Holders of officeare
constantly solicited for personalfavors,and just as in the old days favors
were dependentupon gifts,todaythe acceptanceof a cow or a jug of beer
as a tokenof gratitude forthe performance of certainadministrative services
is stillan expectedformof behaviorfromlocal officials. It is not essential
hereto go intospecificexamples,or intosuchotherand farmoredistasteful
(18) H. H. Gerthand С WrightMills, From Max Weber: Essaysin Sociology

(New York: OxfordUniversityPress,1958), p. 207 ff.
(19) PierreBettezGravel,The Play for Power: Descriptionof a Community
in
EasternRwanda (UnpublishedDoctoralDissertation, 1962).
320

typesof behavioras spyingand politicalassassination, bothof whichare still

occasionallypracticed;whatneedsto be stressed is thatsuchformsof behavior
are partof a normative orientationto politicswhichhas been operativefor
a verylong time,2L_d is likelyto continueformanyyearsto come.
All this,of course,does not mean thatthe politicalsystemof Rwandahas
remainedstatic. As alreadymentioned, Rwanda is going througha period
of role search,in whichthe confrontation of republicanand feudal norms
inevitablyleadsto confusion.In tryingto redefinetheirrolesand self-images
the elites of Rwanda are necessarily subjectto contradictory impulsesand
motivations, and thisin turn is whatcreatesconflict.
(b) Sources of Conflict

A major source of confusionabout contemporary Rwanda lies in the
assumptionthat racial solidarityamong ths Hutu has resultedin a fairly
homogeneouspolitical culture,free of the type of ethnic and regional
cleavageswhichprevailin otherpartsof Africa. Anotherstemsfromthe
contentionthat since the Hutu have traditionally sharedan inferiorsocial
statustheyhave developeda commonclass consciousness, and this in turn
has tendedto reinforcefeelingsof solidarityamong them. Finally,it is
sometimes suggested thattheircommonhatredof theTutsimonarchy has had
the effectof strengthening theirpsychologicalcommitments to democracy
and egalitarianism.On each of thesecounts,as we shall see, some s^ious
reservationsare in order.
To begin with,it is important to stressat the outsetthe basic cultural
discontinuities which separatethe populationsof the north,the so-called
Kiga complex,fromthoseof the center. Because of the recencyof Tutsi
intrusionin thisarea,the northern regionrepresents a distinctivesubculture,
characterizedby the survivalof specific social, economic and political
institutions(like the ubukonde),and a remarkable popularawarenessof the
normsand traditionsin existenceprior to the Tutsi invasion. And even
withinthissubculture thereis roomforfurther residualcleavages,based on
clan loyaltiesand local parochialism.There is no need to speculateas to
whetherthe people of the north(who call themselves Bakiga) are ethnically
so different fromthe rest of the Hutu population;the main point rather
is that theydo look upon themselves, and are looked upon by others,as
different.
culturally Thus,as theypresstheirclaimsfor recognition of their
culturaldistinctiveness,
and fortheprotection of theirindigenousinstitutions,
theyconfront the centralauthoritieswith a major dilemma,namelywhether
to accomodatetheseparticularistic demandsat the cost of ideologicalpurity
or to ignorethemand face the consequences. In eithercase conflictis
boundto occur.
Secondly,the notion that since traditionalstatusdifferences have been
obliteratedRwandanow approximates of a classlesssociety
the characteristics
cannotwithstandrationalexamination.In the firstplace, traditional(i.e.
pre-Tutsi)statusdifferences are stillverymuchin evidencein certainareas.
321

RENE LEMARCHAND
We have seen,forexample,how the politicization of primordialties among

the Kiga has led to a patternof politicaldevelopment which is obviously
at variancewith the egalitarianprescriptions of the republicanorder. But
equallyat variancewith equalitariannormsis the growingdiscrepancy of
incomeand perquisites thathas developedbetweenhigh-ranking civil servants
and government officialson the one hand,and the ordinaryHutu peasant
on theother. The socialand economicgap betweenthisnew " rulingclass"
and the massesis undoubtedly wider than at any time duringthe ancien
regime,and consequently therehas been a growingresentment of what is
" "
currently referred to as l'embourgeoisement des élites au pouvoir - on
the groundsthatsuch formsof economicinequalityare incompatible with
democracy.The conflictis not only economicbut social and ideological,
thegrievanceorientation originating not onlyfromthe moreunderprivileged
segments of the peasantry but from disaffected primaryschool
intellectuals,
leaversand university graduates, low-level,unskilled clericalpersonnel, and,
of course,unsuccessful politicians- all of whomsharea visionof Rwandese
societywhichcannotbe reconciledwiththe new class structure.
Finally,basic disagreements have arisen over the role of the partyin
society,which also reflectdiscordantopinions about the meaningof the
revolution.The crucialissue is whetherthe Parmehutushould serveas a
strongly centralized, militantparty,dedicatedto a " permanent revolution ".
or whetherit was only intendedto act as an ad hoc instrument for the
realizationof temporary goals. Proponentsof the formerthesishold that
since the partyis the sole repository of republicanlegitimacy, its primary
task is to substituteitselfas nearlyas possiblefor the old feudalpower
structure, so as to destroyit root and branch;to identifyitselffullywith
theideologyand goals of Republicanism and carrythe taskof " psychological
" to its ultimate
emancipation stage. The party,in otherwords,mustbecome
the focalpoint of the politicallife of the nation,and convertitselfinto a
"
"partyof solidarity (20). On theotherhand,thereare thosewho lookupon
the partynot as a fraternalorderbut merelyas a convenientarena for
resolving personaldifferences overmatters of policy;theyfeelthatif theparty
shouldever substitute itselffor the State it would inevitablyacquire some
of the oppressivefeaturesof feudalregime. To identify the rootsof these
ideologicaldivergencesand theirincidenceon recentdevelopments would
carry us too far afield; suffice it to note here that such ideologicalcleavages
as we have justdescribedare not necessarily consistentwithculturaland eco-
nomicdivisions, and henceleave ampleroomformaneuver;nonetheless, they
have imposedenormous strainson elitesolidarity bothat thecentraland local
levels and have virtuallydestroyedthe partyas an autonomouspolitical
structure.
In the absence of a strongpartyapparatus,and given the syncretic,
fragmented and on the whole inefficient characterof the administration,
(20) For an illuminatingdiscussion of the " partyof

of the role and characteristics
",
solidarity see David The
Apter, Politicsof Modernization,
op. cit.,p. 210 ff.
322

where does stabilitystem from? In part from the very stabilityof the
traditional and fromthepotentialforcoercionthatgoes withit.
rolestructure,
Beyondthis,however, attentionmustbe drawn: (1) to the significance of
politicalmythsas a sourceof solidarity;(2) to the presencewithinthe
governmentalstructure statuspositions;and (3) to thedefinition
of interlocking
of thepresidency " ".
alongthelinesof a presidential monarchy
(c) The Quest forStability

