Legal and Judicial Ethics

Contents 1
Legal and Judicial Ethics – Bar Examinations 2023
C O N TEN TS
Contents .....................................................................................................................................................................................1
Basic Facts...................................................................................................................................................................................2
Practice of Law ...........................................................................................................................................................................4
Admission to the Practice of Law ..............................................................................................................................................5
Lawyers’ Duties to Society .........................................................................................................................................................6
Gross immorality....................................................................................................................................................................6
Deceitful conduct, gross misconduct, and violations of law ............................................................................................ 10
Advertisements and solicitation of legal business ............................................................................................................ 23
MCLE Compliance ............................................................................................................................................................... 23
Lawyers in government service ......................................................................................................................................... 25
Office of the Solicitor General ....................................................................................................................................... 29
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel ............................................................................................................. 30
Lawyers’ Duties to the Bar ...................................................................................................................................................... 30
Uphold integrity and dignity of the legal profession ........................................................................................................ 30
Respect for other lawyers .................................................................................................................................................. 32
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines ................................................................................................................................ 33
Respectful language ........................................................................................................................................................... 33
Non-sharing of attorney’s fees .......................................................................................................................................... 35
Prohibition against unauthorized practice of law ............................................................................................................. 35
Lawyers’ Duties to the Courts................................................................................................................................................. 36
Respect for the courts and its officers............................................................................................................................... 36
Obedience to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies .......................................................................................................... 37
Truthfulness to the courts .................................................................................................................................................. 40
Temperate and respectful language.................................................................................................................................. 43
Abuse of court processes ................................................................................................................................................... 45
Prohibition against influence peddling .............................................................................................................................. 48
Lawyers’ Duty to their Clients ................................................................................................................................................. 49
Attorney-client relationship ............................................................................................................................................... 49
Conflict of interest .............................................................................................................................................................. 51
Lawyer’s negligence ........................................................................................................................................................... 57
Accounting and turn over of client’s funds and properties.............................................................................................. 69
Prohibition on obtaining loans from clients ...................................................................................................................... 76
Attorney’s fees .................................................................................................................................................................... 77
Attorney’s lien ..................................................................................................................................................................... 81
Use of honest and legal means .......................................................................................................................................... 83
Confidential information .................................................................................................................................................... 83
Termination of attorney-client relationship ...................................................................................................................... 84
Discipline of Erring Lawyers .................................................................................................................................................... 85
Jurisdiction to discipline lawyers ....................................................................................................................................... 85
Nature of disciplinary cases ............................................................................................................................................... 86
Administrative cases vis-à-vis criminal cases ................................................................................................................ 88
Due process in administrative proceedings ...................................................................................................................... 88
Effect of death .................................................................................................................................................................... 89
Burden and quantum of proof ........................................................................................................................................... 89
Affidavit of desistance ........................................................................................................................................................ 97
Repeated violations ............................................................................................................................................................ 97
Penalty................................................................................................................................................................................. 98
Notarial Practice ...................................................................................................................................................................... 98
Basic principles ................................................................................................................................................................... 98
Notarial commission ........................................................................................................................................................... 99
Notarial register ................................................................................................................................................................ 100
Submission of notarized documents ........................................................................................................................... 101
Competent evidence of identity ...................................................................................................................................... 101
Personal appearance before a notary public .................................................................................................................. 104
Other acts of dereliction .................................................................................................................................................. 107
Discipline of notary public ................................................................................................................................................ 111
Judges and clerks of court as notaries public.................................................................................................................. 111
Judicial Ethics ......................................................................................................................................................................... 111
Inhibition of Judges ............................................................................................................................................................... 112
Administrative Complaints against Judges .......................................................................................................................... 116
#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#DefendPressFreedom #SerenoIsTheFirstFemaleChiefJustice
Basic Facts 2
B AS IC FAC TS
1. Marcos is no hero. In fact, his burial in the grave of heroes on the impulse of [Dictator] Duterte, would continue
the desecration of other citizens’ rights, a chilling legacy of the Marcos dictatorship and evil that survives to this
very day, long after the death of the dictator. (Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Sereno in Ocampo v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc)
2. Marcos’ interment at the LNMB is contrary to public policy. Marcos is a dictator forced out of office and into
exile after causing twenty years of political, economic, and social havoc in the country. In short, he was ousted
by the Filipino people. Marcos was forcibly removed from the Presidency by what is now referred to as the
People Power Revolution. This is the strongest form of dishonorable discharge from office since it is meted out
by the direct act of the sovereign people. Since the dictator was discharged dishonorably serves to convert his
burial into a private affair of the Marcos family. Hence, no public purpose is served by interring his remains at
the LNMB. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio in Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016,
En Banc)
3. The ponencia’s characterization of Marcos as just a human who erred like us, trivializes the magnitude of the
suffering that he inflicted on scores of Filipinos. His errors were not errors that a President is entitled to commit.
They were exceptional in both severity and scale. They were inhuman acts. Marcos provided the atmosphere
of impunity that allowed the molestations, rape, torture, death, and disappearance of Filipinos. Marcos was the
President who, rather than preserve and protect the public trust, caused untold anguish upon thousands of
Filipino families. Marcos plundered the nation’s coffers. The systematic plunder was so exceptional and
outrageous that even after being ousted, he and his family brought more than P27 million in freshly printed
notes, 23 wooden crates, 12 suitcases and bags, and various boxes of jewelry, gold bricks, and enough clothes
to fill 57 racks with them to their exile in Hawaii. These were not accidents that humans, like us, commit. These
were deliberate and conscious acts by one who abused his power. To suggest that these were mere errors is
an attempt to erase the dictator’s accountability for the atrocities during Martial Law. It is an attempt to usher
in and guarantee impunity for them as well as for those who will commit the same in the future. Marcos is not
a hero. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En
Banc)
4. There is sufficient basis to rule that the burial of the dictator Marcos in the LNMB will violate certain
international law principles and obligations, which the Philippines has adopted and must abide by, and R.A.
10368 which transformed the principle and State policy expressed in Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution.
(Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa in Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc)
5. The very presence in LNMB of the remains of Marcos – a dictator and authoritarian; perpetrator of numerous
and gross human rights abuses involving summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance,
arbitrary detention and other atrocities; plunderer of the Philippine economy with enormous ill-gotten wealth
and kleptocrat; dishonorably separated and evicted President by People Power, dishonorably discharged
Commander-in-Chief; fabricator of allegedly received U.S. medals and allegedly committed “heroic” actions
while being a soldier – is an affront to LNMB’s sacredness and hallowedness as the legally designated and
recognized Philippine heroes’ burial site or cemetery. It does not further the esteem and reverence that LNMB
rightly deserves as the memorial in honor of the heroism, patriotism, gallantry, and nationalism of our war dead
and fallen soldiers and military personnel. Its positive cultural and historical significance and integrity are grossly
violated. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa in Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017, En
Banc)
6. Martial law arises from necessity, when the civil government cannot maintain peace and order, and the powers
to be exercised respond to that necessity. However, under his version of martial law, Marcos placed all his
actions beyond judicial review and vested in himself the power to "legally," by virtue of his General Orders, do
anything, without limitation. It was clearly not necessary to make Marcos a dictator to enable civil government
to maintain peace and order. President Marcos also prohibited the expression of dissent, prohibiting "rallies,
demonstrations, and other forms of group actions" in the premises not only of public utilities, but schools,
colleges, and even companies engaged in the production of products of exports. Clearly, these powers were
not necessary to enable the civil government to execute its functions and maintain peace and order, but rather,
to enable him to continue as self-made dictator. Marcos' implementation of martial law was a total abuse and
bastardization of the concept of martial law. A reading of the powers which Marcos intended to exercise makes
it abundantly clear that there was no public necessity that demanded that the President be given those powers.
Martial law was a stratagem. It was an artifice to hide the weaknesses of his leadership as people rose up to
challenge him. It was ruse to perpetuate himself in power despite the term limitations in the 1973 Constitution.
(Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Lagman v. Pimentel III, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018, En Banc)
7. It is no argument that this martial law is different from the martial law of the seventies. Those of us who lived
through those days were also told of the myth of the New Society or the Bagong Lipunan. Many among us were
beguiled with the narrative of a strong, brilliant, and omniscient leader — only to wake up years later with all
our democratic institutions not only undermined but also rendered impotent. The narrative of a benevolent

Basic Facts 3
authoritarian is never true. We have not learned our lessons well. The violent manifestations by those whom
we call rebels or violent extremists are the product of the abuses and inequality within our society. These are
acts of desperation delivered by corruption and a system that rewards greed and fails to make meaningful
citizens of us all. History writes of the folly of the authoritarian that keeps power through fear. Reading the
history of our people correctly, we should already know that it will be the political and economic empowerment
of our people that will assure that those who resort to violence will be dissuaded, discovered, or weakened.
The declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus over a wide
swath of territory does the exact opposite. That is why it should never be normal. It cannot be allowed to be
extended three (3) times. That is why its declaration should be scrutinized carefully, deliberately and
conscientiously, by both the Congress and this Court. It is an exceptional measure. It should not hide the lack
of professionalism, the failures of intelligence, and the inefficiencies that have spawned our troubles. Those
who dissent within a society are not necessarily its enemies, or its government's. It may just be that they
perform the role of asking those in power and in the majority to pause and listen to reason, rather than
acquiesce to the tendencies of the strongest among them. I regret that, in this case and for the fourth time, we
did not again take careful pause. Despite the woeful state of the data provided to us, the majority looked the
other way. It would have been this Court's opportunity to show that we can reason better and truly think for
ourselves. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 243522, February 19, 2019,
En Banc)
8. Justice Leonen's description of the [Dictator] Marcos' regime and its effect on the nation was based on law,
history, and jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the Marcos regime as authoritarian,
referred to "the Marcoses and their cronies"; acknowledged the illegal wealth the Marcoses stashed away which
the government has been attempting to recover; and noted the suffering the Marcos regime had wrought on
the Filipino people. To recall, in their motion to inhibit, protestant and the Solicitor General quote heavily from
Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion in Ocampo, claiming that the quoted portions demonstrate Justice Leonen’s
bias against protestant. In particular, protestant and the Solicitor General take exception to Justice Leonen's
explanation on why the [Dictator] Marcos should not have been buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani, namely:
that he was not a hero; that he invented his supposed medals of honor; that he allowed his family, associates,
and cronies to plunder the Philippine coffers; that even the Supreme Court, throughout the decades, has
identified him to be an authoritarian and dictator, and held that Swiss deposits in the amount of
US$658,175,373.60 under the name of the Marcoses had been ill-gotten wealth, to be forfeited in favor of the
government; and that the abuses during his regime caused suffering for millions of Filipinos. Both protestant
and the Solicitor General also claim that Justice Leonen's prejudice against protestant is apparent because his
dissenting opinion mentioned the accountability of the [Dictator] Marcos' relatives for certain offenses
committed during his regime. Justice Leonen's description of the [Dictator] Marcos' regime and its effect on the
nation was based on law, history, and jurisprudence. In other words, that Marcos is a dictator is supported by
facts.
a. In Mijares v. Ranada, the Supreme Court lamented the nation’s pains in the aftermath of the Marcos
dictatorship. The Court said: “Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet
to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom and the fundamental structures and
processes of democracy have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however,
have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial
law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and
sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due them cannot
be extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage
done was not merely personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve
the award of reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.”
b. In Marcos v. Manglapus, the Supreme Court noted the hardships the nation faced in rebuilding itself after
the Marcos regime, and recognized the government’s efforts to recover the illegal wealth stashed away by
the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. The Court said: “This case is unique. It should not create a precedent,
for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic
and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class
by itself.” The Court added that: “We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the
Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a
position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in
its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We
cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign
borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root
causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.”
c. Galman v. Sandiganbayan illustrated how the [Dictator] Marcos’ use of his authoritarian powers corrupted
the judicial process and rue of law. The Court declared the following: “Last August 21st, our nation marked
with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of
foremost opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years
since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was

Practice of Law 4
sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been
committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled
to trial by judicial process by civil courts he repudiated. The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning
to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report,, and borne out by the happenings (res
ipsa loquitura), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential
Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable
(it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera
prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at
the Malacañang conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public
clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal
shield of double jeopardy.”
d. Republic v. Sandiganbayan recognized the gargantuan task the government faced in relation to the
Marcoses and their illegal wealth – referring to the Marcoses, and not only to the dictator Marcos. The
Court said: “The EDSA revolution in February 1986 swept the Marcoses out of power. One of the first official
acts of then President Corazon C. Aquino was the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) under E.O No. 1. It was given the difficult task of recovering the illegal wealth of the
Marcoses, their family, subordinates and close associates. In due time, the Marcoses and their cronies had
to face a flurry of cases, both civil and criminal, all designed to recover the Republic's wealth allegedly
plundered by them while in power.”
e. Moreover, the assessment in Justice Leonen's dissenting opinion is supported not only by jurisprudence,
but by Republic Act No. 10368, or the Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013.
Indeed, the Solicitor General omitted the extensive discussion on the Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013 which immediately preceded Justice Leonen's statement regarding the
accountability of the Marcoses. Like the cases before that have referred generally to the Marcoses and
their cronies, and the need to recover their illegally gotten wealth, Republic Act No. 10368 itself expressly
mentions the [Dictator] Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, and their immediate relatives by consanguinity or
affinity, as well as their close relatives. Thus, the conclusion in Justice Leonen's dissenting opinion, that
Republic Act No. 10368 implies that Marcos' spouse, relatives, associates, cronies, and subordinates were
active participants is based on the text of Republic Act No. 10368. (Marcos v. Robredo, PET No. 005,
November 17, 2020)
9. Considering the relevant circumstances of this case, the amount of One Billion Pesos (P1,000,000,000.00) as
temperate damages is reasonable and justified. It bears stressing that this is not just an ordinary civil action for
recovery of property and damages. This is an action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth which is imbued with public
interest and concerns not only the government but every Filipino citizen, then and now. As part of the healing
process of this nation, the Freedom Constitution specifically mandates the President to prioritize the recovery
of these ill-gotten wealth. Hence, the loss or injury suffered by every Filipino due to Disini's acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth must be duly recognized and compensated. Further, the Court notes that the Filipino people
have not at all benefitted from the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, the project harked upon by the dictator Marcos
and his druggie son, Ferdinand, Jr., as it has remained inoperable as of this writing, a proverbial White Elephant.
Obviously, a considerable amount of public funds had been invested and allocated for the construction of the
BNPP, which funds came from the blood, sweat and tears of the Filipino taxpayers. The ill-gotten wealth should
have been used and spent or and by the rightful owner thereof and not just by one person or a select group of
people in power. Also, the Republic was unduly deprived of its rights over these substantial commissions as part
of public funds, and was compelled to litigate for their recovery for more than three decades. The Court cannot
overemphasize that Disini received these ill-gotten wealth starting in 1976 when the construction of the BNPP
began. Consequently, he had profited immensely from these commissions for a significant portion of his lifetime
at the expense of the Filipinos. Taking into consideration the inflation rate and the Philippine Peso's purchasing
power at that ime, these substantial commissions, if recovered, would have been greatly valued now and could
have been used for the betterment of the Philippines. In addition, the Republic would have been entitled to
recover legal interest on the total amount of commissions received had it proved such. Undeniably, the recovery
of these illegally acquired public funds, properties and assets has great impact on every Filipino's life. Hence,
the award of One Billion Pesos (P1,000,000,000.00) temperate damages is reasonable under the circumstances
taking into consideration the rights of all Filipino citizens encroached upon by Disini's acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth and the damage caused to the Republic for its failure to make good use of the same. (Disini v. Republic
of the Philippines, G.R. No 205172, June 15, 2021, En Banc)
PR AC TIC E O F LAW
1. A lawyer who has been suspended from the practice of law cannot hold the office of the Regional Director of
the Commission on Human Rights because the exercise of the powers and functions of a CHR Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. In thus performing his functions as CHR Regional Director despite his suspension
from law practice, Atty. Baliga should be suspended further from the practice of law. (Lingan v. Atty. Calubaquib,
A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014, Third Division)

Admission to the Practice of Law 5
2. A lawyer who was suspended from the practice who still engages in the practice of law despite his suspension
should be suspended further from the practice of law. She cannot claim as defense that she never received the
resolution that had allegedly suspended her especially when she admitted that she was indeed suspended.
(Ibana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 8313, July 14, 2015, En Banc)
3. Karaan was not engaged in the practice of law in filing the pleadings as it was done pursuant to his right to self-
representation under Rule 138, Section 34 of the Rules of Court. However, since Karaan is already represented
by counsel, the trial court is correct in requiring his counsel to file the pre-trial brief. (Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao,
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, February 3, 2016, Second Division)
4. Atty. Era’s acts constituted practice of law. It is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (a)
appeared on behalf of his winning clients in the public auction of the condemned properties, (b) tendered bid
in the auction for his clients, (c) secured the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the
corporation’s officers and employees present in the premises at that time, (d) insisted that his clients are now
the new owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises, (e) initiated the pull
out of the properties, and (f) negotiated with Bonifacio’s children in his law office as regards the payment of
the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the properties. While it is true that being present in an
auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be exclusively for lawyers, Atty. Era’s acts
clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and consequences of each course
of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award. Precisely, this is why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent
them in the public auction and in any negotiations/settlement with the corporation arising from the labor case
as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era.
a. However, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law because he was suspended at that time.
(Bonifacio v. Atty. Era, A.C. No. 11754, October 3, 2017, En Banc)
5. Respondent's acts of signing and filing of pleadings for his client in Crim. Case No. 4573-BG months after the
promulgation of the Resolution are clear proofs that he practiced law during the period of his suspension. And
as aptly found by the IBP, respondent's unauthorized practice of law is considered a willful disobedience to
lawful order of the court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. As to the penalty imposed, a review of recent jurisprudence reveals that the Court has consistently
impose an additional suspension of six months on lawyers who continue to practice law despite their
suspension. However, considering that the Court had already imposed upon respondent the ultimate penalty
of disbarment for his gross misconduct and willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the court in an earlier
complaint for disbarment filed against him in Zarcilla v. Quesada, Jr., the penalty of additional six months
suspension from the practice of law can no longer be imposed upon him. The reason is obvious: "[o]nce a lawyer
is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his privilege to practice law." (Valmonte v.
Atty. Quesada, Jr., A.C. No. 12487, December 4, 2019, Second Division)
6. Notarizing of documents constitutes a practice of law. (Cansino v. Atty. Sederiosa, A.C. No. 8522, October 6,
2020, En Banc)
ADMIS S IO N TO THE PR AC TIC E O F LAW

1. Respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, must be barred from admission to the Bar.
a. Under Rule 138, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be
admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course. In this case, respondent
never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered
the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. Clearly, respondent has not completed the
requisite pre-law degree.
b. Respondent’s false assumption of his brother’s name, identity and education records renders him unfit for
admission to the Bar. This is so even if respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a
law degree under his real name. This is because, the practice of law is a privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character. Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member
of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the
latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where
he had been working for years.
c. Respondent cannot be disbarred since he was never a lawyer in the first place. Thus, the name “Patrick A.
Caronan” with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 was dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. (Caronan v.
Caronan, A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016, En Banc)
2. The pendency of civil cases alone should not prevent successful Bar examinees to take their Lawyer's Oath and
sign the Roll of Attorneys, unless the same involves acts or omissions which had been previously determined by
the Court to be tainted with moral turpitude. This is of course without prejudice to the filing of any
administrative action against would-be lawyers who fail to continue to possess the required moral fitness of
members of the legal profession.
a. As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a deterrent for successful Bar examinees to take
their Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since not all charges or cases involve acts

Lawyers’ Duties to Society 6
evincing moral turpitude. The facts and circumstances of each case should be taken into account to
establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. If it were
otherwise, one's entitlement to be a member of the legal profession would be seriously jeopardized by the
expedient filing of civil cases, which do not necessarily reflect one's moral character. Thus, the pendency
of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 against Lee is not enough reason to prevent her from taking her Lawyer's
Oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys. The existence of these civil cases alone does not establish that
she committed acts tainted with moral turpitude.
b. It is equally important to note that all civil cases filed against Lee had been dismissed on account of the
compromise she entered into with her creditors. Thus, there is no longer any obstacle which may hinder
her in officially becoming a member of the Bar by taking her oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
c. Nevertheless, Lee must still satisfactorily exhibit that she would not renege on her monetary obligations to
Bolos. As above-mentioned, Civil Case No. 1436 was dismissed after Lee had agreed to enter into a
compromise with Bolos and set the terms and conditions for her to settle her monetary obligation. There
is no question that Lee owes Bolos a sum of money. (So v. Lee, B.M. No. 3288, April 10, 2019, En Banc)
3. Respondent’s admission to the Philippine Bar has long been held in abeyance due to the criminal cases pending
against him before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Per the rollo, it appears that all criminal
charges against him has been dismissed except for the most recent one filed in 2019. The timing of the filing of
this case, however, is highly suspect as it came just as the other criminal charges against respondent were
dismissed on June 28, 2018, January 4, 2019, and October 15, 2019. Thus, it can no longer be denied that the
manifest intention of complainant in successively filing these criminal cases against respondent is to prevent
him from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. The dismissal of all the other criminal
charges against respondent, coupled with the various certifications of good moral character in his favor, is
sufficient for the Court to conclude that respondent possesses the moral qualifications required of lawyers.
(Zuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui, B.M. No. 2796, February 11, 2020, En Banc)
LAWY ER S ’ DU TIES TO S O C IETY
GROSS IMMORALITY
1. Although his siring the child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, Atty. Advincula
committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct was not as
grave than if he had committed the immorality when already a member of the Philippine Bar. However, he
cannot escape administrative liability. (Advincula v. Atty. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, En Banc)
2. Respondent never refuted complainant’s allegation that he would regularly watch “pampagana” movies in his
office-issued laptop. In fact, respondent readily admitted that he indeed watches “interesting shows” while in
the office, albeit insisting that he only does so by himself, and that he would immediately close his laptop
whenever anyone would pass by or go near his table. Without a doubt, it has been established that respondent
habitually watches pornographic materials in his office-issued laptop while inside the office premises, during
office hours, and with the knowledge and full view of his staff. Obviously, such audacious display of depravity
of respondent’s party should not be countenanced not only because his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation
of the government agency he works for – the CAAP where he was engaged at that time as Acting Corporate
Secretary – but also because it shrouds the legal profession in a negative light. As a lawyer in the government
service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge his duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. (Reyes v. Atty. Nieva,
A.C. No. 8560, September 6, 2016, En Banc)
3. Respondent should be held liable for having illicit relations with complainant. (Tumbaga v. Atty. Teoxon, A.C.
No. 5573, November 21, 2017, En Banc)
4. The acts complained of in this case might not be grossly or starkly immoral in its rawness or coarseness, but
they were without doubt condemnable. Respondent lawyer who made avowals to being a respectable father
to three children, and also to being a respected leader of his community apparently had no qualms or scruples
about being seen sleeping in his own bed with another man's wife, his arms entwined in tender embrace with
the latter. Respondent lawyer's claim that he was inspired by nothing but the best of intentions in inviting
another married man's wife and her 10-year old daughter to sleep with him in the same bed so that the three
of them could enjoy good night's rest in his airconditioned chamber, reeks with racy, ribald humor. And in
aggravation or the aforementioned unseemly behavior, respondent lawyer apparently experienced neither
qualms nor scruples at all about exploding into the room occupied by a married man's wife and her 10-year old
daughter and their two other women companions clad with nothing else but a ”tapis" or a towel. Of course,
respondent lawyer sought to downplay this boorish impropriety by saying in his Motion for Reconsideration
that he was wearing a malong and not tapis at that time. And, of course, this plea will not avail because his
scanty trappings gave him no license to intrude into a small room full of women. Respondent lawyer could have
simply asked everyone in the room to step outside for a little while. Or he could have donned his clothing
elsewhere. But these things seemed to have been totally lost to respondent lawyer's density. Indeed,

respondent lawyer seemed to have forgotten that there are rules other men – decent men, – live by. (Fabugais
v. Atty. Faundo, Jr., A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018, First Division)
5. The abandonment by an attorney of his legitimate family in order to cohabit with a married woman constitutes
gross immorality that warrants his disbarment. (Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, Jr., A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019, En
Banc)
6. Respondent maintained sexual relation with complainant and several other faithless contemporaneous
relations while his marriage with his lawful spouse was still subsisting. He was not just in love and lonely and in
good faith to establish another solid foundation for a life-long partnership when he paired with complainant.
He made complainant just one of his flings. His pattern of faithlessness, especially his indiscriminate liaisons,
with emphasis on the fact that complainant was his vulnerable client when he first pursued her — is a clear and
present danger to the profession where utmost fiduciary obligations must be observed. The victims here are
the spouse and the institution of marriage. As held in several cases, respondent is ordered disbarred for
engaging in illicit relations with another woman, albeit, he was still lawfully married to his spouse. (Venzon v.
Atty. Peleo III, A.C. No. 9354, August 20, 2019, En Banc)
7. The facts of the present case are beyond dispute. Both Chan and Carrera acknowledged their undeniable love
affair, with the latter designating the same as a "chemistry of two consensual adults." At the same time, both
of them did not deny the reality that they were still legally married to another. In a heartbeat, they left their
respective homes and moved into a house that Carrera had bought and where they wilfully resided for a good
three (3) years. It is in said house that they played husband and wife to each other and father and mother to
their child. All of these facts, both parties do not contest. At most, their disagreement lies merely in the alleged
time when each found out about the fact that the other was still legally married to his or her spouse. But the
precise date and time one discovered the other party's existing marriage cannot affect the outcome of the case
for both parties nonetheless openly and deliberately cohabited despite knowledge of their status, separating
only when their relationship had turned sour. It is this clear and outright admission that is the basis for Carrera's
disbarment. His endless accomplishments listed in his curriculum vitae cannot render him innocent of the
charges against him. On the contrary, the Court wonders how despite all these achievements in his professional
career, Carrera allowed himself to falter in such a highly scandalous manner. His level of knowledge and
experience should have alerted him of his duty to keep with the standards of morality imposed on every lawyer.
To recall, he even proposed to Chan his services in annulling her marriage. Hence, all of this could have been
avoided had he made an effort to make things right. In Amalia R. Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, Jr., the Court enunciated
that any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or disbarred even if the misconduct relates to
his or her personal life for as long as the misconduct evinces his or her lack of moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor. Every lawyer is expected to be honorable and reliable at all times, for a person who cannot
abide by the laws in his private life cannot be expected to do so in his professional dealings. (Chan v. Atty.
Carrera, A.C. No. 10439, September 3, 2019, En Banc)
8. A married attorney’s abandonment of his spouse in order to live and cohabit with another unquestionably
constitutes gross immorality because it amounts to criminal concubinage or adultery.
a. Converting into Islam after siring the second child of his mistress is a feeble attempt to shield himself from
the disbarment complaint and to conceal his immoral conduct. It is not a defense. (Panagsagan v. Atty.
Panagsagan, A.C. No. 7733, October 1, 2019, En Banc)
9. Dismissal of the adultery charges by the City Prosecutor does not bar the finding of gross immorality charges in
disbarment proceedings. The rule holds true if the dismissal is not yet final and executory or is yet under appeal.
(Hierro v. Atty. Nava II, A.C. No. 9459, January 7, 2020, En Banc)
10. Atty. Teneza committed gross immorality as established by the evidence adduced by the parties and Atty.
Teneza’s own admission. First, Atty. Teneza contracted a second marriage while the first one was still subsisting.
Notably, Atty. Teneza did not dispute the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the marriage contracts
issued by the NSO. Moreover, in his counter-affidavit in the charge for bigamy, Atty. Teneza admitted entering
into a second marriage. This admission more than proves his identity as husband in both marriages and the
existence of the two marriages. Atty. Teneza cannot validly invoke good faith on the ground that he had not
heard from his first wife since 1983. Atty. Teneza was already a lawyer when he contracted the second marriage
in 1993, having been admitted to the bar on March 31, 1976. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the law
before a second marriage may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by
the appropriate court. Moreover, a lawyer who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as
member of the bar.
a. Atty Teneza was complicit to two bigamous marriages. Atty. Teneza knew that Rogelio had a subsisting
marriage when he contracted the second marriage with Mary Grace. The complaint for ejectment wherein
Atty. Teneza was the counsel states that Rogelio is married but separated in fact from his wife. This was
filed in 2005. Thus, when he attended the marriage of Rogelio and Mary Grace in 2006, Atty. Teneza was
fully aware that Rogelio is engaging in an unlawful act. However, he did not do anything to stop Rogelio.

This is a violation of his sworn duty no to support activities aimed at defiance of the law. (Pasamonte v.
Atty. Teneza, A.C. No. 11104, June 9, 2020, En Banc)
11. Atty. Ignacio fell below the standards of morality required of a lawyer when he contracted a bigamous marriage.
It is undisputed that Atty. Ignacio entered into two marriages – in 1978 with Celia and 1985 with Corazon. The
marriage contract and certificate that Corazon submitted further evidence to establish these facts. Also, Atty.
Ignacio admitted the prior marriage with Celia and argued that Corazon knew his civil status. Foremost, a
lawyer’s culpability for gross immorality is not dependent on whether the other party knowingly engaged in an
immoral relationship with him. Notably, Atty. Ignacio was admitted to the bar in 1974 and is already a lawyer
when he married Celia and Corazon. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance of the law requiring that the first marriage
must be annulled before a second marriage may be validly contracted. Finally, Atty. Ignacio exhibited
reproachable conduct when he engaged in extra-marital affairs and sired children with different women other
than his lawful wife. The argument that some of the children were born before 1985 while others after the
divorce in 1990 does not remove the fact that he begot them while his first marriage with Celia is still existing.
(Ignacio v. Atty. Ignacio, A.C. No. 9426, August 25, 2020, En Banc)
12. Respondent is guilty of gross immorality. Records show that complainant alleged that respondent carried on a
number of adulterous and illicit relations throughout their marriage, eventually abandoning her and their
children to openly cohabit with one paramour. Through pieces of documentary evidence in the form of email
messages and photos, among others, as well as the corroborating affidavits of her witnesses, complainant was
able to establish respondent’s illicit relations with other women, particularly Evelyn, through substantial
evidence which is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. There
can be no doubt that it is morally reprehensible for a married person to maintain intimate relations with another
person of the opposite sex other than his or her spouse. All the more reprehensible is respondent’s act of
leaving his wife and three children to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman with little to no
attempt on his part to be discreet about his liaison. Such act of engaging in illicit relationships with other women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition of appropriate sanctions.
a. On the other hand, respondent’s main defense against complainant’s asseverations was that his marriage
with complainant was void ab initio, a defense that is untenable as respondent, a lawyer, should know that
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of respondent’s marriage to
complainant, states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of
remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law,
even if respondent’s defense that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio because there was no
valid marriage license were true, their marriage is still deemed valid unless declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. (Zerna v. Atty. Zerna, A.C. No. 8700, September 8, 2020, En Banc)
13. Immorality is not limited to sexual matters but also includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude
towards good order and public welfare.
a. Judge Bacolod, by his own admission, is clearly guilty of immorality. Certainly, it is morally reprehensible
for Judge Bacolod, a married man, to maintain intimate relations and cohabit with a woman other than his
legal wife. His actions reflect upon his utter disregard of public opinion of the reputation of the judiciary
which he represents. He failed to live up to the moral standards expected of everyone in the judiciary. His
act of maintaining a relationship and cohabiting with a woman other than his legal wife brought the
judiciary into mockery. (Discreet Investigation Report relative to the Anonymous Complaint against Judge
Bacolod, A.M. No. MTJ-18-1914, September 15, 2020, En Banc)
14. Complainant was able to show that after the Court slapped respondent with a one-year suspension for
immorality, with stern warning against its continued commission, respondent still continued to cohabit with his
mistress in Lahug, Cebu City and even begot another child. Without a doubt, a married lawyer’s abandonment
of his spouses in order to live and cohabit with another, constitutes gross immorality. Here, respondent’s
offense is compounded by the fact that he sired two children with his mistress, one of whom was born after he
was warned by the Court about his illicit relationship. (Villarente v. Atty. Villarente, Jr., A.C. No. 8866, September
15, 2020, En Banc)
15. The Court rules pro hac vice that Atty. Cristobal’s actions fall short of the exacting moral standard required of
the noble profession of law. In sum, Atty. Cristobal’s violence towards his spouse shows his lack of respect for
the sanctity of marriage. It is violative of his legal obligation to respect Divine. Even negating their relationship
as husband and wife, Atty. Cristobal’s actions may clearly be subject of a criminal proceeding – had it not been
for Divine’s desistance. Divine’s alleged attempts to reconcile with Atty. Cristobal will not erase the fact that
Atty. Cristobal did not conduct himself in the manner required of him as a member of the Bar. However, the
penalty of disbarment is too harsh. The proper penalty should be suspension for a period of three months.
a. At the outset, although acts amounting to gross immorality cannot be delineated, the Court has held that
grossly immoral conduct is one that it is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral

indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. Determining whether
one’s actions is grossly immoral depends on the attendant circumstances and prevailing norms of conduct.
b. The instant administrative case is hinged on Atty. Cristobal’s violent and abusive behavior towards his wife,
Divine. The dismissal of the criminal case filed by Divine against him does not exculpate him from
administrative liability. While the Court corrects Divine’s allegation that a preponderance of evidence is
needed in administrative case, the Court nevertheless finds Atty. Cristobal guilty under Rule 1.01 for
unlawful conduct based on substantial evidence. At this point, the Court finally wrote finis to the issue of
determining the quantum of proof in administrative cases in Reyes v. Atty. Nieva. In Reyes, the Court ruled
that the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence – as opposed to preponderance of evidence- is more
in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential consideration attending this type of cases.
c. Of the incidences reported by Divine against Atty. Cristobal, those that happened on January 30, 2005; May
15, 2009; and December 11, 2009 were accompanied by substantial evidence that Atty. Cristobal physically
violent with Divine. In addition, Atty. Cristobal never denied hurting Divine on January 30, 2005. Although
Atty. Cristobal denied choking and punching her, he admitted pushing her after he lost his composure. The
affidavits of his mother, brother, and sister prove that they witnessed Atty. Cristobal pushing Divine. Atty.
Cristobal and his witnesses claimed that he merely did so because of Divine’s provocation. Furthermore,
Atty. Cristobal merely attacks the probative value of Divine’s police blotter and medical certificate, stating
that the blotter has no probative value and that the medical certificate is a sham for failure to indicate the
name of the physician. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty
especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value
may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. According to Lao v. Standard
Insurance Co., Inc., although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted
and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. The Court finds
that the January 30, 2005 incident, which was entered in the police blotter was substantiated by other
competent evidence. The January 30, 2005 blotter was presented in evidence with a medical certificate.
On the other hand, the affidavits presented by Atty. Cristobal failed to refute the fact that an altercation
occurred on Janaury 30, 2005 resulting in his physically hurting Divine out of anger.
d. On May 15, 2009, in an argument between the spouses about Atty. Cristobal’s alleged affair, Atty. Cristobal
again pushed Divine. This caused Divine to lose her balance and hit the gate of their house. Pictures of
Divine’s head injuries were attached to the complaint. Atty. Cristobal’s defense is a denial that a
confrontation occurred on that day. He makes much ado about the absence of proof ha he was with
another woman or was seen in a scandalous situation with another woman. Instead, Atty. Cristobal claims
that the incident was merely fabricated because of Divine’s obsessive jealousy. While Divine’s jealous
behavior is outside the ambit of the instant administrative complaint, what is undisputed is Atty. Cristobal’s
violent reaction during their argument.
e. The December 11, 2009 incident, which became the cause for Divine’s filing of a criminal case against Atty.
Cristobal, also remained unrefuted. As against Divine’s four pictures showing her black eye, the police
blotter, and the Medico-Legal Report, Atty. Cristobal simply attached the Counter-Affidvit he submitted in
the criminal case. Again, the police blotter was given weight because the same was presented in evidence
with a Complaint for violation of AVAWC, pictures of Divine’s black right eye, and a medico-legal report.
Moreover, Atty. Cristobal admitted that he hit Divine on December 11, 2009, although he claimed that it
was merely in an act of self-defense. Atty. Cristobal alleged in his Counter-Affidavit that although he
attempted to brush aside Divine’s aggressive behavior (i.e., her tirades about his womanizing, her holding
his penis and shouting “pinalabas na ba nila ito ha? Pinalabas na ba nila?” and her accusation that Atty.
Cristobal caused her to resign from her previous job), he accidentally hit her when he closed his eyes and
moved his extended arms toward to parry the complainant’s blows and drive her away. Upon opening his
eyes, he saw complainant standing by the wall with an injury marked on her eyes. According to him, he did
not bother to go to the hospital despite the wounds caused by Divine’s aggression and did nothing further.
Atty. Cristobal’s narration of the facts does not inspire belief. Similar to Director Esguerra’s observation,
Atty. Cristobal’s defense is contrary to human experience. One’s acts of parrying an offender’s blows and
driving the latter away is completely different from directly punching the alleged assailant straight o the
face. For Divine to receive a black eye, Atty. Cristobal would have had made a boxing motion. It is
incredulous that the first and only action he did immediately hit Divine in the eye. He already admitted that
he was angry as he felt his blood rising up prior to allegedly closing his eyes. Thus, it is more believable that
he deliberately boxed Divine. What’s more, he admitted seeing Divine with an injury on her eye yet he did
not even bother to attend to her wounds. To him, such fight was a normal quarrel between couples. Let it
be stressed that physical violence is never a normal occurrence when couples argue. Violence is violence.
To justify the same is egregrious and goes against the very essence of a civilized society.
f. Divine’s execution of an Affidavit of Desistance in the criminal case – resulting in its dismissal – does not
absolve Atty. Cristobal from any administrative liability. The Whereas Clause of the Compromise Agreement
categorically stated that its execution was “without admitting liability to each other” and was more for
“amicably settling the civil aspect of the criminal case.” Divine’s desistance in the criminal case did not
diminish the veracity of her accusations against Atty. Cristobal.
g. However, the penalty should only be suspension for a period of three months in view of peculiar
circumstances attendant in this case. The Court cannot turn a deaf ear on Atty. Cristobal’s claim that Divine
is abrasive, boorish, insolent, and disrespectful towards Atty. Cristobal, Atty. Cristobal’s relatives, the

spouses’ household help, their children, the people tasked to renovate their house, and even their
children’s teachers. These are supported by the testimonies of Atty. Cristobal’s mother, Atty. Cristobal’s
sister, Atty. Cristobal’s cousins, one of the construction workers assigned to Araceli’s house, and the
incident report from St. Ferdinand College where Divine’s child was studying. Also, a meticulous scrutiny of
the evidence presented by both parties shows that most of the incidences complained of were caused by
Divine’s provocation. First, Atty. Cristobal pushed Divine to go up their house on the third floor because
Divine denied kicking Atty. Cristobal while the latter was peacefully sleeping on Araceli’s sofa. Second, the
spouses’ altercation in April 2006 was because of Divine’s sudden demand for Atty. Cristobal to give her
money. Her displeasure over (i) Atty. Cristobal’s payment of Araceli’s utility bills; and (ii) his failure to give
her more money prompted her to pack her belongings and point to several items in their house that she
will be getting – all while shouting at Atty. Cristobal. Third, the spouses’ heated argument on May 15, 2009
was caused by Divine’s fits of jealousy. Fourth, what happened on July 17, 2009 stemmed from Divine’s
persistent demand that Atty. Cristobal be the one to bring Divine and their sons to and fro the hospital
twice despite (i) knowing that Atty. Cristobal had a prior engagement; (ii) being offered to be driven by
Franklin or Rolly; and (iii) being offered by Joyce to accompany her. Her incessant nagging and bad-
mouthing of Atty. Cristobal in the presence of their children and Joyce led Atty. Cristobal to leave the car
and ride a tricycle to his uncle’s house to cool off. Fifth, the events that transpired on December 11, 2009
began when Divine impudently confronted Atty. Cristobal about his suspected affair. Notwithstanding Atty.
Cristobal’s pleas to rest after an exhausting week, Divine continued to harass Atty. Cristobal – even going
so far as to pull his penis, punch his chest, slap him, hit him with his belt, and scratch his face. One of Atty.
Cristobal’s part-time drivers, Rolly, recalled how he met with Atty. Cristobal the following day and saw the
latter’s bruises and scratches on his hands. In spite of Atty. Cristobal’s detailed account of the
aforementioned instances, Divne never refuted Atty. Cristobal’s allegations. Moreover, the Court notes
Atty. Cristobal’s claim that he was solely provided for their four children’s education, sustenance, and
support for the past decade. Of their four children, their first three children have been living with Atty.
Cristobal from the time Divine left the conjugal abode on December 9, 2009. Their youngest son, although
within Divine’s custody, is supported by Atty. Cristobal via monthly financial support in accordance with
the spouses’ Compromise Agremeent. Given the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, the penalty of
suspension of three months is appropriate. (Cristobal v. Atty. Cristobal, A.C. No. 12702, November 8, 2020,
En Banc)
DECEITFUL CONDUCT, GROSS MISCONDUCT, AN D VIOLATIONS OF LAW

1. A notary public who notarizes a document even in the absence of the parties to the instrument and fails to file
a comment despite the Court’s orders and directives violates Canon 1. (Anudon v. Atty. Cefra, A.C. No. 5482,
February 10, 2015, En Banc)
2. A lawyer who issued several checks which were subsequently dishonored violated her duties under the CPR.
(Enriquez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015, Second Division; Lim v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 12156,
June 20, 2018, Second Division; Lehnert v. Atty. Diño, A.C. No. 12174, August 28, 2018, En Banc; Andaya v. Atty.
Tumanda, A.C. No. 12209, February 18, 2020, En Banc)
3. A lawyer who enters into a compromise agreement with the opposing party without his client’s consent violates
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since he violates Article 1878 of the Civil Code. (Luna v.
Atty. Galarrita, A.C. No. 10662, July 7, 2015, En Banc)
4. The Assistant Public Prosecutor who extorted money from a party to a case handled by him not only violates
the requirement that cases must be decided on the merits of the parties’ respective evidence but also lessens
the people’s confidence in the rule of law. Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard
of his oath as a government official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect his qualification as a
lawyer, he must be disbarred from his office as an attorney. (Re: Decision dated 17 March 2011 in Criminal Case
No. SB-28361 entitled “People of the Philippines v. Joselito C. Barrozo,” A.C. No. 10207, July 21, 2015, En Banc)
5. A lawyer who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order,
and public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system is guilty of gross misconduct, and
should be suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred. (Coronel v. Atty. Cunanan, A.C. No. 6738,
August 12, 2015, First Division)
6. A Labor Arbiter who unjustly delays the execution of a judgment is guilty of breaching his accountability not
only to the complainant but also to the public in general. (Flores v. Atty. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7314, August 25,
2015, En Banc)
7. Despite the lack of a written special authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a lower judgment award on behalf of
his client and filed a satisfaction of judgment before the RTC. Said pleading also failed to bear the conformity of
his client. For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho
violated Rule 1.01 of the Rules of Court which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. (Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, A.C. No. 10910, January 12, 2016, En Banc)

8. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she misrepresented that she
already commenced an adoption proceeding on behalf of her clients by providing them with a case number
which turned out to be a different proceeding. These acts of misrepresentations by respondent partake of
deceitful acts. (Spouses Lopez v. Atty. Limos, A.C. No. 7618, February 2, 2016, En Banc)
9. A lawyer who engages in forum shopping violates Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also
disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against
unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. (Re: Decision dated August 19, 2008, 3 rd Division, Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79904, A.C. No. 8037, February 17, 2016, Second Division; Atty. Go v. Atty. Teruel,
A.C. No. 11119, November 4, 2020, Third Division)
10. Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in possession of a falsified ID
showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as the Assistant Team Leader
of the anti-smuggling operation. (Cobalt Resources, Inc. v. Atty. Aguado, A.C. No. 10781, April 12, 2016, En
Banc)
11. Respondent’s conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had been indubitably
established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer’s
oath as well as Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Nulada v. Atty. Paulma, A.C. No. 8172, April
12, 2016, En Banc; Wee-Cruz v. Atty. Lim, A.C. No. 11380, August 16, 2016, En Banc)
12. A lawyer who files baseless libel complaints violates his Lawyer’s Oath. Accordingly, he must be sanctioned.
(Aguilar-Dyquiangco v. Atty. Arellano, A.C. No. 10541, July 12, 2016, En Banc)
13. Respondent’s acts of furnishing complainant of a fabricated May 10, 2002 Order purportedly ruling in her favor
amount to deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct in office as an attorney. (Krursel v. Atty. Abion, A.C. No.
5951, July 12, 2016, En Banc)
14. Atty. Ancheta’s deceit and evasion of duty is manifest. He accepted the case though he knew the futility of an
appeal. Despite the receipt of the P30,000.00 acceptance fee, he did not act on his client’s case. Moreover, he
prevailed upon complainants to give him P200,000.00 purportedly to be used to bribe the Justices of the CA in
order to secure a favorable ruling, palpably showing that he himself was unconvinced of the merits of the case.
Atty. Ancheta’s advice involving corruption of judicial officers tramps the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and the judicial system and adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. (Tolentino v. Atty.
Ancheta, A.C. No. 6387, July 19, 2016, En Banc)
15. Respondent’s act of issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude. (Spouses Anaya v. Atty. Alvarez, Jr., A.C. No. 9436, August 1, 2016, Second
Division; Villa v. Atty. Defensor-Velez, A.C. No. 12202, December 5, 2019, First Division)
a. Atty. Demaisip’s defense that the check was supposed to be merely a guarantee check is immaterial.
Although trial for the criminal cases did not ensue for reasons not indicated in the records of this case, the
fact remains that Atty. Demaisip issued a bouncing check – an act which constitutes willful dishonesty and
immoral conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. Moreover, as held in De Jesus
v. Atty. Collado, conviction of the criminal charges is not essential insofar as the administrative case against
the lawyer is concerned. Since the respondent lawyer therein admitted to issuing unfunded checks, her
acts would constitute a violation of the provisions of BP 22. The Court held that the issuance of bouncing
checks by a member of the Bar amounts to serious misconduct, and thus suspended the erring lawyer from
the practice of law. (Bernasconi v. Atty. Demaisip, A.C. No. 11477, January 19, 2021, En Banc)
16. Respondent’s act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly
constitutes gross misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent to violate the law. She
disregarded the lawyer’s oath, which mandates lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. (OCA v.
Tormis, A.C. No. 9920, August 30, 2016, En Banc)
17. The duties of a notary public are intricately related with the practice of law. Atty. Palay no longer disputed the
findings of the IBP, which is tantamount to an admission that he notarized a document without the presence of
the person who allegedly placed his thumbmark therein. By acknowledging the Deed of Sale, he made it appear
that Villaos personally appeared before him when this was not in fact the case. Worse, in his answer to the
complaint, he lied about being called into a car by Villaos’ driver. These actions evince dishonesty on the part
of Atty. Palay – in direct violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. (Endaya v. Atty. Palay, A.C. No. 10150, September 21,
2016, Third Division)

18. Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated her sworn duties under the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Records plainly show that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was completely remiss and negligent in fulfilling
her obligations as a lawyer to Bienvenida. After collecting the full amount of her professional and legal fees,
Atty. Maravilla-Ona did not take a single step to process the registration of land title in Bienvenida’s name.
Worse, when asked to return the money she received from Bienvenida, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued a worthless
check which consequently bounced when presented for payment. (Suarez v. Atty. Maravilla-Ona, A.C. No.
11064, September 27, 2016, En banc)
19. A lawyer who causes the simulation of court documents not only violates the court and its processes, but also
betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client. (Madria v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 11256, March 7,
2017, En Banc)
20. Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the property
just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact, such physical
participation was not even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal responsibility for the
intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of assignment and other documents
as the source of his authority. It is notable in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role
as the assignee since the time of the execution of the deed of assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that
he had been in charge of doing all the actions necessary to enforce the interest of his principal since March 22,
2010, and that the forcible intrusion complained about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than 2 years
from the execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed to have coordinated
all the actions leading to the intrusion. (Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation v. Atty. Tumulak, A.C. No.
11385, March 14, 2017, En Banc)
21. Deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which
a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. (Spouses Victory v. Atty. Mercado, A.C.
No. 10580, July 12, 2017, Third Division)
22. The records show that respondent admitted that he entered into the compromise agreement with the
defendant in the unlawful detainer case and stated that the plaintiff, who is the complainant herein, was willing
to sell the property to the defendant in the amount of P350,000.00 even if the complainant did not instruct or
authorize him to sell the property, and he merely acted upon his own belief. As the SPA granted to him by the
complainant did not contain the power to sell the property, respondent clearly acted beyond the scope of his
authority in entering into the compromise agreement wherein the property was sold to the defendant
Carmelita S. Garlito. Respondent, in his Answer and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No.:XXI-2014-
386, stated that his action was based on an honest belief that he was serving both the interest of his client and
the policy of the law to settle cases amicably. However, his justification does not persuade, because his alleged
honest belief prejudiced his client, since the property she was not willing to sell was sold at a price decided
upon by respondent on his own, which caused his client and her co-owners to file further cases to recover their
property that was sold due to respondent's mistake. He overlooked the fact that he was not authorized by his
client to sell the property. Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall keep
abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve
high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence. (Cerilla v. Atty. Lezama, A.C. No. 11483, October 3, 2017, En
Banc)
23. While the SPA executed by Verano empowered Atty. Diores, in his private capacity, to use the subject property
as guaranty for his bail bond in some of his criminal cases, this did not grant him carte blanche to use the said
property to secure bail bonds in his other criminal cases which were not included in the SPA, much less enter
into a MOA with Visayan Surety for the said purpose. Such act not only violates the trust granted to him by
Verano, but also shows doubt as to his moral character. (Verano v. Atty. Diores, Jr., A.C. No. 8887, November
7, 2017, En Banc)
24. The subject deed executed in 1996 was readily available at the RD. Respondent could have effortlessly and
briefly verified the said deed, which was the basis of the transfer of the title to him. It is to be noted that the
subject deed was not signed by Rogelio on behalf of Pedro; rather, it was purportedly signed by Pedro personally
and confirmed by Cecilia. Evidently, the sale contemplated by the said deed was not anymore a sale through an
agent, which was the original agreement of respondent and Rogelio back in 1989. The consideration stated in
the subject deed, in the amount of P10,000.00, did not reflect the alleged purchase price of P26,000.00 given
by respondent in 1989. Further, the subject deed was executed in Tugegarao, Cagayan when respondent knows
fully well that Pedro and Cecilia are residing in Hawaii as early as 1989. In the same light, it would be impossible
to notarize the subject deed in 1996 before a notary public considering that Pedro was already dead. Also, the
subject deed mentioned CTC No. 2259388, dated January 2, 1996, issued to Pedro, which is patently falsified
because Pedro has passed away at that time. Again, respondent did not bother to even read the subject deed
of sale which contains obvious and palpable irregularities; rather, he continued to disregard them for his own
convenience. (Valin v. Atty. Ruiz, A.C. No. 10564, November 7, 2017, En Banc)

25. Respondent Arnado violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Records show that the business name registered under
Guillen’s name was never dissolved in accordance with the law. Even Arnado failed to prove that the City Grill
Restaurant business had already been terminated. Although said business name was only used for a short
period of time, the same had already acquired goodwill among the residents and customers of the locality. On
February 26, 2004, the City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation was registered with the SEC. Although Arnado and
Ebo were not included as incorporators, those persons reflected in the articles of incorporation as the
company’s incorporators were their relatives. It is clear that when Arnado caused the incorporation of City Grill-
Sutukil Food Corporation, he was fully aware that City Grill Restaurant was still registered in Guillen’s name.
Obviously, he did the same to take advantage of the goodwill earned by the name of City Grill Restaurant.
Arnado was likewise the one who actually notarized some of the City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation’s legal
documents such as the Treasurer’s Affidavit and a letter addressed to the SEC. Thus, Arnado is guilty of taking
advantage of his knowledge of the law and of surreptitiously easing out Guillen from their restaurant business
partnership by registering a corporation under a different but similar name and style, in the same line of
busienss, and using the same trade secrets. Arnado, although not reflected as one of the incorporators of City
Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation, has deceived the public into believing that City Grill Restaurant and City Grill-
Sutukil Food Corporation are one and the same. (Guillen v. Atty. Arnado, A.C. No. 10547, November 8, 2017,
Second Division)
26. The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the document, he actually
knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that her parents should represent
her in the execution of the document. Mommayda was likewise a minor. His awareness of the latter's minority
at the time was not disputed because he was also representing Mommayda in the latter's adoption proceedings
aside from being Mommayda's neighbor. Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed of donation that the donees
were of legal age. His doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to utter a
falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest conduct, defying the law and
contributing to the erosion of confidence in the Law Profession. (Apolinar-Petilo v. Atty. Maramot, A.C. No.
9067, January 31, 2018, Third Division)
27. Instead of paying Yap the remaining balance of the purchase price of the condominium unit, Buri opted to
simply threaten her and file a criminal case against her. Obviously, this strategy was to intimidate Yap and
prevent her from collecting the remaining P200,000.00. When given a chance to defend herself, Buri chose to
stay silent and even refused to file an answer, attend the hearing, or to submit her position paper, despite due
notice. Hence, Yap's version of the facts stands and remains uncontroverted. Buri's unwarranted tenacity simply
shows, not only her lack of responsibility, but also her lack of interest in clearing her name, which, as
pronounced in case law, is indicative of an implied admission of the charges levelled against her. (Yap v. Atty.
Buri, A.C. No. 11156, March 19, 2018, Second Division)
28. As a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the legality of a voluntary conveyance of property,
particularly, the scope of the rights, interests, and participation of the parties/signatories to the deed of sale,
and the consequent transfer of title to the properties involved, yet, she chose to disregard the patent
irregularities in the subject deed and voluntarily affixed her signature thereon. Notably, respondent did not
specifically admit nor deny knowledge of the demise of Perla, but her claim of such strong ties to complainant's
family bolsters knowledge thereof. Besides, her awareness of Perla's demise even prior to the affixture of her
signature on the subject deed may be sufficiently inferred from her averments, among others, that: (a) when
Perla got sickly sometime in the early part of 2004, Lourdes began giving her a series of phone calls regarding
the disposition of Spouses Jimeno's real properties; and (b) she was never remiss in her duty to inform the
Jimeno children, through Lourdes and Teresita Jimeno-Roan, about the legal repercussions and legal
complications of pushing through and continuing with the negotiations with the prospective buyers of the
Malindang property, which admittedly continued even after the demise of Perla. However, despite being aware
that something was amiss with the documents of sale, respondent allowed herself to become a party to the
subject deed which contained falsehood and/or inaccuracies in violation of her duties as a lawyer. (Jimeno, Jr.
v. Atty. Jimeno, A.C. No. 12012, July 2, 2018, Second Division)
29. It is beyond dispute that Atty. Cruz is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct. In several occasions,
he manifested a propensity to lie and deceive his client in order to obtain money. Obviously, his
misrepresentations in order to compel HDI to release money for cash bids, fictitious purchase of a property, the
overpriced purchase price of the Q.C. property and his misrepresentation that he had authority to collect rentals
in behalf of HDI and CGI, as well as his execution of fictitious documents to give semblance of truth to his
misrepresentations, constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These reprehensible conduct
of Atty. Cruz without doubt breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. (HDI
Holdings Philippines, Inc. v. Atty. Cruz, A.C. No. 11724, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
30. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is guilty of "sextortion" which is the abuse of his position or authority to obtain
sexual favors from his subordinate, the complainant, his unwilling victim who was not in a position to resist
respondent's demands for fear of losing her means of livelihood. The sexual exploitation of his subordinate

done over a period of time amounts to gross misbehavior on the part of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes that
affects his standing and character as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court. All these deplorable
acts of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes puts the legal profession in disrepute and places the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, thus warranting disciplinary action from the Court. (AAA v. Atty. De Los Reyes,
31. The Court finds that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and several canons and rules of the Code. She
represented to De Jesus and Aquino that she could secure the acquittal of Fajardo and even used the names of
the Associate Justices to accomplish her ill motives. Respondent also defrauded her clients by drafting a fake,
spurious, and sham decision regarding the purported acquittal of Fajardo. She placed the names of
complainants in the fake decision even though the criminal case of Fajardo was raffled in a different division
and assigned to a different Associate Justice. Glaringly, she discredited and disrespected members of the
judiciary by wrongfully involving complainants' names in her fraudulent scheme. She also maliciously
represented to her clients that she can influence Associate Justices of the CA to ensure the acquittal of an
accused. Further, respondent exacted exorbitant fees from her clients, in the amount of P1,000,000.00 more
or less, as evidenced by receipts she signed. In her ultimate desire to extort more money from Fajardo's
relatives, she presented the fake decision of acquittal and asserted that the promulgation of the said decision
would allegedly depend on the payment of a large sum of money to respondent. Through the operation of the
NBI, respondent was arrested in an entrapment operation when she received the marked money from Aquino
for the purported decision of acquittal. Respondent's arrest and modus operandi were even broadcasted in
television and published in the newspaper, causing further shame, disrepute, and disgrace to the legal
profession. Respondent was given an opportunity to controvert the allegations against her, however, she
neither filed her answer nor attended the mandatory conference in the IBP Commission. Verily, the acts
exhibited by respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath. Her acts are also contrary to Canons 1, 7, and 10, and Rules
1.01, 1.02, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 because respondent violated the laws, particularly Articles 172 and
315, par. 2 of the RPC, tarnished the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and committed falsehood and
deceit against her clients and the courts. (Justice Lampas-Peralta v. Atty. Ramon, A.C. No. 12415, March 5, 2019,
En Banc)
32. The complainants' version of the incident deserves credence. Their experience as narrated by Leojohn and
Rufrex were consistent with and corroborated by the sworn declarations of the other witnesses. Their common
narrative was not the product of a design or a concoction on their part. The respondent did not establish any ill
motive that could have moved them to declare affirmatively against him about his actions and physical presence
during the incident. His insistence that the complainants had accused him of the misconduct only to harass him
and to prevent him from serving the interest of his client would not undercut the fact that such motivation -
even assuming the same to be true - did not necessarily mean that he had not threatened and run after the
minors while wielding his gun. Indeed, they had nothing to gain in so declaring against him except to assert the
truth about the incident. The IBP Board of Governors noted that the psychiatric evaluation and mental status
examination conducted by Dr. Lyn Y. Veron, M.D. revealed that Rufrex had complained of impaired sleep and
nervousness. It observed that such finding showed the psychological and mental effect of the incident on
Rufrex. Thereby, the complainants' account about the respondent's act of chasing and threatening to kill the
minors was confirmed, for such finding was produced by the respondent's imputed acts. In contrast, the
respondent merely denied his presence at the scene. But it is notable that he did not even explain where he
had been exactly to substantiate his denial of physical presence. (Lumbre v. Atty. Belleza, A.C. No. 12113, March
6, 2019, First Division)
33. It is undisputed that respondent agreed to meet with Fortune representatives in LA Franco's office where the
former expected to receive P2 Million from the latter. However, the purpose of the payment, as well as how
the payment was made, are contested. On the one hand, Fortune assailed that respondent had agreed to settle
the labor case in consideration of P2 Million and it was caught off guard when the latter reneged on their
agreement and decided to take the money without signing the Compromise Agreement and Omnibus Motion
to Dismiss insisting that the amount was only a partial fulfillment of Fortune's obligation. On the other hand,
respondent argued that he never categorically expressed that he agreed to the full settlement of the labor case
for P2 Million noting that he had prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt stating that the sum was only a partial
payment of the judgment award. Based on the exchange of text communications and conversations between
Atty. Espela and respondent, it is readily apparent that the parties agreed that the P2 Million was for the full
settlement of the judgment award. This is bolstered by the fact that prior to the meeting in LA Franco's office,
Atty. Espela had sent respondent the Compromise Agreement and Omnibus Motion to Dismiss to be signed
during the meeting. Thus, he should have been aware that it was the understanding of Fortune and its
representatives that the P2 Million served as the full payment of the judgment award. If it were true that he did
not agree with the terms of the compromise, he should have informed them about it. Respondent could have
easily relayed his objections as evidenced by the fact that he even insisted to be paid in cash after he was sent
a photocopy of the Manager's Check. Instead, he continued to communicate with Atty. Espela under the
premise that he was amenable to the P2 Million as compensation for the compromise.
a. Respondent cannot claim that there was no clear agreement that the P2 Million was in consideration of
the full judgment award because there was nothing categorical in his phone conversations and text

messages with Atty. Espela. This is belied by his admission that he was only forced to go along with
Fortune's offer to settle the case so that at least his judgment award could be partially settled. Thus, it is
readily apparent that respondent was never straightforward and honest in his dealings with Fortune in
arriving at a compromise. He was in constant communication with Atty. Espela and he made him believe
that there was progress in the negotiations for compromise. Respondent even agreed to meet with Atty.
Espela in LA Franco's office in spite of him not being amenable to the terms of the compromise. He goaded
Fortune into paying him P2 Million without any intention of accepting any settlement for the judgment
award. Respondent consciously and deliberately deceived Fortune because he knew from the start that
the latter's representative were there to meet him to consummate the agreed compromise.
b. In an attempt to justify his actions, respondent shifts the blame to Fortune claiming that it had withdrawn
its deposit accounts and transferred properties to another corporations in order to reduce his victory to a
meaningless paper judgment. He laments that he had to go through the motions of negotiating a
compromise, otherwise, he would not be able to get anything from Fortune. Respondent adds that the
present complaint for disbarment is only another means for Fortune to harass and prejudice him.
c. Still, it does not negate the fact that respondent was intentionally dishonest when he dealt with Atty. Espela
and Fortune. Instead of pursuing legal means of protecting his rights, he opted to take the law into his own
hands employing deceit to get what he felt he deserved. As a member of the Bar, respondent is held to a
higher standard compared to laypeople as he is duty-bound to promote the respect and observance of the
law and to be a beacon of justice, fairness, honesty and integrity.(Fortune Medicare, Inc. v. Atty. Lee, A.C.
No. 9833. March 19, 2019, En Banc)
34. Atty. Laeno's acts of (a) executing two deeds of sale that covered one single property, (b) indicating an
undervalued consideration contrary to what was agreed on by the contracting parties, and (c) offering one of
these bogus deeds as evidence before the Court is exactly what is proscribed under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. (Atty. Agustin v. Atty. Laeno, A.C. No. 8124, March 19, 2019, En Banc)
35. Records reveal that respondent did not endeavor to initiate the settlement of the publication fee being charged
by complainant. Disagreeing with the statement of account, respondent chose not to pay and immediately
referred the matter to the Executive Judge, instead of negotiating and discussing the matter with complainant.
Remarkably, respondent's obstinate refusal to settle culminated in forbidding his clients, Sps. Manalo, to pay
the reduced publication fee, which the latter secured for themselves. He even shouted at and ignored
complainant when the latter called him up in an effort to finally settle. Ultimately, respondent's acts, which are
violative of Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the CPR, prejudiced his clients as they resulted in the non-completion of the
foreclosure proceedings, since complainant did not issue the affidavit of publication nor provide copies of the
issues where the notice of auction sale was actually printed. (Sevilla v. Atty. Millo, A.C. No. 10697, March 25,
2019, Second Division)
36. Respondent was tasked by complainant to file a complaint for ejectment before the court. To show his
compliance, he furnished her with the alleged receiving copy of the complaint for ejectment filed before the
MTC. However, it was discovered by complainant that no such complaint was actually filed. When confronted,
respondent admitted the fake receiving copy but blamed his messenger for such wrongdoing. The Court cannot
accept the flimsy excuse of respondent. A plain reading of the first page of the purported complaint readily
shows that it was not properly filed. The words "MTC" and the date were only handwritten in the portion of the
received stamp. Also, the docket number of the alleged complaint was merely handwritten. As highlighted by
the IBP, these are net the standard operating procedures in filing a complaint in court. As a lawyer, respondent
should have noticed these irregularities before furnishing his client with the copy of the said complaint. Further,
respondent did not give any concrete detail on the consequences incurred by his messenger; whether
appropriate criminal or disciplinary charges were instituted against him for faking the said receiving copy. In
any case, respondent cannot "pass the buck" to his messenger and escape liability because he has a sworn duty
to observe due diligence and honesty in dealing with his client.
a. By delivering a fake receiving copy of the complaint to his client, thereby deceiving the latter in filing the
case, respondent participated in deceitful conduct towards his client in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code.
As a lawyer, respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
in his dealings with others, especially clients whom he should serve with competence and diligence. While
respondent eventually filed a complaint for ejectment before the MTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 16-022,
it was swiftly dismissed because the jurisdictional requisites were not stated in the complaint. Again, this
shows respondent's gross carelessness in advancing the cause of his client. (Domingo v. Atty. Sacdalan, A.C.
No. 12475, March 26, 2019, En Banc)
37. A male law professor who sexually harasses his female students violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR. (Re:
Anonymous Complaint against Atty. Untian, Jr., A.C. No. 5900, April 10, 2019, En Banc)
38. Respondent never denied that he received the deposits made by Sanidad, but he never issued her any
acknowledgment receipts. He claimed that Sanidad has been their tenant since 1983 yet no contract of lease
was ever presented to support his claim. It, thus, appears that while respondent profited from receiving
substantial amounts of moneys from Sanidad, the latter, however, holds no concrete proof that he has been

actually receiving her payments. The interest of Sanidad, as buyer or lessee, as the case may be, was left fully
unprotected. The lack of transparency due to respondent's failure to give acknowledgment receipts and the
lack of written contracts is highly suspicious of deceit and fraud because it inevitably placed Sanidad in a rather
disadvantageous position. Worse, respondent has utilized the lack of written contracts and acknowledgment
receipts in threatening to evict respondent despite the apparent receipt of payments. (Sanidad v. Atty. Aguas,
A.C. No. 9838, June 10, 2019, Third Division)
39. It was also clearly proven that Ferrer went to Bautista early morning on March 28, 2011 to inquire about the
sum of money and that before proceeding to the government offices to talk to the alleged debtors, Ferrer took
Bautista's cellphone. Moreover, while Ferrer insists that she did not physically prohibit Bautista from taking her
personal property and that she only urged her to settle her obligations before she can totally vacate the leased
premises, evidence show that said personal properties are really being held until payment of obligations. As the
witnesses Johnny Go and Almeida stated in their affidavits, Ferrer allowed the removal of the properties only
after Bautista returns Ferrer's investment. In fact, Ferrer even admitted that she said the following words to
Bautista: "putang ina mo Arlene, ang kapal ng mukha mo. Ayusin mo muna ako bago mo makuha ang mga
gamit mo." Thus, the Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner's finding that Ferrer's taking of
Bautista's cellphone, even if it was eventually returned later on, and refusal to release the personal effects of
Bautista is tantamount to confiscation, or depriving Bautista of something that is hers without due process of
law. This is in clear breach of the Bill of Rights, particularly the principle that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
lawyers, such as Ferrer, are mandated to uphold the Constitution and the laws. The Court is of the opinion,
therefore, that Ferrer's withholding of Bautista's personal property not only runs counter to her duty to uphold
the law, it is also equivalent to putting the law into her own hands. (Bautista v. Atty. Ferrer, A.C. No. 9057, July
3, 2019, Third Division)
40. There is no doubt that by demanding and accepting the bribe in the amount of PhP 10 Million, Atty. Corro, as
found by the OBC, committed gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct, and violated the laws against
bribery, graft and corruption in the government service. Based on the records, the hearings conducted by the
OBC strengthened the allegation that Atty. Corro provided the terms of payment and profited from the illegal
transactions. Moreover, the purported text messages between Dr. Rodil and Atty. Corro showed that the latter
supposedly still attempted to fix the problem, that is, until he suddenly did not respond to the former anymore,
which further displayed Atty. Corro's participation in the despicable transactions. Copies of the text messages
appended to the records showed Dr. Rodil's conversation with Atty. Aguinaldo regarding the return of the PhP
10 Million bribe to Alejandro's family, Dr. Rodil's conversation with the individual named Rico Alberto, and Dr.
Rodil's conversation with Posadas, all of which pertain to the illegal transactions and the ensuing demands for
the return of the money. To reiterate, Atty. Corro received the full amount of Ten Million Pesos (PhP
10,000,00.00) from Dr. Rodil (which was supposedly funded by the family of Alejandro) in exchange for a
favorable decision of acquittal for Alejandro in G.R. No. 205227. This undeniable fact warrants Atty. Corro's
disbarment since he is guilty of gross misconduct as well as grossly immoral conduct for committing such
reprehensible acts. His additional infractions in ignoring and disrespecting lawful issuances or orders from the
Court only added to the long list of reasons why he should no longer be given the privilege to practice law or to
be a member of the Bar. Indeed, in order to maintain membership in the law profession, "[a] lawyer at no time
must be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions precedent to his entrance to, but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership in, a great and noble profession." Unfortunately, Atty.
Corro displayed characteristics and committed contemptible acts contrary to what is expected of a lawyer.
a. As an officer of the court, Atty. Corro violated the lawyer's oath because he disobeyed the legal orders of
the Court and did not conduct himself as a lawyer to the best of his knowledge and discretion given that
he initiated and participated in illegal transactions which ran afoul to his duty to maintain good fidelity to
the courts and even to litigants. By acting in conspiracy with Dr. Rodil, Ancheta, and Posadas to commit
corrupt acts, Atty. Corro additionally broke the laws against bribery, graft and corruption. (Dr. Rodil v. Atty.
Corro, A.C. No. 10461, July 30, 2019, En Banc)
41. A lawyer who conceptualized, planned, implemented and, through another, procured a falsified bail bond and
release order violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the CPR. (Judge Sitaca v. Atty. Palomares,
Jr., A.C. No. 5285, August 14, 2019, En Banc)
42. Respondent patently transgressed the lawyer's oath and the CPR by knowingly misrepresenting himself as the
corporate secretary of Big "N", executing a Secretary's Certificate containing false statements, and knowingly
allowing himself to be used in perpetrating fraud to the prejudice of Big "N", which likewise resulted to the
prejudice of herein complainant. These acts were admitted by respondent, which admission was recognized by
the trial court in its Judgment Based on Compromise in the civil case filed by Big "N." Notably, respondent never
questioned said Judgment Based on Compromise. The Court finds the excuse given by respondent for his action,
i.e., it was Palanca who prepared the document, and that he was merely a victim and used as a tool in Palanca's
ploy and scheme, disturbing and unacceptable. The stubborn fact remains that, for whatever reason, he
knowingly executed a falsified document and made himself be used in his legal capacity to perpetrate a
deceptive ploy to the prejudice of Big "N". It must be stressed that the CPR exacted from him not only a firm

respect for the law and legal processes, but also the utmost degree of good faith in all his professional and even
personal dealings. (Philippine Investment One v. Atty. Lomeda, A.C. No. 11351, August 14, 2019, En Banc)
43. Falsifying the entries in his son’s certificate of live birth constitutes a violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. (Venzon
v. Atty. Peleo III, A.C. No. 9354, August 20, 2019, En Banc)
44. It is evident from the documents presented that: respondent was the one who sought the complainant and
encouraged her to invest in and buy what he represented as a "beach-front" property; respondent volunteered
to act as complainant's representative in the supposed purchase of the alleged property as well as the
processing of the documents necessary to transfer title to complainant; respondent not only received but even
solicited and demanded substantial amounts from the complainant in four separate instances totaling
P1,819,651.00, which he himself acknowledged to have received; he misrepresented that the said amount
would cover, aside from the purchase price, expenses for the payment of various forms of taxes, processing
fees and his professional fee; respondent misappropriated the money he received from complainant;
respondent deceived complainant by making it appear that he bought the "beach-front" property when, in fact,
he did not; he defrauded complainant and made false representations by showing a "Deed of Absolute Sale" of
another property which appeared to have been executed by the owners thereof, when in fact, the said owners
died eight (8) years prior to the date that they supposedly signed the said Deed; and respondent even went to
the extent of making it appear that these dead people acknowledged the execution of the subject Deed of Sale
before him as a notary public. What respondent did to complainant was plain and simple trickery. His
transgression would have been mitigated had he simply acknowledged, at the first instance, that he pocketed
the money given to her by complainant and made amends by returning the same. What makes his act more
deplorable is that he took advantage of complainant's trust in him and actively and knowingly deceived the
latter by making it appear that he bought a property in her name when, in fact, he did not. To make matters
worse, he did not content himself with the supposed purchase price agreed upon and even had the gall to ask
for additional amounts to allegedly defray the expenses for taxes and other processing fees. For a number of
times, respondent promised to indemnify complainant, but he never did. Through the foregoing acts,
respondent is guilty of violating the provisions of Article 19 of the Civil Code which states that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. Respondent also breached his oath as a lawyer to, among others, obey
the laws, do no falsehood, and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion. Respondent is, likewise, guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent's calculated acts of deceit,
dishonesty, abuse of complainant's trust and confidence as well as his misappropriation of the funds he received
from complainant constitute malfeasance and is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession but also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law. Good moral character
is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition
in order for him to maintain his membership in the Philippine Bar.
a. Under Rule 1.01 of the CPR, any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in
defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not necessarily imply
the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. To be dishonest
means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty,
probity, integrity in principle, fairness, and straightforwardness, while conduct that is deceitful means the
proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who
is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon. In order to be
deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious ignorance
thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved
party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner
contemplated to his injury. Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary
to justice, modesty or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals. (Yamon-Leach v. Atty. Astorga, A.C. No. 5987, August 28, 2019, En Banc)
45. Respondent's act of issuing those notices ahead of the issuance of the COMELEC en banc Resolution calling for
a special election was not in compliance with the procedures under the law and the COMELEC rules. In so doing,
he breached his duty to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities, thus, violating
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to
laws and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and,
thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks
of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the public. As servants of
the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the
rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. This, in fact, is what a
lawyer's obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes entails. Moreso, a lawyer who is occupying
a public office. Lawyers in public office, such as respondent who was then a Provincial Election Supervisor of
Maguindanao, are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and

observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice. Respondent's
claim that he issued those notices as there was no more time to prepare for the special elections has no basis
in law. To stress, the notices were issued even prior to the COMELEC Resolution for the holding of a special
election. Members of the Bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather
than seek exceptions as loopholes. Respondent is expected to promote respect for the law and legal processes.
(Fermin v. Atty. Bedol, A.C. No. 6560, September 16, 2019, Third Division)
46. A lawyer who fails to disclose important facts concerning his transaction in his private capacity is liable under
the CPR. Records show that Atty. Tumaliuan sought to acquire the house and lot of Kare in exchange for cash
and her Toyota Fortuner that she had already mortgaged in favor of BDO. Such important fact was withheld
from Kare, the recipient of the vehicle. In fact, as Kare pointed out, Tumaliuan has yet to comply with her end
of their agreement by giving her a clean title to said vehicle or even a document evidencing the release of the
same attachment, without which she cannot transfer the same to her name. (Kare v. Atty. Tumaliuan, A.C. No.
8777, October 9, 2019, Third Division)
47. For his knowledge or at least for his being placed in a position to reasonably know the death of Fermina, Atty.
Delos Santos had knowingly taken part in a false and simulated transaction by making it appear that a vendor,
long dead, executed a document of sale in favor of Pilar. This propensity to deceive is furher bolstered by the
fact that Atty. Delos Santos made it appear that the subject documents supposedly executed by the deceased
Fermina were entered in his notarial register as "Doc. No. 140, Page No. 28, Book No. XXXIV, Series of 2008."
But as certified by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, the document entered as such is not said
deed of sale but an unrelated document entitled "Katunayan sa Pagkakabili" executed by a certain Carmela
Bool. It was through these fraudulent deeds of sale that Atty. Delos Santos was able to register the subject
property in Pilar's name, which further propelled him to commit subsequent falsities that ultimately resulted in
the registration of the land in the name of Hauskon. While he may insist on his honest intentions to "help and
serve" people such as the "very old" Pilar, he failed to explain the fact that the checks issued as payment for
the parcel of land were all made in his name. In the face of these glaring infractions, the Court cannot simply
uphold an indifference lest a grave and irreversible injustice might prevail. (Prospero v. Atty. Delos Santos, A.C.
No. 11583, December 3, 2019, En Banc)
48. The allegations that respondents forcibly entered the property and demolished the structures thereon, shouted
invectives and used abusive language against complainant remain undisputed. In fact, respondents did not deny
that these incidents actually occurred on February 8 and 14, 2015, nor did they offer any justification for said
acts. Although respondents claim to be the rightful owners of the property, they are without authority to use
force and violence to eject complainant who was in prior physical possession of it. The rule of law does not
allow the mighty and the privileged to take the law into their own hands to enforce their alleged rights. As
lawyers, respondents are deemed to know the law, but their actions demonstrate a deliberate disobedience to
the rule of law, in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR. The Court reminds respondents that as lawyers,
they ought to be keepers of public faith, and, are thus, burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and
must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. (Hipolito v. Atty. Alejandro-Abbas, A.C. No. 12485,
December 10, 2019, First Division)
49. A judge, who was removed from the bench by reason of her untruth statements in her PDS which in fact
constitute grave misconduct, dishonesty and falsification of official documents, is also liable for breaches of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 7, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Canon 11 of the CPR. This is because grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and falsification of official documents constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. (Atty.
Nava II v. Atty. Artuz, A.C. No. 7253, February 18, 2020, En Banc)
50. Atty. Salgado is guilty of deceit. From the evidence presented by Lapitan, which remains unrefuted after due
notice, it is clear that Salgado had no intention to pay the contracted amount for the June 26, 2010 event. In
fact, the records show that the contract amount has not been settled by Salgado to this date. Salgado
committed deceit by making it appear that he forgot to bring with him the necessary cash to pay for the
contracted amount when the terms of the banquet event contract clearly indicate that the 50% down payment
should have been made as early as upon signing the contract. Instead, Salgado employed deceit in convincing
Lapitan that he would pay the total contracted amount upon the event’s conclusion and Lapitan believed
Salgado in good faith knowing that the latter was a lawyer and was fully aware of his legal obligation to pay the
terms of the contract. Again, Salgado employed deceit on Lapitan when instead of paying in cash after the
event, Salgado issued a worthless postdated check three (3) days after the completion of the event or on June
29, 2010. (Lapitan v. Atty. Salgado, A.C. No. 12452, February 8, 2020, En Banc)
51. A notary public cannot be found liable for notarizing a letter which was later on used by the affiant, which
complainant alleged to have contained false statements. The notary public merely performed his duty when he
attested to the fact that Lotho personally appeared before him. The truth or falsity of the contents of the letter
is the responsibility of the affiant Lotho and not of the respondent, especially since no substantial evidence was

