THE ROLE OF IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY IN THE ACQUISITION OF

EAST AFRICAN COLONY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Author(s): Raj Kumar Trivedi
Source: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress , 1971, Vol. 33 (1971), pp. 616-623
Published by: Indian History Congress

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44145417

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THE ROLE OF IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY
IN THE ACQUISITION OF EAST AFRICAN
COLONY IN THE SECOND HALF OF
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Raj Kumar Trivedi (Aligarh)

In this paper an attempt has been made to discuss British in

in East Africa, and the Role of the Imperial British East Africa
in the acquisition of the East African colony.
Great Britain had strategic and economic interests in this r
The sultan of Zanzibar claimed sovereignty over the Eastern coast
though he had no effective control over the interior.2 Great Br
enjoyed supermacy in this region since the Napoleonic wars3
also enjoyed trade and commercial monopoly in the area. It h
been the British policy to exercise informal control by maintain
integrity of the kingdom of Zanzibar.4
The safeguarding of the sea route to India was her vital interes
from this strategic consideration, the island of Zanzibar and th
coast of the African mainland were significant areas of trade and
for Great Britain and India. The business, banking, commercial
wholesale trade, and most of the retail trade in East Africa w
hands of Indians.6 A large number of Indians had settled th
bulk of the import and export trade of the kingdom was in the
the British and the Indians. The 'Indian' interests were also, o
included in the British Interest. In 1860 and 1864, the trade
Britain and British India was more than twice that of the Germ
nearly thrice of the U.S.A.8
The Government of India looked after the political affa
Zanzibar.9 In 1870's a number of expeditions were sent to ex
Lake region. Their aims were partly commercial and partly huma
The number of such expeditions went on multiplying.10
It is argued by some historians that British interests in East Af
primarily philanthropic. Her main concern was to stop the A
trade in the Indian Ocean. David Lugard, however, admits that

616

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 617

'brains', capital and energy have not been applied to Africa from motives
of pure philanthropy.11 Implied in the suppression of slave-trade was the
weakening of the Arab economic hold in the region.1* This would naturally
facilitate the extension of British political and economic influence.
The other argument is that in East Africa, British Empire had mainly
strategic interests, to safeguard the sea route to India and the head-waters
of the river Nile. (Robinson and Gallagher).
But the fact is that the British Empire had direct political and econo-
mic interests in this region. She had the greatest stake in East Africa.13
Why she had not shown any particular desire to annex East Africa formally
was only because she could quite well secure British interests through
informal control, instead of direct rule.14
There were great changes in the industrial strength of European
powers in and after 1870's. Hitherto, Britain had enjoyed a practical
world-wide industrial monopoly. In 1870's, with the onset of the Great
Depression, 1873, her share of manufacturing started declining in compa-
rison to the U.S.A. and Germany. Her balance of trade was becoming
adverse.1* Tariff walls were being raised by other states while Britain still
preferred free trade. British export of Capital also experienced adverse
conditions. British economy was affected by the Depression.16 To meet
this situation, her attention was drawn towards the primary producing
areas, prominently in Africa, for new markets and the export of Capital.17
In the 1870's Africa was themain scene of colonization. Among
the European Powers, Germany and France adopted aggressive postures
in Africa. Particularly, Germany pursued a delibrate policy of economic
'openings' of different areas in Africa, for securing naval bases, raw materials,
possible places for immigration and export of Capital.18 Even the Egyptian
Khedive made advances in the upper Nile and Great Lake region.19 The
discovery of Gold in South Africa started the anxious hunt for minerals in
all parts of Africa.
In 1882, Great Britain decided to occupy Egypt. This British action
began the "scramble" of Africa. It was expected that British interests in
West and East Africa would face challenges from other European powers
as a result of this British action.20 When followed by German action in
South- West Africa in 1884, it made the final Partition of African "Conti-
nent" inevitable. The Berlin Conference of 1884 laid down the principle
that no annexation or Protectorate would be recognized unless made
effective by occupation.
In 1885, Dr. Karl Po ters, the first President of the German Colonial
Society, arrived on the Eastern Coast of Africa, and entered into several