Long beforeSorel pressedon our attentionthe importance of mythology
as a sourceof solidarity, the Tutsi had clearlyseen the connectionbetween
politicalmythsand values,and theirrelationshipto authority.As already
noted,themaintenance of Tutsi supremacy dependedto a considerable extent
on the acceptanceof a myth-conveyed schemeof valuespurporting to show
the innatesuperiorityof the Tutsi over all othercastes. What is interesting
about the politicalmythology of RepublicanRwanda is, firstof all, that is
shouldreflectthe same kind of historicaldistortion whichcharacterized the
mythsof feudalRwanda. Now as beforethe tendencyis to twistthe past
in orderto justifythepresent,in orderto give an aura of legitimacy to the
ideals of justiceand equality,and, above all, to conceal the fundamental
differencesof culturaland politicalorientationbetweennorthand south(21).
Furthermore, the new mythsare investedwithmoralconnotations thattend
to makethemdesirablein themselves.Because the mythof Hutu solidarity
impliesa commonadherenceto democracy it becomesa major ingredient of
progress;just as in the past the mythof Tutsi supremacytendedto be
associatedwitha normative view of society,Hutu solidarity is now regarded
as the moralfoundation of Republicanism.
However,conformity with the operativenormsof Republicanismis not
necessarilyfunctionof a popularcommitment to the values thereof.Earlier
we have had occasionto emphasizethe complementary natureof the value
systemof feudalRwandaand thenetworkof reciprocities throughwhichthe
(21) Nowherein this phenomenon betterillustratedthan in the storytold by a

Hutu leaderto the parliamentary studygroup appointedby the Belgiangovernment,
in April, 1959. Aftercommenting on the aspirationsof his kinsmen,this leader
stated: " It is thesecondtimein thehistory of RwandathattheHutu officially request
de jacto social and politicalequalitywiththe Tutsi. The firstpetitionof this kind
can be tracedbackto 1890, at the timeof the battleof Karagwe,underthe reignof
MwamiKigeli IV Rwabugiri.The Hutu who foughtalone againstthe enemywent
beyondtheline of defencedrawnby thecommander of the Tutsiarmiesin accordance
withtheauguries. The resultwas the defeatof the Hutu. Theywerecondemned to
"
be eternally dependentupon the Tutsi. The edictof the sovereignstipulated: You
will workfortheTutsiduringtheday and foryourself duringthe night". Although
historicaltraditions confirmthe existenceof the battleof Karagwe,a battlewhich
Kigeli lostafterbeingoverwhelmed by the combinedarmiesof the kingsof Karagwe
and Buganda,thereis not the slightest evidencein supportof the contention thatthe
outcomeof the battlein anywaysealedthe fateof the Hutu. Aside fromillustrating
the mixtureof factand fictionthatone is likelyto encounter in oral traditions,
the
storyshows a deliberateefforton the part of Hutu politiciansto give historical
justification fortheirclaims,in a typicallyTutsi-likefashion.
323

RENE LEMARCHAND
systemactuallyfunctioned.Somethingsimilarto this can be observedin

contemporary Rwandain thatover and above the questionof value commit-
ment,thesystem seemsto operateessentially through thereciprocal obligations
whichdifferent setsof officeholdersowe one another. This tendsto create
a kind of partnership reminiscent of the interlockingstatuspositionswhich
once tied the clientsto theirsubchief,the subchiefto the chief,and the
chiefto theMwami. Thus at the local level the burgomasters are dependent
forre-election on the supportof the heads of the local familieson the hills
(the so-called baktirubimiryango);and the communalcouncillorsand
communalpolicemen,likewise,feel that theirtenurehingeson the ability
of theburgomaster to retainthesupportof thesefamilies.Hence a triangular
of
pattern reciprocities tends to develop betweenthe local familyheads,
the burgomasters and the communalpolicemenwhich in turn providesa
basis forstability.In fact,however,the evidenceshowsthatthis particular
typeof relationship is subjectto wide variations;thereare manyareaswhere
the local familyheads no longerenjoy much authority, and otherswhere
theirauthority is ignoredby local officials. The dominanttrendnowadays
seemsto be towardsa straightpatron-client typeof relationship involving
a chain of reciprocities betweencivil servantsand politicians(and among
politicians)whichrunsthroughthe whole governmental hierarchy.Typical
of thisis the patternof reciprocity whichlinksthe deputiesto the burgo-
masters,especiallyat electiontime; indeed,few deputiescan hope to be
re-electedunlesstheyenjoythe supportof the communalauthorities.Until
recently anotherrequirement was thatcandidatesshouldbe approvedby the
party'shigherorgans,but sincethepartyhas ceasedto existas an independent
politicalunitthe burgomaster-deputy partnershipis likelyto becomeincreas-
inglystrongin monthsto come.
The consequences of thissituationare essentially
three: (1) the grievances
of the local populationsare almostneveropenlyventilatedin the National
Assembly,and hence seldom communicableto the centralgovernment;
(2) becauseof the verystrength of this interlocking relationship,the role
of theprefecttendsto be eclipsedor contaminated by the influenceof local
" bosses
"; indeed,the prefectoral echelontendsto becomemore and more
heavilypoliticized, and thisin spiteof therecurrentefforts of thegovernment
to counteract thistrend;(3) althoughtheprincipleof reciprocity characterist-
icallydoesnotextendto therelations betweentheexecutiveand thelegislature,
the attitudeof the government has been tacitlyto recognizetheselinks of
mutualdependenceas unavoidable,no matterhow stronglyreminiscent of
the abhorredfeudalsystem.In short,becausethe normof reciprocity is by
naturemalleableand indeterminate in termsof theobligations thatit implies,
it can be adaptedto a varietyof transactions and contextswhile at the same
timeretainingits systemstabilizingfunctions.This is why it could be so
transferredfromone typeof regimeto another. As Gouldnerput it,
"easily
it can be appliedto countlessad hoc transactions, thusprovidinga flexible
moralsanctionfor transactions whichmightnot otherwisebe regulatedby
specificstatusobligations... The normis like a kindof plasticfiller,capable
324