presented to prove that he knowingly notarized a false document. (Ick v. Atty. Amazona, A.C. No. 12375,
February 26, 2020, Second Division)
52. Atty. Viaje indeed took undue advantage of his knowledge as a lawyer to gain personal benefit at the expense
of complainant, GRDC, and its stockholders. There is no doubt that Atty. Viaje, through fraud, duress, and
coercion, prevailed upon complainant to surrender her shares of stock in GRDC by signing a Voting Trust
Agreement and making himself and two others stockholders and directors in the said corporation. Moreover,
Atty. Viaje was able to make himself the majority stockholder and a director of GRDC by illegally holding a special
stockholders meeting without the required notice to the stockholders of the said corporation and without
having the necessary qualifications of a director at the time of his election. It was duly established that when
Atty. Viaje, Sy, and Gozun were elected as directors, they were not even stockholders of GRDC as none of the
had at least one share of capital stock in the corporation. In so doing, respondent failed to show that he
maintained that degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him or her. (Puno v. Atty.
Viaje, A.C. No. 12085, February 26, 2020, En Banc)
53. A lawyer who continues to represent a deceased client and fails to properly notify the court of his client’s death
within the specified period and give the court the names and addresses of his client’s legal representatives
violates Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court. In turn, he violates Canon 1 of the CPR and Rule 10.03, Canon
10 of the CPR which provides that the lawyer shall promote respect for law and legal processes and observe
the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. (Siao v. Atty. Atup, A.C. No.
10890, July 1, 2020, Second Division)
54. Respondent began defaulting in his obligation in October 2012, when the post-dated check issued for that
month was dishonored. The two remaining post-dated checks were likewise dishonored subsequently.
Complainant sent demand letters to respondent and sought the help of the barangay for conciliation, but her
attempts to get respondent to pay all proved futile. Respondent simply denied he received these notices. While
he acknowledged the decision of the MCTC, it is nonetheless quite telling that he also did not participate in the
proceedings before it despite notice. Verily, it cannot escape the attention of the Court that several months
had already passed from October 2012, when the first check was dishonored, after the first demand letter was
sent to respondent in May 2013. It also took almost a year from October 2012 to September 2013, when
complainant filed the small claims against respondent. It is revealing of respondent’s character that he let the
months slip by without attending to his obligation, and belies his disavowal that he had no intention to renege.
Thus, in light of the prolonged silence of respondent, the Court is inclined to believe the version of complainant
had the alleged willingness of respondent to pay, albeit in piecemeal, was a belated attempt on his part to settle
after the MTCC had already issued the writ of execution. As correctly pointed out by complainant, she had no
obligation to accept the payment plan of respondent, considering his previous failure to pay promptly and the
express provision under Rule 39, Section 9 of the Rules of Court that the officer enforcing an execution of
judgment for money shall demand from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated
in the writ of execution and all lawful fees.
a. Furthermore, a lawyer’s act of issuing worthless checks, punishable under BP 22, constitutes serious
misconduct. Here, the fact that the checks were drawn in the name of respondent’s wife and not directly
in his name is of no moment. As respondent himself has admitted, he stood as the lessee of the property
subject of the lease contract and acknowledged that he and complainant had agreed that the postdated
checks drawn in the name of his wife would be used in payment of the monthly rentals. Being a lawyer,
respondent was well aware of, or was nonetheless presumed to know, the objectives and coverage of BP
22. Yet, he knowingly violated the law and thereby exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect
of his illegal act to public interest and public order. The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy
of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. In the same manner, respondent
should not have resorted to persistently ignoring the demands made against him by the complainant to
settle his obligations. If he were truly in dire financial straits, he could have facilely explained his
circumstances to complainant and be, at the very least, forthcoming about it. (Francisco v. Atty. Real, A.C.
No. 12689, September 1, 2020, En Banc)
55. There is more than enough evidence that shows that Atty. Sederiosa has continuously been practicing his legal
profession despite the suspension order against him. He remained to be a duly commissioned notary public
from January 8, 2016 to December 31, 2017 as attested by the Certification from the RTC – Davao City, the
Commission for Notary Public dated January 8, 2016, and the Affidavit of Loss dated August 8, 2016 which he
duly notarized. In short, he had never served his suspension. It must be stressed that at the time he notarized
the Affidavit of Loss on August 8, 2016, Atty. Sederiosa was already cognizant of the Court’s December 7, 2015
Resolution as early as January 29, 2016. As such, he was already aware that the Court had imposed the following
penalties upon him: immediate revocation of his notarial commission; disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years; and suspension of one year from the practice of law.
Consequently, Atty. Sederiosa should have refrained from performing the duties of a notary public and engaging
in law practice. Yet, he continued to notarize documents in clear defiance of the Court’s orders. By doing so, he

continued to practice law. Atty. Sederiosa’s willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Supreme Court
constitutes a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath, which mandates every lawyer to obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the court as to his clients. His actuations
amounted to gross deceit and malpractice, or gross misconduct. (Cansino v. Atty. Sederiosa, A.C. No. 8522,
October 6, 2020, En Banc)
56. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Respondent and complainant entered into a Deed of Transfer of
Rights over complainant’s house and lot wherein he obligated himself to assume the remaining financial
obligations of the complainants to the GSIS. Notwithstanding their agreement, and in spite of complainant’s
repeated reminders and requests, respondent reneged on his obligation and failed to settle the remaining
programmed installments in favor of GSIS, eventually leading to the rescission of the Deed of Transfer of Rights
and massive financial liabilities on the part of the complainant. In his attempts to evade liability, respondent
offered the defense of general denial as to the factual nature of his agreement with complainant. Respondent
averred that he accepted complainant’s offer to transfer the rights of the housing unit to him in his desire to
help the latter, who was in need of money and was looking for another house to move in, but with the
understanding that it was complainant himself who would still continue to pay the P2,584.44 monthly
amortization on the property. The Court finds this claim completely absurd, as complainant chose to transfer
his rights over the property for the exact reason that he was experiencing financial difficulties. Had complainant
been capable of paying the scheduled monthly amortizations, there would have been no reason for him to
transfer the rights over the property to the respondent. Respondent likewise maintained that his alleged failure
to pay the monthly amortizations were due to honest inadvertence and unintentional oversight. He denied
having received any notice from the GSIS or complainant as regards the GSIS loan account he assumed and
blamed the complainant for not having sent the notices of non-payment and surrender of the subject property
to his alleged residence address. Worst, respondent even had the audacity to ask why it took complainant
another six years to file the instant administrative complaint when, according to him, all that he could have
done was simply surrender the housing unit to the complainant or to the GSIS. (Caballero v. Atty. Sampana, A.C.
No. 10699, October 6, 2020, En Banc)
57. Atty. Rivera undoubtedly fell short of the standard under Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he committed a series of
fraudulent acts not only against the complainant, but against the courts as well. Atty. Rivera misrepresented to
the complainant that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before Branch 215 of the RTC of
Muntinlupa City when none was in fact filed. He even simulated the stamp of the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the RTC to make it appear that it received the petition. In truth, Branch 215 of the RTC of Muntinlupa does not
exist. To make matters worse, Atty. Rivera blatantly furnished complainant with a fake court decision
purportedly penned by the Presiding Judge of Branch 206 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which granted
complainant’s petition. These acts are disrespectful, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession and
clearly displayed Atty. Rivera’s disgusting moral unfitness to practice law and his ineptitude to discharge the
duties of a member of the bar. His disbarment is thus in order. (Reyes, Jr. v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 9114, October
6, 2020, En Banc)
58. Respondent fully knew that he was not authorized to redeem the property and yet he deliberately
misrepresented himself and paid the redemption amount at the City Treasurer’s Office of Antipolo. This is
buttressed by the fact that Solid Builders, Inc. informed complainant that they will be the one to redeem the
subject land pursuant to R.A. 7160, Section 261. Thus, respondent’s act of misrepresenting himself as a
representative of Solid Builders, Inc. authorized to redeem the property is a clear indication of dishonesty and
deceitful conduct, in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR. (Bernal, Jr. v. Atty. Prias, A.C. No.
11217, October 7, 2020, Second Division)
59. Atty. Asuncion employed trickery by luring the Aguinaldo into agreeing to buy the subject property. Respondent
should not have led the complainant to believe that the subject parcel of land was still owned by his mother
when in truth and in fact, it was already sold to another buyer. Atty. Asuncion failed to disclose the fact that the
property is already owned by the Posadas family. This was substantiated by the fact that the respondent failed
to produce documents to prove his title/ownership of the property when it was required by the complainant.
As a lawyer, the respondent was duty-bound to observe fairness and candor in his dealing with the complainant.
Further, the respondent willfully refused to return the earnest money given by the complainant,
notwithstanding the fact that the transaction did not materialize. Atty. Asuncion’s integrity was placed in serious
doubt when the earnest money was paid by Aguinaldo in advance. It started motivating the respondent’s every
move to seemingly evade the pending transaction back then. The respondent even blamed the complainant for
the failed transaction and insist that the latter had forfeited the earnest money for backing out from the
transaction in view of the unrealistic condition he has imposed and his failure to pay the down payment.
a. It is apparent that the misrepresentation of the respondent led the complainant to agree to buy the subject
property and parted with the earnest money. The utter lack of good faith of the respondent was evident
from his acts. First, despite the persistent demand by the complainant, the respondent stubbornly refused
to give back the earnest money considering that the transaction did not push through. Second, regardless
of the chances that has been given to the respondent to return the earnest money, he simply ignored the

complainant. It must be noted that there has been a negotiated settlement between the parties in this
case but the respondent again failed to return the money attributing to the complainant the fault for the
non-fulfillment of the respondent’s obligation. (Aguinaldo v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr., A.C. No. 12086, October 7,
2020, First Division)
60. Atty. Mendez exhibited gross misconduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. There is no dispute that an
incident happened on February 12, 2014 at the CENRO Compound of the DENR in Bangkal, Davao City, involving
the group of respondent on the one hand, and the group of Roger on the other. Indeed, the evidence when
taken as a whole would clearly exhibit that physical blows were indeed inflicted upon Roger’s person by
respondent and his group. (Dap-og v. Atty. Mendez, A.C. No. 12017, October 14, 2020, Second Division)
61. In this case, Atty. Rivera undoubtedly fell short of such standard when he performed a series of fraudulent acts
against the complainant. In fact, what Atty. Rivera did to the complainant demonstrates the complete opposite
of how a lawyer should approach and treat a client. Atty. Rivera made the complainant believe that collection
cases would be filed to recover money from persons who had obligations to pay complainant. However, after
receipt of the funds intended as filing fees, Atty. Rivera duped the complainant as he did not spend the amount
as intended and instead, appropriated the funds for his own benefit. He resorted to false pretenses and
misrepresentations to deceive the complainant into parting with its money. Atty. Rivera even had the audacity
to use fake stamps of courts of justice and other government offices to give his dishonest scheme an
appearance of truth and credibility. Atty. Rivera succeeded in deceiving his client and besmirching the
reputation of the courts. Further, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR commands that as officers of the court, lawyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing. The Court has always reminded lawyers not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct.
Clearly, Atty. Rivera failed to heed the tenets of the CPR. His elaborate scheme to defraud his client constitutes
dishonest and deceitful conduct of the highest order. (Professional Services, Inc. v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 11241,
November 3, 2020, En Banc)
62. Respondent violated her sworn duties under the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR when she deliberately misled and
deceived her client by fabricating a court decision.
a. Saladaga v. Astorga declares that any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in
defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is “unlawful.” Unlawful conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. To be
“dishonest” means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray, be untrustworthy, lacking in
integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness, and straightforwardedness. On the other hand,
conduct is “deceitful” means having the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice,
or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the
party imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted
in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done
with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false
statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury. (Manalang v. Atty. Buendia, A.C. No. 12079,
63. Based on De los Santos’ testimony, respondent told her that he drafted and notarized another instrument that
did not state the true consideration of the sale, in order to reduce the capital gains tax due on the transaction.
Respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public document for an unlawful
purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount lower than the actual price paid for the property sold,
respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due and thus violated
Rule 1.02 of the CPR which states that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system. (Lopez v. Atty. Ramos, A.C. No. 12081, November 24, 2020, En
Banc)
64. A lawyer is not allowed to divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
Regardless of whether a lawyer is representing his client in court, acting as a supposed spokesperson outside
of it, or is merely practicing his right to press freedom as a “journalist-blogger,” his duties to the society and his
ethical obligations as a member of the bar remain unchanged. Here, Atty. Causing had clearly violated Section
12 of R.A. 8369, or the Family Courts Act of 1997, which prohibits the publication or disclosure, in any manner,
of the records of the Family Court cases. This is, in itself, a breach of his duties under Canon 1 as well as Canon
13 and Rule 13.02 of the CPR as the subject post not only disclosed confidential information regarding the nullity
case, but also included his own, strongly-worded opinion regarding complainant’s character and the
circumstances surrounding the case. (Velasco v. Atty. Causing, A.C. No. 12883, March 2, 2021, En Banc)
65. Atty. Labastilla’s filing of the SB complaint defied the CA TRO and WPI since he was acting as an agent of the
respondents enjoined under the said CA TRO and WPI, in violation of Rule 1.02 and Canon 1 of the CPR. (Bildner
v. Atty. Labastilla and Atty. Alobba, A.C. No. 12843, March 18, 2021, First Division)
66. Atty. Bayaua is guilty of violating Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.

a. To recall, Atty. Bayaua attempts to evade administrative liability by contending, among others, that he only
acceded to Atty. Abrajano’s request to use his office space out of fraternal love for an ailing brother in the
legal profession, and that his participation in Civil Case No. 4595-MN was very limited. In particular, Atty.
Bayaua maintains that (i) it was Atty. Abrajano who prepared and signed the Petition therein, and that he
merely notarized the Verification and Certification attached thereto; and (ii) while he signed as counsel in
all other succeeding pleadings int hat case (i.e., the Motion to Order Investigation and to Set the Case for
Pre-Trial, the Pre-Trial Brief, and even the Memorandum), it was nevertheless prepared by Atty. Abrajano,
and that he did not anymore verify its contents because he trusted the latter.
b. Atty. Bayaua’s contentions are untenable. Atty. Bayaua himself admitted that he signed the succeeding
pleadings in Civil Case No. 4595-MN, and hence, practically confirmed that he is petitioner’s counsel on
record in the said case, and not Atty. Abrajano. His responsibility as such is governed by Rule 7, Section 3
of the Rules of Court. Notably, the magnitude of the signature of counsel on each and every pleading filed
before the court, as well as the consequences of the failure to abide by this rule, has even been amplified
in the amendments introduced to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by AM No. 19-10-20-SC effective May
1, 2020. Thus, Atty. Bayaua’s act of signing the same is essentially a certification coming from him that he
has read it, that he knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the same. More
importantly, it was his signature on these pleadings which supplied the same with legal effect and elevated
their status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document. In this case, Atty. Bayaua himself
insists that somebody else, i..e, Atty. Abrajano, prepared the pleadings in connection with Civil Case No.
4595-MN and that he did not anymore verify its contents before signing them. Thus, by his own admission,
Atty. Bayaua violated Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. This violation is an act of falsehood before the
courts, which, in itself, is a ground for subjecting him to disciplinary action. (Spouses Mariano v. Atty.
Abrajano and Atty. Bayaua, A.C. No. 12690, April 26, 2021, Second Division)
67. Respondent’s established deplorable conduct exhibited her unfitness and sheer inability to discharge the
bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. Her dishonest, deceitful, and fraudulent conduct of
misappropriating complainant’s manager’s check, as well as her act of misleading the RTC in Civil Case No. 119-
0-2008, evinces a serious flaw in her moral fiber.
a. Respondent was dishonest when she concealed from complainant that Civil Case No. 86-0-2013 had
already been dismissed by the RTC on July 31, 2014. She even went to the extent of instructing complainant
to purchase the subject manager's check purportedly as bond for the consignation of the subject property.
Indeed, respondent deceived complainant when she impressed upon the latter the need for such bond,
despite the prior dismissal of Civil Case No. 86-0-2013. Consistent with her dishonest acts, respondent got
hold of complainant's manager's check through deceitful assurances. Respondent, then, defrauded
complainant by misappropriating the latter's manager's check as settlement for the obligation of another
client in another case. In doing so, she likewise deceived the RTC into believing that complainant's
manager's check was issued for Civil Case No. 119-0-2008, to which complainant was not a party.
b. Interestingly, for reasons only known to her, respondent has opted to remain silent despite such serious
charges. After the disbarment case was filed, respondent repeatedly failed to file her comment despite due
notice. From the issuance of the Court's first Resolution on February 3, 2016 requiring her to file comment,
to the issuance of Resolution dated February 24, 2020 submitting the case for resolution, an overwhelming
period of about four years had already passed. During said period, respondent was reasonably accorded a
chance to file her comment, and was even issued a "show cause" Order on August 19, 2019 for her
repeated failure to do so. Failing to refute the allegations levelled against her despite several opportunities
to do so, respondent is either not at all interested in clearing her name or simply has nothing to say in her
defense. (Domingo-Agaton v. Atty. Cruz, A.C. No. 11023, May 4, 2021, En Banc)
68. Respondent engaged in deceitful and unethical conduct when he persuaded RODCO’s client to breech their
consultancy contracts.
a. RODCO asserts that respondent persuaded its clients to revoke their consultancy contracts with the firm
and took them as his clients instead. Again, respondent does not outrightly deny the allegation, but merely
reasons that these clients left RODCO of their own accord. However, as the IBP found, respondent had a
hand in these clients' decision to withdraw from RODCO. He actively solicited clients through underhanded
and aggressive tactics, such as making house visits and incessant phone calls.
b. In the case of Mesa, respondent lured her away from RODCO by peddling lies, wrong information, and black
propaganda against the company. He tried to use the same tactics with Tajaran, although he did not
succeed in getting her to revoke her contract with RODCO. On the other hand, respondent convinced Mejia
not report to RODCO about the compromise agreement he entered into with the adverse party, even as
the consultancy contract with RODCO was still subsisting.
c. As noted by the IBP, causing the clients to withdraw or violate the terms of their consultancy contract is
brazen solicitation of business from the public. Indeed, respondent was not only actively soliciting clients,
but actually leading clients with existing consultancy agreements with RODCO to break their agreements.
It bears repeating that RODCO being respondent's client, his foremost duty was to protect its interests.
Instead of doing so, however, respondent engaged in conduct that undermined its own client's business.
d. Equally significant is that respondent's Contract of Legal Service with complainant explicitly provided that
respondent could not infringe upon the contract between RODCO and the seafarer-claimants.

Respondent's action clearly breeched his obligation under said contract. (RODCO Consultancy and
Maritime Services Corporation v. Atty. Concepcion, A.C. No. 7963, June 29, 2021, En Banc)
ADVERTISEMENTS AND SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS

1. There is sufficient evidence to show that respondents violated these rules. No less than their former paralegal
Jesherel admitted that respondent Atty. Pedro Linsangan came with her and another paralegal named Moises,
to Manila Doctors Hospital several times to convince complainant to hire their services. This is a far cry from
respondents' claim that they were merely providing free legal advice to the public. Moreover, while
respondents deny Jesherel 's connection with their law firm, this was sufficiently rebutted by complainant when
he presented Jesherel's resignation letter as received by respondents' firm. In employing paralegals to
encourage complainant to file a lawsuit against his employers, respondents indirectly solicited legal business
and encouraged the filing of suit. These constitute malpractice which calls for the exercise of the court's
disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions.
a. A lawyer in making known his legal services must do so in a dignified manner. They are prohibited from
soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. The CPR
explicitly states that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business. Corollary to this duty is for lawyers not to encourage any suit or proceeding for any corrupt motive
or interest. Thus, ambulance chasing, or the solicitation of almost any kind of business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment, is proscribed. (Palencia v. Atty. Linsangan,
A.C. No. 10557, July 10, 2018, En Banc)
2. Rule 2.03 of the CPR explicitly states that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business. Thus, “ambulance chasing” or the solicitation of almost any kind of business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent, in order to gain employment, is proscribed. (Zamora v. Atty.
Gallanosa, A.C. No. 10738, September 14, 2020, Second Division)
3. In this case, respondent admitted having met complainant (albeit under different circumstances as claimed by
complainant), advised the latter to see her in her officer so they can discuss her husband’s labor case, and
prepared the position paper for the case, all of which constitute practice of law. To recall, complainant averred
that outside the office of the Labor Arbiter where her husband’s illegal dismissal case against DM Consuji, Inc.
was pending, respondent approached her and inquired about the said case and the papers that she has. When
she showed respondent the Position Paper prepared by the PAO for the case, the latter remarked, “Walang
kadating dating ang ginawa ng abogado mong PAO, matatalo ang demanda mo dyan.” Respondent further
inquired about the pieces of evidence in the case, to which complainant replied that she provided them to the
lawyer from the PAO but the latter did not attach the same to the position paper. Respondent thus opined that
complainant should change the position paper and, subsequently, listed the documents to be attached to the
new position paper, assuring the latter that once the said documents were completed, she will surely win the
case. (Zamora v. Atty. Gallanosa, A.C. No. 10738, September 14, 2020, Second Division)
MCLE COMPLIANCE
1. Respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His application
for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended.
He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He likewise did not comply with the Third and
Fourth Compliace periods. Respondent’s failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard the
directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP.
a. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP
Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the
Supreme Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from
directing the IBP Board of Governors to declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP. (Arnado
v. Atty. Daza, A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015, Second Division)
2. Respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850 as evidenced by the certification issued by the MCLE stating that
respondent had not complied with the first and second compliance period of the MCLE. In addition, respondent,
despite such non-compliance, repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings before
the trial courts. In indicating patently false information in pleadings filed before the courts of law, not only once
but four times. Furthermore, in using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also put his
own clients at risk. Such deficiency is pleadings can be fatal to the client’s cause as pleadings with such false
information produce no legal effect. (Mapalad, Jr. v. Atty. Echanez, A.C. No. 10911, June 6, 2017, En Banc)
3. Failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificat
eof Compliance does not result in the dismissal of the case. Arrojado states that the failure of a lawyer to
indicate in his pleadings the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result
in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the peladings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will
subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
a. Granting that the Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA on October 29, 2013 even before the
Resolution dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922, it bears to stress that petitioner’s

counsel later submitted Receipts of Attendance in the MCLE Lecture Series for his MCLE Compliance IV on
March 3, 2014 and the Certificate of Compliance albeit on January 26, 2015. Hence, the CA erred in issuing
the assailed November 28, 2014 Resolution denying Doble’s motion for reconsideration, there being no
more reason not to reinstate the petition for certiorari based on procedural defects which have already
been corrected. (Doble, Jr. v. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017, Second Division)
4. Respondent failed to indicate in the pleadings field in the said labor case the number and date of issue of his
MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010,
considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the
MCLE Office, Elibena discovered that respondent had failed to comply with the three MCLE compliance periods.
For this reason, respondent violated Canon 5 of the CPR. (Cabiles v. Atty. Cedo, A.C. No. 10245, August 16,
5. There is no showing that respondent had ever been issued a Notice of Non-Compliance. On the contrary, the
records show that for the first to third compliance periods, she was exempted for being a member of the
judiciary, and that she was able to complete the requirements for the fourth compliance period. The Court also
notes that when complainant filed the disbarment case on October 12, 2012, respondent still had until April 14,
2013 to comply with the fourth compliance period. She eventually completed the required units on May 19,
2012. Thus, there is no reason for respondent to be held liable and declared delinquent under B.M. 850. (Ko v.
Atty. Uy-Lampasa, A.C. No. 11584, March 6, 2019, Second Division)
6. It is worthy to note that Atty. Caringal could not be declared a delinquent member as the sixty (60)-day period
for compliance did not commence to run. There was no showing that he was ever issued and that he had
actually received a Non-Compliance Notice as required by the MCLE Implementing Rules. In addition, by March
11, 2011, he had already complied with the MCLE requirements for MCLE II and III compliance periods, albeit
belatedly.
a. Nevertheless, Atty. Caringal is being held liable for knowingly and willfully misrepresenting in the pleadings
he had signed and submitted to the courts that he was exempted from MCLE II and III. Prior to its
amendment on January 14, 2014, BM No. 1922 imposed a stiff penalty for a practicing lawyer's failure to
indicate the details of his/her MCLE Compliance/Exemption in the pleadings filed before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies, i.e., the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records, which,
in effect, ultimately penalized said lawyer's clients, too. Atty. Caringal, in this case, not only failed to indicate
the necessary MCLE details in his pleadings and motions, but purposely stated therein the false information
that he was exempted from MCLE II and III. As he had filed the subject pleadings in 2010, prior to the
amendment of BM No. 1922 on January 14, 2014, he risked the dismissal of the cases and expunction of
the pleadings and motions by the courts, to his clients' detriment. In fact, as Turla mentioned, the pleadings
which Atty. Caringal filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 09-269, were indeed
expunged from the records per the Order dated March 4, 2013 because of the false MCLE information he
indicated therein. Considering the foregoing, Atty. Caringal violated his sworn oath as a lawyer to "do no
falsehood" as well as certain provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
b. When Atty. Caringal indicated that he was MCLE-exempt in the pleadings and motions he filed, although in
fact he was not, he engaged in dishonest conduct which was also disrespectful of the courts. He
undoubtedly placed his clients at risk, given that pleadings with such false information produce no legal
effect and can result in the expunction of the same. Undeniably, he did not stay true to the cause of his
clients and actually violated his duty to serve his clients with competence and diligence. (Turla v. Atty.
Caringal, A.C. No. 11641, March 12, 2019, En Banc)
7. A non-compliant lawyer must pay a non-compliance fee of PhP 1,000.00 and still comply with the MCLE
requirements within a sixty (60)-day period, otherwise, he/she will be listed as a delinquent IBP member after
investigation by the IBP-CBD and recommendation by the MCLE Committee. The non-compliance fee is a mere
penalty imposed on the lawyer who fails to comply with the MCLE requirements within the compliance period
and is in no way a grant of exemption from compliance to the lawyer who thus paid. (Turla v. Atty. Caringal,
A.C. No. 11641, March 12, 2019, En Banc)
8. The respondent did not disclose his MCLE certificate of compliance number and the date of issue of the
certificate in the complaint he filed in Civil Case No. 6835 of the RTC in Masbate City. Such non-disclosure was
a flagrant disobedience to the aforequoted terms of the resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922.
a. It is good to mention that the respondent seemed to be a repeat violator of the requirement for disclosure
under the resolution issued in Bar Matter No. 1922. He had been observed to have been guilty of the same
omission in A.C. No. 12131, where the Court noted his having defied the order for him to submit his MCLE
compliance, to wit: “With regard to the case docketed as SEC-MC13-138 pending before RTC Mandaluyong
City, Branch 211, complainant also appeared as counsel for and signed the pleadings without a certificate
of compliance for MCLE IV. Also, in its order dated August 19, 2014, the RTC directed complainant to show
cause for his failure to comply with the directives of the court for him to submit his MCLE compliance. Up
to the present, complainant has yet to comply with the order of the court. (Atty. Muntuerto, Jr. v. Atty.
Alberto, A.C. No. 12289, April 2, 2019, En Banc)

9. There is no dispute that when the subject complaint was filed before the RTC, petitioners' counsel failed to
indicate the date and number of her MCLE Compliance Certificate for the immediately preceding period, which
is the third compliance period in this case, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922. The obligation to disclose the
information required under Bar Matter No. 1922 is not a useless formality. The inclusion of information
regarding compliance with (or exemption from) MCLE seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for
those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain[ing] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhance[ing] the standards of the practice of law." Thus, the
dismissal of petitioners' complaint for non-compliance therewith was proper.
a. It must be stressed that the dismissal was brought about by their counsel's non-observance of Bar Matter
No. 1922. Be that as it may, such dismissal did not prejudice petitioners' cause or rights because the same
complaint may be re-filed with complete compliance of the rules as it had not been adjudicated on the
merits. Moreover, such dismissal could not be considered a violation of due process as rights were never
deprived or taken away from the petitioners. (Spouses Cruz v. Onshore Strategic Assets (SPV-AMC), Inc.,
G.R. No. 212862, June 17, 2019, Second Division)
10. Respondent acted in manifest bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit. The respondent had willfully contravened the
requirement under B.M. No. 1922 by concealing his non-compliance with the use of the fictitious MCLE
compliance number in his pleadings in the ejectment case. He had not also met the MCLE requirements
corresponding to the second, third, fourth and fifth compliance periods. His actuations were designed to
mislead the courts, his client and his colleagues in the profession, as well as all other persons who might have
trusted in his representation of his compliance. The Court notes that the respondent did not refute the charge
against him. Instead, he misrepresented that he would be seeking his exemption from the requirement based
on his having served as Assistant City IBP Investigating Commissioner for Makati City, his having worked in the
National Prosecution Service of the Department of Justice, and his having retired from government service on
July 18, 2015. At best, his misrepresentations were another occasion for him to mislead, for he did not thereby
show any honest effort to explain or to justify his non-compliance and concealment of his deficient status in
the MCLE program. To be sure, he did not present any certificate or other acceptable proof to substantiate his
proposed exemption. (Atty. Gustilo v. Atty. De La Cruz, A.C. No. 12318, October 15, 2019, En Banc)
LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

1. There is no dispute that respondent knows fully well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which
is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
GOCCs. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-
College of Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor. Clearly, respondent knowingly
defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the Court.
a. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between permanent and temporary appointments.
Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve respondent from liability. (Malabed v. De
La Peña, A.C. No. 7594, February 9, 2016, En Banc)
2. Respondent, who is a lawyer in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the DOH,
committed unauthorized practice of his profession when he defended complainant in a case against the Office
of the Ombudsman. Although he is authorized to engage in private practice as shown by the National Center
for Mental Health Chief Vicente, said authority does not permit respondent to engage in any activity in the
practice of his profession that will run in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government
as a whole. Thus, in serving as counsel for complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against the
government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest. By appearing against the
Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going agaisnt the same employer – the Philippine government – he
swore to serve.
a. The same rule stands even if respondent did not sign any pleading provided that he acted as complainant’s
counsel in said suit. (Fajardo v. Atty. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016, Second Division)
3. Prosecutor’s failure to resolve I.S. No. 04-211 and to turn over the case records thereof despite orders to do so,
appear to have been committed for the benefit of and to safeguard private interests. Absent any intelligent
explanation as regards his lapses, it can only be inferred that said prosecutor not merely failed, but obstinately
and deliberately refused to perform his duties as a preosecutor. Such refusal evidently worked to the advantage
of the respondents in I.S. No. 04-211 which included the prosecutor’s cousin, Elezar – as the absence of the
case records in the office of the Provincial Prosecutor resulted in the delay in the filing of the appropriate
criminal information in court against them. Hence, it is apparent that respondent used his public position as a
prosecutor to advance and protect the private interest of his relative, which is clearly proscribed in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. (Facturan v. Prosecutor Barcelona, A.C. No. 11069, June 8, 2016, First Division)
4. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) is the principal law office of GOCCs and their
subsidiaries. However, the Land Bank Legal Department is not precluded from participating as counsel for LBP
as long as the OGCC consents to such participation and said Legal Department acts under the control and
supervision of the OGCC.

a. The OGCC directly participated as counsel for LBP when it filed its Manifestation and Confirmation of
Authority before the RTC, attaching thereto the Letters of Authority it had earlier issued which authorized
the lawyers of the LBP Legal Services Group to handle the instant case. To be sure, subsequent pleadings
and motions in the courts were filed by the OGCC as the lead counsel of LBP with the LBP Legal Services
Group acting as collaborating counsel thereof. These filings of the OGCC clearly and unequivocally
demonstrate the OGCC’s control and supervision over the actions of the LBP Legal Services Group, and its
approval of the actions already undertaken by the latter. (Land Bank v. Spouses Amagan, G.R. No. 209794,
June 27, 2016, First Division)
5. Counsel for accused were grossly remiss in their duty to inform the courts of the accused’s death. His counsel
continued to file pleadings on his behalf despite his death. It was only through the July 15, 2016 letter of the
Director General of the Bureau of Correction did the court find out that accused had already died – one year,
four months, and 15 days after its occurrence.
a. Accused was represented by the Public Attorney’s Office. Notwithstanding their heavy case workload and
the free legal assistance they provide to indigents and low-income persons, counsel from the PAO are still
obliged to pursue their cases with competence and diligence. Rule 14.04 of the CPR provides that a lawyer
who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of
conduct governing his relations with paying clients. Additionally, Canon 2 of the CPR explicity states that a
lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible with the
independence, integrity, and effectiveness of the profession. Counsels for the accused have shown
inefficiency in the performance of their duties. Relying on their representations in their pleadings, the
Supreme Court was led to believe that the criminal action against accused subsisted. Consequently, the
Court issued a resolution even after accused’s death. Had counsel for accused informed the Court earlier
of the death of their client, the Court would have saved precious time, effort, and resources and
additionally, the parties need not have filed the pleadings calling for the resolution of accused’s Motion for
Reconsideration. (Hernandez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205871, September 28, 2016, Second
Division)
6. Respondent, a retired judge, violated Rule 6.03 of the CPR when took on the case that he had intervened in
during his incumbency in the Bench. To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the CPR, the respondent must
be shown to have accepted the engagement or employment in relation to a matter that, by virtue of his judicial
office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. That showing was
sufficiently made herein. The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC of Tangub City, presided
over the case before eventually inhibiting himself from further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted
intervention within the meaning of the rule since he not only exercised the power to influence the outcome of
the proceedings but also had a direct hand in bringing about the result of the case by virtue of his having the
power to rule on it. Although the respondent removed himself from the case once his neutrality and impartiality
were challenged, he ultimately did not stay away from the cases following his retirement from the Bench and
acted thereon as a lawyer for and on behalf of the defendants. Respondent ought to note that the restriction
under Rule 6.03 of the CPR extended to engagement or employment. Respondent could not accept work or
employment from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter in which he had intervened as a judge
except on behalf of the body or authority he served during his public employment. Accordingly, the fact that he
was already retired from the Bench, or that he was already in the private practice of law when he was engaged
for the case was inconsequential. (Atty. Pasok v. Atty. Zapatos, A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016, First Division)
7. The focal point of the complaitn for disbarment against respondents was the collection of arrears against the
monthly salaries of the petitioners to pay off housing loans. The rampant collection problems which plagued
the GSIS from housing loans that were prevalently unpaid by its members resulted in the influx of receivables
and bad debts to the detriment of the GSIS fund. The scenario geared the GSIS-BOT and the Management to
enhance its collection efforts as a result of which Atty. Bautista issued the second memorandum regarding the
legal right of the GSIS to demand payment of the arrearages from the cancelled housing loans due to
delinquency, the issuance of Board Resolution No. 48, and the implementation of the same through the
management of Atty. Garcia. Clearly, nothing from the acts of the respondents is deemed a violation of Canon
1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR, Canon 5, and the Lawyer’s Oath. (Munar v. Atty. Bautista and Atty. Garcia,
A.C. No. 7424, February 8, 2017, Third Division)
8. Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration records of an alien, which resulted in the
alien’s wrongful detention, opens the special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration to administrative liability.
a. Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the CPR, then she may be subject
to disciplinary sanction by the Court. (Fuji v. Atty. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 11043, March 8, 2017, Second
Division; Pelipel, Jr. v. Atty. Avila, A.C. No. 7578, August 14, 2019, En Banc)

9. A public prosecutor cannot be administratively disciplined for the lawful performance of his official duties and
in the absence of clear cases of misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as a lawyer. (Yagong v.
Magno and Garcia, A.C. No. 10333, November 6, 2017, Second Division)
10. It was, likewise, established that in her quest to inquire about the money she had given Bautista, Ferrer did not
stop at merely dropping by Bautista's house. As the records show, Ferrer began her confrontation early in the
morning at Bautista's place where she confiscated the latter's cellphone, then proceeded with Bautista to the
government offices to talk to the debtors, and finally ended up at the police station where she further
questioned Bautista about the same issue concerning the money she had given her. In hindsight, this
interrogation practically persisted the entire day, beginning early in the morning of March 28, 2011 up until 7
o'clock in the evening. Thus, Ferrer may insist that she only wanted to "talk about Bautista's obligations in front
of the police authorities," but We agree with the Investigating Commissioner when he said that Ferrer's
actuations gave Bautista the impression that she was arrested and detained, and worse, that government
agencies were being used to advance her private interests. Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a lawyer in government from using his/her public position or influence to promote or
advance his/her private interests. On this score, let Us not forget that Ferrer was the Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, at the time of the incident and that Bautista was well aware of such
fact. Let Us also not forget that Bautista was questioned at the police station from 2:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., or
almost 5 hours. But despite this, Ferrer did not file any complaint against Bautista, insisting that she merely
wanted to talk to Bautista in front of the police authorities. These police authorities searched Bautista's
belongings looking for any clue as to the whereabouts of Ferrer's money as well as the debtors who borrowed
the same. Thus, even assuming that Ferrer did not really kick, punch, or repeatedly slap Bautista's head, the
fact that Bautista surrendered her cellphone and allowed herself to be brought by Ferrer from one place to
another, from early morning until the evening, shows how Ferrer succeeded in using her high and powerful
position in the government to intimidate Bautista, a mere manicurist and lessee of her property.
a. While Ferrer had every right to demand the return of her investments, the appropriate course of action
should have been to file a collection case against Bautista. But instead, she chose to put the law into her
own hands by personally questioning Bautista, bringing her to the police station, and confiscating her
personal belongings. To the Court, Ferrer's acts evinces a certain vindictiveness, an undesirable trait in any
individual, and as extensively discussed above, these actuations violated multiple provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, Ferrer may have been in the government service for many years, but
such fact may not extinguish her administrative liability. (Bautista v. Atty. Ferrer, A.C. No. 9057, July 3, 2019,
Third Division)
11. It is undisputed that respondent not only presided over the arraignment proceedings involving the accused but
also ordered the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. 3265, 3266, and 3267 upon his determination that the cases
involved a commonality of evidence. Accordingly, he performed acts that influenced the outcome of the
proceedings. To be sure, the arraignment is an essential stage of criminal prosecution where discretionary
matters (such as plea bargaining or a motion to suspend arraignment) may be raised, and without which the
criminal cases cannot proceed. Furthermore, by conducting the arraignment of the accused, respondent had
necessarily examined the records forwarded by the prosecutor and consequently, determined the existence of
probable cause; otherwise, the case would have already been dismissed. Meanwhile, in ordering the joint trial,
respondent had to examine the records of these cases in order to determine the commonality of evidence.
Case law states that joint trial is permissible where the actions arise from the same act, event or transaction,
involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the
court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue
advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. Given respondent's directive for joint trial,
the presentation of evidence must now cover ail the charges against and the defenses for all the accused, unlike
before when they were to be taken individually. Thus, given the significance of these acts to the outcome of
the proceedings, respondent's acts fall within the ambit of the prohibition under Rule 6.03. Hence, he should
not have accepted the engagement to be the private counsel of the accused in the same criminal cases in which
he had previously intervened while in the government service.
a. According to the PCGG case, Rule 6.03 of CPR retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics "but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with
the word "intervened." Notably, the word "intervened" was held to only include "an act of a person who
has the power to influence the subject proceedings." The intervention cannot be insubstantial and
insignificant. It does not "includ[e] participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has
no effect or little influence."
b. However, due to respondent's supervening death, the Court finds it apt to dismiss the instant
administrative complaint. The general rule is that "the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an
administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the
pendency of the respondent's case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution
of the case." (In Re: Atty. Atencia, A.C. No. 8911, July 8, 2019, Second Division)
12. Petitioner admitted having notarized a Deed of Sale and a Deed of Assignment in August and September 2008,
respectively. It appears that she was paid the amount of P30,000.00 for notarizing said documents. The acts of

notarization are within the ambit of the term "practice of law," thus, a prior request and approval thereof by
the NHA are required. However, there is no showing of any written authority from the NHA issued in 2008
allowing petitioner to engage in notarial practice. In fact, she was not a commissioned notary public in Quezon
City in 2008. The Court found that petitioner failed to substantiate her allegations of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause.
a. The evidence presented during the preliminary investigation on which the Ombudsman based its
conclusion proved that the act complained of constituted the offense charged, to wit: “The pieces of
evidence on record show that, on two occasions, respondent engaged in notarial service while being
employed as Legal Officer of the NHA in 2008. On August 20, 2008, she notarized the Deed of Absolute
Sale and entered the same in her Notarial Register as document number 742 on page 79, Book No. II, series
of 2008. On September 30, 2008, she notarized the Deed of Assignment and entered the same in her
Notarial Register as document number 805 on page 81, Book No. II, series of 2008. Respondent disclosed
that her 2006 petition for Notarial Commission with authority issued by NHA was granted on May 4, 2006
by Executive Judge Natividad Giron-Dizon and was issued on May 5, 2006, covering the period 2006-2007.
On the other hand, her February 9, 2008 Petition for Notarial Commission with authority issued by NHA,
was granted and issued on March 3, 2009 by Executive Judge Teodor A. Bay covering the period 2009-
2010. She stressed that when she notarized the alluded documents in August and September 2008, her
Notarial Commission was still on petition. A closer look on the alleged 2008 petition shows that the petition
bears the date February 9, 2008. However, it was stamped received by the Office of the Clerk of Court on
February 10, 2009. It also appears on the signature page of the petition that the petitioner was issued IBP
No. 751924 on January 14, 2009 and PTR No. 0472089 on January 12, 2009. From the foregoing, it can be
deduced that the petition prepared on February 9, 2008, was only filed on February 10, 2009. Clearly, there
is no pending petition for notarial commission when the alluded documents were notarized in August and
September 2008, respectively. Since there was no petition filed on the said dates, and the authority given
by the NHA comes as an attachment to the petition, the logical conclusion is that there was no authority
given by the NHA in order for respondent to engage in the limited practice of notarial services when she
notarized the documents in August and September 2008. Section 7, paragraph b(2), R.A. 6713, prohibits
any public official and employee to engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by
the Constitution or law. Respondent is a government employee and is prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of her profession unless authorized by the NHA. Complainant has established that on two
occasions respondent engaged in notarial practice while employed as Legal Officer of [the] NHA in 2008,
without prior authority from the NHA.” (Jabinal v. Overall Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232094, July 24,
13. Respondent, a Trial Attorney III of the DAR, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The records do not
show that respondent was given written permission or authority to engage in private practice by the Secretary
of the DAR. To stress, Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986, provides that no government officer or
employee shall engage in any private business, profession, or undertaking unless auhorized in writing by their
respective department heads. (Spouses Cuña v. Atty. Elona, A.C. No. 5314, June 23, 2020, En Banc)
14. Mistakes committed by a public official are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption
of regularity in the discharge of his official duties and functions. Here the fact that Atty. Jurado previously acted
as VACC’s counsel in its complaint against PAGCOR prior to becoming the chairperson of OGCC does not derail
the presumption that Opinion No. 174 was properly issued. Hence, Opinion No. 174 is deemed regularly and
validly issued. The allegation that respondents unduly preferred APECO over PAGCOR and utilized their public
positions to advance their personal interests in issuing Opinion No. 174 is nothing, but bare allegations
unsupported by evidence. The rule is that a lawyer is not answerable for every error or honest mistake
committed, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and
knowledge. Here, other than being Atty. Jurado’s Chief of Staff, Atty. Olandesca was only tasked to review and
proofread Opinion No. 174, nowhere did complainants point out any overt act that would warrant the
imposition of any liability against him. Verily, the disbarment complaint against Atty. Olandesca has no basis
and should be dismissed for lack of merit. (Vega v. Atty. Jurado, A.C. no. 12247, October 14, 2020, Second
Division)
15. Government lawyers who, in the course of performance of their respective mandates render legal opinions, in
the absence of a patent violation of a law, morals, public policy or good customs, should not, as they could not,
be held liable for their opinions. However, Atty. Jurado is not free from any liability. In Berenguer v. Carranza,
even if there is no intent to deceive on the part of the lawyer, he should not be allowed to free himself from a
charge thereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not willful. In this case case,
Atty. Jurado completely disregarded Opinion No. 152, EO 13, and R.A. 7916 when he issued Opinion No. 174.
As a result, no less than the incompetent, foolish and murderous Duterte criticized Atty. Jurado and publicly
called him a “fool” for allowing APECO to grant franchises to areas outside Aurora Province. It is evident that
Atty. Jurado fell short of what is expected of him as a lawyer in issuing Opinion No. 174 in disregard of an existing

law and jurisprudence, albeit without bad faith. (Vega v. Atty. Jurado, A.C. no. 12247, October 14, 2020, Second
Division)1
16. Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Atty. Miñas, as a regional adjudicator and a member of the
Bar, is expected to be well-versed on legal procedures, most specially those which affect her official functions
in the RARAD. This expectation is imposed upon all members of the legal profession because membership in
the Bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order. It is quite hard to believe that
Atty. Miñas is unaware of these procedural rules; considering that she is a recipient of the Most Outstanding
RARAD award for several years. In this case, Atty. Miñas perilously stretched the DARAB Rules by declaring her
Decision dated January 24, 2001 final and executory despite the pendency of Agrarian Case No. R-1241 and in
complete disregard of Section 57 of RA 6657 which vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to Special Agrarian Courts. Verily, where her own decision was assailed
either on appeal or by original court action, proper judicial temperament as adjudicator dictates upon Atty.
Miñas to be more circumspect and judicious and not preempt the court on the latter's action on the petition
filed with it.
a. A regional adjucator at the DAR is subject to the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct since a
regional adjudicator is tasked with the duty of deciding conflicting claims of the parties as part of the quasi-
judical system of government. (In Re: Supreme Court (First Division) Notice of Judgemnt dated December
14, 2011 in G.R. No. 188376, A.C. No. 12536, November 17, 2020, En Banc)
17. Although the Court recognizes Atty. Erro’s appointment as undersecretary of DAR during the pendency of this
case and his inability to continue private law practice because of conflict of interest, this does not excuse him
from complying with his responsibility to update the Court and the IBP of his current and complete address and
to his clients. Clearly, petitioner cannot be faulted when it relied on the information of Atty. Erro’s address as
stated in his pleadings filed before the LA and the NLRC. His failure to withdraw as counsel of record of
respondent Ibay in this case or even the proper turn-over of the same to his partner, Atty. Pahilga, undoubtedly
shows negligence on his part. (Inter-Island Information Systems, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 187323, June 23, 2021,
Third Division)
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

1. The Solicitor General cannot take the cudgels for a defeated Vice Presidential candidate. To recall, the OSG is
the law office of the government and its default client is the Republic of the Philippines. Here, the Republic of
the Philippines is not a party litigant. Protestant filed this election protest in his bid to oust the duly elected Vice
President. Simply, this involves private individuals only. (Marcos v. Robredo, PET No. 005, November 17, 2020)
2. The issue raised by Panga-Vega regarding the authority of the HRET to initiate the case before the Court must
first be addressed. She argues that as an agency or instrumentality of the Government, the statutory counsel
of HRET is the OSG. She opined that the instant petition should have been filed by the OSG, not the Secretary
or Deputy Secretary of the HRET. Panga-Vega is correct.
a. The HRET was created by virtue of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the
House of Representatives shall have its own Electoral Tribunal that shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members. As a recognized instrumentality of the
Government, the Court, in a catena of cases, exercised over it its expanded judicial power to include the
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
b. Meanwhile, the OSG was constituted as the law office of the Government and shall discharge duties
requiring the services of a lawyer as such. It shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies,
instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer. It is tasked to represent the Government and its officers in the Court, the CA, and
all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government, or any
officer thereof, in his official capacity is a party, among others.
c. The OSG, however, may be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and instrumentalities
when there is an express authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal officers who are being
deputized in cases involving their respective offices, subject to its supervision and control, or when the OSG
takes a position different from that of the agency it is duty bound to represent.
d. A perusal of the records shows that there was no express authorization by the OSG naming the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary of the HRET as its deputized legal officers in filing this petition. There was also no
proof, let alone an allegation, that the OSG took a position different from the HRET in this case. Instead of
providing a plausible justification why the OSG did not represent it, the HRET simply reasoned that the
instant petition should be given course in the interest of a speedy determination of issues. It even posited
that the defect in its filing of the instant petition may be cured upon a subsequent filing by the OSG of a
manifestation and motion ratifying and adopting it, but there had been no such manifestation and motion
in this case. These facts necessarily evince that HRET lacked the legal capacity to initate this case, and the
1
Words describing Duterte are mine. They are accurate descriptions of Duterte.
Lawyers’ Duties to the Bar 30
HRET gave no compelling reason for the Court to disregard this finding. (HRET v. Panga-Vega, G.R. No.
228236, January 27, 2021, Second Division)
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL

1. As a general rule, GOCCs are not allowed to engage the legal services of private counsels. This is because the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) acts as the principal law office of all GOCCs, their
subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings, and government acquired asset corporations. However, they may hire
the services of a private counsel in exceptional cases with the written conformity and acquiescence of the OGCC
and with the concurrence of the COA. (The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. COA, G.R.
No. 185544, January 13, 2015, En Banc)
2. The ACCRA pleadings do not contain a conforme from respondents NECU and NEWU, which purportedly are its
clients, or a withdrawal of appearance from their counsel, Atty. Galit. It also appears from ACCRA’s affidavits of
service that there were no copies furnished to Atty. Galit or to respondents NECU and NEWU. However, in view
of the denial of the 16,500 workers’ Solicitous Motion for Reconsideration, it is no longer necessary to pass
upon ACCRA’s pleadings. (Republic of the Philippines v. Cortez, G.R. No. 187257, August 8, 2017, En Banc)
3. The present petition involving PSALM, a GOCC created pursuant to Section 49 of the EPIRA Law, should be
prosecuted and supervised by the OGCC. At the very least, the OGCC should have duly authorized or deputized
the legal department of PSALM to handle the same. In Land Bank v. Spouses Amagan, the Court ruled the entry
of appearance by the OGCC and its subsequent filing of pleadings, while submitting Letters of Authority earlier
issued to authorize Land Bank’s lawyers to handle the case, unequivocally demonstrated the OGCC’s control
and supervision over the actions of Land Bank’s Legal Services Group, and its approval of the actions already
undertaken by the latter. Similarly, in this case, the OGCC entered its appearance, submitted an authority letter
dated June 18, 2019 in favor of PSALM’s in-house lawyers authorizing them to appear as counsel, and filed a
Reply on behalf of PSALM. With this premise, the Court rules that the current suit is being litigated by the OGCC,
PSALM’s principal counsel. Respondent’s argument that the present petition should be dismissed for lack of
authorization from the OGCC is without merit. (PSALM v. COA, G.R. No. 245830, December 9, 2020, En Banc)
LAWY ER S ’ DU TIES TO THE B AR
UPHOLD INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

1. Respondent violated Rule 7.03 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he allowed a
forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and notarized. (Vasco-Tamaray v. Atty. Daquis, A.C. No.
10868, January 26, 2016, En Banc)
2. Respondent violated Canon 7 when he was rude and disrespectful when he uttered “Maski sampulo pang
abogado darahon mo, dai mo makua ang gusto mo! (Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what
you want!)” against complainant, who was already 70 years old at that time. The tenor of the message cannot
be taken lightly and was meant to annoy and humiliate complainant. Not only was it ill-mannered, it was also
unbecoming of a lawyer, considering that he did it to an elderly and in front of co-litigants and the NLRC
employees. (Canlapan v. Atty. Balayo, A.C. No. 10605, February 17, 2016, Second Division)
3. Respondents compromised the integrity of the judiciary by maliciously imputing corrupt motives against the
Sandiganbayan through a checkbook entry that a check in the amount of P2 million was issued and given to the
Sandiganbayan in order to secure a favorable TRO in the POTC case. This violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands every lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession at all times. (PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation v. Atty. Lokin, Jr., A.C. No. 11139, April 19, 2016, En
Banc)
4. The act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a character that disregards
the human dignity of another. In addition, respondent’s question to complainant, “Wa ka makaila sa ako?” (“Do
you not know me?”) confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying,
harassment, and discrimination. Respondent’s arrogance is intolerable and violates Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. (Ricafort v. Atty. Medina, A.C. No. 5179, May 31, 2016, En Banc)
5. Atty. Del Prado violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he deceived the complainant
by making her sign the deed of sale and making her believe that he would pay in full the balance of the purchase
price after he had the document notarized. Complainant waited for Atty. Del Prado to make good his promise
to pay but despite several demands, he continued reneging on his obligation which prompted her to file a case
against him. (Deveza v. Atty. Del Prado, A.C. No. 9574, June 21, 2016, En Banc)
6. The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer’s Oath by receiving money from the complainants after
having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the redemption in their mother’s behalf. She
was convincing about her ability to work on the redemption because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did
not inform them soon enough, however, that she had meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It
was her duty to have so informed them. She further misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by
falsely informing them about having started the redemption process. She concealed from them the real story
that she had not even initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured them she would do.
Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part with the substantial amount of
P350,000.00. She took advantage of the complainants who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her
ability to perform the task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably eroded
public trust in the Legal Profession. (Mercullo v. Atty. Ramon, A.C. No. 11078, July 19, 2016, En Banc)
7. The filing of cases by respondent against the adverse parties and their counsels, as correctly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, manifests his malice in paralyzing the lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in
protecting their client’s interest. Even assuming arguendo that such acts were done without malice, it showed
respondent’s gross indiscretion as a colleague in the legal profession. (Ret. Judge Alpajora v. Atty. Calayan, A.C.
8. Respondent has repeatedly failed to give child support to his son, a minor. This is contrary to law. Under the
Family Code, he as a parent is obliged to support and provide everything indispensable for his son's sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education, and transportation. Too, he has the duty to instruct his
children according to right precepts and good example and to give them love, companionship, and
understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. Respondent failed in this respect. Not only has he
evaded his duty to support his son and deprived him of the love and affection he deserves from him as his
father, he has also displayed an abusive and rude behavior toward his son's mother. He has, therefore, shown
himself to be truly unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. In addition, respondent seriously
disrespected the IBP's authority and dignity when he disregarded an agreement brokered by the IBP between
him and complainant. He defied the undertaking which he voluntarily made before an officer of the IBP. His lack
of respect for the authority of the IBP constitutes disrespect for this Court as well. For the IBP is integrated by
the Supreme Court to assist in the administration of justice, elevate the standards of the legal profession, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibilities more effectively. Canon 7 of the CPR mandates that a
lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
integrated bar. (Venzon v. Atty. Peleo III, A.C. No. 9354, August 20, 2019, En Banc)
9. A lawyer who misrepresented himself as a senior citizen to get a senior citizen’s card and willfully uses it even
though he is just 45 years old tarnishes the dignity of the legal profession. (Venzon v. Atty. Peleo III, A.C. No.
9354, August 20, 2019, En Banc)
10. An “unlawful” conduct refers to any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in
defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law. It does not necessarily imply the element of criminality
although the concept is broad enough to include such element. To be “dishonest” means the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle,
fairness, and straight forwardness. A “deceitful” conduct means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice, or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the
prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.
a. Here, Atty. Dalangin exhibited dishonesty in feigning that he did not represent Sylvia. Foremost, the caption
in Civil Case No. 1470 and CA-G.R. CV No. 53694 entitled “Syliva Reyes Rivera & Nicasio Rivera v. Felipe
Pecache and the Register of Deed of Nueva Ecija.” Atty. Dalangin even moved for execution of judgment
with preliminary words “Plaintiffs, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully state.” The motion to clarify
writ of execution that Atty. Dalangin filed was similarly worded. Verily, there is no way Atty. Dalangin could
forget that Sylvia is his client. The theory that he counseled only Nicasio and Emily can hardly be given
credit. (Rivera v. Atty. Dalangin, A.C. No. 12724, July 28, 2020, First Division)
11. In unduly borrowing money from Reyes and the Corporation and refusing to pay the same, Atty. Gubatan
abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients. In doing so, he failed to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, in contravention of Canon 7 of the CPR. (Reyes v. Atty. Gubatan, A.C. No. 12839,
November 3, 2020, First Division)
12. The acts committed by Atty. Gille showed that he fell far short of the exacting standards expected of him under
the CPR. First, respondent presented a spurious title of a property which was offered as a collateral in order to
obtain loan from Michelle. It is a clear act of deception which brought disgrace and dishonor to the legal
profession. He took advantage of his knowledge of the law to gain undue benefit for himself at the expense of
Michelle. Atty. Gille thus failed to exercise good faith in his dealings with a client. Second, respondent failed to
pay his debt despite repeated demands which likewise constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct. Prompt
payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer. This is in accord with his mandate to faithfully
perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. Lastly, it is even more
appalling that the check issued by respondent was later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account. In Cuizon v. Macalino, the Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account shows a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed

on him. It manifests a lawyer’s lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy
of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Thus, the act of Atty. Gille in issuing the
check without sufficient funds reflects his moral unfitness and skewed character. (Buenaventura v. Atty. Gille,
A.C. No. 7446, December 9, 2020, En Banc)
13. Atty. Agustin violated Canon 7 of the CPR. In unduly borrowing money from his client and by blatantly refusing
to pay the same, he abused the trust and confidence reposed in him, and in so doing, failed to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. (Dalumay v. Atty. Agustin, A.C. No. 12836, March 17, 2021, Third
Division)
RESPECT FOR OTHER LAWYERS

1. Atty. Pondevilla's actions violated Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he negotiated
with Cabalida without consulting Atty. Lobrido. Records show that Atty. Pondevilla's participation in the
negotiation for the Memorandum of Agreement ensued when he relayed Alpiere's terms to Cabalida. The same
terms that Pondevilla relayed to Cabalida were then faithfully stated in the Memorandum of Agreement. Thus,
Pondevilla cannot dilute his role in the creation of the Memorandum of Agreement to that of a spectator. The
notary public's presence also does not remedy the situation especially that his obligation is only towards
ensuring the authenticity and due execution of the instrument. Atty. Pondevilla knew that Atty. Lobrido was
Cabalida's counsel thus he should have, at the very least, given notice to Atty. Lobrido prior to submission of
the Memorandum of Agreement to court. (Cabalida v. Atty. Lobrido, Jr., A.C. No. 7972, October 3, 2018, First
Division)
2. Respondent’s underhanded tactics against complainant were in violation of Canon 8 of the CPR. As aptly pointed
out by the Investigating Commissioner, instead of availing of remedies to contest the ruling adverse to his client,
respondent resorted to personal attacks against the opposing litigant's counsel, herein complainant. Thus, it
appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly intimidating, harassing, and blackmailing complainant with
purported administrative and criminal cases and prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return
the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available to
him and his client, specially considering that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties
according to law, not to harass them. More significantly, the foregoing showed respondent's lack of respect and
despicable behavior towards a colleague in the legal profession, and constituted conduct unbecoming of a
member thereof. Furthermore, respondent's aforesaid acts of threatening complainant with the filing of
baseless administrative and criminal complaints in an effort to strong-arm the latter and his client into
submission not only contravened the Lawyer's Oath, which exhorts that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same," but also violated
Canon 19 and Rule 19.01 of the CPR. (Roque v. Atty. Balbin, A.C. No. 7088, December 4, 2018, En Banc)
3. The Court also finds that Atty. Diño violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he filed a
disbarment case to harass the Reals, his former clients' new counsel. By resorting to such harassment tactics
against the opposing counsel, he failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues. In Reyes v. Chiong, the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two years
for failing to treat his opposing counsel and other lawyer with courtesy, dignity and civility, and for wittingly and
willingly promoting a groundless suit. There, the respondent lawyer impleaded his opposing counsel and the
prosecutor handling the estafa case of his client as parties-respondents in a civil complaint for the collection of
sum of money. The Court found that respondent lawyer misused the legal processes when he unjustly
impleaded the two lawyers despite knowing that they had no participation in the civil complaint. (Vantage
Lighting Philippines, Inc. v. Atty. Diño, Jr., A.C. No. 7389, July 2, 2019, En Banc)
4. Atty. Plata’s harassing tactics of filing multiple groundless and baseless suits are contrary to Canon 8, Rule 10.03,
Rule 12.02, and Rule 12.04 of the CPR. Upon examination of the records, it becomes apparent that these suits
are mere harassing tactics against Pagdanganan, his correspondents, and their counsel. While the Court is
mindful of Atty. Plata’s duty to defend his client’s cause with utmost zeal, the professional rules impose limits
on a lawyer’s zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications. Atty. Plata’s filing of several cases
against the adverse parties and their counsel lays bare his intent to repress the opposing counsel from exerting
utmost effort in protecting his clients’ interests. The filing of several groundess suits and the reservation of filing
another perjury suit in the future despite the pendency of another perjury case reveal Atty. Plata’s gross
indiscretion as a colleague in the legal profession, in blatant violation of his oath and duties as a lawyer. In fact,
Atty. Plata did not deny that he had filed several civil, criminal and administrative cases against the opposing
parties and their counsels. However, said cases were found groundless. (Pagdanganan v. Atty. Plata, A.C. No.
12701, February 26, 2020, En Banc)
5. Respondent is guilty of violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another
lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result, or reduced fees
for his services. It is undisputed that respondent was aware of the professional relationship between the PAO
and the complainant/her husband with respect to the labor case, yet, she assumed the drafting of a new
position paper, especially to replace the one originally filed by the PAO. To recall, respondent approached

complainant outside the office of the Labor Arbiter and inquired about the said case and the papers that she
has. Complainant also showed respondent the Position Paper prepared by the PAO for the case. (Zamora v.
Atty. Gallanosa, A.C. No. 10738, September 14, 2020, Second Division)
6. Atty. Sevandal’s acts were in direct violation of Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the CPR, which mandates that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result, or reduced fees for his services. Here, it is undisputed that Atty. Sevandal was not the counsel of record
in NLRC Case No. NCR OFW (M) 05-06890-11. It was Atty. Adame who filed the complaint with the NLRC and
the only counsel on record of Merlina. Atty. Sevandal’s insistence that he executed a Retainer Contract and an
Addendum to Retainer Contract with Merlina as basis for appearing on her behalf before the NLRC is untenable.
First, the Retainer Contract covered services for the recovery of the client’s share in the conjugal partnership
property acquired during the marriage, as well as her legitime as heir and surviving spouse of her deceased
husband. The scope explicitly stated that the contract covers the litigation at the level of the RTC only. Next,
the Addendum to Retainer Contract was dubious according to the findings of the IBP since (a) the said
Addendum did not amend or expand the scope of Atty. Sevandal’s engagement as provided in the Retainer
Contract, i.e., still limited to the RTC level only; and (b) it appeared that there were two different versions as
annexed in the Complaint and respondent’s Position Paper. Also, despite having no authority to represent
Merlina in the proceedings before the NLRC, Atty. Sevandal did the following: (a) filed a formal entry of
appearance as counsel of May 9, 2011 in the NLRC case filed by Atty. Adame despite his opposition to the said
case since on the same date he filed a Manifestation Re: Withdrawal of Complaint; (b) at the succeeding NLRC
mandatory conferences, he entered his appearance as counsel for Merlina and manifested his objections to the
appearance of Atty. Adame; and (c) filed an Ex Parte Motion for Attorney’s Lien on June 17, 2011 asking for the
payment of his attorney’s fees equivalent to 20% of the amount that will be awarded to Merlina and later on
received the amount of P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees in order to stop him from meddling in the ongoing
settlement before the NLRC. All these occurred after Merlina hired the services of Atty. Adame as her lawful
attorney-in-fact and caused the latter to file the NLRC Complaint on May 3, 2011 and the annulment of the
Retainer Contract by Merlina through a Revocation of Retainer Contract dated May 24, 2011. (Atty. Sevandal v.
Atty. Adame, A.C. No. 10571, November 11, 2020, Third Division)
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. The IBP is a sui generis public institution deliberately organized, by both the legislative and judicial branches of
government and recognized by the present and past Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal profession.
a. Section 4 of the IBP’s By-Laws allows only private practitioners to occupy any position in its organization.
This means that only individuals engaged in the private practice are authorized to be officers or employees
and to perform acts for and in behalf of the IBP. Hence, the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP,
are private practitioners performing public functions delegated to them by the SC in the exercise of its
constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. (Tabuzo v. Atty. Gomos, A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018,
Third Division)
2. The misconduct of Atty. Laki is further aggravated by Atty. Laki's non-chalant attitude on the proceedings before
the IBP, as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of the IBP's directives to file his comment on the complaint
and appear during hearings. Atty. Laki, while astute in filing several motions for postponement of the mandatory
conference, he never filed his answer to the complaint, despite several reminders and opportunities given by
the IBP. He, likewise, offered no justification or any valid reason as to why he failed to submit his Answer. Clearly,
Atty. Laki's act of ignoring the IBP's directives is tantamount to an obstinate refusal to comply with the IBP's
rules and procedures. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct unbecoming
lawyer. As an officer of the court, Atty. Laki is expected to know that said directives of the IBP, as the
investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers, is not a mere request but an order which
should be complied with promptly and completely. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's
obedience to court orders and processes. (Mariano v. Atty. Laki, A.C. No. 11978, September 25, 2018, En Banc)
3. Atty. Laysa changed her office and residence addresses without updating the IBP. There being no court notice
or processes that reached Atty. Laysa, she was unable to file a single answer or position paper on the complaint
against her. She also failed to attend the mandatory conference of the case and file the required mandatory
conference brief. Had Atty. Laysa fulfilled her duty to update her registration with the IBP, she would have
received every pleading and notice in relation to the instant case and be able to explain her side. To stress,
Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws provides that every change after registration in respect to any matter, such as
office address and residence address, shall be reported within 60 days to the Chapter Secretary who shall in
turn promptly report the change to the national office. (In Re: Petition for the Disbarment of Atty. Laysa, A.C.
No. 7936, June 30, 2020, En Banc)
RESPECTFUL LANGUAGE
1. Calling the respondent a “notorious extortionist” in the reply submitted to the Ombudsman renders the lawyer
liable for violation of prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive, and abuse language in a lawyer’s
professional dealings. (Gimeno v. Atty. Zaide, A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015, Second Division)

2. Calling his brother “polpol” (stupid), even though done in text messages, constitutes use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions. In addition, Orlando’s insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the
services of Maximino indicates Orlando’s offensive conduct against his colleage. (Noble III v. Atty. Ailes, A.C. No.
10628, July 1, 2015, First Division)
3. Respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he called complainant’s counsel
“silahis by nature and complexion” and accused complainant of “cohabiting with a married man ebfore the wife
of that man died.” (Malabed v. De La Peña, A.C. No. 7594, February 9, 2016, En Banc)
4. Respondent violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he stated in his Answer that the
demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated “as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by
her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose.” (Sanchez v. Atty.
Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016, First Division)
5. Respondent violated Canon 8 of the CPR when, without proof nor enough basis on record, swiftly concluded,
based only on gut feeling, that the complainant has been bribed or had acted for a valuable consideration. This
conduct overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness, and candor. (Bacatan v. Atty. Dadula, A.C. No. 10565,
September 7, 2016, Third Division)
6. Atty. Madamo’s actuations do not measure up to Rule 8.01 of the CPR. Reconrds show that he referred to
Buenviaje as a “swindler.” He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is
committing swindling activities. Even if he was suspicious of Buenviaje, he should have refrained from making
such malicious reference or name-calling for he should know as a lawyer that the mere filing of a complaint
against a person does not guarantee a finding of guilt, and that an accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty. Atty. Magdamo’s malicious imputation against Buenviaje is further aggravated by the fact that said
imputation was made in a forum which is not a party to the legal dispute between Fe’s siblings and Buenviaje.
(Buenviaje v. Atty. Magdamo, A.C. No. 11616, August 23, 2017, Second Division)
7. The sending of the unsealed scurrilous letter by respondent lawyer to DOJ Secretary De Lima, was a violation
of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which stipulates that a lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. In that letter, not only
did respondent lawyer employ intemperate or unbridled language, he was also guilty of corner-cutting
unprofessionally. His act of directly asking the Secretary of Justice to intervene immediately in the syndicated
estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases showed his propensity for utterly disregarding the rules of
procedure which had been formulated precisely to regulate and govern legal and judicial processes properly.
(Yumang v. Atty. Alaestante, A.C. No. 10992, June 19, 2018, En Banc)
8. Atty. Dicen resorted to the use of derogatory language in his pleadings when he referred to complainant as
a”lunatic” who was on a “crazy quest for revenge” against him, and “a puppet and a milking cow” of a certain
Martin, who he suggested was complainant’s lover in the Philippines while her husband was in the US. The
totality of these circumstances leads to a conclusion that Atty. Dicen violated Rule 8.01 of the CPR for his use
of language that not only maligned complainant’s character, but also imputed a crime against her, i.e., that she
was committing adultery against her husband who was, at the time, living in the US. (Washington v. Atty. Dicen,
A.C. No. 12137, July 9, 2018, First Division)
9. It was clearly established, and in fact admitted by Ferrer, that she uttered the derogatory remarks "putang ina
mo Arlene, ang kapal ng mukha mo. Ayusin mo muna ako bago mo makuha ang mga gamit mo" in the confines
of her own office. This fact, standing alone, already violates Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from using language which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper.
It is not amiss to add, moreover, that Ferrer was even thrusting a pair of scissors making a move to throw it in
anger. To the Court, Ferrer's excuse that she did not point the same in the direction of Bautista and that it is
simply her mannerism to hold things with her hands does not absolve her from administrative liability. The fact
that she angrily hurled offensive words at Bautista while holding a pair of scissors was enough to threaten and
intimidate the latter. As the Investigating Commissioner held, these words surely have no place in the mouth
of a lawyer in a high government office such as Ferrer, an Assistant Regional State Prosecutor no less. (Bautista
v. Atty. Ferrer, A.C. No. 9057, July 3, 2019, Third Division)
10. Respondent likewise failed to use temperate and respectful language in his pleading against complainant. In his
Comment in Special Proceeding Case No. Q-95-23334 before RTC-QC Branch 77, respondent averred that
Rufina collected "BILLIONS OF PESOS" in rent which were "DISSIPATED ON HER GAMBLING VICES." The Code
provides that a "lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language that is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper." Lawyers are instructed to be gracious and must use such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another. Our language is rich with expressions that are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. Here, respondent, in his eagerness to advance

his client's cause, imputed on Rufina derogatory traits that are damaging to her reputation. (Lim v. Atty.
Mendoza, A.C. No. 10261, July 16, 2019, En Banc)
11. The TSN of the hearings held at the trial court plainly show that Atty. Puti employed impertinent and
discourteous language towards the opposing counsels. To recall, Atty. Puti called Atty. Tan "bakla" in a
condescending manner. To be sure, the term "bakla" (gay) itself is not derogatory. It is used to describe a male
person who is attracted to the same sex. Thus, the term in itself is not a source of offense as it is merely
descriptive. However, when "bakla" is used in a pejorative and deprecating manner, then it becomes
derogatory. Such offensive language finds no place in the courtroom or in any other place for that matter. Atty.
Puti ought to be aware that using the term "bakla" in a derogatory way is no longer acceptable — as it should
have been in the first place. Verily, in Sy v. Fineza, the Court ruled that the respondent judge's act of ruling that
a witness should not be given any credence because he is a "bakla" was most unbecoming of a judge. As against
the public prosecutors, Atty. Puti made the following statement: "Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki siguro
bayad sa inyo.” Such remark was clearly unprofessional, especially since Atty. Puti used to be a public
prosecutor. By nonchalantly accusing the prosecutors of having been bribed or otherwise acting for a valuable
consideration, Atty. Puti overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness, and candor which he owes to the
opposing counsels. For his statements against the private and public prosecutors, Atty. Puti violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Canete v. Atty Puti, A.C. No. 10949, August 14, 2019,
Second Division)
12. Self-laudatory or undignified statements which border on a lawyer’s advertisement of his talents, per se, are
not sanctionable if there is no sufficient evidence to show that these statements are false, fraudulent,
misleading or deceptive. (Atty. Aguirre v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 4355, January 8, 2020, First Division)
13. Atty. Misa violated the canons and rules of the CPR for his use of derogatory and defamatory language in his
affidavit. It must be noted that Roselyn was not even a party to the subject criminal case under investigation by
Asst. Prosecutor Cordillo, Jr. The statements made in the counter-affidavit that Roselyn was a known drug
addict, a fraud, and making insinuation that her marriage was a “fixed marriage” were pointless and uncalled
for, and thus only show that the clear intention of Atty. Misa was to humiliate or insult Roselyn. (Parks v. Atty.
Misa, Jr., A.C. No. 11639, February 5, 2020, Second Division)
14. Respondent’s acts of calling Atty. Nava II and his father “barbaric, nomadic, and outrageous” and baselessly
imputing to Atty. Nava II the use of his alleged influence as the godson of the City Prosecutor who, by virtue
thereof, allegedly had the audacity to display “his bad manners and wrong conduct and arrogance” in an official
pleading falls short of the conduct being exhorted by Canon 8 to all members of the Bar. Verily, such use of
intemperate language and aspersions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. (Atty. Nava II v. Atty. Artuz,
A.C. No. 7253, February 18, 2020, En Banc)
15. Atty. Basa violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the CPR when he resorted to clearly derogatory, offensive, and virulent
language against his opposing counsel. Records show that in the Omnibus Motion filed by Atty. Basa on behalf
of his clients, in a special proceeding where Atty. Cabarroguis was the petitioner, Atty. Basa misspelled the first
name of Atty. Cabarroguis, Honesto, as “HONESTo.” The Court notes that this was not the first time that Atty.
Basa misspelled the first name of Atty. Cabarroguis. In a previous demand letter dated May 31, 2007 drafted by
Atty. Basa and addressed to Atty. Cabarroguis, the latter’s name had also been mispelled as “Honest.” While
the mistake in the demand letter may be dismissed as unintentional, the Court cannot arrive at the same
conclusion with regard to the Omnibus Motion. By spelling the first six letters of Atty. Cabarroguis’ first name
in capital letters and leaving the last letter in lowercase, the impression given to the reader is that the author is
attempting to illustrate an irony at the expense of Atty. Cabarroguis. The misspelling was far from being a mere
inadvertence as it had consistently appeared in all 14 pages of the Omnibus Motion. (Atty. Cabarroguis v. Atty.
Basa, A.C. No. 8789, March 11, 2020, First Division)
16. Atty. Causing violated Rule 8.01 of the CPR when he used the words “polygamous,” “criminal,” “dishonest,”
“arrogance,” “disgusting,” and “cheater” in the subject post and in his pleadings in direct reference to
complainant. Indeed a lawyer’s language, though forceful and emphatic, must always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. (Velasco v. Atty. Causing, A.C. No. 12883, March 2, 2021,
En Banc)
NON-SHARING OF ATTORNEY’S FEES

1. Atty. Linsangan’s act of waiving portions of the property he received by virtue of his professional services in
favor of his wife and children violated Rule 9.02 of the CPR. (Heirs of Carlos v. Atty. Linsangan, A.C. No. 11494,
July 24, 2017, Third Division)
PROHIBITION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

1. As for Atty. Bragas, who is an associate of Atty. Era’s law firm, she is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his
unauthorized practice of law since there is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era’s suspension
from the practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era’s unauthorized practice. Clearly,

Lawyers’ Duties to the Courts 36
Atty. Bragas violated Canon 9 of the CPR which mandates that a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized
practice of law. Being an associate in Atty. Era’s law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order.
The factual circumstances of the case clearly show that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel
for his and/or the law firm’s clients during the latter’s suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who
admittedly was the one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling. (Bonifacio v.
Atty. Era, A.C. No. 11754, October 3, 2017, En Banc)
2. The respondent was also liable for the charge of assisting and abetting the unauthorized practice of law by a
non-lawyer because he had a non-lawyer sign and file the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the
Herein Attached Amended Complaint despite him being the counsel of record of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
6835. He thereby patently breached both the letter and spirit of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. (Atty. Muntuerto, Jr. v. Atty. Alberto, A.C. No. 12289, April 2, 2019, En Banc)
3. Atty. Rivera's act of allowing persons other than himself to use his signature in signing papers and pleadings, in
effect, allowed non-lawyers to practice law. Worse, he failed to display or even manifest any zeal or eagerness
to unearth the truth behind the events which led to his involvement in the filing of the unauthorized civil suit,
much less to rectify the situation. Although he claimed that the signatures were forgeries, there was nary a
display of willingness on his part to pursue any legal action against the alleged forgers. On the contrary, he
openly admitted his association with a disbarred lawyer and their ongoing agreement to allow the latter to use
his signature and "details" in the preparation of pleadings. By so doing, Atty. Rivera not only willingly allowed a
non-lawyer to practice law; worse, he allowed one to continue to practice law notwithstanding that this Court
already stripped him of his license to practice law. (Petelo v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 10408, October 16, 2019,
Third Division)
4. Atty. Tamaño offered plain oversight by his office in failing to log details of the GIS in the notarial book as excuse.
The Court stresses, however, that notaries public are the ones charged by the law with the recording in the
notarial registry books of the necessary information regarding documents they have notarized. Section 2, Rule
VI of the Notarial Rules declares in no uncertain terms that the notary shall record in the notarial register the
details of documents and instruments executed by him. Clearly, notaries public must cause the personal
recordation of every notarial act in the notarial books since they are personally accountable for all entries in
the notarial register. Atty. Tamaño’s delegation of his notarial function to his office staff is also a direct violation
of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the CPR, which provides that a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. (Re:
Order dated Decemebr 5, 2015 in Adm. Case No. NP-008-17, A.C. No. 12274, October 7, 2020, First Division)
5. As an excuse, Atty. Gonzales attributes to his former secretary the negligent assignment of erroneous notarial
details on the Director’s Certificate, and the failure to record the instrument in the notarial register. It is well-
settled that failure to make entry in the notary public’s notarial register concerning his notarial acts violates his
duty under the CPR. Moreover, Atty. Gonzales’ delegation to his former secretary of his notarial function of
recording entries in his notarial register is a clear contravention of the explicit provision of the notarial rules
that such duty must be fulfilled by the notary public himself and not by anyone else. This is a direct violation of
Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. (Orenia
III v. Atty. Gonzales, A.C. No. 12766, October 7, 2020, Second Division)
LAWY ER S ’ DU TIES TO THE C O U R TS
RESPECT FOR THE COURTS AND ITS OFFICERS

1. As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are expected to
be honest in all their dealings. Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest. With full knowledge that
Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication. (Bernardino v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583, February 18, 2015, Second Division)
2. A lawyer who appropriates another lawyer’s IBP Official Receipt number and professional tax deserves
disciplinary action. (Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Atty. Maghari III, A.C. No. 10525, September 1, 2015, En Banc)
3. A lawyer who disregards the directives of Investigating Commissioner to attend the mandatory conference and
to submit a position paper, which results in undue delay in the resolution of the instant administrative case,
violates Canon 11 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Spouses Lopez v. Atty. Limos, A.C.
No. 7618, February 2, 2016, En Banc; Mapalad, Jr. v. Atty. Echanez, A.C. No. 10911, June 6, 2017, En Banc)
4. A lawyer who fails to obey the RTC’s repeated orders to present the Affidavit of Publication violates his duty to
the courts. (Tiburdo v. Atty. Puno, A.C. No. 10677, April 18, 2016, Second Division)

5. Respondent’s act of soliciting money to bribe a judge served to malign the judge and the judiciary by giving the
impression that court cases are won by the party with the deepest pockets and not on the merits. Thus,
respondent must be disbarred. (Plumptre v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 11350, August 9, 2016, En Banc)
6. By provoking a sitting Justice of the Court of Appeals to a debate, respondent violated his basic obligation under
the Rules of Court to obey the laws of the Philippines, and to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers. He also transgressed Rule 11.05, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
only. (Genato v. Atty. Mallari, A.C. No. 12486, October 15, 2019, En Banc)
7. Atty. Lazo’s statements defamed Judge Ramos and tarnished her judicial office. Atty. Lazo hurled baseless
accusations against Judge Ramos, accusing her of bribery, corruption, bias, prejudice, and immorality. These
serious allegations were aired in public, without affording Judge Ramos an opportunity to defend herself. The
statements made by Atty. Lazon exceeded the limits of fair comment. He publicly attacked the manner in which
Judge Ramos was handling her pending cases. In his first speech delived on September 9, 2013, he discussed
Criminal Case Nos. 2131-2131-9 involving four Chinese nationals who were apprehended with high-powered
firearms and explosives. In this case, he related that Judge Ramos issued an Order of Inhibition in response to
an allegation that she received P2 million from the Chinese accused. He further declared that money might
change hands, imputing bribery and corruption against Judge Ramos. He likewise cast doubt on her ability to
render a fair decision, urgin that the case should be closely monitored. Furthermore, bad faith and malice were
likewise apparent in the second speech delivered by Atty. Lazo on September 16, 2013, where he discussed the
case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs resolved by Judge Ramos. He stated that the accused was acquitted due
to Judge Ramos’ close personal relations with a relative of the accused. He hinted that the accused is a relative
of a “very, very, very, very close friend of the Presiding Judge,” a statement imputing illicit relations and personal
prejudice. More so, Atty. Lazo’s privilege to speak before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan should not have been
used as a vehicle to ridicule and degrade Judge Ramos.
a. Atty. Lazo cannot validly claim that he was merely performing his duty to protect the peple of Ilocos Norte.
Atty. Lazo knew that his grievances against Judge Ramos should be ventilated by filing a complaint before
the OCA. No matter how noble his intentions were, he had no reason to disregard the proper protocol, and
to malign and degrade Judge Ramos outside of legitimate channels. Nothing prevented him from directly
filing a complaint before the OCA if he truly believed in his cause. (Judge Ramos v. Atty. Lazo, A.C. No.
10204, September 14, 2020, Third Division)
OBEDIENCE TO THE COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES

1. The OBC correctly pointed out that the Court’s resolution suspending respondent from the practice of law for
a period of six months became final and executory 15 days after respondent received a copy of the same on
October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should have already commenced serving his six-month suspension.
However, respondent never heeded the suspension order against him as he continued discharging his functions
as an Assistant City Prosecutor. Verily, respondent’s continuous discharge of his functions, which constitutes
practice of law, is a clear defiance of the Court’s order of suspension against him. (Spouses Eustaquio v. Atty.
Navales, A.C. No. 10465, June 8, 2016, First Division)
2. Atty. Jose may be administratively sanctioned for reading the Supreme Court’s Resolution addressed to
respondent. It is not disputed that Atty. Jose took hold of the Supreme Court’s correspondence and read it.
Atty. Jose cannot claim that he did so out of concern because, if he were truly concerned, his proper recourse
would have been to inform respondent about receiving mail from the Supreme Court. (In Re: Resolution dated
August 14, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. – GR.CV No. 94656, A.C. No. 10117, July 25, 2016, Second
Division)
3. Atty. Mejica failed to exercise candor and courtesy to the court when he failed to inform the same of the
pendency of his MR before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in connection with the same cause of action.
Likewise, records show that he failed to withdraw his MR before the OPP despite the subsequent filing of his
complaint before the MCTC. Accordingly, Atty. Mejica is liable under Canon 10 of the CPR. (Lim v. Atty. Mejica,
4. Notably, when asked to answer the administrative charges against him, respondent does not lament the actions
he has taken. Rather, he justifies them by insisting that this Court has erred in its decisions in G.R. No. 124468
and G.R. No. 157659-decisions which have long attained finality. He again bombards the Court with arguments
against the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in this disciplinary case knowing fully well, he
being a member of the bar, that final and executory decisions may no longer be disturbed. The same holds true
with regard to respondent's reliance on Article 429 of the Civil Code. His refuge, if at all, under the article is
tainted with bad faith since he knew that the issue on ownership of the properties has long been settled in G.R.
No. 124468. Such action on his part only affirms his misplaced zealousness and malicious intent to reopen the
case in the hopes of gaining a favorable judgment. He demonstrates his propensity to abuse and misuse court
processes to the detriment of the winning party and ultimately, the administration of justice. As such, he

violated Canon 10 and Rule 10.03 of the CPR. (In Re: G.R. No. 157659 “Eligio P. Mallari v. GSIS and the Provincial
Sheriff of Pampanga,” A.C. No. 11111, January 10, 2018, En Banc)
5. According to the OBC, Basilio received the Decision on November 3, 2015. However, records show that Basilio,
through Robea, actually received the Decision on December 2, 2015, as per the Registry Return Receipt, and
that the same was merely mailed on November 13 (not 3), 2015. The OBC - albeit still inaccurately - must have
thought that this latter date was to be considered as the date of receipt. In fact, Basilio, in his motion for
reconsideration and compliance to the Court's October 5, 2016 Resolution, has repeatedly maintained that he
received the Decision on December 2, 2015. This averment appears to be consistent with the documents on
record and hence, ought to prevail. This notwithstanding, Basilio himself admitted that he served his suspension
only on July 9, 2016, proffering that he believed that what was immediately executory was only the revocation
of his notarial commission and the two (2)-year prohibition against being commissioned as a notary public.
Unfortunately, the Court cannot accept such flimsy excuse in light of the Decision's unequivocal wording.
Irrefragably, the clause "effective immediately" was placed at the end of the enumerated series of penalties to
indicate that the same pertained to and therefore, qualified all three (3) penalties, which clearly include his
suspension from the practice of law. The immediate effectivity of the order of suspension - not just of the
revocation and prohibition against his notarial practice - logically proceeds from the fact that all three (3)
penalties were imposed on Basilio as a result of the Court's finding that he failed to comply with his duties as a
notary public, in violation of the provisions of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, and his sworn duties as a
lawyer, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, with the Decision's
explicit wording that the same was "effective immediately", there is no gainsaying that Basilio's compliance
therewith should have commenced immediately from his receipt of the Decision on December 2, 2015. On this
score, Basilio cannot rely on the Maniago ruling as above-claimed since it was, in fact, held therein that a
decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof if the decision so indicates, as in this case. All told, for
his failure to immediately serve the penalties in the Decision against him upon receipt, Basilio acted
contumaciously, and thus should be meted with a fine in the amount of P10,000.00, as recommended by the
OBC. Pending his payment of the fine and presentation of proof thereof, the lifting of the order of suspension
from the practice of law is perforce held in abeyance. (Atty. Bartolome v. Atty. Basilio, A.C. No. 10783, January
31, 2018, Special First Division)
6. There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five Resolutions of the CA. His actions were definitely
contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with the CA resolutions, respondent
displayed not only reprehensible conduct but showed an utter lack of respect for the CA and its orders.
Respondent ought to know that a resolution issued by the CA, or any court for that matter, is not mere request
that may be complied with partially or selectively. (Re: CA-G.R. CV No. 96282, A.C. No. 11173, June 11, 2018,
First Division)
7. Atty. Cruz's indifference to the IBP's directives to tile his comment on the allegations against him cannot be
countenanced. He disregarded the proceedings before the IBP despite receipt of summons and notices. Atty.
Cruz's act of not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating Commissioner, despite due
notice, further aggravated his already disgraceful attitude. As an officer of the Court, Atty. Cruz is expected to
know that said directives of the IBP, as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers,
is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. (HDI Holdings
Philippines, Inc. v. Atty. Cruz, A.C. No. 11724, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
8. Atty. Lupeba failed to comply with the Court's lawful orders. He did not give any justifiable reason why he
disobeyed the directives of this Court. Atty. Lupeba was given time from 2009 to 2015 to explain why he should
not be sanctioned, yet he failed to respond to any of the said orders of the Court. In fact, he did not even
participate at the proceedings before the IBP. Atty. Lupeba only filed a Compliance for payment of the fine of
P1,000.00 and also filed the Motion for Reconsideration of Our Resolution dismissing the Petition for repeated
failure to file a Reply. The Court emphasizes that a "Court's resolution is not to be construed as a mere request,
nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively." Atty. Lupeba's actions not only stand his
disrespect to the Court, but also constitute gross misconduct and willful disobedience of the lawful orders of
this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Records also show that Atty. Lupeba did not settle the P5,000.00 fine imposed by this Court in the
Resolution dated October 14, 2014. In view of his inordinate delay to settle said amount, the imposition of twice
the value of the initial fine is proper to sanction Atty. Lupeba and to make an example of his case in order to
deter others from the same conduct. This Court affirms the payment of the fine of P10,000.00. (In Re: G.R. No.
185806, A.C. No. 12426, March 5, 2019, En Banc)
9. While the allegations against Atty. Cabugoy are unsubstantiated and would have warranted the dismissal of the
instant complaint, the Court cannot look past Atty. Cabugoy's nonchalant attitude in complying with the IBP's
directives, as well as the Court's numerous Resolutions. Atty. Cabugoy's disregard of the Court's Resolutions
directing him to file his Comment and to show cause for his failure to do so, as well as the IBP's directives to file
his position paper and to attend the mandatory conference, despite due notice, without justification or valid
reason, indicates a lack of respect for the Court and the IBP's rules and procedures. As an officer of the Court,

Atty. Cabugoy is expected to know that said Resolutions of the Court, and the IBP, as the investigating arm of
the Court in administrative cases against lawyers, is not a mere request but an order which should be complied
with promptly and completely. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and authority
of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court orders
and processes. Clearly, Atty. Cabugoy's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court
which, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. His cavalier attitude in ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. Atty. Cabugoy's conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. His obstinate refusal to
comply with the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his
disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. (Radial Golden Marine Services
Corporation v. Atty. Cabugoy, A.C. No. 8869, June 25, 2019, En Banc)
10. As of August 13, 2019, this Court has yet to receive respondent's comment to the complaint. At the outset, this
Court would like to address respondent's callous disregard of the various orders and processes it issued which
led to the unreasonable and inordinate delay in the resolution of the instant case. This Court has been very
tolerant of respondent's failure to comply with its directives as evidenced by the numerous opportunities which
were given to him to file his comment to the complaint. However, respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of this Court without any justifiable reason, much less explanation, only shows his utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. What makes matters worse for respondent is the fact that he is not an
ordinary litigant but is an officer of the court who is particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes.
As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request
but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely and not partially, inadequately or
selectively. Moreover, as the courts' indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer, like herein respondent, than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to its processes. Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise
of disciplinary action against him. In the instant case, respondent's failure to comply with the Court's several
directives to file his comment to the complaint constitutes willful disobedience and gross misconduct. The Court
defined gross misconduct as "any inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of a cause." It is a "conduct that is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or
intentional purpose." In previous cases, this Court held that a respondent-lawyer's failure to comply with the
lawful orders of this Court constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect which, alone, can
merit the penalty of disbarment. As mentioned above, respondent's willful disobedience of this Court's
numerous orders has resulted in the extreme delay of the instant proceedings. Thus, he is guilty of violating
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. He also violated Rules 12.03
and 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Code, which state, respectively, that a lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so and a lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse court processes. (Yamon-Leach v. Atty. Astorga, A.C. No. 5987, August 28, 2019, En
Banc)
11. A lawyer who fails to comply with the directive of the Court to return the copy of his client’s OCT is
administratively liable. The lawyer cannot set up the defense that it was his client’s obligation to retrieve said
OCT from him. (Miranda v. Atty. Carpio, A.C. No. 6281, January 15, 2020, First Division)
12. Respondent’s repeated disregard of the IBP-CBD’s orders and proceedings, particularly failing to file his answer,
mandatory conference brief, and position paper and failing to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference
despite due notice, violates Canons 11, 12, and Rule 12.04 of the CPR. (Jacolbia v. Atty. Panganiban, A.C. No.
12627, February 18, 2020, En Banc)
13. Respondent violated Canon 11 when he disobeyed the orders of the IBP to file his position paper. To stress, the
IBP is empowered by the Court to conduct proceedings regarding the discipline of lawyers. In this regard, it is
only proper to remind respondent to be mindful of his duty as a member of the bar to maintain his respect
towards a duly constituted authority. (Spouses Cuña v. Atty. Elona, A.C. No. 5314, June 23, 2020, En Banc)
14. There is no question that Atty. Alisuag utterly disrespected the lawful orders by the Court by ignoring the
Decision dated September 26, 2017, to render the necessary accounting of expenses incurred relative to the
purchase of the property, and to return to complainants the remaining unutilized amounts given to him. Upon
verification with the records, Atty. Alisuag received the said Court’s Decision on December 1, 2017 as per
Registry Receipt No. 4879. In fact, he was able to file his motion for reconsideration. He also received Resolution
dated January 10, 2018 which denied his motion for reconsideration on March 5, 2018 as per Registry Receipt
No. 12232. Moreover, it also appears that all the subject manifestations of Simmons which reiterated Atty.
Alisuag’s non-compliance with the Court’s directives, were, likewise, received by the latter, as shown by the
registry receipts. In a Resolution dated October 9, 2018, the Court required Atty. Alisuag to file his Comment

on Simmons’ Manifestation, which he also received, as per Registry Receipt No. 117063. However, as per Report
for Agenda dated November 22, 2019, Atty. Alisuag has yet to comply with the Court’s directives. Clearly, Atty.
Alisuag’s obstinate refusal to comply with several Court’s directives shows a blatant disregard of the system he
has vowed to support. By his cavalier conduct, as shown by his repeated failure to comply with the Court’s
directives, Atty. Alisuag exhibited lack of respect for the authority of the Court. A resolution of the Court is not
to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. His
obstinate refusal to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores
his disrespect of our lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. (Basiyo v. Atty. Alisuag, A.C. No. 11543,
July 28, 2020, En Banc)
TRUTHFULNESS TO THE COURTS

1. Respondent’s statements on when he received the trial court’s order denying their motion for reconsideration
are glaringly inconsistent. The glaring inconsistencies in respondent’s statements are sufficient to show that he
is guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a
lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be mislead by any artifice. (Francisco v. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 10753, January 26, 2016, En Banc)
2. Respondent’s act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information, i.e., false MCLE Compliance
number, is a mockery of the courts. (Mapalad, Jr. v. Atty. Echanez, A.C. No. 10911, June 6, 2017, En Banc)
3. Atty. Magdamo was out of line when he made inference to the marriage documents of Buenviaje and Fe as
“spurious” as well as his conclusion that “Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life.” He should know
better that without the courts’ pronouncement to this effect, he is in no position to draw conclusions and apss
judgment as to the existence, and validity or nullity of the marriage of Buenviaje and Fe. While his statements
in the notice given to IBP-Dagupan might be prompted by a good cause, it were nevertheless careless,
premature, and without basis. At the very least, Atty. Magdamo’s actuations are blatant violation of Rule 10.02
of the CPR, which provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a
law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved. (Buenviaje v. Atty. Magdamo, A.C. No. 11616, August 23, 2017, Second Division)
4. By misrepresenting himself as a commissioned notary public at the time of the alleged notarization, he did not
only cause damage to those directly affected by it, but he likewise undermined the integrity of the office of a
notary public and degraded the function of notarization. In so doing, his conduct falls miserably short of the
high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers, and it is only but proper
that he be sanctioned. (Triol v. Atty. Agcaoili, Jr., A.C. No. 12011, June 26, 2018, En Banc)
5. Respondent violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 of the CPR. Firstly, the respondent exhibited
dishonesty and deceit in alleging in the petition for reconstitution that his clients had been the true and absolute
owners of the property involved therein, and that such property had been free from all liens and encumbrances
despite his knowledge that the ownership of the same was controversial and still the subject of several cases
pending in the MTC and RTC in Lucena City. Secondly, the respondent's act of instituting intestate proceedings
involving the estate of the late Arsenio Lukang simultaneously in two courts of co-equal jurisdiction in the hope
of obtaining a favorable ruling constituted a deliberate disregard of court processes that smacked of outright
forum shopping and tended to unduly clog the courts' dockets. Further, he instituted the petition for letters of
administration for the same estate despite the existence of a valid and binding extrajudicial settlement executed
on August 5, 1976 by the heirs of the decedent. Thereby, the respondent manifestly neglected his solemn vow
under his Lawyer's Oath to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as appeared
to him to be consistent with truth and honor. Lastly, the respondent ignored his solemn duty under the Lawyer's
Oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to its doing in court by noting in the records in Civil Case No. 89-87
of the RTC in Lucena City that he had received the order of non-suit only on February 14, 1993, which was
contradicted by the certification of the postmaster of the Parañaque Post Office to the effect that he had
received it on December 14, 1992. (Lukang v. Atty. Llamas, A.C. No. 4178, July 8, 2019, First Division)
6. Respondent drafted and signed the Petition for Intervention which avers in essence that the subject
corporations, Skyline, etc., were mere dummies created by the late Pastor Lim. He also notarized the affidavits
of Teresa Lim, Lani Wenceslao and Susan Sabado stating in essence that they were dummies in the corporations
of Pastor. Respondent in his Position Paper before the IBP-CBD claimed however that the statements in the
Petition for Intervention, as well as the Affidavits in support thereto were not his statements. The petition was
filed pursuant to "agreed arrangements" between complainant and the late Miguel Lim and that the assignment
of shares of stock by Miguel to him, was a "pre-arranged agreement as payments for attorney's fees and for
reimbursements of whatever litigations [sic] expenses advanced by the respondent." The flip-flopping
averments of respondent in his pleadings betray a lack of forthrightness and transparency on his part. He initially
averred, through the Petition for Intervention and supporting affidavits which he signed and notarized, that the
corporations were dummies of Pastor. He now claims, however, that the statements in the Petition were mere
hearsay and that the shares of stocks he now owns in the corporations were actually payments to him for his

services and advances. With the incompatibility of the two positions, it is clear that respondent has been less
than truthful in at least one occasion. This, the Court cannot countenance.
a. Respondent also cannot feign ignorance as to the veracity of the statements in the petition because he
signed the same. Lest respondent forgot, a counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality
nor even a mere means for identification. It is a solemn component of legal practice that through a
counsel's signature, a positive declaration is made. In certifying through his signature that he has read the
pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his
competence, credibility, and ethics.
b. Respondent also erred in asserting that while the May 11, 1972 Agreement between Rufina and Pastor was
"improper for notarial act," it has "binding effect against third persons." The Agreement in essence was a
contract entered into by the parties, separating their present and future properties, with Rufina waiving
her support from Pastor and both spouses waiving any future action between them, whether civil or
criminal.
c. The sworn obligation of every lawyer to respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition
for retaining membership in the profession. He is also expected to keep abreast of legal developments. To
claim that such agreement is binding against third persons shows either respondent's ignorance of the law
or his wanton disregard for the laws of the land. Either of which deserves disciplinary sanction. (Lim v. Atty.
Mendoza, A.C. No. 10261, July 16, 2019, En Banc)
7. That this duty is owed by the lawyer to the public and the Court is, albeit stating the obvious, a necessary
iteration as the present case demonstrates, where Atty. Bassig filed a complaint that was false in a critically
material aspect—the status of the plaintiff. The mere act of filing such a complaint, alongside the proven
deceased status of its purported plaintiff, shows either Atty. Bassig's ill intent on the one hand, or appalling
incompetence on the other, neither of which are excusable under the circumstances. (Spouses Asuncion v. Atty.
Bassig, A.C. No. 11830, July 30, 2019, First Division)
8. There is, thus, no question in our mind that by delegating to someone else the work that is reserved only for
lawyers, Atty. Rivera violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, the
actuations of Atty. Rivera tended to mislead the Court. Indeed, the RTC of Makati City was misled into believing
that the complaint was filed by the real party-in-interest and that Atty. Rivera was duly authorized to file the
same. As it turned out, the RTC eventually dismissed the complaint after it was established thru the
Manifestation filed by Petelo that it was filed not by the real party-in-interest or by the duly authorized
representative. Atty. Rivera, thus, in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10, committed a falsehood, or consented to
the doing of any in court; he not only misled the RTC but likewise wasted its precious time and resources. (Petelo
v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 10408, October 16, 2019, Third Division)
9. A lawyer shall never misquote a provision of law. Here, Atty. Pangilinan, in the petition for review, cited the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Republic v. Marasigan, but mangled the unequivocal statements in Marasigan. In
advocating for petitioner’s cause, Atty. Pangilinan boldly claimed that the Court held that R.A. 26 states that the
duty to send notices of the petition for reconstitution to adjoining owners and actual occupants is imposed
upon the trial court instead of reflecting the real ruling which clearly enunciated that “equally unacceptable is
the opinion of the said Court that it was the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and privae
respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do so.” Such blatant act of misquoting jurisprudence is a clear
badge of some desperate effort to mislead the Court into thinking that it was the RTC’s and not petitioner’s
duty to notify actual occupants in a reconstitution of title case. It is the height of disrespect on the part of Atty.
Pangilinan to insinuate that the RTC should have taken up petitioner’s cudgels in complying with the
jurisdictional requirements for the latter’s petition for reconstitution to prosper even when the contrary
statutory principle had already been clarified by jurisprudence. (Denila v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
206077, July 15, 2020, Third Division)
10. Foremost, it was clearly established that the electronic tickets pre-marked as exhibits were altered. The
representative of VIA Philippines attested to this fact and Mr. Encabo failed to substantiate that any error
occurred in the system. Atty. Arnado cannot hide on the simple excuse that he has no expertise to determine
the authenticity of these documents especially that the introduction of such evidence can potentially mislead
the trial court. Also, Atty. Arnado cannot solely rely on his client’s narrations without inquiry when the
circumstances call him to be more meticulous. Indeed, lawyers must diligently familiarize themselves as to the
nature of the cases they would represent. This flows from the duty to advise clients of their candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the litigation and to ensure that their representation will remain
within the bounds of law. Yet, Atty. Arnado failed to examine the electronic tickets and notice that some of
them have no booking reference number. It is of no moment that Mr. Encabo printed the tickets and handed
them for pre-marking. The fact remains that Atty. Arnado did not observe greater care to prevent the Court
from being misled. His indifference further negates any claim of good faith. (Bukidnon Cooperative Bank v. Atty.
Arnado, A.C. No. 12734, July 28, 2020, First Division)
11. Atty. Tacorda should be held administratively liable for violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records
show that he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood and clearly failed to provide adequate explanations to

justify the acts imputed against him. First, as to the act of utilizing as basis of the administrative case against
Judge Desales-Esidera the minutes of the proceedings and intentionally left out the orders issued by the latter,
Atty. Tacorda merely stated that the minutes as attached to the complaint were supplied by Atty. Alvarez, the
first counsel of the heirs of Lucia Mijares-Telegrapo, to complainant Deoasido, who in turn handed them over
to Atty. Tacorda. Verily, Atty. Tacorda only attributed the act as the acts of Atty. Alvarez and Deoasido and failed
to justify his omission of the TSNs and/or the eventual orders of the proceedings which would otherwise reflect
in detail what actually transpired during the trial. Second, as to the act of ascribing to Judge Desales-Esidera the
alleged issuance of the erroneous Order dated April 5, 2005 when it was reflected in the attached minutes of
the proceedings that the name of the judge therein is Acting Presiding Judge Falcotelo, Atty. Tacorda provided
a weak explanation that since Judge Desales-Esidera presided Branch 20, RTC, Catarman, Northern Samar, it
follows then that she had control and supervision of the Clerk of Court, who was then responsible for the
records of the minutes. Third, as to the act of ascribing the delay spanning from 2002 up until April 22, 2016 to
Judge Desales-Esidera when it was clear that she already inhibited from the case as early as December 9, 2010,
Atty. Tacorda did not provide a better explanation other than asserting the constitutional right of Deoasido to
a speedy disposition of his case. (Re: Resolution dated October 11, 2017 in OCA IPI No. 16-4577-RTJ, A.C. No.
11925, September 28, 2020, Second Division)
12. Foremost, Atty. Baldovino admitted that Lawrence is his client in Civil Case No. 128-P-09 and that he is the
counsel of record who drafted the petition for nullity of marriage. Both Atty. Baldovino and Lawrence did not
deny these facts. Also, it was proven that Lawrence was abroad when the case was filed until it was decided.
The affidavits of Rosalinda Berzonla Tomei and Dianne Santos, information on Italy’s Amnesty Program,
certification from the BOI, and Lawrence’s Counter-Affidavit before the public prosecutor established this
finding. In stark contrast, Atty. Baldovino did not disprove these evidence but merely argued that the person he
was dealing as his client was not Lawrence. Yet, Atty. Baldovino failed to substantiate this theory. He did not
even attempt to describe the alleged impostor or to present any corroborating witness. Atty. Baldovino could
have gathered testimonies from court personnel who are supposed to have seen his client during the trial. The
Court stresses that bare assertion is not evidence. As the IBP aptly observed, it is highly impossible for Atty.
Baldovino to draft a petition and prepare a judicial affidavit without discovering the real identity of his client.
At most, Atty. Baldovino allowed another person to sign these documents. To be sure, the questioned
signatures on the petition and the judicial affidavit (first set) varied from the standard signatures in Lawrence’s
passport and counter-affidavit in the criminal case (second set). The swash and the leg of the letter “A” on the
judicial affidavit are connected while it is disconnected in the second set. Also, the letters “n,” “t,” “o,” and “i"
cannot be ascertained in the second set unlike in the first set. Further, the word “Antonio” can be effortlessly
read in the first set but it is not visible in the second set. These differences in the handwriting characteristics
are clearly discernible to the naked eye and support the conclusion that another person signed on behalf of
Lawrence who was abroad during the entire proceedings. In other words, convincing evidence exists that Atty.
Baldovino represented Lawrence in the case for nullity of marriage despite his absence in the Philippines.
Thereafter, Atty. Baldovino knowingly presented another person to act on Lawrence’s behalf during the
proceedings and an expert witness who does not have the required qualifications. These further resulted in
violations of the rules on notarial practice. At this point, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that a lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
Otherwise, the lawyer is as equally guilty as the witness who falsely testifies in court. This amounts to a deceitful
conduct which is a ground for disbarment or suspension not to mention the possible criminal prosecution.
(Berzola v. Atty. Baldovino, A.C. No. 12815, November 3, 2020, En Banc)
13. Atty. Labastilla’s failure to allege the existence of the CA TRO and WPI effectively misled the SB into issuing the
SB TRO as it had no notice or knowledge of any other injunctive order involving the same issues (i.e., who can
act as the legitimate POTC Board of Directors), contrary to Rule 10. 01 of the CPR. (Bildner v. Atty. Labastilla and
Atty. Alobba, A.C. No. 12843, March 18, 2021, First Division)
14. Atty. Bayaua’s contentions are untenable. Atty. Bayaua himself admitted that he signed the succeeding
pleadings in Civil Case No. 4595-MN, and hence, practically confirmed that he is petitioner’s counsel on record
in the said case, and not Atty. Abrajano. His responsibility as such is governed by Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court. Notably, the magnitude of the signature of counsel on each and every pleading filed before the court,
as well as the consequences of the failure to abide by this rule, has even been amplified in the amendments
introduced to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by AM No. 19-10-20-SC effective May 1, 2020. Thus, Atty.
Bayaua’s act of signing the same is essentially a certification coming from him that he has read it, that he knew
it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the same. More importantly, it was his signature
on these pleadings which supplied the same with legal effect and elevated their status from a mere scrap of
paper to that of a court document. In this case, Atty. Bayaua himself insists that somebody else, i..e, Atty.
Abrajano, prepared the pleadings in connection with Civil Case No. 4595-MN and that he did not anymore verify
its contents before signing them. Thus, by his own admission, Atty. Bayaua violated Rule 7, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which, in itself, is a ground for subjecting
him to disciplinary action. (Spouses Mariano v. Atty. Abrajano and Atty. Bayaua, A.C. No. 12690, April 26, 2021,
Second Division)

15. Atty. Mandagan should be liable for transgressing the CPR since the complaint Atty. Mandagan against Mr. Diaz
for the latter’s alleged violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 6713, Grave Abuse of Authority, and Grave Misconduct was
found to be lack of merit.
a. Notably, the dispute arose from the construction, rehabilitation, and repair of the barangay health center
which allegedly encroached upon Atty. Mandagan's property without her consent. Atty. Mandagan accused
Mr. Diaz to have authored the construction. According to her, it was Mr. Diaz who approved the resolution
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the construction and rehabilitation of the project, and that Mr. Diaz
and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod committed irregularities in the construction of the
barangay health center by misappropriating public funds and by giving unwarranted benefits to SMT
Construction. Notwithstanding the seriousness of her accusations against Mr. Diaz, Atty. Mandagan
curiously adduced no evidence to support her allegations. As aptly observed by the IBP, the documents
attached by Atty. Mandagan to her complaint merely pertained to her purported ownership of the portion
encroached upon by the newly constructed and upgraded barangay health center. Atty. Mandagan could
have at least presented proof that Mr. Diaz caused the construction and rehabilitation of
the barangay health center, but she did not. On the contrary, Mr. Diaz adduced several pieces of relevant
evidence to refute the unsubstantiated accusations of Atty. Mandagan.
b. From the undisputed pieces of evidence presented by Mr. Diaz, the structures of the questioned barangay
health center were erected in the property declared in the name of the Government of Ilagan, Isabela, not
in the purported property of Atty. Mandagan. Moreover, the project was indeed an undertaking of the
DOH, not by the City of Ilagan, Isabela. Apparently, the serious accusations hurled by Atty. Mandagan
against Mr. Diaz were baseless. With these groundless averments, it appears that Atty. Mandagan
instituted the criminal action against Mr. Diaz without due and proper investigation of the case and without
due regard to his rights. The Ombudsman, thus, correctly dismissed her complaint for lack of merit. In filing
the meritless Ombudsman complaint against Mr. Diaz, the Court agrees with the IBP that Atty. Mandagan
violated the following pertinent provisions of the CPR particularly Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01,
and Rule 10.03.
c. As a member of the bar, Atty. Mandagan should have employed only such means as are consistent with
laws, legal processes, truth and honor. Owing candor, fairness and good faith to the court, she should have
not prosecuted her patently frivolous and meritless complaint, or instituted a clearly groundless action
before the Ombudsman. Being a member of the bar, Atty. Mandagan should have known better not to
misuse legal processes to defeat the ends of justice. As correctly opined by both the Ombudsman and the
IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Mandagan could have merely filed the appropriate case to remove
any encroachment on her purported property. There was no need to concoct accusations against Mr. Diaz
to gain improper advantage over him. Indubitably, Atty. Mandagan violated the CPR. (Diaz v. Atty.
Mandagan, A.C. No. 12669, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
TEMPERATE AND RESPECTFUL LANGUAGE

1. Respondent Pamatong violated his duties to the court. It is not disputed that the Motion for Inhibition filed by
Pamatong contained blatant accusations of corruption against complainant Panatanosas and calling him a
disgrance to the judicial system. As counsel for the plaintiffs, it was incumbent upon respondent Pamatong to
observe and maintain respect towards the judicial office then being occupied by complainant Pantanosas. That
the slanderous remarks were inserted in no less than a public record, i.e., Motion for Inhibition, makes the
matters even worse. Even granting that the bribery charges were true, such personal attacks against the person
of complainant Pantanosas should have been reserved for a different forum and certainly not included in a
motion filed before a court of law. Such behavior exhibited by respondent Pamatong only serves to betray his
utter lack of reverence towards the courts. Finally, the records also disclose that a news article detailing the
events that precipitated the bribery charge against complainant Pantanosas was published on September 15,
2006 with the participation of respondent Pamatong. This act violated the rule that lawyers should refrain from
attributing to a judge motives not supported by the records or have no materiality to the case. (Judge
Pantanosas, Jr. v. Atty. Pamatong, A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016, En Banc)
2. Respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the CPR when he, in the demand letter that he sent complainants, maligned
their character and imputed crimes against them, i.e., they were criminally liable for worthless or bum checks
and estafa. (Spouses Nuezca v. Atty. Villagarcia, A.C. No. 8210, August 8, 2016, First Division)
3. Respondent failed to conduct himself toward his fellow lawyer with that courtesy that all have the right to
expect. When he mentioned that complainant used his influence in persuading the fiscal, he used a language
which was abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper. (Atty. Aseron v. Atty. Diño, Jr., A.C. No. 10782, September
4. Lawyers should use only respectful and temperate language in the preparation of pleadings, in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession. Their arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both the
court and the opposing counsel and should consist only of such words as may be properly addressed by one
honorable member of the bar to another. In this case, respondents twice accused complainant of antedating a
petition it filed with the DOJ without any proof whatsoever. This allegation of impropriety undoubtedly brought
complainant and its lawyers into disrepute. The accusation also tended to mislead the courts, as it was made

without hesitation notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary support. (The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda
Aseoche v. Atty. Lazaro and Atty. Morta, A.C. No. 7045, September 5, 2016, First Division)
5. Atty. Pascua’s use of the words and phrases like “duped, to take advantage of the innocence of, his ignorance
and abusive manner, foolishness” are not offensive and abusive. They are of common usage in our daily life.
(Chua v. Atty. Pascua, A.C. No. 10757, December 5, 2016, First Division)
6. Respondent’s Facebook remarks compained of disclosed that they were made with malice tending to insult and
tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a “quack doctor,” “Reyna ng Kaplastikan,”
“Reyna ng Payola,” and “Reyna ng Kapalpakan,” and insinuating that she has been bribing people to destroy
respondent manifest respondent’s inappropriate and obscene language in violation of Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
(Belo-Henares v. Atty. Guevarra, A.C. No. 11394, December 1, 2016, First Division)
7. Respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the complainant in his pleadings. He
insisted that complainant antedated the order, dated August 15, 2008, because the envelopes where the order
came from were rubber stamped as having been mailed only on August 26, 2008. He also accused the
complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable close ties with the adverse counsels; and that
complainant irrefutably coached said adverse counsels. However, these bare allegations are absolutely
unsupported by any piece of evidence. Respondent did not present any proof to establish complainant's alleged
partiality or the antedating. The date of mailing indicated on the envelope is not the date of issue of the said
order. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-motives to
complainant. (Ret. Judge Alpajora v. Atty. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018, En Banc)
8. The Court finds Atty. Young's act of sending the subject letter to Judge Macapagal highly improper. Moreover,
as shown in the following portion of the subject letter, there is no question that Atty. Young did threaten to file
administrative and criminal complaints against Judge Macapagal if the writ of demolition was implemented.
Atty. Young wrote that “with all due respect, but much to our regret, we wish to make manifest that we will be
compelled to file an administrative complaint against you before the Office of the Court Administrator as well
as a criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" if you should persist in your stubborn
actuation of implementing the writ of possession/writ of demolition against non-parties to the expropriation
case.” Furthermore, while Atty. Young alleged in his Comment that he had no intention to threaten Judge
Macapagal in sending the subject letter, he also stated that she may be "stubbornly pursuing" the demolition
operations "because of her desire to please and gratify" the Mayor of Parañaque City. He also stated in his
Comment that he sent the subject letter in order to "courteously warn" and prevent Judge Macapagal from
"committing a judicial act which would be a transgression" of his clients' right to due process, and which would
make her "truly vulnerable to criminal as well as administrative" complaints. These statements, in the mind of
the Court, indubitably demonstrate how Atty. Young had failed to observe the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers. While he denied in his motion for reconsideration that he criticized Judge Macapagal, the Court
finds otherwise. In Pantanosas, Jr. v. Pamatong, the Court reiterated that while lawyers have the right, both as
officers of the court and as citizens, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges, such criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. (Judge Macapagal v. Atty. Young, A.C. No. 9298, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
9. The TSN of the May 22, 2013 hearing shows that Atty. Puti made several remarks against the judge. Specifically,
Atty. Puti stated in open court that the judge was abusing his discretion and implied that the judge was partial
and biased. Moreover, Atty. Puti threatened the judge that he would withdraw from the case and walk out if
his request was not granted. Again, such statements were improper. While a lawyer, as an officer of the court,
has the right to criticize the acts of courts and judges, the same must be made respectfully and through
legitimate channels. In this case, Atty. Puti violated Canon 11, Rules 11.03 and 11.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Canete v. Atty Puti, A.C. No. 10949, August 14, 2019, Second Division)
10. A reading of the quoted portion (i.e., “By provision of law, jurisprudence, and specific provision of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, this Honorable Court cannot be partial to the party which Atty. Lim representes”) does not
call to mind that Judge Medina is being labelled as partial. It neither insinuates so in any way. It would be far
too a stretch to say that after enumerating all the points Judge Medina failed to consider, the above statement
is a conclusion of his partiality. There is no other statement to bridge such a connection. In addition, the last
statement of the last pleading (i.e., “Defendants are furnishing a copy of this motion to the Court Administrator,
as they reserve to upgrade their above perceived violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct to a formal
administrative complaint.”) cannot be construed as either a direct or veiled threat against Judge Medina that
should he fail to rule in favor of Atty. Mahinay’s clients, they would file an administrative case against him.
(Zamora v. Atty. Mahinay, A.C. No. 12622, February 10, 2020, First Division)
11. Respondent’s descriptions of complainant in his Counter-Affidavit were offensive. Respondent’s use of the
words “devil,” “with a devil smile,” and “atat na atat” to describe complainant and her actuations during the
meetings held for the preparation and drafting of the Extrajudicial Settlement of her son’s estate fell short of

his sworn duty to act with dignity and civility. The use of these distasteful words in her counter affidavit were
uncalled for. (Tan-Te Seng v. Atty. Pangan, A.C. No. 12829, September 16, 2020, First Division)
12. The Court notes the disrespectful, inappropriate, and offensive language used by Atty. Taningco in the petition
before the Court, to wit: “Aforesaid Decision was rendered by then MTC Judge PAZ ESPERANZA M. CORTES
(now RTC Judge of Taguig City who granted bail in the celebrated case of movie & TV personality Vhong
Navarro). It was apparently railroaded to finality as the appeals by other defendant with RTC Kalibo and before
Court of Appeals – Cebu were all dismissed. The former RTC Executive Judge of Kalibo, Sheila Martelino Cortes
(now retired) is the mother of Judge Paz Ezperanza Martelino Cortes, while CA President Judge Andres C. Reyes
is the latter’s uncle. The Presiding Justice’s mother is a Cortes from Balete, Aklan.” His innuendos that the MTC
Judge is the daughter of the retired RTC Executive Judge of Kalibo, Aklan, and the niece of the now retired SC
Associate Justice Andres C. Reyes are unnecessary and irrelevant. Moreover, the language used by Atty.
Taningco showed his lack of courtesy to the courts expected from every lawyer. Worse, his unfounded
statement suggests that the MTC Decision was affirmed not on its merits but because of the MTC judge’s blood
relationship with the magistrates from the RTC and CA. Undoubtedly, Atty. Taningco failed to be circumspect
in his language in the Petition filed before the Court. By insinuating that his clients failed to get a fair decision,
which he has vested personal interests as well, because of a Judge’s connections with other members of the
bench, tarnishes the reputation of the entire Judiciary. His malicious insinuation undermines the public’s
confidence in the orderly administration of justice. (Taningco, et al. v. Fernandez, et al., G.R. No. 215615,
December 9, 2020, Third Division)
ABUSE OF COURT PROCESSES

1. A lawyer who files several motions and cases with a clear intention of delay the execution of the final judgment
is guilty of misuse of court processes thus violating Canons 10 and 12 of the CPR. (Salabao v. Atty. Villaruel, Jr.,
A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015, Second Division)
2. Atty. Ediza violated Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer should
not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment, or misuse Court processes. It should be noted that
Atty. Ediza was remiss in following the orders of the Court to file his comment in the disbarment proceedings
and orders to show cause. (Floran v. Atty. Ediza, A.C. No. 5325, February 9, 2016, En Banc)
3. Respondent’s act of filing numerous pleadings that caused delay in the execution of a final judgment constitutes
professional misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath. (Avida
Land Corporation v. Atty. Argosino, A.C. No. 7437, August 17, 2016, First Division)
4. Atty. Baclig violated the rule against forum shopping. It must be noted that an amended complaint was filed by
Lamonera, et al. against herein complainant and Paa before the MTCC in February 2010. In such, such amended
complaint sought for the nullification of the mortgage contract and deed of sale which transferred the property
to herein complainant and his co-defendants and the declaration of Lamonera, et al. as the absolute owners of
the subject property. Eventually, the case befpre the MTCC was dismissed with prejudice in an Order dated
November 9, 2012. However, on September 19, 2012, another amended complaint was filed by Lamonera, et
al. against complainants, Robert and Paa, but this time, before the RTC. A cursory reading of the complaint
reveals that the reliefs sought pertain to the nullification of any and all the documents in the form of a written
agreement which may be executed without the consent of Lamonera, et al. In sum, such complaint before the
RTC prayed for similar reliefs as those which were sought for in the complaint before the MTCC. There was
forum shopping in this case, for while the case before the MTCC was pending, Atty. Baclig consented to the
filing of another complaint before another forum, i.e., RTC. Such cases deal with the same parties and same
reliefs. Moreover, regardless of the fact that Atty. Baclig did not act as counsel in the case before the MTCC, it
would not exempt him from culpability. He did not categorically deny the allegaitons fo the complainant
regarding the commission of forum shopping while he answered the other causes of aciton raised by
complainant. Hence, he is deemed to have admitted that he has knowledge of the pendency of a similar
complaint before the MTCC when a complaint before the RTC was filed. In this regard, the filing of another
action concerning the same subject matter violates Rule 12.04 of the CPR which prohibits the undue delay of a
case by misusing court processes. (Alicias, Jr. v. Atty. Baclig, A.C. No. 9919, July 19, 2017, Third Division)
5. Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal cases, and even administrative cases
against different trial court judges relating to controversies involving CEFI, in fact, runs counter to the speedy
disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of justice. It degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts.
(Ret. Judge Alpajora v. Atty. Calayan, A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018, En Banc)
6. Moreover, the filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res
judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the CPR, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Respondent's act of filing Civil Case No. 12053
(which was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of res judicata) further indicates his proclivity to muddle the
issues of the case in order to delay the execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 7802. By his conduct, respondent
violated not only the lawyer's mandate "to delay no man for money or malice," but also Rules 12.02 and 12.04

of the CPR. (In Re: G.R. No. 157659 “Eligio P. Mallari v. GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga,” A.C. No.
11111, January 10, 2018, En Banc)
7. While defendants' notice of appeal was pending before the sala of complainant, respondent called him.
Respondent said that if the notice of appeal is not denied, he would file a disbarment case against complainant
and insinuated that, through his connections with the Court, the complainant was sure to be disbarred.
Complainant admitted that he was shocked by respondent's threat but, at the same time, he was cowed by the
latter's claim of power and influence in the Court. Manifestly, respondent threatened complainant that he
would suffer consequences, such as a disbarment complaint, if he does not act in favor of respondent. Then,
on May 22, 2014, respondent barged into complainant's chambers, fully aware that he had a pending case
before complainant's sala, and demanded he order the court sheriff to sign the garnishment order, which
respondent himself prepared. When respondent did not obtain a favorable response from complainant, he
turned his ire on Sheriff Nabua and made several threats that he would be dismissed from service if he did not
sign the said garnishment order. Respondent was already making a scene in the court that complainant had to
pacify him. Sheriff Nabua was only following the proper court processes when he declined to sign the
garnishment order prepared by respondent. He correctly stated that he cannot enforce the order of
garnishment because defendants offered their personal property for satisfaction of the writ of execution, thus,
the enforcement of the notice of garnishment was held in abeyance pursuant to Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court. Instead of respecting the court processes, respondent blatantly seized for himself the execution of
the judgment by drafting his own version of the order of garnishment and demanded that Sheriff Nabua sign it.
Further, the said garnishment sought by respondent is highly questionable and dubious because it required the
release of the supposed garnished check of one of the defendants, addressed to RCBC in the amount of
P18,690,000,643.00, in favor of Pathways. However, it is clear from the RTC Order dated January 30, 2014, that
the judgment award is only P16,000,000.00 with 10% thereof as attorney's fee. Glaringly, the prepared
garnishment order also specifically stated that the RCBC should release the check's amount to respondent. The
events that transpired on May 22, 2014 were duly recorded in the incident report submitted by complainant to
the OCA. Respondent was given several opportunities to refute the charges against him but he neither
submitted his comment before the Court, despite due notice, nor attended the mandatory conference in the
IBP. Manifestly, the acts of respondent are palpably irregular and disrespectful to the court and its officers.
Respondent had the gall to barge into the chambers of a judge and threaten his court personnel. For his wanton
disregard of the good conduct expected from lawyers before the courts, respondent violated Rules 11.03 and
19.01 and Canons 11 and 19 of the Code. Further, respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath to obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; to do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion,
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. (Judge Dumlao, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, A.C. No. 10498,
September 4, 2018, En Banc)
8. Respondent misused the legal process by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage without any
serious intention to prosecute it. He clearly did it only as a ploy to convince complainant that he was truly
decided to end his marriage with his lawful wife. His excuse that his failure to prosecute was a "purely personal
matter" is flimsy. In any event, if truly he did not use the same as a mere ploy to serve an illicit purpose, he
should have formally withdrawn it. As it was, however, he just left it there to clog the already clogged docket of
the court and waited till it was dismissed. Lawyers are ordained to avoid casual resort to judicial processes for
their personal gain. As officers of the court, they ought to foster respect for court procedures and processes
and be the frontline of defense against those who wittingly and willingly misuse and/or abuse them. Court
processes are, and should forever be, available only for the redress of genuine grievances and should not be
used to suit the whims of unscrupulous individuals. By his actions, respondent undeniably misused and abused
the court processes to suit his whims. Respondent is guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. (Venzon v. Atty. Peleo III, A.C. No. 9354, August 20, 2019, En Banc)
9. Records reveal that in order to unduly prolong the proceedings in different cases filed against him, respondent
had interposed numerous appeals and petitions from issuances rendered by courts in these cases. A template
for this kind of practice, G.R. No. 157659 and G.R. No. 157660, respondent deliberately ignored the final and
executory decisions therein and disregarded the writs of possession correspondingly issued by the courts.
Respondent's dilatory and vexatious tactics were obviously to delay the full enforcement of the courts' decisions
that were adverse to him. It is a fundamental rule that it is the ministerial duty of courts of law to issue a writ
of possession once the decision in a case becomes final and executory. As it was, however, despite finality,
respondent did not recognize these decisions, rendering them inutile. Worse, respondent employed all possible
ways to stall the execution of the final and executory decisions. Respondent's act of unduly extending the
proceedings in these cases clearly run counter to the objective of the Rules of Court to promote a just, speedy,
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Genato v. Atty. Mallari, A.C. No. 12486, October
15, 2019, En Banc)
10. Here, Atty. Calayan never denied the fact that he engaged in an indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, and
civil, criminal and even administrative cases against several trial court judges, lawyers, and members of his
family. He did not deny initiating complaint after complaint not only against the adverse parties to the

controversy, but even their respective counsels who were merely doing their duty to represent their clients.
Neither did he deny instituting administrative complaints against all those judges who handled his cases, as well
as countless manifestations and motions before them. As Judge Diaz put it, he relentlessly filed cases against
her and her fellow judges and unnecessary pleadings "almost every day," to the point that no judge from the
Lucena City trial court wanted to have anything to do with a case involving Atty. Calayan. Against Judge Diaz
alone, Atty. Calayan filed two (2) petitions before the CA, challenging her letter, as well as an administrative
complaint, sending her an advanced copy thereof. It seemed as though he spared no judge from his complaints
and, in the case of Judge Alpajora, the Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Calayan made sure that
the same would turn out agonizing for him by filing the case just a few months before his retirement in January
2009. As expected, the case had delayed the approval of Judge Alpajora's retirement benefits. (Executive Judge
De Leon-Diaz v. Atty. Calayan, A.C. No. 9252, November 28, 2019, First Division)
11. Atty. Basa violated Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the CPR when he initiated four more
criminal complaints against Atty. Cabarroguis for the same cause of action. The foregoing also falls under Canon
1, Rule 1.03 of the CPR since it shows how Atty. Basa recklessly applied the same cause of action in four different
complaints that were all dismissed for lack of probable cause. (Atty. Cabarroguis v. Atty. Basa, A.C. No. 8789,
March 11, 2020, First Division)
12. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Alentajan violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR which mandates
lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and to not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. In addition, the
filing of another action concering the same subject matter runs contrary to Rules 12.02 and 12.04 of Canon 12,
which prohibits lawyers from filing multiple cases arising from the same cause and the undue delay of a case by
misusing court processes, respectively. In addition, forum shopping is a violation of Canon 1, which requires a
lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his or her duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice. Regardless of the fact that Atty. Alentajan did not act as counsel in Civil Case No. Q-05-5629, it would
not exempt him from culpability. He knowingly filed another civil case despite the finality of the judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-05-5629 which already resolved the issue of ownership and validity of foreclosure of mortgage
of the subject property. In fact, aside from filing Civil Case No. R-QZN-13-02119-CV, Atty. Alentajan assisted his
clients in filing various cases such as, criminal complaint for violations of Section 1 and 36 of R.A. 7652 in relation
to Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. 3765, criminal complaint for violation of Article 302 of the RPC or robbery in an
uninhabited place or a private building and contempt against the officers of COCOLIFE which were all dismissed
for lack of merit. (Villanueva v. Atty. Alentajan, A.C. No. 12161, June 8, 2020, Second Division)
13. A lawyer who files frivolous motions with the intent of delaying the execution of the MCTC Decision that had
long been final and executory abuses the legal process and blatantly disregards the precepts of judicial process.
Moreover, this amounts to an infraction and a clear defiance of his sworn duty under the Lawyer’s Oath to obey
the legal orders of a duly constituted authority and to delay no man for money or malice. (David v. Atty. Rongcal,
A.C. No. 12103, June 23, 2020, En Banc)
14. The remedies which respondents pursued and exhausted were sanctioned by the applicable rules and were
intended solely to advance their clients’ interest in the kidnapping case. Furthermore, they did not violate Canon
11, Rule 11.03 when they filed a certiorari petition before the CA in order to assail the issuances of the RTC. In
fact, their actions are supplied by Canons 17 and 19 of the CPR, particularly, owing fidelity to the cause of their
clients and representing their clients with zeal within the bounds of the law. (Atty. Perito v. Atty Baterina, A.C.
No. 12631, July 8, 2020, Second Division)
15. While there is no showing that Atty. Donayre was the one who prepared and filed Bacalso’s first complaint for
illegal dismissal and money claims docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB VII-09-2458-2009, the records reveal that
she was the counsel on record for Bacalso when the LA dismissed the case in a Decision dated May 14, 2010.
This is precisely the reason why Atty. Donayre was furnished with a copy of the LA’s Decision which, notably,
became final and executory on June 10, 2010. Notwithstanding the finality of the dismissal of the earlier case,
Atty. Donayre deliberately filed another labor case, docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1396-10, based on
the same cause of action, involving the same parties, and with the same prayer before the LA. Atty. Donayre
should have known better than to file the second labor case as the dismissal of NLRC Case No. RAB VII-09-2458-
2009 had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. More than that, it appears that Atty. Donayre filed the
second illegal dismissal case almost one month after the Decision dated May 14, 2010 attained finality. Such
action clearly reveals a misplaced zealousness and malicious intent to relitigate the case in the hope of gaining
a favorable judgment. It also demonstrates a clear abuse and misuse of court processes to the detriment not
only of the winning party, but also of the administration of justice. (Tapang v. Atty. Donayre, A.C. No. 12822,
November 18, 2020, Third Division)
16. Atty. Labastilla’s resort to an injunctive complaint with the SB evinces his disregard of the CA TRO and WPI
constituting an abuse of the court’s process and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct, and degrade
the administration of justice, contrary to the dictates of Rule 10.03 of the CPR. (Bildner v. Atty. Labastilla and
Atty. Alobba, A.C. No. 12843, March 18, 2021, First Division)

17. In the case, it is clear that respondents' filing of multiple motions and cases before the LA, the NLRC, the RTC,
the CA, and even the Court had been intended to delay the execution of the NLRC Decision dated March 25,
2009, which found respondents' client liable for constructive dismissal and awarded Recio backwages and
separation pay of P767,542.82. As a matter of fact, the records show that respondents continued to block the
execution of the NLRC Decision through various legal maneuverings despite the absence of any order from the
CA staying the execution of the NLRC's final judgment; notwithstanding the two Entries of Judgment issued by
the NLRC – the first pertaining to the finality of its Decision on the main case, and the second on the validity of
the Writ of Execution issued by the LA. To make matters worse, respondents proceeded with their strategy to
delay the execution of the NLRC Decision even after the Court itself had ruled on the matter with finality in G.R.
No. 194035 wherein it upheld the NLRC's award of backwages and separation pay in Recio's favor. To this end,
respondents again questioned the LA's issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution before the NLRC and then with
the CA via another certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 122848. This time, respondents argued that the NLRC
Decision could not be executed despite its finality on account of a ''supervening event" in the form of a supposed
Notice to Work requiring Recio to report back to work. What is more disturbing though is the CA's conclusion
that Atty. Madamba, whose signature appeared in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, had
filed the certiorari petition without the required authority from their client. Based on these considerations,
there is no question that respondents have made a mockery of the judicial system by abusing and misusing
court processes in order to unduly delay the execution of a final judgment, in clear violation of the Lawyer's
Oath which proscribes lawyers from delaying any man tor money or malice, as well as Rule 1.03, Canon 1, Rule
10.03, Canon 10, and Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12 of the CPR. (Recio v. Atty. Madamba and Atty. Apostol,
Jr., A.C. No. 12197, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
PROHIBITION AGAINST INFLUENCE PEDDLING

1. Respondent should be sanctioned for violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
gave his client an impression that he has friends at the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with a fee. It
was for this reason that complainant was forced to give respondent the amount of P1.4 million. (Fajardo v. Atty.
Alvarez, A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016, Second Division)
2. In this case, while CV Case No. 2004-0181-D was pending before the sala of complainant, where respondent
was the counsel for the plaintiff therein, respondent fraternized with complainant and gave an impression that
he was an influence peddler. He tried to impress complainant with his influence by dropping names of two
Justices of the Supreme Court, who were supposedly his colleagues and close friends. Then, while defendants'
notice of appeal was pending before complainant, respondent asked him to deny the said notice and issue a
writ of execution. He declared that the case of Pathways was closely monitored by the said Supreme Court
Justices. He also stated that then President Aquino III would supposedly appoint him as the Presidential Legal
Consultant. Verily, respondent consistently applied his influence peddling scheme in order to persuade
complainant to rule in favor of his client. At the same time, he related to complainant that he would share a
portion of his attorney's fees with complainant in exchange for the issuance of the writ of execution and the
denial of the notice of appeal filed by defendants. He also insisted that a portion of the judgment would be
donated to the U.P. Law Center. Evidently, this constitutes attempted bribery or corruption of public officers
on the part of respondent as he offered monetary consideration in exchange for a favorable ruling. Then, on
May 22, 2014, respondent barged in the chamber of complainant and required Sheriff Nabua to sign the
garnishment order he prepared, he again gave an impression that he would be able to dismiss Sheriff Nabua
because of his influence with the higher authorities. He uttered the following statements: "Kapag hindi mo
pipirmahan ito, papatanggal kita", "Alam ng nasa itaas ito.", "Alam ng dalawang Justices ito," and "Kung hindi
niya pipirmahan ito, tutuluyan ko dismissal nito." Respondent also sent several text messages to complainant
stating that the latter and Sheriff Nabua are guilty of graft and that they will receive pleadings from the Supreme
Court. Clearly, respondent continuously and unceasingly asserted that he had influence in the Court and that
he would be able to punish complainant and Sheriff Nabua if they do not follow his whims and caprices. At one
point, respondent even attempted to bribe complainant with a share of his attorney's fees. By implying that he
can influence Supreme Court Justices to advocate for his cause, respondent trampled upon the integrity of the
judicial system and eroded confidence in the judiciary. This gross disrespect of the judicial system shows that
he is wanting in moral fiber and that he lacks integrity in his character. These acts of respondent constitute the
height of arrogance and deceit. Respondent violated Canon 13, Rule 13.01, Canon 10 and Canon 10.01 of the
Code. (Judge Dumlao, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, A.C. No. 10498, September 4, 2018, En Banc)
3. But what the Court finds more deplorable was Atty. Laki's act of giving assurance to Mariano that he can secure
a favorable decision without the latter's personal appearance because the petition will be filed in the.RTC of
Tarlac, which is allegedly presided by a "friendly" judge who is receptive to annulment cases. Atty. Laki's
deceitful assurances give the implication that a favorable decision can be obtained by being in cahoots with a
"friendly" judge. It gives a negative impression that decisions of the courts can be decided merely on the basis
of close ties with the judge and not necessarily on the merits. Without doubt, Atty. Laki's statements cast doubts
on the integrity of the courts in the eyes of the public. By making false representation to his client, Atty. Laki
not only betrayed his client's trust but he also undermined the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession. (Mariano v. Atty. Laki, A.C. No. 11978, September 25, 2018, En Banc)

Lawyers’ Duty to their Clients 49
4. The Court agrees with and find as persuasive the finding of the IBP Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Diño
tainted the image of the Judiciary by claiming that the P150,000.00 to be collected from Vantage will be used
to facilitate the issuance of the TRO. Although Atty. Diño now denies bribing the judge to secure the issuance
of the TRO, explaining that the amount of P150,000.00 was for the payment of the additional fees, expenses
and costs of litigation which he euphemistically called "mobilization expenses" and, for alleged professional fees
for collaborating lawyers who devoted laborious man-hours in personally monitoring the progress of the
complaint, the Court finds his explanation not worthy of credence. First, Atty. Diño himself admitted in his
complaint-affidavit for estafa that the P150,000.00 which he described as mobilization and representation
expenses was for the purpose of securing the TRO. This statement negates his assertion in the verified complaint
that the P150,000.00 was for other expenses. Atty. Diilo did not even explain in the Billing Statement what he
needed to mobilize. Second, the Retainer's Agreement and the Billing Statement did not authorize the hiring of
collaborating lawyers. Third, the reimbursement of incidental expenses such as sheriff's and process server's
fees were billed under Item No. 5, i.e., "Reimbursement of incidental expenses" in the Billing Statement. This is
different from Item No. 2, i.e., "Reimbursement of Mobilization and Representation Expenses" of the same
Billing Statement. Plainly, and contrary to Atty. Diño's claim, the P130,000.00 could not have included the
sheriffs and process server's fees. By representing to his clients that he can secure the issuance of a TRO by
bribing the judge P150,000.00, Atty. Diño violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Vantage
5. Atty. Mercy is guilty of influence peddling. Records show that Atty. Mercy boasted that her connections with
influential persons, would get Nenita a favorable rate for the sale of the hotel. At the same time, she used her
alleged connections to discourage Nenita from filing a complain against her and Atty. Ladimir. By giving the
impression that justice is served depending on one’s connections, and insinuating that the administration of
justice is susceptible to corruption and misconduct, Atty. Mercy has placed the judiciary in a bad light thereby
eroding the public’s trust and confidence in the judicial system. (Ko v. Atty. Maduramente and Atty.
Maduramente, A.C. No. 11118, July 14, 2020, En Banc)
6. Though it is true that Atty. Causing is, by all means, given the liberty to defend his client’s cause with utmost
zeal, this is not without reasonable limtiations. In this case, it appears that Atty. Causing’s post in Facebook was
so designed to elicit, at the very least, a negative public opinion against complainant. Such act, however, is
proscribed under Rule 19.01 of the CPR which, among others, mandates lawyers to “employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client.” (Velasco v. Atty. Causing, A.C. No. 12883, March 2, 2021, En
Banc)
7. Respondent engaged in influence peddling. His repeated disregard of the proscription against influence
peddling proves his unfitness for the legal profession. Based on Tajaran's statements, respondent had implied
LA Concepcion, his wife, could be bribed into ruling in her favor, or that he can sway the case if only Tajaran
would be willing to counter the alleged offer of money by the opposing counsels. Such conduct from a lawyer
is reprehensible. Respondent not only attempted to solicit a bribe from a client, he undermined the integrity of
the labor tribunal by making it appear that its arbiters were susceptible to influence and bribery. Meanwhile, in
Jarloc's case, respondent asked RODCO for money he specifically said was for the purpose of securing a
favorable ruling before the CA, where he claimed to have "connections" that can guarantee the same.
Regardless of whether such claims were true, respondent had placed the integrity of the CA, indeed the entire
judiciary, into question and put its decisions into disrepute. This is not the conduct expected of a member of
the Bar. (RODCO Consultancy and Maritime Services Corporation v. Atty. Concepcion, A.C. No. 7963, June 29,
2021, En Banc)
LAWY ER S ’ DU TY TO THEIR C LIEN TS
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
1. The relationship between a lawyer and a client is imbued with utmost trust and confidence. Lawyers are
expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They
commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability
without need to be reminded by either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of
legal proficiency and attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an
indigent litigant. (Ramirez v. Atty. Buhayang-Margallo, A.C. No. 10537, February 3, 2015, En Banc)
2. Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years prior to Muñoz’s appointment as Provincial Legal Officer,
hence, he cannot feign ignorance thereof. As a local public official, it was incumbent upon Muñoz to secure the
proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG not only for his first term, but also his second and third. His
failure to do so rendered him liable for unauthorized practice of his profession and violation of Rule 1.01 of the
CPR. (Monares v. Atty. Muñoz, A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017, En Banc)
3. Here, Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong Barangay
in violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty. Baldo therefore violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in connection with
Section 9 of P.D. 1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses James and Josephine Baldo in a hearing before
the Punong Barangay, Barangay Pico, Municipality of La Trinidad in Benguet. All told, the Court finds that the
evidence adduced is sufficient to support the allegations against Atty. Baldo. (Malecdan v. Atty. Baldo, A.C. No.
12121, June 27, 2018, Second Division)
4. It is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was created when respondent lawyer agreed to accept the
complainants’ case and, in consideration thereof, received from complainants payment in cash and in kind.
(Spouses Vargas v. Atty. Oriño, A.C. No. 8907, June 3, 2019, First Division)
5. There was no attorney-client relationship between Bereber and Burgos. Accordingly, Atty. Bereber cannot be
held liable for conflict of interest. There is insufficient evidence which would confirm the presence of an
attorney-client relationship between Burgos and Bereber. There was no instance did Burgos obtain Bereber’s
legal advice in connection with the pending NEA complaint and/or Audit Report, in as much as Burgos made no
attempt to refute such allegations decisive of this controversy. In his attempt to show even a semblance of an
attorney-client relationship between him and Bereber, Burgos suggested that Bereber is a supposed
“representative” of District III from which the complainants of the NEA case, such as Burgos, are also member-
consumers thereof. This Court, however, agrees with the finding of the IBP that Bereber, as CAPELCO director,
represents the entire membership of CAPELCO, and not just the member-consumers of District III. In any case,
Burgos failed to establish that Bereber was engaged as counsel by the member-consumers of District III.
a. A lawyer can be said to representing conflicting interests specifically in circumstances when he, having
been engaged as counsel for a corporation, subsequently represents the members of the same
corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit filed against them. To be clear, a corporation in a
derivative suit is the real party in interest, while the stockholder filing suit in the corporation’s behalf would
only be considered a nominal party. This is clearly wanting in this case. While the facts established on record
reveal that Bereber assumed the role as counsel of CAPELCO, the administrative complain filed before the
NEA against the accused CAPELCO directors and managerial staff were brought by Burgos and other
consumer-members in their individual capacities and not in behalf of CAPELCO.
b. Atty. Bereber cannot be punished on the allegation of supposed lack of “delicadeza” or sense of decency
in this case because it is not a legal ground for administrative disciplinary action under the CPR. At best,
Atty. Bereber can be said to have merely exercised independence of judgment as a lawyer when he
defended the interests of other member-consumers of CAPELCO. (Burgos v. Atty. Bereber, A.C. No. 12666,
March 4, 2020, Second Division)
6. There is no evidence that Atty. Espiritu was retained as counsel by Capinpin. The latter’s claim, that she obtained
the services of Atty. Espiritu to handle her civil cases, and especially, to deal with BDO, lacks factual basis. First,
with regard to Civil Case No. Q93-15901, the Answer filed by Capinpin before Branch 82 of the RTC-QC, was
signed by Atty. Dionisio Maneja, Jr. It was alleged therein that Capinpin offered the subject property to Atty.
Espiritu. Incidentally, Capinpin signed the Verification attached to the Answer, attesting that she caused the
preparation of the pleading, and that she understood and confirmed its contents, which are true and correct.
It is then clear that Atty. Espiritu did not represent Capinpin in the civil case. The mention of Atty. Espiritu in the
Answer was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a prospective buyer of Capinpin’s property. The same is true
with the letter addressed to BDO’s Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Irene Ishiwata, dated August 4, 1993, and signed
by Atty. Espiritu. Second, the Motion to Set Case for Reception of Rebuttal Evidence, in Civil Case No. 0-91-
10383, was signed by Atty. Espritu as attorney-in-fact of Capinpin. An attorney-in-fact is an agent authorized to
act on behalf of another person, but not necessarily authorized to practice law. Capinpin’s insistence that their
agreement was to establish an attorney-client relationship and not just a mere principal-agent relationship, is
misplaced. Capinpin never presented the Special Power of Attorney she executed in favor of Atty. Espiritu or
any other evidence to prove her attorney-client relationship with Atty. Espiritu, like the receipt for the money
supposedly entrusted to him. (Capinpin v. Atty. Espiritu, A.C. No. 12537, September 3, 2020, First Division)
7. A lawyer-client relationship was established when complainant sought respondent’s legal services for the
settlement of her son’s estate. To be sure, complainant was introduced to respondent to discuss the properties
her deceased son Patrick left behind. Thereafter, they had several meetings at respondent’s law office for the
preparation and drafting of Extrajudicial Settlement. Respondent even sent complainant and April the list of
pertinent documents he would be needing. From respondent’s own actions, it is crystal clear that a lawyer-
client relationship between him and complainant had been forged. Finally, the absence of retainer agreement
and non-payment of fees do not negate the existence of a lawyer-client relationship. (Tan-Te Seng v. Atty.
Pangan, A.C. No. 12829, September 16, 2020, First Division)
8. There is an attorney-client relationship. Records show that the legal services of Atty. Capela was engaged by
Napoleon to handle a civil case before the RTC of Alaminos City, Pangasinan. Atty. Capela entered his
appearance as Napoleon’s counsel, moved for extension of time, and filed an Answer. Atty. Capela’s contention
that he did not receive a copy of the signed retainer agreement to prove an attorney-client relationship, is not
credible. He would not have undertaken to enter his appearance, as well as, move for extension and file a
pleading if he was not representing Napoleon. Moreover, a written contract or retainer agreement, is not an
essential element in the employment of an attorney. To establish a lawyer-client relationship, it is sufficient that

the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession, as in
this case. (Quitazol v. Atty. Capela, A.C. No. 12072, December 9, 2020, En Banc)
9. The moment Atty. Constantino approached Atty. Aransazon to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the
personal relationship between Atty. Constantino and Atty. Aransazo. At this point, the relationship between
them imposed upon Atty. Aransazo certain restrictions circumscribed by the profession. (Atty. Constantino v.
Atty. Aransazo, A.C. No. 9701, February 10, 2021, Third Division)
10. A lawyer-client relationship is established when lawyers consistently manifest to a person consulting them that
they would provide legal representation or assistance, regardless of the close ties between the parties, or the
lack of a written contract, or the non-payment of legal fees. Lawyers who later on decide not to represent their
client have the duty to inform their client. Failure to do so will be cause for administrative sanction.
a. Contrary to the finding of the IBP that there was no attorney-client relationship, the text messages
exchanged between the parties represent a different picture. Their conversations did not appear like casual
exchanges between friends about a theoretical legal issue. On the contrary, the series of exchanges
between the parties show that respondent voluntarily acquiesced to representing complainant in his
prospective annulment case, or at the very least, render her legal assistance in his suit. She asked
complainant to submit his documents related to the case and repeatedly assured him that she would be
filing the annulment complaint even after complainant expressed hesitation due to the lack of action on
respondent’s part.
b. A lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and
the complainant or the non-payment of the former’s fees. Hence, despite the fact that complainant was
kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a
personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare
– and had actually prepared – at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client’s interest. Rule
18.03 of the CPR provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
c. While respondent may later refuse to represent complainant, as in this case when she was requested by
complainant’s mother-in-law to refrain from interfering in complainant’s domestic issues, it was still
incumbent upon respondent to inform complainant that she would no longer be able to represent him.
When complainant asked respondent for an update on his case on February 26, 2014, respondent did not
infom him that she would no longer be connected with the case due to conflict of interest, even though
she was approached by complainant’s mother-in-law sometime before November 2013. It was only when
she filed her Answer before the IBP that complainant learned of the reason why respondent would not be
representing him. (Sison v. Atty. Dumlao, A.C. No. 11959, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
1. Respondent violated the prohibition against conflict of interest. In this case, respondent would necessarily
refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse,
he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. (Bernardino v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583, February 18,
2. Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts. Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest
and to obtain their written consent, but no such evidence was presented. (Bernardino v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No.
10583, February 18, 2015, Second Division)
3. There is no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm’s client. The
lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the
case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ’s services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way
connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman. The prior case where
Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the annulment of a land title.
Somontan was never a party to this case since this case only involved Gimeno’s relatives. On the other hand,
the case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan’s Ombudsman complaint against
Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno’s alleged
corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the
Ombudsman case are totally unrelated. In addition, there was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide
because at the time Somontan engaged his services, he has already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the
record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he acquired while he
was still their counsel in the annulment of title case. (Gimeno v. Atty. Zaide, A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015,
Second Division)
4. Respondent represented conflicting interests when he served as counsel for RPB in the case for annulment of
mortgage filed by the complainant, who happens to be respondent’s former client, against RBP. (Mabini
Colleges, Inc. v. Atty. Pajarillo, A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015, Third Division)

5. Respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Records show that in both Civil Case
No. 4866-R (Heirs of Angeline S. Tulio represented by Arthur S. Tulio v. Heirs of Artemio Patacsil) and Civil Case
No. 6185-R (Deogracias s. Tulio, et.al. v. Arthur Tulio), the subject property under dispute is one and the same.
This is also the same subject property of the Deed of Waiver of Rights which plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6185-R
have executed and signed in favor of Tulio, which respondent later on used against Tulio. Clearly, the series of
respondent’s actions in protecting the rights and interests of Tulio over the subject property before and after
the filing of Civil Case No. 4866-R, to the preparation of the Deed of Waiver of Rights in favor of Tulio runs
counter and in conflict to his consequent filing of Civil Case No. 6185-R and his imputation of fraud against Tulio.
There is no question that respondent took an inconsistent position when he filed Civil Case No. 6185-R against
Tulio whom he defended and protected as client in the past. (Tulio v. Atty. Buhangin, A.C. No. 7110, April 20,
6. Atty. Francisco could have avoided the incident if she at least tried to talk to Balbuna’s counsel on the matter
of amicable settlement of the criminal case instead of talking to Balburias himself. Balburias misinterpreted the
approach as an attempt to buy her opponents. However, Balburias failed to satisfactorily show that Atty.
Francisco acted in bad faith. Delos Santos’ affidavit showed that Atty. Francisco immediately corrected herself
when she realized that she might have offended Balburias by saying that she was referring to the amount of
the complaint. Nevertheless, Atty. Francisco should be admonished to be more careful with other litigants to
avoid a repetition of a similar incident in the future. (Balburias v. Atty. Francisco, A.C. No. 10631, July 27, 2016,
Second Division)
7. Respondent cannot be held liable for any violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibiliy
because he was never a counsel for either party in the COMELEC prior to the filing of the said action. The mere
fact that respondent agreed to handle a case for Atty. Bello does not – alone – prove that they are indeed
partners. (Cruz, Jr. v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 9090, A.C. No. 9090, August 31, 2016, Third Division)
8. A lawyer who agrees to represent a client’s interests in the latter’s business dealings is duty-bound to keep the
confidence of such client, even after their lawyer-client relationship had ended. If he represents any other party
in a case against his former client over a business deal he oversaw during the time of their professional
relaitonship, he is guilty of representing conflicting interests. (Diongzon v. Atty. Mirano, A.C. No. 2404, August
9. It is undeniable that complainants Silvestra and Santos, on one hand, and Martinez, on the other, have
conflicting interests with regard to the disputed property, particularly Lot 456 covered by TCT No. 3900 which
complainants assert they never sold to Martinez. Atty. Lizardo now finds himself arguing against the ownership
by Silvestra and Santos of their shares in the disputed property, which is the very legal position he was bound
to defend as their counsel in the partition case.
a. In the complaint for partition, which is the only case filed in court concerning the subject properties, Atty.
Lizardo is the counsel of record therein of Silvestra and Alicia. There is no mention of Martinez in said
complaint. As argued by complainants, if Martinez was indeed also Atty. Lizardo’s client in the partition
case, he should have included Martinez as one of the plaintiffs in order to protect the latter’s interests.
Likewise, after the death of Alicia and the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement of her estate, Atty.
Lizardo had yet another chance to implead Martinez to protect his interest as sole owner of the shares of
Silvestra and Alicia in TCTs No. 13866 and 3900, but again failed to do so for no discernible reason. These
inactions make it hard to believe Atty. Lizardo’s claim that Martinez engaged his services concurrently with
Silvestra and Alicia in the filing of the partition case. There is no credible proof on record that Atty. Lizardo
was from the beginning engaged to represent Silvestra, Alicia, and Martinez as their common counsel.
Hence, as counsel for Silvestra and Alicia, Atty. Lizardo is required to deliver the property of his client when
due or upon demand, and mandated to always be loyal to them and vigilant to protect their interests.
(Medina and Medina v. Atty. Lizardo, A.C. No. 10533, January 31, 2017 En Banc)
10. Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal’s allegations of disloyalty. As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted
as counsel for ALECO under the management of the old BOD in the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 10007
entitled “ALECO, Petitioner, v. Adonay, NEA Project Supervisor, Respondent,” which was filed by Olaybal and
his group. It sought for the injunction, accounting with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and/or TRO,
seeking to stop the election of the new set of members of the Board of Directors; and (b) Civil Case No. 10066,
which was also filed by Olaybal. Said case was for prohibition, mandamus, and receivership, with preliminary
prohibition and mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining and mandatory orders. Muñoz thereafter
served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of the NEA management team. Muñoz could have
easily anticipated that his advice would be sought with respect to the prosecution of the members of the old
BOD, considering that the latter was deactivated due to alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest
between Olaybal’s board on one hand, and NEA and its management team, on the other, is apparent. By
representing conflicting interests without the permission of all parties involved, Muñoz violated Rule 15.01 and
15.03 of the CPR. (Monares v. Atty. Muñoz, A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017, En Banc)