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 618

treaties with the native Chiefs. He ignored the vague claims of sovereignty
by the Sultan of Zanzibar. "Over his shadowy rights" on the Eastern
Coast21 Sultan Barghash lodged a protest with Germany against the vio-
lation of his sovereignty. The German Government, undaunted, granted
a charter to the German Colonial Society. Soon a commercial treaty with
Sultan followed, the Sultan ceding the port of Dares-Salam to Germany. The
establishment of a German Colony in East Africa with a major sea port
in the Indian Ocean alarmed Great Britain. These changes occurred in
her area of "informal Empire". The possibility of Germany becoming a
colonial power were laughed at in British government circles ; but the
laughter was probably a forced one.22
Britain faced a new situation in this region. She had a powerful
rival-now, who was encroaching into her areas of preponderance, whether
political or economic. Her old interests of securing the sea route to Indian
Empire was important. But she had to decide about the African continent
itself.
Lord Granville, threxV out a suggestion to Germany for a delimitation
of the territory, to avert any contingency.23 To neutralize this region
Britain entered into two treaties with Germany on 29 October, 1886 and
1 November, 1886, similar to the Anglo-French agreement of 1862.24
Despite continuity of interest British Government failed to devise a
consistent policy. Yet she had to take part in the Partition of Africa to
carve out the spheres of influence and concessions.25
Dilke and Lord Granville saw the diplomatic side of the events.26
Britain decided not to initiate any move, in the larger interests of her em-
pire. There were domestic pressures too, and her statesmen were unfamiliar
with the realities of East Africa.27
These events resulted in the collapse of Sultan of Zanzibar's sover-
eignty over the Eastern Coast. This forced the British ministers momen-
tarily to sit up and take notice.28 It could not be visualized that Great
Britain will have no important sea port in between Natal and Aden. They
first resorted to protect Britain's predominant interests by diplomatic
actions.29 When they carved out the spheres of influence, anticipatory
annexations were uppermost in their minds.30 The changed atmosphere
modified the British practice of diplomacy. German advances, forced her
to reconsider the question whether she were to establish direct rule or not.
From this time onward, the British Foreign office began to encourage
private entrepreneurs and traders, who had old interests in this region.
In 1872, William Mackinnon, a Scottish businessman, founded the
British India Steam Navigation Company. The Company established
regular communication between India- Zanzibar and Europe. Realizing

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 619

the threat to his Domiņions Sultan Barghash offered through Derby, a

concession on his mainland Dominion, to William Mackinnon.31 Without
the support of the Foreign office, however, he was not ready to proceed
with the offer. The concession fell through.
In 1887, William Mackinnon met Sultan Barghash along with an
Arabist, Badger. - But Mackinnon's scheme failed again. Why it failed
is not clear. T.V. Lister, a Foreign Office official later on wrote, that
there was secret history behind the failure.38 It seems that the Foreign
office feared some involvement on the mainland.
However, some changes in attitude were noticeable- Lord Salisbury
and Rosebery took some interest in African affairs.33 In the Foreign office,
Percy Anderson and his successor Clement Hill in the African department,
began to give consideration to commercial factors in East Africa. British
Consuls at Zanzibar, Kirk and Halmwood were pressing for early action.34
In 1887, William Mackinnon, succeeded in securing a concession from
the Sultan.35 His East African Association, applied for a Royal Charter,
for without this security private capital would not flow in this area. The
British Government sought German approval for the request. The charter
was, however, refused.
Foreign office realized the dangers of Dr. Karl Peters activities in
the Southern region of the Lake Victoria. East Africa Association des-
patched Johnston, to interior and enter into treaties like Dr. Peters. Later
on H.M. Stanley and Capt. Lugard were also sent with the same object
in view. It was on the basis of the treaties made by them36 the East
Africa was secured for Great Britain.
On 18 April, 1888, the founders of the East Africa Association,
reconstituted themselves into the Imperial British Africa Company with a
subscribed capital of £ 240,000. It was essentially a trading company.37 It
had its base at Mombasa.
The declared objective of the IBEA38 was to bring the concessions
under the effective occupation of the IBEA. The other major objective was
to obtain a Royal Charter from the Crown to secure treaties from native
chiefs under the British sphere of influence to construct roads and railways
and to open the area for trade and commerce.
It was not only in East Africa that British position were under strain.
Elsewhere also, her traditional position was challenged by other Imperialist
powers. At this juncture the IBEA came to British Government's diplo-
matic assistance39 as the custodian of Imperial interests. The soundness
of Mackinnon's schemes was realized.40 In the Lake region the British stakes
were high, and the kingdom of Uganda was to be saved from falling into