of being pouredinto the shiftingcrevicesof social structures, servingas a

kindof all-purpose moralcement" (22).
This mayalso help to explainwhyin recenttimesthePresidency has taken
on some of the qualitiesof Mwamiship. Kayibandaembodiesthe ideals of
Hutu solidarity in the same fashionthat the Mwami once symbolizedthe
ideals of Tutsi supremacy.And, because he is the incarnationof moral
values,his authority enables him to investthe Presidencywith a special
prerogatives.He standsin relationto his people not unlikea divineking
in relationto his subjects,and he uses the prerogativesof officeaccordingly.
Like the Mwami,the Presidentis inaccessible, inviolateand unaccountable.
His inaccessibility enableshim to avoid takingup overtpositionson specific
issues,and thusto createaroundhis personand his policiesan atmosphere
of ambiguitywhich makes them immuneto criticism. But even when
commitments cannotbe averted,his decisionsremainwell beyondthe pale
of accountability. Justas in thepast,theMwamiused his advisersas a cat's
paw in order to deflecthostilityagainsthis entourage,Kayibandahas con-
sistentlyendeavoredto shiftthe onus of responsilibity for his policiesupon
individualcabinetmembers.But since politicalofficeis still regardedas a
gift of the sovereign,no amountof politicalpressurefromthe National
Assemblyor fromanywhere else can forcehim to removea memberof his
cabinet,or preventhim fromappointinga favorite(23).
Whereasin otherpartsof Africathe legitimacy of the positionoccupied
by nationalistleadersowes nothingto the political institution and nearly
all to thepersonalcharismaof theofficeholders, we findin Rwandaprecisely
the reversesituation. Kayibandais the antithesisof the charismatic leader,
and whatever authorityhe has restslargelyon theperceivedlegitimacy of the
officehe occupies. The storygoes thatin tryingto mobilizesupportforhis
ideas Kayibandawent about the countryside sayingthatthe purposeof the
revolution was to give theHutu a Mwamiof theirown. If thisis truethis
goal has been fulfilledbeyondall expectations;the problem,however,is
whetherin the long run the incompetence and arbitrariness
of some of the
governing elites,and the growing demands forincreased
politicalparticipation
of thoseoutsidethe government, will not bringinsuperablepressureto bear
upon boththe officeand the occupant. But untilthishappens,the stability
of the Rwandesepoliticalsystemwill continueto dependto a considerable
extenton the legitimacy of Kayibanda'spresidential Mwamiship.
"
(22) AlvinW. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity : A Preliminary Statement ",
AmericanSociologicalReview,25 (April, I960), p. 175.
(23) Yet therehas been occasionswhenKayibandadid feelthe compulsionto heed
the mood of his people; furthermore, no matterhow stronglyreminiscent of the
methodsof the past, his authority
autocratic is not absolute. Kayibandais deeply
"
indebtedto the old-guardHutu politicians(the so-scalled révolutionnaires de la
premièreheure"), and althoughhe mayfeelthe needto replacethemby youngerand
bettereducatedelements, he cannotalwaysaffordto do so. His authority does not
dependexclusivelyon thesanctityof officebutalso on his abilityto reconciledivergent
viewpointsand factionswithinthe rulingoligarchy.More oftenthan not this has
meant" playingbothends againstthe middle".
325

RENE LEMARCHAND
IV. Burundi: Kingshipon Trial

Afterwhathas been said of the politicalsystemof Rwanda,one can see
whyit shouldbearmorethana superficial resemblance withthatof Burundi.
Despite theirdifferentconstitutional
frameworks, both systemsare deeply
immersedin tradition;theyboth lean on redefinition of the principleof
for the
kingship maintaining stability of theirpolitical and they
institutions;
both seem to operateon the basis of a social machineryinheritedfrom
feudalism.Where differences exist,thesemustbe seen in the lightof the
timinginvolvedin the sequenceand clustering
differential of issues,not in
the characterof the issues themselves.In Burundidemandsfor greater
popularparticipationoccurredat a timewhen the basic constitutional order
had alreadybeen definedand accepted,which means that until then the
legitimacyof monarchicinstitutions had never been seriouslycalled into
question. It also means that in coping with these demandsthe political
systemwas relativelyfree of the restraininginfluencesof the colonial
and therefore
establishment, operatedwitha fargreaterdegreeof autonomy
than in Rwanda. For thesereasonsthe Crownwas allowed to emergeas
elementin thepoliticalsystem.
thecentralstabilizing
(a) The Politicizationof EthnicCleavages

Since Burundipoliticsnow primarily centerupon Hutu-Tutsiantagonisms,
thefirstquestionto whichwe mustaddressourselvesis - whydid thebases
of conflictso suddenlyshiftfromdynasticto ethnicrivalries ? Until inde-
pendencepoliticalconflicttendedto focuson gwana rivalries, the two main
contenders,the Parti Démocratique Chrétien (PDC) and the Union pour le
ProgrèsNational (Uprona) being identified,respectively, with the Batare
and Bezi families;althoughthePDC and the Upronawereby no meansthe
sole competitors,otherspartiesseemedlike negligibleentitiescomparedto
thesetwo. Not until shortlyafterJuly1962, when the countryformally
accededto independence, of ethniccleavagesbecome
did the politicization
manifest,and at thispoint the Uprona,afterscoringa landslidevictoryat
thepolls,beganto showsignsof an internalsplitfromwhichit has not yet
recovered,and probablyneverwill. Fromthenon the stagewas set foran
irreduciblefightforsupremacy betweenHutu and Tutsi.
For thepoliticalfortunes,or misfortunes,of the Uprona,two explanations
suggestthemselvesat the outset. One is that the death of Prince Louis
Rwagasore,the Mwami'seldestson, in October1961, deprivedthe Uprona
not only of an extraordinarily prestigiousfigurebut of its single most
important sourceof internalcohesion. Accordingto this view, given the
extremestructural weaknessof the Upronaon theone hand,and Rwagasore's
unique leadershipqualitieson the other,his death left a politicalvacuum
whichin turnwas bound to open up a Pandora'sbox of competingethnic
claimsamonghis presumptive heirs. Anotherpossibleexplanationis that
ethnicrivalriesmerelyreflectthe prejudicesand preconceptions of certain
Belgian administratorsand settlers
who, long beforeindependence becamea
326