11. There is no denying that respondent’s preparation and filing of motions on behalf of the complainant, the
adverse party in the case filed by him for his client, conflicts his client’s interest. Indeed, a motion for extension
to file an answer would not be favorable to his client’s cause as the same would merely delay the judgment
sought by his client in filing the case. Moreso, the motion for postponement of the TRO hearing would definitely
run counter with the interest of his client as such remedy was precisely sought, supposedly with urgency, to
protect his client’s right over the subject property before complainant could proceed with the sale of the same.
a. Rule 15.03 expressly requires a written consent of all parties concerned after full disclosure of the facts if
ever, for whatever reason, a lawyer will be involved in conflicting interests. Corollary to this, Rule 15.04 of
the CPR substantially states that if a lawyer would act as a mediator, or a negotiator for that matter, a
written consent of all concerned is also required. Notably, there is no record of any written consent from
any of the parties involved in this case. (Celedonio v. Atty. Estrabillo, A.C. No. 10553, July 5, 2017, Third
Division)
12. FLC engaged respondent’s legal services to represent it in opposing complainant’s actions to forestall the
foreclosure proceedings. As can be gleaned from respondent’s position paper, it is admitted that respondent
extended help to the complainant in negotiating with FLC for the reduction of the loan payment and cessation
of the foreclosure proceedings. Evidently, respondent was working on conflicting interests – that of his client,
which was to be able to foreclose and obtain the best amount they could get to cover the loan obligaiton, and
that of the complainant’s, which was to forestall the foreclosure and settle the loan obligation for a lesser
amount.
a. Respondent’s allegation that such negotiation was within the knowledge of his client will not exonerate
him from the clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR.
b. Respondent’s admission that he received advance payments of professional fees from the complainant
made matters worse for him. As correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner, it was highly improper
for respondent to accept professional fees from the opposing party as this creates clouds of doubt
regarding respondent’s legal practice. Furthermore, if a lawyer receives payment of professional fees from
the adverse party, it gives an impression that he is being paid for services rendered or to be rendered in
favor of such adverse party’s interest, which, needless to say, conflicts that of his client’s. Simply put,
respondent’s professional fees must come from his client. (Capinpin, Jr. v. Atty. Cesa, Jr., A.C. No. 6933,
July 5, 2017, Third Division)
13. Contary to Salandanan’s futile defense, he sufficiently represented or intervened for Paces in its negotiations
for the payment of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. The letters he sent to the counsel of E.E. Black Ltd. identified
him as the Treasurer of Paces. Previously, he had likewise represented Paces in two different cases. It is clear,
therefore, that his duty had been to fight a cause for Paces, but it later became his duty to oppose the same for
E.E. Black Ltd. His defense for Paces was eventually opposed by him when he argued for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus,
Salandanan had indisputably obtained knowledge of matters affecting the rights and obligations of Paces which
had been placed in him in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge led him to the identification of those
attachable properties and business organizations that eventually made the attachment and garnishment
against Paces a success. To allow himt to utilize said information for his own personal interest or for the benefit
of E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse party, would be to violate the element of confidence which lies at the very
foundation of a lawyer-client relationship. In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full disclosure
to it of the conflict of interest, Salandanan should have either outrightly declined representing and entering his
apparance as counsel for E.E. Black Ltd., or advised E.E. Black Ltd. to simply engage the services of another
lawyer. Unfortunately, he did neither, and must necessarily suffer the dire consequences. (Paces Industrial
Corporation v. Atty. Salandanan, A.C. No. 1346, July 25, 2017, En Banc)
14. Without the written consent of all concerned parties after a full disclosure of the facts, respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interest. Respondent did not merely act as its investor at his own behest in a letter
dated April 26, 2007, the respondent wrote AFP-RSBS, acting for and in behalf of Phil Golf. Worse, at Phil Golf’s
instance, he caused the filing of a Complaint dated October 10, 2007 against complainant with the HLURB,
stating that he is the duly authorized representative and assignee of Phil Golf and that he caused the
preparation of the complaint. (Palacios v. Atty. Amora, Jr., A.C. No. 11504, August 1, 2017, En Banc)
15. With Atty. Evangelista’s admission that he retaiend clients who have cases against Adela without all the parties’
written consent, it is clear that he has violated Rule 15.03 of the CPR. (Romero v. Atty. Evangelista, Jr., A.C. No.
11829, February 26, 2018, Second Division)
16. Atty. Deloria represented Menguito, the President of LSDC, in the criminal case for estafa that the Spouses
Flores filed against her. Subsequently, however, Atty. Deloria filed a complaint for delivery of title against BPI
on behalf of Corazon before the HLURB. As such, Atty. Deloria simultaneously represented Menguito and
Corazon despite their conflicting interests, considering that Corazon's estafa case against Menguito was
premised on the latter's and LSDC's alleged misrepresentation of ownership over the lots sold and LSDC's
eventual failure to deliver the title. It must be stressed that it was LSDC that obligated itself to ensure the
transfer of the ownership of the purchased lot to Corazon, a lot buyer, pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed
between them. Thus, Atty. Deloria's simultaneous representation of Menguito and Corazon sans their written

consent after a full disclosure of the facts violated the rules on conflict of interest. Moreover, he represented
several lot buyers as complainants in HLURB Case No. REM-C-03-8-1171 against BPI while also representing
LSDC as third-party respondent therein. In fact, he even filed a Position Paper on behalf of both the
complainants therein and LSDC. Such dual representation without the written consent of the parties again
constitutes a violation of Rules 15.01 and 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, warranting disciplinary action therefor.
(Buenavista Properties, Inc. v. Atty. Deloria, A.C. No. 12160, August 14, 2018, En Banc)
17. Respondent admitted handling at least 24 cases for Dr. Malvar. He also admitted handling two land cases for
the Lopezes. He was instrumental in facilitating the various dealings between Dr. Malvar and the Lopezes
involving the litigated properties he was handling, and in fact signed as a witness in the joint venture agreement
and three deeds of conditional sale between the parties. After their falling out, respondent then filed a
complaint, with himself as co-plaintiff together with the Lopezes, seeking to invalidate the same agreements
he prepared at a time when he enjoyed the confidence of Dr. Malvar. These facts clearly establish that
respondent represented conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Canillo v. Atty. Angeles, A.C. No. 9899, September 4, 2018, En Banc)
18. Respondent indeed violated the rule on conflict of interest when he entered his appearance for defendant
Malino in Civil Case No. CV-08-5950, and thereafter, accepted his appointment as attorney-in-fact for Gabriel,
who was the plaintiff in the same case, and even submitted pleadings and motions on Gabriel's behalf therein.
As aptly remarked by the Investigating Commissioner, "it is undeniable that [respondent] placed himself in a
situation where he could as easily manipulate one side to gain an advantage for the other." Jurisprudence
provides that "it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice." Thus, even
if respondent's intentions in accepting Gabriel's designation as attorney-in-fact were honest and in good faith,
the fact remains that his actions constitute representing conflicting interests, for which he must be
administratively sanctioned. (Atty. Legaspi v. Atty. Fajardo, A.C. No. 9422, November 9, 2018, Second Division)
19. Respondent was obviously taking instructions from the unidentified buyer when he did not reveal the latter's
identity to his client which itself authorized him to forge the sale. Too, while he may not be fully responsible in
delaying Civil Case No. 95-086, he did not actively pursue its quick end even though it was the most appropriate
thing, he as a lawyer, should have done. As it was, Respondent appeared to have had a different agendum in
which expediting the case was not the most profitable for him because the land then was still statutorily barred
from being sold, conveyed, or alienated. Respondent insisted and demanded that he alone negotiate for and
effect the sale of the land. But when the time to sell came, he did not reveal to his client and its farmers-
beneficiaries the details of the sale itself, let alone, the buyer's identity. Respondent even sowed fear in the
minds of the farmers-beneficiaries who expressed reservations on the fairness of the terms of the sale especially
with respect to the extremely low price of P30.00 per square meter. Respondent told them that in reality they
had a very slim chance of winning the case filed by Philippine Veterans Bank. Hence, if they do not accept the
sale now they would end up with nothing at all. With the ultimate objective of closing the sale and even after
he got spurned by the sitting members of the Board at that time, Respondent just took it upon himself to side
with the opposition group which wanted to establish and assert themselves as the new leaders of the
Cooperative. Hence, his determination of which between the two (2) opposing groups may properly give
instructions about the sale was patently tainted by his own private interest to earn from the sale of the land.
He knew he could only ensure his private interest if he was able to simultaneously continue not only as the
Cooperative's lawyer but as the Cooperative's agent authorized to sell the land and to actually consummate it.
He may have also forgotten he was the lawyer of the Cooperative which has a personality distinct from its
members. As it was, instead of staying neutral for the sake of maintaining order within the organization of the
Cooperative, Respondent chose to side with Lino D. Sajol just so he could complete the sale of its only asset.
a. Respondent had proven himself disloyal to his client --- exploitative, untrustworthy, and a double-dealer.
The client's land had been sold. The client did not know who the buyer was. Respondent acted to protect
the buyer's interest, and in all likelihood, his as well. The client did not know and still does not know how
much was actually paid for the land. Money flowed from an account set-up by Respondent himself and
although under the Cooperative's name, Respondent alone had access to it. The cash proceeds of the sale
have not been accounted for to this date.
b. A lawyer is prohibited from acting or continuing to act for a client where there is a conflict of interest,
except when there is a written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, there was
no consent to speak of at all. Instead of halting his legal representation of the Cooperative to avoid conflict
of interest, he stubbornly continued to engage therein, i.e. his seeming obsession to sell the land in
question. He even managed to secure alleged General Assembly Resolutions to validate his objective of
selling the land.
c. The rule against conflict of interest requires a lawyer to decline a retainer from a prospective client or
withdraw from a client's ongoing matter. This, Respondent did not do, obviously for monetary
considerations arising from the sale of the land. A lawyer should examine whether a conflict of interest
exists not only from the outset but throughout the duration of a retainer because new circumstances or

information may establish or reveal a conflict of interest. Respondent did not have the circumspection as
his professional judgment has been obscured by the singular objective of selling the land to his undisclosed
buyer. (Palalan CARP Farmers Multi-Purpose Coop v. Atty. Dela Rosa, A.C. No. 12008, August 14, 2019, En
Banc)
20. Respondent Nava is guilty for conflict of interest. It is undisputed that Atty. Nava became the retained counsel
of Hierro in the latter’s cases and also as counsel for Annalyn in the petition for the issuance of a TPO against
Hierro. It must be highlighted that the petition for the issuance of a TPO contains reference to the criminal cases
that were handled by Atty. Nava to demonstrate Hierro’s propensity for violence in order to show supposed
maltreatment of Hierro to Annalyn. Records show that Atty. Nava was the lawyer of Hierro in seven of the eight
mentioned cases. As defense counsel for Hierro, Atty. Nava advocates the innocence of his client in these cases.
However, in citing these as part of the petition for the issuance of a TPO, in effect, he is implying that there is a
merit in these cases which is diametrically opposed to his position as defense counsel of Hierro.
a. Atty. Nava’s defense that he accepted the engagement by Annalyn because of emergency, exigency, and
on temporary capacity only does not excuse him. As a lawyer, he should have used better judgment to
foresee the possibility of conflict of interest as that is what the society expects of him. Besides, even if the
filing of the TPO is an emergency which requires a swift response, he could have easily recommended
another competent lawyer in his place. (Hierro v. Atty. Nava II, A.C. No. 9459, January 7, 2020, En Banc)
21. There exists a conflict of interest. Atty. Barin admits he is the counsel of Ms. Calamiong in the estafa case filed
by herein complainant. His act of notarizing the affidavit of desistance of complainant, which was later
submitted to the investigating prosecutor, is a clear violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR. Atty. Barin cannot
represent both parties in the same case, as the counsel for the accused and the complainant. The affidavit of
complainant should have been subscribed and sworn to before the investigating prosecutor to give the latter
an opportunity to determine the veracity of its contents and voluntariness of its execution. (Castro v. Atty. Barin,
A.C. No. 9495, March 2, 2020, Second Division)
22. Atty. Gonzales violated the rule on conflict of interest when he represented Aquarino in the unlawful detainer
case filed by Legaspi’s company. Records reveal that lawyer-client relationship between Legaspi and Atty.
Legaspi already attached to their meeting on June 13, 2013. It must be noted that said consultation was
intended for Legaspi to seek elgal advice which also included inquiry on the rates to be paid. The information
received by Atty. Gonzales are material to the issues against Aguarino which are intended by Legaspi to be
confidential. The fact that no fees were paid by Legaspi during their previous meeting does not excuse Atty.
Gonzales in observing the foregoing rule. It is also of no moment that the said case was filed by the sister of
Legaspi, Atty. Legaspi-Rosales, who happened to be the President of Rafel Realty. (Dr. Legaspi v. Atty. Gonzales,
A.C. No. 12076, June 22, 2020, Second Division)
23. There is no conflict of interest in this case. The record is devoid of any allegation, much less proof, that a lawyer-
client relationship exists between respondent and the spouses Ingram. An attorney-client relationship is said to
exist when a lawyer acquiesces or voluntarily permits the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business
or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. Here,
respondent’s mere act of notarizing the subject promissory note and nothing more, hardly gave rise to an
attorney-clien relationship between the notary public and the payees of the said note, the spouses Ingram.
There is, in fact, no showing that responden and the spouses Ingram never dealt with each other, as it was only
the spouses Blanco, as the makers and signatories of the instrument, who appeared before him to acknowledge
their execution thereof. For this reason, respondent did not violate the rule on conflict of interests.
a. Nonetheless, respondent is far from being scot-free. Respondent clearly took up inconsistent positions
when, on one hand, he attested in the notarial acknowledgment of the promissory note that the instrument
was Mr. Blanco’s own free will and voluntary act and deed, while on the other hand, he assailed the due
execution thereof by putting up the defenses of coercion, threats, and intimidation allegedly employed by
the spouses Ingram that forced the spouses Blanco to execute the same. Respondent’s attempt to nullify
the promissory note on the ground that it was not duly executed, defeated the very purpose of his own
notarial act. By his conduct, he made a clear mockery of the integrity of a notary public and degraded the
function of notarization. (Ingram v. Atty. Lorica IV, A.C. No. 10306, September 16, 2020, Third Division)
24. The lack of opposition, i.e., that the two laywers who assisted complainant during the mediation never opposed
responden’s appearance as April’s represenaive, did not cure respondent’s violation of the prohibition on
representing conflicting interests. (Tan-Te Seng v. Atty. Pangan, A.C. No. 12829, September 16, 2020, First
Division)
25. There was no conflict of interest. During the negotiations between complainant and Atty. Alvarico, the latter
did not represent the former’s interestsbecause his offer to settle the civil aspect of the case through the
payment of the value of the allegedly stolen steering wheel is in the interest of his client Manco who was
criminally charged for the theft thereof. The settlement of the civil aspect of the theft case filed against his
client was towardshis client’s interest, and even encouraged by the legal system and aligned with the duty of
an attorney. The civil aspect of theft is subject to mandatory Court-Annexed Mediation and Judicial Dispute

Resolution wherein parties are encouraged to reach a settlement and put an end to litigation. Further, a lawyer
is encouraged under Rule 1.04 of the CPR to encourage his clients to settle a controversy if it would admit of a
fair settlement. In negotiating with complainant, Atty. Alvarico remained loyal to the cause of his client Manco.
The terms of settlement offered by Atty. Alvarico were designed pursuant to the interests of his client Manco,
and not to the benefit of complainant. This was acknowledged by Manco himself when he stated in his Affidavit
that it was he who asked Atty. Alvarico to reach a settlement with complainant. Moreover, Atty. Alvarico was
not remiss in apprising Manco on the updates concerning the negotiations, as admitted by the latter in his
Affidavit. complainant’s allegations that Atty. Alvarico proposed terms unfavorable to his client when he asked
for a commission are self-serving and unsubstantiated. The Affidavit of Atty. Alvarico presented by the
complainant proved nothing more than the negotiations between the parties, and did not in any way show
solicitation of commission. (Tan v. Atty. Alvarico, A.C. No. 10933, November 3, 2020, First Division)
26. Atty. Ballicud represented conflicting interest. In particular, Atty. Ballicud accepted a new relation that would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client, or to invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Records show that Atty. Ballicud caused
the registration of EAT with the SEC on March 27, 2013, or before the termination of his services as legal counsel
with KWP in July 2013. Atty. Ballicud occupied the highest position as EAT’s President and major stockholder.
The primary purpose of EAT is to engage in the business of trading, manufacturing, assembling, selling,
purchasing, distributing, servicing, and otherwise dealing in and with industrial supplies, equipment, and other
related products and components on wholesale and retail basis, including importing and exporting of said
products. Meanwhile,the primary purpose of KWP is to engage in the business of trading, manufacturing,
assembling, selling, purchasing, distributing, servicing, and otherwise dealing in and with wear resistant linings
and other industrial supplies and other related products and components on wholesale basis. Considering that
EAT and KWP’s primary purposes are the same, save for the inclusion of “wear resistant linings” as KWP’s
product and the phrase “retail basis including importing and exporting of said products” in EAT’s primary
purpose, both companies clearly belong to the same industry. In the circumstances, Atty. Ballicud’s new relation
with EAT would prevent the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to KWP and would invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of his duty.
a. Atty. Ballicud’s contentions that he never handled a case for, or against KWP and that he has no knowledge
of any confidential information relating to KWP’s business operations are of no moment. In Quiambao v.
Atty. Bamba, the Court emphasized that actual case or controversy is not required for the proscription
against representation of conflicting interests to apply. The important criterion is the probability, and not
the certainty, of conflict. Thus, whether Atty. Ballicud is Spouses Gabriel’s dummy, or that he has
confidential information about KWP’s business operations, the fact that Atty. Ballicud’s actions invited
suspicion of unfaithfulness, or double-dealing remains. Atty. Ballicud is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests. (Pilar v. Atty. Ballicud, A.C. No. 12792, November 16, 2020, Second
Division)
27. There is no doubt that the act of respondent amounts to representing conflicting interests. Here, there is no
denying that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Villamor and respondent despite the absence of any
express or written agreement or arrangement as to attorney’s fees. Atty. Jumao-as’ argument that it was
Retubado who engaged his legal services and that his participation was limited only to the incorporation of the
lending company, is misplaced. It must be stressed that in the course of the incorporation, respondent directly
dealt with Villamor as owner of the company; conversely, Villamor definitely made consultations with
respondent on legal matters pertaining to the incorporation and operation of the lending business. In turn,
respondent learned of confidential information from Villamor. As the records bear out, Atty. Jumao-as was the
one who reserved with the SEC the name of their business, AEV Villamor Credit, Inc., as evidenced by the stamp
marked at the bottom portion of the AOI which indicated: “presented by: Name: Ely Galland Jumao-as, dated
March 12, 2007.” Respondent’s name and signature also appear at the bottom portion of the Certificate of
Incorporation of AEV Villamor Credit Inc., which he notarized. On the other hand, respondent expressly
admitted that Yu is also his client. It is also on record that Atty. Jumao-as sent a Demand Letter dated October
8, 2008 for and in behalf of his client, Yu, demanding payment of P650,000.00 from Villamor. Likewise,
respondent also sent a Reply Letter dated October 22, 2008, for and in behalf of his client Yu, stating that
Villamor received the P500,000.00 from him (respondent) and in exchange, Villamor signed a promissory note
in favor of Yu. Thus, when respondent sent a demand letter to Villamor on behalf of Yu, he was clearly
representing conflicting interests. Suffice it to state that Villamor and Yu have inconsistent interests. If
respondent would argue for the rights of Yu, he would in effect directly oppose the interests of Villamor.
(Villamor v. Atty. Jumao-as, A.C. No. 8111, December 9, 2020, En Banc)
28. While acting as counsel for complainants in the perjury cause, respondent filed the Motion to Issue Show Cause
Order against his own clients without their knowledge and consent. Whatever justification respondent might
have in filing the same, he had incontrovertibly shown his unwillingness to remain faithful to his clients’ cause
by failing to address or resolve the issue himself and unabashedly seeking to hold them in contempt for
something he failed to address as their counsel. By his own admission, respondent knew that the address
complainants gave for the purpose of posting bail in the perjury case was incorrect as it was actually the address
of Vibar whom respondent was very familiar with. To protect his own interest, however, respondent had more

or less acted in a manner that directly conflicted or opposed complainants’ cause. In filing the Motion to Issue
Show Cause Order against his own clients – which if granted would have been prejudicial to their cause –
respondent violated Canons 15 and 17 of the CPR.
a. Moreover, by alluding in the Motion to Issue Show Cause Order that complainants may be absconding from
some debt and that they had been evading payments for attorney’s fees and other legitimate expenses,
respondent had unwittingly revealed his genuine intent in its filing. While this may fall short of a judicial
action against complainants, respondent had nonetheless violated Rule 20.04 of the CPR, as the motion
sought the court’s intercession to impose the penalty of contempt on his own clients. Rule 20.04 of the
CPR provides that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. In sending complainants text
messages filled with accusatory, inflammatory, and obscene language (i.e., “Mga Estapador. Mga Ulol,”
“Sira Ulo kayo si Romy at Didang,” and “Di ako pad na Libre and Serbisyo Ko, Mga Ulol.”), respondent had
acted in a manner unbecoming of a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court – bereft of any degree
of dignity and professionalism expected from him as a lawyer. Such rude and pedestrian language against
his own clients tarnishes not only respondent’s own integrity but also the noble profession he represents.
With his reprehensible behavior, respondent had also violated Rule 14.04 of the CPR, which states that a
lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same
standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients. (Adan v. Atty. Tacorda, A.C. No. 12826,
February 1, 2021, Third Divisions)
29. Atty. Aransazo represented conflicting interests. As counsel for Atty. Constantino in Civil Case No. 03-105994,
Atty. Aransazon advocated the validity and due execution of the Deed of Assignment upon which Atty.
Constantino’s interest over the real estate mortgage is based. On the other hand, the sworn statement of Atty.
Aransazo refuted Atty. Constantino’s claim that the Deed of Assignment was executed with a valid
consideration, which necessarily jeopardized and prejudiced the latter’s interest in Civil Case No. 03-105994.
Worse still, it appears that Atty. Aransazo even intended to take the witness stand to testify on his sworn
statement. Clearly, Atty. Aransazon violated the rule against conflict of interest. As correctly held by IBP-BOG,
respondent’s sworn statement necessarily would refute complainant’s claim that the deed of assignment was
executed with a valid consideration. Worse, based on the manifestation of complainant’s opposing party, the
respondent himself may take the witness stand to testify on his sworn statement. Furthermore, Atty. Aransazon
further insisted that in executing his sworn statement, he merely intended to rectify the error he committed
and reveal the truth in conformity with his duties under the CPR. The Court, however, finds counsel’s execuse
as irrelevant, if not inconsequential, in determining his culpability. Whether there is some truth to Atty.
Aransazo’s statements, i.e., that the Deed of Assignment is void for lack of consideration, is a factual matter to
be determined before the proper forum, and not in disbarment proceedings, such as in this case. As it stands,
Atty. Aransazo advocated for the rights of Atty. Constantino for nine long years before a competenent court.
Atty. Aransazo cannot simply be allowed to commit such acts that are diametrically opposed to his client’s
interests without this Court meting the proper penalty against him. (Atty. Constantino v. Atty. Aransazo, A.C.
No. 9701, February 10, 2021, Third Division)
30. Respondent violated the proscription against conflict of interest. Respondent violated the rules on conflict of
interest when his law office represented Icayan in a case the latter filed against RODCO. Even as respondent
insists that his contract of service with RODCO had been terminated at that point, and while he was not the
lawyer personally handling the case, it was his law firm – the law firm that bears his name – over which he
presumably has some measure of control, that was representing Icayan in a case where respondent had
previously acted as counsel for the RODCO. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein
a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients.
It also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is related, directly
or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. This
rule applies regardless of the degree of adverse interests. What a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain
inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect the client in any
matter in which the lawyer previously represented him. Thus, it is of no moment that his contract of service
with RODCO had been terminated by that time. As a lawyer, he should have used better judgment to foresee
the possibility of conflict of interest as that is what the society expects of him. Indeed, it is part of the Court's
solemn oath to demand that every lawyer should exercise prudence and circumspection in the performance of
his or her duty. Corollarily, it is the Court's moral obligation to hold a lawyer who fails to do so accountable.
(RODCO Consultancy and Maritime Services Corporation v. Atty. Concepcion, A.C. No. 7963, June 29, 2021, En
Banc)
LAWYER’S NEGLIGENCE
1. Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to complainants’ name. He
continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his duty. However, after three years and several
demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the task given to him and even refused to return
the money. In addition, complainants’ alleged failure to provide the necessary documents to effect the transfer
does not justify his violation of his duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Spouses San Pedro v.

Atty. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440, November 26, 2014, Second Division; Costenoble v. Atty. Alvarez, Jr., A.C. No.
11058, September 1, 2020, En Banc)
2. The general rule is that errors of counsel bind the client. The only exception would be where the lawyer’s gross
negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law. In this case, there
is no iota of proof that the lawyer committed gross negligence in the case. (Stanley Fine Furniture v. Gallano,
G.R. No. 190486, November 26, 2014, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Parcon, G.R. No. 219592,
August 17, 2016, Third Division; Tabobo III v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220977, June 19, 2017, Third
Division)
3. Hiring legal counsel does not relieve litigants of their duty to monitor the status of their cases, especially if their
cases are taking an unreasonably long time to be resolved. In this case, petitioner took almost 7 years from the
CA’s issuance of the Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration to file a petition before the SC.
Petitioner ought to have been sooner alerted of the unreasonably long time. His failure to know or to find out
the real status of appeal binds him. (Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015, Second
Division)
4. Respondent failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence, assuming that complainant Ramirez was
no longer interested to pursue the Appeal. There was no proof, however, that she exerted efforts to
communicate with her client. Respondent failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s
interest. She thus clearly violated Canon 17, and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. (Ramirez v. Atty. Buhayang-Margallo, A.C. No. 10537, February 3, 2015, En Banc)
5. Respondent did not exert any effort on his client’s case and completely reneged on the obligations due his
client. The respondent lied to the complainant that he had made the necessary application and payment with
the NSO for the issuance of the birth certificates of the complainant’s children. Despite the complainant’s
repeated requests, the respondent failed to comply with their agreement to provide a psychologist to
administer the necessary psychological tests, thus causing further delay in the proceedings of the complainant’s
annulment case. Clearly, these actions show the respondent’s negligence and lack of zeal in handling the
complainant’s case.
a. Respondent failed to live up to his duties when he unlawfully withheld complainant’s money. The money
given to the respondent was never used for its intended purpose, as could be gleaned from the NSO’s non-
issuance of the birth certificates of complainant’s children, and by the non-administration of psychological
tests on the complainant and her children. These omissions confirm the presumption that the respondent
misappropriated the funds of his client, in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR that holds a lawyer in trust of
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. (Andrada v. Atty. Cera, A.C. No.
10187, July 22, 2015, Second Division)
6. While Atty. Zerudo’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration may be considered as negligence, petitioner is
still bound by her counsel’s acts. This is because a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all
acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client.
(Gregorio v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 180559, January 20, 2016, Third Division)
7. Failure of counsel to act upon a client’s case resulting in the prescription of available remedies is negligence in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Francisco v. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 10753,
January 26, 2016, En Banc; In Re: Petition for the Disbarment of Atty. Laysa, A.C. No. 7936, June 30, 2020, En
Banc)
8. In failing to perform anything in furtherance of a of filing a petition for adoption of a minor child despite the
lapse of almost a year and for unknown reasons, respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since she neglected a legal matter entrusted to her by her client. (Spouses Lopez v. Atty. Limos,
A.C. No. 7618, February 2, 2016, En Banc)
9. Respondent failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and discretion and will all good fidelity
to his clients when he did not file a motion for reconsideration in his clients’ behalf despite receiving from them
the P7,000.00 he requested for that purpose. He further neglected to regularly update them on the status of
the case, particularly on the adverse result. (Ramiscal v. Atty. Orro, A.C. No. 10945, February 23, 2016, En Banc)
10. SPIDC’s complaint was dismissed on account of the law office’s negligence. The law office’s lackadaisical efforts
in prosecuting the complaint should have prompted SPIDC to take the precautionary measures of being
constantly updated about the proceedings and promptly engaging the services of another lawyer. Instead,
SPIDC left the fate of its case to the hands of the law office. SPIDC was not entirely blameless; hence, the law
office’s negligence binds the SPIDC. (Systems and Plan Integrator and Development Corporation v. Municipal
Government of Murcia, G.R. No. 217121, March 16, 2016, Third Division)

11. A lawyer cannot simply withdraw a case without notice to the client and complying with the requirements in
Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the lawyer will be held liable for violating Canons 17 and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he fails to attend any of the hearings of the court. (Chang v.
Atty. Hidalgo, A.C. No. 6934, April 6, 2016, Second Division)
12. Atty. Puno failed to inform his client of the dismissal of the case and thus violated Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Records show that the office of Atty. Puno duly received the Order of the RTC
dismissing the case. However, Atty. Puno never informed Marquard or Tiburdo of the Order.
a. Atty. Puno cannot merely argue that he had no responsibility to interfere in the case. The records are bereft
of any indicationt hat Atty. Puno ahd indeed withdrawn himself as counsel for Marquard in the case. Until
the withdrawal of a counsel has been approved by the court, he remains counsel of record and is expected
by his client, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his client require. It should be noted that
Atty. Puno never filed such withdrawal with the court and merely relied on the letter of Tiburdo terminating
his services to support his argument that he was no longer the counsel for Marquard. (Tiburdo v. Atty.
Puno, A.C. No. 10677, April 18, 2016, Second Division)
13. Respondent failed to discharge his duties as counsel. He failed to prepare and file a memorandum on the
complainant’s behalf despite the RTC’s order to do so and complainant’s payment of P10,000.00. Additionally,
respondent insinuated to complainant that there is a good chance that the decision of the RTC will be
overturned by the CA should they appeal the case. Complainant acquiesced and willingly paid out the amount
of P15,000.00, which respondent required as his professional fees. However, two days before the lapse of the
period of filing the appellant’s brief, respondent was nowhere to be found and did not even bother to
communicate with complainant to inform him of the status of his case. (Hermano v. Atty. Prado, Jr., A.C. No.
7447, April 18, 2016, Third Division)
14. Atty. Sususco, although the subject case was assigned belatedly to her, was able to discharge her duties with
promptness, and was in fact able to submit the Resolution on March 28, 2010. She was thus not negligent in
her duty. (Cabas v. Atty. Sususco, A.C. No. 8677, June 15, 2016, Third Division)
15. Absent a showing that petitioner regularly followed up with his counsel as to the status of the case, a mere
endorsement does not relieve a client of the negligence of his counsel. The only interaction between DCWD
and its counsel, Atty. Luna, as stated in the petition itself, was the alleged undated endorsement letter of the
Notices of Disallowance. No follow-ups were apparently made as to the progress of the appeals to the Notices
of Disallowance during the six-month appeal period – all because petitioner thought that Atty. Luna had taken
the appropriate action thereon. Worse, it was only after the lapse of twenty-three months from receipt of the
Notices that petitioner was able to file its appeal. Verily, petitioner cannot escape liability for negligence of his
counsel. (Paluca v. COA, G.R. No. 218240, June 28, 2016, En Banc)
16. Records reveal that sometime in May 2004, complainant secured the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles (an enabler
of Marcos propaganda and historical revisionism) and Paler for the purpose of annulling his marriage with
Mutya, and in connection therewith, paid them the aggregate sum of P350,000.00 representing legal fees.
However, despite the passsage of more than five months from the engagement, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
failed to file the appropriate pleading to initiate the case before the proper court; and worse, could not even
show a finished draft of such pleading. Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to them by their clinet
constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
a. Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler likewise failed to return the amount complainant paid them upon her
demand; thus, violating Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
b. Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler misrepresented to complainant that they delay in the filing of
his petition for annulment was due to the fact that they were still looking for a “friendly” court, judge, and
public prosecutor. They also made it appear that they went to various locations to look for a suitable venue
in filing the said position and even paid various amounts to prosecutors and members of the NBI to act as
their consultants, as evidenced in the two billing statements. These misrepresentations and deceits on the
part of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler are violations of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. In addition, by insinuating that
they can find a “friendly” court and judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in complainant’s annulment
case, respondents undemined and denigrated the integrity of the courts; thus, violating Canon 11 of the
CPR. (Dongga-as v. Atty. Cruz-Angles, A.C. No. 11113, August 9, 2016, En Banc)
17. Records show that Atty. Venida was completely remiss and negligent in handling Ethelene’s case,
notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of P29,000.00 from her by way of his acceptance and filing fees. Instead
of filing the petition, Atty. Venida gave his client a runaround and led her to believe that the petition had already
been filed. When pressed for updates, Atty. Venida evaded Ethelene and refused to return her calls. Worse, the
fees remain unaccounted for, which were entrusted to him for the filing of the petition. When a lawyer receives
money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he or she does not use the money for the
intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client. Consequently, Atty. Venida is

duty-bound to return the P29,000.00 given to him by Ethelene. (San Juan v. Atty. Venida, A.C. No. 11317, August
23, 2016, En Banc; Balmaceda v. Atty. Uson, A.C. No. 12025, June 20, 2018, Second Division)
18. Respondent, a long standing legal practitioner, did not sign a position paper that he filed in a labor suit allegedly
due to oversight. What more, he claimed that his client’s failure to pay legal expenses and attorney’s fees
contributed to such oversight. In addition, respondent’s inattention is further highlighted by his disobedience
to the labor arbiter’s directive that he sign the position paper. Hence, due to respondent’s negligence, the labor
arbiter did not consider the position paper of the company and the complainant. This circumstance deprived
the company of the chance to explain its side of the controversy, which was caused by its own counsel. (Gimena
v. Atty. Sabio, A.C. No. 7178, August 23, 2016, En Banc)
19. Respondent admittedly breached this duty when he failed to prepare, much less file, the appropriate pleading
to initiate complainant and Reposo’s case, before the proper court. Respondent’s additional contention that
his failure to file the petition was due to complainant and Reposo’s failure to remit the full acceptance fee of
P150,000.00 is not an excuse to abandon his client’s cause considering that his duty to safeguard his client’s
interests commences from his retainer until his effective discharge from the case or the final disposition of the
entire subject matter of litigation. To reiterate, respondent’s act of agreeing to handle complainant’s case,
coupled with his acceptance of the partial payment of P100,000.00 already established an attorney-client
relationship that gave rise to his duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Further, respondent also violated Rule
16.01 and Rule 16.03 when he failed to return the amount of P100,000.00 representing the legal fees that
complainant paid him. (Egger v. Atty. Duran, A.C. No. 11323, September 14, 2016, First Division)
20. Respondent failed to competently and diligently discharge his duty when he was unable to cause the transfer
of ownership of property from complainant to Jaynie May. Despite doing nothing, he even obstinately refused
to return the P40,000.00 he received as attorney’s fees. (Fabie v. Atty. Real, A.C. No. 10574, September 20,
2016, En Banc; Sioson v. Atty. Apoya, Jr., A.C. No. 12044, July 23, 2018, Second Division)
21. Respondents clearly transgressed Canons 15, 16, and 17 of the CPR when they failed and refused to file the
separate civil action for damages against David despite their receipt of payment and the relevant documents
from complainant. (Balingit v. Atty. Cervantes and Atty. Delarmente, A.C. No. 11059, November 9, 2016, Third
Division; Francia v. Atty. Sagario, A.C. No. 10938, October 8, 2019, En Banc)
22. A substitution cannot be presumed from the mere filing of a notice of appearance of a new lawyer. The
representation of the first counsel of record continues until a formal notice to change counsel is filed with the
court. Hence, it is imperative that the intention fo the petitioners to replace their original counsel, Atty.
Sanchez-Malit, be evidently clear before substitution of counsel can be presumed. The records readly reveal
that herein petitioners did not manifest even the slightest of such intention. (Spouses Pontigon v. Heirs of
Sanchez, G.R. No. 221513, December 5, 2016, Third Division)
23. For Atty. De Castro to be held liable for negligence and undue delay, complainant must show that Atty. De
Castro was indeed moved to cause delays by malice, or dishonesty, or deceit, or grave misconduct. However,
there was a clear indication that the postponements of the hearing at Atty. De Castro’s instance were mostly
sanctioned by the trial court, which negated or foreclosed malice, or dishonesty, or deceit, or grave misconduct.
The motions to re-set were based on grounds such as the possibility for an amicable settlement, trips abroad
for an emergency medical treatment, and to attend a son’s graduation from the University of California, which
are not flimsy excuses. (Chua v. Atty. De Castro, A.C. No. 10671, December 5, 2016, Special Third Division)
24. Belated filing of an appeal displays counsel’s negligence. (Heirs of Tan, Sr. v. Atty. Beltran, A.C. No. 5819,
February 1, 2017, First Division)
25. Counsel failed to exercise the diligence required of lawyers in handling complainants’ case when he failed to
file the necessary motion to postpone the hearing due to a conflict in his schedule, and as a result, complainants
lost their opportunity to present their evidence in the ejectment case. (Spouses Montecillo and Salonoy v. Atty.
Gatchalian, A.C. No. 8371, June 28, 2017, First Division)
26. Respondent breached his duty not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him when he admittedly failed to file
the necessary position paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his
client. To be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible witnesses in
support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for respondent to completely abandon his
client’s cause.
a. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client relationshop commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to
handle a client’s case and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter, as in this case. From then
on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and in
such regard, not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. (Samonte v. Atty. Jumamil, A.C. No. 11668, July

27. Respondent cannot justify his non-compliance by shifting the blame to complainant for failing to meet with
him, especially so that he failed to inform his client of the pleadings she needed to sign. (Sison v. Atty. Valdez,
A.C. No. 11663, July 31, 2017, First Division)
28. With regard to the labor case to which he opted not to file a Reply and refused to present the cash vouchers
which, according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted to the NLRC, even granting that he had the discretion
being the handling lawyer to present what he believed were available legal defenses for his client, and
conceding too, that it was within his power to employ an allowable legal strategy, what was deplorable was his
way of handling the appeal before the NLRC. Aside from handing over or delivering the requisite pleading to his
clients almost at the end of the day, at the last day to file the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered
to advise Elbena and the rest of his clients about the requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect
Elbena and her companions to be conversant with the indispensable procedural requirements to perfect the
appeal before the NLRC. If the averments in his Answer are any indication, respondent seemed to have relied
heavily on the NLRC’s much vaunted leniency in gaining the successful prosecution of the appeal of his clients
in the labor case, no less censurable is his propensity for passing the blame onto his clients for not doing what
he himself ought to have done. (Cabiles v. Atty. Cedo, A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017, First Division)
29. While Datu insists that he properly performed his obligation as Bondoc’s lawyer in the case for civil damages,
the evidence clearly shows that the only effort that Datu made was to write a letter to Mercado 18 months
from the time that Bondoc obtained his services. This letter purportedly invited Mercado to a meeting. This
meeting, however, did not push through as Datu claims that Mercado’s counsel had informed him that Mercado
had already settled the matter by paying Bondoc P500,000.00. While Bondoc asserts that he denied Mercado’s
version and even presented to Datu the acknowledgment receipt showing that he received a mere P30,000.00,
Datu, isntead of endeavoring to ascertain the truth of Mercado’s claim, merely decided to believe Mercado’s
story hook, line and sinker. Datu attempts to prove his claim by presenting an affidavit allegedly signed by a
certain Hector Mercado stating that Bondoc had already been paid P500,000.00. The document, however, is
both unsigned and undated. Accordingly, Datu failed to protect Bondoc’s interest by: (a) not acting on the
complaint he promised to file on behalf of Bondoc; (b) acting on the matter only after 18 months and after
Bondoc’s persistent inquiries; and (c) by believing Mercado’s alleged payment to Bondoc without as much as
demanding any proof of this payment. Rather than securing Bondoc’s interest, Datu chose to side with
Mercado. This is not the kind of unwavering loyalty and diligence that is expected of members of the legal
profession. (Bondoc v. Atty. Datu, A.C. No. 8903, August 30, 2017, First Division)
30. The records show that respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Real Property executed
by the vendor, Alberto C. Tajo, and the vendee, complainant herein. In two receipts both dated March 2, 2010,
respondent acknowledged that complainant gave him the amount of P11,280.00 for payment of the capital
gains tax on the sale of property and that complainant paid him P10,000.00 for processing the transfer of the
title of the property in complainant's name. As respondent failed to comply with his obligation at the promised
time, complainant went to the BIR to inquire whether the capital gains tax had been paid. Complainant learned
from the BIR that no document of her transaction was submitted, and respondent could not produce the claim
slip from the BIR, which showed that respondent did not fulfill the legal matter entrusted to him by the
complainant. Respondent's omission is violative of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03. (Ojales v. Atty. Villahermosa III,
A.C. No. 10243, October 2, 2017, Second Division)
31. The records show that as counsel of the complainant's parents, respondent was remiss in her duty toward them
by never appearing in the hearings of the criminal case, which contributed to the delay of the pre-trial of the
case for eleven months or almost a year until the trial court finally appointed a counsel de officio for
respondent's clients so the pre-trial and trial on the merits could proceed. Respondent kept on filing a motion
to reset the scheduled pre-trial, including those dates of hearings requested by her, from the start until her
withdrawal as counsel. (Cabuello v. Atty. Talaboc, A.C. No. 10532, November 7, 2017, En Banc)
32. His failure to file the appellants' brief, despite the CA's grant of leniency in reconsidering its initial dismissal of
the appeal further compounds respondent's inadequacies. In this case, respondent's neglect of his professional
duties led to the loss of complainants' properties and has left them bereft of legal remedies. They lost their case
not because of merits but because of technicalities, specifically the respondent's failure to file the required
pleadings. Certainly, the situation in the case at bar, is one such evil that the CPR intended to avoid. Worse,
respondent's failure to inform complainants of the unfortunate fate of their appeal further amplifies his lack of
competence and diligence. As an officer of the court, it was respondent's duty to inform his client of whatever
important information he may have acquired affecting his client's case. The purpose of informing the client is
to minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the
client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client's interests. The Court fails to find merit to
respondent's claim that complainant Vicente directed him not to pursue the appeal. If that was true, candor
and respect of the courts would have impelled respondent to file a motion to withdraw their appeal. Further, if
indeed it was true that complainants lost interest in pursuing the appeal, they would not have secured the
services of another counsel and file before the CA a motion to set aside the entry of judgment. (Spouses Gimena
v. Atty. Vijiga, A.C. No. 11828, November 22, 2017, First Division)

33. When De Leon received a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration which Atty. Geronimo prepared, she was
disappointed since the motion was composed of only three (3) pages and the arguments did not address all the
issues in the assailed decision. After Atty. Geronimo had provided her with copies of the LA and NLRC decisions,
De Leon never heard from him again. When she called him on March 1, 2006 to follow up on the status of the
motions, she was so furious to learn that, not only had the motions been denied by the NLRC, but worse, Atty.
Geronimo no longer appealed the case to the CA. Atty. Geronimo's failure to inform his client about the adverse
ruling of the NLRC, thereby precluding her from further pursuing an appeal, is a clear breach of Canons 17 and
18 of the CPR. (De Leon v. Atty. Geronimo, A.C. No. 10441, February 14, 2018, Second Division)
34. Malvar is the buyer of the properties subject herein and that Amurao, Feir's client, is one of the owners of the
same. It is also undisputed that said subject properties are already registered under Malvar's name. But
according to Amurao, he has yet to receive the remaining balance of its purchase price. To the Court, this fact
alone is enough reason for Amurao to seek the legal advice of Feir and for Feir to send the demand letters to
Malvar. As the IBP held, these demand letters were based on a legitimate cause or issue, which is the alleged
failure of Malvar to pay the full amount of the consideration in the sale transaction as well as the alleged falsified
Deed of Sale used to transfer ownership over the lots subject of the instant case. Whether the Deed of Sale
used in transferring the properties in the name of Malvar was, indeed, forged and falsified is another matter
for as far as the instant complaint for disbarment is concerned, Feir was simply acting in compliance with his
lawyer's oath to protect and preserve the rights of his client. It bears stressing, moreover, that the monetary
consideration Feir was demanding from Malvar in the amount of P18,000,000.00 cannot be considered as the
subject of blackmail or extortion. Feir's demand for said amount is not an exaction of money for the exercise of
an influence but is actually a legitimate claim for the remaining balance subject of a legitimate sale transaction.
Contrary to Malvar's claims, there is nothing in the demand letters to show that the same was maliciously made
with intent to extort money from him since it was based on a valid and justifiable cause. Indeed, the writing of
demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to
the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as
agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps necessary to collect it,
such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period. (Malvar v. Atty. Feir, A.C. No.
11871, March 5, 2018, Second Division)
35. Atty. Roxas's defiant attitude ultimately caused his client to lose its trust in him. He intentionally denied his
client's requests on how to proceed with the case and insisted on doing it his own way. He could not possibly
use the supposed blanket authority given to him as a valid justification, especially on non-procedural matters,
as in the case at bar, if he would be contradicting his client's trust and confidence in the process. Atty. Roxas
clearly disregarded the express commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifically Canon
17.
a. RREC's Board of Directors specifically instructed Atty. Roxas to postpone the filing of the motion for the
issuance of a Writ of Execution until further notice, but he defied the same and still filed the motion. He
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for Inhibition with the CA without first securing
RREC's consent and authority. Again, without being authorized, he likewise filed an administrative
complaint against several CA Justices and a petition assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Decree
No. 774, both on RREC's behalf. Said unauthorized acts caused RREC's Board to request Atty. Roxas to
voluntarily withdraw as counsel for the corporation and to finally terminate its retainer agreement with
him when he refused. Even after he was terminated, Atty. Roxas still continued to appear and argue for
RREC. Worse, he also threatened to sue the members of the RREC Board unless they reinstated him as the
company's counsel. (Atty. Villonco v. Atty. Roxas, A.C. No. 9186, April 11, 2018, Second Division)
36. Respondent failed to file an answer on behalf of complainant in the LMWD case. As a result, complainant was
declared in default. When the matter of default was referred to respondent by complainant, he assured it that
he would take care of it. He, however, did not do anything, hence, LMWD was allowed to present evidence ex
parte and judgment was rendered in its favor. Again, complainant referred the adverse judgment to
respondent. Once more, he assured it that he would take care of the matter. He failed to do so. Thus, the
adverse judgment rendered on the basis of ex parte evidence was enforced and executed against complainant.
The Court is of the view that respondent's conduct constitutes inexcusable negligence. He grossly neglected his
duty as counsel to the extreme detriment of his client. He willingly and knowingly allowed the default order to
attain finality and he allowed judgment to be rendered against his client on the basis of ex parte evidence. He
also willingly and knowingly allowed said judgment to become final and executory. He failed to assert any of
the defenses and remedies available to his client under the applicable laws. This constitutes inexcusable
negligence warranting an exercise by this Court of its power to discipline him. (UCPB v. Atty. Noel, A.C. No.
3951, June 19, 2018, En Banc)
37. Regarding the first charge, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for failing to deliver within
reasonable time the title to complainant or to her sister, Josephine, who acted as her representative. The
relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary; it demands great fidelity and good faith on the
part of the lawyer. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) requires lawyers to account for

all money and property collected or received for and from their clients. In addition, Rule 16.03 mandates that
a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. In the present case, there
is no doubt that respondent's services led to the issuance of a new title in complainant's name. Accordingly,
and upon demand by complainant's representative, Josephine, respondent was expected to timely deliver the
title to her. This, respondent failed to do.
a. Respondent's excuse that he neither knew about nor participated in his nieces' scheme also deserves scant
consideration. The Court gives merit to the IBP's findings and conclusion. First, the mortgage was executed
only five days after complainant's title had been issued over the parcel of land. At this point, complainant
had not even seen the title. In fact, respondent did not deny that Josephine had repeatedly demanded for
its surrender. Second, upon his alleged discovery of the fraudulent mortgage, respondent readily accepted
Norena's claim. Josephine's repeated follow-ups should have alerted respondent to irregularities attending
the mortgage. Respondent's failure to ensure the timely turnover of the title to complainant and/or her
representative led to, if not facilitated, the constitution of the fraudulent mortgage. Neither does it appear
that respondent took steps to verify his niece's claim. We are thus inclined to agree with the IBP's
conclusion that respondent's nieces are used here as mere scapegoats and that respondent had a hand in
the fraudulent mortgage. (Gozales v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10178, June 19, 2018, En Banc)
38. Regarding the second charge, the Court concurs with the IBP and find respondent guilty of abusing his client's
trust and confidence. Canon 17 of the CPR directs a lawyer to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him. In the present case, it is uncontested that respondent received an additional P20,000.00 from
complainant. Respondent, however, denied that it is payment for the filing of an ejectment suit against the
occupants of complainant's property. Nonetheless, he does not proffer any reason to explain why such amount
was given him. As this is a "he said, she said" scenario, we find complainant's version more logical and
convincing. We agree with the IBP that it is incredible for respondent to receive an additional P20,000.00
without a clear reason for its payment. As complainant stated, respondent received P20,000.00 through his
ATM account on June 20, 2007 for the ejectment case and even acknowledged its receipt on June 22, 2007.
The Court finds it more likely that the amount of P20,000.00 was for a given purpose, that is, to file an ejectment
suit. Respondent violated his client's trust when he received said amount despite knowing that he could not file
the ejectment suit because some of the occupants of complainant's property are his friends. Indeed, he was
not able to file the case but without informing complainant of his reasons. (Gozales v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No.
10178, June 19, 2018, En Banc)
39. In the instant case, Atty. Mendez' guilt as to his failure to do his duty to his client is undisputed. His conduct
relative to the non-filing of the appellant's brief falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication
and commitment to their client's cause. An attorney is bound to protect his clients' interest to the best of his
ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file the brief within the reglementary period despite notice certainly
constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the failure resulted in the dismissal of the appeal, as in this case.
The Court cannot give credence to Atty. Mendez' lame excuse that they did not receive the notice to file the
appellant's brief, or that their secretary cannot recall receiving the notice. Such bare allegation of non-receipt
of notice as against the registry return card, the postmaster's record books and the certification issued by the
Caloocan Central Post Office showing receipt of the notice by Jennifer Lastimosa, the firm's secretary, the latter
deserves more weight. Likewise, in the absence of proof to support Atty. Mendez' claim of forgery insofar as
Jennifer's signature showing receipt of notice, such claim cannot be sustained. Making the law office secretary,
clerk or messenger the scapegoat or patsy for the delay in the filing of pleadings, motions and other papers and
for the lawyer's dereliction of duty is common alibi of practicing lawyers. Like the alibi of the accused in criminal
cases, counsel's shifting of the blame to his office employee is usually a concoction utilized to cover up his own
negligence, incompetence, indolence and ineptitude. Other than Atty. Mendez' allegation of non-receipt of the
notice, he has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of the appellant's brief despite
notice, thus, the allegation of negligence on his part in filing the appellant's brief remains uncontroverted. As a
lawyer, it is expected of him to make certain that the appeal brief was filed on time. Clearly, his failure to do so
is tantamount to negligence which is contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility enjoining lawyers not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. (De Borja v. Atty.
Mendez, Jr., A.C. No. 11185, July 4, 2018, Second Division)
40. Corazon attested to the fact that Atty. Deloria failed to communicate with and inform her, as his client, about
her complaint against BPI before the HLURB. Likewise, Atty. Deloria failed to file the required position paper
and draft decision before the HLURB. As such, he neglected the legal matters entrusted to him and failed to
serve his client with competence and diligence, for which he must be clearly held administratively liable.
(Buenavista Properties, Inc. v. Atty. Deloria, A.C. No. 12160, August 14, 2018, En Banc)
41. The Court finds that PAGCOR failed to prove that the negligence of its former counsel was so gross that it
effectively deprived it of due process. PAGCOR argues in its petition that its failure to comply with the CA's
October 22, 2015 resolution was unintentional. It contends that its failure was merely due to the heavy
workload of its former counsel and an effect of the recurring water intrusion/leakage in its offices. The Court
fails to see how these excuses could amount to gross negligence on the part of its former counsel. In fact, they
themselves characterized it as a mere, unintentional lapse. This is simple negligence. There is simply no gross

negligence to speak of in the instant case. Further, PAGCOR was not deprived of due process. On the contrary,
it was given every opportunity to be heard, which is the very essence of due process. The merits of its case were
heard by the CSC. It appealed the decision of the CSC to the CA. The CA initially dismissed the case for failure to
acquire jurisdiction over respondent due to PAGCOR's failure to comply with its orders regarding service of a
copy of the petition to respondent and/or her counsel. When the CA reinstated the case in view of respondent's
voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, PAGCOR squandered the second chance given to it by failing to comply
with the CA's directive to furnish respondent with a copy of the petition. This is despite respondent volunteering
the current address of her counsel through the manifestations she filed. To add salt to injury, PAGCOR let the
period to appeal the January 3, 2017 resolution of the CA before this Court lapse. Instead, it filed the present
petition for certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal. The acts of its former counsel did not deprive PAGCOR
of due process. PAGCOR was given every opportunity to be heard but it failed to take advantage of the said
opportunities. Hence, the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client applies herein.
(PAGCOR v. CA, G.R. No. 230084, August 20, 2018, Third Division)
42. Records show that sometime in September 2012, complainant secured respondent's services in order to assist
her in filing a petition for the annulment of her marriage, and in connection therewith, paid the latter a total of
P188,000.00. However, and despite respondent's assurances that the case had already been filed before the
RTC, complainant later on found out through the Certification issued by the RTC that no annulment case was
ever filed by respondent on her behalf. Such neglect of a legal matter entrusted to respondent constitutes a
flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR. Case law exhorts that once a lawyer takes up the cause
of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively
liable, as respondent in this case.
a. Moreover, records further show that respondent misrepresented to complainant that she filed the first
petition for annulment in early 2013, withdrew the same after complainant told her to do so, and filed the
second petition in 2015. However, no such case was filed. This act is a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and
Canon 15 of the CPR
b. Furthermore, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when she failed to
return to complainant the total amount of P188,000.00 representing her legal fees despite numerous
demands from the latter. (Go v. Atty. Buri, A.C. No. 12296, December 4, 2018, En Banc)
43. The manner with which the Law Office of Ramirez Lazaro & Associates Law handled the case of petitioner, as a
collaborating counsel shows gross negligence and utter incompetence, when it failed to attach a Notice of
Hearing when it filed the motion for reconsideration before the RTC on October 4, 2010, and antedated the
filing thereof to make it appear that it was filed on time. As a result thereof, the RTC in an Order dated December
10, 2010, denied the motion for reconsideration and considered the same as a mere scrap of paper. Worst, the
August 13, 2010 Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. Thus, petitioner lost its right to appeal the Decision and
petitioner's petition for relief was denied. Clearly, the rights of petitioner were deprived due to its collaborating
counsel's palpable negligence and thereof is not bound by it. Also, contrary to findings of the RTC and the CA,
petitioner exercised due diligence in monitoring the case it filed. Petitioner even inquired with the Law Office
of Ramirez Lazaro & Associates Law and informed it that the motion for reconsideration was duly filed. As far
as petitioner is concerned and in respect of its interest, its duty to be vigilant to the status of the case was
complied with by being updated on the progress of the case. (B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 233135,
December 5, 2018, First Division)
44. Respondent failed to safeguard complainant's interests after the retainer commenced. Respondent's mere
acceptance of the money from the client without fulfilling his duties as a lawyer is indicative of lack of integrity
and propriety. Respondent's actions constitute a clear violation of the trust reposed in him by complainant.
a. Complainant alleged that respondent received PhP 72,000.00 for filing fees. However, the Court agrees
with the Resolution of the Board of Governors that only PhP 21,000.00 shall be returned to the complainant
for failing to fulfill his duties as a lawyer. The return of only the partial amount of PhP 21,000.00 was
explained in the Report and Recommendation of the Commission in CBD Case No. 11-3182. (Sorensen v.
Atty. Pozon, A.C. No. 11334, January 7, 2019, Second Division)
45. Complainant engaged respondent's services to secure a declaration nullifying her marriage with her husband.
However, despite complainant's considerable efforts at coming up with the cash for respondent's professional
fees, respondent did not reciprocate with similar diligence toward her case. Further, instead of filing an actual
petition for the nullity of complainant's marriage, he attempted to hoodwink complainant by fmnishing her a
copy of a Complaint with a fraudulent received stamp from the Regional Trial Court. As the Investigating
Commissioner found: “A painstaking review of the case shows that respondent was negligent enough in his
obligation as counsel despite having received the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000) PESOS from the
complainant. He was remised (sic) in his obligation when he failed to file the petition for annulment of marriage
despite the lapse of reasonable period of time. Worse, he deceived complainant by showing a copy of the
petition with a stamp of the court in order to make her believe that it was already filed when in truth, there was

no such case filed by him. His belated filing of the petition in (sic) June 27, 2011 will not exculpate him from any
administrative liability under Rule 18.03 of the CPR which states: "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” Respondent's deceitful
conduct violates Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides, "A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral[,] or deceitful conduct."
a. Worse, even after their attorney-client relationship was severed, respondent filed a second Complaint in a
blatant attempt to cover up his earlier negligence and thwart complainant's efforts to recover the money
she paid him. Respondent's repeated duplicity toward complainant reflects his lack of integrity, and is a
clear violation of the oath he took before becoming a lawyer, as correctly found by the Investigating
Commissioner: “Very clearly, respondent violated his oath as he was not forthright and honest in his
dealings with the complainant. He engaged in deceitful conduct by presenting a bogus complaint allegedly
bearing the stamp of the court. Consequently, he must bear the consequence of his own wrongdoing.”
(Angeles v. Atty. Lina-ac, A.C. No. 12063, January 8, 2019, En Banc)
46. Records show that sometime in January 2014, complainant secured respondent's services in order to assist him
in filing his Nullity Case, and in connection therewith, paid the latter the amount of P120,000.00. Initially,
respondent followed through with his undertaking by filing the necessary petition before the RTC. However,
after such filing, respondent unduly neglected the Nullity Case, as evinced not only by the RTC Order dated July
2, 2015 which dismissed the case for respondent's failure to comply with the trial court's directives, but also by
the RTC Order dated January 22, 2016 which ordered the archival of the case due to his non-filing of any
pleadings in furtherance of the case after its reinstatement.
a. In an attempt to exculpate himself from any liability, respondent offered the excuse that his inaction was
because he got "depressed" when the Court suspended him from engaging in legal practice in the case of
Baens, and that in any case, he had met with complainant and already advised him to look for a
replacement counsel. However, and as aptly pointed out by the IC, respondent's reasons are untenable,
considering that: (i) there was a considerable period, i.e., seven (7) months, between the filing of the
petition and the time he learned of his suspension, and that it was never shown that he took steps to move
forward with the Nullity Case during that time; and (ii) assuming that he indeed gave such advice to
complainant, he did not take positive steps to ensure his timely replacement.
b. Accordingly, respondent's neglect of the legal matter entrusted to him by complainant constitutes flagrant
violations of the afore-cited tenets of the CPR. It is settled that "once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a
legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable x x x," as in this case. (San Gabriel v. Atty. Sempio, A.C. No. 12423, March 26, 2019,
En Banc)
47. After borrowing money from his client, respondent did not update his client anymore regarding the status of
her case. It was only when complainant actually verified with the MTC that she confirmed the fake complaint
for ejectment. Verily, respondent cannot invoke the distance of the parties or the erratic internet service in
failing to comply with his duty as a lawyer. If respondent was sincere in updating complainant with her case,
then he should have availed of the numerous and modern channels of communication to reach his client, but
he failed to do so. Hence, respondent violated Rule 18.04, which requires that a lawyer must regularly update
his or her client regarding the status of his or her case. As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to
inform his client of whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his client's case. He should
notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review
thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss
of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is
defending the client's interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions,
omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to
expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the
client's cause. (Domingo v. Atty. Sacdalan, A.C. No. 12475, March 26, 2019, En Banc)
48. A lawyer who forgets to make use of a certificate of title in preparing documents of transfer of titled property
should be held administratively liable. (Bucag v. Atty. Olalia, A.C. No. 9218, March 27, 2019, Third Division)
49. Respondent lawyer failed to serve complainants with industry and diligence. He neglected the legal matter
entrusted to him. Respondent lawyer claimed that he decided to withdraw from the aforesaid ejectment case,
because, in his view, the case was unmeritorious. However, he admitted that he failed to formally withdraw as
counsel for complainants allegedly due to his hectic schedule during the 2010 elections. He also admitted that
he failed to file the aforesaid position paper with the MCTC. After the MCTC rendered a decision adverse to
complainants, respondent lawyer filed a notice of appeal, however, he failed to file the memorandum of appeal
before the RTC for complainants. Consequently, the RTC dismissed complainants' appeal. Respondent lawyer
clearly fell short of the circumspection and diligence required of those privileged to practice law. He attributed

his shortcomings as a lawyer to his being a politician. The Court finds such reason unacceptable, if not a display
of insolence and arrogance. (Spouses Vargas v. Atty. Oriño, A.C. No. 8907, June 3, 2019, First Division)
50. Under his Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Librada expressly vowed to conscientiously safeguard the cause of WCI once he
accepted his engagement. From that moment on, WCI fully expected him to diligently advance and protect its
interest in each phase of the proceedings before the trial court and he had to meet the expectation. But the
records reveal how Atty. Librada had been inexcusably remiss in discharging his duty of diligence towards WCI.
a. Firstly, the dismissal of WCI's complaint was attributable solely to Atty. Librada's inexplicable absence from
the pre-trial conference despite due notice to him. Surely, the RTC could but be justified in dismissing the
complaint based on his non-appearance. Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court precisely authorizes
dismissal of the action with prejudice based on the non-appearance of the plaintiff during pre-trial. Atty.
Librada's attempt to exonerate himself by passing the buck to WCI for its failure to timely provide his
transportation only deserves stern rebuke from the Court. Had Atty. Librada been truly mindful of his
obligation to exercise the utmost diligence expected of him as a lawyer, the problem of transportation was
not so insurmountable as to have prevented him from still going to the pre-trial by his own means of
conveyance. Every lawyer knows that the duty to appear at the pre-trial is binding on both the client and
the lawyer, and the latter's duty towards the Court in this regard is personal and direct, and may not be
shifted unto the shoulders of the client. But Atty. Librada utterly ignored his duty despite the strict
requirements upon an attorney in his shoes to faithfully adhere to the rules and the canons of professional
ethics. This failing on his part was a badge of his lack of professionalism, and clearly exposed his lack of
resolve to live up to his duties and responsibilities as a worthy member of the legal profession.
b. Secondly, the filing of the defective motion for reconsideration and the belated filing of the omnibus
motion underscored Atty. Librada's negligence. That the trial court would not act upon any written motion
unless the movant set if for hearing and duly notified the opposing party thereof were basic procedural
rules familiar to all lawyers. At the very least, Atty. Librada was expected to know the rudiments of law and
legal procedure. His knowledge and proper observance of the procedural rules were part and parcel of the
legal duty to handle the client's legal matters with care and mindfulness. He thus had no excuse to offer to
save him from his plight.
c. Thirdly, the IBP found that Atty. Librada had willfully withheld the CA's adverse decision from WCI. Such
concealment prevented WCI to take the necessary actions or to lessen its injury. The respondent's
actuations compounded his unprofessionalism. He thereby violated the need for the relationship between
a counsel and his client to be founded on confidence and candor, under which the former must adequately
and constantly inform the latter of the developments of the case and should not leave it in the dark as to
the mode and manner in which its interests are being prosecuted or defended.
d. Certainly, Atty. Librada's acts and omissions betrayed his failure to perform his obligations due towards
WCI as his client, and thereby breached the highest degree of confidence and candor expected of him as
counsel. The acts and omissions were in direct violation of Canon 17 and Canon 18 and, more specifically,
of Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Cas v. Atty. Librada, A.C. No. 11956,
August 6, 2019, En Banc)
51. Atty. Narido, Jr. claims that he has constantly updated complainant through his representative Almonia.
However, Atty. Narido, Jr. did not present any document establishing such fact. It is logical that Atty. Narido, Jr.
should have at least a document formally informing the complainant of the status of the case. He stated that
he knew that the complainant was hardly in the Philippines, then it would have been more prudent, in keeping
with his duty to inform his client of the status of the case, to formally inform the complainant in writing and not
merely verbally through Almonia, which Atty. Narido, Jr. has not proven. As held in the case of Mendoza vda.
de Robosa v. Atty. Juan B. Mendoza, Canon 18 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. (Gabucan v. Atty. Narido, Jr., A.C. No.
52. As expressly stated in the SPA, respondent shall represent complainant in all the cases filed for or against her.
These include Civil Case No. 6657, previously docketed as Civil Case No. 103, pending before the RTC of
Tagbilaran City. The SPA, considerably, categorically directed respondent to appear in all stages of the case such
as the pre-trial conference. Here, respondent was present during the pre-trial stage of Civil Case No. 6657, but
failed to represent complainant well enough and protect her interest either as an attorney-in-fact or by way of
special appearance. Consequently, complainant was declared in default. The situation became worse when
respondent failed to at least inform the complainant about the progress of the case so that proper action could
be taken to reverse the default order. Respondent's neglect of the legal matter entrusted to him constitutes
flagrant violations of the tenets of the CPR. It constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable. (Sousa v. Atty. Tinampay, A.C. No. 7428, November 25, 2019, Second Division)
53. The transcript of stenographic notes dated July 28, 1994 reveals that Atty. Salas admitted to not filing the
appellant's brief in the CA and not updating the appellate court of his then current mailing address. It is crystal
clear that the root cause of non-filing of appellant's brief was Atty. Salas' failure to inform the CA of the change
in his mailing address. Had he done so, he would have received the CA's notices requiring him to file the

appellant's brief. Had he been diligent in his duty, Alcantara's appeal would not have been dismissed. There is
no one to blame but Atty. Salas, because as a handling lawyer and officer of the court, he must be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client. (Alcantara v. Atty. Salas, A.C. No. 3989, December 10,
54. The lawyer who admitted to have intentionally not filed the appeal brief violates Canon 18 and Rule 18.02 of
the CPR. (Sta. Maria v. Atty. Atayde, Jr., A.C. No. 9197, February 12, 2020, First Division)
55. A lawyer who fails to perform his legal engagement to process the transfer and registration of a land title,
despite payment of the professional fees and the lapse of 12 years from engagement, has neglected the legal
matter entrusted to him by his client and has violated the relevant rules under the CPR. (Jacolbia v. Atty.
Panganiban, A.C. No. 12627, February 18, 2020, En Banc)
56. A lawyer who fails to follow up on his client’s case after the filing of the petition for review and to apprise his
client of the case status violated the CPR. (Katipunan, Jr. v. Atty. Carrera, A.C. No. 12661, February 19, 2020,
First Division)
57. A lawyer is in no position to rule on the merits of his client’s case. Accordingly, the lawyer is not justified in
deciding on his own whether to pursue a motion for reconsideration. (Katipunan, Jr. v. Atty. Carrera, A.C. No.
12661, February 19, 2020, First Division)
58. Respondent can be reprimanded for several material defects in the Petition for Review which defects caused
the dismissal of the same. This is because respondent attempted to remedy the foregoing defects by submitting
an Omnibus Motion and attaching therein the necessary pleadings and material portions of the record, a duly
accomplished Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping, and a copy of respondent’s MCLE
Certification of Compliance. After submitting said Omnibus Motion, the CA still denied the Omnibus Motion
based on its substantive aspect. Clearly, respondent attempted and exerted earnest efforts to remedy the
technical albeit fatal defects of the Petition for Review filed in the Ejectment Case. Said negligenct act attributed
to respondent in handling the Ejectment case is not so gross or inexcusable as would warrant the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. (Violago v. Atty. Aranjuez, Jr., A.C. No. 10254, March 9, 2020, Third Division)
59. Respondent filed the motion for reconsideration 17 days late. Also, when the motion for reconsideration was
denied he, likewise, failed to file a notice of appeal. Because of this, the judgment has attained finality and
judgment was executed against complainant. Without a doubt, this exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and
diligence in managing his client’s cause in violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR. As such, he neglected
the legal matters entrusted to him for which he must be clearly held administratively liable. (Lorenzo-Nucum v.
Atty. Cabalan, A.C. No. 9223, June 9, 2020, En Banc)
60. A lawyer who fails to inform the CA of his client’s death and fails to file the Appellee’s Brief is liable for neglect
of duty. (Santamaria v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 12006, June 29, 2020, Second Division)
61. A lawyer must promptly call upon the client to correct any fraud. If the client refuses, the lawyer should
terminate their professional relationship.
a. Here, the facts are insufficient to presume that Atty. Flroes authored the falsification. Foremost, Herminia
failed to show that Atty. Flores was involved directly or indirectly in the falsification of the court order and
forgery of the judge’s signature. The substance of Atty. Flores’ counter-affidavit before the public
prosecutor can hardly be considered as acknowledgment of the imputed acts. To be sure, Atty. Flores
vehemently denied authorship of the bogus court order and explained that a former court employee
named Vincent gave it to him. At most, Atty. Flores only admitted the possession of spurious document
and knowledge of its falsity. Moreover, there is no evidence that Atty. Flores used the fake order and
benefited from it. Atty. Flores even categorically stated in his counter-affidavit that the document is
inexistent, useless, and without value. Thus, he shared the document to his client. Unknown to Atty. Flores,
Arthur, et al. utilized the falsified order to harass Herminia’s caretaker. It must be underscored that the
fake order is about the segregation of the land and submission of the survey report. On the other hand,
the threat against Herminia to refrain from planting on the land because she is no longer its owner is Arthur,
et al.’s own words and beyond the contents of the document. Lastly, the Court applied in Sitaca, the
presumption of authorship against the respondent. However, the present case is starkly different. The
essential requisites that the respondent must use and benefit from the simulated court issuance are
absent. Unlike the respondent in Sitaca, Atty. Flores did not utilize or derive any benefit from the fake court
order but merely shared it to his client. Quite the contrary, the respondent in Sitaca used the falsified
documents with the goal of securing his son’s liberty. Also, Atty. Flores did not feign ignorance of the
spurious document but is keen in noticing its falsity. The fact that Atty. Flores is Arthur’s counsel of record
and that he did not explain Vincent’s identity or file a case against him are minor considerations inadequate
to warrant the presumption. Nevertheless, Atty. Flores must be penalized for his carelessness in entrusting
a forged document in the hands of his client despite the danger of using it for a wrongful purpose. Rule
19.02 of the CPR states that the lawyer who received information that his clients has, in the course of the

representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify
the same and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client. Atty. Flores failed to follow
the above-cited rule. Upon knowledge of falsification, Atty. Flores should have immediately alerted the trial
court or reported the matter to the authorities. However, Atty. Flores’ negligence encouraged Arthur, et
al. to assert their supposed claim against Herminia. Worse, Atty. Flores remained indifferent and did not
confront Arthur to rectify his fraudulent representation. (Tiongson v. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 12424,
62. Respondent not only neglected his duty to protect his own client’s interests by failing to explain the true import
of the Compromise Agreement; worse, he literally sold out his client’s cause in order to gain personal benefits.
It is unrebutted that respondent received a P100,000.00 cut from the P300,000.00 paid by Azucena to
complainant and his wife and a three-meter wide perpetual road right of way on the subject land. (Laurel v.
Delute, A.C. No. 12298, September 1, 2020, En Banc)
63. The duties transgressed by Atty. Dancel fall under the duties to his client and to the Court. As correctly observed
by the OBC, Atty. Dancel has the propensity for filing motions for extension of time to file pleadings and failing
to file the same. Thus, in failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, Atty. Dancel had clearly fallen
short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Canon 12 of the CPR. According to said Canon, a lawyer shall exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 12.03 in
particular states that a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda, or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Canon
18 further exhorts lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence. They shall not neglect legal
matters entrusted to them and shall keep their clients informed of the status of their cases. Atty. Dancel was
also duty-bound to inform Telles of the dismissal of their appeal before the CA following Rule 18.04, Canon 18
of the CPR which requires that a lawyer shall keep their client informed of the status of his case. (Telles v. Atty.
Dancel, A.C. No. 5279, September 8, 2020, En Banc)
64. Atty. Lorica opted to inform complainant of the CA Decision by sending a letter through the postal service
instead of updating them personally or via mobile phone of the status of their case. Given that the
correspondence was received by complainant, only after thirteen days – or two days before the expiration of
the reglementary period for the filing of a motion to reconsideration – there is no question that Atty. Lorica had
failed to timely notify complainant of the CA’s adverse ruling against her and her husband, in violaion of Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR. To make matters worse, the records show that Atty. Lorica even asked
complainant’s husband for the payment of P25,000.00 as his professional fee prior to his filing of a motion for
reconsideration in their behalf. This left complainant and her husband with no other choice but to look for
another counsel despite the meager time left for the filing of their motion with the CA. To be sure, when faced
with such dire circumstances, they would not simply decide to engage a new counsel unless they truly felt that
their current counsel was not acting in their best interest. As such, the Court finds Atty. Lorica in breach of his
duty under the Lawyer’s Oath not to delay any man’s cause for money and Canon 17 of the CPR. (Ocampo v.
Atty. Lorica IV, A.C No. 12790, September 23, 2020, Second Division)
65. Atty. Tecson neglected to file his clients’ position paper and appeal memorandum in the ejectment case, which,
according to Canoy v. Atty. Ortiz, is a violation of Rule 18.03 of the CPR. Atty. Tecson’s claim that he had personal
problems and a heavy workload is a lame excuse that cannot justify his infractions. He could have taken available
remedies to ensure that the position paper and the appeal memorandum were filed. He could have
recommended the hiring of a collaborating counsel or could have requested for more time to file the pleadings
if available. To be sure, Atty. Tecson did not exert any effort to ensure that his clients’ cause will not be
prejudiced. His failure to do so led to the dismissal of his clients’ appeal. Atty. Tecson breached his duty to serve
his client with competence and diligence, as provided under Canon 18 of the CPR. Furthermore, Atty. Tecson
violated his duty when he did not file the annulment of title case after receiving his professional fees. He agreed
to represent complainants and to file the case. It was his idea to file it in the first place. He cannot excuse himself
by alleging that he did not receive the P71,000.00 and that he was tricked by a certain Joseph Bermoy in signing
documents acknowledging receipt of the initial payment of his professional fees. Aside from lacking support,
the Court cannot credit Atty. Tecson’s bare allegation because he is a lawyer who must be aware of the
importance of signatures in documents. (Taghoy, et al. v. Atty. Tecson III, A.C. No. 12446, November 16, 2020,
Second Division)
66. Atty. Capela’s failure to attend hearings constitutes negligence. (Quitazol v. Atty. Capela, A.C. No. 12072,
December 9, 2020, En Banc)
67. The Lawyer’s Oath mandates every lawyer to conduct himself/herself according to the best of his/her
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to his/her clients. Atty. Centro
unfortunately departed from his sworn oath by committing the following acts: (a) failing to file a Memorandum
and even misrepresenting about it; (b) failing to inform Portuguese of the RTC’s Decision; (c) failing to protect
Portuguese’s interest against the adverse RTC’s Decision; (d) failing to inform Portuguese of the Motion for
Execution, the scheduled hearing, and the resolution granting the said motion; and (e) failing to file an Answer

to the instant Complaint. Worse, when Portuguese confronted him about the deliberate lapses concerning the
civil case, the latter merely replied that there was nothing more he could do and that he was giving up the case
for good. Atty. Centro’s unjustifiable negligence and abandonment of his client’s cause violated the Lawyer’s
Oath as well as the CPR. He casually set aside a legal matter that was entrusted to him and which deserved his
full attention and diligence. He was grossly negligent of his duty as counsel and was manifestly disinterested in
his client’s cause.
a. Atty. Centro must be reminded that “being a lawyer is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a member
of the bar, he must maintain the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by refraining from committing
acts which might diminish in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the profession.” He should have informed Portuguese at the earliest opportunity that he could no longer
properly represent him and perform his functions as counsel. This way, Portuguese would have the option
to secure the services of another lawyer so that his interests would be protected. Unfortunately, Atty.
Centro did not even bother to apprise Portuguese about the developments in the civil case or inform or his
incapacity to continue as counsel. (Portuguese, Jr. v. Atty. Centro, A.C. No. 12875, January 26, 2021, En
Banc)
68. Negligence of the lawyer binds petitioner. Petitioner claims that the attempt of the RTC to furnish him of the
order was not valid because he was represented by a counsel. Further, petitioner argues that the period of 10
days given by the RTC within which to pay the P91,735.40 never started to run because his counsel never
received a copy of the Order dated December 7, 2012. Petitioner’s argument is untenable. As a general rule, if
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. There is no question that petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Zosa,
was able to attend the hearing on December 7, 2012. The latter was personally informed in open court of the
RTC’s order for petitioner to pay the deficiency in the docket fees. In this regard, it bears stressing that while
petitioner zealously harps that Atty. Zosa should have received a copy of the said order, albeit court appearance,
the former did not give any explanation why the latter failed to inform him of the court’s order. Prudence and
diligence dictate that since the foregoing order of the RTC was crucial to the case, Atty. Zosa should have
immediately informed petitioner about it. Oddly, the omission of petitioner to even allege his counsel’s
negligence gives the Court a clear impression that he is trying to shroud or disproving to deny Atty. Zosa’s
negligence in timely notifying him. Petitioner has not shown willingness to pay. (Chua v. Spouses Go, G.R. No.
244140, February 3, 2021, Third Division)
69. Convincing evidence exists that Atty. Perez failed to exercise the required diligence in handling his client’s case.
The records show that Atty. Perez did not attend the pre-trial on December 10, 2003 resulting in the dismissal
of the case. The fact that Atty. Perez was able to reconsider the order of dismissal would not exculpate him
from his omission since the RTC dismissed again the case for his failure to appear on the subsequent pre-trial
dates. Atty. Perez did not even offer any explanation to justify his absence on the scheduled hearings. On this
point, Atty. Perez exhibited carelessness in handling his client’s cause. Atty. Perez should have been more
circumspect to send a substitute counsel to appear on his behalf instead of leaving the proceedings unattended
in view of its adverse consequence, i.e., the dismissal of the case.
a. Moreover, Rule 18.04 of the CPR is explicit that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. The lawyer’s duty
to keep his clients constantly updated on the developments of their case is crucial in maintaining the
fiduciary nature of their relationship. Nevertheless, Atty. Perez left his client groping in the dark. Atty. Perez
did not inform his client of the status of the case. Danila had to inquire from the RTC otherwise he would
not have known the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, a lawyer need not wait for his clients to ask for
information but must advise them without delay about matters essential for them to avail of legal
remedies.
b. Lastly, Atty. Perez’ argument that he had informed Danilo of his desire to withdraw as counsel does not
excuse him from his negligence. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of
his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing. An attorney should see to it that the
name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. Here, Atty. Perez betrayed this procedure. Atty. Perez did
not file a notice of withdrawal as counsel before the RTC. Danilo did not even consent to Atty. Perez’
supposed withdrawal. As such, Atty. Perez remained the counsel of record who is expected to perform
what the interests of his client require. (Sanchez v. Atty. Perez, A.C. No. 12835, February 3, 2021, Second
Division)
70. Here, respondent violated the rule when he neglected to file Joseph's petition for nullity of marriage, the very
pleading which would have initiated the entire process. Despite repeated prodding from complainant,
respondent simply made excuses and foisted lies upon lies onto complainant to lead her to believe there was
actual progress in Joseph's case when in fact there was none. Commissioner Puno-Yambot, therefore, correctly
found respondent liable for violating Rule 18.03 of the CPR. (Nicolas v. Atty. Laki, A.C. No. 12881, February 9,
2021, En Banc)
ACCOUNTING AND TURN OVER OF CLIENT’S FUNDS AND PROPERTIES

1. Respondent Galarrita entered into the Compromise Agreement involving complainant Luna’s property without
informing him. In such regard, respondent Galarrita received the amount of P100,000.00 as settlement amount
by the opposing party. However, Atty. Galarrita refused to turn over the settlement amount to Luna. Thus,
respondent Galaritta violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
a. Respondent Galaritta cannot validly invoke a lawyer’s retaining lien in retaining the money. This is because
the provision on retaining lien assumes that the client agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of attorney’s
fees and as to the application of the client’s fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursement. Without the
client’s consent, the lawyer has no authority to apply the client’s money for his fees. Instead, he should
return the money to his client, without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his unsatisfied fees. (Luna v.
Atty. Galarrita, A.C. No. 10662, July 7, 2015, En Banc)
2. Atty. Camacho violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for additional
docket fees, the latter obediently granted the amount of P1.2 million to the former. Certainly, it was understood
that such amount was necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-0655.
Yet, when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho regarding the said amount, the latter replied that he simply
gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed. Whether the said amount was pocketed by him
or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form of bribery, it was unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did
not apply the amount given to him by his client for its intended legal purpose. (Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, A.C.
3. Respondent violated Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she failed to
return the amount of P75,000.00 representing legal fees that complainants paid her. (Spouses Lopez v. Atty.
Limos, A.C. No. 7618, February 2, 2016, En Banc; In Re: Petition for the Disbarment of Atty. Laysa, A.C. No. 7936,
June 30, 2020, En Banc)
4. Atty. Mandagan failed to act in accordance with the rule stated in Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Atty. Mandagan never denied receiving the amount of P300,000.00 from Ramos for the purpose
of posting a bond to secure the latter’s provisional liberty. When the petition for bail of Ramos, however, was
denied by the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Mandagan failed to return the amount to Ramos. Worse, she unjustifiably
refused to turn over the amount to Ramos despite demand from Ramos’ counsel. (Ramos v. Atty. Mandagan,
A.C. No. 11128, April 6, 2016, Third Division)
5. Respondent’s refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return the amount paid in
excess of what was required as docket fees, violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent cannot raise, as his defense, that he was a mere associate in the law office and has
no participation whatsoever regarding the fees the complainant is giving to the office, since he admitted that
he received P70,000.00 for the docket fees. (Malangas v. Atty. Zaide, A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016, En Banc)
6. Atty. Maravilla-Ona received money from her client for the filing of a case in court. Not only did she fail to file
the case but she also failed to return her client’s money. These acts constitute violations of Atty. Maravilla-
Ona’s professional obligations under Canon 16. (Gutierrez v. Atty. Maravilla-Ona, A.C. No. 10944, July 12, 2016,
En Banc; Mariano v. Atty. Laki, A.C. No. 11978, September 25, 2018, En Banc)
7. Respondent, by converting the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent, was guilty of
deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct. Furthermore, respondent’s act of propositioning himself as a lawyer
of Tan and Camino who have opposing interests as one being the seller and the other one, the buyer, is
deplorable. As a lawyer of the buyer, Tan, he facilitated the buyer’s payments to Camino, but at the same time
when it seemed that he could get a higher price from another buyer, he encouarged Camino to cancel the sale
in favor of Tan. Clearly, such actuations of Atty. Pasagui are tantamount to double-dealing and conflict of interst,
and manifests unethical practice of law. (Camino v. Atty. Pasagui, A.C. No. 11095, September 20, 2016, En Banc)
8. The accusation against De Guzman stemmed from his wife’s purchase of the Speaker Perez property from BDO
when Enrique did not have the means to buy it. The Zalameas claim that De Guzman, as their counsel, could
not acquire the property, either personally or through his wife, without violating his ethical duties. However,
the prohibition which the Zalameas invoke does not apply where the property purchased was not invovled in
litigation. De Guzman clearly never acquired any of his client’s properties or interests involved in litigation in
which he may take part by virtue of his profession. There exists no iota of proof indicating that said property
has even been involved in any litigation in which De Guzman took part by virtue of his profession. True, they
had previously sought legal advice from De Guzman but only how to handle their mother’s estate, which
likewise did not involve the contested property. Neither was it shown that De Guzman’s law firm had taken part
in any litigation involving the Speaker Perez property. (Zalamea v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7387,
November 7, 2016, Third Division)
9. Atty. Samson’s persistent refusal to return Padilla’s money and case files despite frequent demands clearly
reflects his lack of integrity and moral soundness; he is clinging to something that does not belong to him, and
that he absolutely has no right to keep or use without Padilla’s permission. Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust

their client’s money and property that may come into their possession. Thus, Atty. Samson’s failure to return
Padilla’s money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby
betrayed the trust that was reposed upon him, which constitutes a gross violation of professional ethics and a
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. (Padilla v. Atty. Samson, A.C. No. 10253, August 22, 2017,
En Banc; Punla v. Atty. Maravilla-Ona, A.C. No. 11149, August 15, 2017, En Banc; Segovia, Jr. v. Atty. Javier, A.C.
No. 10244, March 12, 2018, Second Division)
10. Respondent did not violate Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which mandates lawyers to account for all money or property
collected or received or from the client. Consistent with this duty, respondent accounted for his receipt of
P60,000.00 as acceptance fee from complainant when he issued the Official Receipt date August 3, 2012. He
also cannot be held liable for failure to account complainant’s alleged payment of P2,500.00 as research fee for
lack of proof that such amount was paid to respondent. (Martin v. Atty. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 9832, September 4,
11. It is indubitable that respondent received the amount of P1,200,000.00 from complainant to be used to cover
the expenses for the transfer of title of the subject property under C Five's name. Respondent admitted having
received the same, but claimed that she had spent a portion of it for various expenses, such as documentation,
permits, and licenses, among others, as evidenced by the Statement of Expenses with attached receipts.
However, it has been established that the registration of the property in C Five's name could not have
materialized, as the subject property was covered by a Free Patent issued on August 13, 2009 which,
consequently, bars it from being sold, assigned, or transferred within a period of five (5) years therefrom. Thus,
and as the CBD-IBP had aptly opined there was no longer any reason for respondent to retain the money.
Furthermore, the expenditures enumerated in the Statement of Expenses, except for the documentation and
notarization fees for which no receipts were attached, do not relate to the purposes for which the money was
given, i.e., the documentation and registration of the subject property. As such, even if official receipts had
been duly attached for the other purposes which, the Court notes, respondent failed to do despite the
opportunity given - the expenditures are not legitimate ones. Hence, the Court finds respondent to have
violated the above-cited rules, to the detriment and prejudice of complainant.
a. Returning the full amount to complainant does not completely exonerate the administrative liability of
respondent. (Isalos v. Atty. Cristal, A.C. No. 11822, November 22, 2017, Second Division)
12. There is no question as to whether or not the respondent lawyer misappropriated the amount of money the
complainant entrusted to him, since Atty. Agleron already admitted the same, in clear violation of his fiduciary
duty to his client. Jurisprudence is instructive that a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the monies he/she
holds for his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has appropriated the said monies for his/her
own use, to the prejudice and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client. Proceeding from the
premise that indeed Atty. Agleron merely wanted to help another client who is going through financial woes,
he, nevertheless, acted in disregard of his duty as a lawyer with respect to Iluminada. Such act is a gross violation
of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. (Yuzon v. Atty. Agleron, A.C. No. 10684, January 24, 2018,
Second Division)
13. The respondent's failure to deliver the checks to Asialink and instead depositing the checks in his account and
thereafter misappropriating the funds thereof for his personal benefit constituted a serious breach by him of
Canon 16, Rule 16.01; and Rule 16.02 of the CPR. (De Mesa v. Atty. Olaybal, A.C. No. 9129, January 31, 2018,
Third Division)
14. Respondent allegedly failed to return, despite demand, the complainant's documents after he withdrew as his
counsel in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 which provides that a lawyer shall account for and hold in trust the
money or property from the client. Moreover, despite respondent's legal services having been allegedly paid in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), which, as allegedly agreed upon, was to cover the
acceptance fee, appearance fees, and other fees until the resolution of the cases, he allegedly abandoned his
client when the latter was not able to give him the "pocket money" he had demanded. This is a serious charge
which the respondent should have addressed and answered, as well as the other allegations, during the IBP
proceedings. However, after requesting for a copy of the Affidavit Complaint in order to be able to prepare his
Answer, respondent failed to participate in the IBP proceedings. (Sorongon, Jr. v. Atty. Gargantos, A.C. No.
11326, June 27, 2018, Second Division)
15. Atty. Mendez received money from Jaime for the titling of property covered by Tax Declaration No. D-006-
01404 on August 30, 2009. However, despite several oral and written demands to Atty. Mendez as evidenced
by demand letters dated February 13, 2012 and August 2, 2012, the same fell on deaf ears. Not only did Atty.
Mendez failed to use the money for its intended purpose, and return the money after demand, he also did not
give Jaime any reply regarding the latter's demands. The Court, likewise, takes note that considering it took
more than a year before Atty. Mendez' made an initiative to return the money albeit partial only, the same
cannot be said to be prompt or immediate return of the money, rather, he was already in delay for a
considerable period of time in returning his client's money. Notably, it must be pointed out that Atty. Mendez
not only failed to return the money immediately, but he also failed to return the whole amount of P300,000.00.