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 620

any foreign hand. The IBEA took charge of this responsibility. The
Company was thus from the beginning chartered as a political instrument.41
In 1889, Capt. Lugard took upa job under the IBEA. He along
with a task force was to occupy Uganda.42 On 26 December, 1890 Lugard
executed a treaty with the King of Uganda.
Lord Salisbury, in 1890, entered into three separate agreements with
Germany, Italy and Portugal to secure through diplomatic means the
British sphere of influence. The treaties executed by the IBEA and the
agreements made by Lord Salisbury established the pattern of the British
Colony in East Africa.43
The defence of Imperial interests developed upon the Chartered
Company.44 The occupation of Uganda and maintaining it was a ' political
necessity'. But the resources of IBEA were insufficient for the responsi-
bility. Mackinnon was still not receiving sufficient support from the British
Government.

The IBEA was thus placed in an unequal contest. It had to compete

with the resources of the German Empire.45 The interests of a private
company were identified with the interests of the British Empire, but the
IBEA had to rely on its own resources. While other European Govern-
ments like Italy, Belgium, etc., had given cash subsidies to their trading
companies, the finances of IBEA were dwindling ; and it found it difficult
to raise private capital and induce capital investment.46
It was its responsibility to open the interior for free flow of British
Commerce, capital, and immigrants. It planned a railway project from
Mombasa to Victoria Nyanza. But since no help came, the IBEA decided
to withdraw from Uganda.47
Lord Salisbury paid public tribute to IBEA, and its founder William
Mackinnon, for its services. But at one stage Lord Salisbury had contrasted
dislike for him, and Kitchner advised his removal.48
The I BE A's announcement of withdrawal from Uganda aroused
'public opinion' in England.49 The question before the Government was
whether to retain the territory or abandon it. Lord Rosebery was in
favour of retention, while Harcourt was for its abandonment.50 Gladstone
who had all through opposed annexations was warned by his Scottish agent
that if he vacated Uganda then he will have to "vacate 10 Downing Street
too".61
A compromise was arrived at between Rosebery and others, and a
decision to obtain a report from Gerald Portal, the Consul at Zanzibar,
was taken.
Portal gave his report in favour of Uganda's retention in the Empire.
In August 1894, a Protectorate was declared. The IBEA territories were

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 621

taken over by the Foreign Office in June 1895, and given the name of the
British East Africa Protectorate.
It is well known that trading Ćompanies played an important role in
the acquisition of colonies for the British Empire, during the Partition of
Africa.62 It has been suggested that the authorities deliberately used the
Chartered Company for building the Empire.53 The Chartered Company
submitted every treaty to the Foreign office. It acted 'with the continued
knowledge of Her Majesty's Government'.54
. It thus seems, that the task of expansion, during the "scramble" was
given to the Chartered Companies.55 However, these Companies were
different from their prototypes of the 16th and 1 7th centuries. The earlier
companies were primarily private monopolies and in tune with the general
economic policy of the Government. The companies of 1880's were not
granted monopoly of trade. Their responsibilities were more Imperial than
Commercial. They mainly formed buffers between the Imperial Govern-
ment and other foreign states.56
The British Government's support was assured by the grant of the
charter itself.57 When the British policy of informal control became obsolete
in 1880's British Government resorted to diplomatic efforts of defending its
spheres of interests through agreements. The main objective of these
was to neutralize the region. They had the confidence, that with their
industrial and naval supremacy, the policy of laissez faire could be conti-
nued. A compromise in Africa at that time would have gone against her
elsewhere. But the spheres of British influence were defined through
them.

The chartered company was the most convenient instrument during

the transition period, when the old policy had not been abandoned and a
new one had not yet emerged.58 Colonial development through the
Chartered Company was only a stage not lasting one.59 Yet without it,
the East African Empire could not have been obtained.
In short it may be concluded that in 1880's British Empire had to
face the challenges from other imperialists. She had vital Imperial and
economic interests in this region. She herself looked for new areas of
Capital investment and sources of raw materials.
So long as the policy of 'informal control' worked well, there was no
desire to include primary producing areas in the British Empire* She
enjoyed monopoly in industry and preferred the policy of laissez faire.
But in the 1880's this was no longer possible. For some time Britain tried
to continue with her traditional role by taking up the question with the
other powers, notably Germany, at a diplomatic level. But this proved
abortive. She had to devise a new policy towards Africa itself. The grant

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 622

of Royal Charter to the trading company with the primary aim of acquiring
areas of spheres of influence, was an important part. British objectives of
Imperalism were the same in this region as elsewhere, only her methods
had changed.