reality,read intothe contextof Burundipoliticsthe same portentsof ethnic

strifeas in Rwanda. While both explanationsare plausible,theyare not
entirelysatisfactory,becausetheytend to minimizethe contagiousinfluence
of Rwandapoliticson the attitudesand expectations of the Hutu leadership
of Burundi,a factorthatwouldhavecomeintoplaysooneror laterregardless
of othercontingencies.
Indeedthe crucialelementin the suddeneruptionof Hutu-Tutsiantagon-
ismslies in thepsychological repercussions of theRwandeserevolution among
a tinyminorityof Hutu politicianswho, even beforeindependence, took
theircue fromthe Parmehutuleadership. By identifying their aims and
aspirationswiththoseof theirRwandesekinsmen, theyimputedto the Tutsi
of Burundimotiveswhichat firsttheyprobablydid not possesbut to which
theyunwittingly gave a substanceof truth,a phenomenonthatcan best be
understood by reference to Merton'swell-known notionof the self-fulfilling
prophecy(24). To paraphraseMertonone mightsay that by giving the
Burundisituationa falsedefinition to begin with,theseHutu elitesevoked
a radicallynew type of behavior,both among themselvesand the Tutsi,
whichmade theiroriginallyfalse imputations true.
The result,in anyevent,has been to createa climateof intensecompetition
betweenthe Hutu and Tutsi leadershipgroups,culminating in the summer
of I962 with a major crisis of confidencewithinthe ruling party. Its
repercussions were immediately feltbothwithinand outsideparliament, and
beforelong contamination spread to the whole administrative machinery.
Thus the personalfeud betweenRwagasore'spresumptive heirs led to the
emergence of two bitterly hostilefactionsin the NationalAssembly, roughly
equal in size - the so-calledCasablancaand Monroviablocs, respectively
identifiedwith the Tutsi and Hutu groups in parliament- which soon
broughtparliamentary proceedingsto a virtualstandstilland markedthe
beginningof a prolongedstalematebetweenHutu and Tutsi politicians.
Basically,the intervention of the Crown in the political life of the
country was thelogicaloutcomeof thisstalematesituationengendered by the
suddenpoliticization of ethnicties. But beforewe turnto an examination
of themethodstriedby theCrownto restorestability, and of thereasonswhy
they eventuallybackfired,certainqualificationsmust be borne in mind.
(1) Becauseat firstonlya smallfraction of the totalpopulationfeltactively
involved in the politics of ethnicity, and because ethnic rivalrieswere
at firstlimitedto the capitalcityof Bujumbura, conflictcould be kept on a
relativelymanageablebasis. (2) Althoughethniccommitments werestrongest
" ".
at the leadershiplevel, not all elites were equally strongly committed
Despite notable exceptions to the rule,the ganwa clearlystood as a group
apart,not only because manyof themhad failed to securerecognitionof
theirtraditionalclaims to authority, havingbeen displacedfromofficeby
youngeraspirants, but also because of their presumedneutrality on the Hutu-
(Glencoe,III : The Free

(24) RoberK. Merton,Social Theoryand Social Structure
Press,1963), p. 421 ff.
327

RENE LEMARCHAND
Tutsi issue Moreover,therewere some politicianswho simplyfailed to

qualify as pure Hutu or Tutsi, and some who possessed the physical
characteristics of one group while actuallybelongingto the other;in both
cases this enabledthemto maneuverbetweenthe two groupswithoutever
firmlycommitting themselvers to either,therebygiving a certainmeasure
of flexibilityand opennessto politicalalignments.(3) A thirdfactorwhich
has contributed to limit the scope and intensity of ethnicconflictis that
at least,it did not involveany fundamental
initially, disagreementover the
legitimacy of theconstitutionalorder. This is whatmade it possibleforthe
Crown to avoid the taint of ethnic favoritism.Only much later,once
conflicthad ceased to revolve exclusivelyaround the problemof Hutu
admissionintothepartyleadership, did the questionof monarchic
legitimacy
intrudeitselfupon the race issue, and this, characteristically enough,in
reactionto the policiesof the Court.
(b) The Arbitrationof the Crown

The centraldilemmaof Burundipoliticsis that in attempting to restore
a measureof stability to thepoliticalsystem,
the Crownwas led to redefine
its role in a way thatcontradictedboththe traditional normsand the newly
established constitutional
order. The growingcentralizationof poweraround
the Courtdestroyed the old patternof balancedtensionsamongthe ganwa;
and it caused the youngergenerations of politicians,Hutu and Tutsi alike,
to takean increasingly hostileattitudetowardsthe meaningof neotradition-
alism. For in tryingto satisfydemandsfor greaterpoliticalparticipation,
the Crownended up by further whateverdegreeof participation
restricting
alreadyexisted.
The tacticsemployedby theCourtto solidifyits powerbase wereof three
kinds. Firstof all, a consciouseffortwas made to shiftthe locus of power
and authority away fromthe government to the Court. Space limitations
do notpermita fulldiscussionof thefactorsbehindeach specificstep in the
directionof royalhegemony; but theirconsequencesare worthnoting. First,
in June, 1963, the gendarmerieand the army were broughtunder the
exclusivejuridiction of the Court,and a few dayslaterthe Mwamilet it be
understood thatthe government no longerneededthe formalinvestiture of
parliament, and thatfromnow on the Courtwould have full authority to
" make" or " break" a
government.Then in February,1964, the Mwami
servednoticeon the Ministerof the Interiorthatprovincialgovernors were
the sole representativesof the Crownin theirrespectivebailiwicks,and as
such shouldbe consultedon any matterregardingthe local and provincial
administration.Eventuallythe Ministriesof Planningand Justice,along
with the Ministryof Information and Immigration, were all convertedinto
of State,underthe directcontrolof the Crown,thereby
Secretariats reducing
almostto nil thelittlethatwas leftof governmentalauthority.
328

POLITICALINSTABILITYIN AFRICA: THE CASEOF RWANDAAND BURUNDI
Alongwiththisdrasticcurtailment of executiveand parliamentary powers