He was able to return the amount of P140,000.00 only, thus, there is still a remaining balance of P160,000.00.
While, Atty. Mendez insisted that the remaining balance was used for the titling of the property and his daily
needs, there was still no proper accounting as to when, where and how the remaining balance was specifically
utilized. Clearly, these acts constitute violations of Atty. Mendez' professional obligations under Canon 16 of
the CPR which mandates lawyers to hold in trust and account all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession. (De Borja v. Atty. Mendez, Jr., A.C. No. 11185, July 4, 2018, Second Division)
16. The Court finds that while respondents gave prompt notice to complainant of their receipt of money collected
in the latter's favor, they were amiss in their duties to give accurate accounting of the amounts due to
complainant, and to return the money due to client upon demand. The Attorney-Client Contract between the
parties states: "We/I hereby voluntarily agree and bind ourselves, our heirs and assigns to pay Atty. Pedro L.
Linsangan and his collaborating Singapore counsels, the sum equivalent to thirty-five [35%] percent of any
recovery or settlement obtained." Clearly, the stipulated rate referred to the combined professional fees of
both respondents and their collaborating Singapore counsel, Gurbani & Co. Nevertheless, respondents
proceeded to deduct separate fees on top of the amount already deducted by Gurbani & Co. Complainant
contested this deduction and refused to accept the amount being tendered by respondents. Since a claim for
attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered,
or in a separate action, respondents, instead of forcibly deducting their share, should have moved for the
judicial determination and collection of their attorney's fees. The fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for his
attorney's fees on money in his hands collected for his client does not entitle him to unilaterally appropriate his
client's money for himself. Worse, respondents allegedly kept the money inside the firm's vault for two years
until they were made aware of the disciplinary complaint against them before the IBP-CBD. It is improper for
the lawyer to put his client's funds in his personal safe deposit vault. Funds belonging to the client should be
deposited in a separate trust account in a bank or trust company of good repute for safekeeping. (Palencia v.
Atty. Linsangan, A.C. No. 10557, July 10, 2018, En Banc)
17. Dr. Malvar provided documentary evidence, in the form of copies of checks and receipts, to prove that he
transmitted the sums of P1,233,333.00, P980,000.00, and P435,000.00, respectively, to respondent. For the
first sum, respondent's primary defense was that the agreement was void because the seller did not sign it, and
that the checks he received could have been payment for some other transactions. He placed the blame on Dr.
Malvar, who as an educated person should not have been ignorant and gullible to pay on the basis of a contract
not signed by the owner. For the second sum, respondent relied on the provision of the contract which provides
that the buyer, Dr. Malvar, had no more right to be refunded of the amounts already paid in the event of an
adverse decision in the case where the subject land was being litigated. For the third sum, respondent claimed
that the money is already with a certain Col. Manuel Manalo (Col. Manalo). Respondent's defenses do not
absolve him of his duty under Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to account for all money or
property collected or received for or from his client. Respondent's only means of ensuring accountability was
by issuing and keeping receipts. Regrettably, he failed to live up to this basic professional responsibility. Even if
his defense in connection with the sum involving P1,233,333.00 was true, i.e., the money was for some other
transaction, he failed to render an accounting of the sum so received. The same is also true for the sum
amounting to P435,000.00. Because of respondent's failure to account for the money he received, Dr. Malvar
had to request for a certification from the Clerk of Court to confirm the amount of docket fees. Notwithstanding
the admission of Col. Manalo that he used the balance of P390,000.00 for administrative expenses, it was
incumbent upon respondent to, at the very least, notify Dr. Malvar, or more prudently, ask for his written
confirmation, before transferring the money to Col. Manalo.
a. Respondent's liability, however, is not limited to his failure to account for his client's money. He likewise
contravened Rule 1.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he knowingly
facilitated dubious transactions involving his client, Dr. Malvar. In the transaction involving the Tandang
Sora property, respondent was the one who facilitated the contract of conditional sale, and in fact signed
thereon as a witness and countersigned the corrections in the document. He did this despite the absence
of the owner of the property—then later used the absence of the owner to claim that the contract was
void. For the Canillo property, he sold a parcel of land to Dr. Malvar despite not being its owner. He also
facilitated a champertous contract between Dr. Malvar and Canillo, where the former acted as financier in
exchange for a share of the land in dispute. As a lawyer, respondent ought to have known that these
transactions were of suspect legal validity. He was duty-bound to refrain from facilitating such kinds of
transactions and to dissuade his client, Dr. Malvar, from entering into such agreements. (Canillo v. Atty.
Angeles, A.C. No. 9899, September 4, 2018, En Banc)
18. Atty. Panagsagan's failure to return Yoshimura's money despite repeated demands gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of, the trust
reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
a. The Court likewise cannot overlook Atty. Panagsagan's reprehensible conduct when he asked Yoshimura
for the amount of P40,000.00 as "under the table" allegedly to expedite the release of the yellow plates of
the bus units with plate numbers PHP-559 and RHP 568. Atty. Panagsagan himself signed a receipt showing
that he took money in the amount of P40,000.00 for the said purpose. Undoubtedly, this act of Atty.

Panagsagan is tantamount to grave misconduct. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client,
purportedly to be used as a bribe to expedite a transaction, is not only an abuse of his client's trust but an
overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession. As officers of the court,
lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a
lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the public's perception of the dispensation of justice.
b. Equally reprehensible was Atty. Panagsagan's act of convincing Yoshimura and Bernadette to instead join
another cooperative, Sta. Monica, when in fact Sta. Monica was no longer in the business of operating
transport buses. It can be presumed that it was through Atty. Panagsagan's misrepresentation which
prompted Yoshimura to pay the total amount of P200,000.00 for the processing of documents to be able
to join said cooperative. Several temporary receipts were also issued for several amounts of monies
received totaling to P380,000.00 purportedly for "stock membership and bus membership, albeit, it was
unclear who actually received said amounts of monies and issued the receipts therefor. To give semblance
of truth, Atty. Panagsagan also prepared and notarized a management contract between Yoshimura and
Bernadette and Rhoel F. Correa, the chairman/authorized representative of Sta. Monica. However,
Yoshimura and Bernadette insisted that they have never met Rhoel Correa. In an affidavit, Rhoel Correa
also stated that he has never met Yoshimura and Bernadette and that he neither received any money from
them nor issued any receipts to them. Clearly, Atty. Panagsagan's act in convincing Yoshimura and
Bernadette to join a cooperative which no longer operate, in order to obtain money from them, speaks of
his dishonest and deceitful character. This actuations of Atty. Panagsagan constitute grave violations of the
CPR which mandates lawyers not to do any falsehood.
c. Adding to Atty. Panagsagan's list of infractions was his violation of the notarial law. He notarized on June
10, 2009 the management contract between Yoshimura and Bernadette and Sta. Monica without all the
affiant's personal appearance. To reiterate, Yoshimura and Bernadette maintained that they have never
met Rhoel Correa, which is consistent with the latter's statement in his affidavit that he has never met
Yoshimura and Bernadette prior to their meeting at the Prosecutor's Office on June 2, 2010. Thus,
considering that both Yoshimura and Bernadette, and Rhoel Correa have never met each other prior to
June 2, 2010, it can be surmised that at the time of the notarization of the contract on June 10, 2009, both
or one of them did not appear before Atty. Panagsagan. (Yoshimura v. Atty. Panagsagan, A.C. No. 10962,
19. It is beyond cavil that respondent received from complainant the amount of P43,500.00 as payment for his
supposed legal services. But, as it turned out, no actual case was filed in court, for they were settled at the
barangay level. Therefore, and as the IBP-CBD had correctly pointed out, there was no reason at all for
respondent to retain the money, or even ask for it in the first place, because during the mediation proceedings
at the barangay, the parties need not be represented by lawyers. Worse, when asked to return the money,
herein respondent reportedly shouted at complainant that the amount of P43,500.00 was not even enough for
his services. Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the money but also verbally abused
complainant in the process. Respondent's unseemly behavior is a blot on the legal profession. (Flora III v. Atty.
Luna, A.C. No. 11486, October 17, 2018, First Division)
20. Respondent received the total amount of P170,000.00 from complainant for the processing, transfer of titles,
and other related fees, including his professional fees, for the subject properties. Evidently, complainant gave
respondent such amount to facilitate the transfer of titles of the subject properties under her name.
Complainant, Diaz and Urisantos even gave respondent the owner's duplicate copies of the TCT of the two (2)
subject properties, tax declarations, and duly signed deeds of absolute sale for the transfer of the said
properties. Since payments were tendered by complainant on July 6 and 13, 2006, until filing her instant
complaint, or after a period of eight (8) years, respondent was remiss in his obligation of transferring the titles
of the subject properties to complainant. It was not even confirmed whether respondent actually notarized the
deeds of absolute sale for the subject properties. Complainant went to respondent's office several times to
follow up the transfer of the titles but the latter was always unavailable. Due to respondent's inaction, on July
2, 2014, complainant went to the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to verify the status of the lands only to discover
that the subject properties remained under the name of the previous owners. Demand letters dated July 7,
2014 and July 22, 2014, respectively, were sent to respondent requiring the return of the original documents,
as well as the amount of P170,000.00, but these were unheeded. Complainant even sought the assistance of
the IBP of Imus, Cavite, where respondent is a member, and the Office of the Punong Barangay of the
Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, but to no avail. Verily, respondent's acts and omissions violated the Lawyer's
Oath because he delayed the case of his client for a period of eight (8) years without any justifiable reason. He
also violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01, 16.02, and 16.03 of the Code because he received a substantial amount of
money from his client, in the total sum of P170,000.00, to facilitate the transfer of the subject properties.
However, he failed to comply with his obligation. Further, he could not explain where the money went.
Manifestly, respondent utterly failed to account and safe-keep the hard-earned money of his client.
Respondent's acts and omissions further violated Canons 17 and 18, and Rule 18.03 of the Code because he
failed to observe his duty to his client. Complainant, Diaz, and Urisantos engaged the services of respondent to
facilitate, notarize, and process the sale and transfer of the titles of the subject properties to complainant. They
even entrusted the important relevant documents to respondent. However, after a long period of time,
respondent failed to comply with his duty because the titles were still under the name of the previous owners.

When complainant sought the return of the important documents and the payments tendered, respondent
simply ignored her pleas. These acts and omissions show respondent's wanton disregard and indifference to
his client's cause. (Salazar v. Atty. Quiambao, A.C. No. 12401, March 12, 2019, En Banc)
21. It bears to note that after all this time, Atty. Zambrano still has not made any effort to remit the settlement
money which rightfully belongs to Huang. Being undisputed, the presumption that he had appropriated Huang's
settlement money for his own use becomes conclusive. (Huang v. Atty. Zambrano, A.C. No. 12460, March 26,
2019, En Banc)
22. Complainant accuses respondent of grave or gross misconduct for allegedly misappropriating the amount of
PhP 369,416.98 intended for the licensing and registration of its products with the BFAD. It appears that
sometime in 2004, complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to cause the licensing and registration
of its products with the BFAD. Respondent, however, breached her client's trust as not only did she fail to fulfill
her obligation but she also failed to return the amount entrusted to her even after several demands to do so.
This prompted complainant to file the instant disbarment case against her. Despite the many opportunities
given to her by the Court and the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, however, made no effort to refute
the accusations hurled against her. Her deafening silence, coupled with the fact that she has a pending criminal
case for estafa same offense, which she likewise refused to face and which has resulted in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against her, is indicative of her guilt. In fact, her mere refusal and/or failure to return the
money to her client without any justifiable reason is sufficient reason for the Court to find her guilty of
misappropriation, which is a violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
a. Worth mentioning at this point is the fact that this is not the first time respondent has been found guilty
of deceit, grave misconduct, and violating the Lawyer's Oath. Neither is this the first time respondent has
refused to comply with the lawful order of the Court requiring her to file an answer or a comment to the
charges filed against her. As earlier mentioned by complainant, in the case of Emilio Grande, respondent
was previously suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years for issuing to the complainant
in that case a bouncing check as settlement of the civil aspect of the criminal case filed against her client.
In that case, respondent also refused to accept the notices served on her by the Court requiring her to
comment on the disbarment complaint filed against her. A criminal complaint for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22 was also filed against respondent by the complainant in that case with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which led to the filing of an Information for violation of BP 22
against respondent.
b. Regrettably, the penalty of suspension imposed upon respondent by the Court in Emilio Grande did not
deter her from committing similar acts of deceit and gross misconduct. Since then and until now,
respondent has not reformed or changed her ways. (Arde v. Atty. De Silva, A.C. No. 7607, October 15, 2019,
En Banc)
23. Complainant had sufficienly proved that respondent received from him the total amount of P53,500.00 for the
payment of capital gains tax and for the services rendered for the transfer of his and his siblings’ property from
the Spouses Ardente; and that she also took the original copy of TCT No. 64507 covering the said property as
well as the original copy of the sketch plan to facilitate the transfer of title. In fact, respondent, in her letter to
the IBP Cebu Chapter, to which the complainant first referred his complaint before filing the same with the
Court, did not deny receiving the said amount of P53,500.00 and the documents from complainan, but put up
the defense that they were all given to a fixer who never returned the money and documents to her despite
several demands. The money which was given to respondent for the purpose of the payment of the capital
gains tax, which was not used for that purpose, should have been immediately returned by respondent upon
complainant’s demand. However, respondent never did. Her failure to pay the capital gains tax and real estate
tax for the transfer of the title and to return the documents she took from complainant violates the trust and
confidence reposed on her by the complainant. (Caballero v. Atty. Pilapil, A.C. No. 7075, January 21, 2020, En
Banc)
24. Complainant was able to establish that Atty. Doctor received from him the amounts of P400,000.00 on June 8,
2011, another P400,000.00 on June 21, 2011, and US $50,000.00 on June 21, 2011. She submitted the Joint
Affidavit of Evangeline and Kevin, who accompanied her during those dates and witnessed the act of receipt of
said amounts by Atty. Doctor from complainant. However, Atty. Doctor failed to issue official receipts despite
assurances to do so. Moreover, Atty. Doctor failed to use the money for the intended purpose, i.e., (a) as
settlement for the Taiwanese crew members to be cleared by the BID; (b) for the immediate release of the
vessel from the custody of the BFAR; and (c) for the termination of the BFAR administrative case. Atty. Doctor
should have properly accounted for said amounts and immediately returned the money to complainant when
he failed to use the same. If he had done so, there would have been no need for complainant to send demand
letters to him. (Minas v. Atty. Doctor, Jr., A.C. No. 12660, January 28, 2020, En Banc)
25. Respondent was engaged by complainant to file a civil case for annulment of marriage. Complainant paid him
the amount of CAD$2,000.00, which he duly acknowledged. However, respondent never performed his duty;
he did not even file a petition for annulment of marriage in court. Due to respondent’s inaction and
complainant’s loss of trust and confidence, she terminated his legal services. Notably, complainant only

demanded that half of her legal fees be returned to her, even though respondent did not perform any of his
legal duties. Complainant sent two Demand Letters to respondent, which was duly received by the latter, but
these demands were unheeded. Complainant’s son, Conrad, consistently contacted respondent for the return
of the legal fees. However, respondent was either unresponsive or busy making excuses. Respondent promised
that he would return half of complainant’s money but he never did. His explanation that he did not return
complainant’s money to Conrad because the latter’s identity was questionable deserves scant consideration.
Conrad presented a Special Authorization signed by complainant, which was duly sworn to before the Philippine
Consulate General in Canada, authorizing him to transact with respondent. This authorization was furnished to
respondent but he still failed to return complainant’s money through Conrad. Finally, respondent’s flimsy
justification that complainant’s money was supposed to be returned to her but was inadvertently left in the
case folder is absolutely irresponsible. Respondent had numerous instances and opportunities to return his
client’s money – through complainant while she was in the Philippines, through Conrad, or even during the
Mandatory Conference before the Commission – but he glaringly failed to do so. It shows that from the very
beginning, respondent did not have an ounce of eagerness to return his client’s entrusted money. Indeed,
respondent’s misdealing towards his client is manifest and obvious. (Bondoc v. Atty. Licudine, A.C. No. 12768,
26. Atty. Ladimir and Atty. Mercy acted both as agents and as lawyers of Nenita in the purported sale transaction.
This is in contravention of the settled rule discouraging lawyers to engage in business transactions with their
clients. Worse, Atty. Ladimir and Atty. Mercy’s failure to return upon demand the P5 million gave rise to the
presumption that they appropriated the money for themselves in violation of the trust reposed in them by
Nenita. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ladimir and Atty. Mercy utterly disregarded the trust reposed in them by Nenita.
Their acts are in gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. Finally, Atty. Mercy should
not have consented to the issuance of the checks by Nenita in her name. This alone constitutes a violation of
the Code which mandates lawyers to keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him. (Ko v. Atty. Maduramente and Atty. Maduramente, A.C. No. 11118, July 14, 2020, En
Banc)
27. It was not shown that respondens failed to account for the money which they received from complainant. In
fact, on March 4, 2015, even before the issuance of the formal demand letter dated March 31, 2015,
respondents had already returned P300,000.00 which complainant himself personally acknowledged.
Subsequently, respondents issued three postdated checks with the total amoun of only P1.050 million on June
1, 2015, and another P300,000.00 which was received by CFO Deacosta on July 3, 2015. Thus, out of the sum
of P2 million given by complainant to respondent, the latter was able to return P1.650 million. As to the
remaining balance of P350,000.00, the records show that it was utilized by the respondents for the preparation
and filing of the complaint against the former and current officials of the Philippine Reclamation Authority now
Public Estates Authority including the expenses for operations, research, leg work, and media expense. Under
the principle of quantum meruit, recovery of attorney’s fees is authorized when the attorney-client relationship
was terminated through no fault of the lawyers. Furthermore, the case National Power Corp. v. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay teaches that attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device used to prevent
unscrupulous clients from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and
also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. Here, the amount of P350,000.00 that was
not returned to the complainant simply represents the legal fees and expenses incurred in relation to the
services actually rendered and accomplished. (Gow v. Atty. De Leon, A.C. 12173, September 23, 2020, Second
Division)
28. Convincing evidence exists that Atty. Ferrer represented Salvacion in a criminal case and that he received funds
for her in the total amount of P375,000.00. However, Atty. Ferrer remitted only P80,000.00 and unjustifiably
refused to return the balance of P295,000.00, despite repeated demands. The special power of attorney,
acknowledgment receipts, the memorandum of agreement and the demand letters established these findings.
In stark contrast, Atty. Ferrer did not disprove these evidence but merely argued that he gave the amounts to
Salvacion’s daughter. Yet, Atty. Ferrer failed to substantiate this theory. The Court stresses that bare assertion
is not evidence. As the IBP aptly observed, Atty. Ferrer should know the law better than his client, and there is
no other person to blame but him for not requiring receipts. At any rate, Atty. Ferrer admitted his obligation
and promised to return the funds on a specific date. The acknowledgment of debt is voluntary and Salvacion’s
supposed threat to file a disbarment case to enforce her legal claim against Atty. Ferrer does not vitiate his
consent to the agreement. Atty. Ferrer even subsequently offered to pay his obligation on installment basis.
Verily, Atty. Ferrer breached Salvacion’s trust when he failed to render an account of her funds upon demand.
(Romo v. Atty. Ferrer, A.C. No. 12833, November 10, 2020, En Banc)
29. Atty. Demaisip had already admitted that she failed to return the balance of the money entrusted to her for the
transfer of ownership of Bernasconi’s property. Taking into account the fiduciary nature of a lawyer-client
relationship, she clearly violated the trust reposed in her by her client. Del Mundo v. Atty. Capistrano decrees
that when a client entrusts money to his or her lawyer for a specific purpose, such money, if not utilized, be
immediately returned upon demand and failure to do so gives rise to the presumption that the money has been
misappropriated. In this case, Atty. Demaisip has not submitted any valid reason for her failure to return the

remainder of Bernasconi’s money, or to even account for the same. It is apparent based on the liquidation of
expenses she prepared that not the entire amount entrusted to her was expended. Thus, there is no excuse for
her to not be able to remit the balance. Her claim that she has yet to be paid for her attorney’s fees is clearly
an afterthought, as what the OBC also opined, because save for her repeated promises to return the money,
she has never raised the matter of attorney’s fees to Bernasconi. Besides, Atty. Demaisip’s contention was also
belied by the liquidation of expenses she submitted, which shows that she already charged the amount of
P297,000.00 as her partial attorney’s fees despite not being able to complete the task she was supposed to
accomplish. (Bernasconi v. Atty. Demaisip, A.C. No. 11477, January 19, 2021, En Banc)
30. As the IBP noted, respondent received money on different occasions from RODCO in connection with the cases
of Abalos and Jarloc, and in the case RODCO filed against its former lawyer, a fact that he does not even deny.
a. With regard to Abalos, respondent asked for Php350,000.00, despite not being counsel of record, allegedly
to be used to secure an early and favorable ruling on the Abalos' claim. He claimed that the money was
paid to the representative of the insurance company as a "settlement fee" and that he only got
Php50,000.00 as attorney's fees in this case. However, there is no proof that he indeed used the money
for that purpose. While Abalos was successful in his claim, respondent still had to make an accounting of
the money to RODCO, which, in fact, it demanded.
b. On the other hand, respondent obtained Php150,000.00 from RODCO for Jarloc's case, again despite not
being the counsel of record, allegedly to give to someone in the CA who could expedite the resolution of
the case. Nevertheless, RODCO learned that it was never given to the alleged "connection" at the CA.
Worse, they failed to secure a favorable outcome. Despite demands, respondent failed to make an
accounting or return the money. Such conduct not only violates the duty to account for his client's funds,
but amounts to influence peddling, which is also prohibited conduct for lawyers.
c. At yet another time, respondent asked for Php20,000.00 from Villanueva, purportedly for a case RODCO
filed against another lawyer. RODCO averred that respondent was not the counsel of record in that case
and thus, had no business asking for representation fees in connection with that case.
d. Respondent himself admitted receiving the aforementioned amounts, albeit advancing the reason that
they were all justified by services he rendered. However, he has not rendered any accounting for any of
the money he received, despite repeated demands from RODCO. His duty included reporting to his client
that the money was used for the purpose intended. Such refusal and the failure to account gives rise to a
presumption that the amount was misappropriated, which is a violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.
e. Indeed, the payment received for services that were not rendered gives rise to a duty to return the amount.
There is simply no justification for keeping the money. His obligation was to immediately return the said
amount. His refusal to do so despite repeated demands constitutes a violation of the lawyer's oath. Thus,
respondent should return the sums of money he received: Php350,000.00 to Abalos and Php 20,000.00 to
RODCO. Similarly, the amount of Php150,000.00 respondent obtained from RODCO, which he asked to
secure a favorable ruling at the CA which he eventually failed to obtain, must likewise be returned. All the
said amounts shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this decision until
satisfied. (RODCO Consultancy and Maritime Services Corporation v. Atty. Concepcion, A.C. No. 7963, June
29, 2021, En Banc)
PROHIBITION ON OBTAINING LOANS FROM CLIENTS

1. In obtaining loans from her client, respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. There is no dispute that respondent obtained several loans
from complainant beginning in 2008 or two years after they established a lawyer-client relationship in 2006,
and before they terminated the same in 2009. (Aguilar-Dyquiangco v. Atty. Arellano, A.C. No. 10541, July 12,
2016, En Banc)
2. There is hardly any doubt or dispute that Atty. Cabarroguis did lend money to his client, Tangcay, this fact being
evidenced by a real estate mortgage which the latter signed and executed in favor of the former. In fact,
Commissioner Adriano noted that respondent did not deny the existence of the mortgage in his favor. His
answer did not directly touch on the propriety of his act of extending the loan to Tangcay, a client. (Tangcay v.
Atty. Cabarroguis, A.C. No. 11821, April 2, 2018, First Division)
3. Respondent also admitted that he borrowed money from complainant. As found by the IBP Commission,
respondent borrowed P100,000.00 from complainant, as evidenced by his email. Respondent claims that the
amount was merely a cash advance on his legal fees. However, even when his legal services were terminated
and there was no more basis for the cash advance, he never returned said amount. Respondent's argument -
that the borrowed amount was fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice - deserves
scant consideration. Aside from this bare allegation, respondent did not provide any detail or justification
regarding such protections surrounding the loan that he secured from his client.
a. It must be underscored that borrowing money from a client is prohibited under Rule 16.04. A lawyer's act
of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical. It comes within those acts considered
as abuse of client's confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability

to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his or her obligation. Unless the client's interests are fully
protected, a lawyer must never borrow money from his or her client.
b. Further, respondent obtained the amount of P50,000.00 from complainant as deposit for his legal fees, on
top of the P75,000.00 he received as his acceptance fee. However, as discussed above, respondent did not
perform any substantial legal service for complainant because he simply furnished her with a fake
complaint. Even when the actual complaint was filed in court, it was immediately dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Thus, respondent should not have received the said amount from complainant because he did
not render any significant service in the furtherance of his client's case.
c. Worse, when complainant sought to recover the amounts of P50,000.00, as deposit, and P100,000.00, as
cash advance, from respondent, it fell on deaf ears. Respondent initially gave an assurance that he would
eventually pay complainant but it did not materialize. Even assuming that respondent borrowed the
P100,000.00 for a genuine purpose of financing his wife's hospitalization, it neither justifies his non-
observance of the high moral standards required from a member of the legal profession nor extinguishes
his obligation to repay his client promptly and fully. Indeed, respondent's misdealing towards his client is
manifest and obvious. (Domingo v. Atty. Sacdalan, A.C. No. 12475, March 26, 2019, En Banc)
4. Atty. Amistoso obtained a loan from complainant in the amount of P65,000.00 and failed to return the same,
as evidenced by the promissory note he issued in favor of the complainant, in violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
(Mitchell v. Atty. Amistoso, A.C. No. 10713, September 8, 2020, En Banc)
5. There is no doubt that Atty. Gubatan obtained several loans from Reyes and the Corporation, which are
evidence by promissory notes and an acknowledgment/agreement. These loans appear to have been
contracted during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship among the parties, when Atty. Gubatan was
employed by the Corporation and retained as legal consultant and special assistant to the president.
Consequently, Atty. Gubatan clearly violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR. (Reyes v. Atty. Gubatan, A.C. No. 12839,
November 3, 2020, First Division)
6. It is undisputed that Atty. Gille secured a loan from Michelle. The mere act of borrowing money from his client
is considered unethical and an abuse of the latter’s confidence reposed upon him. In doing so, Atty. Gille took
advantage of his influence over his client, Michelle. Further, Michelle was at a disadvantage because of
respondent’s ability to use all the legal maneuveirngs to evade his obligation. (Buenaventura v. Atty. Gille, A.C.
7. In seeking to absolve himself of the charge of violating Rule 16.04 of the CPR, Agustin merely offered a specific,
although unsubstantiated, denial of the genuineness and due execution of the handwritten loan agreement
bearing his signature. Also, he presented numerous transaction records to support the notion that he had
handled the financial matters entrusted to him by Dalumay as well. His mind would somehow disprove the
existence and validity of the loans he had obtained. However, Agustin failed to dispute the similarity of the
signature appearing on the loan agreement with those affixed in the pleadings he submitted before the IBP,
nor did he allege that the signature on the agreement was forged. Rationally, the Court is compelled to
recognize the validity of the handwritten loan agreement and to find that Agustin had indeed borrowed
P300,000.00 and US$9,000.00 from Dalumay while having served as his counsel. (Dalumay v. Atty. Agustin, A.C.
No. 12836, March 17, 2021, Third Division)
ATTORNEY’S FEES
1. The Board of Directors, acting on behalf of Clark Development Corporation, contracted the services of
petitioner, without the necessary prior approvals required by the rules and regulations for the hiring of private
counsel. Their actions were clearly unauthorized. It was, thus, erroneous for the OGCC to bind Clark
Development Corporation, a government entity, to pay petitioner on a quantum meruit basis for legal services,
which were neither approved nor authorized by the government. Even granting that petitioner ought to be paid
for services rendered, it should not be the government’s liability, but that of the officials who engaged the
services of petitioner without the required authorization. (The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and
Gastardo v. COA, G.R. No. 185544, January 13, 2015, En Banc)
2. There are two concepts of attorney’s fees – ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is
awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. (Aquino
v. Casabar, G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015, Third Division)
3. The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respect. They both require, as a prerequisite to their
grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a client may not be held liable
for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for
attorney’s fees as damages in favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of
counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control and modification. (Aquino v. Casabar, G.R. No.
191470, January 26, 2015, Third Division)

4. Attorney’s fees in its extraordinary sense belong to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of his
judgment recoveries.against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may, however, agree that whatever
attorney’s fees as an element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as his compensation
or as part thereof. In such a case, the court, upon motion, may require the losing party to pay such fee directly
to the lawyer of the prevailing party. (Aquino v. Casabar, G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015, Third Division)
5. A lawyer may file a motion before the trial court for the approval of charging lien as an incident of the main
action. In addition, the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance over the motion even if the judgment has
become final and executory. In such regard, docket fees are to be paid by the lawyer. (Aquino v. Casabar, G.R.
No. 191470, January 26, 2015, Third Division)
6. The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of
justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum
and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice,
imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of
the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a
lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous
cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial
tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. (Aquino v.
Casabar, G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015, Third Division)
7. Acceptance fee is different from attorney’s fee in its ordinary concept. Acceptance fee refers to the charge
imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case while attorney’s fees in its ordinary concept refers to the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Since the acceptance fee
only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of
the legal services rendered. (Dalupan v. Atty. Gacott, A.C. No. 5067, June 29, 2015, Third Division)
8. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding,
provided that it is laid down in an express contract. (Mendoza v. Atty. Mendoza and Atty. Navarro, A.C. No.
6056, September 9, 2015, Third Division)
9. The 35% contingent fee award is excessive and unreasonable because, while the lawyer rendered his services
for at least 12 years, his functions or duties was nothing extraordinary. His services constitute the normal and
usual duties required of a lawyer to render to his client, which duties do not warrant the payment of such a
hefty premium. (Enriquez vda. De Santiago v. Atty. Suing, G.R. No. 194814, October 21, 2015, First Division)
10. Acceptance fee is different from attorney’s fees. For instance, unlike the latter, the former cannot be ordered
returned in case a lawyer abandons or neglects his duty in handling cases. (Yu v. Atty. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 10912,
January 19, 2016, En Banc)
11. Respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. Records show that he
did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such
knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for
either causes of action. The case contemplated by the parties and for which respondent’s services was egaged
was for an action for annulment of complainant’s marriage with her husband, and did not contemplate legal
separation at all. Thus, when respondent filed a petition for legal separation manifested his negligence.
a. As a consequence, respondent should not have accepted the engagement because it was revealed that it
was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. His having
supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage
shows his incompetence. Resultantly, he is not entitled to retain the amounts he had already received. In
addition, the principle of quantum meruit does not apply since respondent did not really begin to perform
the contemplated tasks since he prepared a petition for legal separation instead of the petition for
annulment of marriage. (Sanchez v. Atty. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016, First Division)
12. Atty. Roxas’ contract of legal services with RREC partakes of a champertous contract. It should be noted that in
the letter-agreement between RREC and RGR & Association, a decision in RREC’s favor would entitle Atty. Roxas’
firm to at least 3.5 hectares of land or a minimum of P175 million from the judgment awad, depending on the
land or amount to be awarded by the courts. The letter-agreement is silent on reimbursement of RGR &
Associates’ advanced payment. (Atty. Roxas v. Republic Real Estate Corporation, G.R. No. 208205, June 1, 2016,
Second Division)
13. Recovery of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized (a) when there is no express contract
for payment of attorney’s fees, (b) when although there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees, the fees
stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the Court, (c) when the contract for attorney’s fees is
void due to purely formal defects of execution, (d) when the lawyer for justifiable cause was not able to finish
the case for its conclusion, (e) when the lawyer and the client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees, and (f)

when the client dimissed his client before the termination of the case or the latter withdrew therefrom for valid
reason. (Campos, Jr. v. Atty. Estebal, A.C. No. 10443, August 8, 2016, Second Division)
14. It was not disputed that only the filing of the two-paged Manifestation for Information constituted respondent’s
rendition of professional services for the complainants. Although he did claim that the filing of the Manifestation
for Information had prevented any intrusion on their property, thereby fulfilling his end of the contract, the
worth of such minimal effort was exaggerated and disproportionate when taken in the context of the attorney’s
fees being Lot No. 37925-G with 300 square meters in area. The two-paged Manifestation for Information was
not even the procedural precursor of the promised petition for certiorari. Moreover, he did not actually file the
petition for certiorari as he promised. And, lastly, he did nothing more after filing the Manifestation for
Information. He certainly transgressed the Lawyer’s Oath by receiving property of a substantial value from the
complainants after having made them believe that he could ensure their land from intrusion by third parties.
He took advantage of them who had reposed their full trust and confidence in his ability to perform the task by
virtue of his being a lawyer. He was definitely bent on obtaining Lot No. 37925-G than in protecting the
complainants’ interest in their property. He exhibited his zeal by refusing their offer to give cash for his
attorney’s fees instead of the land. Surely, the totality of the respondent’s actuations inevitably eroded public
trust in the Legal Profession. On the basis of his acts and actuations, the attorney’s fees in the form of the lot
he charged from them were unconscionable and unreasonable, and should be struck down for failing to pass
muster under the guidelines provided by the CPR. (Spouses Jacinto v. Atty. Bangot, A.C. No. 8494, October 5,
2016, En Banc)
15. The payment of the success fee, as contained in the Contract for Legal Services, is dependent on the fulfillment
of two conditions, namely: (a) petitioner retaining possession of the subject property, and (b) the property
being titled under the name of petitioner. Clearly, this falls under a contingent fee contract. However, since
respondent was not able to fulfill one of the conditions provident in the Contract for Legal Services, his
attorney’s fees shall be based on quantum meruit. (Villarama v. Atty. De Jesus, G.R. No. 217004, April 17, 2017,
Second Division)
16. While a written contract for services controls the amount to be paid, the stipulated attorney’s fees may be
reduced if found to be unconscionable. In this case, the P250,000.00 attorney’s fees was unconscionable. First,
the attorney’s fees amount to almost 50% of the value of the property litigated as it was only for P600,000.00.
Second, Riguer was a farmer of advanced age with limited educational attachment. Third, the stipulated
attorney’s fees in the Kasunduan referred to Atty. Mateo’s services for the appeal because the legal fees during
the proceedings in the trial court had already been paid. Lastly, Atty. Mateo judicially admitted that he believed
he was entitled to 10% attorney’s fees. It was stated in the Kasunduan that Atty. Mateo was to be paid
P250,000.00 because he claimed that the litigated property had a fair market value of around P3 million. The
same, however, was sold for only P600,000.00. (Riguer v. Atty. Mateo, G.R. No. 222538, June 21, 2017, Second
Division)
17. The P100,000.00 paid by complainant to respondent, which amount answers for the legal services respondent
was engaged to provide, albeit in staggered amounts, pertains to respondent’s acceptance fee. However,
acceptance fees may be ordered returned when the lawyer had been negligent in the handling of his client’s
case.
a. Respondent only conferred once with the complainant’s son for 20 minutes, filed his entry of appearance,
obtained copies of the case records, and inquired twice as to the status of the case. For his efforts and
particular circumstances in this case, respondent should be allowed a reasonable compensation of
P3,000.00. The remained, or P97,000.00, should be returned to the complainant. (Ignacio v. Atty. Alviar,
A.C. No. 11482, July 17, 2017, Third Division)
18. In regard to the refund sought for payments made to respondent alleged to be in the total amount of
P97,500.00, complainant failed to present receipts or documents to evidence the same. The attorney's fees
shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney, which constitutes
the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or
public order. In this case, there was no retainer's agreement between the parties to be able to ascertain the
attorney's fees agreed upon and received by respondent. In his Complaint, complainant sought the return of
acceptance fees in the amount of P20,000.00 for the criminal cases and P15,000.00 for the case supposed to
be filed against the police officers who arrested the accused. The Court notes that in Annex "14" of respondent's
motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted to having received the amount of P25,000.00 as attorney's
fee/acceptance fee for the two criminal cases and P15,000.00 for the case supposed to be filed with the fiscal's
office plus P5,000.00 for expenses, and P5,000.00 representing the refund of the PAL ticket rescheduled four
times due to the cancellation and resetting of the court hearings, totaling P50,000.00, which amount
respondent offered to return to complainant's mother Cecilia Cabuello. Cecilia Cabuello, however, declined and
denied receipt of such payment from respondent's representative, Marivic Alusitain, because she had no right
to receive the money that belonged to her children, as stated in her letter (Annex "D-2") attached to
complainant's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, in the absence of receipts or
documentary evidence to substantiate the amount of P97,500.00 sought to be recovered by complainant from

respondent, complainant is entitled to a refund in the amount of P50,000.00, which had been admittedly
received by respondent from the Cabuellos as payment for attorney's/acceptance fees and other expenses
including refund of a PAL ticket and which amount respondent offered to return to Cecilia Cabuello. (Cabuello
v. Atty. Talaboc, A.C. No. 10532, November 7, 2017, En Banc)
19. The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what respondent handled was merely a labor case, his
attorney's fees should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under Article 111 of the Labor Code. Although the
Court agrees that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, the Court does not agree that the 10% limitation as
provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.
a. It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes required is in the ordinary sense as it
represents reasonable compensation for legal services he rendered for complainant. Necessarily, the 10%
limitation of the Labor Code would not be applicable. Beyond the limit fixed by Article 111, such as between
the lawyer and the client, the attorney's fees may exceed 10% on the basis of quantum meriut. However,
the Court is hard-pressed to accept the justification of the 50% contingency fee that Atty. Cortes is insisting
on for being exorbitant.
b. Considering that complainant was amenable to a 12% contingency fee, and which we likewise deem to be
the reasonable worth of the attorney's services rendered by Atty. Cortes under the circumstances, Atty.
Cortes is hereby adjudged to return to complainant the amount he received in excess of 12% of the total
award. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in
its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to such tenets and principles. (Cortez v. Atty. Cortes, A.C. No. 9119, March 12, 2018, First Division)
20. NPC is not liable to pay the attorney’s fees of Atty. Muzones since the same is a personal obligation of the
Spouses Javellana who benefited from the legal services of Atty. Muzones. It must be stressed that the contract
for the payment of attorney’s fees is strictly a contract between Spouses Javellana and Atty. Muzones.
Therefore, any action as to the satisfaction of the attorney’s fees should be brought against the Spouses
Javellana and not against NPC. (National Power Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 206167, March 19, 2018, First
Division)
21. A champertous contract is defined as a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the
stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under
the judgment. It is a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry
on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or
subject sought to be recovered. In the legal profession, an agreement whereby the attorney agrees to pay
expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public
policy. The execution of this type of contract violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his
client, for which the former must incur administrative sanction. Specifically, champertous contracts are contrary
to Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a
client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they
are handling for the client. As correctly found by the IBP, respondent's agreement with Angelina, wherein
respondent undertook to pay for and advance all costs and expenses, including taxes, necessary to secure the
Torrens certificate of title for the land in exchange for two hectares of land, squarely falls within the above
definition. (Canillo v. Atty. Angeles, A.C. No. 9899, September 4, 2018, En Banc)
22. Atty. Cornelio represented the respondents herein from the time when the case was in the CSC until the filing
of the petition for review on certiorari in this Court. In all that time, he took on the task of preparing and filing
several pleadings in behalf of both the respondents. Given the time and skill lent by him in defending Panal's
cause, as well as taking guidance from Article 111 of the Labor Code, a provision that explicitly limits the
recovery of attorney's fees in illegal dismissal situations in relation to private employment to 10% of the
amounts recovered by the client, we deem it proper to accord to Atty. Cornelio a charging lien of 10% of the
amounts that would be awarded in favor of Panal. (National Power Corporation v. Cabanag, G.R. No. 194529,
August 6, 2019, En Banc)
23. A contingent fee contract is valid and binding but the same must be reasonable and just under the
circumstances. In this case, Atty. Narido, Jr. claims that the contingency fee agreement between him and the
complainant is only limited at the MCTC level and a separate contingency fee is required in the appeal before
the RTC and another separate contingency fee is required in the appeal before the CA. Be it noted that the
amount of contingency fee in the instant case is 35% of the property or its value. A separate contingency fee
for the appeal before the RTC and another separate contingency fee for the appeal before the CA is clearly
unreasonable, unjustified and unconscionable. It should be stated that this is a mere ejectment case and
requiring a 35% contingency fee of the property or its value and limiting the same only in the MCTC case is
clearly violative of Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Narido, Jr. makes it appear that complainant
owes him for representing the latter in the appeal before the RTC and the CA, despite the absence of a separate
retainer agreement from complainant. Atty. Narido, Jr. should be reminded that this is exactly his duty to his
client and not a circumstance that would be interpreted as a noble act or that would mitigate his unethical
conduct. Once he accepted or agreed to take up the cause of the complainant, Atty. Narido, Jr. owes fidelity to

such case. It is a fundamental rule in ethics that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to
carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. He cannot simply abandon his
client and withdraw his service without reasonable cause and only upon proper notice with the court. (Gabucan
v. Atty. Narido, Jr., A.C. No. 12019, September 3, 2019, En Banc)
24. Atty. Duran admitted that out of the P339,854.60 value of the check deposited in his account, he gave
P160,000.00 to complainant, leaving a balance of P179,854.60. Complainant did not dispute receiving this
amount. Further, the value of the LBP bonds assigned to Atty. Duran was P332,520.59. In all, Atty. Duran
received P512,375.19 as attorney’s fees. The complainant conceded in the termination letter which he
prepared, that Atty. Duran was already paid more than P500,000.00. Atty. Duran claimed that he thoroughly
studied the partition case, filed the necessary pleadings, and through his efforts, complainant secured part of
the just compensation for some of the estate. Before complainant terminated Atty. Duran’s services,
complainant was able to collect P13.1 million as just compensation, 25% of which represents his share.
Complainant did not dispute these facts. Under the contingent fee arrangement, 20% of complainant’s share
in the partition case shall inure to the benefit of Atty. Duran as attorney’s fees, or an estimated amount of
P658,566.73. Considering the number of properties involved in the partition case (74 parcels of land) that Atty.
Duran is the counsel of complainant in other cases, to which attorney’s fees was not proven to have been paid,
and that Atty. Duran has been in practice of law for at least four decades, the Court finds the amount of
P512,375.19 attorney’s fees commensurate to the services rendered and reasonable in the circumstances.
(Salazar v. Atty. Duran, A.C. No. 7035, July 13, 2020, First Division)
25. The Court notes that when he testified in the collection case before the MTC, Reyes admitted that he did not
pay Atty. Gubatan for legal services rendered to him and the Company. He claimed that Atty. Gubatan
volunteered his legal services without payment in view of the many favors he extended to the latter. This is
belied by Atty. Gubatan, who claims that he should be paid for the services he rendered to Reyes and the
Corporation. Indeed, a lawyer is entitled to protection against any attempt on the part of a client to escape
payment for legal services. However, any disagreement as regards professional fees is not a matter that a lawyer
could simply take into his own hands, for there are proper legal steps to be followed in order to recover his just
due. Lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients’ money for themselves by the mere fact
that the clients owe them attorney’s fees. Hence, regardless of the veracity of his claim of non-payment of
professional fees, Atty. Gubatan is not justified in refusing to pay his debts to Reyes and the Corporation. In any
event, the disposition of the administrative case is without prejudice to any action that Atty. Gubatan may
institute to collect his professional fees. (Reyes v. Atty. Gubatan, A.C. No. 12839, November 3, 2020, First
Division)
26. Respondents are precluded from propounding a claim of attorney’s fees beyond that what they prayed for, and
that awarded by the RTC Baguio in Civil Case No. 5751-R.
a. Civil Case No. 5751-R was an action to recover and enforce the ownership of the Spouses Jacinto
(decedents) and consequently their estate, over the subject properties against that of the titles of
defendant EPCIB. The RTC Baguio’s ensuing judgment thereon declared the transfers of the subject
properties null and fraudulent, and ultimately settled the valid registered ownership over these. The RTC
Baguio granted Ramon’s and Marlene’s prayer for damages in the total amount of P700,000.00, including
P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. There was no other judgment award in favor of respondents’ client,
Marilene, as the then administratrix of her parents’ estate.
b. Separate from the judgment award to plaintiffs, the RTC awarded EPCIB the value of FPI’s loan and the
mortgage in the amount of P154 million plus legal interest, based on the cross claim of EPCIB against its
co-defendant FPI. Plainly, the judgment debtors in the case are defendants EPCIBand FPI for the respective
amounts adjudged by the RTC Baguio.
c. Fairly evident is that EPCIB was both a judgment debtor and judgment creditor in Civil Case No. 5751-R. It
was jointly and severally liable with FPI to pay Ramona nd Marilene P700,000.00 in damages and should
likewise be paid by FPI the amount of P154 million, equivalent to the value of its loan. In all, while FPI is a
judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 5751-R, jointly and severally with EPCIB to pay P700,000.00 in damages
to Ramon and Marilene, it was liable only to EPCIB for the value of the loan.
d. Verily, without delving into the finality of the monetary awards to Ramon and Marilene, respondent lawyers
have not claim to the judgment amount in favor of EPCIB. It was erroneous for the appellate court to set
the amount of P154 million on which to deduct respondents’ claimed 25% attorney’s fees. Perforce, the
Notice of Attorney’s Lien filed by respondents before the RTC Baguio was a superfluity and did not relate
to the judgment amount in favor of EPCIB on its cross-claim against FPI. Curiously, respondents did not
present their contingency fee agreement with Marilene before the RTC Baguio while litigating Civil Case
No. 5751-R; respondents also did not question the P100,000.00 award as attorney’s fees. (Jacinto v. Attys.
Litonjua and Solis, G.R. No. 207675, January 20, 2021, Third Division)
ATTORNEY’S LIEN
1. A valid retaining lien possesses the following: (a) lawyer-client relationship; (b) lawful possession of the client’s
funds, documents and papers; and (c) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. (Spouses San Pedro v. Atty.
Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440, November 26, 2014, Second Division)

2. There is no valid retaining lien when the lawyer has not performed any work arising from the legal employment.
This failure to perform any work done blurs any claim for attorney’s fees. In other words, when there is no
unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their client’s funds or properties. (Spouses
San Pedro v. Atty. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440, November 26, 2014, Second Division)
3. An attorney has an equitable right to a charging lien over money judgments he has secured in litigation for his
client. For the lien to be enforceable, the attorney must have caused: (a) a statement of his claim to be entered
in the record of the case while the court has jurisdiction over the case and before the full satisfaction of the
judgment, and (b) a written notice of his claim to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party.
a. The filing of the statement of the claim does not, by itself, legally determine the amount of the claim when
the client disputes the amount or claims that the amount has been paid. In these cases, both the attorney
and the client have a right to be heard and to present evidence in suport of their claims.
b. A motion for the enforcement of the lien is in the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his
clients for attorney’s fees. As in every action for a sum of money, the attorney-movant must first pay the
prescribed docket fees before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to order the payment of the attorney’s
fees. Without the docket fees having been paid, the court does not acquire jurisdiction to enforce the
charging lien. (Navarez v. Atty. Abrogar, G.R. No. 191641, September 2, 2015, Second Division)
4. While the CPR recognizes the right of a lawyer to have a lien over the funds and property of his client as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees, Rule 16.03 demands that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property
of his client when due or upon demand. (Chua v. Atty. Jimenez, A.C. No. 9880, November 28, 2016, Second
Division)
5. Worse, after failing to get the reimbursement/payment for his fees and other amounts he advanced for such
illegal purposes, Atty. Diño threatened complainants that they would not like the succeeding events if they-fail
to pay him. Indeed, he made true to his threats to institute retaliatory acts against complainants and the Reals
as he in fact filed five actions against Vantage and its officers within a span of two months. Atty. Diño claims
that he was merely trying to collect his professional fees and other advances that he made in complainants'
behalf. Under Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, however, a claim for attorney's fees may
be asserted either in the very action in which a lawyer rendered his services or in a separate action. (Vantage
6. Charging lien is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of said judgments, which he has secured in litigation of his client. Pursuant to its successful
litigation of Primetown Property’s case against Titan-Ikeda Construction, Dimayuga Law Offices caused the
annotation of its attorney’s lien in Condominium Certificate of Title Nos. 35739, 35743, 35744, 35745, 35748,
35779, 35797, 35798, 35805, and 35806 based on the retainer agreement which entitles it to 12% of all the
monetary awards and interests granted to Primetown Property. These 10 condominium certificates of title are
part of the 60 condominium units which the RTC ordered Titan-Ikeda Construction to return to Primetown
Property. Hence, upon the annotation of said attorney’s lien to the condominium certificates of title, it became
a burden upon the condominium units. Notably, these 10 condominium units subjected to the attorney’s lien
of Dimayuga Law Offices were also the subject of Deeds of Absolute sale entered into between Primetown
Property as the seller and Dimayuga Law Offices as the buyer as payment for the latter’s attorney’s fees. This
lien, until properly discharged, follows the property. In fact, PD 1529, Section 59 states that whenever a
registered land is conveyed, all subsisting encumbrances or annotations appearing in the registration book and
noted on the certificate shall be carried over and stated in the new certificate of title except where the said
encumbrances or annotations are simultaneously released or discharged. In this cas, the attorney’s lien was not
properly cancelled.
a. The compromise agreement entered into between Primetown Property and Titan-Ikeda Construction
providing for the dissolution of any lien and adverse claim annotated upon the condominium certificates
of title cannot be the basis for the cancellation of the lien and adverse claim of Dimayuga Law Offices. To
recall, a compromise agreement is binding only between the parties and their successors-in-interest and
could not affect the rights of third persons who were not parties to the agreement. A party’s lawyer is a
third person who should not be totally deprived of his compensation because of the compromise
agreement executed by the client. This is especially true in cases where the compromise agreement was
entered into by the parties without the lawyer’s participation and conformity. In this case, a perusal of the
provisions of the compromise agreement entered into between Primetown Property and Titan-Ikeda
Construction would show that there was no mention of how the attorney’s fees earned by Dimayuga Law
Offices will be paid. Worse, the compromise agreement even provided for the cancellation of the attorney’s
lien already annotated in the 10 condominium certificates of title prior to the execution of the said
compromise agreement. The absence of any provision respecting the attorney’s lien annotated in the 10
condominium certificates of title cannot prejudice the rights of Dimayuga Law Offices which was not a party
to the compromise agreement.
b. Moreover, the 10 condominium units should not have been included in the compromise agreement
because they have already been sold by Primetown Property to Dimayuga Law Offices as payment in kind

of the attorney’s fees that the latter earned. In other words, the 10 condominium units were already owned
by Dimayuga Law Offices long before the compromise agreement was executed. (Dimayuga Law Offices v.
Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 247724, September 23, 2020, Third
Division)
USE OF HONEST AND LEGAL MEANS

1. By securing the SB TRO, Atty. Labastilla unfairly caused an impasse between POTC and PhilCOMSAT since the
two factions would have been restrained from acting as members of POTC’s Boad of Directors, in breach of Rule
19.01 of the CPR. (Bildner v. Atty. Labastilla and Atty. Alobba, A.C. No. 12843, March 18, 2021, First Division)
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
1. By causing the filing of the complaint before the HLURB and in the absence of any written consent from all the
parties involved as to his representation of Phil Golf’s interest, respondent must have necessarily divulged to
Phil Golf and used information that he gathered while he was complainant’s counsel in violation of Rules 21.01
and 21.02 of the CPR.
a. Rule 21.01 of the CPR states that a lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except (i)
when authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure, (ii) when
required by law, or (iii) when necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates,
or by judicial action.
b. Rule 21.02 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto. (Palacios v. Atty.
Amora, Jr., A.C. No. 11504, August 1, 2017, En Banc)
2. The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Mendoza totally absolved of fault. While We find the allegations of
violation of rule on privileged communication and extortion to be unsubstantiated, the Court finds Atty.
Mendoza's act of causing himself to be interviewed by the media, i.e., ABS-CBN, thereby divulging information
he has gathered in the course of his employment with complainant in the media to be violative of Rules 13.02,
21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR. Here, Atty. Mendoza's actuation of allowing himself to be interviewed by the media,
thus, utilizing that forum to accuse his former employer of committing several illegal activities and divulging
information which he secured in the course of his employment while he was the complainant's in-house
counsel, no matter how general the allegations are, is an act which is tantamount to a clear breach of the trust
and confidence of his employer. Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Atty. Mendoza
should have done was instead lodge a proper complaint against complainant if he finds it necessary and allowed
the judicial system to take its course. He should have exercised prudence and refrained from holding press
conferences, issuing press statements, or giving interviews to the media on any matter or incident related to
the issues subject of the controversy. The fact that he brought his issues to the arena of public opinion was
reckless and punctuates his indiscretion. (Adelfa Properties, Inc. v. Atty. Mendoza, A.C. No. 8608, October 16,
3. Jonathan failed to establish that Atty. Lacuanan has confidential information which the latter acquired through
their connection or previous employment and which can be used against him in the pending civil and criminal
proceedings instituted by Mary Grace. Jonathan generally avers that in the course of their professional and
personal relations, he has shared with Atty. Lacuanan confidential information as regards his marital and family
life as well as his businesses and properties. However, these are merely his bare allegations, unsubstantiated
by any piece of evidence, and disputed by Atty. Lacuanan. According to BSA Tower Condominium v. Reyes II, the
burden of proof is on the complainant to prove with substantial evidence the allegations in his administrative
complaint against a lawyer.
a. It was also completely unnecessary and not to mention highly improbable, for Atty. Lacuanan to have
acquired knowledge of all of Jonathan’s assets and businesses in order to carry out or accomplish their
previous engagements. To recall, Jonathan employed the services of Atty. Lacuanan for two specific
matters, i.e., to facilitate the sale of a lot from Metrobank to the Spouses Parungao and draft a demand-
letter concerning a defective vehicle sold to Jonathan. These are apparently simple undertakings which
Atty. Lacuanan could get done even with limited information. Moreover, there is merit to Atty. Lacuanan’s
argument that the allegations of concubinage, grounds for both the criminal and civil proceedings against
Jonahan, are based on public records, particularly, the final and executory Decision dated September 27,
2002 of the CA in C.A. G.R. no. 70503, which recalled and set aside the Decision dated May 28, 1999 of the
RTC, declaring null and void Jonathan’s previous marriage to Annaliza. The said Decision of the appellate
court effectively upheld the validity of Jonathan’s previous marriage to Annaliza. Documents which are
public records could not be considered confidential.
b. Mary Grace has employed the services of Atty. Lacuanan as counsel for two legal proceedings against
Jonathan, viz: (i) the criminal complaint for concubinage, physical injury, and threat in relation to R.A. 9262;
and (ii) the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The significant events which led to the institution
of said proceedings only took place from late 2012 onwards. It is being alleged in both proceedings that
Jonathan separated from Mary Grace and left the family dwelling in November 2012; that Mary Grace
discovered in February 2013 that Jonathan was alread cohabiting with another woman; and that when

Mary Grace chanced upon Jonathan and his other woman on April 17, 2013, an altercation ensued between
them, with Jonathan ultimately inflicting physical injury on Mary Grace. The pending criminal and civil
proceedings against Jonathan in which Atty. Lacuanan now acts as counsel for Mary Grace evidently involve
matters that are totally distinct and unrelated to Atty. Lacuanan’s previous two engagements with
Jonathan, which only pertained to the acquisition of a lot and a defective vehicle in 2011. Absent any
showing that said lot and vehicle still formed part of the current marital assets of the Spouses Parungao,
they have no material significance in the pending proceedings between the spouses. (Parungao v. Atty.
Lacuanan, A.C. No. 12071, March 11, 2020, Second Division)
4. Respondent violated Canon 21, Rules 21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR, when he charged complainant with
falsification using the documents complainant herself entrusted to him in confidence. (Tan-Te Seng v. Atty.
Pangan, A.C. No. 12829, September 16, 2020, First Division)
5. Atty. Aransazo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he executed
the subject sworn statement. As correctly held by the IBP-BOG, without a doubt, the contents of respondent’s
sworn statement contained information revealed to him in confidence by complainant during a lawyer-client
relationship. By executing the sworn statement alone, respondent breached his obligation to maintain inviolate
the confidence reposed on him and to preserve the secrets of complainant. Clearly, the information regarding
the real estate mortgage, private documents such as the Deed of Assignment, and other pertinent facts and
figures revealed in confidence to Atty. Aransazo used as basis or support in the execution of his sworn statement
and the filing of the amended complaint of Aldaba against Atty. Constantino, were all acquired through an
attorney-client relationship. (Atty. Constantino v. Atty. Aransazo, A.C. No. 9701, February 10, 2021, Third
Division)
TERMINATION OF ATTORNEY -CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

1. The circumstances of the case show that Atty. Cristobal made no such move. The Court agrees with the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Cristobal's defense of discharge as self-serving. Atty. Cristobal
claimed that her return of the case records to Lopez as well as the latter's acceptance of P10,000.00 effectively
discharged her from her obligations as counsel for complainant. The Court does not agree. Atty. Cristobal clearly
disregarded the mandate of Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR. Atty. Cristobal never sought the written consent
of Lopez, his client or the permission of the court. Atty. Cristobal also did not file a petition for withdrawal in
court.
a. Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR, on the other hand, provides that an attorney may only retire from a case
either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which
event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who
desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal
in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three (3) days
before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of paper."
(Lopez v. Atty. Cristobal, A.C. No. 12146, October 10, 2018, Second Division)
2. Failure to contact the client despite diligent efforts is not considered as a good cause upon which a lawyer may
withdraw from the case without first seeking the client’s written conformity.
a. A counsel may only be allowed to withdraw from the action either with the written consent of the client or
from a good cause. Canon 22, Rule 22.01 of the CPR provides the good causes under which a counsel may
withdraw without the written conformity of the client, viz: (i) when the client pursues an illegal or immoral
course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; (ii) when the client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules; (iii) when his inability to work with co-counsel will not
promote the best interest of the client; (iv) when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it
difficult from him to carry out the employment effectively; (v) when the client deliberately fails to pay the
fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement; (vi) when the lawyer is elected or
appointed to public office; and (vii) other similar cases.
b. Petitioners' counsels had the responsibility, right at the start of their engagement, to establish the modality
of communication with their clients. Mere difficulty in contacting the client is not a sufficient reason for his
or her counsel to abandon his or her cause, more so in this case where counsels are rendering legal aid pro
bono. Counsels should exert the same amount of professionalism, regardless of their client's capacity to
pay for their services. Nonetheless, it would be unjust for this Court to compel the two (2) remaining
fisherfolk-petitioners, Sanny and Ejona, to continue with this case without legal counsel. Petitioners'
counsels have likewise manifested that they exerted earnest attempts to contact them on their cellular
phones but were unable to as the two were no longer in Pag-asa Island. This Court also takes note of the
six (6) fisherfolk-petitioners' handwritten letter dated July 15, 2019, in which they manifested their
representation of the other members of the fisherfolk association. (Abogado v. DENR, G.R. No. 246209,
3. The Court likewise finds that Atty. Lorica had failed to promptly turnover the case records to complainant upon
the severance of his legal services. As the IBP aptly noted, complainant was only able to retrieve some
documents, albeit on a piece-mail basis, from Atty. Lorica after the filing of their motion for reconsideration

Discipline of Erring Lawyers 85
with the CA, in violation of Rule 22.02, Canon 2 of the CPR. (Ocampo v. Atty. Lorica IV, A.C No. 12790, September
23, 2020, Second Division)
DIS C IPLIN E O F ER R IN G L AWY ER S
JURISDICTION TO DISCIPLINE LAWYERS

1. Only the Supreme Court can impose on members of the Bar. This disciplinary authority is granted by the
Constitution and cannot be relinquished by the Supreme Court. The resolutions of the IBP are, at best,
recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not be equated with decisions and resolutions
rendered by the Supreme Court. (Bernardino v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583, February 18, 2015, Second
Division; First Mega Holdings Corp. v. Guiguinto Water District, G.R. No. 208383, June 8, 2016, First Division;
Balbin v. Atty. Cortez, A.C. No. 11750, November 22, 2017, Second Division)
2. Under Rule 139-B, as amended, administrative complaints against attorneys are generally not dismissed
outright but are instead referred for investigation, report, and recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office
of the Bar Confidant, or any office of the Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such referral ensures that the
parties’ right to due process is respected as to matters that require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved
by the mere evaluation of the documents attached to the pleadings. Consequently, whenever the referral is
made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or other authorized office or individual must conduct the formal
investigation of the administrative complaint, and this investigation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be
dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons because it serves the purpose of threshing out all the
factual issues that no cursory evaluation of the pleadings can determine. However, the referral to the IBP is not
compulsory when the administrative case can be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or
when the referral to the IBP for the conduct of formal investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such
as when the protraction of the investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed
at the outset should the Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit. (The Christian Spiritists in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Atty. Mangallay, A.C. No. 10483, March 16, 2016, First Division)
a. The IBP Board’s resolution is merely recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer.
The amended provisions under Rule 139-B stress the Court’s authority to discipline a lawyer who
transgresses his ethical duties under the CPR. Hence, any final action on a lawyer’s administrative liability
shall done by the Court based on the entire records of the case, including the IBP Board’s recommendation,
withou need for the lawyer-respondent to file any additional pleading. (Festin v. Atty. Zubiri, A.C. No.
11600, June 19, 2017, First Division)
3. Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance that he had immediately accepted the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors suspending him from the practice of law for two months as final and executory and that he had
gone on leave from work in the NBI for two months starting in November and lasting until the end of December
2012. The manifestation of compliance, however, is unacceptable. Atty. Advincula ought to know that it is only
the Court that wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board of Governors did not possess such power,
rendering its recommendation against him incapable of finality. It is the Court’s final determination of his
liability as a lawyer that is the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed
compliance with the recommended two-month suspension could not be satisfied by his going on leave from his
work at the NBI. Moreover, his being a government employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice
of law should include his suspension from office considering that his position mandated him to be a member of
the Philippine bar in good standing. (Advincula v. Atty. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, En Banc)
4. Petitioner’s counsel must be investigated because the resolution of the petitioner’s case has been delayed by
his contumacious behavior. It should be noted that the Supreme Court gave him opportunities to remedy a
defect in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the petition. The Court even
allowed him to sign the petition after it had been filed. However, he has failed to comply with the above
Resolutions and with the show cause order. He has not even bothered to offer any explanation for his failure
to do so. Thus, the Supreme Court instituted the disciplinary proceedings against Atty. Manaois and referred
the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. (Heirs of Dacanay v. Siapno, Jr., G.R. No.
185169, June 15, 2016, First Division)
5. The Supreme Court alone has the power to discipline lawyers and remove their names from the rolls. The IBP
Board of Governors may only recommend the dismissal of a complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action
on a respondent lawyer. (Wee-Cruz v. Atty. Lim, A.C. No. 11380, August 16, 2016, En Banc)
6. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged with administrative offenses
involving their official duties. The proper forum is the Office of the Ombudsman. (Alicias, Jr. v. Atty. Macatangay,
A.C. No. 7478, January 11, 2017, Second Division)
a. The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate government lawyers charged with administrative offenses
involving the performance of their official duties. (Trovela v. Robles, A.C. No. 11550, June 4, 2018, Third
Division)

b. In his complaint, complainant imputes to respondent manifest bias and partiality in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and issuance of the Resolution which recommended the filing of a criminal case
against him. The acts complained of arose from respondent's performance or discharge of official duties as
a public prosecutor. Hence, the authority to investigate and discipline respondent exclusively pertains to
her superior, the Secretary of Justice. The authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman
which similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over public prosecutors as public officials pursuant to
Section 15, paragraph 1, of R.A. No. 6770. Indeed, respondent's accountability as an official performing or
discharging her official duties is always to be differentiated from her accountability as a member of the
Philippine Bar. For this reason, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate respondent as such government
lawyer. (Segura v. Prosecutor Garachico-Fabila, A.C. No. 9837, September 2, 2019, Third Division)
7. The Supreme Court, not the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in a disciplinary proceeding against the lawyers,
can order the return of the money received by the lawyer as part of his attorney’s fees especially when the
lawyer was negligent in performing his duties. (Murray v. Atty. Cervantes, A.C. No. 5408, February 7, 2017, En
Banc)
8. Generally, the IBP’s formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except
for valid and compelling reasons, as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the
issues raised. Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Supreme Court usually remands the administrative
case to the IBP for further proceedings. However, in light of respondent’s own admission that he resumed
practicing law even without a Court order lifting his suspension, there is a compelling reason to resolve the
matters raised before it even without the IBP’s factual findings and recommendation thereon. (Paras v. Paras,
A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017, First Division)
9. It must be stressed that the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from the
practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering that the Supreme Court still had to release its
final action on the matter. It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty
to discipline lawyers. The factual findings of the IBP can only be recommendatory. Its recommended penalties
are also, by their nature, recommendatory. Thus, the Court will not refuse a review of the IBP’s
recommendation for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition. In fact,
an examination of the IBP resolutions for his suspension is warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence
of a petition, because it is the Court that has the duty to take a final action on any determination of the IBP for
a lawyer’s suspension from the practice of law or disbarment. (Atty. Dela Fuente Torres v. Atty. Dalangin, A.C.
10. Disciplinary proceedings conducted by the IBP are reserved only for those belonging in the legal profession.
Clearly, respondent “Atty. Caronan” is not and was never a member of the bar. Hence, the penalty of
disbarment is not available to him.
a. A disbarment proceeding against a non-lawyer is rendered moot when there is a previous decision striking
his name off the Roll of Attorneys. (AA Total Learning Center for Young Achievers, Inc. v. Caronan, A.C. No.
12418, March 10, 2020, En Banc)
11. The fact that Villanueva had no authority to represent COCOLIFE in the disbarment case since Villanueva had
special power of attorney executed in his favor by COCOLIFE, since the Resolution which was issued in favor of
Villanueva referred to a different legal action, does not prevent the Court to exercise its disciplinary jurisdiction.
The Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against members of the bar, irrespective of the form
of initiatory complaints brought before it. In addition, the procedural requirement observed in ordinar civil
proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact,
the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally
has no interest in the outcome. (Villanueva v. Atty. Alentajan, A.C. No. 12161, June 8, 2020, Second Division)
12. As a rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the government official’s misconduct is of
such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined
as a member of the bar on such ground. In addition, the IBP has no jurisdiction over government lawers charged
with administrative offenses involving their official duties. The IBP only holds inquisitorial power of the
government lawyers’ misconduct amounting to violation of either the Lawyer’s Oath or the CPR. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court retains disciplinary jurisdiction over government lawyers.
a. Here, the SC can discipline Atty. Cruzabra for her violations which were committed in her capacity as
Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City. To note, Atty. Cruzabra registered Co’s affidavit of cancellation
even though she was fully aware of the pendency of Civil Case No. 4749 wherein Co was a defendant and
where she was likewise impleaded. (Sismaet v. Atty. Cruzabra, A.C. No. 5001, September 7, 2020, Third
Division)
NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY CASES

1. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own and may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases, including violations of BP 22. This is because the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers is the respondent’s fitness to remain as a member of the Bar and any finding thereon have no material
bearing on the other judicial actions which the parties may choose to file against each other. (Aga v. Atty.
Salvado, A.C. No. 10952, January 26, 2016, En Banc)
2. A disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action, such as an indirect contempt case, filed
against a lawyer despite being involved in the same set of facts. Thus, it is wrong for respondents to argue that
the filing of an administrative case against them on the basis of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling in the indirect
contempt case is premature on the premise that their conviction has not attained finality. (PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation v. Atty. Lokin, Jr., A.C. No. 11139, April 19, 2016, En Banc)
3. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are private and confidential until their final resolution and the final
decision of the Supreme Court. In fact, malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of
administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers may be actionable as contempt of court. (Atty. Palad
v. Solis, G.R. No. 206691, October 3, 2016, Third Division)
a. The disciplinary proceeding against petitioner became a matter of public concern considering that it arose
from his representation of his client on the issue of video voyeurism in the internet. The interest of the
public is not in himself but primarily in his involvement and participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal.
Since petitioner has become a public figure for being involved in a public issue, and because the event itself
that led to the filing of the disciplinary case against petitioner is a matter of public interest, the media has
the right to report the disciplinary case as legitimate news. In fact, respondents merely reported on the
alleged penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a year against petitioner, and the supposed
grounds relied upon. It appeared that the respondents, as entertainment writers, merely acted on
information they received from their source but the petitioner who used to appear before the media in
representing his actress client. Also, there was no evidence that the respondents published the articles to
influence the Supreme Court on its action on the disciplinary case or deliberately destroy petitioner’s
reputation. (Atty. Palad v. Solis, G.R. No. 206691, October 3, 2016, Third Division)
b. It must also be pointed out that the confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is
not to be applied, under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. The confidentiality rule requires
only that proceedings against attorneys be kept private and confidential. The rule does not extend so far
that it covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions. Thus, Atty. Dojillo, in attaching the
subject documents to his client's Answer, did not per se violate the confidentiality rule as the purpose was
to inform the court of its existence. Moreover, the subject documents become part of court records which
are protected by A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Even if Atty. Dojillo attached said subject documents to Garcia's
Answer and Counter-Affidavit filed before the courts, the same remains private and confidential. In fact,
even after the decision, resolution, or order is made public, such information that a justice or judge uses in
preparing a decision, resolution, or order shall remain confidential. (Atty. Guanzon v. Atty. Dojillo, A.C. No.
9850, August 6, 2018, Second Division)
4. The client’s non-participation in the filing of the complaint for alleged conflict of interest is immaterial since it
is stated under Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645, that
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio or upon the filing of a verified complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the IBP. (Romero
v. Atty. Evangelista, Jr., A.C. No. 11829, February 26, 2018, Second Division)
5. The filing of an administrative complaint against an adjudicator is not the proper remedy for assailing the legal
propriety of an adverse decision, order, resolution, or recommendation, in the case of administrative
complaints against lawyers. More importantly, the reckless practice of filing baseless administrative complaints
against fellow lawyers undeniably degrades rather than cleanses the ranks of the legal profession. (Tabuzo v.
Atty. Gomos, A.C. No. 12005, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
6. Respondent’s election as member of the House of Representatives does not bar the finding of administrative
liability for violation of the notarial rules. (Ang v. Atty. Belaro, Jr., A.C. No. 12408, December 11, 2019, Second
Division)
7. The Court cannot order respondent to pay his financial obligations to complainant. The delineation between
which obligations the Court can order a respondent-lawyer to perform has already been settled. In Tria-
Samonte v. Obias, the Court clarified that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue
of whether the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only
concern is his or her administrative liability. Thus, matters which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s
professional engagement, such as the liabilities which are purely civil in nature, should be threshed out in a
proper proceeding of such nature, and not during administrative-disciplinary proceedings, as in this case.
Considering that the liability of respondent with regard to the amount involved is purely civil in nature, it being
his obligation as a lessee, the Court cannot properly order respondent to pay complainant said amount. The

remedy of complainant in this score lies with the MCTC which, as it turns out, has already granted her motion
for execution. (Francisco v. Atty. Real, A.C. No. 12689, September 1, 2020, En Banc)
8. The findings in the administrative case do not undermine the findings made in a separate civil or criminal case
involving related facts. (Laurel v. Delute, A.C. No. 12298, September 1, 2020, En Banc)
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES VIS-À-VIS CRIMINAL CASES

1. A complaint for disbarment based on the respondent attorney’s moral turpitude cannot prosper after the
criminal cases charging him with offenses involving moral turpitude were dismissed by the competent trial
courts. The rule regarding this ground for disbarment requires the respondent attorney’s conviction of the
offense involving moral turpitude by final judgment. (Interaden Zahntechnik, Phil., Inc. v. Atty. Francisco-
Simbillo, A.C. No. 9464, August 24, 2016, First Division)
2. Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public documents are not the proper venue to
establish the falsification or forgery. Such bases should first be duly and competently established either in
criminal or civil proceedings appropriate for that purpose. (Flores-Salado v. Atty. Villanueva, Jr., A.C. No. 11099,
3. Acquittal in a criminal case does not necessarily exculpate one administratively. (Arsenio v. Atty. Tabuzon, A.C.
No. 8658, April 24, 2017, Third Division)
4. Respondent’s contention that the DOJ had resolved to withdraw the criminal complaints filed against him and
his co-accused, the spouses Cledera, does not persuade. The dismissal or withdrawal of the criminal
complaints/informations, at the instance of the DOJ, is of no moment. Respondent should know that
administrative cases against lawyers are sui generis. (Sta. Maria v. Atty. Cortes, A.C. No. 6980, August 30, 2017,
First Division)
DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

1. Atty. Tolentino, like any respondent in a disbarment or administrative proceeding, is entitled to due process.
a. Knowing that there is a pending administrative complaint against him, Atty. Tolentino should have actively
and voluntarily participated in the case especially so when he believes that his meritorious. Instead, after
filing his Comment containing bare denials and facts unsupported by any proof, Atty. Tolentino deliberately
failed to participate in the proceeding and now hides behind the flimsy excuse that no notices were
received by him or his counsel. (Natanauan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 4269, October 11, 2016, En Banc)
2. A lawyer enjoys a legal presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved. In
addition, he must not be denied a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard. (Gradiola v. Atty. Deles, A.C.
No. 10267, June 18, 2018, First Division)
3. At the outset, the Court notes, through complainant's own submissions, that he filed two complaints against
respondent. The first is the 2008 disbarment complaint for violation of the rules on notarial practice filed before
the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter. The second is the present complaint for violation of Section 20(d), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court filed before the IBP-CBD. The Court agrees with Commissioner Cachapero's finding that there
was no substantial evidence to prove that respondent violated Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent's narration of facts and the documentary evidence he presented, especially the affidavit of Ramie
clarifying that he understood the contents of the subject complaint-affidavit, substantiated his claim of
innocence. The Court also agrees with the Commissioner Cachapero in exluding the allegation that respondent
engaged in notarial practice despite the expiration of his notarial commission in his resolution of the complaint.
A review of complainant's pleadings shows that this issue, along with the documents submitted to support the
charge (specifically the compromise agreement between the Municipal Treasurer of Bindoy, Negros Oriental
and Felix Villanueva, Jr. and the verification executed by Kristie Marie E. Fernandez), were already subject of an
earlier investigation by the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter. The records also show that the IBP-CBD did not order
the consolidation of these two complaints. From these, it is apparent that the inclusion of the additional issue
(i.e., notarizing documents without authority) in resolving this complaint would result in a situation where two
separate complaints are filed against respondent by the same complainant concerning the same offense based
on the same set of facts.
a. There is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. To include this additional ground in the present complaint would constitute
forum shopping as the same is similar to complainant's cause of action in the 2008 disbarment complaint
he filed against respondent. Therefore, the Court finds that the IBP Board of Governors erred when it took
into consideration the additional ground, which, to repeat, is identical to the charge in an earlier
disbarment complaint.
b. In essence, the Court finds that respondent was able to refute complainant's claim that he violated Section
20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The additional charge of violating notarial rules, on the other hand,
is already subject of an earlier disbarment proceeding. Consequently, there is no basis to impose

disciplinary action against respondent at this time. The proceedings in the 2008 disbarment complaint filed
before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter against respondent should be allowed to run its course to
determine the latter's culpability as to the charge that he notarized documents without authority. This will
also prevent the situation of two or more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions
upon the same issue and ensure that the proceedings for the disbarment and discipline of attorneys are
followed. The procedures outlined by Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are meant to ensure that the
innocents are spared from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just due.
Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken lightly. (Magusara v. Atty. Rastica, A.C. No. 11131, March
4. The allegations raised by Pabalan in this case have been previously ruled upon by the IBP and the Court in A.C.
No. 9809. Having already imposed a punishment on Salva in the said case involving the same set of facts, the
Court is thus constrained to dismiss the instant complaint. (Pabalan v. Atty. Salva, A.C. No. 12098, March 20,
5. Atty. Belaro’s right to due process was not violated. A thorough examination of the records shows that
respondent Atty. Belaro was accorded ample opportunity to defend himself and adduce his own evidence. The
IBP duly notified him of the proceedings by sending the notices via registered mail to St. Dominic Savio College
of Law, where he used to teach and was the College Dean. While respondent Atty. Belaro claimed that the
notices were not sent to his regist red address of place of business, such bare assertion deserves scant
consideration as he failed to sufficiently prove that the service of notices was highly irregular. Notably, upon
being informed of the notices, respondent Atty. Belaro filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reinvestigation
and a subsequent Answer to Letter-Complaint Requesting for Formal Investigation dated September 22, 2015.
He even filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP assailing the April 29, 2016 Resolution which was in
fact given due course by the IBP. Therefore, the minimum requirements of administrative due process have
been observed and met by the IBP. (Ang v. Atty. Belaro, Jr., A.C. No. 12408, December 11, 2019, Second Division)
6. The irregularity in the notarization of the Complaint against respondent is not fatal to the Complaint’s validity.
In fact, under Rule 139-B, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, the alleged defect in the notarization of the
Complaint could not be considered substantial. Moreover, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice since Atty.
Pasok was able to fully participate in the proceedings before the IBP. (Elanga v. Atty. Pasok, A.C. No. 12030,
EFFECT OF DEATH
1. Complainant’s death does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the disbarment complaint against Atty.
Reyes. (Atty. Aguirre v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 4355, January 8, 2020, First Division)
2. The Court dismisses the instant complaint, insofar as Atty. Abrajano is concerned, in view of his death prior to
the filing of the same. (Spouses Mariano v. Atty. Abrajano and Atty. Bayaua, A.C. No. 12690, April 26, 2021,
Second Division)
BURDEN AND QUANTUM OF PROOF