REFERENCES

1. D.K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empire (1966), p. 215.

2€ Reginald Coupland, The Exportation of Africa , p. 26.
3. R. Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians. The Of
Mind of Imperialism (1967), p. 42.
4. Ibid , p. 43.
D.C.M. Piatt, Finance , Trade and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815-
(1968), p. 361.
5. Op . Cit . p. 190.
6. Coupland, p. 5.
7. P.L. McDermott - The British East Africa , p. 2 or IBEA (1893).
8. Coupland, p. 77.
9. Charles Eliot, The East African Protectorate , p. 26.
10. E.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 , p. 187.
11. David Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1965), p. 6
12. R. Robinson and John Gallagher, p. 14.
13. D.K. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empire , p. 214.
14. R. Robinson and John Gallagher, p. 42.
15. Derek H. Aldcroft and Harry W. Richardson, The British Economy
1939 (1968), p. 67.
16. D.C.M. Piatt, p. 362.
17. Ibid, p. 68 ; R. Robinson and John Gallagher, p. 18.
18. S.H. Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa (1939) , p. 17.
David Lugard, p. 9.
19. Reusch, History of East Africa (1954), p. 297.
20. E.C.K. Ensor, p. 189.
C.J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists , Vol. I. (1967), p. 123.
21. H.H. Johnston, A History of Colonization in Africa by alien races , p. 267.
22. H.H. Johnston, p. 276.
23. P.L. McDermott, p. 5.
24. R. Robinson and John Gallagher, p. 190, C.J. Lowe, Vol. I, p. 125, Charles
Eliot, p. 137.
25. E.C.K. Ensor, p. 188.
26. Ibid., p. 190,
27. R. Robinson and John Gallagher, p. 21.
28. Ibid., p. 14.
29. Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. Ill, p. 167.
30. M. Barrat-Brown, After Imperialism, p. 87.
31. CHBE Vol. Ill, p. 73.
32. Marie de Kiewet, British East Africa Company, pp. 43-44.
33. E.C.K. Esnor, p. 190. ; CHBE, Vol. Ill, p. 130.
34. Ibid.

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 623

35. Charles Eliot, p. 27.

36. D.K. Fieldhouse, p. 221.
37. P.L. McDermott, p. 10.
38, Imperial British East Africa Company .
39. C.P. Lucas, The British Empire (1916), p. 149.
40. C.P. Lucas, The British Empire (1916), p. 104.
41. R. Robinson and John Gallagher, p. 250.
42. Charles Eliot, p. 28. (IBEA sought permission from the Govt, of India to
recruit soldiers from the neighbourhood of Delhi, and permission to recruit Sikhs was
refused. McDermott, p. 151).
43. D.K. Fieldhouse, p. 215.
Charles Eliot, pp. 137-138.
44. CHBE Vol. Ill, pp. 165-168, 227.
45. Egerton, A Short History of British Colonial Policy , p. 467.
H.H. Johnston, p 337 ; P.L. McDermott, p. 140.
46. P.L. McDermott, p. 176.
47. Ibid., p. 194 (4 September, 1891).
48. C.J. Lowe, p. 127.
49. Times wrote in favour of retaining Uganda for the Empire.
50. E.C.K. Ensor, p. 212.
51. David Lugard, p. 616.
52. A. Wyatt Tilby, Britain in the Topics (1527-1910).
53. M.E. Townshend and C.H. Peake - European Colonial Expansion since
1871 (1941), p. 14. ; C.P. Lucas, p. 150.
54. P.L. McDermott, p. 247 (Quotes the speech of Burdett Coutts, M.P. of the
House of Commons).
55. N.W. Nigeria Company of Goldie (1886), IBEA of William Mack innon
(1888) and British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes (1889), see S.H. Frankel,
pp. 21-22.
56. David Lugard, Dual Mandate , p. 23.
57. R. Robinson and John Gallagher, p. 250.
58. S.H. Frankel, p. 22.
59. E.C.K. Ensor, p. 190.

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