the tendencyhas been to entrustkey posts withinand outsidethe govern-
mentto membersof the royalfamily,i.e. to ganwa elementsof Bezi origin.
Here again for the sake of brevityone must refrainfromgiving specific
examples;what mustbe stressed,however,is that this suddeninfusionof
ganwa blood into the sinews of the governmentprofoundlyaltered the
relationshipof the cabinetto the Court. No longerat the mercyof a vote
of confidence, the cabinetbegan to look to the Palace for guidanceand
leadership;no longerthe originators and formulators of policy,the Ministers
began to act as the obedient servants of the Court. As in Rwanda clientage
relationsreappearedin one formor anotherat various echelonsof the
governmental hierarchy, but with the main threadsreachingout fromthe
Court,i.e. fromtheverysourceof powerand patronage. Finally,withinthe
limitsof thephenomenon we just described, the Courtwentto greatlengths
to insureparityof ethnicrepresentation in government : Thus each of the
fivegovernments "appointed" since 1963 contained an even proportionof
Hutu and Tutsi, all of themchosenbecause of theirpresumedloyaltyto
the monarchy.
Stability,in short,was achieved by restructuring the authorityof the
Crownalong hierarchical lines,whichmeantan increasingconcentration of
powerin thehandsof theMwamiand his entourage.But thisverycentral-
izationof power,howevereffective it mayhave been fora timein bolstering
the positionof the Crown,defeatedits purpose. As long as the Crown
remainedpoliticallyneutral,or was consideredso, its legitimacywas never
threatened.But in the long run its policyof balancingeach groupagainst
the other,while at the same timeplayingthe role of the balancer,made it
impossible fortheCrownto remainneutral.Insteadof trying to accommodate
theclaimsof Hutu againstTutsi,or vice versa,theCrownpursueda deliberate
policyof playingoffdemandsfromeach side,so as to neutralizethe claims
of eachgroupagainsttheother. Becauseof theabsenceof adequatechannels
for convertingdemandsinto policies,conflictbecame all the more acute.
Chronicrioting,assassinations, massralliesbecamethe orderof the day,and
repression, therefore, all the more frequent. Repression,however,did not
obliteratedemandsbut merelyservedto give thema new direction. The
cruxhereis not thattheHutu-Tutsiconflictlost anyof its intensity but that
it shiftedpartof its animuson to the Crown. Once it came to be regarded
by bothcampsas an obstacleto the realizationof theirultimateobjectives,
theCrownitselfbecamethe targetof ethniccompetition
In addition,someof the factorswhichhad previously contributed to limit
the scope of conflictlost theirrelevance. Because of theirclose association
withthe Courtthe ganwa foundit increasingly difficultto live up to their
reputationof impartiality; and, as a resultof the failureof the systemto
effectively channelpopular demands,these found an alternativeoutlet in
propagandaand mob action. The resultwas to spreaddiscontentinto the
ruralareas.
329

RENE LEMARCHAND
(с) The ChangingConcept of MonarchicLegitimacy

In thefaceof suchconflicting claimsand cleavages,how couldtheprinciple
of kingshipretaineven a semblanceof legitimacy ? The answer,briefly
stated,is thatthe Crown has again been thrown back intoits traditional
role,
servingan instrumental, symbolicpurposeratherthanactingas the central
fulcrumof power. To understand how this processof reconversion came
about,attention mustbe paid to thechangingdefinition of theethnicinterests
at stake,in relationto eachotherand in relationto theCrown.
Ratherthanlookingat Hutu and Tutsi interests as fixed,immutable quan-
tities,it would be more accurateto regardthem as involvinggroups of
individualsin competition witheach other,dependingfortheirchancesand
fortunes on theircapacityto manipulatefactorsexternalto themselves.In
practicethis meantthatin seekingto improvetheirrelativepositionvis-à-
vis each other,Tutsiand Hutu alikehad to contendwiththe influence of the
here the that each set of " " had to score
Court, expressing probability players
a victory overtheother. To put it somewhat differently, the contestbetween
Hutu and Tutsi was not onlya contestbetweenthemselves, but a kind of
game being playedagainst the limitationsinherent in the politicalenviron-
ment,and morespecifically againstthelimitations imposedby the Court.
In thesecircumstances, one mightassumethatsince bothHutu and Tutsi
shareda commoninterestagainstthe Crowntheirdifferences were bound
to evaporate.But thisoverlooksthestrength of mutualantagonisms, and the
subsidiary natureof theiroppositionto the Crown. Indeed,compromise at
the expenseof the Crownwas veryunlikelyas long as theirhatredof each
otherwas morevirulentthan theirhatredof the monarchy.This, in fact,
is the fundamental reasonwhymonarchicinstitutions are still alive,though
clearlyless so than before. Another,however,is that one set of players
miscalculated its chancesof winning. The Hutu tooka gambleand lost,and
becausetheyowed theirdefeatin part to a tacticalallianceof the Crown
withthe army(whoseofficers were forthe mostpartof Tutsi origin),this
automatically enhancedthe bargainingpowerof the Tutsi in relationto the
Crown.
For the sake of clarityit may be usefulat thispoint to put this whole
processof gamesmanship in its properhistoricalperspective.In early1965,
shortly after the assassinationof Prime Minister Ngendadumwe(a Hutu),
theCrowntookthefateful decisionto dissolveparliament and lay theground-
work for legislativeand communalelections,thus bringingto an end the
long parliamentary deadlockwhich in part had justifiedits intervention.
With approximately two thirdsof the seatsin the new parliament, including
the Presidencyand Vice-Presidency of both the Senate and the National
Assembly,the Hutu decided to press their claims throughthe regular
constitutionalchannels. However,the Crown intimatedat this point that
theonly" living" constitution was whatit said it was,and certainly notwhat
the " nominal" constitution prescribed. Taking strongexceptionto the
"
adage that thekingreignsbut does notgovern", theMwamipublilystated
330

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN AFRICA : THE CASE OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI
in July, 1965, that "the subtletyof this phrase cannot be allowed to do

violence to traditionsthat are deeply anchored in our minds and our hearts".
If there were any doubts as to what the intentionsof the Court were these
were quickly dispelled by subsequent events. While the National Assembly
favored the appointmentof the late Gervais Nyangoma (a Hutu) as Prime
Minister, the Mwami called upon his cousin, Leopold Biha, a well-known
ganwa, to head the new government; again when the National Assembly
nominated Nyangoma to sit on the Crown Council, the Mwami passed him
over; the last straw came in September, 1965, when the Court decided to
initiate a drastic local governmentreform,aiming among other things at
convertingthe burgomastersinto mere civil servants,and this without even
referringthe matter to parliament. Despite vehement protestationsfrom
the deputies, the Court went ahead and promulgated the reformthroughan
an été-lot.
By then,some Hutu leaders felt that theyhad no alternativethan to resort
to violence, and thus, late on October 18, a coup was instigatedagainst the
Palace with the collaboration of a few gendarmerie and army officers.
Although the coup failed miserably,for reasons into which we cannot go,
its consequences were momentous. (1) For one thing, its effecton govern-
ment was almost as paralyzing as if it had succeeded. Though unharmed,
the Mwami fled the country,deeply traumatized;the physical injuries suffered
by Prime Minister Biha compelled him to spend several weeks in Belgium
for medical treatment;as for the other members of the cabinet, their initial
reaction was one of complete shock, and for a while no one seemed to have
a precise notion of what exactlyought to be done. (2) Secondly,the failure
of the coup eventuallyled to the physical liquidation of the entire Hutu
leadership. (3) Thirdly, after a period of protractednegotiations between
" "
loyal army officers,Tutsi politicians and Court officials, accompanied
by occasional tiffs between the exiled Mwami and the rump government
over the question of the royal succession,a second coup was staged in July,
1966, this time by the army,which led to the proclamationof Prince Charles
Ndizeye, the Mwami's youngestson, as the sole legitimateheir to the throne.
Simultaneously,a new governmentwas formed,headed by Cdt. Micombero,
and including,besides threeotherarmyofficers,a group of second generation
intellectualsof mixed origins, but with the Tutsi assuming a clearly pre-
dominant place in terms of numbers and positions held.
Although it is still too early to pass a definitivejudgement on the chances
of survival of the new government,some of its characteristicsare worth
noting. Perhaps the most salient feature of the new team is its extreme
youth, the median age being 26. Secondly, the overwhelmingmajority of
ministersare intellectuals,many of whom happened to be associated at one
time or another with the militant,pro-Tutsi,left-wingJeunesse Nationaliste
Rwagasore (J.N.R.); indeed, the recent appointment of Prime Nyongabo,
formerlyPresident of the J.N.R., to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is
symptomaticboth of the growing influenceof the J.N.R., and of its potential
331