1. The complaint for disbarment against Atty. Bron should be dismissed because there was no evidence to show
that Atty. Bron had a hand in the falsification of the Wee Brothers’ CTCs or Paul’s medical ecertificates. The
quantum of proof required is clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. (Balistoy v. Atty. Bron, A.C. No. 8667,
February 3, 2016, Second Division)
2. The instant complaint is a virtual duplicate of previous administrative complaints which the Court had already
dismissed, there being no prima facie case. Clearly, all the cases filed by the complainant before the different
bodies essentially revolve around the same circumstances and parties involving the decisions, resolutions, and
orders relative to the labor case. (Chan Shun Kuen v.Coloma-Javier, A.C. No. 9831, March 9, 2016, Third Division)
3. A public prosecutor who acknowledges his mistake and appear contrite in his actions which did not contain any
malice or bad faith, need not be disbarred. (Boto v. Villena, A.C. No. 9684, March 16, 2016, Special Third
Division)
4. The quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual liable for administrative offenses is substantial
evidence. (Re: Complaint of Aero Engr. Darwin A. Reci against Court Administrator Marquez and Deputy Court
Administrator Bahia, A.M. No. 17-01-04-SC, February 7, 2017, En Banc; In Re: Alleged Immorality and
Unexplained Wealth of Justice Jurado, A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-21-SB-J, April 4, 2017, En Banc; Billanes v. Atty.
Latido, A.C. No. 12066, August 28, 2018, En Banc; Morales v. Atty. Borres, Jr., A.C. No. 12476, June 10, 2019,
Second Division; Atty. Aguirre v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 4355, January 8, 2020, First Division)
5. Spouses Chua failed to attribute clear and preponderant proof to show that the respondents committed
infracitons in contravention with the standards provided for by the CPR which would have warranted the
imposition of administrative sanctions against them. Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail

is the presumption that the prosecutors involved herein have regularly performed their official duties. (Spouses
Chua v. Tan-Sollano, A.C. No. 11533, June 6, 2017, En Banc)
6. Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For one, the evidence submitted were inadmissible. It must be
noted that the receipts showing payment of Atty. Bassig to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and
signed by Atty. Bassig were photocopies of the original. A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not
admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her
complaint, Robiñol was not able to present any evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig failed to pay his rent and
that he had in fact leased a house from Robiñol. (Robiñol v. Atty. Bassig, A.C. No. 11836, November 21, 2017,
En Banc)
7. The two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its findings of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality harped
only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledged on the wrongful relationship
between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant
and unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the
child’s birth certificate, a public document, expressly indicate the girl’s father to be Pascual’s husband, and not
Atty. Dalangin. Julienne’s baptismal certificate also provided such fact, along with a confirmation of Atty.
Dalangin’s defense on his closeness to Julienne for being her godfather. (Atty. Dela Fuente Torres v. Atty.
Dalangin, A.C. No. 10758, December 5, 2017, En Banc)
8. Despite the charges hurled against Atty. Salutan, Rico failed to show any badge of deception on the lawyer's
part. There was no court decision declaring that Villa Abrille's title was fake or that it had encroached on Rico's
property. All that Atty. Salutan did was to zealously advocate for the cause of his client. He was not shown to
have misled or unduly influenced the court through misinformation. He merely persistently pursued said cause
and he did so within the bounds of the law and the existing rules. He succeeded at finally having the writ of
execution, albeit at the fourth (4th) time, implemented. (Rico v. Atty. Salutan, A.C. No. 9257, March 5, 2018,
Second Division)
9. Except for complainant's allegations, however, she failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate her
complaint. The Court agrees with the findings of Commissioner Andres that complainant has not proffered any
evidence that tended to show that respondents intentionally and deliberately made false statements in the
Resolution dated December 19, 1988 in order to deceive and induce Mayor Asistio to dismiss complainant from
service. She neither offered any documentary evidence to buttress her arguments nor presented any witness
to corroborate her claims. (Santiago v. Atty. Santiago, A.C. No. 3921, June 11, 2018, First Division)
10. Even disregarding the electronic mail sent by respondent lawyer, we are satisfied that other incontrovertible
evidence supports the allegation that a lawyer-client relationship did exist, or had been established, between
respondent lawyer on the one hand, and Berlin and Higino on the other. For one thing, it was remarkable that
respondent lawyer never refuted or denied Berlin's claim that he (Atty. Alaestante) represented him in a civil
case pending before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal (RTC-Rizal). As against a Motion to Discharge
Counsel duly filed with the RTC-Rizal, respondent lawyer's bare denial of the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship is of no avail. Caught in a web of lies, Atty. Alaestante even contradicted himself when he stated
that after having been convinced of the personalities of Berlin and Higino Gabeitan in relation to counsel's pro
bono handling of the case in RTC San Mateo, as well as the smell of estafa having been committed by Berlin
Gabeitan against the plaintiff thereof, counsel decided not to pursue defending defendant Gabertan. That is
the problem with fibs, falsehoods, dissemblances, prevarications, and half-truths. They not only collide with the
truth, they also collide with each other. More than these, guided by the tenor of a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) constituted between or amongst, Berlin, respondent lawyer, and two other persons, it can hardly be
doubted that Berlin and respondent lawyer had a close relationship with the parties therein, and that he offered
his legal expertise to the said parties. This is evident from the language of the MOA where Berlin and respondent
lawyer were collectively referred to as the "second parties" who were able to secure a favorable decision dated
August 26, 2011 from the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26 and were hired "to recover
actual and physical possession over" a parcel of land. (Yumang v. Atty. Alaestante, A.C. No. 10992, June 19,
2018, En Banc)
11. Here, BSA Tower seriously failed to discharge said burden of proof. The issues which BSA Tower presented in
this case had already been submitted for judicial resolution and the courts had ruled in favor of Reyes. Hence,
the Court finds that the acts of Reyes are not tantamount to a violation of any of the CPR provisions. (BSA Tower
Condominium Corporation v. Atty. Reyes II, A.C. No. 11944, June 20, 2018, Second Division)
12. In Concepcion, the basis for the disbarment depended on whether or not the lawyer therein did, in fact, notarize
the 145 documents without authority, which, if proven, would have merited the punishment prayed for.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the grounds for the disbarment of Atty. Maglalang centered chiefly on the truth
and genuineness of the General Power of Attorney which he supposedly signed in acceptance of the agency,
and the acknowledgment receipts which he purportedly issued as proof of receipt of payment in consideration
of the lawyer-client relationship, for proving the authenticity of said documents would have unequivocally given

birth to the concomitant duty and obligation on the part of Atty. Maglalang to file the petition on behalf of
Goopio, and undertake all necessary measures to pursue the latter's interests. Both cases are further
comparable in that both sets of photocopies of documents offered into evidence have been impugned by the
lawyers therein for being false, without basis in fact, and deployed for purposes of malice and retaliation, which
in effect similarly placed the motives of the complainants within the ambit of suspicion. Finally, in both
Concepcion and the case at bar, the complainants therein failed to submit the original of their documentary
evidence, even though the same would have clearly redounded to the serving of their interests in the case, and
despite having no bar or prohibition from doing the same. In both cases, the documentary evidence was the
causal link that would chain the lawyers therein to the violations alleged against them, and in the same manner,
both central documentary evidence were gossamer thin, and have collapsed under the probative weight that
preponderance of evidence requires. (Goopio v. Atty. Maglalang, A.C. No. 10555, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
13. In the instant case, the Court finds that Atty. Guanzon failed to provide clear and convincing evidentiary support
to his allegations against Atty. Dojillo. As the IBP aptly concluded, Atty. Dojillo cannot be faulted in attaching
the disbarment records in his client's Answer and Counter-Affidavit in the three cases which Atty. Guanzon filed
against his client as he found it necessary to establish factual basis on the motive of Atty. Guanzon in filing said
cases against his client. In effect, Atty. Dojillo's act of attaching said subject documents to his client's Answer
was to defend his client's cause which is his duty as counsel. In the absence of proof that Atty. Dojillo was
motivated by malice or bad faith, or intent to harass or damage Atty. Guanzon's reputation, the instant
disbarment complaint deserves no merit. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent
of the charges against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension
proceedings always rests on the complainant. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty. Preponderance of evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. Thus, not
only does the burden of proof that the respondent committed the act complained of rests on complainant, but
the burden is not satisfied when complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence. (Atty.
Guanzon v. Atty. Dojillo, A.C. No. 9850, August 6, 2018, Second Division)
14. In this case, complainant's claims of deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct on the part of respondent
revolve around the alleged inclusion of Lot 646-B-2 in the list of properties of Salvacion's estate, and Reytaliano's
takeover of the said lot through the "wits and eloquence" of respondent who purportedly knew that the lot no
longer belonged to Salvacion. Complainant specifically alleged that Lot 646-B-2 was mortgaged by Salvacion to
a certain Teofila, who, in turn, executed a document for the transfer of her rights to complainant for a valuable
consideration. Unfortunately, however, complainant failed to attach the supporting documents to prove her
claims. In fact, complainant was given several opportunities to make such submissions, and yet repeatedly failed
to produce the supporting documents evidencing the alleged mortgage and transfer of rights involving Lot 646-
B-2. Thus, being mere allegations that are unsupported by substantial evidence, complainant's imputations
against respondent anent the inclusion of Lot 646-B-2 must fail.
a. The same goes for complainant's imputation that respondent committed a "misconduct in the highest
degree" when he notarized the Affidavit of Arnulfo (stating, inter alia, that Arnulfo had already surrendered
the possession of Lot 646-B-2 to Reytaliano, respondent's client) and thus, dealt with a party having an
adverse interest to the one he is representing." Essentially, the rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits
a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In this case, there is no proof showing that respondent, by merely notarizing the said
document, represented Arnulfo in the intestate proceedings. In fact, respondent did such act to the benefit
of Reytaliano, who sought possession of Lot 646-B-2 as the appointed Administrator of Salvacion's estate;
hence, respondent was faithfully acting in pursuit of his client's legitimate interests. And given that there
is no evidence to prove that Arnulfo's Affidavit was merely wrangled from him in exchange for the dropping
of his name in the direct contempt charge, the Court is hard-pressed to find any ethical violation on the
part of respondent. (Alag v. Atty. Senupe, Jr., A.C. No. 12115, October 15, 2018, Second Division)
15. In this case respondent failed to file his answer. Following the April 16, 2007 Order of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, respondent appeared to have been in default (although there was no actual order of default
issued against him), and the case should have been heard ex parte. However, there was no indication in the
records that complainant presented evidence ex parte. Even the Investigating Commissioner mentioned that
complainant did not follow-up the status of this case, which presupposes that no other proceeding transpired
between its filing and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. There was even no
showing that this case was set for a mandatory conference; that the Investigating Commissioner directed the
submission of position papers; or that the case was submitted for resolution. There being no other pleading
submitted, the recommendation to suspend respondent was solely pursuant to the Complaint. However, on
the basis alone of the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds that complainant failed to convince the
Court, much more discharge the necessary burden to prove by substantial evidence that respondent committed
the accusations against him. Let it be underscored that, other than the attached photocopy of a final demand
letter in the Complaint, (allegedly made on respondent but received by a certain Ely Tagalog), no other evidence
was adduced establishing that respondent accepted money but failed to render any service in favor of

complainant. Keeping in mind the above-discussed requirement of due process as well as the fact that the
power to disbar (including the power to suspend) must be exercised with great caution, the Court holds that
there is no sufficient basis for a disciplinary action against respondent. The Court cannot simply deprive
respondent of the right to practice his legal profession without any sufficient factual and legal justifications.
After all, such legal practice involves respondent's rights to work and to make a living, which are his property
rights, and the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. Given
all these, the Court finds that the allegations against respondent remained unsubstantiated. Hence, the
disciplinary action against him cannot stand. (PSP Development Corporation v. Atty. Arma, A.C. No. 12220,
16. In a disbarment complaint, the allegations of the complainant must be proven with substantial evidence.
(Buntag v. Atty. Toledo, A.C. No. 12125, February 11, 2019, Third Division; Deltaventure Resources, Inc. v. Atty.
Martinez, A.C. No. 9268, September 30, 2020, Second Division)
17. The Court notes that, in his Petition before this Court, petitioner admits that on January 3, 2006, he met Obiedo
and Tan along with respondent, Atty. Sales and Atty. Villegas; and that, during said meeting, respondent casually
asked him (petitioner) whether the signature in the subject deeds were his. However, petitioner claims that he
was not apprised that respondent was about to notarize the subject deeds. In effect, petitioner admits that he
appeared before respondent and acknowledged his signature in the subject, but denied that he consented to
the notarization of the subject deeds for the purpose of the meeting was to renegotiate his debt with Obiedo
and Tan and not to notarize the subject deeds. The Court agrees with the IBP that petitioner has failed to
establish, with the requisite degree of proof, that the subject deeds were notarized without his consent,
knowledge and physical presence. Petitioner admits his physical presence before respondent on January 3,
2006, but denies he gave his consent to the notarization. Except for his bare allegation that he did not give his
consent to the notarization of the subject deeds, petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof to establish his
alleged lack of consent. Moreover, petitioner did not explain why it took him four years and eight months to
complain about the alleged spurious notarization of the subject deeds. His inaction or delay for such a
considerable period of time casts doubt not only upon his motive or sincerity, but also upon the validity or truth
of his claim. (Sia v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 10015, June 6, 2019, First Division)
18. In the present case, complainant's failure to present sufficient and concrete evidence to substantiate her
accusations against Atty. Joyas is fatal to her case. Moreso, when Atty. Joyas was able to refute the allegations
against him by showing proof that he has exerted efforts in handling complainant's petition, and that he was
not remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel. It must be stressed anew that lawyers enjoy the legal
presumption that they are innocent of the charges against them until proven otherwise — as officers of the
court, they are presumed to have performed their duties in accordance with their oath. It is only when such
presumption is overcome by convincing proof of the lawyer's misconduct that the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension should follow. (Zara v. Atty. Joyas, A.C. No. 10994, June 10, 2019, Third Division)
19. Anent the respondent's conviction for the crime of other forms of swindling as defined and punished under
Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, the Court, through the resolution dated August 16, 2010,
set aside its decision promulgated on September 29, 2009 in G.R. No. 149588 entitled Francisco R. Llamas and
Carmelita C. Llamas v. Court of Appeals, thereby acquitting him of the crime charged for failure of the
Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The consequence of the reversal of the conviction and
his resulting acquittal, according to Interadent Zahntechnik, Phil., Inc. v. Francisco-Simbillo, prevented the
disbarment complaint based on the respondent attorney's moral turpitude from prospering. (Lukang v. Atty.
Llamas, A.C. No. 4178, July 8, 2019, First Division)
20. Atty. Corro harped on the instance that he was supposedly not allowed to procure a copy of his alleged text
messages with Dr. Rodil. Yet, Atty. Corro also stated that such text messages could have been tampered with
due to the advances in technology. Even so, Atty. Corro should remember that he was given the opportunity to
apprise himself regarding the incidents of his case but he chose to disregard such chance. At this juncture, the
Court would like to point out that Atty. Corro would still be found liable even without a copy of the said text
messages. In other words, the existence of such "proof is not indispensable to the case at bench. Interestingly,
Atty. Corro mentioned that he was present at the Supreme Court premises, specifically that he was in his work
station, during the time of the alleged incidents. Thus, he posited that he could not have left his work station at
those times since the said transactions were conducted during business hours. He argued that if he left, his pay
slips should have reflected the corresponding deductions on his salary. The Court finds this defense ridiculous
as it was not physically impossible for him to leave his work station during those times. The same goes for his
excuse that since he filed a leave on December 13, 2013 which was certified by the Office of Administrative
Services (OAS), he could not have been at the area where the alleged transactions transpired. Unquestionably,
there is still a possibility that he went to Max's Restaurant to receive the money even if he was on leave at the
time. Simply put, he has no solid alibi to negate his presence on the alleged dates of the illegal transactions. As
for Atty. Corro's attempts to display his character by submitting his performance evaluation forms, his
application to become a judge, or his clearance from the Court after he resigned, We find that these are not
conclusive to show that he is not guilty of the accusations against him. As a matter of fact, submitting such

documents is a feeble yet unconvincing endeavor to sway the Court of his supposed "good character." Yet, it is
common sense to know that a person's true character cannot be determined solely by such evaluations and
documents. This is akin to the belief that one person may not look like a villain but can very well be one in secret
or that a person may be a wolf in sheep's clothing. Likewise, presenting a copy of his 2013 Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), even if it suggested that he has more than enough to sustain his daily
sustenance and activities, does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of amassing wealth through illegal
means. Considering these findings, Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that no attorney shall be
removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself
or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed
to determine the matter ex parte. In connection with this, "[a] member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a form of public
trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts. (Dr. Rodil v. Atty. Corro, A.C. No. 10461, July 30, 2019, En Banc)
21. In the instant case, the Court agrees with both the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors
that complainant failed to discharge his burden of proving the liability of respondents Madrazo and Tan with
respect to his accusations against them. No proof was presented to show that the Affidavits of "No[n]
Encumbrance" and "Marking the Coconut Trees," which were supposedly attached to their application for
Permit to Cut coconut trees, were spurious. Neither was there evidence to prove that Madrazo and Tan were
complicit in the alleged illegal act of respondent Delante in assigning document and page numbers to these
notarized affidavits which already belonged to other documents that he previously notarized. It is settled that
mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, for lack of sufficient, clear and convincing evidence against them,
respondents Madrazo and Tan may not be held liable for fraud, conduct unbecoming a lawyer, and violation of
the Notarial Law.
a. It is settled that in disbarment and suspension proceedings against lawyers in this jurisdiction, the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant. Thus, this Court has held that "in consideration of the gravity of the
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar, we have consistently held that a
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint through substantial evidence." A complainant's failure
to dispense the same standard of proof requires no other conclusion than that which stays the hand of the
Court from meting out a disbarment or suspension order. (Rico v. Atty. Madrazo, Jr., A.C. No. 7231, October
1, 2019, En Banc)
22. The prevailing rule is that once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his
privilege to practice law, as there is no double or multiple disbarment in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in
previous cases, this Court still imposed the corresponding penalty against a lawyer, who was previously
disbarred, for the sole purpose of recording it in his or her personal file in the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).
The Court shall be fully informed by his personal record in the OBC that aside from his disbarment, he also
committed other infractions that would have merited the imposition of penalties were it not for his disbarment.
These factors shall be taken into consideration should the disbarred lawyer subsequently file a petition to lift
his disbarment. Thus, in the present case, the Court finds that, while respondent was previously disbarred, it is
still proper to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) months, revocation of his notarial commission, and disqualification from re-appointment as a notary public
for a period of one (1) year, for the sole purpose of recording it in his personal file in the OBC. In the event that
respondent should apply for the lifting of his disbarment, the penalties m the present case should be considered
in the resolution of the same. This means that in the event that he should apply for the lifting of his disbarment
in Maria Angalan, et al. v. Atty. Leonido C. Delante, the penalty imposed in the present case should be
considered in the resolution of the same. (Rico v. Atty. Madrazo, Jr., A.C. No. 7231, October 1, 2019, En Banc)
23. In the instant case, there is no question that Atty. Diocos is the counsel of the complainants in view of his own
admission in his Comment dated November 7, 2011. However, complainant failed to prove and substantiate
that Atty. Diocos had indeed collected P150.00 from each of the cap holders. There was neither any receipt nor
affidavit from the cap holders that would show that Atty. Diocos collected the amount of P150.00 from each of
the cap holders. Complainant also failed to prove that there were two versions of the decisions, i.e., one where
their case was dismissed due to non-payment of docket fees but later changed to absence of cause of action.
Indeed, the best way to prove this allegation is to present copies of the two versions of the disputed decision
but complainant failed to do.
a. However, Atty. Diocos is not without fault. It appeared that the complaint was dismissed due to lack of
cause of action, yet, no appeal was made. Indeed, as the IBP noted, although complainant failed to prove
that the case was not appealed because they failed to give the amount being asked of them by Atty. Diocos,
it is still apparent that the period to appeal was simply allowed to lapse. It does not matter if Atty. Diocos
thought the court a quo's decision to dismiss the case was lawful, he is still bound by his duty to inform his

clients the next steps to take and the possible consequences of their action or inaction. He should have
notified his clients of the adverse decision within the period to appeal to give his clients time to decide
whether to seek an appellate review. Neither does the failure of his clients to pay him fees warrant
abandoning the case. (Aboy, Sr. v. Atty. Diocos, A.C. No. 9176, December 5, 2019, First Division)
24. The lawyer cannot be suspended or disciplined for allegedly hurled invectives at the client’s bodyguard in the
absence of substantial evidence. To recall, complainant, her bodyguard, and witness failed to declare Atty.
Tadena’s alleged misconduct in the police reports. Neither did he explain the reason for his omission. Apart
from this, what cast more doubt on Zenaida’s claims are the photographs she presented, supposedly showing
Atty. Tadena in the act of breaking into her condominium unit. But these photographs are, at best, mere
abstract illustrations that are extremely blurred. (Martin-Ortega v. Atty. Tadena, A.C. No. 12018, January 29,
25. While the Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP-BOG to dismiss the disbarment complaint, it bears
stressing that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence and not preponderance of
evidence. (Spouses Nocuenca v. Atty. Bensi, A.C. No. 12609, February 10, 2020, Second Division)
26. There is a dearth of evidence on the legal fees agreed upon between the defunct law firm and Aerocom as
compensation for the legal services it rendered in the Aerocom case. Petitioners failed to discharge their burden
of proving that an agreement on the attorney’s fees amounting to 40% of the total recovery award in favor of
Aerocom existed; and that there was indeed receipt by the law firm of the alleged amount that should be turned
over to petitioners. Even the President and the Corporate Secretary of Aerocom denied petitioners’ allegations
of an existing agreement. Aside from petitioners’ own declarations, the only evidence the petitioners presented
to prove the agreement as to the legal fees between Aerocom and the defunct law firm are the affidavit of Atty.
Los Banos, and several documents from the Sandiganbayan which pertained to the execution of the judgment
in favor of Aerocom. However, as correctly observed by Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Atty. Los Banos
merely indicated in her Affidavit that she learned of the 40% arrangement for legal fees during the time when
she was handling the Aerocom case without her indicating how she obtained the information. The court
documents with respect to the execution of the recovery award in favor of Aerocom solely pertained to the
satisfaction of the judgment and the amount Aerocom recovered from PCGG albeit received by respondent
Atty. Lokin as counsel for Aerocom. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the duty of obtaining evidence with
regard to the agreement on the legal fees between Aerocom and their former law firm and the amount paid by
Aerocom to respondents belonged to them as complainants and not to the investigating body. Furthermore,
the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim of Atty. Suplico which he voluntarily
executed and never refuted. This effectively discharged the Raval Suplico and Lokin Lawyers from any action or
obligation arising from Atty. Suplico as a partner reckoned from January 15, 1995. It included the legal fees from
the Aerocom case wherein the Writ of Execution was issued on January 11, 1999. Atty. Suplico even
categorically stated in his quitclaim that he received a valuable consideration from the defunct law firm; thus,
he voluntarily released and forever discharged the law partnership from any action or obligation arising from
his being a partner. Similarly, Atty. Raval withdrew from the partnership in May 1999 and even waived his rights
over his share in the attorney’s fees from the Aerocom case in exchange for the Amberland office which facts
remained unrebutted. Thus, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondents indeed
committed deceit, fraud, or misconduct in violation of Rule 7.03 of the CPR with respect to the distribution of
attorney’s fees received by the defunct law firm from the Aerocom case. (Atty. Suplico v. Atty. Lokin, Jr., A.C.
No. 9152, July 1, 2020, Second Division)
27. When a disbarment complaint’s body of proof consists mainly of documentary evidence and the content of
which will prove either the falsity or veracity of the charge for disbarment, the complainant must attach the
original of the documentary evidence or certified copies of said documents, pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule
(Original Evidence Rule) under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, save for an established ground that would merit
exception. (Basagan v. Atty. Espina, A.C. No. 8395, July 8, 2020, Third Division)
28. A perusal of the records would reveal that complainant merely alleged that Atty. Lapore, by taking advantage
of her absence, facilitated the fictitious sales between her and her parents, and then between the latter and
Charity. Strikingly, though, she miserably failed to present any proof in support of the alleged forgery in her
signature or the authenticity of the thumb mark of his father indicating his consent to the sale. If complainant
was so sure her signature was fake, she could have submitted the documents in question to expert analysis to
the NBI, the PNP, or some other handwriting expert. Regrettably for complainant, the records are bereft of any
such analysis or even any attempt to have her signature even bother to inform it of the change in her address.
Under the circumstances, complainant’s bare allegations of Atty. Lapore’s purported misconduct cannot prevail
over the presumption of regularity accorded to the lawyers as members of the Bar. Absent any showing that he
acted in any manner that would render Atty. Lapore as unfit to the practice of law and unable to hold the office
of an attorney, this complaint must fail. (Armilla-Calderon v. Atty. Lapore, A.C. No. 10619, September 2, 2020,
Second Division)

29. Complainant charges Atty. Bantugan with violations of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR which stemmed from his
alleged misuse of LAELEP funds and property. According to the Special Committee, Atty. Bantugan committed
the following acts: (a) received P150,000.00 as combat pay fee deductions; (b) paid LAELEP’s obligation with
JJ’s Seafood Village with the issuance of a personal check which was dishonored, but now fully satisfied; (c)
failed to liquidate a total amount of P197,960.00 consisting of two checks in his name for a trip to Singapore;
(d) based on oral information from different personalities, Atty. Bantugan was in prolonged possession of a
laptop belonging to IBP-Bohol; and (e) unduly retained possession of the PNP Handbook whose reproduction
was forestalled despite full payment. The alleged commission of these acts were primarily established by the
complainant through the presentation of the Special Committee’s Final Report/Recommendation and Minutes
of the Joint Meeting by the IBP Board of Officers and the LAELEP. However, the aforementioned acts were not
supported by any other evidence, documentary or otherwise. In administrative proceedings, the burden of
proof lies upon the complainant. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against a respondent
must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. As aptly found, the evidence presented by
complainant does not sufficiently establish the facts from which her Letter-Complaint is based. (Atty. Biliran v.
Atty. Bantugan, A.C. No. 8451, September 30, 2020, Second Division)
30. The complaint should be dismissed. According to the IBP, it was error on the part of Atty. Rivera to have
criminally charged Risie for violating Municipal Ordinance No. 2006-006 because she is not the owner of the
business subject of the closure order. We disagree. Whether to include Risie or not in the charge is purely
discretionary on the part of Atty. Rivera. If he perceives that Risie is involved in the management of the business
of her father without the requisite business permit, then he can very well include Risie in the charge. In any
event, it is the prosecutor who will ultimately decide whether to include or drop Risie from the charge. Next,
the IBP recommends that Atty. Rivera should be held administratively liable for seizing other items that are not
included in the seizure order and for prematurely implementing the Closure Order. The Court again disagrees.
As the Court sees it, Atty. Rivera was merely implementing the local tax ordinance when he enforced the Closure
and Seizure Orders on the businesses operated by the Baygar family without the necessary business permits.
More importantly, Risie's recourse from the alleged acts of Atty. Rivera is not through this disbarment
complaint. She could have assailed the issuance of the Closure Orders before the proper authorities. To stress,
Atty. Rivera's acts could not be considered as violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR. Atty. Rivera was
merely performing his official duties as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of Binangonan, particularly
the implementation of the Closure Order against the businesses operated by the Baygar family and matters
related thereto. As Municipal Administrator, one of his duties is to assist in the coordination of the work of all
the officials of the local government unit, under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor or
mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government
unit. The implementation of a closure order and the issuance of business permits may be considered well within
this function of a Municipal Administrator. Significantly, Risie failed to prove by substantial evidence that in the
performance of his functions, Atty. Rivera committed acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR. (Baygar
v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 8959, October 7, 2020, Second Division)
31. There is an absolute dearth of evidence of the respondents’ alleged gross misconduct. Other than his bare
allegations, complainant was unable to present proof to substantiate his grave charges against respondents.
That the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Resolution – MR issued by the respondents in the OMB
cases were adverse to complainant does not, by itself, establish malice or prejudice against him. In contrast,
respondents enjoy, absent any evidence to the contrary, the presumption that they had regularly performed
their official duties as GIPOs and Directors of the EIO, Office of the Ombudsman, when they resolved the OMB
cases. All parties were accorded the opportunity to be heard following the rules of procedure before the Office
of the Ombudsman. In fact, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Mosquera effectively granted complainant’s prayer
for the inhibition of respondents Atty. Bunagan and Atty. Salazar of EIO – Bureau A by re-assigning complainant’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the Consolidated Resolution to respondents Atty. Golangco and Atty. Agbada of
EIO – Bureau B for resolution. It is also noteworthy that both the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated
Resolution – MR were reviewed and ultimately approved by Ombudsman Carpio Morales. Furthermore, a
perusal of the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Resolution – MR issued by respondents readily shows
that they sufficiently presented factual and legal bases for the dismissal of complainant’s charges against Zafe
and Alberto. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the subject Resolutions were completely arbitrary, capricious,
or groundless. More importantly, if complainant really believed that respondents committed reversible errors
in judgment or grave abuse of discretion in rendering the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Resolution
– MR, then his remedy would have been to seek judicial review of the same, and not through a disciplinary case
against the respondents. (Tablizo v. Atty. Golangco, A.C. No. 10636, October 12, 2020, Second Division)
32. Complainant was clearly misguided and did not even present a valid argument. Even without the presumption
that an attorney as an officer of the Court have performed his duties in accordance with his oath, it is plain and
logical that the respondent only followed the protocol in implementing the subject Decision of the OMB. The
said protocol is pursuant to the standing arrangement between the DILG and the OMB where officials of the
DILG were advised to seek prior clarification with the OMB should there be issues that arise on the
implementation of the latter’s decision. As noted by the IBP, Atty. Nuyda simply followed the directive given to
him by his superior at the DILG to await further advice on the dismissal of Governor Tanco. In addition, there

was never any intentional or willful disobedience to the decision of the OMB, as the latter, in fact, eventually
confirmed that its order dismissing Governor Tanco from service can no longer be implemented. In other words,
there is no gross neglect of duty on the part of Atty. Nuyda. Thus, his actions were done within the authority
granted to him and the laws. (Macaventa v. Atty. Nuyda, A.C. No. 11087, October 12, 2020, First Division)
33. Dillon did not present substantial evidence to show that respondent violated the CPR. In fact, the instant case
is simply evident of the complainant’s frustration and dissatisfaction with the outcome of the case which the
respondent handled.
a. The Court disagrees with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner that the respondent signed the JA
for and in behalf of his client without the requisite authority to do so. The respondent was fully authorized
by the complainant through an SPA he executed and signed in favor of respondent. The said SPA was
attached and annexed with the JA and was also attached with the respondent’s position paper. A perusal
of the SPA would show that the respondent was authorized to sign in behalf of the complainant and was
given full power and authority to do and perform every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary
to be done in and about the premises. Thus, the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that the
respondent is liable of signing the JA for and in behalf of his client without the requisite authority is of no
moment. Further, the respondent signed the JA of the complainant in due reliance with the above-
mentioned SPA. The complainant did not even bother to contest the subject SPA in all his pleadings before
the IBP. The actions of the complainant clearly denote that he had given the full authority in favor of the
respondent to sign and file the disputed JA.
b. The electronic mail sent on September 28, 2015 by the complainant to the respondent calls the Court’s
attention. It is apparent from the said electronic mail that the complainant did not just threaten the
respondent but also the other lawyer who handled his case. He also threatened to seek the dismissal of
Judge Leonardo and the Fiscal assigned to the case. To quote the complaiant, he explicitly said that : “I am
going to blacken their names and reputations. What have I got to lose?” The explicit display of this
misconduct only means that he will come after those who are involved in his case which is very alarming.
He simply cannot accept that he lost a case and as a result, he will go a long way to blacken the names and
reputation of those that are involved. Likewise contained in the above-mentioned electronic mail, the
complainant expressly belittled the judicial system of the Philippines. Notable also is the fact that
complainant gave the respondent some optiosn to avoid the filing of a disbarment case, such as: (i)
refunding the P46,000.00 he paid the respondent, plus the cost of three visits to the Philippines which is
P150,000.00, or (ii) file an appeal immediately, within the prescribed period to file, or (iii) commence and
prosecute a civil action against Mapili entirely at the respondent’s cost, expecting to claim P4 million in
damages. Such conditions are borderline blackmail and extortion which are uncalled for. (Dillon v. Atty. De
Quiroz, A.C. No. 12876, January 12, 2021, First Division)
34. The complaint must be dismissed.

a. In this case, the IBP properly found that Riveral, as the President and General Manager of OPASCOR, did
not act in bad faith in approving the early retirement of Gerodias instead of criminally charging him and
terminating his employment under which he would have received a considerably lesser separation pay than
the retirement package. As President and General Manager, he approved Gerodias' request to avail of the
early retirement program even when he was short of two years in service as per the company policy. The
Court finds no violation of the CPR or the Lawyer's Oath in Riveral's benevolent act of accommodating
Gerodias' request. No evidence was presented to show that Riveral acted with bad faith, malice, or ill will.
Hence, the presumption of good faith in his favor stands.
b. As to the two questioned Secretary's Certificates signed and executed by Pulvera-Page as the Corporate
Secretary and Geyrosaga as the Recording Secretary, the Court agrees with the IBP that the act is
sanctioned under Article IV, Section 1, 2nd paragraph of the Amended By-Laws of OPASCAR. The
corporation's power to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the BOD which may duly authorize an
individual through its corporate by-laws or by a specific act to sign documents in behalf of the corporation.
Hence, there is nothing erroneous nor illegal in Pulvera-Page's signing and executing a Secretary's
Certificate as OPASCOR's Corporate Secretary as she is duly authorized to do so by virtue of the Amended
By-Laws and the Director's Certificate dated July 3, 2017. The fact that Geyrosaga is also duly authorized to
sign and execute a Secretary's Certificate by virtue of the said Director's Certificate does not connote;
connivance nor conspiracy between the two to terminate Gerodias' employment. In addition, OPASCOR
BOD's act of authorizing two persons to execute Secretary's Certificate is not prohibited and well within
the ambit of the law.
c. Lastly, the Court cannot fathom how Supatan's act of receiving Gerodias' Position Paper in the proceedings
of the labor case would imply conspiracy and connivance with Riveral, Pulvera-Page and Cadungog in order
to illegally terminate Gerodias from his employment. As per the records, Supatan is an associate of the firm
of Riveral, Pulvera-Page & Associates which represents OPASCAR in the labor casb filed by Gerodias. Hence,
Supatan, as an associate of the firm, is duty bound to assist and represent its client OPASCAR in the said
labor case including the receipt of any pleadings filed. To reiterate, her act of receiving a copy of Gerodias'
Position Paper is a lawful act and does not in any way violate the CPR nor the Lawyer's Oath. (Gerodias v.
Atty. Riveral, A.C. No. 12719, February 17, 2021, Third Division)

35. As regards the administrative complaint against Atty. Alobba, complainant failed to discharge the burden of
proving, with substantial evidence, Atty. Alobba’s willful disobedience of a lawful order. The basis of the instant
administrative complaint refers to the acts performed by Atty. Alobba as Assistant Corporate Secretary of POTC
and PHILCOMSAT. The complainant sought Atty. Alobba's disbarment because of the latter's issuance of
Secretary's Certificates certifying the authority of some members of the Nieto-PCGG group to represent POTC
and PHILCOMSAT in cases involving both corporations. However, complainant failed to show how Atty. Alobba
willfully defied a TRO and WPI issued by the CA when she issued the Secretary's Certificates. Not every
erroneous filing of a case by a lawyer can be the subject of disciplinary proceedings. Otherwise, lawyers of losing
parties are immediately open to administrative sanctions. (Bildner v. Atty. Labastilla and Atty. Alobba, A.C. No.
12843, March 18, 2021, First Division)
36. Atty. Labastilla's actions clearly fall short of the standard of professional conduct under the CPR. Despite the
myriad of cases filed before the SEC and different courts, the instant administrative case is simple - Atty.
Labastilla did not inform the SB that his client (i.e., Nieto-PCGG group) was effectively enjoined from acting as
officers of POTC and PHILCOMSAT by virtue of the CA TRO and WPI. Because of this omission, the Nieto-PCGG
group was able secure the SB TRO two days after or on September 23, 2005. Atty. Labastilla insists that the CA
TRO and WPI did not include Locsin - the affiant in the SB complaint. He maintains that the CA TRO and WPI
only enjoined the respondents therein, i.e., Nieto, Jr., Lokin, Jr., and Atty. Alobba. Such reasoning smacks of
Atty. Labastilla's attempt to use his knowledge of the law to thwart the implementation of the CA TRO and WPI.
The CA TRO and WPI were obviously meant to enjoin the NietoPCGG group from acting as a body
politic sans Locsin who, although authorized by the Nieto-PCGG group to represent POTC, was also elected as
a member of the BOD by the Africa-Bildner group in a stockholders meeting dated July 28, 2004. With Locsin
signing the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, Atty. Labastilla deftly consented (if not
advised) his client to file the SB TRO in order to supplant the CA TRO and WPI without defying it on its face.
What's more, the CA TRO and WPI expressly enjoined the respondents in that case and "their officers, agents
and other persons acting for and in their behalf." It is undisputed that Atty. Labastilla was the Nieto-PCGG
group's counsel. As such, he was clearly acting on their behalf when he filed the SB complaint. By Atty.
Labastilla's admission that "control [of the corporations involved in an intra-corporate dispute] becomes very
nebulous," he knew that the authority of whoever would file the SB complaint would be questioned. Thus, Atty.
Labastilla's duty to inform the SB of the CA TRO and WPI enjoining the Nieto-PCGG group becomes more
apparent. In fact, by virtue of the CA TRO and WPI, Atty. Labastilla should have advised his clients against filing
the SB complaint in the first place - especially since the object of the SB TRO was to enjoin the Africa-Bildner
group from acting as the POTC's BOD by conducting its stockholders' meeting on September 22, 2005. (Bildner
v. Atty. Labastilla and Atty. Alobba, A.C. No. 12843, March 18, 2021, First Division)
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
1. Although there are times when the Court dismissed the case after the complainant withdrew the complaint for
disbarment, the dismissal was not due to our acquiescence to the complainant’s wish but because of the
absence of any competent and credible evidence by reason of the desistance. (Atty. Yumul-Espina v. Atty.
Tabaquero, A.C. No. 11238, September 21, 2016, Third Division)
2. The filing by the respondent public prosecutors of the motion for reconsideration of the court order despite
the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information, is not a defiance or willful disobedience
to the lawful order of the superior court. (Domingo c. Atty. Rubio and Atty. Rubio, A.C. No. 7927, October 19,
3. An affidavit of withdrawal or desistance does not terminate the disciplinary proceedings against an errant
lawyer. (Quitazol v. Atty. Capela, A.C. No. 12072, December 9, 2020, En Banc)
REPEATED VIOLATIONS
1. Considering that this is the third disbarment case of Atty. Limos, with the first two cases suspending her from
the practice of law, Atty. Limos should be disbarred. This is because despite her two prior suspensions, still,
Atty. Limos demonstrates that she is unfit to stay in the legal profession for her deceitful conduct but also is
remiss in following the dictates of the Court. (Pacao v. Atty. Limos, A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016, En Banc)
2. Respondent’s repeated violations of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility deserve the
imposition of the penalty of disbarment. (Paras v. Atty. Paras, A.C. No. 7348, September 27, 2016, En banc)
3. A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes another ground prior to his
eventual disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over his
other disbarrable act or actuation committed while he was still a member of the Law Profession. (Domingo v.
Atty. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 5473, January 23, 2018, En Banc)
4. In Philippine laws, there is no double or multiple disbarment. Neither does our jurisdiction have a law mandating
a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission. Once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be
imposed regarding his privilege to practice law. At best, the Court may only impose a fine or order the said

Notarial Practice 98
lawyer to pay the monetary obligation to his or her client. In this case, the infractions committed by respondent
are influence peddling, attempted bribery, threatening court officers and disrespecting court processes. These
offenses are different from that of his previous administrative case that caused his disbarment. There is no
monetary penalty that could be imposed against respondent because he has no unpaid debt or misappropriated
funds. Verily, a fine or an order to pay a monetary obligation cannot be imposed upon him. Thus, the Court
finds that, as respondent was previously disbarred, it is proper to give the corresponding penalty of suspension
for two (2) years from the practice of law for the sole purpose of recording it in his personal file in the OBC. In
the event that respondent should apply for the lifting of his disbarment in Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, the penalty
in the present case should be considered in the resolution of the same. (Judge Dumlao, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho,
5. The more pressing issue to be tackled in this case is the fact that Atty. Pagatpatan has been practicing law
despite the issuance of a suspension order by this Court on June 15, 2005. There were no records showing that
he served said suspension or moved to lift said order because Atty. Pagatpatan, himself, admits that he
continued practicing the legal profession notwithstanding said order. On record, Atty. Pagatpatan had been
representing party litigants in court from 2005 until the instant case was filed before the IBP in 2016. Atty.
Pagatpatan has made a mockery of this Court's authority by defying this Court's suspension order for over
eleven (11) years. If Fr. Zafra had not filed the instant case, Atty. Pagatpatan would have continued disregarding
the suspension order of this Court. His actions clearly constitute gross misconduct as defined under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. (Fr. Zafra III v. Atty.
Pagatpatan, A.C. No. 12457, April 2, 2019, En Banc)
6. It is undisputed that Atty. Ramon was suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years pursuant to
Mercullo v. Ramon. In addition, in Lampas-Peralta v. Ramon, Atty. Ramon was disbarred after it was proven that
she drafted a fake decision of the CA and exacted exorbitant fees from her clients. Nonetheless, despite her
suspension from the practice of law, Atty. Ramon defied the suspension order and appeared as private
prosecutor in a criminal case. As such, Atty. Ramon is administratively liable for willfully disobeying the lawful
order of a superior court and appearing as an attorney without authority. Accordingly, in view of Atty. Ramon’s
disbarment, a penalty of fine is meted against her. (In Re: Order dated October 27, 2016 issued by Branch 137,
RTC, Makati in Criminal Case No. 14-765, A.C. No. 12456, September 8, 2020, En Banc)
PENALTY
1. The determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. (Dumanlag v. Atty. Intong, A.C. No. 8638, October 10, 2016, First Division)
2. The SC may reduce the fine upon meritorious grounds. (Domingo v. Atty. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 5473, July 3, 2018,
En Banc)
3. It is true that when there is a conflict between the fallo, or the dispositive portion, and the body of the decision
or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo is the final order, which becomes the subject of execution,
while the body of the decision or order merely contains the reasons or conclusions of the court ordering
nothing. However, as an exception, when one can clearly and unquestionably conclude from the body of the
decision that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. In the present
case, a perusal of the body of the Resolution unquestionably shows complainant's entitlement to the restitution
of the P60,000.00 acceptance fee. Unfortunately, the dispositive portion of the said Resolution did not reflect
an order for respondent to restitute such amount, not because of any substantial consideration but merely
because of an unwitting clerical omission. In Tuatis v. Spouses Escol, the Court reiterated the rule that when
there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or a mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, the Court
may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final, as in this case.
Certainly, this Court cannot be precluded from making the necessary amendment thereof, so that the fallo will
conform to the body of the said decision. In this light, the Court therefore deems it proper to amend the
dispositive portion of the Resolution to reflect complainant's entitlement to the restitution of the P60,000.00
acceptance fee. It bears stressing that the Court's original Resolution dated September 4, 2017 had already
settled the issue of whether or not complainant is entitled to restitution, and no further discussion is needed
to that effect. However, the amendment of the dispositive portion thereof must be made for complainant to
effectively execute the Court's judgment on that aspect; hence, this Resolution. Moreover, so as to avoid any
confusion, the Court is prompted to note that respondent's six (6)-month suspension shall begin not from the
date he would receive this Resolution but the date of his receipt of the original Resolution dated September 4,
2017, which date shall be indicated in the Manifestation that he is required to file before this Court signifying
the start of his suspension from the practice of law. (Martin v. Atty. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 9832, October 3, 2018,
Special Second Division)
N O TAR IAL PR AC TIC E
BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public
instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and
due execution. (Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez, A.C. No. 8384, April 11, 2013, En Banc)
2. When respondent negligently failed to enter the details of three documents on his notarial register, he cast
doubt on the authenticity of complainant’s documents. In addition, respondent cannot absolve himself in
stating that he delegated the recording of the entries in the notarial register to his secretary because a notarial
commission is a license held personally by the notary public. (Pitogo v. Atty. Suello, A.C. No. 10695, March 18,
2015, Second Division; Recio v. Atty. Fandiño, A.C. No. 6767, October 5, 2016, Third Division)
3. Notarization of verifications and certifications on non-forum shopping does not constitute part of a clerk of
court’s daily official functions. While clerks of court are notaries public ex-officio, the may notarized couments
or administer oaths only when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. Thus, clerks of
court cannot notarize complaints, answers, petitions, or any other pleadings on a daily or a regular basis.
(Mathaeus v. Spouses Medequiso, G.R. No. 196651, February 3, 2016, Second Division)
4. Atty. Ching failed in ensuring that only documents which he had personally signed and sealed with his notarial
seal, after satisfying himself with the completeness of the same and the identities of the parties who affixed
their signatures therein, would be included in his notarial register. This also means that Atty. Ching failed to
properly store and secure his notarial equipment in order to prevent other people from notarizing documents
by forging his signature and affixing his notarial seal, and recording such documents in his notarial books,
without his knowledge and consent. This is gross negligence. (Castelo v. Atty. Ching, A.C. No. 11165, February
NOTARIAL COMMISSION
1. Before a lawyer may notarize, he must be commissioned by the Executive Judge. (Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez, A.C.
No. 8384, April 11, 2013, En Banc; Atty. Lim v. Atty. Tabiliran, Jr., A.C. No. 10793, September 16, 2020, Second
Division; Atty. Manzano v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 12173, November 3, 2020, En Banc; Judge Guerrero v. Atty.
Giron, A.C. No. 10928, December 9, 2020, En Banc)
a. Atty. Rivera’s act of making it appear that he was a duly commissioned notary public is in blatant disregard
of the Lawyer’s Oath to obey the laws, i.e., the notarial law, and to do no falsehood. It likewise constitutes
a transgression of Rule 1.01 of the CPR which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. (Atty. Manzano v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 12173, November 3, 2020, En Banc)
2. Atty. Parado violated the law when he notarized several documents even though he had not been issued a
notarial commission. Thus, without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts.
(Japitana v. Atty. Parado, A.C. No. 10859, January 26, 2016, En Banc; Spouses Frias v. Atty. Abao, A.C. No. 12467,
April 10, 2019, En Banc; Yusay-Cordero v. Atty. Amihan, Jr., A.C. No. 12709, September 8, 2020, First Division)
3. Atty. Solbita’s guilt of violating the notarial law is undisputed as he readily admitted that he had actually made
the unauthorized notarization despite an expired notarial commission. In addition, his defense of voluntary
disclosure to the parties of the fact that his notarial commission has expired cannot exonerate him.
a. Atty. Solbita is likewise liable for violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
as he made it appear that he was duly commissioned when he is not. Said act partook of deliberate
falsehood. (Spouses Gacuya v. Atty. Solbita, A.C. No. 8840, March 8, 2016, En Banc)
4. It was sufficiently established that respondent was without a notarial commission when he notarized the
affidavits he offered in evidence. This was supported by the certification issued by the RTC of Mandaluyong City
that from January 1998 until August 2005, respondent was never commissioned as a notary public. A lawyer
who notarizes documents without a valid notarial commission is remiss in his professional duties and
responsibilities. (Villaflores-Puza v. Atty. Arellano, A.C. No. 11480, June 20, 2017, En Banc)
5. It is indisputable that Atty. Echanez performed notarial acts on several documents without a valid notarial
commission. The fact of his lack of notarial commission at the time of the unauthorized notarizations was
likewise sufficiently established by the certifications issued by the Executive Judges in the territory where Atty.
Echanez performed the unauthorized notarial acts. For misrepresenting in the documents that he was a notary
public for and in Cordon, Isabela when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, he further
committed a form of falsehood which runs afoul to Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(Mariano v. Atty. Echanez, A.C. No. 10373, May 31, 2016, En Banc; Maniquiz v. Atty. Emelo, A.C. No. 8968,
6. It was established that respondent notarized a Joint Affidavit in 1993 and an Application for Business Permit, as
well as the SPA of Amante, in 2010, all in San Pedro, Laguna. However, as per the October 5, 2011 Certification
issued by COC Beran-Baraoidan of the RTC-San Pedro, respondent was commissioned as a notary public for and
within San Pedro, Laguna only from 1998 to 2005, and that the said commission has not been renewed in 2010
and therefore, already expired. Furthermore, it was shown that although respondent has been issued a notarial

commission by the RTC-Biñan (which was valid from January 1, 2010 until December 31, 2011), he (a) conducted
business as a notary public during such time not only in his Biñan, Laguna law office (which he shared with a
certain Atty. Salandanan) but also in his other law offices in San Pedro, Laguna, and thus, performed notarial
acts beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the said commissioning court; and (b) notarized an Affidavit for Death
Benefit Claim in Biñan, Laguna on April 10, 2012, during which time the said commission had already expired.
(Miranda, Jr. v. Atty. Alvarez, Sr., A.C. No. 12196, September 3, 2018, Second Division)
7. The IBP found that respondent notarized the subject document, "Memorandum of Agreement," without being
commissioned as a notary public at the time of notarization. This fact has been duly certified to by none other
than the Notarial Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Thus, by knowingly performing notarial acts at the time when he was not authorized to do so,
respondent clearly violated the Notarial Rules and in consequence, should be held administratively liable.
a. It should be emphasized that respondent's transgressions of the Notarial Rules also have a bearing on his
standing as a lawyer. In Virtusio v. Virtusio, the Court observed that a lawyer who notarizes a document
without a proper commission violates his lawyer's oath to obey the law. He makes it appear that he is
commissioned when he is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood that the lawyer's oath forbids. This
violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 7
as well. (Collantes v. Atty. Mabuti, A.C. No. 9917, January 14, 2019, Second Division)
8. The IBP found that Atty. Parado notarized the subject Deed without being commissioned as notary public.
Worse, Atty. Parado notarized the subject Deeds with Estrella and Michelangelo personally appearing before
him. By misrepresenting himself as a commissioned notary public at the time of the alleged notarization, Atty.
Parado also violated the provisions of the CPR, particularly Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 10.01, Canon 10
thereof. (Piczon-Hermoso v. Atty. Parado, A.C. No. 8116, September 16, 2020, Second Division)
NOTARIAL REGISTER
1. Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaing different notarial registers in several offices. This
is evident from the notarized documents being irregularly numbered and entered. (Gimeno v. Atty. Zaide, A.C.
No. 10303, April 22, 2015, Second Division)
2. Here, respondent failed to properly discharge his duties as a notary public. While the conformity document
appears to have respondent's notarial details and was registered in respondent's notarial book with specific
document and page numbers, such document does not appear in the records of the National Archives, the final
repository for notarized documents of the Philippines. Worse, the National Archives found in their records
another document which bore the same notarial registration details as that in the conformity. Since the
document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records, doubt is engendered that it has not really
been notarized. Notably, respondent did not deny notarizing the document and even admitted that Jose
appeared before him for the said notarization of the document. However, respondent failed to record the
assailed document in his notarial book and even used the same notarial details in notarizing another document.
Such failure by respondent is inexcusable and constitutes gross negligence in carefully discharging his duties as
a notary public. (Buenafe v. Atty. Lirazan, A.C. No. 9361, March 20, 2019, First Division ; Atty. Lim v. Atty.
Tabiliran, Jr., A.C. No. 10793, September 16, 2020, Second Division)
a. Respondent cannot simply impute the error to his secretary because he is the one charged by law with the
recording in his notarial register of the necessary information regarding documents or instruments he has
notarized. Notaries public must observe the highest degree of compliance with the basic requirements of
notarial practice in order to preserve public confidence in the integrity of the notarial system. Respondent
cannot simply evade liability and invoke good faith. Failure to enter the notarial acts in one's notarial
register constitutes dereliction of a notary public's duties, which warrants the revocation of a lawyer's
commission as a notary public. (Buenafe v. Atty. Lirazan, A.C. No. 9361, March 20, 2019, First Division)
3. Respondent Delante is administratively liable for infractions in relation to his notarial acts and in keeping and
maintaining his notarial register. His assignment of identical document numbers, page numbers and book
numbers to several distinct documents on different dates, his failure to make the proper entry or entries in his
Notarial Register of his notarial acts, and his delegation of his notarial function of recording entries in his
Notarial Register to a member of his staff is a clear contravention of the explicit provisions of the Rules on
Notarial Practice. He is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires
lawyers to promote respect for law and legal processes. Moreover, his delegation to his secretary of his notarial
function of recording entries in his notarial register is a breach of Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of the same Code, which
provides that a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law
may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. (Rico v. Atty. Madrazo, Jr., A.C. No. 7231,
October 1, 2019, En Banc)
4. The 2004 Notarial Rules cannot be given retroactive effect to a deed of donation executed and acknowledged
before the notary public on January 18, 2002. Accordingly, at the time of the notarization, there is no rule yet
that requires the parties to sign the notarial register.

a. Under Rule IV, Section 3 of the 2004 Notarial Rules, at the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or
affix with a thumb or other mark the notary public’s notarial register. The purpose of these requirements
is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature and to ascertain that the document
is the signatory’s free act and deed. (Patenia-Kinatac-an v. Patenia-Decena, G.R. No. 238325, June 15, 2020,
First Division)
5. Here, Atty. Tamaño did not deny notarizing the five UCSPAI’s GIS and even stated that the affiants appeared
before him for the notarization of the GIS. However, he failed to record the GIS in his notarial register. Atty.
Tamaño assigned the entries of the notarial details of UCSPAI’s GIS for the years 2010 up to 2014 to five distinct
documents. The Certificates issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Bacolod City revealed that as per Atty.
Tamaño‘s notarial books submitted to them, the notarial particulars assigned to the UCSPAI’s 2010 GIS pertain
to a Certificate executed by Wilfreda Remula, the 2011 GIS’ notarial details pertain to a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Julius Caesar Lacson and Jonathan Bayona, the 2012 GIS to a Contract Extension Agreement
executed by Victor C. Go, the 2013 GIS to a Sworn Statement (RTPL) executed by Atty. Ma. Cecilia Soriano
Salcedo Mating, and the 2014 GIS to a Memorandum of Agreement Executed by Ricky Desampasado and Rico
C. Catalogo. Undoubtedly, the GIS of UCSPAI for the years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 are not found in
Atty. Tamaño’s notarial register. There is no doubt that Atty. Tamaño’s failure to record the GIS in his notarial
book is inexcusable and constitutes gross negligence in carefully discharging his duties a a notary public. By
failing to record proper entries in the notarial register, Atty. Tamaño violated his duty under Canon 1 of the CPR
to uphold and obey the laws of the land, specifically, the Notarial Rules, and to promote respect for law and
legal processes. (Re: Order dated December 5, 2015 in Adm. Case No. NP-008-17, A.C. No. 12274, October 7,
6. Atty. Gonzales readily admitted that he failed to record the Director’s Certificate in his notarial register.
Moreover, he admitted that he failed to provide the instrument with different notarial details and assigned it
with the same entries as the Deed of Sale he notarized the day prior. In addition, Atty. Gonzales cannot evade
liability by passing the negligence to his former secretary and invoke good faith since he is the one charged b
law to record in the notarial register the necessary information regarding documents or instrumens being
notarized. More so, failure to enter a notarial act in one’s notarial register and the assignment of erroneous
notarial details in a notarized instrument constitute dereliction of a notary public’s duties which warrants the
revocation of a lawyer’s commission as a notary public. (Orenia III v. Atty. Gonzales, A.C. No. 12766, October 7,
7. As certified by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC in Malolos City, Bulacan, the Affidavit which Atty.
Navarro notarized and bore his notarial seal was not included in the latter’s report for the month of August
2007. Given the evidentiary value accorded to notarized documents, Atty. Navarro’s failure to record the
document in his notarial register corresponds to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized
when, in fact, it was not. (De Vera v. Atty. Navarro, A.C. No. 12912, January 18, 2021, Second Division)
SUBMISSION OF NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS

1. Basilio cannot be held administratively liable if he did not forward a copy of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of
Court. This is because only instruments acknowledged before the notary public are required to be forwarded
to the Clerk of Court. (Atty. Bartolome v. Atty. Basilio, A.C. No. 10783, October 14, 2015, First Division)
2. Respondent failed to forward to the Clerk of Court (COC) of the commissioning court a certified copy of each
month's entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged before him. Under the Notarial
Rules, a notary public must forward to the Clerk of Court, within the first ten (10) days of the month following,
a certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged before
the notary public. According to case law, failure to comply with this requirement is a ground for revocation of
a notary public's commission. As per the September 21, 2011 Certification issued by COC Beran-Baraoidan, a
copy of the SPA executed by Amante was not submitted before the Office of the COC of the RTC-San Pedro.
This omission comes as no surprise considering that, as previously discussed, his notarial commission therefor
had already expired. (Miranda, Jr. v. Atty. Alvarez, Sr., A.C. No. 12196, September 3, 2018, Second Division)
COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY

1. The fact that the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties
personally known to him. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with
them. In addition, only stating that the parties subscribed and swore their affidavits before him is insufficient.
When the notary public or in certain instances, the trial court judge, notarizes the documents, he or she must
state that the parties were personally known to him or her or that the parties presented their competent pieces
of evidence of identity. (Tupal v. Judge Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014, Third Division)
2. Basilio violated the prohibition for a notary public not to affix his official signature and seal on an incomplete
notarial certificate and the prohibition for a notary public not to notarize a document if the person involved is
not personally known to him or has not identified himself through competent evidence of identity. As the
records bear out, Basilio affixed his official signature and seal on the notarial certifcate on the Joint Affidavit

without properly identifying the person/s who signed the same. In addition, the notarial certificate lacked the
details of the affiants’ identities. (Atty. Bartolome v. Atty. Basilio, A.C. No. 10783, October 14, 2015, First
Division)
3. Presentation of their community tax certificates is insufficient because those cannot be considered as
competent evidence of identity. More so, reliance on the CTCs alone is punishable indiscretion by the notary
public. (Japitana v. Atty. Parado, A.C. No. 10859, January 26, 2016, En Banc; Spouses Aldea v. Atty. Bagay, A.C.
12733, October 14, 2020, Third Division)
a. A CTC cannot be considered competent evidence of identity as it does not bear the photograph and
signature of its owner. As such, Atty. Sentillas could not have properly verified whether the person who
appeared before was in fact complainant Conrado. Although this does not, by itself, conclusively establish
that complainant did not personally appear before Atty. Sentillas when the second SPA was notarized, it is
nevertheless sufficient to constitute a violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules. (Lopez v. Atty. Mata, A.C. No.
9334, July 28, 2020, First Division)
4. The IDs of respondents Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui from La Vista Association, Inc., R.O. Barra Builders &
Electrical Services, and St. Charbel Executive Village, respectively, do not constitute competent evidence of their
identities under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.. In the same vein, their Joint-Affidavit identifiying Andales
and assuring the CA that he was a party-litigant is not competent evidence of Andales’ identity under the 2004
Notaarial Rules, considering that they – Singson, Pasqui, and Lominiquie – themselves are privy to the
instrument, i.e., Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, in which Andale’s participation is sought
to be proven. Tellingly, the notarial certificate of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
attached to private respondents’ petition before the CA did not state whether they presented competent
evidence of their identities, or that they were personally known to the notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of
the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation
to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. (William Go Que Construction v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191699,
April 19, 2016, First Division)
5. By not ensuring that the person then appearing before him as the executor of the documents was really Elena
Gongon, not the impostor, he clearly did not exercise the precautions and observe the protocols that would
have easily insulated the performance of his notarial duties from forgery and falsification. (Magaway v. Atty.
Avecilla, A.C. No. 7072, July 27, 2016, First Division; Uy v. Atty. Apuhin, A.C. No. 11826, September 5, 2018,
Second Division)
6. Respondent transgressed Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the Notarial Rules by affixing her official signature and seal on
the notarial certificate of the affidavit contained in the Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable
Land in the absence of the complainant and for failing to ascertain the identity of the affiant. In addition,
respondent failed to record the assailed document in her notarial book despite having admitted that she signed
and notarized said document. (Malvar v. Atty. Baleros, A.C. No. 11346, March 8, 2017, Third Division)
7. Atty. Gumangan violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing the Contract of Lease on December
30, 2005 without competent evidence of identity of Renato and Carmelo and, thus, committing an expressly
prohibited act under the Rules. In addition, a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) no longer qualifies as competent
evidence of the parties’ identity as defined udner Rule II, Section 12 of the Notarial Rules.
a. Competent evidence of identity refers to the identification of an individual based on: (i) at least one current
identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual,
or (ii) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction
who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document, or transaction who each personally knows
the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification. (Iringan v. Atty. Gumangan, A.C.
No. 8574, August 16, 2017, First Division)
8. Respondent affixed his signature and seal on the notarial certificate without verifying the identity of the
executor. Such was inferred from the fact that the competent proof of such executor’s identity was left in blank.
Hence, his act of signing the notarial certificate, notwithstanding the fact that it was incomplete, is a clear
violation of the said Rules. No allegation as well as Remoreras is personally known to the respondent to dispense
with the presentation of a competent evidence of identity. (Spouses Chambon v. Atty. Ruiz, A.C. No. 11478,
9. Neither the petition’s Verification and Compliance with Non-Forum Shopping Law nor its Affidavit of Proof of
Service contains any statement that their respective affiants were personally known to the notary public or
have presented competent evience of identity pursuant to Rule II, Section 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. The omission is also evident in the Affidavit of Proof of Service attached to petitioners’ Rpely. Thus,
the notary public must show cause why he should not be made administratively liable. (Lao v. LGU of Cagayan
De Oro City, G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017, Third Division)

10. In this case, respondent, as duly found by the IBP, was remiss in the faithful observance of his duties as a notary
public when he failed to confirm the identity of the person claiming to be Jacinto through the competent
evidence of identity required by the 2004 Notarial Rules. Jurisprudence provides that a community tax
certificate or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and competent evidence of identity not only because it
is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the Rules; but moreso, it does not bear the
photograph and signature of the persons appearing before them, which the Rules deem as the more
appropriate and competent means by which notaries public can ascertain the person's identity. Records show
that Jacinto passed away on July 13, 1999, and therefore, clearly could not have appeared before respondent
to sign and execute the two (2) documents. Had respondent been more circumspect in performing his duties
as notary public and asked for the photograph-and-signature-bearing identification document required by the
2004 Notarial Rules, he would have immediately discovered that the person before him was not the person
whom he purports to be. All told, by accepting the residence certificates presented by the person who claimed
to be Jacinto as evidence of identity, respondent made it appear that Jacinto personally appeared before him
and subscribed the SPA and the Deed in violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules and to the detriment of Dandoy
and his siblings. (Dandoy v. Atty. Edayan, A.C. No. 12084, June 6, 2018, Second Division)
11. Respondent clearly failed to faithfully observe his duties as a notary public when he failed to confirm the identity
of Torrices through the competent evidence of identity required by the Notarial Rules. This fact is clear from
the Deed itself which shows that Torrices presented only his CTC when he appeared before respondent.
Jurisprudence provides that a community tax certificate or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and
competent evidence of identity not only because it is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity
under the Rules; more importantly, it does not bear the photograph and signature of the person appearing
before notaries public which the Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent means by which they can
ascertain the person's identity.
a. While respondent argues that, apart from the CTC, he required all the parties to the Deed to present at
least two (2) current government identification documents and conducted further interviews to ascertain
their capacity and personality to enter into the transactions, the Deed itself, however, belies this
contention. Had respondent indeed required – and had the parties presented – current government
identification documents at the time of the Deed's notarization, respondent should have reflected these
facts on the Deed's. acknowledgement portion in the same manner that the Deed reflected Torrices' CTC.
By notarizing the Deed notwithstanding the absence of the competent evidence of identity required by the
Notarial Rules, respondent undoubtedly failed to properly perform his duty as a notary public. (Heirs of
Unite v. Atty. Guzman, A.C. No. 12062, July 2, 2018, Second Division)
12. The notarial certificate of the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping that was attached to
Rufina's petition for certiorari filed before the CA stated that she is personally known to the notary public. The
fact that it contained no details of her competent evidence of identity is inconsequential simply because its
presentation may be excused or dispensed with. If it is not required for the affiant to show competent evidence
of identity in case he/she is personally known to the notary public, with more reason that it is unnecessary to
state the details of such competent evidence of identity in the notarial certificate. The foregoing considered,
the CA should have decided the Petition for Certiorari based on its merits. It should have determined whether
or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Extraordinary Remedies, which
assailed the June 16, 2016 Order of Labor Arbiter Santos. A plain reading of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure,
as amended, would reveal that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing outright the petition due to
Rufina's failure to post a cash or surety bond. (Jorge v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 232989, March 18, 2019, Third Division)
13. Complainant asserts Atty. Osorio notarized the documents although neither she nor her daughter Kumar
personally appeared before him to subscribe the same in April 2009. As proof, complainant submitted a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) stating that Kumar left the Philippines on
November 3, 2006, hence, could not have possibly personally appeared before Atty. Osorio when the
documents were supposedly notarized in April 2009. Notably, the BID certification does not contain any
statement that Kumar was still out of the country in April 2009. Hence, the BID Certification, on its face, does
not serve to negate Atty. Osorio’s categorical statement that complainant’s daughter did personally appear and
subscribe the documents before him. The presumption of regularity accorded to Atty. Osorio in the
performance of his official duty as notary public is upheld on this score.
a. Nonetheless, Atty. Osorio violated the notarial rules. Particularly, he peremptorily notarized the documents
without first requiring the parties to present competent proofs of identity. There is no showing nor any
averment that he personally knew the parties so as to exempt them from presenting to him competent
proof of identity. In addition, he certified the Deed of Absolute Sale with a jurat instead of an
acknowledgment. He demonstrated lack of basic knowledge of the notarial acts in failing to distinguish one
from the other. Finally, per verificaiton with the Office of the Clerk of Court for Quezon City, nonetheless,
it was discovered that this entry pertained to an entirely different document in his notarial register, i.e., a
document executed by a certain Benjamin Alfonso and Dante C. Rosento, Jr. on April 24, 2009. This failure
to make the proper entries demonstrated his lack of care in the discharge of his duties as a notary public.
(Ladreda v. Atty. Osorio, A.C. No. 10315, January 22, 2020, First Division)

14. The records show that Atty. Salatan had affixed his official signature and seal on the notarial certificate of
Teresita’s affidavit without properly identifying the person who signed the document. This conclusion can easily
be inferred from the fact that the competent proof of Teresita’s identity had been left blank on the face of the
document itself. Unforunately, in his Comment, Atty. Salatan simply claimed that he had “ascertained” that the
affiant was the same person executing the document, but he completely failed to explain why Teresita’s
competent evidence of identity was not indicated in the notarial certificate. Similarly, there was also no
allegation that Teresita is personally known to Atty. Salatan to dispense with the presentation of her competent
evidence of identity. Based on these considerations, there is no question that Atty. Salatan had violated: (a)
Section 2(b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules by notarizing Teresita’s affidavit without requiring any competent
proof of her identity; and (b) Section 5(b), Rule IV of the same Rules when he affixed his official signature and
seal on an incomplete notarial certificate.
a. To make matters worse, it appears that the notarization of the subject affidavit was not recorded in Atty.
Salatan’s notarial register, which is a clear violation of Section 2(a), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules. Here, Atty.
Salatan did not deny that the subject doument was not recorded in his notarial register. He said that he
was not personally involved neither had participation in the mechanical act of listing documents and
assigning docket numbers even as he kept on reminding his office staff to record completely all notarial
acts in the Notarial Register. However, it is settled that a notary public is personally accountable for all
entries in his notarial register. Thus, Atty. Salatan’s designation of his notarial function of recording entries
in his notarial register to his office clerk is in itself a violation of the Notarial Rules, as well as Rule 9.01,
Canon 9 of the CPRC which provides that a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
(Leano v. Atty. Salatan, A.C. No. 12551, July 8, 2020, Second Division)
15. Atty. Venzon himself admitted that on the date alluded to by complainant, he indeed notarized a document
denominated as a Sinumpaang Salaysay which was brought to him by an elderly couple, and that he no longer
required the presentation of any competent evidence of their identities due to their age. As a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public, Atty. Venzon was mandated to exercise the function of his office and must
have observed with utmost care the basic formalities of his office and requisites in the performance of his
duties. When Atty. Venzon affixed his signature and notarial seal on the Sinumpaang Salaysay, he certified that
the party purportedly executing the same, i.e., herein complainant, personally appeared before him, and
attested to the truth and veracity of its contents – even if it appears that it was not complainant who had the
document notarized before him. Verily, such conduct of Atty. Venzon’s part was fraught with dangerous
possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a documen that the courts and the public
accord on notarized documents. Hence, it is only proper that Atty. Venzon be held administratively liable
therefor. (De Guzman v. Atty. Venzon, A.C. No. 8559, July 27, 2020, Second Division)
16. Atty. Ayon-Ayon exhausted all means to determine the identities of the parties. More so, Atty. Ayon-Ayon
complied with Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. First, the persons who appeared before
Atty. Ayon-Ayon and claimed to be the sellers of the subject property were able to present the Deed. Second,
before Atty. Ayon-Ayon affixed his signature on the Acknowledgment and his notarial seal on the Deed, he
required the persons appearing before him to represent their respective identification cards, and the following
were shown to him: (a) Unified Multi-Purpose ID No. CRN-0003-6696782-9 issued in the name of Teresita
Leonor; Tax Identification Number 103-090-285 issued in the name of Manuel Leonor; and (c) Driver’s License
No. N09-75-024598 issued in the name of Manuel Leonor. Third, the mentioned identification card presented
by the persons who appeared before Atty. Ayon-Ayon are considered competent evidence of identity pursuant
to Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that provides that a “competent evidence of
identity” refers to the identification of an individual based on at least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual. In this case, the
identification cards presented by the persons who appeared before Atty. Ayon-Ayon were sufficient for him to
reasonably believe that the persons who were the same persons indicated as owners in the Deed. Lastly, the
persons who appeared before Atty. Ayon-Ayon manifested that they voluntarily affixed their signatures on the
Deed and even declared that they had executed it as their free and voluntary act and deed. Equally important
to note, the persons who appeared before Atty. Ayon-Ayon also presented an original copy of TCT No. 46664
of the subject property bearing the same names in the identification cards presented to him. Thus, Atty. Ayon-
Ayon is justified in believing that the persons who appeared before him were the true owners of the subject
property considering that they were able to present not only their respective identification cards, but also TCT
No. 46664 of the subject property. As found by the IBP-BOG, Atty. Ayon-Ayon reasonably relied on good faith
that the persons who appeared before him were indeed the persons that they purport to be. (Leonor v. Atty.
Ayon-Ayon, A.C. No. 12624, September 16, 2020, Second Division)
PERSONAL APPEARANCE BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC

1. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice states that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person before
the notary public. Thus, a notary public should not notarize the document if the parties are not physically
present before him. In this case, the Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s
representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should
have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee. (Anudon v. Atty. Cefra, A.C.