RENE LEMARCHAND
role in shapingBurundi'sforeignpolicy. Thirdly,the locus of power has

once moreshiftedaway fromthe Courtto the government.
This new relationshipbetweenthe governmentand the Court is the
logicaloutcomeof the crisisof successionengendered by the abortivecoup
of October,I965. Thoughit wouldbe incorrect to say thatMwamiMwam-
butsa purelyand simplyabdicatedin favor of his son, his self-imposed
exile,togetherwiththe circumstances whichled up to it, had preciselythis
result. Even if he had wantedto, Mwambutsacould not have stayedin
powerafterOctober,1965. One reasonforthis is hintedat by A. Zolberg
whenhe writesthat" althoughthe shiftto forcerepresents an attemptto
overcomedeteriorating legitimacy and inadequatepower, paradoxicallyit
enhancesthe problemof the legitimacyof the rulersin the eyes of those
to whom the implementation of forcemust be entrusted"(25). In this
case theimplementors of forceweretheTutsiofficers who quelledthemutiny,
and thoseTutsipoliticianswho organizedtherepression, and sincetheCrown
was now entirelydependentfor its survivalon the loyaltiesof these two
groups,it had no choicebut to bow to theirdecisions. Moreover,neither
groupfeltthatMwambutsahad properlydefinedthe role of kingshipin the
politicalsystem,and theyboth favoreda transfer of authority to his son,
who, by virtueof his age, temperament and education,was more inclined
thanhis fatherto sharetheprogressive, militant,and thoroughly Westernized
outlookof the new government.Being only 19 yearsof age, and having
spentalmosthalfof theseyearsabroad,one can see whythe Princeshould
lack the judgementand maturity necessaryfora strong,independent policy,
and whyhis accessionto the thronedid not evoke too much anxietyeven
amongthoseTutsi elementswho at one timewereknownforbeingardently
committedto the ideals of republicanism.
But whilethe monarchy, owes a heavydebt to the army
as an institution,
and the government, it is equallyplain thatboth sharea commoninterest
in the royalestablishment and hence in the perpetuation of kingshipitself.
They feel that theirauthority will continue to depend on theirabilityto
the of
manipulate symbols kingship, on theirabilityto extractfromkingship
the sanctionsthat will give legitimacyto their actions,no matterhow
incompatible thesemaybe with the acceptednormsof monarchictradition.
dependson thecontinued
in short,
Stability, popularacceptanceof monarchic
legitimacy,as definedby the incumbents.But is the definition of monarchy
given by those in power reallycompatiblewith the traditionalimage of
kingshipheld by the uneducatedmasses,and in particularby the Hutu?
And how compatibleis it with the drasticsocial and economicreforms
currently envisagedby the government ? Perhapsthe firstpoint to note is
that the consensuswhich presentlyexistsamong the kingmakers may not
lastindefinitely.Long ago Ibn Khaldunobservedthat"when royalauthority
of PoliticalConflictin the New Statesof

(25) AristideR. Zolberg,The Structure
Africa,Paperdeliveredat the 1966 AnnualMeetingof the AmericanPoliticalScience
New York, 1966.
Association,
332

is firmlyestablishedin one particularfamily...it oftenhappensthat (the

king's)wazirsand (his) entouragegain powerover the throne. This occurs
mostoftenwhena littlechildor a weak memberof the familyis appointed
successorby his fatheror made rulerby his creaturesand servants "
(26).
This has been a commonoccurrencein the historyof Burundi,and while
to-day'sking-makers, or " wazirs", do not definetheirinterests in the same
way as theirpredecessors, theymay stillshow the same penchantforintrigue
and factionalism.Withinthiscuriouscombination of PraetorianGuard and
TamanyHall elementswhichconstitutes the government of Burundi,there
seemsto be no such thingas a commonvisionof the future,and the more
radical,left-wing, pro-J.N.R.elementsmaysoon findthemselves at odds with
the more moderateamong the armyofficers. If and when this happens,
kingshipwill again becomethe focusof inter-group rivalries.
Secondly,the legitimacyof monarchicinstitutions hinges to a certain
extenton theacceptanceof thePrinceas Mwamiby theelders- theso-called
bashigantahe - whoseauthority in theruralareasis stillconsiderable, though
not unchallenged.So farthe strategy of thegovernment has been to by-pass
theelders'approval,forfearthatit mightbe withheld, and to createa de jacto
situationwherethe Princewill eventually gain recognitionas the legitimate
Mwami. Butwhether thiscan be achievedwithoutcontravening theritualistic
aspectsof kingship, and withoutharmto the legitimacy of the institution,is
stilluncertain.Thirdly,and moreimportantly, one maywonderwhetherby
aligninghimselfwiththemoreradicalof the Tutsi elements, and by giving
his supportand thatof theCrownto the forced-draft modernization schemes
which theyseem to advocate,the Prince will not attractto himselfthe
hatredof the peasantryand thus help refocusthe grievancesof the Hutu
massesagainstthe Crown. Certainlythe wholesaleliquidationof the Hutu
leadershipwhichfollowedin the wake of the abortivecoup has evidently
serveda stabilizingpurpose;but anothergenerationof Hutu leaderswill
eventually emergeto carrythroughthe taskof theirpredecessors, and at this
pointtheproblemof stability will againbe posed,onlywithgreateracuteness.
Whethercombinedor isolated,thesevariouspossibilitiesall tend to presage
an increasingly important role to be playedby the armyin themonthsahead,
forthe veryfactthatstability hangson such a thin-spun threadinvitesthe
military to intervene moredirectlyin the politicallife of the country, if not
to substitute itselfforthe monarchy.
V. Conclusion
The main conclusionto be drawnfromthis discussionis thatin spite of

the impression of uniformityconveyedby the traditional
social systemsand
of Rwanda and Burundi,these were by no means
political institutions
identical;and in the last analysis,the differences
betweenthe two proved
(26) Ibn Khaldun,The Mugaddhnah