No. 5482, February 10, 2015, En Banc; Apolinar-Petilo v. Atty. Maramot, A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018, Third
Division; Gonzales v. Atty. Bañares, A.C. No. 11396, June 20, 2018, Second Division; Rigon, Jr. v. Atty. Subia, A.C.
No. 10249, September 7, 2020, Second Division)
2. Atty. Gasmen violated the notarial rules when he notarized the SPA and the loan application without the party
having appeared before him. (Sappayani v. Atty. Gasmen, A.C. No. 7073, September 1, 2015, First Division)
3. Atty. Resuena violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SPA
without all the affiant’s personal appearance. In addition, it was appalling that Atty. Resuena permitted
Remedios Perez to sign on behalf of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez knowing fully well that the two were
already dead at that time and more so when he justified that the latter’s names were nevertheless not included
in the acknowledgment albeit they are signatories of the SPA. Equally deplorable too is the fact that Remedios
was likewise allowed to sign on behalf of Gracia Perez and Gloria Perez, who were said to be residing abroad.
Worse, he deliberately allowed the use of the subject SPA in an ejectment case that was filed in court. (Fabay
v. Atty. Resuena, A.C. No. 8723, January 26, 2016, En Banc)
4. Atty. Ogena was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public. He failed to require the personal
presence of the signatories of the documents and proceeded to notarize the aforementioned documents
without the signature of all the parties. Likewise, Atty. Ogena failed to require the parties to present their
competent evidenc of identity. (Sistual v. Atty. Ogena, A.C. No. 9807, February 2, 2016, En Banc)
5. Respondent violated the notarial law when she notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale without the personal
appearance of complainant. It was respondent’s duty as notary public to require the personal appearance of
the person executing the document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of his signature. Doing away
with the essential requirement of physcial presence of the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that
the doucments may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. (Baysac v. Atty. Aceron-
Papa, A.C. No. 10231, August 10, 2016, Third Division)
6. It has been established that the affidavits were merely handed to the concerned registered votes of the
Municipality of Biri at the polling precincts on election day, bearing already the signature and notarial seal of
Atty. Anquilo-Garcia. Accordingly, Atty. Anquilo-Garcia failed to perform her duty as a notary public. (Bernaldez
v. Atty. Anquilo-Garcia, A.C. No. 8698, August 31, 2016, Third Division)
7. Complainant’s act of notarizing the document without the presence of the affiant is prohibited by the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. (Atty. Yumul-Espina v. Atty. Tabaquero, A.C. No. 11238, September 21, 2016, Third
Division; Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos, A.C. No. 9209, April 18, 2017, En Banc; Balbin v. Atty. Baranda, Jr., A.C. No.
12041, November 5, 2018, Second Division; Tabao v. Atty. Lacaba, A.C. No. 9269, March 13, 2019, First Division;
Spouses Aldea v. Atty. Bagay, A.C. 12733, October 14, 2020, Third Division)
8. Without a quibble, Atty. Baylosis was negligent in the performance of his duty as a notary public when he
notarized the petition for declaration of the nullity of marriage without the presence of Roldan. (Loberes-Pintal
v. Atty. Baylosis, A.C. No. 11545, January 24, 2017, En Banc)
9. There are serious doubts as to whether the Spouses Navarro did indeed appear before Atty. Ygoña to have the
Deed of Absolute Sale notarized since there are glaring discrepancies in the CTCs used in the Deed. Moreover,
Atty. Ygoña failed to record the transaction in his books and include the same in his notarial register. (Spouses
Navarro v. Atty. Ygoña, A.C. No. 8450, July 26, 2017, First Division)
10. Boer satisfactorily proved that she could not have personally appeared befoe Calubaquib on October 16, 1991
as she was out of the country as early as December 20, 1990. Moreover, Calubaquib’s own evidence established
this same fact. He presented a joint affidavit which expressly states that Boer was not in the Philippines when
he notarized the Deed of Sale. In addition, Calubaquib violated the mandatory recording requirements under
the Rules. The Certification from the National Archives reveals that Calubaquib failed to record the Deed of Sale
in his notarial register. (Boers v. Atty. Calubaquib, A.C. No. 10562, August 1, 2017, En Banc)
11. The SPA in question was notarized by respondent lawyer despite the absence of Mallari, one of the affiants
therein. Mallari could not have personally appeared before respondent lawyer in Muntinlupa City, Philippines
where the SPA was notarized on July 26, 2006 because Mallari was in Japan at that time, as certified to by the
Bureau of Immigration. (Almario v. Atty. Llera-Agno, A.C. No. 10689, January 8, 2018, First Division)
12. The Court, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the notarial law for his act of notarizing the: (a) Deed of
Sale dated April 12, 2002 purportedly executed by and between the spouses Maximo F. Quezada and Gloria D.
Quezada, the buyers, and complainant Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla; and
the (b) Joint Affidavit dated March 20, 2002 purportedly executed by the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto
Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-18490, when in both occasions the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and
Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer execute said documents and appear before Atty. Quesada since they have long

been deceased as evidenced by their death certificates. Tarcela Zarcilla died on January 9, 1988, while Perfecto
Zarcilla died on March 4, 2001. (Zarcilla v. Atty. Quesada, Jr., A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018, En Banc)
13. Records show that respondent indeed violated the 2004 Notarial Rules when he notarized the subject deed
without complainant and Grace personally appearing before him, much more without the requisite notarial
commission in 2011. Significantly, it was established that both complainant and Grace could not have personally
appeared before respondent, since Grace was already residing at the U.S. at the time of the supposed
notarization. Furthermore, complainant presented a Certification dated April 7, 2015 issued by the Clerk of
Court of the RTC showing that respondent was also not a commissioned notary public for and within Quezon
City in 2012. On the other hand, respondent, apart from his bare denials and unsubstantiated defense of
forgery, failed to rebut complainant's allegations and evidence. While respondent provided his specimen
signature in his Answer to support his defense of forgery, the same nonetheless remained insufficient. As aptly
observed by CIBD Dir. Esguerra, respondent did not even submit a copy of his signature appearing in the records
of the Office of the Clerk of Court or any other official document containing the same specimen signature to
prove its genuineness and authenticity. Case law states that where a party resorts to bare denials and
allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the
violation is sustained. Hence, no reasonable conclusion can be had other than the fact that respondent
notarized the subject deed m violation of the 2004 Notarial Rules. (Triol v. Atty. Agcaoili, Jr., A.C. No. 12011,
14. On April 20, 2011, respondent notarized the verification and certification of non forum shopping in the petition
filed before RTC Branch 131 supposedly executed by complainant as the affiant. At that time, however,
complaint was not in the Philippines because she was still in Norway working as an OFW. Undoubtedly,
respondent violated the notarial rules when he notarized a document without the personal presence of the
affiant.
a. Respondent gave a flimsy excuse that he was not informed that complainant was not in the Philippines
when he notarized the verification and certification on non forum shopping. Assuming arguendo that this
is true, he should have refrained from notarizing such document until complainant personally appear
before him. In addition, respondent should have explained to complainant and her parents that he can only
notarize and file the petition before the court once complainant returns to the Philippines. Lamentably,
instead of informing his client about the rules of notarization, respondent proceeded with the notarization
of the document and gave a false assurance that the case of complainant would still continue even in her
absence. (Taday v. Atty. Apoya, Jr., A.C. No. 11981, July 3, 2018, En Banc)
15. It is undisputed that Atty. Latras notarized the subject document without the personal appearance of the
spouses. In fact, in his Comment, he admitted that he indeed notarized the deed. Atty. Latras, however,
reasoned out that he only followed the instruction of Ray Zialcita to notarize the same without their presence
and that he merely relied on the alleged assurance of the spouses that they would be present on that weekend.
Atty. Latras' contention that there has been substantial compliance with the notarial law holds no water. It is of
no moment that he talked with the spouses over the phone and that, through the presence of witnesses, he
was able to verify that the signatures in the said document were those of the spouses. This Court has repeatedly
stressed in a number of cases the requirement for the parties to personally appear before the notary public in
the notarization of documents. The purpose of the requirement of personal appearance by the acknowledging
party before the notary public is to enable the latter to verify the genuineness of the signature of the former.
(Spouses Zialcita v. Atty. Latras, A.C. No. 7169, March 11, 2019, Third Division)
16. It devolves upon complainant to prove that he was not in the Philippines prior to November 25, 2000 because
of his trip to Malaysia; this he failed to do, however. For, a perusal of his submitted copy of page 8 of his passport
shows that there was no exit stamp or "chopping" from the Philippines on or prior to November 25, 2000. His
explanation in his Comment/Rejoinder about the procedure of the "non-chopping" of his passport in Hong Kong
which, according to him meant or indicated that he was a resident there, in no wise proved that he was not in
the Philippines. Nor did the July 9, 2013 Certification by the Bureau of Immigration prove that complainant in
fact left the Philippines prior to November 25, 2000. And, complainant's case is not at all helped by the fact that
his travel record (page 2 of the computer database file of the Bureau of Immigration), which in the nature of
things ought to have presented an accurate information of his arrivals and departures between January 1999
to December 2001, never reflected his alleged departure from the Philippines on November 18, 2000. Neither
was there any Philippine exit stamp on Rajesh's passport on that date. Upon the other hand, the same
certification stated that Rajesh left the country on November 18, 2000 "as appearing on the Bureau of
Immigration's manifest file." And we all know that a passenger manifest is a document issued by an airline
containing the passenger's list for inbound and outbound flights. Notably, the passenger manifest referred to
was not attached to the certification at all. (Gagoomal v. Atty. Bedona, A.C. No. 10559, June 10, 2019, First
Division)
17. Respondent, however, could not be adjudged to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice for such
failure for the reason that at the time the subject Deed of Donation was notarized in 2002, the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice was not yet in force. Instead, respondent's failure to require the parties to the Deed of

Donation notarized by him to personally appear before him constitutes a violation of Section 1(a) of Public Act
No. 2103. As correctly found by the IBP, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before
him when they, in fact, did not do so, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the CPR and [his] oath as a lawyer
that [he] shall do no falsehood. In addition, his act of notarizing the Deed of Donation without the required
presence of the complainants as required by Section 1(a) of Public Act No. 2103 likewise constitutes a violation
of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land. (Sambile v. Atty. Ignacio, A.C. No.
8249, September 2, 2019, Second Division)
18. A notary public who notarizes several deeds of Absolute Sale of the deceased affiant long after the latter’s
demise violates the notarial rules. By notarizing a document without the appearance of the affiant, respondent
failed to ascertain not only the genuineness of his signature but also the due execution of the document. (Atty.
Velarde v. Atty. Ilagan, A.C. No. 12154, September 17, 2019, En Banc)
19. Atty. Galano transgressed the most fundamental rules in the notarization of documents. He notarized the Deed
of Absolute Sale without requiring the presence of the purported vendor Dominga and her husband Miguel,
whose signatures falsely appeared on the document. Worse, he committed falsehoods by stating in the notarial
acknowledgment that Dominga and Miguel personally appeared before him on July 26, 2012, whichwas utterly
impossible considering that they had been dead twenty (20) years prior to such date of notarization. The fact
of their demise was established from the respective Death Certificates which are attached to the records of the
case. (Heirs of Torrices v. Atty. Galano, A.C. No. 11870, July 7, 2020, En Banc)
20. Atty. Baldovino violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which provides that a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the signatory to the document is in the notary’s presence personally at the time of
the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent
evidence of identity. Here, Atty. Baldovino notarized the verification attached to the petition for nullity of
marriage and the judicial affidavit in the absence of Lawrence. (Berzola v. Atty. Baldovino, A.C. No. 12815,
21. Atty. Amores violated the notarial rules. Atty. Amores failed to observe the requirement of physical presence
when he notarized the Secretary's Certificate. Upon examination of the document, and as admitted by Atty.
Amores himself, Irene's signature in the Secretary's Certificate attached to the complaint-affidavit in the
criminal case was merely printed. In short, it was not an actual handwritten signature of Irene. Atty. Amores's
defense that Irene physically signed one copy that was subsequently reproduced then notarized, does not
convince this Court. Atty. Amores did not present any proof that Irene was indeed physically in his presence
upon the signing and notarization of the document. It goes without saying that Irene had signed the document
elsewhere, scanned it, and then sent it electronically to Atty. Amores for the latter to print, reproduce, notarize,
and use for the designated purpose. If indeed Irene had personally appeared before him, he should have asked
her right then and there to affix her signature to each and every copy of the document, not just to one copy. It
is also worth mentioning that Atty. Amores failed to indicate the serial number of his notarial commission in the
concluding part of the notarial certificate of the Secretary's Certificate as required by the rules. (Kiener v. Atty.
Amores, A.C. No. 9417, November 18, 2020, Third Division)
OTHER ACTS OF DERELICTION

1. A notary public who notarizes an affidavit of a perjured witness, despite his knowledge thereof, violates the
Notarial rules. (Samonte v. Atty. Jumamil, A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017, First Division)
2. As to Atty. Siapno’s liability, from his own admission, it cannot be doubted that he is guilty of dereliction of duty
as a notary public. It was admitted that the questioned deeds of sale bore the impression of his notarial seal.
He, however, maintains that he did not notarize the said documents and that his signatures therein were forged,
which, however, were not proven in this case. He admitted that he has no sole access and control of his notarial
seal as other persons could make use of the same without his consent or knowledge. His excuse cannot absolve
him from liability since the notarial rules require a duly commissioned notary public to refrain from committing
any dereliction or any act which may serve as a cause for the revocation of his commission or the imposition of
administrative sanctions. (Castro v. Atty. Bigay, Jr., A.C. No. 7824, July 19, 2017, Third Division)
3. A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary. The act of recording such entries in the Notarial Register is
part and parcel of the duties of a notary public. Keeping in mind the nature of a notary public’s responsibility,
the respondent should not have shifted such responsibility to his office secretary and allowed her to make such
pertinent entries. (Spouses Chambon v. Atty. Ruiz, A.C. No. 11478, September 5, 2017, En Banc)
4. By notarizing another deed of sale with a much lower purchase price, which was later submitted to the BIR for
the purpose of paying the capital gains tax, Alisuag clearly violated his duty of upholding the respect for the law
and protecting the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He allowed and acknowledged a document
which was meant to deprive the government of the correct amount of taxes. (Basiyo v. Atty. Alisuag, A.C. No.

5. There is indeed no basis to hold respondent liable for misconduct for notarizing his wife's Affidavit in 2002. To
recall, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of misconduct because he notarized the affidavit of his
wife on April 25, 2002. Nevertheless, at the time of such notarization, it was the 1917 Revised Administrative
Code that covered notarial practice. As elucidated in Alilano and Ylaya, during the effectivity of said Code, a
Notary Public was not disallowed from notarizing a document executed by a relative. Neither was there a
prohibition for a Notary Public to notarize a document executed by his or her spouse. As discussed, the 1917
Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law. In turn, the provisions anent notarial practice
embodied in the Revised Administrative Code were superseded by the passage of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. This only means that any prohibition enumerated in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice does not cover
the acts made by a Notary Public earlier, including those executed in 2002. (Mabini v. Atty. Kintanar, A.C. No.
9512, February 5, 2018, First Division)
6. Jurisprudence provides that a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such is meted out the following
penalties: (a) revocation of notarial commission; (b) disqualification from being commissioned as notary public;
and (c) suspension from the practice of law – the terms of which vary based on the circumstances of each case.
(Orola v. Atty. Baribar, A.C. No. 6927, March 14, 2018, Second Division)
7. Respondent cannot be faulted for notarizing the document even though it indicated only the community tax
certificate of the parties because the document was notarized before the effectivity of the 2004 Notarial Rules.
(In re: Decision dated September 26, 2012 in OMB-M-A-10-023-A, A.C. No. 9676, April 2, 2018, First Division)
8. A notary public who notarizes a deed of sale, the subject of which is a parcel of land covered by CARP, within
the prohibitive period violates the notarial rules. (Dimayuga v. Atty. Rubia, A.C. No. 8854, July 3, 2018, En Banc)
9. Respondent clearly violated this provision when she notarized the deeds of absolute sale despite the incomplete
signature and identification details of the vendors. Moreover, when the identification details were indeed
provided in the deeds, the proof of identity indicated for all of them was the CTC Number. Jurisprudence already
holds that a CTC is not considered as competent evidence of identity as it does not bear a photograph and a
signature of the individual concerned, as required in Rule II, Section 12 of the Notarial Rules. Worse, while there
are some signatures that do appear on the instruments, the vendors therein claimed that they did not actually
sign the deeds. In support of this, complainant attached in his Complaint the counter-affidavits of some of the
Sultan siblings in the estafa case filed by Jerry (the vendee in the assailed deeds of sale), with respondent as
counsel. (Ko v. Atty. Uy-Lampasa, A.C. No. 11584, March 6, 2019, Second Division)
10. Respondent also violated the Notarial Rules when he allowed his secretaries to perform notarial acts in his
behalf. It has been established that respondent allows his secretaries to perform notarial acts in his stead, and
even forge his signature for such purpose, as what happened on February 10, 2017 when respondent's
secretaries "notarized" the Acknowledgment and affixed his signature therein. As a notary public and their
employer, respondent is responsible for their acts which include implementing such reasonable measures that
would preclude opportunities for the abuse of his prerogative authority as notary public by his secretaries and
enable them to copy his signature and perform notarial acts on his behalf. Evidently, respondent is guilty of
negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which the Court cannot countenance.
a. Section 7, Rule II of the Notarial Rules defines "notarization" or "notarial act" as any act that a notary public
is empowered to perform under said Rules. A "notary public" is any person commissioned to perform
official acts under the same Rules. In performing a notarial act, a notary public is required to, among others:
sign by hand on the notarial certificate; and affix his official signature only at the time the said act is
performed. Hence, it has been settled that since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the
notary public must also personally administer the notarial acts that the law authorizes him to execute. This
important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should
perform it. (Sanchez v. Atty. Inton, A.C. No. 12455, November 5, 2019, En Banc)
11. Notary public Atty. San Jose cannot be held liable for notarizing the Deed of Sale since he had reasonable ground
to believe that the SPA granted in favor of Atty. Delos Santos was force in effect. There is no showing, moreover,
that Pilar had revoked said SPA by any of the modes allowed by law. (Prospero v. Atty. Delos Santos, A.C. No.
11583, December 3, 2019, En Banc)
12. In this case, respondent notarized the subject lease contract signed by his mother. By this fact alone, he violated
the disqualification rule under the aforesaid provision of the Rules. However, the Court notes that other than
respondent's mother, no other party signed the contract. In fact, as embodied in the Acknowledgment itself,
respondent did not declare that any other person appeared before him, aside from his mother. At the same
time, complainant himself admitted that the Bank and Teresita did not pursue the agreement surrounding the
lease agreement. This only shows that despite its notarization, no apparent injury was caused to any party by
respondent's act of notarizing a document signed by his mother. Moreover, respondent readily admitted his
mistake contending that he was a new lawyer at the time he notarized the subject instrument. He asserted,
too, that he was so eager to be of help but due to modest unfamiliarity, without any intention to cause damage,

he acknowledged the instrument executed by his mother. By virtue of the foregoing attendant circumstances,
the Court deems it proper to instead admonish respondent considering that: (a) no evidence of bad faith can
be imputed against him; (b) he readily admitted his mistake; (c) no prejudice to any person was caused by his
complained act; and (d) he was a new lawyer and a first time offender when he committed it. The Court believes
that because of this case, respondent learned his lesson already as regards notarizing a seemingly harmless
instrument. Certainly, this experience will teach him to be more circumspect in exercising his duties as a notary
public. (Caronongan v. Atty. Ladera, A.C. No. 10252, December 11, 2019, Second Division)
13. The Court agrees with the IBP that the signatures of respondent Atty. Belaro found in the three versions of the
Extrajudicial Settlement were indeed forgeries. The signatures were strikingly dissimilar to his specimen
signatures submitted before the RTC-Quezon City when he applied for notarial commission. However, our
conclusion differs as regards his alleged signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
Acknowledgement Receipt. Contrary to the findings of the IBP, the questioned signatures were different from
respondent Atty. Belaro's specimen signatures on file with the RTC-Quezon City even to the naked eye. First,
the middle initial letter "B" in the specimen signatures was in a downward to upward stroke compared to the
questioned signatures which showed that the letter "B" was close to being unrecognizable. Second, the first
strokes in the specimen signatures were pointed downwards whereas in the questioned signatures these were
cursive. Third, anent the signature stroke of respondent Atty. Belaro's surname, the first downward strokes in
the specimen signatures were pointed at the end compared to the questioned signatures which were circular.
Fourth, the strokes of the first letter in the surname in the specimen signatures appeared to be more of a letter
R or B compared to the questioned signatures which significantly looked like letter N. Fifth, the tips of the end
strokes in the specimen signatures were cursive or round unlike in the questioned signatures which were both
pointed. Sixth, the strokes in the surname in the specimen signatures were not drawn as one straight line as
compared to the questioned signatures. Lastly, the specimen signatures appeared to be executed in a free rapid
continuous stroke unlike in the questioned signatures which showed a slow upward stroke resembling
hesitation on the part of the person signing the documents. Clearly, the signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale
and in the Acknowledgement Receipt were not the genuine signatures of respondent Atty. Belaro.
a. Nonetheless, respondent Atty. Belaro is not exculpated from administrative liability. As observed by the
IBP, the Extrajudicial Settlement bore his notarial seal. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly states
that, when not in use, the official seal of the notary public must be kept safe and secure and shall be
accessible only to him or the person duly authorized by him.[37] Here, respondent Atty. Belaro utterly failed
to sufficiently provide any laudable explanation why his notarial seal was found in the documents. He
simply asserted in his Answer to the Letter-Complaint that the signatures of the notary public found in the
subject instruments were not his, that he did not cause the filing of these documents to any government
agencies, and that he never employed Dioneda as his secretary. Indubitably, respondent Atty. Belaro did
not properly secure and keep his notarial seal in a safe place inaccessible to other persons so as to ensure
that nobody can use the same without his authority. Had he done so, his notarial seal would not have been
affixed to the Extrajudicial Settlement which converted the same from a private document into a public
document. Thus, respondent Atty. Belaro has been remiss in his duty to exercise utmost diligence in the
performance of his functions as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of law. In being careless
in failing to secure and keep his notarial seal in a safe place away from any person not authorized to use
the same, respondent Atty. Belaro committed a transgression of the Notarial Law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). (Ang v. Atty. Belaro, Jr., A.C. No. 12408, December 11, 2019, Second
Division)
14. Respondent failed to appreciate the formalities required by the notarial rules and/or was careless in
implementing the rules. Records show that respondent notarized two documents, i.e., the Answer which was
filed in Civil Case No. 5436 and the Deed which was attached as part of the Answer in Civil Case No. 5436.
However, both documents were identifies as “Doc No. 733, Page No. 158, Book No. 02, series of 2016.” It is
clear from the notarial rules that two different documents cannot bear the same notarial details. Further, the
Deed appeared to be notarized despite the fact that it did not contain the competent evidence of identities of
the parties signatories thereto. Specifically, there were blanks allotted for the competent evidence of identities
of the signatories to the Deed, but these blanks were unfilled.
a. In an effort to excuse herself from failing to observe the requirements under the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, respondent harped on her defense that she only mistakenly notarized the Deed as part of the
Answer in Civil Case No. 5436 and that the notarization was supposed to pertain to the Answer only.
However, the Certification dated June 19, 2017 from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC militates
against her claim. It indicates that what respondent submitted before the court is not a copy of the Answer,
but of the Deed. Unfortunately, considering that respondent denied intentionally notarizing the Deed, she
miserably failed to explain as to why she submitted a copy of the Deed to the Office of the Clerk of Court.
The Court finds it unbelievable that after allegedly notarizing the Deed by mistake, respondent would again
mistakenly submit a copy of the Deed as a duly notarized document to the Office of the Clerk of Court.
(Yuchengco v. Atty. Angare, A.C. No. 11892, June 22, 2020, Second Division)
15. As shown in the records of the case, it was not respondent who drafted the document but a certain Atty. Dela
Victoria, while respondent’s participation was only to notarize it. Considering that the Irrevocable General

Power of Attorney – even though there is no such thing as an irrevocable power of attorney – was executed
freely and voluntarily by the parties, the notary public is no longer obligated to go beyond the contents of the
document. Since the identity of the parties was sufficiently established by competent proof, the Court is
convinced that respondent had complied with his duty in the notarization of the irrevocable power of attorney.
(Santamaria v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 12006, June 29, 2020, Second Division)
16. Atty. Dalangin cannot deny that Sylvia is Teofilo’s wife or that she has an interest in the disputed land. As such,
Atty. Dalangin should have been circumspect in notarizing the deed of absolute sale over Teofilo’s property
knowing that a legal heir was left out. The transaction disregarded the rules on succession that the widow is a
compulsory heir of the decedent. Corollarily, Atty. Dalangin should have refused the notarization of the deed.
In addition, Atty. Dalangin did not timely submit his notarial reports. Admittedly, he submitted the certified
copies of his notarial register for 2008 and 2009 only on October 11, 2011 or 43 months from the date of his
commission as notary public on February 6, 2008. The Rules on Notarial Practice is explicit that a certified copy
of each month’s entries and a duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged before the notary public
shall, within the first ten days of the month following, be forwarded to the Clerk of Court and shall be under the
responsibility of such officer. If there is no entry to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a statement
to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein required. (Rivera v. Atty. Dalangin, A.C. No. 12724, July 28, 2020,
First Division)
a. Failure of the notary to send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of Court of First Instance within the
first ten (10) days of the month next following is a ground for revocation of notarial commission under
Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. (Lopez v. Atty. Mata, A.C. No. 9334, July 28, 2020,
First Division)
17. It is undisputed that respondent notarized two deeds of sale in favor of his son who was privy thereto. Clearly,
this is a violation of Section 3(c), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules, which states that a notary public is disqualified
from performing a notarial act if he is a spouses, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by
affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree. Thus, given the express disqualification
of the Notarial Rules, it was incumbent upon respondent to have acted with prudence and as such, should have
refused notarizing the said documents in compliance with the Notarial Rules. (Atty. Lim v. Atty. Tabiliran, Jr.,
A.C. No. 10793, September 16, 2020, Second Division)
18. The Elangas alleged that Atty. Pasok allowed the mortgage and even notarized the document evidencing the
same despite knowing the pendency of Civil Case No. 204 and that the copy of the title of the subject lot was
in the Elangas’ possession. Purportedly, Lourdes and Nilo were likewise not made aware of the mortgage as
they alleged that the signature of Lourdes was forged. Furthermore, Atty. Pasok allowed Francisco to receive
Lourdes’ share from the proceeds of the mortgage despite knowing that Francisco and Lourdes were opposing
parties in the civil case. To make matters worse, the Agreement provided that Atty. Pasok received P23,782.00
as part of the proceeds of the mortgage transaction. Undeniably, Atty. Pasok’s receipt of part of the proceeds
of the mortgage is highly irregular. Additionally, the Agreement was signed only by the plaintiffs and Atty. Pasok.
Lourdes’ signature is noticeably absent as supposedly, her borther Francisco, would receive her share. Yet, there
was no proof presented showing that Lourdes actually agreed to this arrangement. Moreover, in the same
Agreement, Atty. Pasok also received P162,178.03 from the proceeds of the mortgage supposedly for delivery
and deposit to DBP to facilitate the release of the owner’s copy of the title of the subject lot. This is questionable
given that the said document should be given to the Elangas and not to DBP since the Elangas already redeemed
the subject lot from DBP. Curiously, though, according to Dela Gracia, one of Atty. Pasok’s clients, in her Affidavit
dated October 15, 2015, they (the plaintiffs) gave the said amount to the Sheriff to turn over to Lourdes and
Nilo. Since the Elangas refused to receive the same, the money was returned to Catalina and not to Atty. Pasok
as alleged by Lourdes and Nilo. Nevertheless, regardless of who actually received the money, it was improper
for Atty. Pasok to be among the recipients of the proceeds of the mortgage. By notarizing the mortgage
document and subsequently receiving part of the proceeds thereof, Atty. Pasok violated Rule 4, Section 3(b) of
the Rules of Notarial Practice, which states that a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if
he will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash, property,
or other consideration, except as provided by the Rules and by law. Otherwise stated, Atty. Pasok was
disqualified from notarizing the REM document since he will directly or indirectly gain from the mortgage’s
proceeds, as he in fact did thereafter. (Elanga v. Atty. Pasok, A.C. No. 12030, September 29, 2020, En Banc)
19. Atty. Maranan denied having authored or notarized the consultancy contracts and claimed that his signatures
therein as notary public were forged. Although the IBP observed that Atty. Maranan’s signatures in the subject
contracts were strikingly dissimilar to his specimen signatures on file before the Notarial Section of the RTC,
and while it may likewise be true that said contracts were not included in the notarial reports he submitted
thereto, he cannot claim full deniability and be exculpated from administrative liability because the contracts
bore his notarial seal. Instead of offering any plausible explanation as to how the Consultancy contracts came
to be stamped with his notarial seal, Atty. Maranan merely insisted that he never notarized nor authored said
contracts, that his signatures therein were forgeries, and that said contracts were not included in his notarial
reports. No justifiable explanation was given to prove that he had performed his mandatory duties as a notary
public, which include the duty to safeguard his notarial seal to prevent possible tampering or misues thereof.

Judicial Ethics 111
Clearly, Atty. Maranan had been remiss in his obligation as a notary public. Had he been more vigilant in the
performance of his notarial duties, his notarial seal would not have been affixed in the subject contracts.
Indubitably, this failure on the part of Atty. Maranan constitutes a transgression of the Notarial Rules. (In Re:
OMB-C-C-13-0104 Atty. Socrates G. Maranan v. Francisco Domagoso, A.C. No. 12877, December 7, 2020,
Second Division)
DISCIPLINE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

1. The Executive Judge of the RTC initiated administrative proceedings against respondent motu proprio for
violation of Section 1(b)(7) of the same Rule, or failure to require the presence of a principal at the time of the
notarial act, and Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which requires in the notarial act of
acknowledgment that the attesting individual is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules. Following the prescribed remedy
under Section 1(c), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it is reasonable for respondent to appeal the
suspension of his notarial commission, which is immediately executory upon his receipt of the Order, with the
Supreme Court. Perhaps, for purposes of clarification and guidance to any party meted with disciplinary
sanctions pursuant to Sections 1(c) and (d), Rule XI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, it would be prudent
to consider an amendment thereof to clarify the proper mode and period of appeal and to harmonize the same
with the pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The OBC, in its Report, stated that respondent
should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order – to which the Court agrees, as this is a remedy
available to respondent at the time and is not prohibited by any existing rule. Either way, whether respondent
had filed a motion for reconsideration on the Order or directly appealed with the Court, Section 1(c), Rule XI of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly provides that the order imposing disciplinary sanctions shall be
immediately executory pending appeal. (Re: Order dated January 7, 2020 of Judge Ignacio I. Alajar Suspending
Atty. Ely F. Azarraga’s Notarial Commission for One Year, A.C. No. 12798, February 3, 2021, Third Division)
JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT AS NOTARIES PUBLIC

1. It is true that MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents;
however, the documents the judges notarize must be connected only with the exercise of their official functions
and duties. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he will
solemnize because said affidavits of cohabitations are not connected with the exercise of his official functions
and duties as solemnizing officer. In addition, he did not certify that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in
his territorial jurisdiction. (Tupal v. Judge Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014, Third Division)
2. It is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza, the clerk of court, notarized and administered oaths in documents that had
no relation to his official function. The subject documents – an Agreement between Clemente Solis and
Flordeliza Coquia, and Payment Agreement executed by Flordeliza Coquia – are both private documents which
are unrelated to Atty. Laforteza’s official functions. The civil case from where the subject documents originated
is not raffled in Branch 68 where Atty. Laforteza was assigned. While Atty. Laforteza serve as notary public ex
officio and, thus, may notarize documents or administer oaths, he should not in his ex officio capacity take part
in the execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to his official functions. (Coquia v. Atty.
Laforteza, A.C. No. 9364, February 8, 2017, Second Division)
3. BCC Saguyod readily admitted to notarizing hundreds, if not thousands, of various documents which were
submitted before the RTC where he is stationed. As a Clerk of Court, BCC Saguyod's acts of notarization should
comply with Section (f) of the Resolution dated August 15, 2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
a. Under this provision, Clerks of Courts of various Regional Trial Courts are authorized to notarize not only
documents relating to their official functions, but also private documents; provided, that: (a) the notarial
fees received in connection thereto shall be for the account of the Judiciary; and (b) they certify in said
documents that there are no available notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court where they are stationed. Here, aside from maintaining that he did not receive compensation for
notarizing documents, BCC Saguyod claims that he only did so because: (a) there are no notaries public
available within the Municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac; and (b) he believed in good faith that he was authorized
to do so. However, and as correctly pointed out by the OCA, such claim is belied by the fact that there are
other documents filed before the RTC which are duly subscribed by notaries public based in the same
municipality. Furthermore, BCC Saguyod cannot feign good faith in performing the aforesaid acts of
notarization, as he repeatedly did so even on those documents which were not completely accomplished
by the concerned parties. In light of BCC Saguyod's repeated violations of Section (f) of the Resolution dated
August 15, 2006 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, the OCA correctly recommended that he be found administratively
liable for inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. (OCA v. Saguyod, A.M. No. P-
17-3705, February 6, 2018, En Banc)
J U DIC IAL ETHIC S

1. Considering that she was then running for re-election as PJA Secretary-General, it would have done well for
Judge Aquino to have been more circumspect in her actions and limited her assistance to providing the
necessary information to the PJA members on the available hotel accommodations. Despite it being the practice
of past PJA Secretaries- General, Judge Aquino was expected to have sufficient discretion and discernment to
Inhibition of Judges 112
reevaluate, as needed, the propriety and/or extent of the assistance to be extended to PJA members for the
booking of their accommodations for the 2013 Convention and election especially considering that Judge
Aquino was a candidate herself in the said election. As this case has demonstrated, Judge Aquino's booking of
hotel accommodations for the PJA members, although done in good faith or with the best intentions, could be
easily misconstrued and politicized during the period of election of PJA officers to be intended to further Judge
Aquino's candidacy. Under the aforesaid circumstances, Judge Aquino deserves to be admonished. Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge[,]" and Section 1 thereof explicitly mandates that "[j]udges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities." A judge is the visible
representation of the law and of justice. A judge must comport himself/herself in a manner that his/her conduct
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his/her official duties but
also as to his/her behavior outside his/her sala and as a private individual. A judge's character must be able to
withstand the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge
are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system. (OCA v. Judge Aquino, A.M. No. RTJ-
15-2413, September 25, 2018, En Banc)
2. The reduction of the bail bond from P40,000.00 to P10,000.00 does not make or prove that respondent was
biased or hostile against complainants. Moreover, it must be stressed that the Public Prosecutor, Atty. Andrada
of the DENR and the complainants were present during the hearing on the motion, but none of them made a
counter manifestation to or refutation of the grounds offered for the reduction of bail. Respondent Judge asked
the prosectuon whether there were objections to the amount, but the Public Prosecutor stated that he was
submitting the incident to the sound discretion of the court. (Farres v. Judge Diaz De Rivera, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-
16-2462, October 14, 2019, Third Division)
IN HIB ITIO N O F J U DGES

1. A judge or judicial officer is mandatorily disqualified to sit in any case in which: (a) he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise; or (b) he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of
civil law; or (c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or counsel; or (d) he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. Meanwhile, the rule on voluntary inhibition states that
a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than the grounds for a mandatory disqualification.
a. For voluntary inhibition of judges to apply, the inhibition must be for just and valid causes. Hence, mere
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
basis. Additionally, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.
(Castro v. Mangrobang, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2455, April 11, 2016, First Division; Calayag v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 221864, September 14, 2016, Second Division)
2. Judge Abinal violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct when he acted on the criminal complaint and issued a
warrant of arrest despite his relationship to the private complainant. Rule 137 of the Rules of Court clearly
disqualifies judges from hearing cases if they are related one of the parties within the sixth degree of
consanguinity. The rule on disqualification remains even if the present case merely involves the determination
of probable cause and the eventual issuance of a warrant of arrest. (Pangandag v. Judge Abinal, A.M. No. MTJ-
16-1877, June 13, 2016, First Division)
3. Associate Justice De Castro, a consultant in the JBC, can decide in a Aguinaldo, a case which involves the
clustering of the JBC, since she had no participation in the assailed decisions made by the JBC. (Aguinaldo v.
Aquino, III., G.R. No. 224302, August 8, 2017, En Banc)
4. A judge is not required to inhibit himself in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that he will dispense justice in accordance with law and evidence. For instance, the judge is not
required to inhibit himself on the ground that petitioner’s testimony was terminated abruptly and led to the
acquittal of the dictator’s wife, Imelda. Records show that the termination of his testimony was expressly agreed
to by the prosecution, having obtained a stipulation from the defense counsel on the existence of the
documents which petitioner was to identify. In addition, the mere allegation that Judge Pampilo told news
reporters that he was expecting the CA’s TRO to be lifted within the day and thus would should that he was
coordinating with Marcos does not cosntitute proof. (Chavez v. Marcos, G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018, Third
Division)
5. There is an absolute dearth of evidence herein of Judge Aquino's bias, partiality, malice, or bad faith, which
would have called for her voluntary inhibition in the RII Builders case. As of the time of this investigation, Judge
Aquino's involvement in the case was only to grant the Motion for Implementation of the Writ of Execution that
had been previously issued by Judge Eugenio. While it was shown that Judge Aquino knew Arlene Lerma
personally; that Judge Aquino interacted with Arlene Lerma at several social events; and that Judge Aquino, as
PJA officer, would have known that Arlene Lerma had been donating raffle prizes for the annual PJA

conventions, these alone are insufficient reasons for Judge Aquino's voluntary inhibition from the RII Builders
case. There was no proof of the closeness of the relations between Judge Aquino and Arlene Lerma which would
have weighed on the former's judgment and discretion in the case. The prizes were donated by Arlene Lerma
to the PJA to be raffled to any of its participating members at the annual conventions and were not personally
and directly given to Judge Aquino. There is no allegation or argument herein that Judge Aquino's grant of the
Motion for Implementation of the Writ of Execution was in any way palpably wrong, arbitrary, baseless, or
rendered in grave abuse of discretion or with extrinsic malice or bad faith. Even the purported "coincidences"
in Judge Aquino's designation as Presiding Judge of RTC-Manila, Branch 24, vice DCA Eugenio, cannot be taken
against Judge Aquino. Any suspicion that Judge Aquino purposely sought out her transfer and designation to
DCA Eugenio's previous court, before which Arlene Lerma's case was still pending, is belied by a c reful
consideration of the circumstances surrounding Judge Aquino's transfer and designation as Presiding Judge of
RTC-Manila, Branch 24. Judge Aquino's request for transfer from RTC-Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 4 was
coursed through the proper authorities. Judge Aquino requested for transfer to any court in Metro Manila, and
she did not specifically mention RTC-Manila, Branch 24. Judge Aquino's designation as Acting Presiding Judge
of RTC-Manila, Branch 24 was officially approved under Administrative Order No. 53-2012 dated April 17, 2012,
signed by the Chief Justice and the two most senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. Both DCA Eugenio
and DCA Bahia attested before Investigating Court of Appeals Justice Reyes that there were no existing
guidelines for requests for transfer of judges to other stations. Thus, Judge Aquino's transfer from an RTC
designated as a Family Court in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan to an RTC designated as a Commercial Court in Manila
was not evidently irregular, the two courts being of the same level and there being no existing rule or guidelines
against such a transfer. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgtvmgs that the judge acted with prejudice,
passion, pride, and pettiness in the performance of his/her functions cannot overcome the presumption that
the judge decided on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. Mere imputation of bias or
partiality is not enough ground for inhibition. There must be extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith on the
judge's part. Moreover, the evidence must be clear and convincing to overcome the presumption that a judge
will undertake his/her noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.
Because voluntary inhibition is discretionary, Judge Aquino would have been in the best position to determine
whether or not there was a need for her to inhibit from the RII Builders case, and her decision to continue to
act on the case should be respected. Simply put, there is no basis for the Court to take any administrative action
against Judge Aquino for her non-inhibition in theRII Builders case. (OCA v. Judge Aquino, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2413,
6. The Heirs of Non Andres have averred that Judge Majaducon had been Melencio's former counsel prior to his
appointment as the Presiding Judge. In substantiation, they presented two correspondences addressed to the
members of the Sogod Homeseekers Association that had been signed by one Atty. Jose S. Majaducon
demanding the association members to refrain from introducing additional improvements on a lot located at
Barrio New Society, General Santos City and to vacate therefrom. In this connection, it is relevant to remember
that in the 1980s, the Heirs of Yu brought a complaint for forcible entry specifically against the members of the
Sogod Homeseekers Association docketed as Civil Case No. 1668-22.
a. This averment by the Heirs of Non Andres certainly demonstrates a probable conflict of interest committed
by Judge Majaducon. He had no right to preside in any case that involved the same interests pertaining to
Melencio, the predecessor of the Heirs of Yu, who was his former client. The Court cannot turn a blind eye
to this averment, which must be treated herein as a very serious accusation that impairs and diminishes
the good reputation of a judicial officer as well as of the entire Judiciary. It is elementary, indeed, that every
judge should administer justice impartially. As such, the judge must inhibit himself from any proceeding
that may cast doubt over his impartiality, such as having a former client as a party in a case before him.
Every judge is duty-bound not only to render a just judgment but also to render it in a manner "completely
free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." Under the circumstances, the Court must
demand from Judge Majaducon a written explanation why he should not be administratively sanctioned
for violating the ethical rules demanding his impartiality and requiring him to shun conflicts of interest in
every matter he handled as a judicial officer. (Bayani v. Yu, G.R. Nos. 203076-77, July 10, 2019, First Division)
7. A magistrate shall be mandatorily disqualified to sit in any case in which a judge, his/her spouse, or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Here, Judge Arocena's husband is a member of
the board of directors of Self-Reliant Cooperative, which has pending civil actions in her court. As a director,
her husband has an interest in the outcome of the case, which should have been the basis of her inhibition.
However, Judge Arocena failed to do so and violated Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
a. Here, a reasonable observer may perceive the spousal relationship between Judge Arocena. and a member
of the board of directors of a cooperative, which has pending civil actions in her court, as cause for bias
and partiality. In order to avoid a negative public perception, the right thing to do for a judge is to recuse
from the case. However, Judge Arocena failed to do so in disregard of the canons on impartiality and
propriety of the 2004 New Code on Judicial Conduct. Thus, Judge Arocena violated the tenets of the Court.
(Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Aldea-Arocena, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1889, September 3, 2019, En
Banc)

8. Judge Alzate violated Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court when he did not inhibit himself from acting on
his wife’s application for notarial commission. What is involved is the application of Judge Alzate’s wife for
notarial commission and Judge Alzate’s action thereon. The Notarial Rules require the judge in whose sala an
application for notarial commission is filed to conduct a summary hearing to determine wheher a petition for
notarial commission is sufficient in form and substance; whether the allegations contained in the petition are
true; and whether the applicant has read and fully understood the Notarial Rules. Here, Judge Alzate’s wife had
to personally appear before him in cour and prove she was qualified for a notarial commission. Judge Alzate,
however, was disqualified and should have inhibited himself from “sitting in the case” involving his wife
pursuant to Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Canon III, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The
case pertained to his wife’s petition for notarial commission requiring him o ascertain first whether the petition
was sufficient in form and substance; whether the allegations therein were true; and whether his wife had read
and fully understood the Notarial Rules. Surely, these matters required Judge Alzate to exercise his discretion
in passing upon whether or not his wife’s compliance with the rules and qualifications to be commissioned as
notary public. The fact that a petition for notarial commission is summary and non-adversarial in nature does
not remove it from the ambit of Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. (Sindon v. Judge Alzate, A.M. No. RTJ-
20-2576, January 29, 2020, First Division)
9. In the case of Judge Omelio’s voluntary inhibition, the court rules that a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits
himself loses jurisdiction to hear a case. However, while a judge in extremely rare instances may reconsider his
previous inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a careful re-assessment of the circumstances of the case,
the better course is to disqualify himself to avoid being misunderstood and to preserve his reputation for
probity and objectivity. In fact, Judge Omelio exceeded the bounds of his authority when he bypassed the
raffling process and re-assumed jurisdiction over the Republic’s Petition for Relief from Judgment – both
without any apparent justification. Judge Omelio’s failure to heed the guidelines provided in Section 8(a) of
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC amounts to a serious transgression of due process as the litigants (most especially
respondents) were deprived of the benefits of a fair and neutral resolution of their case. Worse, Judge Omelio
also violated the basic tenets of due process when he denied the Republic’s Petition for Relief from Judgment
without conducting a hearing; thereby denying the State an opportunity to raise its concerns or objections on
the re-assumption of jurisdiction as provided in Rule 38, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
a. A judge who voluntarily inhibits himself from handling a case means that he had doubts regarding his
impartiality. Such recusal is commendable on his part for it preserves the integrity of the Judiciary’s ability
to dispense impartial justice. However, a re-assumption of jurisdiction on the part of the judge who had
previously inhibited from a particular proceeding gives the public an impression that he may have acquired
some form of personal interest in the outcome of the case. For reasons of preserving the public’s faith in
the Judiciary’s capability to dispense impartial justice, the best option of a judge who made a prior voluntary
inhibition is to continue the same. This is especially applicable to multi-sala courts such as the RTC of Davao
City. Section 8(a), Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled “Guidelines on the Selection of Executive
Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties,” which also happens to govern the mechanism
for assignment of cases to different branches in a multi-sala court, provides that where a judge in a multi-
branch court is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself, the records shall be returned to the
Executive Judge and the latter shall cause the inclusion of the said case in the next regular raffle for re-
assignment. (Denila v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206077, July 15, 2020, Third Division)
10. None of protestant and the Solicitor General’s arguments cited a clear ground to warrant Justice Leonen’s
inhibition under the Rules. There were no prior proceedings where he may have participated. He had no
professional engagement with, pecuniary interest relative to, or relation within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to any of the parties or their counsels. Protestant also urges Justice Leonen to
voluntarily inhibit. However, a movant seeking the inhibition of a magistrate is duty-bound to present clear and
convincing evidence of bias to justify such request. Protestant failed to do so. (Marcos v. Robredo, PET No. 005,
November 17, 2020)
11. To move for the inhibition of a justice because of a perceived notion of bias or partiality against a party based
on past decisions would not hold water. Ironically, it was protestant himself who gave evidence of Justice
Leonen’s impartiality when he cited a case where Justice Leonen voted for members of the Marcos family.
a. The Solicitor General insists that Justice Leonen exhibited lack of competence and probity when he penned
the Third Division’s decision in Chavez v. Marcos. In effect, what he wants this Tribunal to accept is that
Justice Bersamin, Velasco, Jr., Martires, Jardeleza, and Leonen were all incompetent and lacking in probity
because in Chavez, the then Third Division rendered the decision and merely spoke through Justice Leonen.
When the Supreme Court resolves a case in division, it is not a separate entity from the Supreme Court en
banc. The Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate court where decisions by its divisions may be
appealed. Thus, the Solicitor General’s imputation of incompetence and lack of probity extends to all
members of the Supreme Court when Chavez was promulgated. When sitting as the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, all Justices of the Supreme Court act as one body. The order asking the Commission on Elections
and the Solicitor General to comment was not Justice Leonen's directive. Rather, it was this Tribunal's.
When protestant and the Solicitor General argue that Justice Leonen was grossly ignorant in issuing these
Orders, in effect, what they are saying is that this Tribunal was grossly ignorant of the law. This is

disrespectful and discourteous to this Tribunal. The Tribunal regrets to find itself repeating earlier
statements made when it denied protestant's similar motion as he tirelessly insists on the same arguments.
"Unless protestant can prove with tangible evidence how a single Member was able to maneuver the will
of 14 other Members into blindly following him with regard to all matters referred to the Tribunal, it is best
that he maintain his arguments within the realm of reality."
b. Protestant and the Solicitor General’s ground to inhibit Justice Leonen for dissenting in Ocampo v. Enriquez
fails to persuade. First, protestant is not [Dictator] Marcos. They are two different people. All the quoted
portions of Justice Leonen’s opinion which are allegedly biased against the [Dictator] Marcos are irrelevant
here. Second, when Justice Leonen analyzed the arguments, weighed the evidence, and arrived at a
conclusion in that case, he was not exhibiting bias. Rather, he was exercising his judicial function. To put it
in elementary terms, he was simply doing his job. In the same manner, when the other Justices voted for
the majority, they were not exhibiting bias but merely exercising their judicial functions. Protestant and the
Solicitor General posit that by not joining the majority in Ocampo, Justice Leonen can no longer be impartial
in the present case. Following their logic, the rest of the Supreme Court in Ocampo, who voted either with
or against the majority, would likewise be incapable of being impartial in this case and will always vote as
he or she did in Ocampo in future cases involving the Marcos family. This would then lead to an absurd
scenario where all the justices will have to inhibit for either voting for or against a party when a new case
is filed against that party. This conclusion is plainly unacceptable.
c. Protestant and the Solicitor General quote heavily from Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion in Ocampo,
claiming that the quoted portions demonstrate Justice Leonen’s bias against protestant. In particular,
protestant and the Solicitor General take exception to Justice Leonen's explanation on why the dictator
Marcos should not have been buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani, namely: that he was not a hero; that
he invented his supposed medals of honor; that he allowed his family, associates, and cronies to plunder
the Philippine coffers; that even the Supreme Court, throughout the decades, has identified him to be an
authoritarian and dictator, and held that Swiss deposits in the amount of US$658,175,373.60 under the
name of the Marcoses had been ill-gotten wealth, to be forfeited in favor of the government; and that the
abuses during his regime caused suffering for millions of Filipinos. Both protestant and the Solicitor General
also claim that Justice Leonen's prejudice against protestant is apparent because his dissenting opinion
mentioned the accountability of the [Dictator] Marcos' relatives for certain offenses committed during his
regime. Justice Leonen's description of the [Dictator] Marcos' regime and its effect on the nation was based
on law, history, and jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the Marcos regime as
authoritarian, referred to "the Marcoses and their cronies"; acknowledged the illegal wealth the Marcoses
stashed away which the government has been attempting to recover; and noted the suffering the Marcos
regime had wrought on the Filipino people. (Marcos v. Robredo, PET No. 005, November 17, 2020)
12. A judge should have voluntarily inhibited from a case where his actions, taken together, show badges of bias in
favor of one of the parties to the case.
a. Here, petitioner seeks Judge Acosta's voluntary inhibition from the main case on the ground of bias or
partiality, as manifested in the following actions: (i) Judge Acosta dismissed the Complaint even without a
hearing and without the filing of a motion to dismiss by respondents, who only filed an Answer; (ii)
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration from the Order lifting the Writ of Preliminary Attachment and
Notice of Lis Pendens was pending for almost a year before it got resolved; (iii) Judge Acosta did not act
upon the Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses filed by respondents despite it being
deemed submitted for resolution; (iv) the Motion to Resolve with Motion to Set Case for Pre-trial was also
not acted upon by Judge Acosta; and (v) Judge Acosta issued the October 11, 2013 Order dismissing the
Complaint after more than a year from the time the last pleading was filed.
b. These circumstances taken together, the Court finds that Judge Acosta’s actions showed badges of bias
against petitioner.
c. The records show that respondents filed an Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and
subsequently moved for a Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses, but nowhere does it appear that
Judge Acosta acted on the motion and conducted a hearing on this matter. Still, Judge Acosta dismissed
the Complaint filed by petitioner based on the affirmative defense raised by respondents.
d. Moreover, it took Judge Acosta almost a year, or only on May 22, 2013, to resolve petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the July 5, 2012 Order which lifted the writ of preliminary attachment, despite being
informed of respondents' failure to post a valid counterbond. The records reveal that Judge Acosta
repeatedly reset the hearing for respondents' posting of a counterbond to November 7, 2012, then to
February 6, 2013, and then to March 15, 2013. During the March 15, 2013 hearing, petitioner submitted a
certification issued by the Supreme Court stating that the bonding company from which respondents
obtained their counterbond was not accredited to deal with bonds. He also informed Judge Acosta that a
certain Lutz Kunack already bought the condominium unit subject of the preliminary attachment. Yet, it
was only on May 22, 2013, or almost a year after the July 5, 2012 Order, that another Order revoking the
lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment and notice of lis pendens was issued for failure of respondents
to post the required counterbond, to the prejudice of petitioner. This is in contrast with Judge Acosta's
action when respondents filed a Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Attachment and to Lift Lis Pendens on
January 26, 2012. There, Judge Acosta, in a July 5, 2012 Order, granted their Motion and cancelled the
Notice of Lis Pendens only within a period of six months.

Administrative Complaints against Judges 116
e. Also, the Motion to Resolve with Motion to Set Case for Pre-trial filed by petitioner on July 17, 2013 was
not acted upon while respondents' Motion to Resolve Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Hearing on
Affirmative Defenses was deemed submitted for resolution by Judge Acosta.
f. To create further doubt on his partiality, it took Judge Acosta an inordinate amount of time to resolve the
Complaint, finally ruling in favor of respondents in an October 11, 2013 Order although the last pleading
was submitted for resolution on May 14, 2012. The Constitution mandates that "[a]ll cases or matters filed
after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within... three months [from the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself] for all
other lower courts."
g. Given that his actions under the circumstances, taken as a whole, casted doubt on his partiality, Judge
Acosta should have exercised his discretion in a way that people's faith in the judiciary would not be
impaired-that is to disqualify himself.
h. However, considering Judge Acosta's appointment as Associate Justice in the Court of Appeals, the issue of
his inhibition in the pre-trial and trial of the main case before the trial court has been rendered moot.
(Martirez v. Crespo, G.R. No. 225918, June 30, 2021, Third Division)
ADMIN IS TR ATIV E C O M PLAIN TS AG AIN S T J U DGES

1. In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of the respondent. In the present case, Judge Andaya’s compulsory retirement divested the OCA
of its right to institute a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no
longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over Judge Andaya by filing a new administrative case against him
after he ceased to be a public official. The remedy, if necessary, is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case
for alleged transgression. (OCA v. Andaya, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181, June 25, 2013, En Banc; See v. Judge Mislang,
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2454, June 6, 2018, Second Division)
2. A judge who fails to take appropriate action to 20 unresolved criminal cases and 37 unresolved civil cases is
administratively liable for undue delay. (OCA v. Andaya, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181, June 25, 2013, En Banc; Gamboa-
Roces v. Judge Perez, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1887, January 9, 2017, Second Division; Re: Findings on the Judicial Audit
conducted in RTC, Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC, March 7, 2017, En Banc; Atty.
Miranda v. Judge Oca, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1899, March 7, 2018, Second Division; Atty. Cinco v. Judge Ruiz III, A.M.
No. RTJ-16-2482, August 15, 2018, Second Division; OCA v. Judge Guiling, A.M. No. RTJ-19-2549, June 18, 2019,
En Banc; Atty. Esturas v. Judge Lu, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2281, September 16, 2019, Third Division; Re: Judicial Audit
conducted on Branch 64, RTC, Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental, A.M. No. 20-07-96-RTC, September 1, 2020,
En Banc)
a. Failure to render decisions and orders within the mandated period constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that a judge shall dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. (OCA v. Hon. Atienza-Turla, A.M. No. RTJ-21-005,
December 9, 2020, En Banc)
3. Respondent was careless in disposing the motions filed by complainant, in a criminal case no less. He cannot be
relieved from the consequences of his actions simply because he was newly appointed and his case load was
heavy. (Keng Sin v. Judge Mangente, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015, Second Division)
4. A judge who recalls a void judgment is not liable for gross ignorance of the law. This is because a void judgment
is no judgment at all and is neither a source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. (Rivera v. Catalo, A.M.
No. RTJ-15-2422, July 20, 2015, Second Division)
a. A judge who subsequently rectifies his mistake in his previous order cannot be held liable for gross
ignorance of the law. (Atty. Causing v. Judge Dela Rosa, OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, March 7, 2018, Second
Division)
5. A judge who has been convicted, by a final and executory judgment, for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
and for malversation of public funds confirm that th administrative charges for which he may be found liable
are serious charges.
a. A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC provides that an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on the
grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary aciton against members of the Bar, shall be consiered
as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar. It also states that judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (OCA v. Ruiz, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, February
2, 2016, En Banc)
b. However, before a judge may be held administratively liable as a member of the Bar, she must be directed
to show cause why she should not be disbarred. (OCA v. Tomas, A.M. No. P-09-2633, January 30, 2018, En
Banc)
6. The Sandiganbayan ruling was a collegial decision, with Justice Hernandez as the ponente, and Associate Justices
Quiroz and Corenjo as the concurring magistrates. It bears stressing that in a collegial court, the members act
on the basis of consensus or majority rule. Therefore, Umali cannot impute he perceived to be an erroneous

conclusion of law to Justice Hernandez only. (Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of Alfonso v. Umali, IPI
No. 15-35-SB-J, February 23, 2016, En Banc)
7. To hold judges or Justices of partiality, it is important that the resulting order, resolution, or decision must have
been rendered on an “extrajudicial source.” This rule is known as the Extra-Judicial Source Rule, which states
that in order to be disqualifying, the alleged bias must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion
on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Thus, as long
as decisions made and opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence
presented, the conduct observed by the magistrate, and the application of the law will not sustain a claim of
personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. (Re: Complaint of Atty. Pefianco against Justice Sempio Diy,
Hernando, and Salandanan-Manahan, IPI No. 14-222-CA-J, February 23, 2016, En Banc)
8. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period and without any request for an
extension of time filed to the Supreme Court constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. (Miano v. Aguilar, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408, March 2, 2016,
First Division; OCA v. Casalan, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2385, April 20, 2016, Third Division; Re: Findings on the Judicial
Audit conducted at the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Lilo-an-Compostela, Liloan, Cebu, A.M. No. 12-8-59-
MCTC, April 12, 2016, En Banc; Bancil v. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1869-July 27, 2016, Second Division; Re:
Judicial Audit conducted in the RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, A.M. No. 14-11-350-
RTC, December 5, 2017, En Banc; Re: Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in the RTC Branch 24, Cebu City,
A.M. No. 13-8-185-RTC, October 17, 2018, First Division; Failure to Disclose Cases submitted for Decision and
Pending Motions of Judge Banquerigo, A.M. No. MTJ-20-1938, November 17, 2020, En Banc)
a. The administrative liability stands even if the judge cites his poor health conditions provided that he does
not inform the Court about his condition and did not ask for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of
his cases. (Re: Evaluation of Administrative Liabiliity of Hon. Antonio C. Lubao, A.M. No. 15-09-314-RTC,
April 19, 2016, En Banc)
9. Respondent judge cannot be spared from the consequences of his undue delays. He did not show that he ever
requested the Supreme Court for the additional time within which to dispose of the matters therein. In addition,
his other justifications such as the motion for reconsideration being submitted for resolution in “the period of
euphoria for the Christmas holidays” and him serving his three-month suspension from office, are unworthy
explanations in failing to resolve the motion for reconsideration in an expeditious and seasonal manner.
(Spouses Sustento v. Lilagan, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, March 8, 2016, En Banc; Farres v. Judge Diaz De Rivera, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2462, October 14, 2019, Third Division)
10. A careful perusal of the wording of the question “Have you ever been charged?” would show that it solicits an
answer that pertains to either past or present charge, whether it was already dismissed or not. Judge Contreras
should have known fully well the consequences of making a false statement in his PDS. Clearly, there was an
obvious lack of integrity. (In the Matter of: Anonymoust Complaint for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and
Perjury Committed by Judge Jaime E. Contreras, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2452, March 9, 2016, Third Division)
11. Judge Mislang issued two TROs, a writ of preliminary injunction and a status quo order, both of which did not
satisfy the legal requisites for their issuance, in gross violation of clearly established laws and procedures which
every judge has the duty and obligation to be familiar with. The antecedent incidents of the case brought before
Judge Mislang were clear and simple, as well as the applicable rules. Unfortunately, he miserably failed to
properly apply the principles and rules on three points, i.e., the prematurity of the petition, the inapplicability
of the prejudicial question, and the lack of jurisdiction of the court. His persistent disregard of well-known
elementary rules in favor of Lee clearly reflects his bad faith and partiality. (Department of Justice v. Mislang,
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369, July 26, 2016, En Banc)
12. To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was
gross or patent, deliberate, or malicious. In her ponencia, Justice Padilla explained, citing evidence and
jurisprudence, why she arrived at her conclusion that defendants were purchasers in good faith. Even assuming
that she erred in her ruling, still complainant failed to establish that she was moved by ill-will or malicious
intention to violate the law or jurisprudence. Moreover, it should be noted that it was arrived at after
deliberation by a collegial body, thus, not solely the ruling of the respondent judge. Hence, Justice Padilla cannot
be held liable for gross ignorance of the law. (Re: Verified Complaint of Aliling against Associate Justice Ma.
Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, I.P.I. No. 16-244-CA-J, September 6, 2016, En Banc; Atoc v. Camello, I.P.I. No. 16-241-
CA-J, November 29, 2016, En Banc)
13. The propriety of the TRO cannot be questioned in an administrative case against the justices of the Court of
Appeals. (Morales I v. Real-Dimagiba, I.P.I. No. 16-243-CA-J, October 11, 2016, En Banc)
a. The propriety of the search warrant cannot be reviewed in an administrative case against a judge.
However, if upon the perusal of the records of the compliance with the search warrants it was found that
the judge failed to monitor the return of the search warrants, the judge is found guilty of simple neglect.
(OCA v. Judge Ante, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-12-1814, September 19, 2018, First Division)

14. Respondent judge’s conduct fell short of the exacting standard of moral integrity when he carried an affair with
a married woman. In addition, the illicit affair was known by the staff of court. (Tuvillo v. Judge Laron, A.M. No.
MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016, En Banc)
15. Judge Yu should be administratively sanctioned.

a. First, Judge Yu refuses to acknowledge the appointment of Ms. Lopez on the ground that Ms. Lopez’
appointment laked her personal endorsement. However, Judge Yu failed to appreciate that she could only
recommend an applicant for a vacant position in her court for the consideration of the SPBLC, which then
accorded priority to the recommendee if the latter possessed superior qualifications than or was at least
of equal qualifications as the other applicant she did not recommend. Judge Yu cannot impose her
recommendee on the SPBLC which was legally mandated to maintain fairness and impartiality in its
assessment of the applicants based on performance, eligibility, education and training, experience and
outstanding accomplishments, psycho-social attributes and personality traits, and potentials.
b. Judge Yu also used disrespectful language before the Court when she characterized Ms. Lopez’
appointment as “void ab initio” and “a big joke.” The use of such language in assailing the Court’s exercise
of its power of appointment was highly offensive and intemperate. She disregarded her obligation to show
respect and deference toward the Court and its officials.
c. Judge Yu gravely abused her authority when she issued show-cause order against her fellow Judges, who
are complainants in the administrative case against Judge Yu. The issuance of the show-cause order by
Judge Yu represented clear abuse of court processes, and revealed her arrogance in the exercise of her
authority as a judicial officer. She thereby knowingly assumed the role of a tyrant wielding power with
unbridled breadth. Moreover, Judge Yu’s issuance of the show-cause order emanated from her desire to
retaliate against her fellow Judges and the concerned court employees considering that the allegedly
contumacious conduct was the copying of court records to be used as evidence in the administrative
complaint against her.
d. Judge Yu was grossly ignorant of the law when she ordered the presentation of ex parte evidence before
the OIC who was not a member of the Bar. In addition, she allowed the prosecution of criminal actions
without the actual participation of the public prosecutor.
e. Judge Yu can still be disciplined for inappropriate messages she sent to Judge San Gaspar-Gito, even though
the messages complained of started in August 2009 when she was still a public prosecutor. It is worth
noting that Judge Yu continued her internet stalking of Judge San Gaspar-Gito after she had herself become
a MeTC Judge in Pasay City. Additionally, her messages to Judge San Gaspar-Gito contained sexual
insinuations that were ostensibly improper for a Judge to write and send to another.
f. While some administrative cases against Justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan or judges of trial courts
and court officals who are lawyers may be recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers, it should be
noted the fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set aside
the respondent’s right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
without requiring her to comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process. (OCA
v. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, November 22, 2016, En Banc)
g. Judge Yu was subsequently disbarred since her violations of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct
embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct constitute as breach of the canons of the CPR. (OCA v. Judge
Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, March 14, 2017, En Banc)
16. Second hand accounts have no probative value because these do not establish the acts complained of. As such,
the allegations against the CA justices do not measure up to the required substantial evidence. (Re: Verified
Complaint Dated November 17, 2014 of Dolora Cadiz Khanna, I.P.I. No. 15-227-CA-J, November 29, 2016, En
Banc)
17. Complainant cannot blame respondent judge for taking cognizance of the case which was assigned to him.
Respondent judge explained that it was apparent from the title of the case that it involved an environmental
issue. Besides, as noted by the OCA, the complaint failed to state that it is an environmental case as required
under Section 3, Rule 2 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC. Such omission caused the raffling of the case to a regular court
and not to an environmental court. In addition, complainant actively participated as plaintiff in the lower court.
It was only after respondent judge issued an adverse Order denying the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction that complainant attacked the jurisdiction of the trial court since it is not a designated
environmental court. (Ortega, Jr. v. Judge Dacara, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2423, January 11, 2017, Second Division)
18. An administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for every action of a judge considered “aberrant or
irregular” especially when a judicial remedy exists. (Biado v. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, February
15, 2017, Second Division; Rizalado v. Judge Bollozos, OCA IPI No. 11-3800-RTJ, June 19, 2017, First Division;
Tamondong v. Judge Rasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, October 18, 2017, First Division)
19. Judge Chavez failed to adhere to the judicial standards. He was inefficient in managing his caseload and grossly
negligent in running the affairs of his court. This is evidenced by the following anomalies by the judicial audit
team: (a) case records were not well kept since they were not chronologically arranged and had no pagination;

(b) legal fees forms were not attached to the records, although the amount allegedly paid were enumerated in
the pleadings while there were cases without the breakdown of the fees paid; (c) no documents supporting the
amount of sheriff’s fees for the service of summons were available; (d) the civil and criminal docket books were
not updated and the civil docket book contained erasures as to the status of cases for nullity of marriage; (e)
the court’s semestral docket inventory for June to December 2008 were not accurate; (f) records in some
criminal cases had no certificates of arraignment; (g) archiving of cases were resorted to even if the inaction
were attributable to the non-compliance of government officers, bureaus, and agencies to the directives of the
court, and the court’s failure to set the cases for hearing; and (h) the court staff in the RTC do not observe the
mandatory flag ceremonies under R.A. 8491 and reiterated in Circular No. 37-98 dated June 22, 1998 and
Circular No. 62-2001 dated September 27, 2011. (OCA v. Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, March 7, 2017,
En Banc)
20. Respondent explained that she had worked word to considerably reduce the caseload of her sala and had
endeavored to personally monitor all the cases in her court. However, in 2009, she was usually on leave to look
after her Stage 2A colon cancer-diagnosed husband. Later on, she also had to care for her son who was
diagnosed with Stage 2 Hodgkin’s lymphoma in November 2010. While respondent’s domestic concerns
deserve some consideration, such circumstances could only mitigate her liability. In addition, had respondent
physically inventoried her cases on a semestral basis as prescribed, she could have discovered the unresolved
pending incidents earlier, instead of two year later. The resolution of two fairly simple motions dragged on for
more than two years – thereby prolonging the resolution of the ejectment case. (Rapsing v. Judge Walse-Lutero,
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894, April 4, 2017, En Banc)
21. Failing to comply with the mandate to decide cases within the period prescribed by the Constitution, the laws,
the Rules of Court, and the administrative circulars and guidelines constitutes gross inefficiency and
incompetence, for which the judge may be held to account. Retirement from the Bench does not exempt the
judge from liability for disobeying or ignoring the mandate. (OCA v. Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212,
April 18, 2017, En Banc)
22. A judge who admitted to not wearing the judicial robe due to the extreme heat, non-functioning air-
conditioning units, and regular brownouts, violated the Administrative Circular No. 25, dated June 9, 1989.
(McLaren v. Gonzales, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1876, April 26, 2017, Second Division)
23. It is evident that herein complaints lacked the requirements under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Complainants’ respective single page letter-complaints are indisputably unverified, and bereft of any supporting
affidavits or documents that would support the charges made against herein respondents. They contain bare
allegations that, unfortunately, have no factual or legal anchorage. Moreover, it appears that complainants did
not have personal knowledge of the acts imputed against respondents as they merely relied on hearsay to
support their claims. For one, Adante clearly stated in her letter-complaint that the alleged offense was only
intimated to her, while Ofendoreyes simply asks the Court to investigate and stop the said illicit activities
without providing any further details on the information. (Re: Letter of Ofendoryes alleging illicit activitives of
a certain Atty. Cajayon involving cases in the CA-CDO, A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA, June 6, 2017, En Banc)
24. Judge Barcillano’s dissatisfication with Executive Judge Rosero’s decision to post police officers in the Hall of
Justice does not justify his acts of accosting complainant. While he may be security conscious, checking the
booking of firearms is not part of his job. Further, his act of demanding for complainant’s firearms and ARE in
an aggressive manner effectively harassed the already nervous police officer. If, as Judge Barcillano claims, he
strongly believed that the presence of the police officers violates existing rules, the appropriate course of action
would have been to take up the issue with Executive Judge Rosero, not the police officers who are merely
obeying orders. Hence, Judge Barcillano, being a magistrate, should have observed judicial temperament which
requires him to be always temperate, patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in language. (Marcelo v.
Judge Barcillano, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2450, June 7, 2017, Third Division)
25. Not only are the two handwritten letter-complaints unverified, they are also unsupported by any affidavits or
documents which would validate the charges against the respondents. Additionally, the handwritten letters of
the complainants are couched in general terms that contain no material, relevant and substantial allegation to
support the accusation of continuous and widespread selling of a favorable decision in CA-CDO. The
complainants failed to aver specific acts or to present proof to show that Justice Lantion and Atty. Cajayon were
in cahoots and involved in the continuous and widespread selling of a favorable decision in CA-CDO. Moreover,
these allegations or reports were filed after the lapse of seven years from the time Justice Lantion was
transferred to CA-Manila.
a. There are three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges and justices of the CA and
Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (a) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (b) upen verified complaint with
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or (c) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. (Re: Letter of Dimaano requesting investigation of the alleged illegal activities
purportedly perpetrated by Associate Justice Lantion, A.M. No. 17-03-03-CA, July 11, 2017, En Banc)

26. Judge Diaz’s act of rendering the questioned Decision convicting Alfelor in nine checks subject of B.P. 22 which
were not raffled to his sala constitutes gross ignorance of law.
a. It is obvious that the subject criminal case in Judge Diaz’s sala pertained to only one check, that is, the
subject Land Bank Check No. 0000251550. Had Judge Diaz been more circumspect in reviewing the records
of the case, he could have easily noticed that glaring fact, as well as Judge Sta. Cruz’s prior order acquitting
Alfelor of the nine B.P. 22 cases raffled to MeTC 43, and promulgated a decision based only on that
particular check. The fact that he had served more than 21 years in the judiciary meant that he should have
known better than to haphazardly render a decision in a criminal case without regard to the specific
allegations in the offense charged and his jurisdiction, or lack thereof, to take cognizance of the case. This
is gross ignorance of the law. (Alfelor v. Hon. Diaz, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017, En Banc)
27. An administrative case against a judge on the ground of immorality may be filed by any citizen or member of
the public who knows a judge who commits acts of immorality. Hence, it is erroneous to state that a complaint
anchored on immorality should be filed only by its victims, namely, the spouse betrayed, the paramous who
has been misled, or the children who have to live with the parent’s scandalous indiscretions. In addition – for
male judges particularly, they may be held liable for immorality although the circumstances are not sufficient
to successfully prosecute him for the crime of concubinage. (Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala, A.M. No.
MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017, En Banc)
28. Judge Chavez is entitled to the following mitigating circumstances of remorse in committing the infraction,
length of government service, first offense, and health and age. These humanitarian considerations mitigate
Judge Chavez’s penalty and remove him from the severe consequences of the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture
of his retirement benefits. (OCA v. Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, August 1, 2017, En Banc)
29. Judge Diasen’s act of attempting to sell rice to his employees and to employees of other branches was highly
improper. The Code of Judicial Ethics warns judges to refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to
reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. As a judge, Judge Diasen
exercised moral ascendancy and supervision of these employees. If the sale had pushed through, he would have
profited from his position. (Mendoza v. Judge Diasen Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900, August 9, 2017, Second
Division)
30. Artuz deliberately and calculatedly lied in her answers to the subject queestions in her two PDS to conceal the
truth and make it appear that she is qualified for the judgeship position which she now holds. Indeed, it is
inconceivable for her not to have been aware of any of the pending cases against her since an administrative
case filed against her had been pending before the DOJ since October 23, 2003, or long before she submitted
her application with the JBC. Had she disclosed this material fact in her October 28, 2005 PDS, the JBC may have
disqualified her from nomination for judgeship, or disregarded her application. Because of this intentional
omission, the judiciary may have lost someone truly deserving of the judgeship post. Moreover, when she filed
her November 6, 2006 PDS, Artuz was already clearly aware of the pending charges against her before the
Ombudsman, all of which appear to have been filed, at most, in the early part of 2006 and received by the
Ombudsman on March 24, 2006 through the March 16, 2006 Indorsement of RSP Laurea. In several cases, it
was ruled that a duly accomplished PDS is an official document and any false statements made in one’s PDS is
ultimately connected with one’s employment in the government. An employee making false statements in his
or her PDS becomes liable for falsification. (Nava II v. Artuz, A.C. No. 7253, August 29, 2017, En Banc)
31. Records show that Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio both violated A.O. 125-2007. Although both judges were
clothed with authority to solemnize marriages, in this instance however, they overstepped the bounds of their
authority.
a. As correctly found by the OCA, Judge Murcia affixed his signature in the Marriage Contract of Julius and
Khristine without actually solemnizing their marriage. Judge Murcia’s claim that the contracting parties
personally appeared before him was belied by the groom himself, Julius. When confronted by the
investigating team from OCA, Julius denied knowing or appearing before Judge Murcia; moreover, he
asserted that he was not married in the sala of Judge Murcia in the Island City of Samal, but at their
residence in Davao City. Julius also narrated that it was Judge Omelio, and not Judge Murcia, who acted as
the solemnizing officer. Julius even presented pictures which were taken during the wedding at their
residence showing Judge Omelio as the solemnizing officer.
b. On the other hand, Judge Omelio’s contention that he merely re-enacted the wedding ceremony of Julius
and Khristine upon the request of the groom’s parents was similarly debunked by Julius’ admission that
iwas actually Judge Omelio who solemnized his marriage with Khristine on February 28, 2008 at their
residence in Davao City. Besides, his defense of reenactment would not justify his infraction. Although
Judge Omelio acknowledged said marriage as a sham, he insisted that it was not contrary to law as the
same was conducted only for picture-taking purposes because they were not able to do so in the sala of
Judge Murcia. As a duly-authorized solemnizing officer, Judge Omelio is expected to know that marriage
should not be trifled with, and its sanctity and inviolability should never be undermined, especially by such

a lame ground as picture-taking. Worse, although he was usspoesedly merely doing a re-enactment, Judge
Omelio claimed to have allowed additional witnesses or godparents to affix their signatures in the marriage
certificate that was issued and signed by Judge Murica.
c. Marriage, being an inviolable social institution, should not be trivialized, especially by the solemnizing
officers themselves. (Palma and Mercado v. Judge Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223, August 30, 2017, First
Division)
32. The CJC mandates all members of the bench to be models of propriety at all times. Canon 4 requires that
propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and
that judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. In addition,
while judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, they
should always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
a. In this case, Judge Lorredo’s insulting statements during the preliminary conference (i.e., Atty. Magno as
“petty, dull, and slow thinking”) and in his pleadings before the Court (i.e., the allegations were “amusing”
but “incredibly, super silly”) are obviously offensive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Certainly, while Judge
Lorredo’s concern on the misrepresentation committed by Atty. Magno before the RTC is understandable,
he should not have disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court.
Judge Lorredo failed to exercise caution in his speech. (Atty. Magno v. Judge Lorredo, A.M. No. MTJ-17-
1905, August 30, 2017, First Division)
33. A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending but approves an application
for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guulty of gross ignorance of the law. Rule 114, Section 17(a) is clear
that for purposes of determining whether or not the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is
arrest, not voluntary surrender, before a judge of another province, city, or municipality may grant a bail
application. In the same vein, it is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for bail in a criminal
case outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or unavailability of the judge of the court
where the criminal case is pending. (Tejano v. Marigomen, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, September 26, 2017, En Banc)
34. A judge’s habit of watching telenovelas and Korean telenovelas during office hours instead of conducting
hearings and making lawyers and litigants wait until she had finished watching constitutes as violation of Canon
6, Sections 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 6 institutes competence and diligence as
prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. Section 1 thereof states that the judicial duties of a judge
take precedence over all other activities. Meanwhile, Section 2 thereof states that judges shall devote their
professional activity to judicial duties which include not only the performance of judicial functions and
responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the
court’s operations.
a. Respondent judge violated A.M. No. 01-10-05-SCPHILJA because the judge tried to mediate a frustrated
homicide case and delegated the settlement of the case to a court stenographer, who was not a qualified,
trained, or an accredited mediator.
b. Respondent judge’s delegation of the functions and duties of the Clerk III to a process server classifies as a
violation of various SC circulars, rules and directives. This is because the duties of a Clerk III differ
significantly from those of a process server. A Clerk III’s job is basically clerical in nature and requires him
to be always in the office to assist the clerk of court in maintaining the integrity oft eh docket books of the
court. A process server, on the other hand, has the primary duty of serving court processes such as
subpoenas, summons, court orders, and ntoices, thus, necessitating him to be mostly out of the office and
in the field personally serving and/or mailing court processes. (Re: Anonymous complaints against Hon.
Bandong, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507, October 9, 2017, First Division)
35. Judge Trocino’s actions cannot be considered a mere error in judgment that can be easily ignored. His act of
issuing the questioned TPO is not a simple lapse of judgment but a blatant disregard of the basic rules on child
custody and the rule on the issuance of a protection order. In fact, the questioned TPO was annulled and set
aside by the CA in its Decision dated September 15, 2006. In the same decision, Civil Case No. 1409 was likewise
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the petition for protection order and child custody. The CA held that Judge
Trocino gravely abused his discretion when he issued the questioned TPO awarding the custody of parties’
common child to Peña. It ruled that since the RTC-Mandaluyong City had already taken cognizance of the
petition for protection order and child custody, it exercises jurisdiction thereon to the exclusion of all other
courts. Hence, the RTC-Mandaluyong City has exclusive jurisdiction over said petition and no other petition
involving the same subject matter may be filed before any other court. (Recto v. Hon. Trocino, A.M. No. RTJ-17-
2508, November 7, 2017, En Banc)
36. The OCA observed that the Sandiganbayan and the Court had held Judge Alinea guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Direct Bribery, finding that: (a) Judge Alinea demanded P15,000.00 from Neria in exchange for
a favorable resolution of the latter's case; (b) while at Bon's Restaurant in Iba, Zambales, Judge Alinea had
indeed accepted the said amount from Neria, after which the NBI agents arrested him; and (c) the NBI forensic
chemist subjected Judge Alinea to an ultraviolet light examination, which tested him positive for fluorescent

specks from the money he received from Neria. Hence, it concluded that the foregoing are more than sufficient
evidence to find Judge Alinea administratively liable for the said offense as a member of both the Bench and
the Bar.
a. The Court, in its January 17, 2005 Resolution, explicitly directed Judge Alinea to show cause why he should
not be suspended, disbarred, or otherwise disciplinarily anctioned as a member of the Bar for Violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, to which he complied. Hence, he was undeniably accorded due process
insofar as the disbarment matter against him is concerned. Finally, considering that the offenses charged
against him were also grounds to disbar him, the supreme penalty of disbarment, as recommended by the
OCA, should be, as it is hereby, imposed against Judge Alinea, aside from forfeiture of all of his benefits,
except his accrued leave credits, as a former member of the judiciary. (OCA v. Judge Alinea, Jr., A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1574, November 7, 2017, En Banc)
37. A judge who fails to observe the prcoedure on the raffle of cases pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC is guilty of
simple neglect of duty. (Ferrer, Jr. v. Judge Dating, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2478, November 8, 2017, Second Division)
38. It is undisputed in this case that Judge Natino failed to decide Civil Case No. 20225 within the 90-day period
provided in the Constitution. Records show that the said case was filed on January 30, 1992, submitted for
decision on January 23, 2007, and decided only in August 2010 or after more than three years from the time it
was submitted for decision. (Fajardo v. Judge Natino, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2479, December 13, 2017, First Division)
39. The Court is convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of Oppression as shown in several incidents of
misbehavior by respondent Judge, some of which are stated below:
a. Respondent Judge displayed antagonistic behavior towards Atty. Macapado who appeared as defense
counsel in three (3) criminal cases and who might have increased the tone of his voice in their verbal tussle.
He filed with the court apologizing for the incident but prayed for respondent Judge to extend a little
respect to all lawyers who appear before her court in the presence of their clients and other litigants.
b. Respondent Judge engaged in an argument in open court with a certain Atty. Gerardo Padilla who appeared
as defendants' counsel in Civil Case No. 06-7010. Atty. Padilla found the behavior of respondent Judge
antagonistic which led to the exchange of words between respondent Judge and Atty. Padilla who was
prompted to utter the words "xxx you can do you worst and I will do my best" to respondent Judge,
maintaining civility towards the court despite the exchange.
c. Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz was humiliated by respondent Judge who admonished her also in open court
because respondent Judge felt displeased with ACP Diaz's reaction and alleged disrespectful behavior
which led ACP Diaz to cry and made her unable to continue with the presentation of her witness.
d. Respondent Judge exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge when she shouted at a court staff in her
chambers while correcting the court staffs draft orders which she dictated in open court and called the
court staff, "bogo ba nimo" (you are dumb or stupid). Although respondent Judge and the court staff were
alone in the chambers, the court staff felt humiliated as she was berated for fifteen (15) minutes and she
cried when she went to the staff room.
e. Another court staff also experienced being berated and humiliated by respondent Judge. In correcting the
court staffs eleven (11) draft orders, respondent Judge humiliated her by repeatedly pointing at her
mistakes in an elevated voice in the presence of a friend of respondent Judge, who happened to be a party
in a civil case pending before their court. Nearly in tears, the court staff went out of the chambers and told
her co-workers that she would no longer help in drafting orders in bail bond applications so she could
concentrate on her drafts. Respondent Judge found court staff's reaction to be improper, so respondent
Judge followed her to the staff room and continued to scold her in front of the other staff members, and
even called for an emergency staff meeting where respondent Judge even called the court staff "punyeta
ka, buwisit ka" in front of the other staff. (Prosecutor Cahanap v. Judge Quinones, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470,
40. A judge who fails to observe the prescribed official hours by commencing court sessions between 9:00 a.m. and
10:00 a.m., although the Minutes of the Proceedings reflected the time at 8:30 a.m., is administratively liable.
(Prosecutor Cahanap v. Judge Quinones, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470, January 10, 2018, En Banc)
41. In this case, the OCA, affirming the findings of Judge Balloguing, found that respondent's behavior towards
complainant amounted to a conduct that the Court cannot countenance. Apart from being a display of
arrogance, respondent's demeanor and actuations, which resulted in physical injuries to complainant, are in
direct contravention of the virtues of patience, sobriety, and self-restraint so espoused by the Court and highly
expected of a member of the judiciary. Regardless of the reason for the incident, respondent, being a
magistrate, should have observed judicial temperament which requires him to be always temperate, patient,
and courteous, both in conduct and in language. Respondent's acts, therefore, constitute grave misconduct,
which the Court defines as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or a disregard of established rules, which
must be proven by substantial evidence, as in this case. (Antiporda v. Judge Ante, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-18-1908,

42. The records are replete with glaring circumstances that should have created doubt in the minds of the
respondent judges as to the veracity of the residential addresses declared in the petitions. In all four courts, the
OCA and the judicial audit teams found that most of the given addresses were vague or incomplete. It may be
true, as explained by Judge Quisumbing, that some residential addresses in the provinces have no house
numbers. Yet, the fact that most of the court notices sent to the parties by RTC Imus 20 and 22 and RTC
Dasmariñas 90 were "returned to sender" shows that there was something amiss in the given addresses. It is
even more curious that the notices were "returned to sender" for the reason that the addressees were unknown
at the given address or could not be located. More important, cases where parties have the same address as
those in another case cannot be explained away. In fact, out of the four respondent judges, only Judge
Quisumbing attempted to give an explanation of this anomaly. But his statement, instead of clarifying the
matter, only operated to strengthen the cases against them. He offers the possibility that the petitioners really
lived in the same house, because they were separated from their respective spouses. If this is indeed the case,
then the fact that these parties were represented by the same counsels shines an even more disturbing light
upon the observed irregularity. (OCA v. Cabrera Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, January 16, 2018, En Banc)
43. Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary actions for every erroneous order or decision he
issues, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers granted to them by the law, there will be, not
only confusion in the administration of justice, but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements under
the law and established rules. For repeatedly and deliberately committing irregularities in the disposition of his
cases, thereby manifesting corrupt inclinations, Judge Salise can be said to have misused said powers.
Indubitably, Judge Salise violated the Code of Judicial Conduct ordering judges to ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants
in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. He simply used oversight, inadvertence, and honest mistake
as convenient excuses. He acted with conscious indifference to the possible undesirable consequences to the
parties involved. (OCA v. Judge Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514, January 30, 2018, En Banc)
44. It is clear that Judge Dumayas failed to hear and decide the subject case with the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. As aptly found by the OCA after its exhaustive investigation, first, Judge Dumayas downgraded the
offense charged from murder to homicide. Second, he inappropriately appreciated the privileged mitigating
circumstance of self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender despite the
overwhelming testimonial and physical evidence to the contrary. Third, he sentenced Dela Paz and Datu III to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day, as
minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, which made them eligible for probation. Finally,
he granted the separate applications for probation of Dela Paz and Datu III, effectively sparing them from
suffering the penalties they rightfully deserve. The pattern of said acts appears to be deliberate, calculated, and
meant to unduly favor the accused, and at the same time, can be characterized as flagrant and indifferent to
the consequences caused to the other parties, including the State. (OCA v. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-
2435, March 6, 2018, En Banc)
45. it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of
its agencies" refers to any person employed by the government whose tasks is the performance and exercise
of any of the functions and powers of such government or any agency thereof, as conferred on them by law,
without any intervening agency. Simply put, a "government official connected directly to the operation of the
government or any of its agencies" is a government officer who performs the functions of the government on
his own judgment or discretion – essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292. Applying
the above definition to the present case, it is dear that Justice Pizarro is covered by the term "government
official connected directly with the operation of the government." Indeed, one of the functions of the
government, through the Judiciary, is the administration of justice within its territorial jurisdiction. Justice
Pizarro, as a magistrate of the CA, is clearly a government official directly involved in the administration of
justice; and in the performance of such function, he exercises discretion. Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice
Pizarro violated the prohibition from gambling in casinos as provided under Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869.
(Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Pizarro, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018, En
Banc)
46. A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the
Family Code and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He
should be properly sanctioned. (Keuppers v. Judge Murcia, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, April 3, 2018, En Banc)
47. Judge Arreza himself admitted his inefficiency. While he attributed this to domestic and health issues, suffice it
to say that said reasons, even if found acceptable, cannot excuse him but, at most, can only mitigate his liability.
Unfortunately for him, the Court shares the OCA's observation that the problems alluded to by Judge Arreza
happened years before the judicial audit was conducted in 2016. If he was really inclined to dispose of the
backlog caused by his domestic and health problems, he should have immediately done so. Note that his
separation from his wife happened way back in 2010 and his stroke in 2012. To the mind of the Court, Judge