: An Introduction
to History(New York:
PantheonBooks,1958), p. 377.
333

RENE LEMARCHAND
farmoreconsequential in termsof theirinitialpatternsof politicaldevelop-

mentthanthe obvioussimilarities whichcan be detectedin theirmode of
politicalorganization and ethnic configuration.As notedearlier,becauseof
the greaterfluidityof its traditional systemof social stratification, because
of theabsenceof a close identification of the monarchy witheitherHutu or
Tutsi,and becauseconflictamongthe princesdid not involvecorresponding
classcommitments but on thecontrary led to a reinforcement of locally-based
Burundiwas farbetterequippedto facethechallengeof modernity.
solidarities,
On the otherhand,the elementsof similarity cannotbe overlooked, forit
is not by pure coincidenceif todayBurundiis facedwiththe same arduous
racialproblemwhichRwandaconfronted back in 1959-60. The pointhere
is thatdifferences of politicaland social structure were not so fundamental
as to eliminatealtogetherfromone nationalcontextthe problemswhich
have arisenin the other;but theywere sufficiently important to raise them
at different pointsin time. Th:s difference in the timingof issues is an
important one, becauseit has involveddifferent assetsand liabilitiesforthe
incumbents in each country.In RwandatheHutu revolution beganto gather
momentum beforeindependence, at a timewhen the trustauthorities could
and did use theirinfluence to acceleratetherevolutionary process;in Burundi,
on the otherhand,the Hutu movementdid not begin to take shape until
afterindependence, when it could no longerrelyon the protectiveshield
of the administration, and when the incumbents enjoyedcompletefreedom
to use diversions, concessionsor repression, as the circumstances required,
againstactual or potentialinsurgents.
None the less,problemsof politicalstability are handledin somewhatthe
samefashionin each country.Despite the emphasison race solidarity which
characterizes the attitudeof Rwandeseleaders,in Rwanda as in Burundi
tradition - whetherembodiedin a modifiedconceptof kingship,or in a
revivalof clientagerelations, or in the ancestrallore - is clearlycentralto
the maintenance of stability.
But whereasthe methodsmay seem alike, the end is likelyto be very
different.For if in thecase of Rwandathesemethodshaveworkedreasonably
well,in Burundi,wherethe sourceof stressis essentially racial in character,
theyhave provedless thanadequate. Unlikewhathas happenedin Rwanda
where stresshas been sequentialratherthan cumulative,in Burundithe
race issuehas come intofocusin conjunction with,and to some extentas a
resultof, the problemsof economicdistribution and politicalparticipation
createdby the country'saccess to independence. In Rwanda threatsto
stabilitystem fromwhateverdiscrepancies exist betweenwhat the govern-
mentsetout to achieveaftertherevolution and itsactuallevelof performance
in the economicand social realms;in Burundithisproblemis also present
but is made infinitely more arduousby the existenceof fundamental dis-
agreementsamong the new elites over what constitutesthe legitimate
constitutionalorder,and,above all, by the factthatthesedisagreements tend
to coincidewith separatesubcultures.This is the reasonwhy in Burundi
the importance of theCrownas a stabilizingfactoris likelyto recedeto the
334

pointwhereit maybe supplantedby the sheerstrengthof ethnicaffinities,

as in Rwanda,expressedthrougha civilianor militarygovernment, or a
of both.
combination
Indeed,if thepresenttrendis allowedto continue, in each country
stability
maywell ultimately dependon the tiesof ethnic
solidaritywhich existamong
the elitesin power,and on the senseof mutualrepulsionthateach country
alreadyharbourstowardstheother. Alreadythe flowof Tutsi refugeesfrom
Rwanda has had a profoundeffect,psychologically and otherwise,on the
Tutsi elitesof Burundi,just as the exodusof Hutu refugeesfromBurundi
has tendedto reinforcefeelingsof ethnicsolidarityamong the elites of
Rwanda. A fulldiscussionof theinternational dimensionof internalstability
would carryus far beyondthe scope of this paper; but therecan be little
questionthatin yearsaheadthisaspectof theproblemwill takeon increasing
relevanceto an understanding of the political realitiesof each country.
The crucialissue,then will centreupon the likelihoodof ethnicviolence
deteriorating violence,and thison a scalethatmightinvolve
intointernational
theintervention of thirdpowerswithinand outsidetheAfricancontinent.
L'INSTABILITE POLITIQUE EN AFRIQUE :

LE CAS DU RWANDA ET DU BURUNDI
(résumé)
politiqueest un phénomènegénéralen Afriqueet les anciens

L'instabilité
territoiressous tutellebelge,devenusindépendants le 1er juillet 1962, sous
les noms de RépubliqueRwandaiseet Royaumedu Burundi(1) ne font
pas exceptionà cetterègle.L'articleci-dessusanalysesoigneusement les très
nombreuses causes,parfoiscommunesaux deux pays mais plus souventspé-
cifiques,de cetteinstabilité.
Après quelques considérations théoriquessur ce qui pourraitcaractériser
un régimepolitiquecentre-africain considérécommestable,l'études'attache
à définir,touten les distinguant,les bases historiquesdes structuresdes deux
pays, tous deux habitéspar trois ethniesdont l'une, pygmoïde(les Twa,
1 %), joue un rôle effacé,mais dont les deux autres,hutu (84 %) et tutsi
(15 %), furentsouventdéterminantes de tensionspolitiques aiguës. Au
Rwanda,l'aboutissement d'une longue évolutionfut,au début de ce siècle,
un régimeféodalde centralisation extrême, marquépeut-être par un système
particulierde clientèleprotégeant dans une certainemesurele vassal contre
une exploitation excessivede la partde son suzerain.Le Burundi,en revan-
che, était bien plus un agglomératde territoires semi-indépendants, chacun
d'eux constituant un royaumeen miniature,s'efforçantde ne reconnaître
(1) Un coup d'Etata, depuisla rédaction

de cet article,proclaméla destitution
du
monarqueNtare V et l'instaurationd'un régimerépublicaindans le Burundi.
335

RENE LEMARCHAND
qu'un minimumd'allégeance envers le pouvoir centraldu Mwami. Il en résul-

tait au Burundi des antagonismes entre féodaux tutsi qui pouvaient, dans
une certainemesure,servird'exutoire à d'éventuellestensions socio-politiques
hutu-tutsi,tensions qui, au Rwanda, avaient davantage tendance au durcisse-
ment,emprisonnéescomme elles l'étaient dans la gangue monolithique d'une
impitoyablemonarchieabsolue.
La partie suivantede l'articleest alors consacrée à une appréciationnuancée
des quinze dernièresannées de la vie politique du Rwanda, marquées par une
interventiondélibérée et très perceptible des autorités belges de tutelle et
de l'Eglise catholique, par la révolution hutu de novembre 1959, par le
choix de 1961 qui, sous le contrôle des Nations Unies, conduisit à l'abroga-
tion de la monarchie et à l'instaurationd'un régime présidentiel.Et, d'une
part, l'auteur constate de profonds changements institutionnels,retentissant
réellementsur les conditionsd'existencedes habitantshutu des collines, mais,
d'autre part, il est frappé de devoir observer combien le comportementdes
nouvelles autorités mises en place par le régime républicain apparaît fré-
quemment comme une réplique des attitudes des féodaux de jadis. Cette
analyse très fouillée constitue l'un des passages les plus attachantsde l'arti-
cle, d'où il se dégage qu'à l'ancien solide commun dénominateurdes Hutu
- l'opposition au Tutsi féodal - a souvent succédé localement une incon-
testable phase de flottement,variable d'ailleurs selon les régions. Et le parti
politique qui a conduit les Hutu à la victoire politique se trouve désormais
confrontéavec un difficilechoix entre les purges que requerraitla poursuite
d'une révolution permanente ou l'acceptation de situations doctrinalement
non satisfaisantesmais permettantl'utilisationdu parti pour une tâche urgente
de constructionéconomique nationale. Il semble que - la stabilité politique
serait à ce prix - la deuxième branche de l'alternativesoit dans l'ensemble
dominante, ce qui accentue l'analogie entre les rapports actuels « autorités
politiques - paysans des collines », et certains liens de clientèle du passé.
Il n'est pas jusqu'au rôle du Président de la République qui, par certains
côtés, ne commence à rappeler ce qu'était jadis fondamentalementle com-
portementdu Mwami.
Un chapitre est ensuite consacré au Burundi, indiquant les ressemblances
et les dissemblancesentre les situationsdes deux pays. Un facteurspécifique-
ment rundi a résidé dans l'antagonisme historique de deux familles : les
Batare et les Besi, qui donnèrentnaissance à deux partis politiques s'affron-
tant bientôt violemment, l'un soutenu par l'administrationbelge, l'autre
conduit au succès électoral de septembre1961 par le fils du Mwami régnant,
le Prince Rwagasore, assassiné quelques semaines après son accession aux
fonctionsde Premier Ministre.Le Burundi ayant ainsi été dominé politique-
ment par un parti, non de masse comme au Rwanda mais de personnalité,la
mort de Rwagasore laissa le pays désemparé; le parti Uprona décapité se
scinda bientôt en deux fractionsopposées, qu'il est peut-êtredangereux de
qualifier d'une étiquette simplifiée,comme on le fit parfois, de pro-hutu et
de pro-tutsi,ou encore de pro-Monrovia et de pro-Casablanca, mais qui
constituèrentincontestablementdeux groupes se disputant la suprématie du
pouvoir au prix d'affrontements de plus en plus sanglants.
336

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN AFRICA : THE CASE OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI
Une tentativede dégagerles lignes directricesprofondesde l'évolution

politiquerécentedu Burundi,avec les effortsdu Mwami pour exercerune
influenceen faveurdu clan bénéficiant de ses préférences,
avec des phases
où se retrouvent des symptômes du conflittutsi-hutu comme Га vécu le
Rwanda,composealorsla dernièrepartiede l'article,qui atteintencorechro-
nologiquement la phase historiquede la dépositiondu Mwambutsapar son
filsNdizeye,maisnon l'épisodesuivant- qu'il prophétiseentreles lignes-
du coup d'Etat du CapitaineMicombero,le 29 novembre1966. Quand ce
résuméparaîtra,un nouvellepage d'histoireaura encoreété écritepour le
Burundi,qui vraisemblablement n'infirmera guère les constatationspéné-
trantesde René Lemarchandconcernantl'instabilitépolitique en Afrique
Centrale.
337


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Political instability in Africa : the case of Rwanda and Burundi / L'INSTABILITE POLITIQUE

EN AFRIQUE : LE CAS DU RWANDA ET DU BURUNDI

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(*) The presentarticleis a revisedversionof a paperdeliveredat the 1966 annual

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onlyneedsto look at theRepublicof theCongo (Kinshasa)to findthe same

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of theproteanqualitiesof thisterm,used alternatively to referto differences

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A finalwordor cautionabout the meaningof the terms" stability " and

II. The TraditionalRoots of Stability

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successivewaves of Hamide pastoralistsspead their dominationover the

(5) FrederickDuke of Mecklemburg,In the Heart of Africa (London : Cassei and

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 16:40:02 PM

relationship betweenclientand patron,in some waysreminiscent of the ties

(6) This is also themajorsourceof socialdifferendoti

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.49 on Wed, 18 Jun 2014 16:40:02 PM

monarchy, and thefactthatit stoodas a symbolof Tutsi supremacy, help to

(a) Burundi: Conflictas a source of Stability

(9) B. Malinowski,Magic, Scienceand Religion and otheressays (New York:

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a dramaticillustration of the difference notedabove betweenrebellionand

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German colonization,however,most of the northernHutu kingdoms

(12) See for exampleWilliam Roger Louis, Ruanda-JJrundí 1884-1919 (Oxford:

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Althoughone mightbe tempedat this point to explain the stabilityof

(b) Rwanda: The Functionalvs. Power Interpretations

(14) JacquesMaquet,The Premiseof Inequality(London: OxfordUniversity Press,

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to assumethatthe Pax Belgica,by virtueof the limitationsit imposedon

(16) To the extentthat each of these interpretations emphasizesthe functional

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of thepoliticalsystem, in Burundi,wherecleavageswere less consistent,the

III. Rwanda: The ThermidorianSyndrome

(17) H. Arendt,On Revolution(New York: The VikingPress,1963), p. 35.

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regime;a structure of accountabilityhas been established, in the formof a

(a) The Resurgenceof the TraditionalRole Structure

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are due to thelordhimselfor to theofficial...meansa surrender of thepure

(18) H. H. Gerthand С WrightMills, From Max Weber: Essaysin Sociology

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typesof behavioras spyingand politicalassassination, bothof whichare still

(b) Sources of Conflict

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We have seen,forexample,how the politicization of primordialties among

(20) For an illuminatingdiscussion of the " partyof

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(c) The Quest forStability

(21) Nowherein this phenomenon betterillustratedthan in the storytold by a

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systemactuallyfunctioned.Somethingsimilarto this can be observedin

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of being pouredinto the shiftingcrevicesof social structures, servingas a

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