Arreza had more than enough time to catch up before the conduct of the judicial audit in 2016 especially
considering that his sala has a manageable case load due to the low average of case inflow which was only one
case a month. Moreover, the Court notes that, with respect to the cases already submitted for decision but not
decided within the prescribed period, Judge Arreza failed to ask for extension to decide the same. It has been
previously held that in case of poor health, the Judge concerned needs only to ask this Court for an extension
of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear to him that there would be delay in the disposition of his
cases. To stress, Judge Arreza never bothered to ask the Court for an extension after he suffered a stroke. In
fact, even before his stroke, there were already cases which were overdue for decision for which no motions
for extension were made. Anent the cases with protracted proceedings, the Court shares the observation of
the OCA that there was no reason for them to undergo a long-drawn-out trial considering that there were only
12 cases supposedly in active trial. Given the foregoing, it is not difficult to see that the delay in Judge Arreza's
disposition of cases was the product of his apathy. This becomes even more apparent in light of the fact that
Judge Arreza was able to dispose of all the 23 cases overdue for decision within three (3) months and act on
the other cases after his attention was called by the OCA. Indeed, and as correctly observed by the OCA, Judge
Arreza has the capability but simply chose not to act on the subject cases. (OCA v. Judge Arreza, A.M. No. MTJ-
18-1911, April 16, 2018, First Division)
48. After an assiduous review of the records, the Court finds that complainant miserably failed to sufficiently
substantiate his grave accusations against Justice Punzalan-Castillo. The Court shall carefully address each of
complainant's charges and illustrate why they are all groundless.
a. First, complainant mistakenly imputes that Justice Punzalan-Castillo lied when she said that she intended
to file falsification charges against him. A reading of the complaint filed against complainant before the
RTC-Malolos reveals that the same is principally based on his falsification of various documents to effect
the transfer of titles from his father to his name.
b. Second, complainant misunderstood Justice Punzalan-Castillo's participation in the civil case filed against
him. He believed that the appellate court justice lied when she said she was not involved in the said case
because she was, in fact, one of the party-plaintiffs. It is elementary in procedural rules that spouses shall
sue or be sued jointly, except in cases provided for by law. As pointed out by Justice Punzalan-Castillo, she
was included as party-plaintiff because her husband Elpidio was among the plaintiffs in the case. It could
be reasonably expected that complainant, a layman, would not be well-versed in traversing the nuances of
procedural rules.
c. As to the accusation that Justice Punzalan-Castillo utilized CA personnel and facilities to draft pleadings in
connection with the case before the RTC-Malolos, the Court finds the same also based on conjectures and
speculations. Complainant's only basis was that in one of numerous pleadings filed, there was an
annotation on one of the pages that read "dina.justice.motion for execution" and that Justice Punzalan-
Castillo had a staff named "Dina"; after which he hastily concluded that Justice Punzalan-Castillo was using
her staff for her personal and private affairs. Justice Punzalan-Castillo explained that she merely used a
template of a motion for execution from one of her employees so that she would no longer format the
same; and that the document was only titled as such so that she could easily trace it in her files for future
reference. Even without a rebuttal, complainant's purported evidence fails to concretely establish that the
associate justice took advantage of her staff for personal reasons. It is clear that the alleged evidence are
merely assumptions and haphazard conclusions that could not convince any reasonable person that Justice
Punzalan-Castillo indeed used her CA staff for personal gains. To stress—out of numerous pleadings filed
before the RTC-Malolos, only a single page from one of the pleadings bore the said marking.
d. Meanwhile, the accusation that Justice Punzalan-Castillo failed to inhibit herself in spite of conflict of
interest suffers the same fate as complainant's other accusations. Again, it is nothing but groundless
accusation devoid of proof. Justice Punzalan-Castillo and her husband Elpidio were never partners with
Delos Angeles in the Rural Bank of Calumpit, Bulacan, because, in fact, they bought the shares of the latter
in the said bank. Such lends credence to her explanation that it would be absurd for her to favor Delos
Angeles because they were also victims of his scams.
e. Likewise, complainant's claims that Justice Punzalan-Castillo nefariously procured the services of PAO
lawyer Atty. Ty to serve as Paulino's counsel are without merit. It is noteworthy that the RTC-Malolos did
not expunge Paulino's answer despite his allegations that he did not secure the services of Atty. Ty. In
addition, the administrative case complainant filed against Atty. Ty before the PAO in connection with the
said matter had been dismissed for being baseless and premised on misleading conjectures.
f. Similarly complainant's last two charges both impute that Justice Punzalan-Castillo committed falsification
in executing and/or solemnizing documents. He relied on the examination made by a handwriting expert
from the NBI. In both charges, however, only photocopies of documents were examined. For the results of
handwriting examinations to be credible and deserving of consideration, the specimen signature must be
sourced from the original document and not merely from photocopies. In addition, even if the conclusions
of the NBI expert are considered, they are still insufficient to charge Justice Punzalan-Castillo of falsification.
First, the fact that the same person had written the title number, date, and place of issue does not
contradict the genuineness of the said title. Second, the NBI expert merely concluded that a single person
had made the entries but did not name Justice Punzalan-Castillo as the author. Thus, it is readily apparent
that complainant again resorted to unwarranted conclusions and assumptions. Third, complainant's own
father and sister both attested that they jointly executed the real estate mortgage with their mother,
negating his claim that her mother's signature was forged. (Re: Verified Complaint of Castillo against
Associate Justice Punzalan-Castillo, IPI No. 17-267-CA-J, April 24, 2018, En Banc)
49. The Court agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge's act of granting the accused's Motion for Preliminary
Investigation did not constitute gross ignorance of the law. While the Order granting the Motion for Preliminary
Investigation may not be proper inasmuch as respondent Judge based the Order on accused's bare allegation
of non-receipt of notice from the Office of the Prosecutor, the Court opines that the same did not necessarily
amount to gross ignorance of the law. There was no showing that respondent Judge issued the Order because
of the promptings of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice, ill-will, bad faith or a deliberate intent to do injustice.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that not all erroneous acts of judges are subject to disciplinary action.
a. The Court agrees with the OCA's finding that respondent Judge was inefficient in failing to resolve the
motion for issuance of a hold departure order despite the lapse of 90 days. The Court finds his contention,
that "there is no need to issue an HDO order [sic] because a Hold Departure Order (HDO) is based on sound
judgment and judicial discretion of a Judge," unmeritorious. While it is true that the law gives respondent
Judge considerable discretion whether to issue or not to issue a hold departure order, this grant of
considerable discretion in no wise or manner means that respondent Judge need not resolve at all the
pending motion. Respondent Judge ought to know the difference between a judge's discretionary power
to issue a hold departure order and his mandatory duty to resolve all kinds of motions within 90 days.
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution mandates that all cases and matters must be decided or resolved
by the lower courts within three (3) months or ninety (90) days from date of submission. In addition, Section
5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary directs judges to "perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."
(Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc. v. Judge Cajigal, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523, June 6, 2018, First
Division)
50. The Court likewise finds no merit in the charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondent Judge Daomilas,
Jr. As respondent Judge Daomilas, Jr. aptly explained in his January 20, 2016 Order, while a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Interim Rules, the same rules do not proscribe the filing of
an urgent prayer to post a counter-bond. Be that as it may, the Court finds that respondent Judge Daomilas, Jr.
demonstrated inefficiency in handling the pending incidents in SRC Case No. SRC-223-CEB, which resulted in
undue and inordinate delay in the resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
November 6, 2015 Order was rendered beyond the ninety (90)-day period within which a judge should decide
a case or resolve a pending matter, reckoned from the date of the filing of the last pleading, in accordance with
Section 15, paragraphs (1) and (2), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution. (Atty. Mahinay v. Judge Daomilas, A.M.
No. RTJ-18-2527, June 18, 2018, Second Division)
51. There is merit in the complaint for gross inefficiency and delay in the administration of justice against Judge
Cabrera-Faller when she failed to promptly act on the motion filed by the Spouses Dumdum. On the other hand,
as against Suluen, the charges must be dismissed. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, the responsibility of
acting and resolving a pending matter or incident before a court rests primarily on the judge, and Suluen, who
was merely an OIC/Legal Researcher, could not be held responsible for the delay incurred by the respondent
judge. Based on the facts on record, only Judge Cabrera-Faller may be held liable for the delay in the disposition
of cases. (Atty. Tacorda v. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2460, June 27, 2018, Second Division)
52. Judge Mupas hastily dismissed the subject case without regard to the basic rules of procedure and the
circumstances evident on records. To recall, the assailed February 4, 2009 Order dismissed the subject case
pursuant to Section l(h), Rule 16 and Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. However, Section 2, Rule 16 plainly
provides that a dismissal of the case pursuant thereto requires a hearing, wherein "the parties shall submit their
arguments on the question of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved" in the case. Only after
the requisite hearing may the court dismiss the action or claim. Instead of conducting a preliminary hearing,
Judge Mupas dismissed the subject case based on Mendoza's mere allegation that his loan obligation has been
fully satisfied. (Yu, Jr. v. Judge Mupas, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2491, July 4, 2018, Second Division)
53. Sub judice refers to matters under or before a judge or court; or matters under judicial consideration. In
essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The
restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the public in general, and most especially to members of the Bar
and the Bench. In the Separate Opinion of Justice Brion, sub judice rule finds support in the provision on indirect
contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. (Re: Show Cause Order in the Decision dated May 11,
2018 in G.R. No. 237428, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, En Banc)
54. Instead, as the OCA correctly observed, the respondent Judge had deliberately not resolved the appeal within
the period allowed by the Constitution. A look at the records discloses that the MTCC resolved the ejectment
case through its decision dated June 9, 2004, and the complainants appealed the adverse outcome; that the
appeal went before the respondent Judge, who disposed of it on August 30, 2004 by remanding the case to the
MTCC; and that, in turn, the MCTC resolved the case on August 12, 2005 by again dismissing the case a second
time. This was the point when the whole trouble started. The complainants appealed the second dismissal by

the MTCC, and their appeal went up again to the respondent Judge's court. Normally, the respondent Judge
could have resolved the second appeal in due course, and let the aggrieved parties take it from there. Even if
he sincerely believed that the outcome would not be any different from the previous one, he should not have
desisted from complying with the mandatory period for disposing of the second appeal. But he did not comply.
After nearly two years from the submission of their second appeal for resolution without its being acted upon,
the complainants moved ex parte for its early resolution on July 9, 2007, and again on November 21, 2007. All
to no avail, as the respondent Judge did not issue any resolution. Thus, they were impelled to commence this
administrative case by filing their complaint dated August 31, 2010. It is clear from the circumstances that the
respondent Judge had no excuse for not resolving the second appeal within the mandatory period despite its
being already ripe for judicial adjudication and despite the complainants' constant follow-ups. Worse, as the
OCA noted, the respondent Judge admitted in his comment that he resolved the appeal only after the
administrative complaint had been lodged against him. (Spouses Pacho v. Judge Lu, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2350, July
55. Judge Alaras issued the TRO to be effective "within a period of twenty (20) days from date hereof or until further
orders from this Court." The tenor of the TRO obviously confined its effectivity to the 20-day period provided
under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Given the circumstances, the additional phrase "until further
orders from this Court" was an obvious surplusage and clearly unnecessary. Hence, the TRO cannot be regarded
as grossly erroneous. We should consider the phrase a mere oversight on the part of Judge Alaras in light of her
setting the application for the writ of preliminary injunction for hearing immediately upon her issuance of the
TRO. Such hearing negated the notion that she intended the TRO to be effective for an indefinite period. The
assailed TRO issued by Judge Alaras could not be equated with the TRO issued by Judge Gorgonio Ybañez that
was held to be wrongfully issued in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, a ruling cited by the OCA in its Report. The TRO
of Judge Ybañez expressly stated its effectivity to be until further orders of the court, and did not mention the
20-day limiting period imposed by the Rules of Court. Also, the party enjoined by the TRO issued by Judge
Ybañez sought a clarificatory order as to the period of effectivity. In contrast, the party affected by Judge Alaras'
did not seek any clarification, denoting that such party understood the extent of the effectivity of the TRO.
Moreover, the TRO issued by Judge Alaras was not shown to have been issued in bad faith. (OCA v. Judge Alaras,
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2484, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
56. At the outset, respondent Judge Buyucan's continued illegal settlement erodes the public's confidence in its
agents of justice considering that such act amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of the DA's ownership rights
over the Subject Property. Even worse, his continued refusal to vacate instigated the continued illegal
occupation of other informal settlers residing therein. Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires
that the conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary and that their conduct
must, at the least, be perceived to be above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer. Based on the
foregoing acts alone, it is clear the respondent Judge Buyucan fell short of the required conduct of all members
of the bench.
a. In the same vein, the Court faults respondent Judge Buyucan for his act of acquiring a portion of the Subject
Property from a respondent in a case pending before his sala. His act is further aggravated by the fact that
the respondent therein, Eling Valdez, received a favorable judgment just a few months before the
purported sale. Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. Section 2 of Canon 3
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall ensure that his conduct, both in and out
of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public and litigants in his impartiality and that of
the judiciary. In this respect, respondent Judge Buyucan's conduct incites intrigue and puts into question
his impartiality in deciding the cases then pending before him. Such conduct unquestionably gives rise to
the impression that he was motivated by extraneous factors in ruling on the said cases. (Anonymous
Complainant v. Judge Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1879, July 24, 2018, En Banc)
57. A judge who makes untruthful statements in the PDS is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. (OCA v. Judge
Adalim-White, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2440, September 4, 2018, En Banc)
58. Judge Aquino cannot be faulted for accepting the Chery car she won at the raffle during the 2009 PJA
Convention. The Chery car was the grand raffle prize at the PJA Convention in October 2009. It was still unclear
whether it was sponsored by then Manila Vice Mayor Francisco Moreno Domagoso, more popularly known as
Isko Moreno (Moreno); or by Arlene Lerma; or by Vice Mayor Moreno, through Arlene Lerma. Then Judge
Eugenio picked Judge Aquino's name by luck from a tambiolo containing 600 or more names of PJA members
present at the convention. There was no proof at all of any. irregularity in the raffle of the Chery car at the 2009
PJA Convention, which was conducted in the presence of the raffle committee and all the participating members
and guests ofPJA. While there are legitimate questions as to the propriety of the PJA soliciting and/or accepting
raffle prizes from public officers and private persons for its conventions, these are for the association to address.
Individual PJA officers or members could not be administratively sanctioned simply forjoining the raffle and
receiving their prizes. Even the irregularities in the papers of the Chery car cannot be attributed to Judge Aquino.
Judge Aquino could not have transacted with the Chery car dealer in Metro Manila and she could not have been
issued the Vehicle Sales Invoice for the Chery car on August 8, 2008 as evidence proved that she was then
discharging her duties as Presiding Judge of RTC-Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 4 on the very same date. It

would seem that the Vehicle Sales Invoice dated August 8, 2008 was issued in the name of the initial buyer of
the Chery car, i.e., Golden Blue Metal Dragon with address at E. Rodriguez Ave., Libis, Quezon City. After Judge
Aquino won the Chery car at the raffle, the name and address of Golden Blue Metal Dragon on the Vehicle Sales
Invoice was erased using correction fluid and Judge Aquino's name was superimposed on the same. Indeed,
Judge Aquino might have been negligent to some degree in not ascertaining that all the papers for the Chery
car were consistent and in order before she accepted the same, but it did not have any professional implication
for her and it certainly was not tantamount to any administrative offense. (OCA v. Judge Aquino, A.M. No. RTJ-
15-2413, September 25, 2018, En Banc)
59. The March 19, 2015 Order terminating the rehabilitation proceedings became final and executory after Judge
Gellada denied MADCI's motion for reconsideration to reverse the same. It, thus, became imperative for Judge
Gellada to respect his own final and executory decision in keeping with the basic principle of finality or
immutability of judgments. The doctrine of finality of judgment, which is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, elates that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of
the courts must become final and executory at some definite date set by law. To do otherwise, as what Judge
Gellada did by issuing the May 5, 2016 Order, rendered him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law. Neither will Judge Gellada's explanation, that the motion to revive the proceedings was wrongfully granted
for being based on the outdated 2000 Rules and 2008 Rules, merit an exoneration from administrative liability.
Even if this Court were to consider such mistaken interpretation of the amendments to the Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation, his explanation in itself highlighted his gross ignorance of the law in failing to apply the latest
law on the matter, i.e., FRIA. Considering that RTC Bacolod City Branch 53 is a commercial court, it all the more
makes Judge Gellada's ignorance of the applicable law glaring. This Court has ruled that when a judge displays
an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts.
Such is gross ignorance of the law. (Mañalac v. Hon. Gellada, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2535, October 8, 2018, First
Division)
60. A judge who occupies a portion of the Halls of Justice as her residential quarters violates the prohibition against
the use of Halls of Justice for purposes other than that for which they have been built. The same prohibition
likewise extends to their immediate vicinity including their grounds. (Abiog v. Hon. Cañete, A.M. No. MTJ-18-
1917, October 8, 2018, First Division)
61. A judge who issues an indefinite cease and desist order is liable for gross ignorance of law. (Boston Finance and
Investment Corporation v. Gonzales, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, October 9, 2018, En Banc)
62. There was no evidence to show that Judge Racoma was motivated by bad faith, fraud, or corruption when he
granted the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. Considering the circumstances of this case and the lack of malice
and bad faith on the part of Judge Racoma, the administrative complaint against Judge Racoma is dismissed for
lack of merit.
a. The Court however agrees with the OCA that Judge Racoma's failure to submit the required Comment
reveals a failure to live up to the standards required of a government employee for failing to comply with
the Court's orders. (Tallado v. Hon. Racoma, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2536, October 10, 2018, Second Division)
63. It can be said that respondent's failure to refer the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 14-0504 to the mandatory
CAM and JDR proceedings does not amount to Gross Ignorance of the Law. While respondent deviated from
the required procedure under A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA, such act is not outrageous so as to constitute "gross
ignorance." Records reveal that she is fairly acquainted with the guidelines prescribed for the CAM and JDR, as
in fact, she readily implements the same by ordering the parties in other cases to report to the CAM mediator
after arraignment. Moreover, she explicitly stated in the said orders that her referral to the said mediator is in
accordance with the provisions of A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA. Verily, respondent is well-aware of the rules
involving the CAM and JDR, as well as its application and implementation. The fault of respondent, however,
lies in her belief that an exception to the foregoing was warranted by the circumstances. Respondent pointed
out that the parties had unequivocally expressed their disinterest in settling the civil aspect of the case. Thus,
to her mind, referring the same to the CAM and JDR would be a mere exercise of futility, and would then cause
further delay in the disposition of the case. As such, respondent decided to deviate from the normal course of
procedure in order not to hamper and frustrate the ends of justice. While respondent had good motives in not
referring the case to the CAM and JDR, the Court still finds her administratively liable for not complying with
the provisions of A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA. It bears stressing that under the said rules, cases involving less
grave felonies, where the offended party is a private person, are required to be referred to the CAM and JDR
proceedings, as in this case. Such requirement did not carve out any explicit exception and hence, evinces its
mandatory nature, notwithstanding the parties' desire to forego with the settlement of the civil aspect of the
case. (Carpio v. Judge Dimaguila, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1897, November 21, 2018, Special First Division)
64. The respondent was tasked to resolve the complainant's motion for contempt filed on November 25, 2004, and
motion to dismiss filed on January 13, 2005. In addition, he was expected to act on the complainant's
communication dated July 25, 2005 entitled Follow Up on the Status of the Case. There is no question that the
respondent did not act on both motions, and did not also respond to the inquiry on the status of the pending

motions. His inactions constituted gross dereliction of duty. The failure to decide a case or to resolve a motion
within the reglementary period amounted to gross inefficiency and warranted the imposition of administrative
sanctions against him. (Puyo v. Judge Go, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1677, November 21, 2018, First Division)
65. Complainants' Complaint-Affidavit is predicated on respondent's failure to resolve the Mallari Spouses' Petitions
for more than five (5) years. They insist that respondent's neglect to promptly decide on the Petitions resulted
in a violation of the spouses' constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases. Complainants rely on the
constitutional provision requiring this Court to decide on cases within 24 months from their submission.
Complainants' arguments lack merit. Being the court of last resort, this Court should be given an ample amount
of time to deliberate on cases pending before it. Ineluctably, leeway must be given to magistrates for them to
thoroughly review and reflect on the cases assigned to them. This Court notes that all matters brought before
it involves rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. It would be at the height of injustice if cases
were hastily decided on at the risk of erroneously dispensing justice.
a. While the 24-month period provided under the 1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily bind
this Court to the disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this Court's prompt
resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an inflexible rule. Magistrates must be given discretion
to defer the disposition of certain cases to make way for other equally important matters in this Court's
agenda. Accordingly, respondent's failure to promptly resolve the Mallari Spouses' Petitions does not
constitute gross ignorance of the law warranting administrative liability.
b. Besides, on October 10, 2018, respondent has already vacated her office due to her mandatory retirement,
rendering complainants' Administrative Complaint moot. (Re: Complaint-Affidavit of Enalbes v. Leonardo-
De Castro, A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC, January 22, 2019, En Banc)
66. Other than Gonzales' conclusion that the RTC dilly dallied in deciding her case, there are no evidence to suggest
that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 664-M-2012 were tainted with undue delay. On the contrary,
circumstances show that the disturbances were justified or were within the bounds of procedural law. Gonzales'
perceived delay in the service of the summons to her husband and in the conduct of the collusion investigation
and pre-trial conference are flawed. First, it is noteworthy that the summons was served not within the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC, but in Isabela. The summons was served to Gonzales' husband within three
days from the time the trial court of Isabela received the same. Second, Justice Mendoza-Arcega acted within
reason in giving at least three months to the prosecutor to conduct the collusion investigation and to prepare
a report before the pre-trial conference. The fact that the prosecutor did not exhaust the entire period is
immaterial. In addition, Gonzales never requested for an earlier setting of the pre-trial conference in spite of
the knowledge that a report had been made earlier than scheduled. As to the resetting of hearing dates and
the gap between hearing dates, the alleged undue delay is more of a perception than reality. As pointed out by
the OCA, the rescheduling of the hearing dates were due to the unavailability of the judge or prosecutor on
official business. There were times that it was also due to Gonzales' unavailability on account of her illness or
foreign travel. Thus, the causes of the delay were neither unjustified nor arbitrary. On the other hand, it is of
judicial notice that hearing dates are calendared based on the schedule of other cases pending before a
particular court. As such, the hearing dates may vary depending on the workload of a particular court. Also, it
bears emphasizing that Gonzales was represented by her counsel during the proceedings, and if she had any
concerns regarding the scheduling of hearing dates, she could have asked for an earlier setting through her
counsel.
a. Likewise, the Court finds that there was no delay in making the entry of judgment. The following are
important dates to consider in determining whether there was delay in the entry of judgment: (i) the
Decision was rendered on July 10, 2017; (ii) Gonzales' husband received the Decision on October 23, 2017;
(iii) the OSG received the same on November 7, 2017; and (iv) the entry of judgment was made on
November 24, 2017. Entry of judgment is to be issued upon finality of judgment. In turn, a decision or
judgment becomes final upon the denial of an appeal or after the lapse of the period to appeal with no
appeal being filed. Decisions in a petition for declaration of absolute nullity or petition for annulment shall
become final upon the expiration of the 15 days from notice to the parties. Prior to the receipt of the
decision of the RTC by Gonzales' husband and the OSG, the period before the decision would become final
has not yet commenced. The 15-day period before the decision becomes final is not reckoned from the
date of promulgation. A closer look on the accusations of undue delay levelled by Gonzales would show
that it was brought about by a lack of knowledge and understanding of the law, its nuances and of legal
procedure. This is understandable considering that she is a layperson, who is not expected to fully
comprehend the intricacies of the law. As such, no fault could be attributed to Justice Mendoza-Arcega and
Judge Zaballa-Banzuela with regard to the allegations of undue delay or inefficiency in the conduct of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 664-M-2012.
b. Nevertheless, the Court agrees that Judge Zaballa-Banzuela was guilty of undue delay in rendering a
decision in Gonzales' annulment case. At the onset, it bears emphasizing that she failed to comply with
Section 18 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. As noted by the OCA, Judge Zaballa-Banzuela gave the parties 30 days
to submit their respective memoranda from the time the trial was terminated—beyond the 15 days
allowed by the rules. Observance of the 15-day period is vital as the rules provide that the case is
considered submitted for decision after the lapse of the said period, even if no memoranda were
submitted. As applied in the present circumstances, the case should have been deemed submitted for

decision on October 5, 2016 because the trial was terminated on September 20, 2016. However, Judge
Zaballa-Banzuela even granted Gonzales' Motion for Extension to file a Memorandum and gave her until
November 20, 2016 to file one. In addition, even assuming that Judge Zaballa-Banzuela's orders regarding
the submission of the memoranda and the extension given to Gonzales were in order, she still failed to
render a decision within the prescribed 90-day period. The 90-day period to render a decision is
constitutionally mandated and failure to decide cases within the same constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction except when there are valid reasons for the delay. The prompt disposal of cases is
necessary as undue delay erodes the public's faith and confidence to the justice system and brings it into
disrepute. Here, even after the extension Judge Zaballa-Banzuela had granted, no memoranda were
submitted. Thus, she should have considered the case submitted for decision and prepared drafting the
same in order to comply with the 90-day period. Judge Zaballa-Banzuela erred in deferring the rendering
of the decision just because of a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel was filed by Gonzales' counsel. The said
motion pertained to issues tangentially related to those in the main case. Judge Zaballa-Banzuela could
have resolved Gonzales' annulment case notwithstanding the pendency of the motion to withdraw as
counsel. (Re: E-mail Complaint of Gonzales, A.M. No. 18-03-03-SB, January 29, 2019, En Banc)
67. Since respondent judge was asking for relief from the RTC through the subject motion, he should not have used
therein his title "Judge". For even if he did not intend to take undue advantage of his title, it nevertheless gave
the appearance of impropriety considering the circumstances of the case. The same may be construed as an
attempt to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge (the Presiding Judge of the RTC handling Civil Case No.
V-09-11) by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus is in the right. (Tan-Yap v. Judge Patricio, A.M.
No. MTJ-19-1925, June 3, 2019, First Division)
68. The Court cannot countenance the unjustified refusal of Judge Galvez to comply with the Court's twin
Resolutions dated January 28, 2002 and August 19, 2002, as well as the directive from DCA Elepaño. The Court
thus agrees with the findings of the OCA that Judge Galvez is guilty of gross misconduct for his deliberate and
repeated failure to comply with the Court's lawful orders and directives. He owes candor to the Court when
rendering an explanation, in the same way that he expected it from lawyers who appeared before his court. It
is even hardly necessary to remind Judge Galvez that judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher
tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from which all other courts should take their bearings.
Ultimately, a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request and should be
complied with promptly and completely.The Court is equally not convinced that Judge Galvez was unaware of
the pendency of the Court's directives against him. It is highly incredulous that he could feign ignorance of the
Court orders and, at the same time, admit that he was aware of DCA Elepaño's directive that the pending cases
left behind by retired Judge Fanuñal be raffled among Judge Besana, Judge Patricio and himself. It is also
dubious that he conveniently omitted to specify the number of cases raffled to him and the docket number of
the sole case which he claimed to have already decided on the merits. These circumstances taken as a whole
would lead to no other conclusion than that of the contumacious conduct of Judge Galvez manifested by his
blatant disregard and refusal to respect the Court's directive to decide or otherwise dispose of the thirteen (13)
cases which were raffled to him by reason of Judge Fanuñal’s retirement. Concomitant therewith, all directives
coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of this Court's administrative
supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, should be respected. Similarly, these directives are not
mere requests, but should be complied with promptly and completely. Assuming arguendo that the twin
Resolutions were not served upon Judge Galvez, his unexplained disregard of the directive of the OCA for him
to decide or otherwise dispose of the cases raffled to him shows his disrespect for and contempt, not just for
the OCA, but more importantly for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial court
officers and employees through the OCA. His indifference to, and disregard of the directives issued to him
clearly constituted insubordination which this Court will not tolerate. (OCA v. Hon. Galvez, A.M. No. RTJ-19-
2567, August 14, 2019, Third Division)
69. An attempt by a judge to bribe another judge constitutes gross misconduct. (Judge Maddela III v. Judge
Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-19-2559, August 14, 2019, En Banc)
70. Judge Abul's death intervened in the meantime. Nonetheless, and as recommended by the OCA, his death
should not result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint. In Gonzales v. Escalona, the Court held that
the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the mere fact that the respondent public official had meanwhile
ceased to hold office. Verily, jurisdiction over the case or subject matter, once acquired, continues until final
resolution. With more reason is this true herein because Judge Abul was fully afforded due process during the
investigation. Worth noting is that the Court already sternly warned Judge Abul in Calo v. Judge Abul, Jr. "to be
more circumspect in issuing orders which must truly reflect the actual facts they represent to obviate
engendering views of partiality among others." The warning evidently fell on deaf ears in view of the clear
showing that Judge Abul still committed another serious offense. (Re: Investigation Report on the Alleged
Extortion Activities of Judge Abul, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486, September 3, 2019, En Banc)
a. The death of Judge Abul results in the dismissal of the administrative complaint against him. Because of
Judge Abul’s death, the administrative complaint against him should be dismissed in accordance with the
Constitutional principles of due process and presumption of innocence. Taking into account the instant

Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Abul’s heirs should be granted the death benefits and survivorship
pension benefits due to his death while in actual service. This is considering that prior to his demise, no
definite ruling was rendered and no corresponding penalty was imposed upon him. Equally important is
the Court’s belief in equitable and humanitarian considerations, especially when the case involves an
inevitable occurrence like death. (Re: Investigation Report on the Alleged Extortion Activities of Presiding
Judge Abul, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486, September 8, 2020, En Banc)
b. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Abul, the Court may impose the appropriate administrative penalties
such as forfeiture of all his benefits, including retirement gratuity, as he was afforded an opportunity to
be heard. Records reveal that the investigation had already been concluded at the time of his demise. The
Investigation Report of the OCA was issued on February 10, 2017. Judge Abul even managed to file his
Comment/Answer on April 19, 2017. Judge Abul’s death, by itself, is insufficient to justify the dismissal of
the administrative case and bar the imposition of the corresponding penalties. The penalties arising from
his administrative liability survive his death. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carandang in Re: Investigation
Report on the Alleged Extortion Activities of Presiding Judge Abul, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486, September
8, 2020, En Banc)
71. Judge Pinto was clearly guilty of gross ignorance oflaw and procedure. It is not debatable that when the law or
rule of procedure is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. This is because
a judge is expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Indeed,
Judge Pinto was expected to keep abreast of our laws, changes therein, as well as with the latest jurisprudence
and rules of procedure, for she owed it to the public to be legally knowledgeable because ignorance ofthe law
and procedure is the mainspring of injustice. By virtue of the delicate position that she occupied in society, she
was duty bound to be the embodiment of competence and integrity.
a. Anent gross ignorance of the law and procedure, the audit report copiously detailed how Judge Pinto had
disregarded the law and procedure in handling the cases pending before her sala. The observations and
findings contained in the audit report stood unrefuted by her. Among her gross errors and blunders were
omitting to furnish to the OSG copies of the decisions she had rendered; granting motions to take advance
testimonies and depositions even before the records of the cases were transmitted to her sala; accepting
pretrial briefs on the same days of the holding of the pre-trial conferences, and permitting the lawyers to
take part in the pre-trial conferences despite not being authorized to do so through special powers of
attorney; acting on and admitting formal offers of exhibits even before the respondents or the State could
comment thereon; and not giving notifications to the OSG regarding the progress of proceedings in at least
19 cases. The Court should observe that any of these gross errors and blunders was sufficient to render
her administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
b. The OCA listed other irregularities committed by Judge Pinto, namely: (i) the issuance of a certificate of
finality without proof that the respondent was already furnished a copy of the decision; (ii) the issuance
of a copy of the decision despite the fact that the copy of the decision supposedly sent to the respondent
had been returned for the reason of "wrong address"; (iii) the issuance of an order declaring her decision
final and executory despite the fact that a copy of the decision had been returned with the marking
"respondent unknown;" (iv) the failure to act on the OSG's motion seeking to be furnished with a copy of
the decision; (v) her amending in one case of her original decision by inserting a new date and place of the
marriage in question, and such amended decision was not furnished to the respondent; (vi) her admitting
the formal offer of evidence of the petitioner without first giving the respondent and the public prosecutor
the opportunity and time to comment thereon; (vii) the acceptance of the pre-trial brief of the petitioner
on the same day the pretrial conference was held; and (viii) the issuance of the summons to the parties
on May 8, 2006 although the case was raffled to her sala only on May 9, 2006. Such other irregularities,
singly or collectively, were themselves gross and blatant violations of the rules of procedure and the basic
guidelines for ensuring that proceedings initiated to annul a marriage or declare the nullity of a marriage
are insulated from vice and fraud.
c. Although Judge Pinto sought to justify her having granted motions to take advance testimonies and
depositions even before the records of the cases were transmitted to her sala by contending that she had
seen nothing wrong in so doing if the cases were bound to end up in her sala anyway because her court
was the only family court in the area, such justification was still unacceptable because her doing so rather
evinced her unconcealed partiality that was the very antithesis of her oath to do justice. No judge in her
shoes should grant such motions prematurely and rashly because acting thereon before the records have
been brought to her official cognizance revealed an injudicious and cavalier attitude towards the judicial
functions and office. (OCA v. Judge Tuazon-Pinto, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2250, October 15, 2019, En Banc)
72. Anent the charge of gross inefficiency, Judge Pinto did not refute the audit team's finding that she had allowed
respondent Clarin to issue commitment or release orders in some instances. In her partial
compliance/explanation, however, she would justify this by insisting on her doing so out of her desire to
expedite the proceedings, for in that way the arresting officers and the accused would no longer need to wait
for her to be done with her sessions and trials before the release of the accused could be ordered. The
justification of Judge Pinto for Clarin's actions on the commitment or release orders was flimsy. No law or rule
permitted or authorized Judge Pinto to abdicate her essential judicial responsibilities by delegating them to her
clerical subordinate, even if the latter was her designated Officer-in-Charge. The task of issuing the commitment

or release orders required the exercise of judicial discretion and was not merely clerical or administrative. It
pertained to Judge Pinto, and could not be transferred to her subordinate even for a brief moment. As a result,
Judge Pinto's failure to adhere to and implement existing laws, policies, and the basic rules of procedure
seriously compromised her ability to be an effective magistrate. The convenience of any party cannot ever
justify the flagrant disregard of such laws, policies, and the basic rules of procedure. (OCA v. Judge Tuazon-
Pinto, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2250, October 15, 2019, En Banc)
73. Judge Villarosa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. First, he transferred cases for JDR to Branch 149 without
conducting the first stage of judicial proceedings, including JDR, in violation of the Consolidated and Revised
Guidelines to Implement the Expanded Coverage of Court-Annexed Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution.
Second, he ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 09-524 pending in his court with Civil Case No. CEB-
34790 pending in Branch 10, RTC Cebu City, in violation of Rule 31, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Third, he
issued a TRO that was effective beyond the 20-day period prescribed in Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
and Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in Civil Case No. 11-1059. Last, he issued a TRO against the DOTC in SP
M-7574 in violation of R.A. 8975, Section 3, which prohibits all courts, except the SC, against the issuance of
TRO and preliminary injunction. (OCA v. Judge Villarosa, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2578, January 28, 2020, En Banc)
74. Judge Santos failed to take cognizance of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA in failing to refer the case for mediation.
Here, the case involved a petition for the allowance of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, which is governed
by the rules on the Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons under the Rules of Court. Being a mediatable
case, Judge Santos, who from his actuations, is presumed to have discerned the possibility of amicable
settlement among the parties, should have referred the case to the PMC. However, Judge Santos failed to do
so. In addition, Judge Santos’ overbearing acts to make the parties settle amicably and unjustified delay in
conducting the proceedings violated Canon 2, Sections 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Here, from
the very beginning, Judge Santos has shown his predisposition to resolve the case by way of an amicable
settlement when on August 19, 2010, he directed the parties to propose specific terms and conditions for
possible amicable settlement, and constantly cajoled them to do so through his Orders. He did not deny that in
his effort to persuade the parties, he committed the following acts: (a) he sent text messages to complainant’s
counsel urging the latter to work out a settlement with oppositor; (b) he conducted an ex parte meeting with
complainant and her counsel inside his chambers to propose several options for a settlement; and (c) he
convinced the oppositor to amicably settle during their accidental meeting in Naga City on August 4, 2011, or
more than a year from the time of filing the Petition for the Allowance of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Furthermore, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 cautions judges to avoid in chamber sessions without the other party
and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they not only act
impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and improper. Notably, A.M. No. 03-01-09-
SC, which was adverted to by Judge Santos to justify his actions, mandates judges to persuade the parties to
arrive at a settlement of the dispute. However, it does not give the judge an ubridled license to do this outside
the confines of the official proceedings at the risk of putting into question the integrity of the judiciary. Worse,
because of Judge Santos’ overbearing persistence to make the parties settle amicably, he has unduly hampered
the proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 1870. (Elgar v. Judge Santos, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-16-1880, February 4,
2020, En Banc)
a. The Court finds no compelling reason to reverse its finding that respondent violated Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars when he failed to refer the case to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) as
prescribed in A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA. This is considering that the case before his sala is a mediatable
case under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, i.e., a petition for the allowance of a deed of donation mortis
causa which is governed by the rules on the Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons under the Rules of
Court. There is no merit in respondent's contention that the charge against him of failure to refer the case
to the PMC was not alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit and, thus, violates his right to be informed of the
charges against him. Suffice it to state that respondent's infraction of failing to refer the case to the PMC
is so evident from the narration of both complainant and respondent in their respective submissions in
this case as to what transpired in Special Proceedings No. 1870. Thus, the Court, in the exercise of its
power to discipline judges, may properly penalize him for disregarding the mediation rules under A.M. No.
01-10-5-SC-PHILJA. Further, the Court finds no reason to reverse its finding that respondent exceeded the
bounds of propriety when he issued the Extended Order dated December 19, 2012 and unduly castigated
complainant's counsel. Respondent should have been more prudent in his course of action and refrained
from using his position to browbeat complainant's counsel just because the latter did not agree with him.
Moreover, he should have avoided rendering the Extended Order considering that he already granted the
withdrawal of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 1870. Thus, there was no longer any occasion to
issue the Extended Order. (Elgar v. Judge Santos, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-16-1880, April 27, 2021, En Banc)
b. However, as to respondent's act of giving the oppositor the option of submitting his pre-trial brief, the
Court reconsiders its ruling and instead finds respondent guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars. While respondent is not justified in making the oppositor's submission of the pre-
trial brief optional as provided in his Order dated August: 7, 2012, the Court is cognizant of respondent's
previous Orders dated November 3, 2010 and December 3, 2010, directing the opposnor and his counsel
to submit a pre-trial brief. Respondent even strongly reprimanded oppositor's counsel and ordered him to
pay a fine of P1,000.00 for noncompliance with the Orders including those dated November 3, 2010 and

December 3, 2010. To the mind of the Court, respondent was cognizant of the requirement of filing a pre-
trial brief; however, he decided to relax the requirement considering the oppositor's previous submissions
which purportedly had "some elements of a pre-trial brief." While respondent's actuation does not
constitute gross ignorance of the law, respondent is still guilty of violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars. (Elgar v. Judge Santos, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-16-1880, April 27, 2021, En Banc)
75. Anent the allegation that respondent Judge borrowed money from litigants in cases pending before this court,
there is substantial evidence to hold respondent Judge liable for violation of Rule 140, Section 8(7) of the Rules
of Court. While it is acknowledged that complainants do not have documentary evidence in support of the
alleged loans, with the exception of the Cebuana Lhuiller receipt that spouses Salcedo offered in evidence to
attest to the fact that they sent P5,000.00 to respondent Judge on November 12, 2011, the invesigating Justice
is convinced of the veracity of their respective claims. (Neri v. Judge Macabaya, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2475, February
4, 2020, En Banc)
76. A judge who knowingly received his monthly allowance despite notice of his suspension by the Court is guilty
of dishonest conduct since he knowingly received money not due to him and in effect, defrauded the LGUs
concerned of public funds that could have been used for a worthy governmental purpose. (Baculi v. Judge Belen,
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2286, February 12, 2020, First Division)
77. The CA Associate Justices of the Special 12th and 3rd Divisions did not commit gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law in issuing the aforementioned resolutions against the DILG and Ombudsman. In resolving
the propriety of granting Tallado’s prayer for preliminary injunction and the TRO, the CA Associate Justices of
both the Special 12th and Special 3rd Divisions took into account the applicable law and recent jurisprudence,
specifically the Court’s ruling in Morales v. CA. The CA Associate Justices, hence, acted prudently and within the
authority of settled jurisprudence and the Rules of Court. Villamin and Balce also failed to present any evidence
of malice, bad faith,or fraud on the part of the CA Associate Justices to substantiate their bare allegations.
Considering that the grave penalty of suspension and dismissal of Tallado as Governor of Camarines Norte
would unduly result to the premature disenfranchisement of the constituents of the province who voted for
Tallado during the last May 9, 2016 elections, the CA Associate Justices acted with diligence and good faith
when they issued the injunctive writs in order to maintain the status quo while Tallado’s petition for review was
pending before the CA. (Re: Complaint-Affidavit of Villamin and Balce, IPI No. 17-256-CA-J, February 18, 2020,
En Banc)
78. Insulting and insensitive language used by Judge Dajao in the Order he issued such as “idiot,” “psychopath,”
“big dick (penis),” “sadistic,” and “homophobic baklita” is a language not befitting a judge. It must be
emphasized that judges are enjoined to always be temperate, patient, and courteous both in conduct and
language. Here, Judge Dajao’s unguarded written words, as well as insinuation of a sexual relationship between
the parties involved in the case he was hearing, fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law
and constituted vulgar and unbecoming conduct that eroded public confidence in the judiciary. (Re: Anonymous
Complaint against Judge Dajao, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2456, March 2, 2020, Second Division)
79. Hon Lagura-Yap’s guilt is undisputed. She admitted her failure to decide 118 pending cases within the 90-day
period; failure to comply with Section 8 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC regarding the submission of a certification that
she disposed all cases assigned to her in Branch 28, RTC, Mandaue City, Cebu, upon her promotion to the CA;
and failure to submit a certification of the status of pending cases and cases submitted for decision at the time
of her application in September 2011. The Court have considered the justifications and explanations proffered
by Hon. Lagura-Yap – heavy caseload, voluminous records, death of family members, and being understaffed –
which, while may be recognized as true and reasonable, are not sufficient to exonerate her from liability. To be
sure, the mandatory nature of the period to decide cases provided under the Constitution cannot be considered
as beyond the limits of acceptability or fairness. (OCA v. Hon. Lagura-Yap, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2337, June 23, 2020,
En Banc)
80. Judge Legazpi had been remiss in the performance of his responsibilities for failing to decide cases and resolve
pending incidents within the reglementary period, without any extension granted by the Supreme Court. As
shown in the judicial audit report, Judge Legazpi failed to decide 88 cases submitted for decision within the
prescribed period; failed to resolve 51 incidents submitted for resolution within the prescribed period; failed to
take appropriate action on 49 cases with no further action of setting for a considerable length of time; failed to
take appropriate action on 3 cases with no initial action; and failed to take appropriate action on 24 cases due
for archiving. It is worthy to note that, as disclosed by the audit report, all the transcripts of stenographic notes
are complete and that in fact, a number of draft decisions prepared his staff are ready for his consideration, yet
the said decisions were not finalized. Indeed, while the lack of court personnel may have had an adverse effect
on the orderly and efficien function of the court, Judge Legazpi cannot use this to justify the delay in the
disposition of cases. Moreover, Judge Legazpi’s plea of heavy workload, lack of court personnel, and failing
medical condition cannot excuse him from liability. These circumstances are not justifications for the delay of
non-performance, given that he could have requested the Court for a reasonable extension of time to resolve
cases. However, as revealed by the OCA, no requests for extension of time to resolve the cases pending before

his court were made by Judge Legazpi. (Re: Result of the Judicial Audit conducted in Branch 49, RTC, Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan, A.M. No. 19-12-293-RTC, June 30, 2020, En Banc)
81. Judge Pangilinan explains that the delay was due to his desire to have the parties settle the case amicably. This
justification is not reasonable under the circumstances, considering that the criminal case of perjury was a case
against public interest which had already reached the conclusion of its trial proper. Also, in cases where a judge
is unable to comply with the reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he or she can, for good reasons,
ask for an extension from the Court. As a general rule, requests for extension are granted by the Court in
cognizance of the heavy caseload of the trial courts. Granting that Judge Pangilinan had good reasons for his
delay, it remains a given fact that he failed to ask for an extension of time from the Court within which to resolve
Criminal Case No. 10-5530. Judges, by themselves, cannot extend the period for deciding cases beyond that
authorized by law. As a result of his failure to ask for extension, whether deliberate or not, Judge Pangilinan
promulgated his decision in Criminal Case No. 10-5530 beyond the period allowed by law. (Cayabyab v. Judge
Pangilinan, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-20-2584, July 28, 2020, First Division)
82. A judge commits gross ignorance of the law when he granted bail without a hearing because the accused is a
minor and a mental retardate. This is because the 2009 Revised Rules on Children in Conflict with the law is
explicit that a child charged with a criminal offense shall not be entitled to bail when the evidence of guilt is
strong. The determination of the requisite evidence is a matter of judicial discretion. Consequently, absent a
prior hearing, the order granting bail can hardly be a product of Judge Flor, Jr.’s sound discretion. Also, Judge
Flor, Jr. exhibited cavalier indifference to the rules when he allowed in a criminal case the motion to reduce bail
without a hearing. This is contrary to the clear mandate of the Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by
Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial that a motion to reduce bail shall enjoy
priority in the hearing of cases. (OCA v. Judge Flor, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2503, July 28, 2020, En Banc)
83. Judge Alzate’s act of issuing decisions that voided marital unions despite irregularities and non-compliance with
the rules not only made a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise violated the
basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. His conduct greatly undermines the people’s faith in the Judiciary
and betrays public trust and confidence in the courts.
a. The audit report is replete with findings showing that Judge Alzate continued to try and resolve cases
despite the parties’ dubious circumstances which should have instead put him on guard. There were
certifications which showed that most of the nullity of marriage cases that were identified did not comply
with the rule on venue as provided in Section 4 of the Rule on Declaration of Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Judge Alzate failed to ascertain the true residence of the parties even
though the marriage certificates that were appended to the petitions clearly showed different addresses
from the ones stated in the petitions. Indeed, Judge Alzate could have required the petitioners to submit
their respective proof of residency, such as utility bills or government-issued IDs, which are now required
to be attached to the petitions pursuant to OCA Circular No. 63-2019 on the Guidelines to Validate
Compliance with the Jurisdictional Requirement set forth in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but failed to do so.
b. The audit team also reported that Judge Alzate continued with the court proceedings despite the absence
of the Report on Collusion Investigation. It must be stressed that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Section
8(1), the respondent is required to submit an Answer within 15 days from receipt of the summons. If no
answer is filed, the court shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between
the parties. The rules do not merely ask whether the public prosecutor is in a position to determine
whether collusion exists. They require that the investigating prosecutor determine whether or not there
is collusion. Furthermore, in declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage cases, the investigation
report of the prosecution on whether there is collusion between the parties is a condition sine qua non
for setting the case for pretrial or further proceedings. No further proceedings should have been held
without the investigation report; thus, Judge Alzate should have refrained from proceeding with the
subject cases.
c. During the investigation, the OCA also found that in Civil Case Nos. 15-828 and 15-829, among others,
Judge Alzate proceeded with the court hearings and eventually rendered judgment therein without any
record that the cases underwent pre-trial. Considering that no notices of pre-trial and pre-trial orders were
found in the records of the said cases, it gives the conclusion that no-pretrial was held, thus, the same was
in violation of Section 11 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages where it is stated that pre-trial is mandatory.
d. Moreover, the OCA reported that they found no proof that the Office of the Solicitor General was furnished
with copies of the petitions for annulment. In Civil Case Nos. 15-841 and 14-813, no proof of service were
attached to the said petitions, in violation of Section 5(4) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which requires that the OSG and the Public
Prosecutor be furnished with a copy of the petition for declaration of nullity of void marriages. However,
notwithstanding the glaring absence of the required proof of service, Judge Alzate, instead of dismissing
the same for non-compliance with the foregoing provision, proceeded in hearing the cases and eventually
rendered judgment therein on August 20, 2015 and January 22, 2015, respectively. Likewise, in Civil Case
No. 14-815, Judge Alzate concluded the trial therein despite the absence of the notice of appearance of
the OSG and the delegation of the public prosecutor to represent the said office which again runs counter

of Section 5(4) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. There were also cases with notices or orders for the setting of hearings where no proof of
service or registry receipts were attached, and those were the minutes of the proceedings were not signed
by the counsels and parties which gives the impression that those cases were neither set for hearing nor
even conducted.
e. The OCA also reported the questionable and suspicious haste in hearing and resolving cases. As noted by
the OCA, the filing of the Report on the Investigation of Collusion between the parties, the pre-trial and
the initial trial which all happened on the same day put in serious doubt the integrity of the proceedings
in the said case. (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit conducted in Branch 24, RTC, Cabugao, llocos Sur, A.M.
No. 19-01-15-RTC, September 1, 2020, En Banc)
84. When the respondent in a pending administrative case dies, the case must be rendered moot. Proceeding any
further would be to violate the respondent’s fundamental right to due process. Should it be a guilty verdict, any
monetary penalty imposed on the dead respondent’s estate works only to the detriment of their heirs. To
continue with such cases would not punish the perpetrator, but only subject the grieving family to further
suffering by passing on the punishment to them. (Flores-Concepcion v. Judge Castañeda, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438,
a. Admittedly, respondent’s infraction in this case is severe. The OCA conclusively found that complainant’s
nullity case was resolved with unde haste, having been resolved less than a year after the petition had
been filed. None among complainant, the OSG or the Office of the Public Prosecutor was ever furnished
with copies of the petition. The psychologist was never made to testify in court to confirm the findings of
the psychological report. Responden would have been dismissed for her blatant and gross ignorance of
the law. In 2012, however, the Court has already dismissed respondent from service for her infractions.
Her retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, were forfeited. She has already borne the
humiliation and degradation from that penalty. There are no more retirement, death, or survivorship
benefits from which the Court could bleed out any prospective fine. The Court has already extracted its
pound of flesh. Unfortunately, during the proceedings of the second administrative complaint in the Court,
respondent died. Respondent is no longer in a position to refute the findings of the OCA. She could no
longer know of the proceedings against her. She would not know of the conclusions of the Court and of
the punishment that she would have so rightly deserved. She could no longer move for reconsideration,
admit to the charges, plead her innocence, not even beg for clemency. (Flores-Concepcion v. Judge
Castañeda, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438, September 2, 2020, En Banc)
b. Pending administrative cases are not automatically mooted solely by the fact of a respondent-court
employee’s supervening deah. The consequences of administrative misconduct have a persisting and
surviving effect on the integrity of public service; hence, once jurisdiction is acquired and the respondent
is duly given the opportunity to be heard, the Court should proceed to resolve the case. Accordingly, any
administrative liability, if so found to be established based on the facts on record, should be pronounced
and remain on public record in order to memorialize the public affront, so as to deter future deleterious
conduct by would-be erring public officers. Moreover, a finding of administrative liability, on the one hand,
may be differentiated from the imposition of penalties on the other. While the latter is generally a
consequence of the former, exceptional circumstances may justify a finding of liability without necessarily
proceeding to impose the penalty therefor. As in this case, the Court should have proceeded with the
determination of respondent’s administrative liability and enter the same in the public record. The
administrative penalties – which are either fines or non-monetary penalties converted to fines – need not
be imposed anymore. After all, retribution by punishment is not the sole purpose of administrative
proceedings; recognition of the taint to the integrity of the service is restorative justice on its own. In other
words, notwithstanding respondent’s unfortunate death, her administrative liability should remain on
public record but the penalty of fine may no longer be imposed. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Perlas-
Bernabe in Flores-Concepcion v. Judge Castañeda, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438, September 2, 2020, En Banc)
c. The incontrovertible facts in this case show that (i) respondent allowed an improper service of summons
against complainant in the declaration of nullity case that her husband had initiated by immediately
resorting to service by publication; and (ii) complainant had demonstrated with clear and convincing
evidence that neither she nor her husband resided or has been residing in Paniqui, Tarlac at that time.
Hence, respondent’s decision to grant the petition despite these irregularities smacked of gross ignorance
of the law. Notably, respondent was dismissed from the service in 2012 for dishonesty, gross ignorance of
the law and procedure, gross misconduct and incompetency. With respect to the findings of gross
ignorance of the law, in particular, it was in relation to serious infractions involving petitions for nullity and
annulment of marriage and legal separation, the most disturbing and scandalous of which was the haste
with which she disposed of such cases. All told, the prevailing rule on the non-dismissal of the
administrative case despite the death of respondent is still subject to the following considerations: (i) the
observance of respondent’s right to due process; (ii) the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case
on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and (iii) depending on the kind of penalty imposed.
(Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa in Flores-Concepcion v. Judge Castañeda, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438,
d. Because Judge Escobido had effectively lost the opportunity to be informed and to seek reconsideration
of any judgment against him on account of his death on June 15, 2020, or during the pendency of the

proceedings, the Court is constrained to dismiss this administrative case on the ground of mootness in
accordance with the doctrine laid down in Re: Judge Abdul and Re: Judge Castañeda. (OCA v. Judge
Escobido, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2282, June 14, 2021, Third Division)
85. Judge Bacolod is guilty of maintaining irregular calendar of court hearings and habitual absenteeism with
falsification of official documents, i.e., certificates of service. Records show that Judge Bacolod reports to court
only twice a month, on the 3rd and 4th Monday of every month – their hearing days. However, in trying to justify
his act of holding only two hearing days, and effectively reporting to the court for only twice a month, he
contends that the ABC Session all where they were temporarily holding hearings was available only for morning
sessions. However, Judge Bacolod could have easily asked the OCA or the Court for a temporary place where
hearings may be held both in the morning and afternoon. Unfortunately, there was no showing that Judge
Bacolod exerted effort to the same end and instead had just let things be. (Discreet Investigation Report relative
to the Anonymous Complaint against Judge Bacolod, A.M. No. MTJ-18-1914, September 15, 2020, En Banc)
86. The pieces of evidence submitted by Judge Hugo fell short of competence and were derived from direct
knowledge. First, the Court notes that the 36 cases being used as subject in the allegation of disrespect to higher
courts were not cases of Judge Castilla but of the other branch of the RTC. If at all, the persons who stand to
have direct knowledge and thereby possibly aggrieved by Judge Castilla’s order were the prosecutor, the judge,
or the complaining witnesses of the dismissed criminal cases. If there were valid grounds, the said order of
Judge Castilla could have been assailed by the proper parties to the appropriate courts. In addition, there was
no evidence showing that in issuing said order, Judge Castilla was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or
corruption. Second, in support of her charge that Judge Castilla was fond of insulting his colleagues, Judge Hugo
submitted a copy of the former’s Order of Dismissal, in which she claimed that words therein were personally
insulting to the handling prosecutor of the case. Again, similar to the first allegation, the evidence of Judge Hugo
was not from direct knowledge and was insufficient to warrant administrative liability. Nevertheless, the Court
seizes this occasion to reaffirm Guanzon v. Rufon and declare once again that although respondent judge may
attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from
his courteous speech in and out of court. Third, to prove Judge Castilla’s illicit affairs, Judge Hugo submitted a
transcript of exchanges of text messages between Judge Castilla and the PAO lawyer assigned to his court, his
alleged paramour. In this regard, the Court agrees that this charge was not duly proven. It must be noted that
the transcript of text messages was a court document originally used and taken from the declaration of nullity
of marriage filed by Judge Castilla against his former wife, Climarie. While the said transcript was an attachment
to an affidavit filed by Climarie to the said case, the same and its contents cannot be considered as competent,
and from direct knowledge of Judge Hugo with respect to this instant administrative case. Significantly, the
following were not verified or authenticated: (a) the identity of the cellular phone from which the messages
were culled; (b) the identity of the cellular phone numbers, if they indeed belong to Judge Castilla and the PAO
lawyer; and (c) if the “JC” and “JB” in the said transcript were certainly Judge Castilla and the PAO lawyer. (Judge
Dagani-Hugo v. Judge Castilla, OCA IPI No. 20-3093-MTJ, October 14, 2020, Second Division)
87. Respondent judge denied the affidavits executed by numerous persons as being highly dubious and
questionable. The information from the anonymous BJMP personnel saying that respondent judge used Norma
as “bag woman” is unverified and merely hearsay. However, such affidavits and reports cannot simply be
brushed aside and for this Court to turn a blind eye. While it may be considered as hearsay, such information
and statements can be considered as substantial evidence. (OCA v. Judge Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2506,
88. Judge Mupas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

a. A cursory perusal of the reasons advanced by Judge Mupas show that nowhere in any of the Orders did
he make a pronouncement on the presence of all of the requisites for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Judge Mupas merely discussed the supposed
irreparable damage or injury that may result should he not issue the injunctive reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that although a trial court judge is given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant
a TRO or a WPI if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima facie
evaluation of the evidence of the complainant. As held in Dr. Sunico v. Judge Gutierrez, a judge is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for issuing a WPI without stating the presence of the applicant’s clear legal right
which was sought to be protected.
b. In addition, Judge Mupas had already admitted that he took cognizance of Civil Case No. R-PSY-19-03785-
CV notwithstanding the fact that a petition for certiorari is prohibited by Section 19(g) of the Rules on
Summary Procedure. This prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.
(Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Judge Mupas, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2593, November 10, 2020,
En Banc)
89. Dismissal from service is an appropriate penalty for a judge who becomes a fugitive from justice. To recall,
warrants of arrest were issued against Judge Contreras for sexual abuse starting in 1994 until July 30, 2014.
However, these orders of arrest were returned unserved because Judge Contreras could no longer be located
or his whereabouts were unknown. A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with

lawful orders or resolutions is guilty of grave misconduct. By becoming a fugitive from justice, respondent
committed grave misconduct. Moreover, his clear intent to violate the law and flagrant disregard of the legal
processes are not merely indicative of his reprehensible conduct; worse, his continued evasion of the orders
for his arrest makes it appear that he is immune to or above ordinary judicial processes, thus bringing dishonor
to the Judiciary. Respondent’s flight from justice is fully incompatible with his judicial office and underscores
lack of respect and defiance of the law, in contradiction to the very core of his position. Evasion of arrest is
anathema to a career in the Judiciary; it renders respondent unfit and unworthy of the honor and integrity
attached to his office. (Ballaran v. Judge Contreras, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2437, December 9, 2020, En Banc)
90. There is sufficient basis to find respondent guilty of impropriety for sending the parties’ respective counsels his
text message supposedly explaining his judgment. It was certainly unnecessary for respondent Judge to
elaborate on the rationale for his disposition because his promulgated judgment should already speak for itself.
Respondent Judge’s supposed intent to discourage the parties from appealing cannot justify his text message
to their lawyers because his judgment itself had already included such a discussion on this matter. As correctly
noted by the OCA, his message effectively cast doubt over his impartiality, integrity, and competence in
rendering his judgment. It is of no moment that he sent his message after the decision was promulgated
because the termination of the case will not preclude public criticism for acts which may render the disposition
of a case suspect. (Obiedo v. Hon. Santos, Jr., A.M. RTJ-20-2600, January 12, 2021, First Division)
91. Respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law, when he hastily issued Letters of Administration to
Elisa. In the pertinent order of respondent Judge, he granted Letters of Administration to Elisa, without stating
the clear legal and factual basis for doing so, except for the oppositors’ failure to file a written opposition to the
subject Petition on or before the hearing date. However, the evidence readily shows that petitioner and Nestor
were not formally notified of the proceedings since Elisa deliberately failed to mention them as possible parties-
in-interest in the subject Petition. Even granting that Judge De Leon was notified of the subject Petition,
respondent Judge, in the exercise of sound discretion and pursuant to the foregoing rule, should not have
summarily granted Letters of Administration to Elisa. The oppositors appeared before the court to interpose
their objection to the subject petition. In fact, respondent Judge even gave them a reasonable period within
which to file a written opposition. It should likewise be underscored that the hearing on March 26, 2008 was
only for the submission and offer of documentary evidence to establish compliance with jurisdictional
requirements. Respondent Judge neither set a hearing nor explained how he determined the competence of
Elisa to administer the estate of her sister. The circumstances of the case clearly shows that there was no
prudent, or even legal, reason for respondent Judge to act with haste. Even his claim on the urgency of the
matter was more apparent than real. Respondent Judge’s summary issuance of the Letters of Administration
without hearing, and without even waiting for the period for the oppositors to file a written opposition to lapse,
indubitably transgressed Sections 5 and 6, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. (De Leon-Profeta v. Judge Mendiola,
A.M. No. RTJ-20-2596, January 19, 2021, En Banc)
92. Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

a. First, by claiming that he took judicial notice of Judge De Leon’s poor health, and using the same as his
basis to issue the Letters of Administration to Elisa over Judge De Leon, respondent Judge blatantly
disregard Rule 129, Section 3.
b. Second, respondent Judge erred in denying admission of the oppositors’ exhibits, considering the basis he
cited for doing so pertained to weight, not admissibility, of the evidence. Instead of abiding by the rules
on admissibility of evidence under the Rules of Court, respondent Judge denied admission of all of
oppositors’ exhibits based on the fact that he found the adoption decree questionable, insisting that only
a final and executory decree of adoption based on a certificate of finality can prove the fact of adoption.
c. Even respondent Judge’s justification for denying admission of petitioner and Nestor’s birth certificates
issued by the NSO was erroneous. It is well to stress that as a public document, a registered birth
certificate, duly recorded in the local civil registry, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Further, while it may be true that as a mere prima facie evidence, the facts contained in a birth certificate
are not conclusive and may still be rebutted, still, a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the
presumption of the truth contained in such public document.
d. Respondent Judge likewise erred when he allowed Elisa to present rebuttal evidence. Under Rule 132,
Section 36 of the Rules of Court, an offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days
after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. In this case, the oppositors filed
their formal offer of evidence on November 21, 2011, but Elisa filed her comment only in January 2012.
Moreover, when respondent Judge allowed Elisa to present her rebuttal evidence, she had already rested
her case. Worse, respondent Judge did not take action on the formal offer for more than two years. The
two years of inaction of respondent Judge, without any reasonable justification for the delay, also
constitutes gross inefficiency. (De Leon-Profeta v. Judge Mendiola, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2596, January 19,
2021, En Banc)
93. Respondent Judge is also guilty of manifest bias and partiality. The CA, in the now final and executory decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 13265, found glaring evidence of bias and partiality on the part of respondent Judge, and thus
required respondent Judge to inhibit from further hearing the subject petition. The CA further pointed out all

the ”heavy-handed rulings” he issued against oppositors. Respondent Judge should have adhered to the CA
ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 13265 instead of obstinately continuing to hear the case, under the flimsy excuse that
the motion for reconsideration of the CA ruling was still unresolved. By his contumacious conduct, respondent
Judge violated Canon 3, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that judges shall perform
their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice. He is likewise guilty of violating Canon 4, Section 1 of the
same Code mandating judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
(De Leon-Profeta v. Judge Mendiola, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2596, January 19, 2021, En Banc)
94. There was no deliberate intent on the part of Judge Arguelles to delay the resolution of the Urgent Motion of
Espinosa, Sr. All actions carried out by Judge Arguelles in relation to the Urgent Motion were done with
prudence and in good faith. Instead of denying outright the Urgent Motion for being insufficient in form and
substance, Judge Arguelles took the pragmatic and reasonable recourse of conducting an ocular inspection and
hearings in order to properly evaluate the security concerns of Espinosa, Sr. in his detention facility. In
personally examining the situation on the ground, and in allowing Espinosa, Sr. to substantiate his claims, Judge
Arguelles acted judiciously and carefully to avoid any miscarriage of justice. The Court cannot attribute any
intention to purposely delay the resolution of the Urgent Motion simply because Espinosa, Sr. was killed while
in detention ten days after the Urgent Motion was submitted for resolution. It must be emphasized that
Espinosa, Sr. is not an ordinary detainee. At the time of his detention, he requested to be transferred to the
police station of Albuera, Leyte, the place where he was serving as its incumbent mayor. Due to the obvious
influence he wields in Albuera, Leyte, Judge Arguelles cannot be faulred for requiring an ocular inspection and
for probing further the sub-provincial warden and the provincial warden responsible for securing Baybay Sub-
Provincial Jail. Judge Arguelles was reasonably expected to be more circumspect in resolving the urgent motion
in order to avoid giving Espinosa, Sr. any undue advantage or special treatment that could defeat the purpose
of his detention. (Re: Motu Proprio Fact-Findign Investigation on the Issuance of Search Warrant and Other
Pending Incidents in the case of the Deceased Mayor Rolando Espinosa, Sr., A.M. No. RTJ-17-2494, January 26,
2021, En Banc)
95. As regards the administrative liability for undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the
records of a case, it will be remembered that the Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, granted for the last
time Judge Batingana’s motion for extension of time to decide the civil aspect fo the criminal cases. However,
for over one year thereafter, Judge Batingana had continuously asked for more extensions. It appears from the
records that the criminal cases were decided in 2005, but the civil aspect thereof were resolved only in 2009.
What compounds Judge Batingana’s infractions is the fact that copies of his decisions in the cases were
submitted to OCA only in the eyar 2014. For this, the Court finds Judge Batingana liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case. (Re: Request of Judge Batingana, A.M.
No. 07-4-188-RTC, January 27, 2021, Third Division)
96. Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct in violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Complainant
and Bartolome testified that respondent frequently visited Delagua, Jr. in their beach resort which was the
property subject of the probate case pending before his sala. On October 15, 2014, Bartolome helped Delagua,
Jr. prepare food for respondent and the latter’s court staff and alleged paramour. Bartolome actually saw
respondent accept a pad of P1,000.00 bills from Delagua, Jr. at the beach resort and securing the same inside
his pocket. Apart from his bare denial, respondent failed to adduce any competent and conclusive proof to
controvert complainant’s evidence. Verily, although the money was not directly proven to be a bribe in
connection with the cases pending before the respondent’s sala, respondent’s frequent association with and
accepting money and favors from party litigant Delagua Jr. amounts to grave misconduct, a violation of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 1 of Canon 2, Section 2 of Canon 3, and Section 1 of Canon 4. It
taints his integrity and impartiality for it reveals his corrupt inclination and clear intent to disregard these ethical
principles enjoining judges to always act with integrity, propriety, and impartiality.
a. The charge of immorality must fail. To recall, complainant asserted that respondent brought and flaunted
his alleged mistress, Dimpas, at Delagua’s beach resort. Although complainant and Bartolome testified
that Dimpas was one of respondent’s companions during his visits at Delagua’s beach resort, there was no
substantial proof that the two (2) had an illicit affair.
b. In addition, respondent cannot be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of law. The appointment
of a special administrator rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. Respondent Delagua, Jr. qualified
to be a special administrator for the latter did not exhibit any of the disqualifications set by law for an
administrator. If complainant believed that the appointment was erroneous, he should have challenged
respondent’s Order dated February 8, 2013. But complainant did not. For respondent’s act to be
considered gross ignorance of the law, petitioner must prove that the purported erroneous Order is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence and its issuance was prompted by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. This, complainant failed to do. (Delagua v. Presiding
Judge Batingana, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2588, February 2, 2021, En Banc)
97. While the OCA found the reasons proffered by Judge Teves may have truly justified his delayed resolutions and
decisions, it concluded that the sheer number of cases, i.e., five (5) criminal and twenty-two (22) civil cases, and
pending incidents in three (3) criminal cases and nineteen (19) civil cases which were unacted upon for a

considerable length of time had only shown his gross neglect to perform his avowed duty to efficiently and
expeditiously dispose of the business of the court. Sections 9 and 14 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classify
undue delay in rendering decisions and orders as less serious charges and penalize it with either suspension
without pay for a period of not less than one (1) month, but not more than three (3) months, or a fine of more
than P10,000.00, but not more than P20,000.00. The fine varies in each case, depending chiefly on the number
of cases or matters undecided or unresolved, respectively, within the reglementary period as well as and the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In some cases, fines more than the maximum amount are
even imposed. (OCA v. Judge Teves, Sr., A.M. No. RTJ-21-2006, February 9, 2021, En Banc)
98. The doctrine of judicial stability or the doctrine of noninterference states that the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Here, if Judge Soriaso
had just heeded the information provided by the DOH regarding the existence of the earlier decision of Judge
Enciso, she would have been more circumspect in the eventual issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
realizing the ruse propagated by JBROS to get a favorable judgment. Surely, as the OCA correctly pointed out,
Judge Soriaso's eventual issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction causes confusion as to which order the
parties should follow: the initial decision of Judge Enciso denying the application of the writ or the subsequent
decision of Judge Soriaso? This could have easily been avoided if only Judge Soriaso observed the
aforementioned doctrine. Further, the circumstance above is a textbook example of forum shopping.
Jurisprudentially, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there
is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. Here, while the nomenclature used was
different, both cases seek the same outcome. Also, both cases involve the same parties. Lastly, the same
evidence is required to prove both cases. The OCA is, therefore, correct in finding Judge Soriaso guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for violating the rule on forum shopping and the doctrine of judicial stability. Likewise, the
Court is convinced that Judge Soriaso failed to comply with Administrative Circular No. 7-99. She utterly failed
to notice that the contract between JBROS and the DOH had long been extinguished. As such, the same cannot
be the source of any right to be protected by injunction. Also, as correctly ruled upon by Judge Enciso, the acts
sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished. The settled rule is that an injunction would not lie
where the acts sought to be enjoined had become fait accompli - an accomplished or consummated act. It is
thus undeniable that Judge Soriaso erroneously issued the writ of preliminary injunction despite two glaring
warning signs signs she would have surely taken into consideration had she not taken a nonchalant attitude
towards Judge Enciso's earlier decision. (Re: Letter dated March 9, 2020 of DOH Secretary Francisco T. Duque,
MD, MSC, A.M. No. 20-08-05-SC, February 16, 2021, En Banc)
99. Respondent committed gross ignorance of procedural rules when he issued the November 16, 2017 Order.
There is no question at this point that despite complainant’s submission of the ARE and Certification dated
September 14, 2017 from the FEO certifying that complainant and Brahim are the licensed/registered holders
of the seized firearms, herein respondent did not grant complainant’s Motion to Release Seized Items.
Respondent, instead, issued the November 16, 2017 Order, thereby authorizing himself, the court personnel,
and the government prosecutor to personally verify the authenticity of the firearm licenses at Camp Crame at
the expense of complainant. To justify the propriety of the November 16, 2017 Order, respondent asserts his
doubts on the authenticity of the September 14, 2017 Certification of the FEO, and the inadequacy of the ARE
submitted by complainant. OCA Circular No. 11-2011, citing Del Rosario vs. People, provides that certifications
issued by the FEO Records Section are sufficient proof of the fact of possession or non-possession of a valid
license to own or possess firearms or explosives in the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms. OCA Circular
No. 11-2011 further states that personal appearances of FEO records personnel is not required in order to
establish the authenticity of FEO-issued certifications. This only means that FEO-issued certifications are
sufficient evidence, and thus, should be accepted by the courts in determining the presence or absence of a
valid license or permit to own or possess firearms. Accordingly, it is not the duty of respondent to personally
verify the authenticity of the September 14, 2017 Certification of the FEO, or the firearm licenses of complainant
and Brahim. Neither is respondent enjoined by the rules to travel from General Santos City to Camp Crame,
Quezon City to do the same. Anent the ARE submitted by complainant pertaining to the caliber .380 Pietro
beretta, it has already been established that the seized firearm was not one of the items particularly stated in
Search Warrant Nos. 17-98 and 17-99. It was thus highly irregular, if not anomalous, for respondent to issue
the November 16, 2017 Order. If indeed respondent found the ARE inadequate, or doubted the authenticity of
the September 14, 2017 Certification of the FEO on the basis of the alleged unusual signature of the Chief of its
Records Section, or that it indicated a different firearm, respondent could have simply required complainant to
submit another and/or original FEO certification for the seized firearms. (Maulana v. Judge Noel, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-21-006, March 15, 2021, Third Division)
100. Respondent’s plea that the Decision dated February 4, 2020 be immediately removed the SC website until after
there is a ruling on his Motion for Reconsideration must also fail. There is nothing in the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court to the effect that the Supreme Court must await the filing of a motion for reconsideration of
the decision and the promulgation of a resolution acting on the motion before the decision may be uploaded
on the SC website. (Elgar v. Judge Santos, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-16-1880, April 27, 2021, En Banc)
101. Judge Paderanga is guilty of violating Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

a. In the case at bar, Judge Paderanga violated Sections 1, 2 and 8 of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
During his first encounter with Paga, he threatened to slap the latter who was merely performing his duties
as a quarantine officer. His sarcastic remark that Paga must first show him a copy of the law, followed by
his snide threat to slap Paga if the latter refuses to let the vehicle pass, betray the judicial restraint and
temperament required of a magistrate. He acted like an ill-mannered tyrant, who was easily irritated by
the enforcement of legitimate rules in the Port of Camiguin.
b. The second confrontation was even worse. This time, he actually slapped Paga in front of his sons. His act
of slapping Paga was confirmed by the Medical Certificate which stated that the latter had red lines on the
left side of his cheek. The reason behind the slap was trivial. Apparently, Judge Paderanga was irked when
Paga purportedly glared at him, and failed to move to the side to avoid the motorcycle he and Ethaniel
were riding. It is certainly strange that Paga, who was merely walking, would brazenly meet the motorcycle
head on, when doing so would certainly place him in grave danger. Needless to say, even assuming Judge
Paderanga's version to be true, his act of slapping Paga was certainly uncalled for. Undoubtedly, Judge
Paderanga's act of slapping a hapless man reveals his petty and quarrelsome demeanor that is unbecoming
of a respectable member of the Judiciary.
c. Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that Judge Paderanga did not slap Paga, still, his act
of condoning his sons' harassment is improper. He did not bother to stop them while they mauled Paga.
Sadly, he watched in silence as Mython grabbed Paga's collar and hit him, while Ethaniel boxed the latter.
It must be noted that the RTC observed that Paga was short and barely 5 feet, 3 inches in height, compared
the Padarengas, who towered over him. The Paderangas were described as tall men, who stood at 5 feet
and 8 inches; 5 feet and 9 inches; and 5 feet and 11 inches; and were said to be of athletic built. Indeed,
Judge Paderanga's indifference while his sons manhandled Paga certainly constitutes impropriety and
unbecoming conduct that diminish the public's confidence in his exalted position as a judge.
d. In addition, Judge Paderanga allowed his sons to brag about his stature as a judge, and use his position to
instill fear in Paga. By doing so, he unwittingly dragged not only his name, but the entire judiciary to
disrepute. Section 8, Canon 4 strongly forbids judges from using or lending the prestige of their judicial
office to advance their, or their family member's interests. A judge's position should never be used as an
instrument to instill fear and terror on others. (Paga v. Hon. Paderanga, A.M.-MTJ-10-1762, May 5, 2021,
First Division)
102. Respondent judge’s actions of encouraging his staff to serve as bondsmen are in violation of Rule 114, Section
14 of the Rules of Court, which specifically designates the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be
deposited, viz: collector of internal revenue, or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer. (Re: Anonymous
Complaint against Judge Corpus B. Alzate, A.M. No. RTJ-19-2574, June 23, 2021, First Division)
103. Heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, and poor health, among other things, cannot justify the delay. These
are the same reasons cited by Judge Alzate for the delay in his case disposition. However, the Court finds that
the proximate cause was his preventive suspension. Based on his explanation, he had already prepared the
decisions or orders for the cases enumerated, but these were not promulgated due to his preventive
suspension. (Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Corpus B. Alzate, A.M. No. RTJ-19-2574, June 23, 2021,
First Division)
104. Judge Alzate admitted that he breeds fighting cocks. He would go to derbies where he places bets of anywhere
from P1,100.00 to P3,300.00 in order to showcase his fighting cocks. Unfortunately for respondent Judge, he
cannot rely on the “off the record” opinion of an unnamed ofifical and the actions of his colleagues at the PJA.
Respondent Judge is not prohibited from continuing in this line of business. However, he must be held
administratively liable for gambling, which he admits to engaging in, and improper behavior. Attending
cockfights in arenas and mingling with bettors, even outside of the cockpits, falls short of the high standard set
for judges’ conduct. Judges must always be mindful not only to avoid improper behavior, but also the
appearance of improper behavior. Whatever behavior that would give the public even a speck of doubt in a
magistrate’s integrity must be avoided at all costs. (Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Corpus B. Alzate,
A.M. No. RTJ-19-2574, June 23, 2021, First Division)


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Contents 1

Legal and Judicial Ethics – Bar Examinations 2023

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

ADMIS S IO N TO THE PR AC TIC E O F LAW

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

LAWY ER S ’ DU TIES TO S O C IETY

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

DECEITFUL CONDUCT, GROSS MISCONDUCT, AN D VIOLATIONS OF LAW

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

ADVERTISEMENTS AND SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL

LAWY ER S ’ DU TIES TO THE B AR

UPHOLD INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

RESPECT FOR OTHER LAWYERS

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

NON-SHARING OF ATTORNEY’S FEES

PROHIBITION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

LAWY ER S ’ DU TIES TO THE C O U R TS

RESPECT FOR THE COURTS AND ITS OFFICERS

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

OBEDIENCE TO THE COURTS AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

TRUTHFULNESS TO THE COURTS

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism