CIV Persons and Family Relations TEXT, NOTES and CASES Full

Civil
Law Review
Persons and Family Relations

Text, Notes and Cases

Compiled by Rehne Gibb N. Larena | JD-NT-4 | AY 2020-21 | University of San Carlos

Civil Law Review TEXT, NOTES and CASES Persons and Family Relations

TABLE OF CONTENTS De inition of marriage 15 Custody and support of children during pendency of the case 48

Requisites 17 Effects of Annulment of Marriage 48
Module 1. Introduction 4
Essential Requisites 17 Partition and Presumptive Legitime 49
Module 2. Effects and Application of Laws 4 Formal Requisites 17 Requirement of registration of the decree of annulment or
Effectivity of Laws 4 Effect of absence or defects in any of the requisites 18 nullity of marriage 50
Ignorance of the Law Excuses No One 4 Effect of irregularity in any of the formal requisites 20 Status of children of dissolved marriages 50
Prospective Application of Laws 5 Persons authorized to solemnize marriage 20 Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and
Annulment Of Voidable Marriages 50
Mandatory and Prohibitory Laws 6 Venue of marriage 21
Waiver of Rights 6 Marriage License 21 Module 7. Legal Separation 50
Repeal of Laws 7 Duty of the Local Civil Registrar 22 Grounds 50
Judicial Decisions 8 Certi icate of Legal Capacity to Marry Required for Foreigners Defenses 50
Duty of the Court if the law is silent 9 22 Condonation 50
How to interpret a law in case of doubt 9 Marriage Certi icate 22 Consent 51
Customs and traditions can be a source 9 Principle of Lex Loci Celebraciones in Marriage 24 Connivance 51
Computation of a period 9 Marriages Exempt From The License Requirements 28 Recrimination or Mutual Guilt 51
Theory of Territoriality 9 Marriage in Articulo Mortis 28 Collusion 51
Nationality Theory 9 Marriage in a Far and Remote Place 28 Prescription 51
Lex Rei Sitae Rule and its exceptions 9 Marriage among Muslims or members of ECC 28 Procedure 52
Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebraciones 10 Rati ication of Marital Cohabitation 29 Effects 52
Suppletory Effect of the Civil Code 10 Module 6. Kinds of Defective Marriages 30 Reconciliation 53
Module 3. Law on Human Relations 10 A. Void Marriages 30 Module 8. Rights and Obligations of Husband and Wife 53
Principle of Abuse of Rights 11 Marriages that are Void ab initio 30 Basic Obligations 53
Acts contrary to law done willfully or negligently causing damage Psychological incapacity of one party 31
Incestuous Marriage 37 Module 9. Property Relations Between Husband and Wife 54
12
Void Marriage for Reason of Public Policy 38 Marriage Settlement 54
Willful acts that are contrary to law causing damage to another 13
Imprescriptibility of Action to Declare Nullity of Marriage 38 Donation Propter Nuptias 55
Unjust Enrichment 14
Absolute Nullity of Previous Marriage must be based on Final Absolute Community of Property Regime 56
Parens Patriae 14
Judgment before One can Remarry 38 Charges and Obligations of the ACP 57
Damages Against Public Of icials and for Unfair Competition 14
Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death 42 Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment & Disposition of ACP
Module 4. Law on Persons 14 Voidable Bigamous Marriage 45 58
Civil Personality 14 B. Voidable Marriages 46 Dissolution of Absolute Community 60
Juridical Capacity distinguished from Capacity to Act 14 Grounds for Annulment of Marriage 46 Liquidation of the Absolute Community 61
Natural Persons 14 Kinds of Fraud that could invalidate the marriage 46 Conjugal Partnership of Gains 64
Juridical Persons 15 Prescriptive period for Annulment of Marriage 47 Ownership, Enjoyment, and Administration of Exclusive
Property 65
Module 5. Marriage 15 No declaration of default in annulment cases 47
What are the conjugal partnership properties? 65

Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 2 of 142


Charges Upon and Obligations of the CPG 69 Procedures in Adoption 112 Care and Education of Children 135
Administration of the Conjugal Partnership 71 Effectivity of Adoption Decree 113 Use of Surnames 135
Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership 74 Effects of adoption 113 Absence 138
Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership 75 Rescission of adoption 114 A. Provisional Measures in Case of Absence (Temporary
Separation of Property Regime 77 Effects of rescission of adoption 115 Absence) 138
Voluntary separation 77 Recti ication of simulated birth 115 B. Declaration of Absence 139
Revival of the previous property regime 77 Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 115 C. Presumption of Death 139
Administration of Exclusive Properties 78 Civil Register 139
Module 13. Support 116
Regime of Separation of Properties 78
What support comprises 116
Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage 78
Who are obliged to support each other 116
Module 10. The Family 81 Support between brothers and sisters 116
The Family as an Institution 81 Support pendente lite 118
Family Home 83 Sources 119
Order of priority 119
Module 11. Paternity and Filiation 88
Proportionality 119
Kinds of Filiation 88
When demandable and when payable 119
Legitimate Children 88
Contractual support 120
Proofs of Filiation 96
Primary Proofs 96 Module 14. Parental Authority 120
Secondary Proofs 97 Concept 120
Filiation not established 102 Substitute and Special Parental Authority 127
Action to claim legitimacy – Prescriptive period 103 Effect of Parental Authority 129
Rights of a legitimate child 103 Upon the Person of their Children 129
Illegitimate Children 103 Upon the Property of their Children 130
How Filiation is established 103 Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority 130
When action to claim illegitimate iliation be iled 103
Module 15. Emancipation and Age of Majority 131
Rights of an illegitimate child 106
Legitimated Children 107 Module 16. Summary Judicial Proceedings in Family Law 132
Final Provisions 133
Module 12. Adoption 108
Retroactivity of the Family Code 133
Concept 108
Concept of vested rights 133
Domestic Adoption Law 108
Effectivity of the Family Code 134
Pre-adoption Services 108
Who may adopt 108 Module 17. Civil Code Provisions Not Affected By The Family Code
Who may be adopted 109 134
Whose consent is necessary to the adoption 109 Funerals 134


Part One PRELIMINARY TITLE regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not one year after its publication in the Of icial Gazette.
the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
Module 1. Introduction the so called letters of instructions issued by administrative Ignorance of the Law Excuses No One
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
ARTICLE 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the subordinates in the performance of their duties. ARTICLE 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
Philippines ." compliance therewith.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national Rationale behind the maxim
Module 2. Effects and Application of Laws territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All Ignorance of law distinguished from ignorance of facts
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
(Art. 1 – 18) Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
Effectivity of Laws from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by Is a marriage
contracted in
China and
proven
mainly
by
an
alleged
the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines?
When does an ordinary law take effect? to interpret but to " ill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity
ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after ifteen days following
provision, it is irst necessary to prove before the courts of the
the completion of their publication either in the Of icial Gazette However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
unless it is otherwise provided. xxxx petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a evidence.
Is publication needed? government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel
or the wearing of of ice uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws
Tanada v. Tuvera ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895.
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided " refers to the date of Code. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the
The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all alleged prior Chinese marriage. In resume, we ind the Chinese
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
since its purpose is
to
inform
the public of
the
contents
of
the marriage not to be proved.
legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
laws.
on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, et al.
Farinas v. Executive Secretary
discretion provide that the usual ifteen-day period shall be Indeed, not only is there no documentary evidence to support the
shortened or extended. The "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Bias but the record is
provides that it "shall take effect immediately upon its approval ," punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local is defective . to doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for 1929. This claim can not also be entertained under our law on family
their effectivity, which shall begin ifteen days after publication Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in
relations. Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws
unless a different effectivity date is ixed by the legislature. Tañ ada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement,
relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon
took effect ifteen days after its publication in the Of icial Gazette or a
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders newspaper of general circulation.
well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at Effectivity of the Civil Code
any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act No. 3412, Section
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Lara v. Del Rosario 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, August
30,
1950 , when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, Perfecto Bias before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not


one of those authorized in our country. entitled thereto.

Our Constitution does not in terms prohibit the enactment of
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General Order No. 68, Prospective Application of Laws retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contract or
as reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 361 3, which is now Article 71 deprive a person of property without due process of law, that is,
of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the ARTICLE 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect , unless the which do not divest rights of property and vested rights.
Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it contrary is provided.
was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no validity can be People v. Patalin, et al.
given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to Meaning of Prospectivity
At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery
the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply Mun. of Coron v. Carino with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code).
the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a
The petitioner maintains that the Interim Rules of Court promulgated However, by virtue of the rati ication of the 1987 Constitution,
foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as
on January 11, 1983 to implement the provisions of Batas Pambansa speci ically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death
our own .
Bilang 29 cannot apply to the case at bar for the simple reason that to penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be
revive or recall appealed cases which had been dismissed or which imposed upon accused-appellants.
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem
had become inal and executory would cause a great injustice to those
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took
in whose favor these cases had been decided. It is further contended
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the effect upon the rati ication of the 1987 Constitution. However, said
that to allow its application would put no end to those appealed cases
truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital
which are otherwise considered as closed ones.
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The punishment at its discretion, "for compelling reasons involving
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as heinous crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the legislature from
the given set of circumstances. applicable to actions pending
and
undetermined at
the
time
of reimposing the death penalty at some future time.
their passage . Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic
to that extent. The appellate court should have followed this time
law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on January
honoured rule instead of issuing its July 29, 1983 resolution seeking
obligation to support their child. 1, 1994.
to revive a case already long inal as evidenced by the entry of
judgment made by its Acting Clerk of Court on December 6, 1982. At the time of the rati ication of the Constitution, the instant case was
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed.
Exceptions to the rule on prospectivity Considering that the provision provides that "any death penalty
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
(1) When the law provides for its retroactivity; already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
(2) When the law is curative or remedial; that the framers intended said provision to have a retroactive effect
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
(3) When the law is procedural; on cases pending without any penalty of death having been imposed
law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation
(4) When the law is penal in character and advantageous to the yet.
to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which accused;
(5) When substantive right is declared for the irst time, unless When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right
penalizing the non-compliance therewith. vested rights are impaired.
thereto so
that
any future
act
restoring
the
death penalty would no
Camacho v. CIR longer cover them?
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the A retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new
There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987
forum. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in
retroactively affected and bene ited accused-appellants. The
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize respect to a transaction already past; but that statute is not made
above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it
the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation,
deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice or in other words part of the requirements for its action and
provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages
to the child to be denied of inancial support when the latter is application is drawn from a time antedating its passage.
of a criminal prosecution:



ARTICLE 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory Waiver of Rights

(a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution or prohibitory laws shall be void ,
began; The concept of waiver has been de ined as a voluntary and intentional
(b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not Except w
hen the law itself authorizes their validity. relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right,
begun; and advantage, bene it, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the
PAFLU v. Sec. of Labor et al.
(c) when the sentence is being carried out. party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by
Legal provisions prescribing the period within which a decision a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that
There is no question that the abolition of the death penalty bene its should be rendered are directory, not mandatory in nature - in the such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
herein accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of sense that, a judgment promulgated after the expiration of said period bene it; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment
the death penalty will not affect them. is not null and void, although the of icer who failed to comply with of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with
law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of his delays claiming it.
Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that - unless the intention to the contrary is manifest.
have already become vested, the rule in statutory construction is that Rule and Exceptions
all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective Marcos v. COMELEC, et al.
operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give ARTICLE 6. Rights may be waived , unless t he waiver is
them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of 1. contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
implied from the language use. judgment within a speci ied time
is
generally construed
to
be good customs, or
merely d
irectory , "so that non-compliance with them does not 2. prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
Bernabe v. Alejo invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended law.
such result it would have clearly indicated it." The difference between
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate Requisites for a valid waiver
a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American 1. The person waiving must be capacitated to make the waiver;
effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four
authorities, this court in Marcelino v Cruz h eld that: 2. The waiver must be made clearly, but not necessarily express;
years from attaining majority age within which to ile an action for
recognition. 3. The person waiving must actually have the right which he is
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is
renouncing;
often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from iling an action for 4. The waiver must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy,
less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been public order, or good customs;
enforcing the letter of the law.
supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the 5. The waiver must not prejudice others with a right recognized
latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should by law.
would be impaired. We do not agree. have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in Rights that cannot be waived
the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the
Art 255 of the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have Cui v. Arellano University
fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse
already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or
to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a The issue in this case is whether or not the waiver of petitioner’s
impaired. We hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive
decision within a given or prescribed period. right to transfer to another school without refunding to the
law, as it gives Adrian the right to ile his petition for recognition
respondent the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in
Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to ile an action for relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent We are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending public policy and hence, null and void. Scholarships are awarded in
enactment. disquali ication case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to
elections. bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university
Mandatory and Prohibitory Laws scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the
business potential of an educational institution. Thus conceived it is
Rule not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals.


contravene public policy ; and the principle is recognized that Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and
But
what
is
morals ? Manresa has this de inition. It is good customs; everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the
those generally accepted principles of morality which have received law or rule made solely for the bene it and protection of the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same
some kind of social and practical con irmation. The practice of individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and matter and thus con lict with the special act or provision, the
awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the
not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and detriment to the community at large. general act or provision, especially when such general and special
practical con irmation except in some private institutions as in acts or provisions are contemporaneous , as the Legislature is
Arellano University. When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he not to be presumed to have intended a con lict .
effectively waived his right to claim that his retirement bene its are
Scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement bene its Supremacy of the constitution
in school for their propaganda value but to reward merit or help belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his US v. Palacio
gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a irst retirement bene its does not infringe on the right of third persons, but
lien. even protects the right of his family to receive support. When there are two laws on the same subject enacted on different
dates, and it appears evident by the form and essence of the later law
Leal v. IAC that it was the intention of the legislator to cover therein the whole of
Repeal of Laws
the subject, and that it is a complete and perfect system, or is in itself
The law provides that for conventional redemption to take place, the a provision, the latest law should be considered as a legal declaration
vendor should reserve, in no uncertain terms, the right to repurchase How are laws repealed?
that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force and that all
the thing sold. Thus, the right to redeem must be expressly stipulated ARTICLE 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and that is not shall be rejected and repealed.
in the contract of sale in order that it may have legal existence. their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. A simple perusal of Act No. 2238 is suf icient to show that it was not
In the case before us, we cannot ind any express or implied grant of a the intention of the legislator to cover all matters relative to the
right to repurchase, nor can we infer, from any word or words in the When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the assessment and valuation of the taxable real property of the
questioned paragraph, the existence of any such right. Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall municipalities, and that said Act does not contain a complete and
govern. perfect system for said subject, because, as aforesaid, the Act in
Otamias v. Republic question is closely related to Act No. 82, of which it is virtually a
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
A writ of execution lies against the pension bene its of a retired be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the complement in so far as regards the organization of the service of
of icer of the AFP, which is the subject of a deed of assignment drawn Constitution. making the lists for the complete and adequate collection of the tax
by him granting support to his wife and ive (5) children. The on real property in municipalities organized under said Act No. 82. It
Con lict between General and Special laws cannot, therefore, be maintained that section 87 of this latter Act
bene it of exemption from execution of pension bene its is a
statutory right that m
ay be waived , especially in order to Wherever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment should be considered as repealed, in so far as it prescribes the
comply with a husband's duty to provide support under Article XV of in the same statute, and the latter, taken in Its most comprehensive penalty incurred by any of icial who, being charged with the duty of
the 1987 Constitution and the Family Code. sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be assessing real property, wilfully omits from the tax lists any real
operative, and the general enactment must be taken /to affect only property which he knows to be lawfully taxable.
The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.
character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, Repeals by implication are
not
favored , and will not be decreed,
Speci ic legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
general law upon the same subject unless it clearly appears that the presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of
affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he
provisions of the two laws are so repugnant that the legislators all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that
is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally
must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the earlier in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or
legislation. The special act and the general law must stand together, any former law relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy
guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges
the one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
rest in the individual, are intended for his sole bene it, do
not
general law of the land. convincing, and lowing necessarily from the language used, unless
infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver
of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and
does
not the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless


the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on
every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any That section 1770 is special , in the sense of dealing with a special the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero , or should his
reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not contingency not dealt with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang
operate as a repeal of the earlier. comparing the two provisions. Thus, we ind that while section 1762 and Lucero doctrine in Mapa ?
relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the
As said Act No. 2238 provides no penalty for the provincial assessor Islands at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
or his deputy who, in revising the assessment and preparing the tax Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean. The interpretation
list of real property, wilfully makes any omission such as that arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of
aforestated; and as the provincial assessor, or his deputy, is a public de ined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's
of icial or an of icial of the class referred to in section 87, it being so long as that situation continues. construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
immaterial whether he be a provincial or a municipal of icial (for it intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled
is suf icient that it be the duty of such of icial to assess real property) In our opinion, section 1762, as amended, and section 1770 must be rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
it is evident that the said penal provision contained in section 87 of construed in pari materia as harmonious parts of the law dealing maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet " - the interpretation
Act No. 82 continues in force and is applicable to the provincial with animal quarantine; and section 1762, as amended, can be given placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
assessors and their deputies referred to in Act No. 2238, and that the effect only in so far as it is not restricted by section 1770. Here, as law.
lower court did not err in sentencing defendant, under the provisions always, the general must yield to the particular .
of said section 87, to the penalty speci ied in the judgment appealed The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
from. Judicial Decisions jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the irearm in question and when he was
Lichauco v. Apostol ARTICLE 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
The irst and principal question in the case is whether section 1770 overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
Philippines.
has been repealed by implication, insofar as it relates to draft animals should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to
and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. We say repealed by Doctrine of Stare Decisis parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
implication, for it will be noted that Act No. 3052 has no repealing faith thereof . This is especially true in the construction and
Obiter Dicta
clause, and it contains only one section, i.e., that amending section application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
1762 of the Administrative Code. How are Judicial decisions abrogated? punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
National Amnesty Commission v. COA society.
We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is
untenable, for the reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Apiag v. Cantero
of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a particular Constitution, such as the Civil Liberties Union doctrine, form part of
contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762. our legal system. Supreme Court decisions assume the same Per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x x x a
Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with authority as valid statutes. The Court’s interpretation of the law is judicial declaration of such fact" before any party thereto "can marry
section 1762, as amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a part of that law as of the date of enactment because its interpretation again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void." This was
special quali ication of section 1762. Of course the two provisions merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the expressly provided under Article 40 of the Family Code. However, the
are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is construed law purports to carry into effect. marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their
considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel vs.
can be imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not, in any manner or on its Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the
force the cattle, under the conditions stated in the petition, can be own, rule against or affect the right of any individual, except those doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante applies in favor of respondent.
brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of provided for under the Constitution. Hence, publication of said
Administrative Order No,. 21. But this difference between the Memorandum is not required for it to be valid, effective and Endencia, et al.v. David
practical effect of the two provisions does not make them enforceable.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes
inconsistent in the sense that the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should
is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052). People v. Jabinal
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally



provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not Even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the language of by the number of days which they respectively have.
courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to ill in the gaps in the law;
In computing a period, the irst day shall be excluded, and the
the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is inite and
last day included.
a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may
of the land. apply. Theory of Territoriality
⭐PITC v COA How to interpret a law in case of doubt ARTICLE 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety
A judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Right and justice must prevail Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
passed , subject
that law was originally only to the quali ication
international law and to treaty stipulations.
that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and
a different ARTICLE 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application
view is
adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right Nationality Theory
new doctrine should be applied p rospectively and should not and justice to prevail.
apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good Equity follows the law
ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
transpired prior to such adjudication. Neither can private respondent invoke equity as a ground for the Lex Rei Sitae Rule and its exceptions
reopening of the case "there being an express provision of law under
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present case, the Court
which the remedy can be invoked.” ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is
disagrees
with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
should be applied prospectively. subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
There are instances, indeed, in which a court of equity gives a
remedy, where the law gives none; but where a particular remedy is However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
As the COA correctly argued, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither
given by the law, and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. The Court merely
particular rules, it would be very improper for the court to take it up successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
construed therein the meaning and application of Section 6 of
where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows. provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
Executive Order No. 756 by taking into consideration the rationale
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing retirement laws,
and the subsequent enactments and statutes that eventually repealed Customs and traditions can be a source nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, there was no
Provided it is not contrary to law, etc.
other ruling from this Court that explained the nature of the Renvoi Doctrine and the Christensen case
retirement bene its under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. Thus, ARTICLE 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid provision embodied in the public policy shall not be countenanced. United States and of the State of California at the time of his death.
Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts to the date when Executive
It must be proven as a fact But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
Order No. 756 was enacted.
domiciled in the Philippines.
ARTICLE 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to
Duty of the Court if the law is silent the rules of evidence. The law that governs the Validity of his testamentary dispositions
is de ined in Article 16 of the Civil Code . The application of this
ARTICLE 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment Computation of a period article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning
by reason of the silence, obscurity or insuf iciency of the laws. of the term "national law" as used therein, which, in the case at bar,
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or the private law of the State of California.
Concept of “judicial legislation” nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
The next question is: What is the law
in
California
governing
the
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation sixty- ive days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
disposition of personal
property ? The decision of the court below,
twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the



California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
will in the form and manner he desires. appellant, should be governed by the Philippine law, the domicile, Suppletory Effect of the Civil Code
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
internal law of California.
ARTICLE 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of
Code of California, which is as follows: Commerce and special laws, their de iciency shall be supplied
Miciano v. Brimo by the provisions of this Code.
"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, The institution of legatees in the will is conditional, and the Insular v. Sun Life of Canada
and is governed by the law of his domicile." condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's
will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of While the Insurance Act deals with life insurance, it is silent as to the
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the methods to be followed in order that there may be a contract of
his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account insurance. On the other hand, the Civil Code, in Article 1802, not
the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to Said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the only describes a contract of life annuity markedly similar to the one
con lict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the Civil we are considering, but in two other articles, gives strong clues as to
which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to the proper disposition of the case. For instance, Article 16
of
the
law of the forum. govern his testamentary dispositions. Civil
Code
provides that
matters which are governed by special
laws, any de iciency of the latter shall be supplied by the
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code as its con lict
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is provisions of this Code ." On the supposition, therefore, which is
of laws rule while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, supra, its
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is incontestable, that the special law on the subject of insurance is
internal law. If the law on succession and the con lict of, law rules
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the de icient in enunciating the principles governing acceptance, the
of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
herein oppositor. subject-matter of the Civil Code, if there be any, would be controlling.
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply
to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the Dole Phil. Inc. v. Maritime Co. of the Phil.
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. We have already decided that in a case governed by the Carriage of
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of Civil
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law Procedure on prescription should not be made to apply .
Doctrine of Lex Loci Celebraciones
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner. Similarly, we now hold that in such a case the general provisions of
ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and the new Civil Code (Art. 1155) cannot be made to apply, as such
As explained in the various authorities, the national law mentioned other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the application would have the effect of extending the one-year period of
in Article
16
of
our
Civil Code is the law on con lict of laws in the country in which they are executed. prescription ixed in the law. It is desirable that matters affecting
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the transportation of goods by sea be decided in as short a time as
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's possible; the application of the provisions of Article 1155 of the new
consular of icials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
domicile. The con lict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not in the settlement of questions affecting transportation, contrary to the
be observed in their execution.
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines clear intent and purpose of the law.
in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue and those which have for their object public order, public
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or Module 3. Law on Human Relations
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (Art. 19 – 36)
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, s upra
in the con lict of law rule of the state of the decedent.
We therefore ind that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen,
a citizen of California , is the Philippines , the validity of the



Principle of Abuse of Rights wherein we held that respondents’ default in the payment of his bills
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, “cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for
ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered as a
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. speci ically in the statutes. respondent xxx is entitled.”
The principle of
abuse of
rights sets certain standards which The Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from Go v. Cordero
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in which it could derive practically nothing) to its sister corporation in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: the United States where CALI's plane C-54 was then situated, The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness,
to act with justice ; to give everyone his due ; and to observe succeeding by such swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of honesty and good faith in securing better terms for the purchase of
honesty and good faith . said insolvent's property by removing it from the possession and high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of Cordero as the
ownership of the insolvent. We hold Defendant liable to pay to the duly appointed exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all plaintiff, for the bene it of the insolvent CALI and its creditors, as 19 of the Civil Code.
rights ; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at
in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal the time aforementioned and another equal sum as exemplary When "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless damages. the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Meralco v. CA responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas, rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements a re the following:
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 w
ould be proper. has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public
Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by (1) There is a legal right or duty;
Albetz Investment Inc. v. CA which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
We ind that the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations are of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
applicable, speci ically Article 19. notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the
service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort . When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under
Certainly, the demolition complained of in the case at bar was not Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages
carried out in a manner consistent with justice and good faith. At the The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause arising from a violation of law. Article 21 refers to acts contra
instance of petitioner, it was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a bonus mores and has the following elements:
giving the occupants of the house no time at all to remove their clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. The award of moral
belongings therefrom. No damage worth mentioning would have damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which provides that willful (1) There is an act which is legal;
been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments, Inc. if their men, led injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order,
by the Sheriff, had been instructed to allow said occupants to remove if the court should ind that, under the circumstances, such damages or public policy; and
their personal properties, considering that this would not have taken are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where (3) it is done with intent to injure.
a considerable length of time. the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the
Velayo v. Shell Co. Phil. Likewise, we ind no merit in petitioners’ contention that being in act complained of must be i ntentional .
arrears in the payment of their bills, the private respondents are not
It may be said that Article 19 only contains a mere declaration of entitled to moral damages under the doctrine that “he who comes to Petitioner Go's argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot be held
principles and while such statement may be essentially correct, yet court in demand of equity, must come with clean hands .” We liable solidarily with Robinson for actual, moral and exemplary
We ind that such declaration is implemented by Article 21. rejected this argument in the Manila Gas
Corporation case, supra, damages, as well as attorney's fees awarded to Cordero since no law
or contract provided for solidary obligation in these cases, is equally



bereft of merit. University of the East v. Jader

As to the appellate court’s award to respondent of moral damages, we
ind the same in order. Under Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, May an educational institution be held liable for damages for
Cebu Country Club v. Elizagaque
moral damages may be recovered, among others, in acts and actions misleading a student into believing that the latter
had
satis ied
all
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of referred to in Article 21. the requirements for graduation when such is not the case?
Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an application
for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised YES. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students
arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the
Human Relations provide restrictions. Acts contrary to law done willfully or negligently former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or
In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership, we causing damage omission can support a claim for damages.[ Want of care to the
ind that petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between
ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would
human beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court and negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the make the erring party liable. Petitioner ought to have known that time
the Court of Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and latter for the same. was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform
evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s applications. This is No right impaired, no basis for damages respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent
contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
are liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 Felipe v. Leuterio, et al. immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to
of the same Code. Whether the courts have the authority to reverse
the
award
of
the act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at
board of judges of an oratorical competition. any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set
Respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking
application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because the bar. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform
unanimous vote of the Board members was required. When he sent a theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the
letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they latter into believing that he had satis ied all requirements for the
objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored him. were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed course.
Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of treatment. Having arbiters or referees or judges.
been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases
non-proprietary member of CCCI, he should have been treated by The law in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere
petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they should suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for
have informed him why his application was disapproved. there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith
not mean the same thing. "Wrong " as used in the aforesaid legal make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or
arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a declared winner by the board of referees or judges. abuse.
legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. It bears reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable
Appeals held that petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s are instances of "damnum absque
injuria ". This is one of them. If to respondent for the latter’s actual damages , we hold that
application is characterized by bad faith. fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. respondent should n ot have been awarded moral damages .
But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or
As to petitioners’ reliance on the principle of damnum absque judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself
injuria or damage without injury, suf ice it to state that the same is other judges. We are of the opinion and so declare, that the judiciary whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible
misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez , we held that this principle has
no
power to
reverse the
award of
the
board
of
judges of an for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should
does not
apply
when
there is
an
abuse
of
a person’s right , as in oratorical contest. For that matter it would not interfere in literary have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
this case. contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. speci ically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in


order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon". But
could have suffered untold embarrassment in attending the clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita he never returned and was never heard from again.
graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not being used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit
able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by affair reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
verifying if he has satis ied all the requirements including his school iled deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with preparation, and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony
taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
on the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that unjusti iably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be
and submission of requirements which the prospective examinee defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
must meet. succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA
Willful acts that are contrary to law causing damage family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a Whether or not damages may
be
recovered
for
a breach
of
promise
married man. to marry on the basis of Article 21.
to another
Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of
another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry, is it actionable? Wassmer v. Velez This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21 ,
There is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action for which is designed to
expand
the concept of torts or quasi-delict
"Mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
breach of promise to marry . Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima
What kind of damage can be recovered? vs. Court of Appeals , 109 Phil., 629, as reiterated in Estopa vs. number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
Piansay (109 Phil, 640), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" speci ically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that
Article 21. acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to ful ill
would have it so.
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
Cecilio Pe v. Alfonso Pe
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code. contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
Article 21 of said Code provides that "Any person who willfully scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
for the damage".
to morals, good customs and public policy. her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
The record reveals that plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding
affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who,
was already set.
thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted then 28 years old, simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of postpone wedding-My mother opposes it . . ." He enplaned to his him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to



their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed Extravagance during emergency Module 4. Law on Persons
marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity,
the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust
ARTICLE 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure Civil Personality
but because of moral seduction. or display during a period of acute public want or emergency
may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any Juridical Capacity distinguished from Capacity to Act
Hermosisima v. CA government or private charitable institution.
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the itness to be the
Whether moral damages
are
recoverable, under our laws, for breach Respect for dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of minds of subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
of promise to marry. neighbors. Acts not criminal but ground for damages and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
The Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. Restrictions on the capacity to act
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, ARTICLE 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being
upon the
faith
of
such promise ". The history of breach of promise a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
prevention and other relief:
suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence; incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
of rights of action in the so-called Balm suits in many of the relations of another; easements.
American States. (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends; Factors that modify or limit capacity to act
Unjust Enrichment (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his ARTICLE 39. The following circumstances, among others,
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the
ARTICLE 22. Every person who through an act of performance physical defect, or other personal condition. state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The
Damages Against Public Officials and for Unfair
possession of something at the expense of the latter without consequences of these circumstances are governed in this
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. Competition Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws.
Solutio Indebiti and Accion en rem verso Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or
ARTICLE 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss political opinion.
Distinguished from Natural Obligation because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his of icial duty may ile an A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is quali ied
Even without fault one is liable for damages if bene ited for all acts of civil life, except in cases speci ied by law.
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without
ARTICLE 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be Natural Persons
another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the taken.
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived
ARTICLE 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
act or event he was bene ited. child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
Parens Patriae intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
speci ied in the following article.
oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
Meaning of court’s vigilance for the protection of the poor action by the person who thereby suffers damage. Commencement of civil personality
ARTICLE 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, ARTICLE 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intrauterine life
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
protection.



within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the ➔ PITC v COA
maternal womb. ◆ If SC abandons a doctrine, the new doctrine is applied We do not ind a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
prospectively ;
Extinguishment of civil personality
◆ But if SC interprets a law for the irst time, such Petitioners' sole contention that "the company did not just want to
ARTICLE 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. interpretation attaches to the law retroactively or have two (2) or more of its employees related between the third
upon the date of its effectivity. degree by af inity and/or consanguinity" is lame.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the ➔ Art 10, Equity follows the law
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. ➔ Art 19 on principle of abuse of rights It is signi icant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired
ARTICLE 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more ➔ Arts 20-21 after they were found it for the job, but were asked to resign when
persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of ➔ Law on persons they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
them died irst, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma
other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be
presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no
Part Two LAW ON FAMILY RELATIONS detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners
transmission of rights from one to the other. explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda
The Family Code of the Philippines Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who
Juridical Persons married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The

policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each
Kinds of juridical persons Module 5. Marriage other will be less ef icient. If we uphold the questioned rule without
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons: (Art. 1 – 54) valid justi ication, the employer can create policies based on an
unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an
(1) The State and its political subdivisions; Definition of marriage employee's right to security of tenure.
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union The absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination
begins as soon as they have been constituted between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with in our jurisdiction cannot bene it the petitioners. The protection
according to law; law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution prudently draw inferences from the legislature's silence that married
private interest or purpose to which the law grants a whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage policy based on a prejudice or stereotype.
each shareholder, partner or member. settlements may ix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. Duncan v. Glaxo
Acquisition and Loss of juridical personality
State policy on marriage Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
ARTICLE 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the
marketing strategies and other con idential programs and
preceding article are governed by the laws creating or Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
recognizing them.
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general the same company violates the rights of the employee under the
application on the subject. Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
management prerogative. employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that
are governed by the provisions of this Code concerning The cases of Duncan and PT&T instruct us that the requirement of nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying
partnerships. reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its
Important points from 29 Oct 1st Synch Session questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain
prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity. The burden access to its secrets and procedures.
➔ Art 2 on effectivity of laws, Tanada v Tuvera was successfully discharged in Duncan but not in PT&T.
➔ Art 3 on retroactivity of laws PT&T v. NLRC



PT&T invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be
employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de determined in accordance with the
law in
effect
at
the
time
of A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to its celebration . In this case, the law in force at the time Lea relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status.
terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the
employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certi icate is a historical record
policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex
of
a
violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages. person is determined at birth , visually done by the birth attendant
by Article 136 of the Labor Code. (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Zulueta v. CA Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her
A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or birth, if not attended by error, is immutable .
as disquali ied from work any woman worker who contracts
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against,
is ever available to him or to her. Rule on Intersex
discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and
by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the Republic v. Cagandahan
that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the Cagandahan has Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
company were dissolved principally because of the company’s condition where persons thus af licted possess both male and female
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
policy that married women are not quali ied for employment in characteristics.
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. con idence by one from the other during the marriage, save for The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
speci ied exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; person be classi ied either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of idelity negates such rigid classi ication.
bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because
that each owes to the other.
she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other
words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then
De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro there is no basis for a change in the birth certi icate entry for gender.
policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being
disquali ied from work. While loss of con idence is a just cause for The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scienti ic
termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a
on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on Effect of sex change change in the subject's birth certi icate entry is in order.
the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a
Silverio v. Republic Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjusti ied.
or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry
classi ication would be what the individual, like respondent,
Law governing validity of marriage of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of
having reached the
age
of
majority,
with
good
reason thinks
of
illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
Castillo v. De Leon-Castillo his/her sex . Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering
Marriage between the parties on the ground that respondent had a marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons
previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA civil interdiction, judicial determination of iliation and changes of
makes the gender classi ication at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity
believes on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is ixed.
contracting a second marriage if the irst one was an absolute nullity, consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
and for this purpose she did not have to await a inal decree of nullity nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
of the irst marriage. laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or
events mentioned in
Article
407 . Neither is it recognized nor even



Requisites its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both contract, or at the very least, supported by a certi ication from the
Essential Requisites certi ications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
such license was issued. Given the documentary and testimonial parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
ARTICLE 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate respondent re lects a marriage license number. A certi ication to this
requisites are present: the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of of icial The certi ication moreover is precise in that it speci ically identi ied
(1) Legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must
function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certi ications, is the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely
be a male and a female; and
effectively rebutted. Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
solemnizing of icer. Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
Formal Requisites
marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
ARTICLE 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no suf icient
is of great weight. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a
(1) Authority of the solemnizing of icer ; favor of the validity of the marriage . marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either
of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10- day
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
lived together for several years producing two offsprings, now adults period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the themselves. It took Jaime several years before he iled the petition for affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the
appearance of the contracting parties before the declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual formal requisites
of
marriage
does
not
affect
its validity but the
solemnizing of icer and their personal declaration that sometime in 1991. We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally
they take each other as husband and wife in the the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the and administratively liable.
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. process allow him to pro it from his own deceit and per idy.
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a
Sevilla v. Cardenas This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima " ixer" who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the
A marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The
exception. contract of marriage . authority of the of icer or clergyman shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing
At irst glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one Alcantara v. Alcantara to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing of icer is not
involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8
a marriage license based on the certi ications issued by the Local has
been
duly
and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All
December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
Civil Registrar of San Juan. Thus, the certi ication to be issued by the the solemnizing of icer needs to know is that the license has been
applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code.
Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does issued by the competent of icial, and it may be presumed from the
not exist in his of ice or the particular entry could not be found in the The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's issuance of the license that said of icial has ful illed the duty to
register despite diligent search. Such certi ication shall be suf icient demonstration of its involvement and participation in every ascertain whether the contracting parties had ful illed the
proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is requirements of law.
the Rules of Court. interested.
Kho v. Republic
The irst two certi ications bear the statement that "hope and Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to Petitioner insists that the Certi ication issued by the Civil Registrar of
understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating impugn the validity of his marriage. To be considered void on the Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former
the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the Civil Registrar, is suf icient evidence to prove the absence of the
statement that the Of ice of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert



subject marriage license . The Court agrees with petitioner and inds issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor. presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence (marriage contract), which on fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
By virtue of such certi ication, it becomes the burden of respondent its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such solemnizing of icer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
that burden. The Certi icate of Marriage issued by the of iciating all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was
priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. presented. No other witness also testi ied to prove its existence, The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a
Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention
from the National Archives and Records Section, where information He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent
number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The to be married would allow them to further their objective,
Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with Effect of absence or defects in any of the requisites considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
petitioner's observation that the statements of the witnesses for application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to
respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a Absence of any essential requisite – Void enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for
marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testi ied a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and
ARTICLE 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
respondent. requisites shall render the marriage void
a b initio, except as Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
stated in Article 35 (2).
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
In Republic v. CA , this Court considered the certi ication issued by chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
xxxx
the Local Civil Registrar as a certi ication of due search and the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
inability to
ind the
record
or
entry sought by the parties despite Republic v. Albios
constitutional questions.
the absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not
Is
a marriage, contracted
for the sole purpose of acquiring American
exist in their records despite diligent search." Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent? otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and NO. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties equally valid . Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
Severina is null and void for want of marriage license based on the willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
Marriage Contract presented by Luis which has adequately real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
established its absence. of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, marriage.
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue in luence. Consent must
A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of Aranes v. Occiano
reveals that no
marriage
license
number was indicated therein. It intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the bene icial or
also appears therein that no marriage
license was exhibited to the unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should Petitioner alleges that respondent judge solemnized her marriage to
solemnizing of icer. not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. her late groom Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
itself that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor It appears that petitioner and Orobia iled their Application for
of icer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this
when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January
the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage bene icial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
license. nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates



solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, In the instant case, no
marriage ceremony at all was performed by
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to a duly authorized solemnizing of icer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate
the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity . Such act Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or
the law on marriage. alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy stated in Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage unless he irst secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara , we held contracts a subsequent marriage. the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement
that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Again,
license is void , and that the subsequent issuance of such license Eugenio, Sr., v. Velez this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man initio.
gives the solemnizing of icer the authority to solemnize a and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan Jr.
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally "married" in Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly
judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. established before the trial court, evidenced by a certi ied true copy
of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered
Beso v. Daguman
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between
A marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
only in the following instances: community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
1. at the point of death; authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros
2. in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must (Oliveros), Registration Of icer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig
3. upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, City, testi ied that there was no valid marriage license issued to
statement to this effect. herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros con irmed that only Marriage Licence
legal impediment which disquali ied him from even legally marrying Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her Vitaliana. 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued
iance Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither for the month. Oliveros further testi ied that the local civil registrar
was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to Abbas v. Gloria Goo Abbas of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his and Sally. The certi ication from the local civil registrar is adequate to
chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license , prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any
record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the suspicious circumstance, the certi ication enjoys probative value,
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To being issued by the of icer charged under the law to keep a record of
"[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the of ice of the all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
ordinary of icial attention under present Government policy." Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly
issued said license. It was there that he requested certi ication that no As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate such license was issued. Sally “was made only in jest” and “a simulated marriage, at the
that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority instance of [Sally], intended to cover her up from expected social
and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially
commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certi ication from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives.” In short, it was a
properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was ictitious marriage.
Code. issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained
to another couple. Defect in any of essential requisite - Voidable (Art. 45 FC)
Morigo v. People



however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before

xxxx Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's
the solemnizing of icer and declare in the presence of not less
jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not
affect the than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the
following instances:
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and marriage certi icate which shall be signed by the contracting
administratively liable. (1) at the point of death, parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing
(2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or of icer.
Effect of irregularity in any of the formal requisites
(3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the
Cosca v. Palaypayon statement to this effect. point of death is unable to sign the marriage certi icate, it shall
Judge Palaypayon testi ied that his procedure and practice have been be suf icient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the
that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter his
point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request solemnizing of icer.
chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the Persons authorized to solemnize marriage
party , Gemma del Rosario.
marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign
their marriage contracts. His purpose was to save his precious time More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision ARTICLE 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the
(4) times everyday. (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing court's jurisdiction;
of icer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's religious sect duly authorized by his church or
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are supposed
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
to be irst asked by the solemnizing of icer and declare that they take
the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the general, acting within the limits of the written
each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing of icer in the
authority of the solemnizing of icer as provided in the preceding authority granted by his church or religious sect and
presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to
provision. Non-compliance herewith will NOT invalidate the provided that at least one of the contracting parties
sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
marriage . belongs to the solemnizing of icer's church or
Navarro v. Domagtoy religious sect;
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
mentioned in Article 31;
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain
of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a
marriage. solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
military operation, likewise only in the cases
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
mentioned in Article 32;
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary appointed to speci ic jurisdictions, may of iciate in weddings only
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case
proceeding for the declaration of his irst wife's presumptive death. within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
provided in Article 10.
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñ aranda. marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which Good faith of parties under Art. 35 par. 2
respondent judge to have accepted the joint af idavit submitted by the while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
Enumeration not exclusive. Mayor may also solemnize.
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a of iciating of icial to administrative liability .
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. People v. Bustamante
ARTICLE 5 Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony The main problem poised in this appeal concerns the authority of
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Francisco Nato to solemnize the second marriage. It appears that
Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
Family Code. Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato were the duly elected mayor and
as the justi ications for his having solemnized the marriage between ARTICLE 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the vice-mayor, respectively, of the municipality of Mapandan,
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,



Pangasinan. ARTICLE 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth
be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of or baptismal certi icate or a certi ied copy of either because of
Aquino went on leave of absence for one month. In view of this, the the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an
vice-mayor was designated by the mayor to take over the rein of license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the af idavit of such party or of any other person that such birth or
municipal government during his absence; and; Nato was acting in solemnizing of icer with regard to the celebration of marriage baptismal certi icate has not yet been received though the same
this capacity when he performed the second marriage of Bustamante shall be performed by said consular of icial. has been required of the person having custody thereof at least
with Demetria Tibayan. ifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may
Application form – what it contains? furnish in lieu thereof his current residence certi icate or an
Appellant contends that there could not have been a second marriage instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil
to speak of, as Nato was merely acting as mayor when he celebrated
ARTICLE 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
contracting parties shall ile separately a sworn application for registrar concerned or any public of icial authorized to
the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. administer oaths. Such instrument shall contain the sworn
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following: declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full
We ind this contention untenable. When the issue involves the
name, residence and citizenship of such contracting party and
assumption of powers and duties of the of ice of the mayor by the (1) Full name of the contracting party; of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of birth
vice-mayor, when proper, it is immaterial whether it is because the (2) Place of birth; of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall
latter is the Acting Mayor or merely acting as Mayor, for in both (3) Age and date of birth; be preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good
instances, he discharges all the duties and wields the powers (4) Civil status; reputation in the province or the locality.
appurtenant to said of ice. (5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; The presentation of birth or baptismal certi icate shall not be
(6) Present residence and citizenship; required if the parents of the contracting parties appear
(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties; personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear
Venue of marriage
(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father; to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in
Exceptions: Articulo Mortis and Written request (9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by
and merely looking at the applicants upon their personally
ARTICLE 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the (10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian appearing before him, be convinced that either or both of them
chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or or person having charge, in case the contracting party have the required age.
temple, or in the of ice the consul-general, consul or has neither father nor mother and is under the age of
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in If previously married
twenty-one years.
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in ARTICLE 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required
previously married , the applicant shall be required to
where both of the parties request the solemnizing of icer in to exhibit their residence certi icates in any formality in
furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certi icate required in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a connection with the securing of the marriage license.
the last preceding article,
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that Documents that must accompany the application
effect. 1. the death certi icate of the deceased spouse or
ARTICLE 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such 2. the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or
Marriage License application, shall require the presentation of the original birth 3. the judicial decree of annulment or
certi icates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certi icates of 4. declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.
Where issued
the contracting parties or copies of such documents duly In case the death certi icate cannot be secured, the party shall
ARTICLE 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These make an af idavit setting forth this circumstance and his or her
registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting certi icates or certi ied copies of the documents by this Article actual civil status and the name and date of death of the
party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from the deceased spouse.
is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title. documentary stamp tax. The signature and of icial title of the
person issuing the certi icate shall be suf icient proof of its Parental Consent
Who will issue
authenticity.



ARTICLE 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not Should only one of the contracting parties need parental ARTICLE 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the
having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between consent or parental advice, the other party must be present at Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from the
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one , they shall, in the counselling referred to in the preceding paragraph. date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically cancelled at
addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit the expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have
Duty of the Local Civil Registrar
to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of not made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold
their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons 1.) Posting of Notice characters on the face of every license issued.
having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such Certificate of Legal Capacity to Marry Required for
ARTICLE 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice
consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party,
who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar,
which shall contain the full names and residences of the Foreigners
applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the
or in the form of an af idavit made in the presence of two Who will issue?
applications. The notice shall be posted for ten consecutive
witnesses and attested before any of icial authorized by law to
days on a bulletin board outside the of ice of the local civil ARTICLE 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are
administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded
registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building
in both applications for marriage license, and the af idavit, if citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them
and accessible to the general public. This notice shall request
one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a
all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
certi icate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by
Parental Advice marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The
their respective diplomatic or consular of icials.
marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the
ARTICLE 15. Any contracting party between the age of Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu
period of publication.
twenty-one and twenty- ive shall be obliged to ask their of the certi icate of legal capacity herein required, submit an
parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If 2.) What to do in case of knowledge of legal impediment
af idavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to
they do not obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the ARTICLE 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil contract marriage.
marriage license shall not be issued till after three months
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the If both parties are foreigners, no need to comply with our law
following the completion of the publication of the application
particulars thereof and his indings thereon in the application
therefor. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the Marriage Certificate
for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said license
effect that such advice has been sought, together with the
after the completion of the period of publication, unless
written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application
ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or ARTICLE 22. The marriage certi icate, in which the parties shall
for marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall
that of any interest party. No iling fee shall be charged for the
give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. also state:
petition nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of
ARTICLE 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental the order. (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;
advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in 3.) Payment of license fee (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a (3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the
certi icate
issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to ARTICLE 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment marriage;
solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before the issuance (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued
counsellor duly accredited by the proper government agency to of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the according to law, except in marriage provided for in
the effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said Chapter 2 of this Title;
counselling. Failure to attach said certi icates of marriage license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have
counselling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or secured the parental consent in appropriate cases;
for a period of three months from the completion of the whose income is insuf icient for their subsistence, a fact (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have
publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage license established by their af idavit, or by their oath before the local complied with the legal requirement regarding
within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing of icer to civil registrar. parental advice in appropriate cases; and
administrative sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the (7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement,
4.) Effectivity of marriage license issued
marriage. if any, attaching a copy thereof.
Best proof of marriage



Proof to attack the validity of marriage record of the alleged marriage existed therein; but this absence was
explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who That evidence rendered unnecessary the presumption that "a man
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
kept the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in the
The declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as registry. into a lawful contract of marriage" and may also explain why Roberto
husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the Sanchez could not marry the woman by whom he supposedly had
parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's two illegitimate children, assuming these persons did exist. It is
marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence
of a marriage must natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, strange that the trial court should reject Exhibit "A" in favor of the
be an authentic copy of the marriage contract . While a failed to send a copy of the marriage certi icate to the municipal Transfer Certi icate of Title describing Roberto Sanchez as "single,"
marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear disregarding the elementary principle that the best documentary
absence of the contract must irst be satisfactorily explained. Surely, that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. A Torrens
the certi ication of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage present, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certi icate not certi icate is the best evidence of ownership of registered land, not of
is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of being one of said requisites. the civil status of the owner.
the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the SSS v. Enobiso
is irst presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported
witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
certi ication issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine The SSS stopped paying bene its to Lourdes. The SSS declared that its
the fact of marriage. The person who of iciated at the solemnization
Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, Security and Anti-Fraud Of ice (SAFO) found that the marriage
is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.
there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the certi icate , upon which Lourdes based her claims for bene its by
marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that reason of Petronilo's death, was fake.
of said certi ier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer, said
provincial iscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the The SSS points out that in 1997, the OCR had declared that no record
the functions of his of ice. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not latter, and we af irm the inding of the trial court to that effect. was extant relative to the supposed solemnization of Petronilo and
testify, the same is hearsay. Lourdes' marriage. Further, Marriage License No. 2746492, which
Sy v. CA was issued on March 24, 1969, was not in the names of Petronilo and
Perido v. Perido Lourdes, but of Engracio Mendoza and Nelia Braga. The SSS thus
Petitioner, for the irst time, raises the issue of the marriage being concluded that the foregoing had amply refuted the presumption that
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. Petronilo and Lourdes were married to each other.
certi icates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of
correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certi icate We do not agree.
was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is and marriage license are different and incongruous.
weak and insuf icient to rebut the presumption that persons living Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other
together as husband and wife are married to each other. This The pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage
presumption, especially where the legitimacy of the issue is on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on license . A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence In Trinidad
vs.
Court
of
Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as
the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract proof of marriage may be presented:
shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony;
concluding that the ive children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina resided in Carmona. b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and
Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate. wife after the alleged wedlock;
Villanueva v. CA c) the birth and baptismal certi icate of children born during
Pugeda v. Trias such union; and
The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez with her submission of the
photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the municipality of marriage contract. In the instant petition, Lourdes and Petronilo's marriage was not
Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January 1916, which showed that no promptly recorded with the OCR. It is also true that the testimonies


were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in

of the solemnizing of icer and principal witnesses to the wedding children’s birth and baptism; and the certi ications of marriage
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4),
ceremony, which took place in 1969, were not offered. However, issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Petronilo's siblings unequivocally declared that Lourdes was married Talibon, Bohol.
to their brother and that the couple had nine children. Moreover, the Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
PAG-IBIG nomination form indicated Lourdes and her four children In the matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased Josefa validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
as Petronilo's bene iciaries. In the Member's Data Change or Addition Delgado and Guillermo Rustia abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
Report forms submitted by Petronilo to the SSS, Lourdes was the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
likewise named as a bene iciary and a "housewife". Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227 )
valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
We, therefore, agree with the CA that the lack of prompt recording Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their 1.) A matter of International Comity
with the OCR does not amply rebut the presumption that Lourdes was family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as 2.) Exceptions: Void marriages under Art. 35 to 38
Petronilo's wife. This especially holds true in the light of our husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters 3.) Common law marriage by Filipinos abroad not valid here
declaration in Vda. de Jacob that the "failure to
send a copy
of
a of administration iled by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 4.) Divorce obtained by foreigner spouse against Filipino spouse
marriage contract for record
purposes does not invalidate the referred to them as "spouses." entitles the latter to remarry
marriage. " It is not the duty of the couple to send a copy of the Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna
Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage contract to the civil registrar.
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement
Avenido v. Avenido
be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or of property between the parties of the irst marriage involving
Whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign
existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio. strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certi icate of country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable
identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent
While a marriage certi icate is considered the primary evidence of a passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath marriage.
marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa
marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo The irst marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos,
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certi icate. Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. Pursuant
Hence, even a person’s birth certi icate may be recognized as presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the
convincing evidence suf icient to overcome the presumption of the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and Indeed, the only two types
of
defective
marital
unions under our
of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
shown by the testimony and the af idavit of the of iciating priest, Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the
Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. marriage.
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not
evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
the fact of marriage. violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree
praesumitur pro matrimonio . Always presume marriage. dissolving the irst marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage . with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
Principle of Lex Loci Celebraciones in Marriage obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12,
completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the 1997.
ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
unrebutted fact of the birth within the cohabitation of Tecla and
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
Eustaquio of four (4) children coupled with the certi icates of the Republic v. Orbecido III



Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid lose her right to inherit" from him.
divorce decree capacitating him or her
to
remarry, can the
Filipino The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign
We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the decree is, as here, suf icient.
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they
other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and Lorenzo H. Llorente from his irst wife Paula was valid and validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear
injustice. recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to
do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of
We state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Quita v. CA see Llorente case their conjugal property.
Article 26 as follows:
Bayot v. CA Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 af irmation by Secretary
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the
capacitating him or her to remarry. such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agañ a, February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point
a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport. is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
the latter to remarry.
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, Van Dorn v. Romillo
Llorente v. CA asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly:
For resolution is
the
effect
of
the
foreign
divorce
on
the
parties
and
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certi icate; (2) in
their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) the birth certi icate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce
marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Af idavit There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
established, admitted and undisputed. of Acknowledgment in which she stated being an American citizen. any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine (Bureau) of Identi ication (ID) Certi icate No. RC 9778 and a
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certi icate No. RC 9778 would
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino
public policy.
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national was given only on June 8, 2000. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
law. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that
to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
Appeals , that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,



the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
the marriage . proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and apply in a petition
to
recognize
a foreign judgment relating to
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic , this Court
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the our law on evidence. held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over wife can ile a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Based on the records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the that the court a quo erred in inding that the divorce decree ipso facto status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
alleged conjugal property. clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
requiring him to adduce suf icient evidence to show the Australian fact under the Rules of Court.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
and still subject to a wife's obligations cannot be just. Petitioner an of icial publication or (2) a certi ication or copy attested by the
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to of icer who has custody of the judgment. If the of ice which has
idelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certi ication may be
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry made by the proper diplomatic or consular of icer of the Philippine
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of of ice.
country if the ends of justice are to be served. that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a
to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to
fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
Pilapil v. Ibay Somera marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment
already in evidence two existing marriage certi icates, which were
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
both obtained in the Philippines.
spouse, at the time of the iling of the complaint. marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4)
of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid Ando v. DFA
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. With respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage Japanese Family Court judgment.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines as valid, petitioner should have iled, instead, a petition for the
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality judicial recognition of her foreign divorce f rom her irst husband. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. fact of
the
judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no iled before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory 108 of the Rules of Court.
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he iled suit. the RTC, there appears to be insuf icient proof or evidence presented Fujiki has the personality to ile a petition to recognize the
The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the on record of both the national law of her irst husband, Kobayashi, Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law. Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
not affect or cast obloquy on the other. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason
made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce he has the personality to ile a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
Garcia v. Recio decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry
instituted in the proper forum. on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
Fujiki v. Marinay



material interest in maintaining the

integrity of
the
marriage marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
he contracted
and the
property
relations arising from it. There even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of 3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the it is consistent with their respective national laws. spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in 4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
include the right to be supported “in keeping with the inancial initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like
capacity of the family” and preserving the property regime of the Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
marriage. provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage capacitated to remarry. Speci ically, Manalo pleads for the recognition Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states and enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court operation of the latter's national law.
that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil
may be iled solely by the husband or the wife”—it refers to the registry. Morisono v. Morisono
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. We rule in the af irmative. Pursuant to Manalo , foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be
the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the
subsisting marriage is
the
one who
has the personality to ile a initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree –
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC . not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and presumably the Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
A recognition of a foreign judgment
is
NOT
an
action
to Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe idelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond. in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in
Republic v. Manalo obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of
after marriage, are of two types: requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad . The Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree,
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii , which letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by
terminates the marriage, and the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro , which suspends it and was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on
leaves the bond in full force. the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination
The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put of various factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist: words in the mouths of the lawmakers.
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
Republic v. Cote
our courts cannot grant it. To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the


provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies in a case involving from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 3 of Rule 41 of Solemnized by a Ship Captain or Pilot
recognition of a foreign decree of divorce. the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
ARTICLE 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers
Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign Noveras v. Noveras or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or
divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the
bene its from the effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry. David and Leticia were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, plane is in light, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
Before the divorced Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must ile a Philippines. They resided in California, USA where they eventually
acquired American citizenship. Solemnized by a Military Commander
petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.
ARTICLE 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is They own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia
commissioned of icer, shall likewise have authority to
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons
foreign judgments and laws. June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to
within the zone of military operation, whether members of the
Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia
armed forces or civilians.
To clarify, respondent iled with the RTC a petition to recognize the iled a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.
foreign divorce decree procured by her naturalized (originally Marriage in a Far and Remote Place
Filipino) husband in Hawaii, USA. By impleading the Civil Registry of At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree
Quezon City and the NSO, the end sought to be achieved was the which severed the bond of marriage between the parties. ARTICLE 28. If the residence of either party is so located that
cancellation and or correction of entries involving her marriage there is no means of transportation to enable such party to
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage
status.
evidence. The required certi icates to prove its authenticity, as well may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.
The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
ARTICLE 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings is
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the articles, the solemnizing of icer shall state in an af idavit
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus executed before the local civil registrar or any other person
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was
adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign
performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
Nullada v. the Civil Registrar of Manila party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there
in irmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
mistake of law or fact. The RTC, in its Decision dated January 21, Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar
personally before the local civil registrar and that the of icer
2014 ruled that Florie had suf iciently established that she is married factual milieu that attended in Manalo , the present case warrants a
took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship
to an American citizen and having proven compliance with the legal reversal of the RTC's decision that refused to recognize the divorce
of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment
requirements, is declared capacitated to remarry. decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner
to the marriage.
spouse in Japan solely on the ground that the divorce was jointly
The confusion arose when the RTC denied petitioner's appeal on the initiated by the spouses. The Court inds no reason to deviate from its ARTICLE 30. The original of the af idavit required in the last
ground that no prior motion for reconsideration was iled as required recent disposition on the issue, as made in Manalo . preceding article, together with the legible copy of the marriage
under Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage
Marriages Exempt From The License Requirements to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from
performed within the period of thirty days after the
annulment as de ined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
Marriage in Articulo Mortis performance of the marriage.
only covers void and voidable marriages that are speci ically
cited and enumerated in the Family Code of the Philippines. Solemnized by a Priest Marriage among Muslims or members of ECC
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's ARTICLE 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are ARTICLE 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of
appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since Florie followed the at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly
procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are
proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, an appeal the ailing party subsequently survives.



solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or

People v. Erwin Ong 5-year period should be
the
years immediately before the day
practices.
of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
Appellant contracted a subsequent marriage under Muslim rites with
Zamoranos v. Pacasum Sr. characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
a fellow Muslim convert, and yet again another marriage with the
involved at
any time
within the
5 years
and
continuity - that is
The RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, same partner in a civil ceremony without his irst marriage being
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the legally dissolved. In his Brief before the CA, appellant openly
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose irst admitted all three marriages. He asserted, however, that as a
capacitated to marry each other during the entire ive years, then the
marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized Filipino-Muslim he could not be convicted of bigamy; and that in his
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that subsequent marriages, he was under the belief that these were
have common law relationships and placing them on the same
Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage allowed under Islam faith and culture. This theory is trite as it is
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
ties. wrong. In Nollora, Jr.
v.
People, the Court had ruled upon a similar
issue and rejected exactly the same defense raised by appellant In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot
Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, herein. The standing rule is that Art. 180 of P.D. No. 1083 does not be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for
under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and bar a prosecution for bigamy
when the
irst marriage was
not at least ive years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's
incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083. The charge conducted in accordance with Muslim law . irst marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. Ratification of Marital Cohabitation that Pepito and his irst wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both
This is obviously far from the truth.
Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
ARTICLE 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a already lasted for ive years, the fact remains that their ive-year
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
wife for at least ive years and without any legal impediment to should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law
and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
foregoing facts in an af idavit before any person authorized by Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage law to administer oaths. The solemnizing of icer shall also
before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
state under oath that he ascertained the quali ications of the with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his
had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the
Zamoranos and De Guzman. lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
marriage. actual severance of the ilial companionship between the spouses
Nollora Jr. v. People Ninal v. Bayadog cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party
as being one as "husband and wife".
The trial court found accused Nollora guilty of bigamy. There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to
respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is
Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged lieu thereof, they executed an af idavit stating that "they have attained not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license,
that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of husband and wife for at least ive years, and that we now desire to
celebration of both marriages, Nollora cannot deny that both marry each other." Manzano v. Sanchez
marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived For the provision on legal rati ication
of
marital
cohabitation to
together as husband and wife for ive years without the bene it of apply, the following requisites must concur:
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that marriage, that ive-year period should be computed on the basis of a 1. The man and woman must have been living together as
"[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is husband and wife for at least ive years before the marriage;
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
[Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu the ive-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted other;
of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply. back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This must be present at the time of marriage;


4. The parties must execute an af idavit stating that they have the celebration of their marriage. Important points during 2nd Synch Session 3 Nov
lived together for at least ive years [and are without legal
● Marriage License
impediment to marry each other]; and De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, s upra
○ Navarro v Domagtoy
5. The solemnizing of icer must execute a sworn statement that
The falsity of the af idavit cannot be considered as a mere ○ Aranes v Occiano
he had ascertained the quali ications of the parties and that
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses ● Marriage certi icate/contract
he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who ● Effect of absence of marriage license vs marriage contract
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
● Art 26 on the lex loci celebraciones rule on marriage
signi icant to note that in their separate af idavits executed on 22 wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least ive years
March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing ○ How to prove foreign decree of divorce in a petition
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant for judicial recognition of foreign divorce decree
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage ● Art 34 on Rati ication of Marital Cohabitation
indicated that both were "separated." due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license. In the instant case, there was no “scandalous cohabitation” to
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false af idavit Module 6. Kinds of Defective Marriages
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through (Art. 35 – 54)
subsequent marriage null and void. with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. A. Void Marriages
Cosca v. Palaypayon, s upra Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their
marriage void ab initio. 1. Marriages that are Void ab initio
Republic v. Dayot
The instant case pertains to a rati ication of marital cohabitation. OCA v Necessario ARTICLE 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the
beginning:
Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are guilty of gross ignorance
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with respect to the (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed
an af idavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that
marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during years of age even with the consent of parents or
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. The audit team guardians;
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages
least ive years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally
ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were
each other." One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: authorized to perform marriages unless such
married by mere submission of a pro forma joint af idavit of
whether the falsity of an af idavit of marital cohabitation, where the marriages were contracted with either or both parties
cohabitation. These af idavits were notarized by the solemnizing
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum ive-year believing in good faith that the solemnizing of icer
judge himself or herself.
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack had the legal authority to do so;
of a marriage license.
The af idavits of cohabitation should not be issued and (3) Those solemnized without license , except those
We answer in the af irmative. accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the covered the preceding Chapter;
Court on this matter. The ive-year period of cohabitation should be
one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
It is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have
only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have failing under Article 41;
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least ive years. been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting
only at the time of the marriage. party as to the identity of the other; and
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for ive years at the time they executed their sworn af idavit Tupal v. Rojo (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under
and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa Article 53 .
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize af idavits of
started living together only in June 1986, or barely ive months before
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.



2. Psychological incapacity of one party Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
In the case at bar, the existence of a valid marriage between Jimmy least to communicate with him, for more than ive years are
ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the and Evangeline at the time Ursula and Jimmy were married was circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to suf iciently shown. It must be emphasized that Ursula and Jimmy incapacitated to enter into married life.
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, were married on 15 June 1994, or eight (8) years BEFORE Evangeline
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes was declared presumptively dead. Clearly, the marriage of Jimmy and Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
manifest only after its solemnization. Evangeline was still subsisting at the time Ursula and Jimmy were (a) Gravity,
Meaning married. Further, the Decision of the RTC of Manila is also a
recognition of the validity of the marriage between Jimmy and (b) Juridical antecedence, a nd
"Psychological incapacity " should refer to no less than a mental Evangeline. (c) Incurability.
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed Based on the foregoing, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine the The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so validity of the marriage between Ursula and Jimmy. incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and idelity and Mallion v. Alcantara although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
render help and support. marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
Does
a previous inal
judgment denying a petition
for declaration of cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Requisites nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent
petition for declaration of
nullity
on
the
ground of
lack of
marriage There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by license? con ine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
(a) Gravity, the incapacity must be grave or serious such that serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and signi icance to the
duties required in marriage; ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance marriage is celebrated.
(b) Juridical
antecedence,
it must be rooted in the history of of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the irst Tuason v. CA
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and case is a bar to the subsequent action.
Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he
(c) Incurability, it must be incurable or, even if it were In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of could have testi ied that he was not psychologically incapacitated at
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon the time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their irst
involved. which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by ten years, he and private respondent lived together with their children
petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue as one normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his
Macam v. Macam that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as
In a void marriage, it is as though no marriage had taken place; thus, actual status of petitioner and respondent's marriage. It must be owner and operator of a radio and television corporation places him
it cannot be the source of any right. Consequently, any party may emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res in the public eye and makes him a good subject for malicious gossip
attack the marriage, directly or collaterally. A void marriage may be judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a linking him with various women. These facts, according to petitioner,
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. different method of presenting his case. should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.
Indeed, a void marriage may be impugned either: Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of
their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived Suf ice it to state that the inding of the trial court as to the existence
(1) directly , by iling an action attacking the validity thereof; or any defects therein. For this reason, the Court inds that the present or non-existence of petitioner’s psychological incapacity at the time
(2) collaterally , in a suit instituted not to speci ically question action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of of the marriage is inal and binding on us. Petitioner has not
the same, but where the determination of the issue of its marriage license is barred. suf iciently shown that the trial court’s factual indings and
validity is essential to the resolution of the controversy, as evaluation of the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses
in the case at bar. Santos v. CA vis-a-vis petitioner’s defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous.



Salita v. Magtolis In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita's psychological 7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
more of a “dif iculty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
incapacity. Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars “irreconcilable differences” and “con licting personalities” in no wise
courts.
constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that
point out the speci ic essential marital obligations she allegedly was the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married 8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or iscal
not able to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
insuf icient if not irrelevant to her husband's cause of action. She doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
rationalizes that her insistence on the speci ication of her particular Hernandez v. CA
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of time, In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner
husband could not get along with each other. There had been no
place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
because without these details she cannot adequately and intelligently respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
antecedence nor its incurability.
prepare her answer to the petition. deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. and its concomitant responsibilities.
Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of private
36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
respondent's cause of action against her thus - Private respondent’s alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual in idelity or
bench and the bar:
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
x x x x (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with grounds for inding that he is suffering from a psychological
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be
belongs to the plaintiff.
unable to understand and accept the demands made by his shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
profession - that of a newly quali ied Doctor of Medicine - upon 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the
petitioner's time and efforts so that she frequently complained of essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to
(a) medically or clinically identi ied,
his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose private respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling of being
intervention caused petitioner to lose his job. (b) alleged in the complaint, handsome.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that (c) suf iciently proven by experts and
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish
petitioner can already prepare her responsive pleading or for (d) clearly explained in the decision. the precise cause of private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if
trial. Private respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of
the celebration” of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
profession x x x upon his time and efforts x x x x" petitioner.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA clinically permanent or incurable. Furthermore, such Republic v. Dagdag
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations , not necessarily to those not related WON the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation emotionally immature and
irresponsible,
a habitual
alcoholic,
and a
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." to marriage.
fugitive from justice.
Constant non-ful illment of this obligation will inally destroy the 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to ful ill the marriage. for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. ield of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
Republic v. Molina by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is



on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as Third . Most telling is the insuf iciency, if not incompetency, of the
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial supposed expert testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. ⭐Tenebro v. CA
court. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause
of the alleged psychological incapacity. Speci ically, his testimony We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the
Taking into consideration the Molina guidelines, it is evident that did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage,
Erlinda failed to comply with the evidentiary requirements. Erlinda permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s
failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically essential obligations of marriage. declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
identi ied and suf iciently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
medical doctor testi ied as to the alleged psychological incapacity of Barcelona v. CA celebration of
the
marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws
her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that "expert opinion subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
from justice was not suf iciently proven. In fact, the crime for which
need not be alleged" in the petition is that there is also no need to criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
he was arrested was not even alleged.
allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground
the ields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to of psychological incapacity.
Pesca v. Pesca
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new
Petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to
on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with,
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility , invoked by her, Dedel v. CA marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity . never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by to see his family.
petitioner fall within the term “psychological incapacity?”
Choa v. Choa
We ind that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
The evidence against herein petitioner is grossly insuf icient to Respondent’s sexual in idelity can hardly qualify as being mentally that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
support any inding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage. obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s kind of psychological illness. After respondent testi ied on how
First . The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as its celebration, later af irmed in church rites, and which produced Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
psychologically incapacitated to ful ill her marital obligations, four children. examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she
simply because she iled cases against him. presented evidence that medically or clinically identi ied his illness.
Respondent’s sexual in idelity or perversion and abandonment do This could have been done through an expert witness. This
Second . Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the respondent did not do.
conjunction with his documentary offerings, suf icient to prove contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity. Even if taken as true, immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological Siayngco v. Siayngco
the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
of petitioner’s personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to We have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by
their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an “intention of discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who inds his wife’s
procreative sexuality.” None of these three, singly or collectively, due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet
constitutes “psychological incapacity.” “irritants” and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these


inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father. When perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
ile a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to petitioner could no longer take respondent's domineering ways, he personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
comply with the essential marital obligations. preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her ictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
outright that he wanted to end their marriage. educational attainment, and family background, among others.
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that
respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The Dr. Dayan traced petitioner's personality disorder to his These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further
psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s own dysfunctional family life. linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the
evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the ield of psychology. The Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos
person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband It has been suf iciently established that petitioner had a that personal examination of the subject by the physician is
ful illed the essential marital obligations of marriage. psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a NOT required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that incapacitated .
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have
from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. Particularly, Third . Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to
only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not personality disorders are "long-standing, in lexible ways of behaving have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
able to ful ill, if any, is the obligation of idelity. Sexual in idelity, per that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from ictitious
se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, characters well before she married petitioner.
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those
Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered who display them and for others." Fourth . The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is
personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the suf icient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
ardent wish to have a child of his own lesh and blood. suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature
unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
Respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and void . One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well
her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her to any legal or emotional commitments.
inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological Antonio v. Reyes
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential Fifth . Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
We ind that the present case suf iciently satis ies the guidelines in marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
obligations of marriage.
Molina. Code.
Halili v. Halili and Republic First . Petitioner had suf iciently overcome his burden in proving the Sixth . The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner's psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled
dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations by the Catholic Church.
petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on on his wife's behavior, and certi ications from Blackgold Records and
them for decisions. Petitioner's mother even had to be the one to tell the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's In this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert
him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two witnesses that respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or
upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real. (2) expert witnesses from the ield of psychology who testi ied that incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit
the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering incapacity. propounded to him.
from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a
self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This Second . The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has Buenaventura v. CA
submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of been medically or clinically identi ied, alleged in the complaint,
suf iciently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the
him. This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be
court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
dominated, irst, by his father who treated his family like robots and,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with



the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts abandonment of petitioner without justi iable cause for more than for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting one year are grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.
moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of of marriage under Article 36.
psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the “psychological
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of incapacity” that the law requires, and should be distinguished from
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is the “dif iculty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which marriages.
damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
the marriage, but on speci ic evidence that it was done deliberately concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the
and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her mutually given and accepted. respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information
disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of
appears to have been adduced in this case. Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the her cause cannot be doubted. While Dr. Tayag initially described the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to general characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that the facts established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent
one
is
truly
incognitive of
the basic
marital
covenants
that one of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal con irming the decree the respondent exhibited these traits.
must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the
removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in Te v. Te
purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding
The parties' whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6)
respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the
months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
without basis in law and in fact. provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
Rumbaua v. Rumbaua
incapacitated. Petitioner's behavioral pattern falls under the
Najera v. Najera The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is classi ication of dependent personality disorder, and
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or remove any respondent's, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or con irmation disorder .
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the of already existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural laws
essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent's may be given retroactive effect. Dependent personality
disorder
is characterized in the following
alleged psychological incapacity was not suf iciently proven by manner -- A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of
experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack
incurable. mandatory nature of an OSG certi ication and may be applied self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
retroactively to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments. At times they
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates' pending matter any procedural lapse on the certi ication prior to its actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
conclusion that respondent was psychologically incapacitated was promulgation. Thus, what is important is the presence of the overprotection.
based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was not based on her prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be
personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her inding certi ied to be present. From this perspective, the petitioner’s Antisocial personality disorder described, as follows --
is unscienti ic and unreliable. Moreover, the trial court correctly objection regarding the Molina guideline on certi ication lacks merit. Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
found that petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
personality disorder of respondent was incurable. The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard
reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her for the rights of others (either through exploitativeness or criminal
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and behavior), frequent physical ights and, quite commonly, child or
presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly did not send her greeting cards during special occasions; (d) spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There
abusive conduct of respondent toward petitioner and respondent's represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her is often a façade of charm and even sophistication that masks


disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
control others. faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
non respicit. " suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with
Indeed, petitioner, who is af licted with dependent personality severe inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to
disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living Far from abandoning Molina , the Court in Te v Te simply suggested perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
together, observing love, respect and idelity and rendering help and the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein,
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice Third , Rodolfo's psychological incapacity was established to have
from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions Coming now to the main issue, we ind the totality of evidence clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
(such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he adduced by respondent insuf icient to prove that petitioner is marriage.
believes they are wrong, has dif iculty doing things on his own, psychologically un it to discharge the duties expected of him as a
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such Fourth , Rodolfo's psychological incapacity has been shown to be
from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) suf iciently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the essential
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in years ago. obligations of marriage.
this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the
Respondent failed to prove that petitioner's "defects" were present at Fifth , Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential
persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense
the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.
of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has
prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one
no goals and clear direction in life.
occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the by itself, is insuf icient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who
respondent. Her being af licted with antisocial personality disorder on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being
makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This such "defects" to be incurable. of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
inding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her Azcueta v. Republic and CA
Sixth , the incurability of Rodolfo's condition which has been deeply
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional After a thorough review of the records of the case, we ind that there ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by
behavioral limitations imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in was suf icient compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no the parties' marriage under Article 36.
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and
Chan Paz v. Paz
of committing suicide. First , petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the
psychological incapacity of her husband. Jordan's alleged psychological incapacity was not shown to be so
Both parties being af licted with grave, severe and incurable grave and so permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they Second , the root cause of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity has duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. At best, Jeanice's
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus declared null and void. been medically or clinically identi ied, alleged in the petition, allegations showed that Jordan was irresponsible, insensitive, or
suf iciently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the emotionally immature.
Ting v. Velez-Ting trial court's decision.
Likewise, Jeanice was not able to establish with certainty that
Respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Jordan's alleged psychological incapacity was medically or clinically
Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being
Rodolfo was not gainfully employed and, despite pleas from permanent or incurable.
contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same
petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to ind
argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca , In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by Jeanice failed to
employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couple's
and again in Antonio v.
Reyes . In these cases, we explained that the show that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couple's
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the essential marital obligations and that such incapacity was grave,
inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfo's refusal to have a child
the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their
stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to
ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that marriage.
his mother.
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
Reyes So v. Valera



The factual background of this case covers at least 18 years. The and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted
petitioner and the respondent irst met in 1973 and lived together as the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises. The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s
husband and wife, without the bene it of marriage, before they got moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
married in 1991. In the course of their relationship, they had three Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her indings on the transcript of the parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly de ined
(3) children; established a business, and even incurred indebtedness petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code.
amounting to P4 million; had differences due to what the CA his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her indings would
described as "character faults and defects"; and had a well-described seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to Vinas v. Parel-Vinas
quarrel which the CA observed to be the "common reaction of an disregard the indings on that basis alone. After all, her expert
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by
ordinary housewife in a similar situation." Thus, unlike the usual opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for
Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the past, where marriage, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the
the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the totality of evidence
cohabitation, and perception of psychological incapacity took place issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already
presented is enough to sustain a inding of psychological incapacity,
in that order, the present case poses a situation where there had been settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
a lengthy period of cohabitation before the marriage took place. psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the
resorted to.”
declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of
To be sure, this factual unique situation does not change the Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn,
requirement that psychological incapacity must be present at the task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not
time of the celebration of the marriage. It does, however, raise novel must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the suf iciently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary
and unavoidable questions because of the lapse of time the couple psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.” Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is
has been together and their intimate knowledge of each other at the outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined to perform household
time of the celebration of the marriage. Speci ically, how do these In its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial
chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is
factors affect the
claim
of
psychological incapacity
that
should exist court was expected to compare the expert indings and opinion of Dr.
romantically-involved with another man. She has not been
at
the time of
the marriage, considering that marriage came near or Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr.
maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the latter
at the end of the parties' relationship? Gates.
iled the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is
In her Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Dayan impressed that the conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace.
Our own examination of the psychologist's testimony and
respondent had “compulsive and dependent tendencies” to the extent While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the
conclusions leads us to conclude that they are not suf iciently
of being “relationship dependent.” latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological
in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
incapacity.
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have
delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
3. Incestuous Marriage
lived with the petitioner for 18 years and begot children with him obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 - developments that show a fair level of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully ARTICLE 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous
stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the
the parties for some eleven (11) years. She inished her Dentistry and that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
joined her husband in the communications business - traits that do sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
not at all indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read that would erode their moral iber. (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;
with the comment that she had been strict with employees and in and
business affairs. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on
half blood.
Kalaw v. Fernandez her very young children. We do ind to be revealing the disclosures
made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw – the parties’ eldest son – in his Reason why it is Void
We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses deposition, whereby the son con irmed the claim of his father that
because they were largely drawn from the case records and af idavits, his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong.


4. Void Marriage for Reason of Public Policy generally rati ied or con irmed by free cohabitation or prescription that his irst wife was then generally considered dead or was believed
while the other can never be rati ied. A voidable marriage cannot be by him to be so.
ARTICLE 38. The following marriages shall be void from the assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void
beginning for reasons of public policy: marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages Odayat v. Amante
can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate Respondent's contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo
not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
Portales. The Investigator inds for the respondent and recommends
(2) Between step-parents and step-children; will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the
his exoneration from this charge. Indeed, there is no question that
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio
marriages where the action prescribes.
under Article 80 of the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
The law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death
and the adopted child; of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for Wiegel v. Sempio Diy
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and There is no need for petitioner to prove that her irst marriage was
the adopter; vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
Exception to collateral attack – Hereditary right affected
this to be so the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art.
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the
adopter; 6. Absolute Nullity of Previous Marriage must be based on 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
Final Judgment before One can Remarry annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and respondent she was still validly married to her irst husband,
ARTICLE 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a Code).
marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or
his or her own spouse. inal judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
Effect of termination of marriage by death of a spouse on the People v. Mendoza prior marriage of her irst husband at the time they married each
“Af inity Prohibition” other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to
It is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal
Adoptive relationship contracted during the existence of his irst marriage with Jovita de
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
Asis.
Intentional killing of a spouse at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
There is here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
5. Imprescriptibility of Action to Declare Nullity of would be regarded VOID under the law.
Lema was contracted in the belief that the irst spouse, Jovita de Asis,
Marriage has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered
as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and Yap v. CA
ARTICLE 39. The action or defense for the declaration of void by a competent court.
absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (as amended There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap
by Executive Order 227 s. 1987, RA 8533 ) was valid and that the second marriage contracted by the latter with
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the appellant
Nancy Yap was illegal and void.
Cojuangco v. Romillo acquitted of bigamy.
Ninal v. Bayadog, s upra ⭐Domingo v. CA

Gomez v. Lipana
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is Whether or
not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage
There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a is necessary. If in the af irmative, whether the
same should be
iled
Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have only for purposes of remarriage.
married Isidra Gomez in 1935. Indeed, he contracted the second
taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The irst can be marriage less than seven years after the irst, and he has not shown There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private



respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the nullity of a irst marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
void from the beginning. con licting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
absolute nullity of
a marriage is
now explicitly
required either properties.
The cases of People
v.
Aragon and People
v.
Mendoza relied upon as a cause
of
action or
a ground for
defense . Where the absolute
by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for IN SUMMARY
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
bigamous marriage. ➔ For purposes of remarriage, inal judgment declaring the
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
previous marriage void is the sole basis, whereas
in irmity is a inal judgment declaring the previous marriage
The dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in ➔ For other purposes, other evidence are acceptable.
void .
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v.
Lipana , the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a Article 40 and the crime of Bigamy
and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that For a person to be convicted of bigamy , the following
the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the elements must concur:
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her irst marriage, the
the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy . (1) that the offender has been legally married;
need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates
(2) that the irst marriage has not been legally dissolved
an action for that purpose." That Article 40 as inally formulated included the signi icant clause
or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse
denotes that such inal judgment declaring the previous marriage
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de could not yet be presumed dead according to the
void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Consuegra v. GSIS , that "although the second marriage can be provisions of the Civil Code;
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the irst might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for (3) that the offender contracts a second or subsequent
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial purposes other than remarriage, such as marriage; and
declaration of such nullity."
1. in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
In Tolentino v. Paras , however, the Court turned around and and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, essential requisites for validity.
applied the Aragon and
Mendoza ruling
once again. In granting 2. an action for the custody and support of their common People v. Vicente Cobar, CA-G.R. No. 19344, Nov. 10, 1997
the prayer of the irst wife asking for a declaration as the lawful children and the delivery of the latters’ presumptive
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certi icate of her legitimes. Mercado v. Tan
deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his irst In such cases, evidence needs to be adduced, testimonial or necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted .
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a One who enters into a subsequent marriage without irst obtaining
No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be
limited such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
marriage." solely to an earlier inal judgment of a court declaring such even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”
previous marriage void . Hence, in the instance where a party who
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the Court has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting Petitioner contends that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity
reverted
to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, of his irst marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her irst he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a inal judgment considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaring such previous marriage void. void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she concludes that there is no irst marriage to speak of.
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel." nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the irst marriage was
according to the regime of property relations governing them. It declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she


points out that that declaration came only after the Information had grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
been iled. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. These need not be limited solely to an earlier inal judgment of a We rule in the negative.
She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous court declaring such previous marriage void.
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a In Tenebro v. CA, we declared that although the judicial declaration
subsequent time. The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
We agree with the respondent . not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is signi icant to note
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his irst marriage. In It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is,
fact, he instituted the Petition to have the irst marriage declared void since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a
only after complainant had iled a letter-complaint charging him with initio, the "death bene its" under scrutiny would now be awarded to marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the irst was still respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must irst be a prior judicial liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal
Revised Penal Code. declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before laws on bigamy completely nugatory.
a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage would also be void. And in Jarillo v. People, applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we
the irst marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already af irmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment
been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one
encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy
could simply ile a petition to declare his previous marriage void and not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized the second marriage, the accused’s irst marriage which had not yet
criminal case. We cannot allow that. without irst obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage deemed valid and subsisting.
Nicdao Carino v. Carino of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise , void ab initio.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the irst
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved.
Morigo v. People, s upra
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent
basis solely of a inal judgment declaring such previous marriage Montañez v. Cipriano judicial declaration of nullity of the irst marriage would not change
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for
is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second subsistence of the irst marriage. Thus, respondent was properly
bigamy iled against respondent.
marriage, the SOLE basis acceptable in law, for
said projected charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the
marriage to be free from legal in irmity, is a inal judgment YES. It appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage offense charged were suf iciently alleged.
declaring the previous marriage void . with Silverio in 1983, her irst marriage with Socrates celebrated in
1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or In Atienza v.
Brillantes,
Jr. , the Court already made the declaration
However, for
purposes other than remarriage , no judicial action that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be
applied
declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of
is
necessary
to
declare
a marriage an absolute nullity . For other
bigamy were alleged in the Information. retroactively .
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution Clearly, the annulment of respondent's irst marriage on the ground of Capili v. People
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's irst Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of
the
second
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the marriage justi ies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy iled marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the against her.
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be NO. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the



subsistence of a valid irst marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly
marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the raised only during the presentation of evidence. it - and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not
crime of bigamy. also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that
All considered, we ind that the trial court committed grave abuse of he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent
People v. Edgardo Odtuhan discretion when, in so quashing the Information, it considered an marriage to Fe. His
liability
for
bigamy
is, therefore, now beyond
evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding question .
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission
respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat Iwasawa v. Custodio Gangan
marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of
unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity
which is obtaining in the instant petition.
Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or
requisites for validity. else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the
Sarto y Misalucha v. People
beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Respondent claims that there are more reasons to quash the Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case.
information against him, because he obtained the declaration of put forth the defense of the termination of his irst marriage as a
nullity of marriage before the iling of the complaint for bigamy result of the divorce o
btained abroad by his alien spouse. The documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the
against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the
the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on
that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent
by law and that the time of iling of the criminal complaint or divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November
information is material only for determining prescription. show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of
country's national law. Stated differently, Redante has the burden of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the
Antone v. Beronilla proving the termination of the irst marriage prior to the celebration time she married petitioner; (4) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009
of the second. and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s marriage
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (5) that the
elements of Bigamy were rendered incomplete after herein The certi icate of divorce relied by Redante, however, is utterly second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous,
respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the court insuf icient to rebut the charge against him. First, the certi icate of hence null and void, since the irst marriage was still valid and
believed would negate the allegation in the Information that there was divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
a irst valid marriage. The evidence presented showed that jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree required
respondent later obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the irst to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the No retroactive effect for Article 40
union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage. foreign court and not a mere certi ication. Second, assuming the
Castillo v. De Leon-Castillo, s upra
certi icate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was
In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that a judicial
not accompanied by a certi ication issued by the proper Philippine We ind that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
diplomatic or consular of icer stationed in Canada, as required under retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v.
reprehensible and immoral.
was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably CA , the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights
between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the Maria Socorro's national law. of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. As earlier explained, the
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The


Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is 7. Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
valid in view of the invalidity of her irst marriage to Bautista In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no ARTICLE 41. A marriage contracted by any person during conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica
judicial declaration that the irst marriage was void ab initio before subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable
the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in
requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead
Decision of the RTC of Parañ aque City declaring the nullity of Lea's and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he
irst marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of
subsequent marriage to Renato is valid. where there is danger of death under the circumstances set many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
Vitangcol v. People Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London
absence of only two years shall be suf icient.
for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must irst secure a For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under his wife in England. We do not consider that walking into a major city
judicial declaration of nullity of their irst marriage. If they proceed the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping
with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the into one particular person there -- which is in effect what Nolasco
guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the irst declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, says he did -- can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
marriage. without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. Republic v. Espinosa Cantor
In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a
marriage license number freely and voluntarily signed and attested to Requisites The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary
by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing of icer. proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an
There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be
The irst marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second
death under Article 41 of the Family Code: immediately inal and executory . Modi ication of the court’s
marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of
seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The inal
did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his irst consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the
marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision disappearance occurred where there is danger of death resort to appeal.
declaring the irst marriage as spurious was presented. In other under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
words, petitioner's belief that there was no marriage license is Code; It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course
rendered untrue by his own actuations. to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry ; records of the case to the CA.
This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certi ication 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
from the Of ice of the Civil Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without
the absentee is dead; and
prove that despite the existence of a valid irst marriage, petitioner a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made
nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The 4. That the present spouse iles a summary proceeding for from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless,
admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. ile a petition
for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
due execution suf ices to discharge the burden of proving beyond question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Republic v. Nolasco
reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence jurisdiction that transpired.
will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certi ication Nolasco iled before the RTC, a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article The law did not de ine what is meant by “well-founded belief. ” It
from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be found is
41 of the Family Code. depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be
license was issued.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove
search for
his
missing
wife
with such diligence as to give rise to that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts
a "well-founded belief" that she is dead . and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,



the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active Valdez v. Republic Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law.
effort (not a mere passive one) . However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to
at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the
In the case at bar, the respondent’s “well-founded belief” was So io and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985,
said marriage is legal and valid.
anchored on her alleged “earnest efforts” to locate Jerry, which respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
consisted of the following: Code.
Matias v. Republic
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have The petition for the declaration of presumptive death iled by the
in-laws, neighbors and friends; and the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has by the RTC.
looked through the patients’ directory, hoping to ind Jerry. for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions
for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the The petition for the declaration of presumptive death iled by
These efforts, however, fell short of the “stringent standard” and celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the application
degree of diligence required by jurisprudence. former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry.
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of
First , the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is death established therein is ONLY applicable for the purpose of
It can be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law.
consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were time of the celebration of the marriage.
unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the
her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for
directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
insuf icient to engender a belief that her husband is dead. absentee's estate. petitioner categorically stated that the same was iled "not for any
other purpose but solely to claim for the bene it under P.D. No. 1638
Second , she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by as amended."
seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a inding of law
and
no
court
declaration
is
needed for
the presumption to
well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which arise . Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was
the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we ind it year of absence, So io is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. not iled for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391
missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report Consequently, at the time of petitioner's marriage to Virgilio, there of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition.
his/her absence to the police. existed no impediment to petitioner's capacity to marry, and the
marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code. In our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person
Third , she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of as
a valid
suit
and no court has any authority to take cognizance of
Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner could not have been the same.
not even named. As held in Nolasco , the present spouse’s bare expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was
assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw , Gue and Lukban
collectively, we
whereabouts is insuf icient as the names of the friends from whom are able to ascertain the considerations why a petition for declaration
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring of presumptive death based on the Civil Code was disallowed in our
he made inquiries were not identi ied in the testimony nor presented
petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in jurisdiction, viz:
as witnesses.
the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time
Lastly , there was no other corroborative evidence to support the it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go 1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules
respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve. of evidence that only allow a court or a. tribunal to presume
there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree 2. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express
other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and
on the presumption of So io's death can be granted under the Civil rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a
in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts.



person presumptively dead under either of the said articles "evidence" referred to here excludes a court declaration of 238, and 253 of the Family Code. These provisions explicitly provide
actually presents no actual controversy that a court could presumptive death. that actions for presumptive death are summary in nature.
decide. In such action, there would be no actual rights to be 3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the
enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to be evidence submitted by the claimant and determine their Parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal decisions in
established. suf iciency to establish the requisite factual conditions summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because by
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively speci ied under Article 390 or 391 of the Civil Code in order express mandate of law, judgments rendered thereunder are
dead under Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an for the presumption of death to arise. If the PVAO or the AFP immediately inal and executory. The Court inds that petitioner's
action exclusively based thereon, would never really become determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to challenge
" inal" as the same only con irms the existence of a prima suf icient, they should not hesitate to apply the presumption the RTC's Order declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper .
facie or disputable presumption. The function of a court to of death and pay the latter's claim. 4. If the PVAO or the AFP
render decisions that are supposed to be inal and binding determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is Having determined the propriety of petitioner's mode of challenging
between litigants is thereby compromised. not suf icient to invoke the presumption of death under the the RTC's Order, the Court shall now proceed to tackle the issue of
4. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, whether or not private respondent has suf iciently complied with the
dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be the claimant may ile an appeal with the Of ice of the essential requisites in a petition for declaration of presumptive death.
unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already President (OP) pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of
What remains to be resolved is whether or not private respondent
established by law. administrative remedies.
successfully discharged the burden of establishing a well-founded
The Court deems it necessary to issue the following belief that his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino
guidelines—culled from relevant law and jurisprudential
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no In the case at bar, private respondent irst took a leave of absence
pronouncements—to aid the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely from his work in the United Arab Emirates and returned to the
dealing with
claims
of
death
bene its which are similar to that of
because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Philippines to search for Shanaviv. He then proceeded to inquire
the petitioner:
Section 247, Family Code, supra, are “immediately inal and about his wife's whereabouts from their friends and relatives in
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death bene its of executory”. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give Cagayan and Bicol. Next, private respondent aired over Bombo Radyo
a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to irst due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the Philippines, a known radio station, regarding the fact of
produce a court declaration of the presumptive death of such entire records of the case to the CA. disappearance of his wife. Finally, he claims to have visited various
soldier. In such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao City and nearby
own determination, on the basis of evidence presented by The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground municipalities.
the claimant, whether the presumption of death under of lack
of
jurisdiction , and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision
of November 7, 2001 was immediately inal and executory. Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court in Cantor,
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code may be applied or not.
Granada, and Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court inds that private
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under
Republic v. Tango respondent's efforts falls
short
of
the degree of diligence required
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of
by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural
conditions mentioned in the said articles are established. lapse when it iled a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead First , private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing
Hence, requiring the claimant to further secure a court of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course wife's whereabouts from both friends and relatives. Further, he
declaration in order to establish the presumptive death of a to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case claims to have carried out such inquiries in the place where they
missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established to the appellate court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire lived and in the place where his wife was born and raised. However,
jurisprudence on the matter. jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express private respondent failed to present any of these alleged friends or
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant provision of law, was immediately inal and executory. relatives to corroborate these "inquiries." Moreover, no explanation
need only present before the PVAO or the appropriate of ice for such omission was given. As held in the previous cases, failure to
of the AFP, as the case may be, any "evidence" which shows Republic v. Catubag present any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made
that the concerned soldier had been missing for such tends to belie a claim of a diligent search.
number of years and/or under the circumstances prescribed Since what is involved in the instant case is a petition for declaration
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the of presumptive death, the relevant provisions of law are Articles 41, Second , private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned



unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or

government agencies, namely, the local police authorities and the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
declaring it void ab initio.
NBI. In Cantor , the Court reasoned that while a inding of subsequent marriage.
well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
still be prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid of the Under the Family
Code , no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
authorities in searching for the missing spouse. Absent such efforts marriage is necessary. residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
to employ the help of local authorities, the present spouse cannot be instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
said to have actively and diligently searched for the absentee spouse. The termination of the subsequent marriage by af idavit provided by spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the above-quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
Finally , aside from the certi ication of Bombo Radyo's manager, iling of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee such fact is disputed.
private respondent bases his "well-founded belief” on bare assertions and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife. Again, the subsequent marriage. Effects of termination of subsequent marriage by reappearance of
present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of the absent spouse
evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by af idavit or by court action, such ARTICLE 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage
well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead. referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
absentee's mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in
the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the effects:
Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's
efforts in searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived
passive . the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues in spite of prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
the spouse's physical reappearance, and by
iction
of
law , he or she (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
Requisites for declaration of presumptive death must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved
marriage is terminated as provided by law. and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
8. Voidable Bigamous Marriage marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net pro its
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an of the community property or conjugal partnership
Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death af idavit of reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
SSS v. Vda. De Bailon either spouse as in the case at bar, the effects of dissolution of valid children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
marriages shall arise. spouse by a previous marriage or in default of
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to
the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable children, the innocent spouse;
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code . (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid,
collaterally except in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the irst faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is irst by operation of law;
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under the other spouse who acted in bad faith as bene iciary
made good ab initio.
any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
and void by a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with stipulated as irrevocable; and
these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage. law, Bailon's and respondent's marriage prior to the former's death in (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-bene iciary of in bad faith shall be disquali ied to inherit from the
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 Bailon. innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
consecutive years when Bailon sought the declaration of her
Effects if both parties to the subsequent marriage are in bad faith
presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a Effects of Reappearance
requirement then for purposes of remarriage. ARTICLE 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted
ARTICLE 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
Under the Civil Code , a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions
terminated by inal judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the recording of the af idavit of reappearance of the absent spouse,



made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of 6. Af licted with sexually transmissible disease that is serious
used their power, if any, over the will of petitioner, depriving him of a
law. and incurable
reasonable freedom of choice. Petitioner is a healthy male with
B. Voidable Marriages Elmer Bermudo v. CA suf icient intellectual capacity to resist any untoward intimidation
against him.
Petitioner maintains that his marriage to respondent was solemnized
1. Grounds for Annulment of Marriage without a marriage license because they simply went to the Manila
City Hall where her friends arranged for their marriage after Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation
ARTICLE 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
threatening him with bodily harm. He and respondent did not go to 2. Kinds of Fraud that could invalidate the marriage
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
San Juan, Metro Manila to apply for a marriage license. In fact, their
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage was celebrated in Manila and not in San Juan. Even ARTICLE 46. Any of the following circumstances shall
marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over assuming that a marriage license from San Juan was issued to them, constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding
but below twenty-one, and the marriage was the same is not valid since neither he nor respondent was a resident Article:
solemnized without the consent of the parents, of San Juan.
guardian or person having substitute parental (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by inal
authority over the party, in that order, unless after To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be turpitude;
cohabited with the other and both lived together as apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of
husband and wife; certi ication from the local civil registrar that no such marriage the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
license was issued to the parties. her husband;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease,
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the In the case at bar, as pointed out by the CA, petitioner failed to present regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
other as husband and wife; any concrete proof, such as a certi ication from the local civil marriage; or
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, registrar of San Juan, to attest to the fact that the challenged marriage (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or
unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of license does not exist in their records, or that the same is spurious. homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of
the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the marriage.
Likewise, petitioner’s claim of vitiated
consent as a result of the
the other as husband and wife; No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
force and intimidation employed by respondent’s friends in obtaining
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, his agreement to his marriage with respondent has no merit. rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
intimidation or undue in luence, unless the same grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter Petitioner is an educated person. He is a seaman by profession. He Buccat v. Buccat
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; knowingly and voluntarily went out with respondent's friends and
even if, as he insisted, he was surprised that they did not go to the The plaintiff requests the annulment of his marriage to the defendant
(5) That either party was physically incapable of Luida Mangonon de Buccat on November 26, 1938, in the City of
place that they intended to be and instead, they went to the Manila
consummating the marriage with the other, and such Baguio, on the grounds that, by consenting to said marriage, he did so
City Hall, he still knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or because the defendant had assured him that she was a virgin .
ceremony. We ind as incredible, petitioner's claim that respondent’s
(6) That either party was af licted with a friends tried to threaten him if he would not marry respondent
sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious considering that the City Hall of Manila is a crowded place. Thus, if The plaintiff's and appellant's allegation that he had not even
and appears to be incurable. he was really being threatened into marrying respondent, he could suspected the serious condition of the defendant is implausible,
have easily sought for immediate help from other people within the being this, as has been proven, in a very advanced pregnant
Simply condition. Therefore, there is no room to estimate the fraud of the
premises.
1. Lack of Parental Consent appellant. The latter's allegation that it is not uncommon to pull
2. Unsoundness of mind The records disclose that no evidence was presented to reveal force, people with a developed abdomen seems childish to merit our
3. Consent obtained by Fraud intimidation or undue in luence. There is no proof of the facts or consideration, all the more so since the applicant was a irst-year law
4. Consent obtained by force, intimidation, or undue in luence circumstances constituting force, intimidation or undue in luence student.
5. Physical incapacity of consummating the marriage that respondent or her friends have improperly taken advantage of, or



force, intimidation or undue in luence disappeared or

Aquino v. Delizo the ‘plump’ case
ceased ; The role of the prosecuting attorney or iscal in annulment of
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence
by the injured party, within ive years after the
and is ground for annulment of marriage. is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to
marriage .
the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion
The defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months 4. No declaration of default in annulment cases existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner
pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are
that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, Role of the Fiscal in annulment cases Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by
ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
plaintiff. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not
prosecuting attorney or iscal assigned to it to appear on behalf proceedings in the trial court.
she was pregnant at the time of their marriage, more so because she
must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or Ancheta v. Ancheta
The evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together suppressed. The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to ile an answer to
with what has already been adduced, would, in our opinion, be the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment
suf icient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the
shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment. acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion
of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of
Tuason v. CA, s upra the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner
3. Prescriptive period for Annulment of Marriage
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The
ARTICLE 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be iled fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in de iance
by the following persons and within the periods indicated annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, of Article 48 of the Family Code.
herein: the prosecuting attorney or iscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the Republic v. Iyoy
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the
parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does
party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the not bar him or his Of ice from intervening in proceedings for
consent, within ive years after attaining the age
court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
of
twenty-one , or by the parent or guardian or person the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
having legal charge of the minor, at any
time before 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints
parties. The prosecuting attorney or iscal may oppose the the Solicitor General as the principal law of icer and legal defender of
such party has reached the age of twenty-one ; application for legal separation or annulment through the the Government. His Of ice is tasked to represent the Government of
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its of icials
the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's is dubious and fabricated. and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person requiring the services of lawyers. The Of ice of the Solicitor General
having legal charge of the insane, at any time before The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of
shall constitute the law of ice of the Government and, as such, shall
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not
the death of either party, or by the insane spouse discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.
declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner
during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
iled his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code is to ensure that the
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Articles 45, by alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
the injured party, within ive years after the proceedings below by iling several pleadings and cross-examining annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
discovery o
f the fraud; the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by not by collusion. principal law of icer and legal defender of the land, then his
ive years from the time the
the injured party, within



Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of

intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
the other parent.
the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it. relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
Silva v. CA by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is be, of the Family Code.
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement
or the Court of Appeals. While it is the prosecuting attorney or iscal their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
Of ice of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters.
the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when this af inity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that threat to the well-being of the child. private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them,
Of ice of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and
the case merely concerns the visitation right of a parent over his the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50,
control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or iscal therein
children which the trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code,
to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
holding that he shall have “visitorial rights to his children during should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains,
Sin v. Sin
children without the written consent of the mother x x x." The the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in
We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial the latter case until the contract is annulled),are irrelevant to the
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson iled with the trial parent to his or her child or children. liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
court a manifestation, stating that he found no collusion between the spouses. The irst paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
parties, he did not actively participate therein. Other than entering his applying paragraphs (2),(3),(4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by
appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more was heard its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage
6. Effects of Annulment of Marriage
marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity
the iscal to contribute to the proceedings. ARTICLE 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
(4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. In now requiring
Thus, the case was remanded to the RTC for proper trial.
the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by inal
annulled by inal judgment under Articles 40 and 45. judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law
aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the
The inal judgment in such cases shall provide for the
5. Custody and support of children during pendency of the second marriage.
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
case spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the
Visitorial rights of parent
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
ARTICLE 49. During the pendency of the action and in the All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between community or the conjugal partnership shall be noti ied of the vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also
the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the proceedings for liquidation. meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand,
spouses and the custody and support of their common between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment)
children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void
moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on
the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in provisions of Articles 102 and 129. co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148
Valdes v. RTC of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may



merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on
the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of Judge Reyes-Carpio inds support in the Court En Banc Resolution in The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
regime of the spouses. of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "partition may be
Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x
Macadangdang v. CA evidence on custody, support, and property relations after the trial x x." It is NOT necessary to liquidate the properties of the
court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
WE do not ind merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned judgment granting the petition. marriage .
decision had not become inal and executory since the law explicitly
and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the The trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed Salas Jr. v. Aguila
conjugal part nership of gains of the absolute community of with the liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of
property as among the effects of the inal decree of legal common children, and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon Under Art 147 of the Family Code, property acquired during the
separation . entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the
provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the this act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the
inal decree. This legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar
Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of, the case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological
judgment decreeing legal separation -- for the purpose of determining The trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of
the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets. judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio by co-ownership. Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered
Ledesma v. Intestate Estate of Pedrosa sought to comply with in issuing the assailed orders. Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but
on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal
The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with partnership of gains.
equal reason, the doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a Dino v. Dino
marriage annulment which is the situation at bar. The respondent Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
presiding judge is directed to decide the partition (liquidation) case absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of this decision to partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article 7. Partition and Presumptive Legitime
determine which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should 147 of the Family Code.
be adjudicated to the husband and the wife. This is but a consequence ARTICLE 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
or incident of its decision rendered in the same case annulling the YES. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of
marriage. Petitioner's letters to the Court indicate that she is seventy not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family the inal judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
(70) years of age and the prolonged action for partition (liquidation) Code. property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
has taken a toll on her resources. Justice and equity demand the agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such
disposition of her case with dispatch. Any properties that may be It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the matters.
adjudicated to the deceased husband Pedrosa can then be distributed Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property
in accordance with his last will and testament in the special annulled by inal judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
proceedings involving his estate. Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which
are
declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of
the liquidation of the properties of the parties. the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the parents; but the value of the properties already received under
presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody, support, and In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered
property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial under Article 36 and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs as advances on their legitime.
court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
custody, support, and property relations. respondent are the rules on co-ownership .



(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the

8. Requirement of registration of the decree of annulment petitioner to change religious or political af iliation ;
others.
or nullity of marriage A
decree of legal separation, on the ground of concu binage, may
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
Effects of non-compliance petitioner, a common child, or a child of the be issued upon proof by preponderance of evi dence in the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution , or connivance action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
ARTICLE 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity in such corruption or inducement; conviction is necessary .
of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive Defenses
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and imprisonment of more than six years , even if
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third pardoned; ARTICLE 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied
persons. (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the on any of the following grounds:
ARTICLE 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again respondent;
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense
after compliance with the requirements of the immediately (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality o
f the respondent; or act complained of;
preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the
null and void. (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
commission of the offense or act complained of;
bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the
9. Status of children of dissolved marriages abroad;
commission of the offense or act constituting the
ARTICLE 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of (8) Sexual in idelity or perversion; ground for legal separation;
annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the
has become inal and executory shall be considered legitimate. separation;
petitioner; or
Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain
Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without decree of legal separation; or
justi iable cause for more than one year . (6) Where the action is barred by prescription .
10. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a ARTICLE 57. An action for legal separation shall be iled within
Annulment Of Voidable Marriages child by nature or by adoption. 5 years f rom the time of the occurrence of the cause.
See A
.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Gandionco v. Penaranda, et al. 1. Condonation
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
Almacen v. Baltazar
Module 7. Legal Separation incidents consequent thereto, such as, the application for support
pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for One of the causes for legal separation is "adultery on the part of the
A.M. No. 02-11-11, Rule on Legal Separation, March 15, 2003 concubinage iled against him by the private respondent. WRONG . wife and concubinage on the part of the husband."
A.M. No. 02-11-12, Rule on Provisional Orders
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Accordingly, if the plaintiff was the only one who committed adultery
Grounds Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, which is a good cause for disinheritance and legal separation,
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for defendant's theory would seem to be correct; but, in the present case,
ARTICLE 55. A petition for legal separation may be iled on any concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil we agree with the lower court's ruling that defendant is still bound to
of the following grounds: liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal support his wife, irstly, because plaintiff and defendant were both
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil guilty of in idelity and before the iling of the action they had a
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the reconciliation or, at least, defendant had pardoned plaintiff's
conduct directed against the petitioner, a common legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal unfaithfulness.
child, or a child of the petitioner; partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and
disquali ication from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among There has been a condonation by the defendant of the acts committed
by the wife because of the latter's testimony and documentary



evidence submitted, which show that the defendant had given money 2. Consent
to the plaintiff on several occasions through third persons and, in our In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred
opinion, such evidence is really suf icient to show condonation or People v. Sensano from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and
reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant, for had there been no thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove
We have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his
condonation of plaintiff's in idelity and no reconciliation between it. And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no
conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous
her and defendant, the latter would not certainly have given any defense, is not by itself collusion.
relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not
amount of money for her support. authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding. We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and
Defendant argues, however, that he and plaintiff never resumed their take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted
conjugal relationship and, therefore, there has been no legal 3. Connivance condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It
condonation of the acts of the erring wife; but it cannot be disputed 4. Recrimination or Mutual Guilt will be remembered that she "left" him after having" sinned with
that the act of giving money to an erring wife and the fact proven in Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men.
the case that no action was taken against her before the courts of Arroyo Jr. v. CA Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home.
justice are suf icient to establish forgiveness amounting to Hers was the obligation to return.
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in
condonation, for "condonation is the forgiveness of one of the
the sense that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while
married parties of an offense which he knows the other has
pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for either consent
committed against the other." At any rate, pardon or condonation 6. Prescription
or pardon to bene it the accused, it must be given prior to the iling of
does not require sexual intercourse and it may be
express
or
a criminal complaint.
implied . Brown v. Yambao
Bugayong v. Ginez The court a quo found, and correctly held, that the appellant's action
5. Collusion was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal
Condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has Ocampo v. Florenciano adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. An
committed". action for legal separation can not be iled except within one (1)
Collusion i n divorce, or legal separation means the agreement. year from
and after
the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause
Does the husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights and
within ive years from and
after
the
date
when
such cause
"* * * between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to
despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a occurred . Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of
appear to commit, or to be (represented in court as having
condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts? such indings and conclusion.
committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a
A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense.
after discovery of the offense is ordinarily suf icient to constitute divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions
condonation, especially as against the husband. acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce." seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage,
involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to
decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
constitute condonation? make it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed
record.
although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for
ordinarily is suf icient to constitute condonation, and where the denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by
parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on Here, the offense of adultery had really taken place, according to the petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes unnecessary to
terms of matrimonial cohabitation. evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten
acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part.
moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not
have practiced deception at such a personal risk.


Procedure Petitioner cites the Family Code which provides that in actions for Pacete v. Carriaga
annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting of icer
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
1. No hearing within 6 months from iling should intervene for the state because the law "looks with disfavor
mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be
upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by
ARTICLE 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be default." He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the iling of the
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the iling of petition ," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off"
hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting of icer
the petition. period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his
parties to reconcile.
2. No decree can be issued without efforts towards conciliation non-appearance.
ARTICLE 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the The special proscriptions on actions that can put the integrity of
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is
marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's
Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for
interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave
and is fully satis ied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties
highly improbable. separation, the prosecuting attorney or iscal is ordered to
to alone dictate.
appear on behalf of
the
state for the purpose of preventing any
3. No decree based on stipulation of facts or confession of
collusion between the parties and to take care that their It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, speci ically pray for legal
judgment
evidence is
not
fabricated or
suppressed . If the defendant spouse separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental,
ARTICLE 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements
determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting aforequoted.
4. Court should order Fiscal to take steps to prevent
attorney or iscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
collusion
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his De Ocampo v. Florenciano, s upra
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
iscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between Effects
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of
or suppressed. Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not 1. After iling, the spouses may live separately.
declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner
Macias v. Ochotorena iled his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action
ARTICLE 61. After the iling of the petition for legal separation,
alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Paculanag had iled a
Certi ication dated May 04, 2001 with the respondent judge’s court, proceedings below by iling several pleadings and cross-examining The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the
stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to
General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff’s evidence, even of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership
cross-examining the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. not by collusion. property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have
Zalsos, and that he had no objection to the granting of the petition for the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the
The role of the prosecuting attorney or iscal in annulment of Rules of Court.
declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certi ication does not suf ice
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
to comply with the mandatory requirement that the court should 2. During pendency of the action, the court may provide order of
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence
order the investigating public prosecutor whether a collusion exists support and custody of children in accordance with Art. 49 F.C.
is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to
between the parties. Such directive must be made by
the
court
the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion ARTICLE 62. During the pendency of the action for legal
before trial could proceed, not after the trial
on
the
merits
of
existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner
the case had already been had. Notably, said Certi ication was separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to
that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
iled after the respondent judge had ordered the termination of the the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
case. common children.
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the 3. Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership is dissolved and
Tuason v. CA, s upra
validity of the proceedings in the trial court. the guilty Spouse is not entitled to a share in the pro it



4. Offending spouse disquali ied to inherit from innocent spouse Reconciliation

ARTICLE 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the There should be joint manifestation under oath of reconciliation Module 8. Rights and Obligations of Husband
following effects: to be iled in court and Wife
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from
ARTICLE 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding (Art. 68-73)
each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be
joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be
severed; Basic Obligations
iled with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation.
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership Consequences of reconciliation ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending
ARTICLE 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles observe mutual love, respect and idelity, and render mutual
spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
shall have the following consequences: help and support.
pro its earned by the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall Arroyo v. Vazquez de Arroyo
accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain
(2) The inal decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to
the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of Civil Code. The
the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of
the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not
Article 213 of this Code; and
spouses agree to revive their former property regime. conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon
(4) The offending spouse shall be disquali ied from The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it has been
inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate proper civil registries. determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this
offending spouse made in the will of the innocent Agreement to revive former property regime must also be under jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. oath maintenance (Goitia vs.
Campos
Rueda , 35 Phil., 252); and he may
be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily
5. Innocent spouse may revoke donation in favor of guilty spouse ARTICLE 67. The agreement to revive the former property
incurred in enforcing such obligation. (Mercado vs. Ostrand and
regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed
ARTICLE 64. After the inality of the decree of legal separation, Ruiz , 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as
under oath and shall specify:
the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or well as of society at large require that the courts should move with
by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance
designation of the latter as bene iciary in any insurance policy, regime; of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto
even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each separation of the spouses—a state which is abnormal and fraught
revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries spouse; and with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it
of property in the places where the properties are located. (3) The names of all their known creditors, their follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance
Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith addresses and the amounts owing to each. in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation
before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall
registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or fault of the husband.
be iled with the court in the same proceeding for legal
change in the designation of the insurance bene iciary shall separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors The plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right
take effect upon written noti ication thereof to the insured. named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home
brought within ive years from the time the decree of legal shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. and cohabit
with
him . The only question which here arises is as to
separation become inal. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall the character and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded
not prejudice any creditor not listed or not noti ied, unless the to him by judicial decree.
debtor-spouse has suf icient separate properties to satisfy the
creditor's claim. The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of



conjugal rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part of the Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not In case of disagreement , the court shall decide whether or
complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated not:
requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
(1) The objection is proper, and
him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality. Of course Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
(2) Bene it has accrued to the family prior to the objection or
if such a decree were entered, in unquali ied terms, the defendant
thereafter. If the bene it accrued prior to the objection, the
would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should refuse Fixing of the Domicile
resulting obligation shall be enforced against the
to obey it; and, so far as the present Writer is aware, the question is
raised for the irst time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent
ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall ix the family community property. If the bene it accrued thereafter, such
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. obligation shall be enforced against the separate property
for the court to make such an order.
of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is
not the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of
within the province of the courts
of
this
country to
attempt to compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such creditors who acted in good faith. (as amended by RA 10572 )
compel one of
the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with
rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the solidarity of the family.
the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be Module 9. Property Relations Between
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an Joint responsibility for the Support of the family
Husband and Wife
order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best
support of the family. The expenses for such support and
ARTICLE 74. The property relationship between husband and
such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel wife shall be governed in the following order :
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community
the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of those
property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or (1) By marriage settlements executed before the
countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
fruits of their separate properties. In case of insuf iciency or marriage;
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice
absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be (2) By the provisions of this Code; and
is extremely questionable.
satis ied from the separate properties. (3) By the local custom.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case Joint management of the household Marriage Settlement
is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of
the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part ARTICLE 71. The management of the household shall be the
De inition
of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such
declaration that his wife has absented herself without suf icient management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of By an ante-nuptial settlement or agreement, the parties may de ine their
cause and that it is her duty to return. Article 70. property rights in property existing or after acquired, and they may vary
substantially property rights that would otherwise arise on their
Application for relief from the court if one party commits acts
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, s upra marriage by operation of law, superseding, in a sense, statutes on that
which will bring danger or dishonor to the family
subject.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To ARTICLE 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties
procreate children based on the universal principle that Types of regime that may be included and how modi ied
to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring
procreation of
children
through
sexual
cooperation is the basic danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the ARTICLE 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage
end of marriage ." Constant non-ful illment of this obligation will aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community ,
inally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case conjugal partnership of gains , complete separation of
at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to Objection on the exercise of profession
property , or any
other
regime . In the absence of a marriage
ful ill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
ARTICLE 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system
incapacity.
profession, occupation, business or activity without the of absolute community of property as established in
consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, this Code shall govern.
People v. Jumawan on Marital Rape
serious, and moral grounds.
Requisites for its validity
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies.



situated in a foreign country whose laws require

ARTICLE 76. In order that any modi ication in the marriage different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
Grounds for revocation of donation
settlements may be valid, it must be made before the
Effects if marriage did not materialize
ARTICLE 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of
by the donor in the following cases:
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
ARTICLE 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void
ARTICLE 77. The marriage settlements and any modi ication contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration
ab initio except donations made in the marriage
thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed of a future marriage, including donations between the
settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the
third persons unless they are registered in the local civil marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not
parents or guardian, as required by law;
registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid.
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad
the proper registries of properties.
Donation Propter Nuptias faith;
1. In writing ; (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
2. Executed before t he celebration of marriage; and (1) Must be made before the celebration of marriage; (5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is
3. Registered i n the LCR and Registry of Properties. (2) Must be in consideration of marriage; complied with;
(3) In favor of either or both of the future spouses. (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as
Persons other than parties who must sign the marriage speci ied by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations
settlement De inition
in general.
ARTICLE 78. A minor who according to law may contract ARTICLE 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which Donation between spouses during marriage. Rule and Exception
marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same,
they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. ARTICLE 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage,
to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
ARTICLE 83. These donations are governed by the rules on shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may
agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.
ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of the give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
ARTICLE 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement Civil Code, insofar as they are not modi ied by the following
executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil articles. Donation between people living together without marriage
interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any Limitations on Donation Propter Nuptias The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian husband and wife without a valid marriage.
appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. ARTICLE 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other
than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate Matabuena v. Cervantes
Laws that governs marriage settlement (Nationality Theory)
to each other in their marriage settlements more than one- ifth A question of irst
impression is before this Court in this litigation.
ARTICLE 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void. We are called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation
marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall Donations of future property shall be governed by the between the spouses during a marriage applies to a
be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of common-law relationship .
celebration of the marriage and their residence. wills.
YES. If the policy of the law is "to prohibit donations in favor of the
This rule shall not apply: Donation of property subject to encumbrance other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
(1) Where both spouses are aliens; improper pressure and in luence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
ARTICLE 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts rooted in our ancient law; then there is every reason to apply the
subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure
affecting property not situated in the Philippines and same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and
of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the
executed in the country where the property is located; wife without bene it of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be
and assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
liable for the de iciency. If the property is sold for more than
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts in luence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law
the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled
entered into in the Philippines but affecting property seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
to the excess.



Agapay v. Palang through their actual joint contribution of money, property or the correctness of this inding, but contends that the gift was void,
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their citing Article 1334 of the Civil Code which provides that "All gifts
This involves the ownership of two parcels of land acquired during
respective contributions. between spouses during the marriage shall be void. Moderate gifts
the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent’s legitimate
which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of the family
spouse.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she are not included in this rule."
1. Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol were married on July 16, is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store
but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy In our opinion the position taken by appellants is untenable. They
1949 in Pangasinan.
the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of are not in a position to challenge the validity of the transfer , if it
2. Miguel left to work in Hawaii in October 1949.
conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around 20 years of may be called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the parties
3. Herminia, their only child, was born on May 12, 1950.
age. Even assuming that the subject property was bought before to the transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interests
4. In July 1973, the then 63-year-old Miguel contracted his second
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and inchoate, present, remote,or otherwise, in the property in question at
marriage with 19-year-old Erlinda Agapay.
proof of actual contribution would still be essential . the time the transfer occurred. Although certain transfers from
5. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the
husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article
Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land . A
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by
house and
lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased
purchase price of the riceland, we ind no basis to justify her persons who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer or
in September 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee.
co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland to the property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights or
6. In October 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of
should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the interests. Unless such a relationship appears the transfer
Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a
deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. cannot be attacked.
case iled by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same Even assuming that defendant might have invoked Article 1334 as a
child, Herminia Palang. for P20,000.00 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the defense, the burden would be upon it to show that the gift in question
7. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property does not fall within the exception therein established. We cannot say,
Palang, born in December 1977. reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Sagun testi ied that Miguel as a matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his
8. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that wife is not a moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend
Carlina’s complaint. Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee. upon the circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is
9. Two years later, in February 1981, Miguel died. disclosed by the record.
10. Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda,
and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express Absolute Community of Property Regime
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. provision of law because it was made between persons guilty
of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation , under When it will commence
The irst and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family
property subject of this action. Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations ARTICLE 88. The absolute community of property between
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, marriage is celebrated . Any stipulation, express or
Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better implied, for the commencement of the community regime at
148 of
the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when than those in legal union. any other time shall be void.
a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the bene it Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Co No waiver of rights in the ACP during marriage. Rule & exception
of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda ARTICLE 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the
automobile at the time of the issuance of the policy, and, therefore, absolute community of property during the marriage can be
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
had no insurable interest in it. The court below found that the made except in case of judicial separation of property.
subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.
automobile was given to plaintiff by her husband shortly before the When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties issuance of the policy here in question. Appellant does not dispute property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled,
the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be



recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse shall be solidarily
liable
for
the
unpaid balance with their
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the separate properties .
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support
waiver to the extent of the amount suf icient to cover the
amount of their credits.
of illegitimate children shall be governed by the ARTICLE 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in
provisions of this Code on Support; any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
ARTICLE 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
absolute community of property between the spouses in all marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community
matters not provided for in this Chapter. bene it of the community, or by both spouses, or by one but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
spouse with the consent of the other; community property.
What comprise the Community Property
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse Ayala Investment v. CA
ARTICLE 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of without the consent of the other to the extent that the What debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are
all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the family may have been bene ited ; considered “for the bene it of the conjugal partnership ” which
celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses , including major are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement
or minor repairs, upon the community property; or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor
What are excluded from the Community Property of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?
ARTICLE 92. The following shall be excluded from the (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made
during marriage upon the separate property of either The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage relation, for
community property:
spouse used by the family; and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title contributes toward the support of his family, are not his personal and
by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or
private debts, and the products or income from the wife’s own
thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, complete a professional or vocational course, or other
property, which, like those of her husband’s, are liable for the
testator or grantor that they shall form part of the activity for self-improvement ;
payment of the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the
community property; (7) Antenuptial
debts of either spouse insofar as they have payment of such debts.
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. redounded to the bene it of the family;
However, jewelry shall form part of the community The husband, as the manager of the partnership (Article 1412, Civil
property; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both Code), has a right to embark the partnership in an ordinary
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for commercial enterprise for gain, and the fact that the wife may not
who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a approve of a venture does not make it a private and personal one of
the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. professional or vocational course or other activity for the husband.
self-improvement ;
Property acquired during marriage using exclusive money of one Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the
spouse. (9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling
industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the
under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of
ARTICLE 93. Property acquired during the marriage is family, cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. If he
illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities
incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or
presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved that incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a
profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal
it is one of those excluded therefrom. quasi-delict, in
case
of absence or
insuf iciency
of
the
partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses,
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse , the payment
Property acquired by gratuitous title before the marriage. Are unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
of which shall be considered as advances to be
they exclusive or part of ACP?
deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the assets
Charges and Obligations of the ACP liquidation of the community; and of the conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the and expenses of the spouses, but not to the payment of the personal
ARTICLE 94. The absolute community of property shall be
suit is found to be groundless. obligations (guaranty agreements) of the husband, unless it be
liable for:
proved that such obligations were productive of some bene it to the
If the community property is insuf icient to cover the foregoing family.
liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses



Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment & Disposition of ACP

When there is no showing that the execution of an indemnity The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent
agreement by the husband redounded to the bene it of his family, the Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on Husband and wife are joint administrator
undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an obligation personal to him. behalf of PBM. Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that
There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which Alfredo Ching’s acting as surety redounded to the bene it of the
ARTICLE 96. The administration and enjoyment of the
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership. The bene its must be one directly resulting community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to from the
loan. It
cannot
merely
be
a by-product or
a spin-off of case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail,
the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the loan itself . subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and which must be availed of within ive years from the date of the
well-being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied Marmont Resort Hotel v. Guiang contract implementing such decision.
the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the When the spouse can be the sole administrator?
The Guiang spouses moved to dismiss the Complaint of the Hotel.
inancial stability of the conjugal partnership.
The spouses assailed the validity of the second Memorandum of In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can Agreement, alleging that the subject matter thereof involved conjugal unable to participate in the administration of the common
derive the following conclusions: property alienated by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
her husband, Federico Guiang. Further, it was alleged that the land administration. These powers do not include disposition or
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the upon which the hotel's water supply facility was installed -- and encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to which the Guiang spouses occupied -- formed part of the public consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
be used in or for his own business or his own profession, domain and was then still the subject of a Miscellaneous Sales consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
that contract falls within the term “x x x x obligations for the Application submitted by Federico Guiang. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
bene it of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual bene it offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
may be proved. It is enough that the bene it to the family is The second Memorandum of Agreement, although ostensibly and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was also by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family signed by
her husband Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto. offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
stands to bene it from the loan facility or services to be This circumstance indicates not only that Federico was present
during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in fact, Neither spouse can dispose or donate a community property
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is
given his consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora. without the consent of the other spouse.
immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband Otherwise, he should not have appended his signature to the ARTICLE 98. Neither spouse may donate any community
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, document as witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the
property without the consent of the other. However, either
the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation second Memorandum of Agreement as their effective consent thereto
spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate
will redound to the bene it of the conjugal partnership . is suf iciently manifested in the document itself.
donations from the community property for charity or on
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
That the land in dispute was, at the time of execution of the second
another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a
Memorandum of Agreement, public land, is of no consequence here. The sale of a common property by one spouse only is VOID
surety or guarantor , that contract cannot, by itself, alone
Pending approval of Federico's Miscellaneous Sales Application over
be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations PNB v. CA
said land, respondent spouses enjoyed possessory and other rights
for the bene it of the conjugal partnership.” The contract of
over the same which could validly be assigned or transferred in favor Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by
loan or services is clearly for the bene it of the principal
of third persons. In this case, respondent spouses chose to transfer the spouses during coverture apply to property covered by a Torrens
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption
such rights (over the portion upon which the water pump was certi icate of title in the name of the widow?
can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
installed) to Maris Trading.
surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the bene it of
When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were
the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to
registered in the name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the
establish bene it redounding to the conjugal
torrens certi icates of title covering said properties the mortgage loan
partnership .
applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgages


were duly constituted and registered in the of ice of the Register of be conjugal in the instant veri ied petition. The daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
Deeds. Veri ication/Certi ication on Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was signed only by the In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under
In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB husband. the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the
had the right to rely on what appears in the certi icates of title and no Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is
more. On its face the properties are owned by Donata Montemayor, a The property subject of the original action for recovery is conjugal.
widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of Whether it is conjugal under the New Civil Code or the Family Code, a 1. absent, or
said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are fact that cannot be determined from the records before us, it is 2. separated in fact or
no liens and encumbrances covering the same. believed that the certi icate on non-forum shopping iled in the Court 3. has abandoned the other or
of Appeals constitutes suf icient compliance with the rules on 4. consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
The presumption of conjugality applies to property acquired during forum-shopping.
the lifetime of the husband
and
wife . In this case, it appears on Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Under the New Civil
Code, the husband
is administrator
the of incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial
Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the property is the conjugal partnership . In fact, he is the sole administrator, court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in
registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in this
when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and
endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit
that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper
or action without being joined by the wife.
presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one remedy is
a judicial guardianship
proceedings under Rule 93 of
spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Under the Family Code , the administration of the conjugal property the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
belongs to the husband and the wife jointly . However, unlike an act
Docena v. Lapesura Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such
of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure
Anent the ground that the certi ication of non-forum shopping was required, joint management or administration does not require that
for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under
signed by only one of the petitioners, it is the contention of the the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
petitioners that the same is suf icient compliance. The petitioners exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention
proceedings under the Family Code.
argue that since they are spouses with joint or indivisible interest of the court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the
over the alleged conjugal property subject of the original action Family Code. It is believed that even under the provisions of the
Villaranda v. Villaranda
which gave rise to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, the Family Code, the husband alone could have iled the petition for
signing of the certi icate of non-forum shopping by only one of them certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued Without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance
would suf ice, especially considering the long distance they had to against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being of conjugal property prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code is not
travel just to sign the said certi icate. Moreover, there is substantial joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certi icate of void, but merely voidable .
compliance with the Rules of Court where the certi ication was non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. If
anybody may repudiate the certi ication or undertaking for Petitioner contends that the Deed of Exchange is null and void
signed by the husband who is the statutory administrator of the
having been incorrectly made, it is the wife who may because the signature of Honorio’s wife, Ana, does not appear on the
conjugal property.
conceivably do so. instrument.
It has been our previous ruling that the certi icate of non-forum
Indeed, petitioner’s contention is untenable. The Deed was entered
shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a Uy v. CA
into on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code took effect only on
case, and that the signing by only one of them is insuf icient. The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of August 3, 1998. Laws should be applied prospectively only, unless a
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, and could not manage legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared
In the case at bar, however, we hold that the subject Certi icate of
their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of or is necessarily implied from the language used. Hence, the
Non-Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio Docena alone
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124
of
the provisions of the Civil Code , not the Family Code, are applicable to
should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the
Family
Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, the present case. The Macasandig lot was part of Honorio and Ana’s
rules. There are only two petitioners in this case and they are
worth more than twelve million pesos, with the approval of the conjugal properties.
husband and wife. Their residence is the subject property alleged to
court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own


court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both
According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That husband and wife must concur.
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it
consent. This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written
Article 173 of the same Code. The latter states that an action to annul under challenge. consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively
an alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties,
the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law
Videlicet, the lack of consent on her part will not make the husband’s properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without for its validity. Signi icantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma
alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have
partnership void, but merely voidable. Hence, the Deed is valid until shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal
and unless annulled. partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes properties. However, being merely
aware
of
a transaction
is
not
Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least consent .
In this case, the records show no evidence that any action to annul be given his share of the rentals.
the transfer made by Honorio was ever brought by Ana within ten Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly
years from “the transaction questioned.” Her right to bring an In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the refuses to af ix her signatures to the contracts to sell, court
action
to
invalidate the contract has thus prescribed . Hence, the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's harassment of their authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable. tenant at Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and
her children of the income therefrom on which they depend for their The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she
Moreover, in Papa v.
Montenegro , the Court explained that the legal subsistence. She also testi ied the numerous other conjugal alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be
prohibition against the disposition of conjugal property by one properties, real and personal, in the sole custody of the husband. obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court
spouse without consent of the other has been established for the which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the
bene it, not of third persons, but only of the other spouse for whom These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court
the law desires to save the conjugal partnership from damages that that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private authorization under
Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where
might be caused. Not being the proper party, Vicente cannot avail respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the the spouse who does not give consent is i ncapacitated .
himself of the remedy prescribed by Article 173. conjugal assets.
Sabalones v. CA Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, et al.

Dissolution of Absolute Community
We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may
an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife’s written Grounds for dissolution
respondent court was justi ied in allowing the wife to continue with consent.
her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the ARTICLE 99. The absolute community terminates:
evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four
interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the parcels of land between petitioner and respondent spouses; that (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
appeal. petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as
to the price and the terms of payment, and a downpayment was paid (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over by petitioner to the latter; and that respondent Norma refused to sign
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
the conjugal properties as clearly provided in Article 124 of the the contracts to sell.
Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after a petition for legal (4) In case of judicial separation of property during
separation has been iled, the trial court shall, in the absence of a Article 124 of the Family Code requires that the disposition of a
the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate
spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the Effect of de-facto separation on the ACP
disposition is void.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has ARTICLE 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife
been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that:


(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses perfectly within her rights in transferring the property in question.
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the The defendants attempted to prove that the carabaos belonged Whenever it shall be shown that there is another coowner as the hem
right to be supported; exclusively to the widow as paraphernal property brought on her of the deceased husband, then there will be occasion to prosecute an
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of second marriage to her husband, Esteban Marigsa, whom she action for the annulment of the sale with respect to one-half of the
the other is required by law, judicial authorization married thirty years before, and that the husband brought nothing said property; in order that it may be inventoried as belonging to the
shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; to the conjugal partnership. testate or intestate succession of the predecessor in interest.
(3) In the absence of suf icient community property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily In the registration of animals belonging to husband and wife, the From the preceding premises it is concluded that suf icient grounds
liable for the support of the family. The spouse record thereof is often made out only in the name of the husband, on have not been shown in this suit to adjudge that the property in
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary account of his being the administrator of the conjugal partnership; question was the private property of the deceased spouse, as against
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer so that the registration herein concerned is not conclusive evidence the legal presumption that it was the community property of both
or encumber any speci ic separate property of the of the exclusive ownership of the husband. Other kind of proof is spouses; and, consequently, the irst part of the irst inding of the
other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to necessary to destroy the presumption. judgment appealed from, declaring it to be such, is improper and
satisfy the latter's share. should be reversed .
Although the property appears as registered in the name of the
Effect of abandonment or failure to comply with his/her husband, if it was acquired for a valuable consideration during the Noveras v. Noveras , supra
obligation to the family. marriage it has the inherent character of partnership property,
whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and
ARTICLE 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other spouses only. in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for The marriage of Marigsa with Macabuntoc having lasted for more all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their
judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole than thirty years, according to the testimony, and some of the properties in the Philippines, Leticia iled a petition for judicial
administrator of the absolute community, subject to such carabaos being the offspring of others which were purchased, as separation of conjugal properties.
precautionary conditions as the court may impose. stated by the defendant, during the marriage, such animals are not
paraphernal property of the widow, as she claims, for even such At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
offspring is considered as community property; nor were they the which severed the bond of marriage between the parties. Based on
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
private property of the deceased husband. the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or required certi icates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of The community property of
the marriage, at the
dissolution of California law on divorce were not presented.
returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a this bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to
period of three months or has failed within the same period to the legal partnership and becomes the property of a Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be community, by
operation of law, between the surviving spouse parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus
prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the and the
heirs
of
the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
conjugal dwelling. of the widower or the widow if he or she be the heir of the
deceased spouse. In the present suit, no proof was adduced to As a general rule , any modi ication in the marriage
Meaning of abandonment? settlements must be made before the celebration
of
marriage .
show what right the plaintiff has to call himself coowner with the
Liquidation of the Absolute Community defendant widow, the only action which could appertain to him in An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modi ication
order that he might interfere with the acts of a person who, in the is judicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in
Marigsa v. Macabuntoc exercise of her rights with respect to property of which she is a Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.
Narciso Marigsa, as the administrator of the intestate estate of coowner, or perhaps an absolute owner, disposed of such property by
transferring the same, without the need therefor of any Leticia anchored the iling of the instant petition for judicial
Esteban Marigsa, demands from Ildefonsa Macabuntoc, the widow separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the
of the said Esteban Marigsa, certain property for administration, on authorization whatever. Although it were upon no other basis than
that of coownership, which coownership is irrefutably shown to have Family Code, to wit:
the ground that it belonged exclusively to the deceased.
existed by the evidence in this case, the surviving widow acted
ARTICLE 135. Any of the following shall be considered



suf icient cause for judicial separation of property : abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back separate properties in accordance with the
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second , Leticia heard provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of
Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once them.
declared an absentee; con ined, testi ied that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more community shall constitute its net assets , which
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of
signi icantly, they had iled for divorce and it was granted by the shall be divided equally between husband and wife,
petitioner has been decreed by the court;
California court in June 2005. unless a different proportion or division was agreed
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for
latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided
at least one year, the
petition
for
judicial
separation
of
absolute
to the family as provided for in Article 101 ; in this Code. For purposes of computing the net
community of property should be granted .
pro its subject to forfeiture in accordance with
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2) , the said
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
in the marriage settlements has abused that power; pro its shall be the increase in value between the
property automatically dissolves the absolute community
and market value of the community property at the time
regime , as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family
Code, thus: of the celebration of the marriage and the market
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have value at the time of its dissolution.
been separated in fact for at least one year and
ARTICLE 99. The absolute community terminates: (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common
reconciliation is highly improbable.
children shall be delivered upon partition, in
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the (5) Upon the death of either spouse; accordance with Article 51 .
presentation of the inal judgment against the guilty or absent (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the
(6) When there is a decree of legal separation; partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of
judicial separation of property. and the lot on which it is situated shall be
(7) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no of the common children choose to remain .
(8) In case of judicial
separation
of property during
abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. have chosen the mother, unless the court has
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority,
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has the court shall decide, taking into consideration the
dissolution of the absolute community regime and the
returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, best interests of said children.
following procedure should apply:
as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not
ARTICLE 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community
acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial regime, the following procedure shall apply:
Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately
because the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be
all the properties of the absolute community and the
of the absolute community of properties. limited to the Philippine properties .
exclusive properties of each spouse.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute
David had indeed separated for more than a year and that community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
reconciliation is highly improbable . First , while actual insuf iciency of said assets, the spouses shall be
- Inventory of assets


- Payment of all liabilities

Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial court's irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
- Net remainder shall constitute as net assets which shall be
holding.
divided equally To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or
- How to compute the net pro its subject to forfeiture of the First , let us determine what governs the couple's property relation . equitable—to the present or future enjoyment of property.
guilty spouse From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the
- Delivery of presumptive legitime to children respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time In Alcantara, et al. v. Ermita , we also explained:
- Who will get the conjugal dwelling and lot of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code
- Liquidation in case of death and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property The concept of “vested right ” is a consequence of the
relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses a
Effect if no liquidation is made after the death of a spouse on the
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains . Under this present ixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
subsequent marriage of the surviving spouse
property relation, “the husband and the
wife
place in
a common protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal
ARTICLE 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, fund the fruits
of
their
separate
property and the
income from or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
the community property shall be liquidated in the same their work or industry .” The husband and wife also own in exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving perfect or ixed and irrefutable.
Second , since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
spouse shall liquidate the community property either
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code,
judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death From the foregoing, it is clear that while one
may not be deprived
the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far
of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due
as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or process and such deprivation is founded in law and
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article
encumbrance involving the community property of the jurisprudence .
63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because
terminated marriage shall be void.
according to Article 256 of the Family Code “[t]his Code shall have
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
process. First , he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.”
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the Second , when the Decision was promulgated, the petitioner never
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court
ARTICLE 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community trial
court
forfeited them
in favor of his children pursuant to Articles termed as “net pro its,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code ? Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due
person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out process.
simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of We respond in the negative.
each community shall be determined upon such proof as may More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr. , we reiterated our
be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of The petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written on long-standing ruling that:
doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , we de ine and explained “vested
right” in the following manner: Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest
the same shall be divided between the different communities
of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate , a mere
in proportion to the capital and duration of each.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable
Quiao v. Quiao not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
case since the parties' property relation is governed
“vested right” expresses the concept of present ixed interest remainder or “remanente liquido ” (haber ganancial ) resulting
by the system of relative community or conjugal
which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
partnership of gains.
against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of
right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
Of hand, the trial court's Decision held that Article 129(7) of the


liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the 2. Then the debts and obligations of the absolute community constitutes the “net pro its .”
marriage, when it is inally determined that, after settlement of are paid out of the absolute community's assets and if the (d) Since both husband and wife have no separate
conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be community's properties are insuf icient, the separate properties , and nothing would be returned to each of them,
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for what will be divided equally between them is simply the
the unpaid balance. “net pro its.” However, in the Decision, the trial court
The net pro its of
the
conjugal
partnership of
gains
are
all
the 3. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered forfeited the half-share of the petitioner in favor of his
fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the to each of them. children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the instant case
products of their labor and industry. 4. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the
assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the petitioner since both parties entered into their
As to the de inition of “net
pro its ,” we cannot but refer to Article wife; and for purposes of computing the net pro its subject marriage without bringing with them any property .
102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for to forfeiture, said pro its shall be the increase in value
purposes of computing the net pro its subject to forfeiture under between the market value of the community property at the Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value
this provision, net pro its “shall be the increase in value between the at the time of its dissolution. Concept of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the “net pro its” requires ARTICLE 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
dissolution.” Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies that we irst ind the market value of the properties at the time of the settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall
to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions
Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal the properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Where lies community and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes properties of the absolute community, from which we deduct the partnerships of gains already established between spouses
used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under market value of the properties at the time of marriage, which then before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the results to the net pro its. rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of other laws, as provided in Article 256.
the Family Code. Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant
case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102: ARTICLE 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of
On Absolute Community Regime gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the
(a) According to the trial court's inding of facts, both husband proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community , the and wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties and those acquired by either or both spouses
husband and the wife become joint owners of all the
properties
of properties in the list above are all part of the absolute through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the
the marriage . Whatever property each spouse brings into the community. And its market value at the time of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or bene its
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally
excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common “market value at dissolution .” between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage
mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or (b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent inally were settlements.
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the legally separated, all the properties which remained will be
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the liable for the debts and obligations of the community. Such Properties Excluded from the Conjugal Partnership
parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have debts and obligations will be subtracted from the “market What are the exclusive properties of each spouse?
originally owned. value at dissolution .”
(c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid ARTICLE 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes each spouse:
the net remainder or net asset. And from such net
1. An inventory is prepared, listing separately all the (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her
asset/remainder of the petitioner and respondent's
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive own;
remaining properties, the market value at the time of
properties of each; (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by
marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality
gratuitous title;



(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by

barter or by exchange with property belonging to only
ARTICLE 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate
In ine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without
one of the spouses; and petitioner cannot be nulli ied on the grounds advanced by Benjamin.
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to
Thus, we uphold its validity. litigate with regard to the same.
wife or of the husband.
Presumption of conjugality Paci ic Ace Finance v. Yanagisawa ARTICLE 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a
spouse administered by the other automatically terminates the
ARTICLE 116. All property acquired during the marriage, An undertaking not to dispose of a property pending litigation, made
administration over such property and the proceeds of the
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted in
open court and embodied in
a court order, and duly annotated on
alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.
or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed the title of the said property, creates a right in
favor of
the
person
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. relying thereon. The latter
may seek
the annulment of
actions that Rule in case of donation pro-indiviso in favor of both spouses
are done in violation of such undertaking. during the marriage
Real property acquired by a Filipina wife of a foreigner is
exclusive A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of ARTICLE 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses,
the Parañ aque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall
Matthews v. Taylor pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive
his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to
In ine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement rely on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property, and in the absence of designation, share and share
of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the property (as con irmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.
consent of her British husband. RTC), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791. Rule in case of onerous donation
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity to own real ARTICLE 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the
Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the property as their defense to the suit. They maintained that Eiji, as an charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the donee
vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under alien incapacitated to own real estate in the Philippines, need not spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal
her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this argument is partnership of gains.
sought the nulli ication of the contract on two grounds: irst, that he beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by
Rule on retirement bene its, pensions etc. acquired during the
was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds Eiji. This defense does not negate Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2,
marriage
used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal
into a valid contract involving the subject property without his with the registered property, to the annotations entered on the title. ARTICLE 115. Retirement bene its, pensions, annuities,
consent. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based on this gratuities, usufructs and similar bene its shall be governed by
defense. the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be
The rule is clear and in lexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to proper in each case.
acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions. We ind and so hold that What are the conjugal partnership properties?
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Ownership, Enjoyment, and Administration of Exclusive
Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely Property ARTICLE 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in Rule on transfer of administration of exclusive property of one
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be
the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership spouse of the other spouse
for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's claim that he ARTICLE 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, (2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or
provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such profession of either or both of the spouses;
administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties.
contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in (3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received
his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the during the marriage from the common property, as well as
declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;
conjugal/community property of the spouses. means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the
registry of property of the place the property is located.



(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the
after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner
the law awards to the inder or owner of the property entire property of one of the
spouses
shall
belong
to
the
constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and,
where the treasure is found; conjugal partnership , subject to reimbursement of the
for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature.
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as ishing or value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
hunting; Viewed in light of the paraphernal nature
of the property , the CA improvement; otherwise , said property shall be retained in
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying Antonia's 4 ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
in excess of the number of each kind brought to the November 1997 sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
marriage by either spouse; and liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. That
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be
Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive property may, in fact,
from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the
be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof as security for the
be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
payment of the P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.
Dela Peña v. Avila Muñoz, Jr. v. Ramirez, et al.
Rule on property bought on installment by one spouse before the
Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all One of the issues in the present case boil down to whether the
marriage
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal subject property is paraphernal or conjugal .
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the ARTICLE 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from
husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from As a general rule , all property acquired during the marriage ,
property was acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either conjugal u nless t he contrary is proved.
case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the
160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peñ as did not even come close to upon liquidation of the partnership. residential lot from her father has suf iciently rebutted this
proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage presumption of conjugal ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92 and
between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia's bare and Rule on amount received by one spouse during the marriage as 109 of
the
Family
Code , properties acquired by gratuitous title by
uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she payment of credit either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from ARTICLE 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse .
which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be period of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda's exclusive paraphernal
ascertained . Considering that the presumption of conjugality may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by property .
does not operate if there is no showing of when the property installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of
alleged to be
conjugal was acquired , we ind that the CA cannot be We cannot subscribe to the CA's misplaced reliance on Article 158 of
the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage
faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia's exclusive the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas .
on the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
property.
Rule on ownership of improvements made by the conjugal As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil
Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the partnership on the exclusive property of one spouse Code, its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to
Dela Peñ as insist that the registration thereof in the name of "Antonia 189) should have governed their property relations. However, with
R. Dela Peñ a, of legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Peñ a" ARTICLE 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code
should have already suf iciently established its conjugal nature. utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158,
Confronted with the same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or have been s
uperseded by those found in the Family Code
Appeals , this Court ruled, however, that the phrase "married to" is efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states:
merely descriptive of
the
civil
status
of
the
wife and cannot
be partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the
interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered following rules: ARTICLE 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
owner . Because it is likewise possible that the property was settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains
acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal shall govern their property relations during marriage, the
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than



provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary of a sum of money may be nulli ied on the ground that the real on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the
application. properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during
exclusive properties of a husband who did not participate in his coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed . the purchase.
partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code , without Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, where that indebtedness may not be paid for with them, her obligation not
with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. business transaction eventually resulted in the iling of Civil Case No. having been shown
by the
petitioners
to
be
one
of
the
charges
2224, Romarico acted, or, as charged by petitioners, failed to act, in against the conjugal partnership . In addition to the fact that her
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the belief that he was not involved in the personal dealings of his rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation
the provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with estranged wife. That belief was buttressed by the fact that the of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her
respect to rights then already vested. complaint itself did not mention or implicate him other than as the authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the
husband of Katrina. complaint and proven at the trial.
Article 120 of the Family Code , which supersedes Article 158 of the
Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the Hence, laches may not be charged against Romarico because, aside Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred,
improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, from the fact that he had no knowledge of the transactions of his the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's
at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of estranged wife, he was also not afforded an opportunity to defend personal obligation to them. Execution purchasers Santos and
either or both spouses. himself in Civil Case No. 2224. There is no laches or even inality of Joson
possess no
rights
which
may rise above judgment debtor
decision to speak of with respect to Romarico since the decision in Katrina's inchoate proprietary rights over the
properties
sold
Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any Civil Case No. 2224 is null and void for having been rendered without at public auction. After all, a person can sell only what he owns or is
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements prescribed authorized to sell and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no
the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the by law. more than what the seller can legally transfer. But, inasmuch as the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to decision in Civil Case No. 2224 is void only as far as Romarico and
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against the conjugal properties are concerned, the same may still be executed
the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be Romarico as he has not yet had his day in court and, necessarily, the by the Spouses Wong against Katrina Henson personally and
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to public auction sale is null and void. Moreover, the power of the court exclusively. The Spouses Wong must return to Juanito Santos and
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. in the execution of judgments extends only over properties Leonardo Joson the purchase prices of P145,000 and P119,000
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. respectively, received by said spouses from the public auction sale.
In the present case, we ind that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS
loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to April On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the The redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure proceeding against
30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire amount of the Court disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are Romarico and Katrina Henson iled by the Rural Bank of Porac
GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the exclusively owned by Romarico. Having been acquired during the should, however, be respected unless Romarico exercises his right of
P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal redemption over the property covered by Transfer Certi icate of Title
Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is partnership even though Romarico and Katrina had been living No. 30951 in accordance with law.
fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is separately.
considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo Jocson v. CA
through monthly salary deductions. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties
subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing It is the position of petitioner that since the properties sold to
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the Agustina Jocson-Vasquez were registered in the name of "Emilio
property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; properties are exclusively owned by Romarico . While there is Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the certi icates of title he
the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had presented as evidence were enough proof to show that the properties
borrowed from an of icemate, it is unclear where he obtained the covered therein were acquired during the marriage of their parents,
Wong v. IAC money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the and, therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to
be
money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof conjugal properties.
Whether
or
not
the
execution of a decision in an action for collection



Martin Lacerna in said certi icate of title is merely descriptive of the redemption pertained to the wife. In the absence, however, of proof
Before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under civil status of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not that such right of redemption pertains to the wife — and there is no
Article 160 he must irst present proof that the disputed properties necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and proof that the contract of carriage with PANAM or the money paid
were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra petitioner herein. therefor belongs to Mrs. Zulueta — the property involved, or the
Poblete. The certi icates of title, however, upon which petitioner rights arising therefrom, must be presumed, therefore, to form part of
rests his claim is insuf icient. The fact that the properties were Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. the conjugal partnership.
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the For obvious reasons of public policy, Mrs. Zuluete is not allowed by
Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co.
spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before the
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any property by Appellant contends (1) that the funds separately awarded the wife,
title but merely con irms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela , gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from her Sonja Maria Lilius, partake of the nature of conjugal property, at least
supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives to the extent of the sum of P800 awarded to her as interest on the
Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only within the fourth degree. It is true that the law favors and encourages principal award of P10,000 made in her favor by the trial court, and
after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was the settlement of litigations by compromise agreement between the as such should respond for the support of the family, including
described in the certi icates of title as married to the latter. contending parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement with medical expenses and (2) that even assuming that the sums awarded
one of the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a separately to Sonja Maria Lilius are not conjugal property, but her
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certi icates of title show, on common cause, such as the defense of the rights of the conjugal own paraphernal property, still under the provisions of the Civil Code
their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is to payment may be required out of said funds, her husband being
registered owner. This is so because the words "married to " jeopardize 'The solidarity of the family" — which the law seeks to insolvent, under her liability for the medical expenses incurred by
preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are merely descriptive of the civil protect — by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding her husband, one of the obligations imposed by law upon the wife.
status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the that had arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus
rendering more dif icult a reconciliation between them. The second contention under this assignment of error can be
certi icates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the
disposed of by calling attention to the fact that there is no proof in
properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and
PANAM maintains that the damages involved in the case at bar are not this case that her husband is insolvent.
that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
among those forming part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to
Article 153 of the Civil Code. Considering that the damages in The appellants, the Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd., and the Bank of the
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented suf icient
question have arisen from, inter alia, a breach of plaintiffs' contract of Philippine Islands also contend that the sum separately awarded
proof to show that the disputed properties were acquired during his
carriage with the defendant, for which plaintiffs paid their fare with Sonja Maria Lilius is conjugal
property
and therefore liable for the
parents' coverture, We would have ruled that the properties, though
funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, We hold that payment of the private debts of her husband, Aleko E. Lilius,
registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties
said damages fall under paragraph (1) of said Article 153, the right contracted during her marriage.
in view of the presumption under Article. 160. There being no such
proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the thereto having been "acquired by onerous title during the marriage.”
It is contended that damages awarded for personal injury are not
presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties classi ied as separate property of each of the spouses in Article 1396
In the present case, the contract of carriage was concededly entered
are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson. of the Civil Code and they should therefore be presumed conjugal. In
into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were incurred, during
marriage. Hence, the rights accruing from said contract, including answer to this, Article 1401 of the same Code, in enumerating the
Magallon v. Montejo property belonging to the conjugal partnership, does not
those resulting from breach thereof by the defendant, are presumed to
From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta. The fact mention damages for personal injury .
relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certi icate of title to the that such breach of contract was coupled, also, with a quasi-delict
land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named therein, constitutes an aggravating circumstance and can not possibly have It appears that there are two distinct theories as to whether
Martin Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the certi icate of the effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of such property damages arising from
an
injury
suffered by
one
of
the
spouses
title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as rights. should be considered conjugal or separate property of the
resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. injured spouse .
Moreover, on the authority of Litam vs. Rivera and Stuart vs. Yatco , Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property
does not make the property redeemed conjugal if the right of The theory holding that such damages should form part of the
the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon" written after the name of
conjugal partnership
property is based wholly on the proposition



(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have

that by the injury, the earning capacity of the injured spouse is not know where he "wasted the money." Debts contracted by the
redounded to the bene it of the family;
diminished to the consequent prejudice of the conjugal partnership. husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses
Assuming the correctness of this theory, a reading of the decision of which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed
in favor of their common legitimate children for the
this court in G. R. No. 39587 will show that the sum of P10,000 was to be his exclusive and private debts.
exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a
awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius "by way of indemnity for patrimonial
professional or vocational course or other activity for If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
and moral damages." It should be added that the interest on that sum
self-improvement; and directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own
is part of the damages "patrimonial and moral" awarded to Sonja
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "x
Maria Lilius.
is found to be groundless. x x x obligations for the bene it of the conjugal partnership." Here, no
Furthermore it appears in the decision of the trial court in G. R. No. If the conjugal partnership is insuf icient to cover the actual bene it may be proved. It is enough that the bene it to the
39587 that Aleko E. Lilius claimed the sum of P10,000 as damages on foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature
account of the loss of the services of Sonja Maria Lilius as secretary the unpaid balance with their separate properties . of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to bene it from
and translator, her particular work as a member of the conjugal the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
partnership. The trial court disallowed this claim and neither of the Ros v. PNB profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business
plaintiffs in that case appealed to this court. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
The subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal husband contracts
obligations on
behalf of the family business,
In view of the foregoing it is held that the sum of P10,000 with partnership of gains. the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
interest thereon awarded to Sonja Maria Lilius as damages is redound to the bene it of the conjugal partnership .
paraphernal property . There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros
and Aguete's marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January For this reason, we rule that Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the
1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968. There is also bene it of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to
no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he the conjugal partnership.
Charges Upon and Obligations of the CPG
mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974. PNB Laoag does
not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. CA, s upra
ARTICLE 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable f or:
Ros' mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the other hand, Sps Buado v. CA and Nicol
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support af ixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents. Is the husband, who was
not
a party
to the
suit
but whose
conjugal
of illegitimate children shall be governed by the property is
being executed on
account of
the
other
spouse
being
the
provisions of this Code on Support; The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?"
without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the
husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil
by the designated administrator-spouse for the bene it of character of the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v.
Code allows Aguete to question Ros' encumbrance of the subject
the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by CA , which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. CA , this Court held
property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts
one of them with the consent of the other; that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a
will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without declared only upon a inding that the wife did not give her consent. In "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for
the consent of the other to the extent that the family may the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and an obligation that has redounded to the bene it of the conjugal
have bene ited; rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros' encumbrance of the subject partnership .
property.
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or On the other hand, in Naguit v. CA and Sy v. Discaya , the Court
minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; The application for loan shows that the loan would be used stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during exclusively "for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & writ of execution was issued and is therefore justi ied in bringing an
the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; virginia tobacco." In her testimony, Aguete con irmed that Ros independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it exclusive or paraphernal property .
complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did
self-improvement;



foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this case as the

Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the liability incurred by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an As held in Calma v.
Tañedo , after the death of either of the spouses,
obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the bene it of the unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai. no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against
conjugal partnership or not. Petitioners argue that the obligation of the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse.
the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the It should be noted that the judgment debt for which the subject Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the
conjugal partnership. We do not agree . property was being made to answer was incurred by Michele and her liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for
partner, Matrai. Respondents allege that the lease of the property in this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Lanka Drive redounded to the bene it of the family. By no stretch of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the
Article
122
of
the
Family
Code explicitly provides that payment of one's imagination can it be concluded that said debt/obligation was administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during incurred for the bene it of the conjugal partnership or that some settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except advantage accrued to the welfare of the family. even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of
insofar as they redounded to the bene it of the family. any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of
In this case, Michele, who was then already living separately from the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities Cleodualdo, rented the house in Lanka Drive for her and Matrai's own
incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is bene it. In fact, when they entered into the lease agreement, Michele In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or and Matrai purported themselves to be husband and wife. spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This
insuf iciency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same Respondents' bare allegation that petitioners lived with Michele on does not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of the leased property is not suf icient to support the conclusion that continues . And private respondent cannot be said to have no remedy.
gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has
no
duty
to
make the judgment debt against Michele and Matrai in the ejectment suit Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in
advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse . redounded to the bene it of the family of Michele and Cleodualdo and court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal
petitioners. creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death,
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that
the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Alipio v. CA administration be granted to some other person.
Erlinda redounded to the bene it of the conjugal partnership.
Whether a creditor can
sue
the
surviving spouse for the collection of It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and
personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some whether such claim must be iled in proceedings for the settlement of wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the
advantage or bene it is shown
to
have
accrued to the
conjugal the estate of the decedent . The trial court and the Court of Appeals partnership which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when
partnership. ruled in the af irmative. We reverse . the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into
by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
Francisco v. Gonzales We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money
Records show that Cleodualdo and Michele were married on June 12, debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between
chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. As them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary to be true, the
remedy is for him to ile a claim in the settlement of estate of the
such, their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed
decedent.
conjugal partnership of gains . later, is not solidary but rather merely joint.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses,
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping
signed the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of
things necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows his claim against the Alipios with those against the Manuels
stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of
money for that purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to
the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal
needed sum; when administration of the conjugal partnership is represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal
partnership . When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be
partnership was automatically dissolved and debts chargeable
wife gives moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish any of paid. Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains to the court
against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in
these circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not be bound having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and
accordance with Rule 73, §2.
to answer for the wife's personal obligation. Considering that the not to any other court.


Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., et.al. (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article
(e) the spouses jointly iled a petition for the voluntary have been covered.” No prior liquidation of those assets is
This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on
dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal required . This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that
conjugal properties where one of the spouses has
been
found
partnership of gains. “at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse
guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the
shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes
victims’ heirs. None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia. above-mentioned.”
To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by
criminal liability is chargeable against the properties of the marriage, Payment of Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse by the CPG. What is
Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the its difference from the ACP?
the Court has irst to identify the spouses’ property relations. fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or
industry in the common fund. This means that they continue under ARTICLE 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of
such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
conjugal partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to
properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage charged to the conjugal properties partnership except
the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any
settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into insofar as they redounded to the bene it of the family .
prenuptial agreement. Although the heirs of the deceased victims do
absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took
not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which Neither shall the ines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such
governed the marriage, they insist that it was the system of absolute upon them be charged to the partnership.
separate properties.
community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia.
However , the payment of personal debts contracted by either
What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil spouse before the marriage, that of ines and indemnities
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their
Code was still the operative law on marriages. The presumption, imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate
conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the
absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under children of either spouse, may be enforced against the
conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said
the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the
to have acquired vested rights in speci ic assets, it is evident that
Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
and
automatically convert into absolute community of property partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal
relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before insuf icient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Consequently, the Court partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been
1988 excepting o nly those with prenuptial agreements . must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage
for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. ARTICLE 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
settlements cannot be modi ied except prior to marriage.
game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s inding that Melecia has no gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
exclusive property of her own, Article 122 of the Family Code borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988
applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
cannot be modi ied except before the celebration of that marriage.
case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal conjugal partnership property.
Post-marriage modi ication of such settlements can take place assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of
the Family Code have been covered. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership
only where:
If the conjugal partnership is insuf icient to cover the foregoing ARTICLE 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
(a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
(b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and balance with their separate properties. jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
agreed to revive their former property regime; prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 allows payment of
the remedy, which must be availed of within ive
years from the
(c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground
criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the date of the contract implementing such decision.
that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails
partnership assets even before these are liquidated . Indeed, it
to comply with his obligations to the family;
states that such indemnities “may be enforced against the partnership



In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal Neither can the “amicable settlement ” be considered a continuing of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear,
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
administration. These powers do not include disposition last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.
or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written after the sale, petitioners iled a complaint for trespassing against Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void . “amicable settlement” and petitioners iled before the MTC a motion obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.
However , the transaction shall be construed as a continuing for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a Signi icantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article to be void i f done
124.
Sps Guiang v. CA (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, OR
The
sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the Sps Ravina v. Villa Abrille et al. (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one Petitioners assail the appellate court’s declaration that the sale to The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten
renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof them by Pedro of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not
carried
makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can void. However, in addressing this issue, it is imperative to determine: over to the Family Code . It is thus clear that alienation or
rati ication cure the defect. (1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the
exclusive
property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether husband without the consent of the wife is n ull and void .
Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was
its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s
validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable
consent. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the
consideration. The absence of private respondent’s consent merely
husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but
their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement,
The error in petitioners’ contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2,
T-26472, respectively. Later, however, Pedro sold the lot covered by such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given ive
refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which
TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting and purchased the (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the
were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and
property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT husband to institute the case.
vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue in luence or
No. T-88674, was issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the
fraud. In this instance, private respondent’s consent to the
subject lot remains to be an exclusive property of Pedro as it was Here, respondent Mary Ann timely iled the action for annulment of
contract of
sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent
acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or money of the sale within ive (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the
or absent .
latter. deed. However, her action to
annul
the
sale pertains only to the
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of conjugal
house
and
lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT
We are not persuaded. Article 160
of
the
New
Civil Code provides, No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he
Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the
“All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.
two lower courts.
conjugal partnership , unless it be proved that it pertains
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are
of private respondent’s consent. To constitute a valid contract, the buyers in good faith .
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471,
Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably
him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by
absent in the case at bar. Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract
TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family
cannot be rati ied.
and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject Code, he must show that he inquired into
the
latter’s
capacity
to
sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.



mortgages and taxes, but also attachment, LEASES, inchoate dower several titles under the Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro rights, water rights, easements, and other RESTRICTIONS on USE." which the provisions on the property relations between husband and
and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that wife, Article 173 included, are found.
during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance but also a "quali ied
However, Mary Ann’s conformity did not appear in the deed. Even alienation, with the lessee becoming, for all legal intents and Secondly , the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3,
assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner of the thing affected by 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is,
property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by the lease." Thus, the joinder of the wife, although unnecessary therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any
Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still for an oral lease of conjugal realty which does not exceed
one alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the
proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Ann’s written year in duration, is required in a lease of
conjugal realty
for
a effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124.
consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible period of more than one
year,
such a lease being
considered a
and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was conveyance and
encumbrance within the provisions of the Civil Thirdly , according to Article 256 of the Family Code , the
being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Code requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument by provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no
Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they which real property is conveyed or encumbered. vested rights are impaired. Herein, however, the petitioners did not
failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3,
cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good In the case at bar, the allegation in paragraph 2 of the complaint, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of
faith. indicates that petitioner's estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. the Family Code.
Roxas had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M.
Roxas v. CA, et al. Cayetano without her marital consent being secured as required by Fourthly , the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that
law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a cause Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had
Whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal of action under Art. 173 to ile a case for annulment of the contract of delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the
partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease involving lease entered into without her consent. Petitioner has a cause of property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA
conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the action not only against her husband but also against the lessee, granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
wife . Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not
NO.
The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
Sps Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr., et al.
administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise alienate ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an
the property being administered, the husband can do so in certain Whether the sale of conjugal property made by
respondent wife by authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only
cases allowed by law. He is not required by law to render an presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the
accounting. Acts done under administration do not need the prior executed by respondent husband in her favor was validly made to the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Speci ically, the
consent of the wife. vendees, who allegedly
acted in good faith and paid the full purchase apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was
price, despite the showing by
the
husband that
his
signature on
the limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or
However, administration does not include acts of ownership . SPA
had been forged
and
that the
SPA
had been executed during his extend to the power to administer the property.
For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets absence from the country.
unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Lastly , the petitioners' insistence that Atty. Parulan's making of a
We resolve the main issue against the vendees and sustain the CA's counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting rati ied the sale
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is an inding that the vendees were not buyers in good faith, because they merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the
encumbrance and/or alienation . In the contract of lease, the lessor did not exercise the necessary prudence to inquire into the wife's transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the
transfers his right of use in favor of the lessee. The lessor's right of authority to sell. We hold that the sale of conjugal property without proper court order was void; hence, rati ication did not occur, for a
use is impaired, therein. He may even be ejected by the lessee if the the consent of the husband was not merely voidable but void; hence, void contract could not be rati ied.
lessor uses the leased realty. Therefore, lease is a burden on the land, it could not be rati ied.
it is an encumbrance on the land. The opinion of the Court of Appeals On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void
sale
was a
that lease is not an encumbrance is not supported by law. The Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio
concept of encumbrance includes lease, thus "an encumbrance is properties made AFTER the effectivity of the Family Code had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was
sometimes construed broadly to include not only liens such as withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last
To start with, Article
254
the
Family
Code has expressly repealed



sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code the possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary to Elena's representation. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouse's paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on ARTICLE 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be partnership property without the consent of the other. she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other However, either spouse may , without the consent of the returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is other , make moderate donations from the conjugal period of three months or has failed within the same period to
withdrawn by either or both offerors. partnership property give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of 1. for charity or prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the
both spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by 2. on occasions of family rejoicing or conjugal dwelling.
sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition. Thus, the buyers
of 3. family distress . Quiao v. Quiao, s upra
conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership On Conjugal Partnership Regime
diligence , namely :
ARTICLE 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of
(a) the diligence in verifying the validity
of
the
title covering
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife
the property; and
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
(b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
transacting spouse to sell conjugal property on behalf of
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
the other spouse.
marriage under Articles 134 to 138. bene its obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show that he marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his
ARTICLE 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a
has relied on the face of the certi icate of title to the property, for he is shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
not required to explore beyond what the certi icate indicates on its mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses.
face. In this respect, the petitioners suf iciently proved that they had (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals .
checked on the authenticity of the TCT. live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to
be supported; Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the
Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners that the issue was (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation
whether or not they had diligently inquired into the authority of Ma. other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be of the couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of
Elena to convey the property. obtained in a summary proceeding; gains is dissolved, to wit:
(3) In the absence of suf icient conjugal partnership property,
Firstly , the petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily
ARTICLE 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal
written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not present liable for the support of the family. The spouse present partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
evidence to show that they had made inquiries into the shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately
circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly executed judicial authority to administer or encumber any speci ic all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or exclusive properties of each spouse.
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
Secondly , the inal payment of P700,000.00 even without the (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership
owner's duplicate copy of the TCT No. 63376 being handed to them ARTICLE 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other in payment of personal debts and obligations of
by Ma. Elena indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
the petitioners. aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for partnership as an asset thereof.
judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
Lastly , another reason rendered the petitioners' good faith incredible. administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of
They did not take immediate action against Ma. Elena upon such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of
discovering that the owner's original copy of TCT No. 63376 was in property or for the value of his or her exclusive


property, the ownership of which has been vested Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership
by law in the conjugal partnership. (a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their ARTICLE 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death,
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal separate properties. In the instant case, the trial court the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the
partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. found that the couple had no separate properties when same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
In case of insuf iciency of said assets, the spouses they married . Rather, the trial court identi ied conjugal deceased.
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with properties.
their separate properties, in accordance with the (b) Ordinarily, the bene it received by a spouse from the If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned in equal spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership; and if the judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month
community is enriched at the expense of the separate
the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
them. involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated
properties to their respective owners shall be made.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemni ied from (c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the marriage shall be void .
whatever source, the loss or deterioration of debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
movables used for the bene it of the family, obligation of each of the spouses shall be paid from their without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous respective separate properties. But if the conjugal mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal partnership is not suf icient to pay all its debts and govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
funds, if any. obligations, the spouses with their separate properties shall
be solidarily liable. Heirs of Protacio Go v. Servacio
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of The disposition by sale of
a portion of the conjugal property by
properties shall constitute the pro its , which shall the husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated
be divided equally between husband and wife, them. In the instant case, since it was already established by
Article
130 of
the Family Code
is
not necessarily void
if said
unless a different proportion or division was agreed by the trial court that the spouses have no separate portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or
extrajudicial
upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has properties , there is nothing to return to any of them . partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate,
been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal the requirement of
prior liquidation does not prejudice vested
as provided in this Code. partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains should be rights.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective
children shall be delivered upon the partition in heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family
accordance with Article 51. the guilty party , his share from the net pro its of the Code, viz:
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family ARTICLE 105. In case the future spouses agree in the
dwelling and
the
lot on which it is situated shall, Code . marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be partnership of gains shall govern their property relations
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
of the common children choose to remain . nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal supplementary application.
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may
have chosen the mother, unless the court has be accounted for in the guilty party's favor. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, partnerships of gains already established between spouses
the court shall decide, taking into consideration the In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
best interests of said children. the petitioner is not entitled to any property at all . vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the
liquidation of the properties of the spouses: It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before
and


after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs of
found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, the deceased spouse until inal liquidation and partition. The
(Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. supra ]. surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half
Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of
dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition
AFTER the liquidation ; otherwise , the disposition is void . cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire of the conjugal partnership.
property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of of the co-owners is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora's surviving
gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Revised Rules of Court. heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora's share of the
Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were conjugal partnership until inal liquidation and partition; Anastacio,
married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Domingo v. Sps Genaro on the other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership
their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest.
Melecio principally argues that the sale of land belonging to the
partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta's death in 1987,
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent is invalid. Melecio Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any speci ic
the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of
also claims that fraud attended the conveyance of the subject portion of the conjugal properties without an actual partition being
the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
property and the absence of any document evidencing the alleged irst done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless,
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her
sale made the transfer null and void. Finally, Melecio claims that the Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation
action has not yet prescribed. interest in the subject property.
following its liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary
co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code. Anastacio and
Flora's
conjugal
partnership
was dissolved upon
Barrido v. Nonato
Flora's death.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in
The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been
respect of Marta's share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before declared void for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
assert or claim title to any speci ic portion of Marta's share without the Family Code's effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
an actual partition of the property being irst done either by relation is a conjugal p
artnership. partnership regime governed their property relations. Although
agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an
Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the
ideal or abstract quota in Marta's share. Nonetheless, a co-owner The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 speci ically covers the
could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to Flora died in 1968, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code (now effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations.
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest Article 126 (1) of the Family Code). Article 130 of the Family Code
of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not spouse and prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation. exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of or without the bene it of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for
Marta's share. While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition
involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the
Article 147 to operate , the man and the woman:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of
the entire property provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to vested
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
by one co-owner without
the
consent
of
the other
co-owners is rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
(3) their union is without the bene it of marriage or their
not null and void . However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller other laws ."
marriage is void.
are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs governed the
Here, all these elements are present. The term "capacitated " in the
The proper
action in cases like this is not for the nulli ication of the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition.
irst paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common
In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna , we held party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been
from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners
that the properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They
who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common


deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors
lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However,
fruits or rents pertaining to them. and other persons with pecuniary interest.
their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Separation of Property Regime Toda, Jr. v. CA
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses The separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of
ARTICLE 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree
of
the
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on marriage settlements, the separation of property between court approving the same . It, therefore, becomes effective only
equal co-ownership . Any property acquired during the union is spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by upon judicial approval, without which it is void.
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the either be voluntary or for suf icient cause. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie
property shall be considered as having contributed to the same should be considered dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial
jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of What are suf icient causes for judicial separation of property?
court approved their joint petition for voluntary dissolution of their
the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of the ARTICLE 135. Any of the following shall be considered conjugal partnership.
family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition suf icient cause for judicial separation of property:
of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or Espinosa et al. v. Omaña
industry. (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction ; Whether Omaña
violated the
Canon
of
Professional Responsibility in
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa's "Kasunduan Ng
property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be declared an absentee ; Paghihiwalay. "
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. petitioner has been decreed by the court; This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the
Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void . The
Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the
rules on co-ownership . family as provided for in Article 101; disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
ARTICLE 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal marriage settlements has abused that power; and partnership, which is exactly what Omañ a did in this case.
partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted by (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried separated in fact for at least one year and Revival of the previous property regime
out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of reconciliation is highly improbable.
Revival if separation is based on Art. 135 = Pars 1 - 6;
each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the
be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of Revival if separation is based on Art. 136 = Par 7.
presentation of the inal judgment against the guilty or absent
doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong, spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of ARTICLE 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings
the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in judicial separation of property.
proportion to the capital and duration of each. where separation of property was decreed, ile a motion i n
Voluntary separation court for a decree
reviving
the
property regime that existed
ARTICLE 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of between them before the separation of property in any of the
estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal How is it done? following instances:
and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other
matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter. ARTICLE 136. The spouses may jointly ile a veri ied petition (1) When the civil interdiction terminates;
with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute (2) When the absentee spouse reappears;
ARTICLE 133. From the common mass of property support community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the (3) When the court, being satis ied that the spouse
shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children separation of their common properties. granted the power of administration in the marriage
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until settlements will not again abuse that power,
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal authorizes the resumption of said administration;
what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the
spouse, shall be listed in the petition and noti ied of the iling



(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
without a decree of legal separation resumes common all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
life with the other; marriage from his or her separate property. all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the cohabitation.
Both
spouses shall bear
the
family expenses in proportion to their
spouse previously deprived thereof;
income. Liability is solidary. Valdes v. RTC, s upra
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at
least one year, reconcile and resume common life; or ARTICLE 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in In a void marriage , regardless of the cause thereof, the property
(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute proportion to their income, or, in case of insuf iciency or relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
community of property or conjugal partnership has default thereof, to the current market value of their separate by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the properties. be, of the Family Code.
spouses, they agree to the revival of the former
The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
property regime. No voluntary separation of property
shall, however, be solidary. woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
may thereafter be granted.
Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by or without the bene it of marriage.
Article 67 . If no legal impediments to marry each other or the marriage is
void the regime is co-ownership. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
Administration of Exclusive Properties through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
When can the court order the transfer of administration of an
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
exclusive property of one spouse to another spouse?
and wife without the bene it of marriage or under a void party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
ARTICLE 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to equal shares and the property acquired by both of them "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
the other spouse: through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
on co-ownership. couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
Article 147 of the Family Code , in substance and to the above
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
extent, has clari ied Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law
carries with it civil interdiction; or obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
now expressly provides that -
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent
If the other spouse is not quali ied by reason of incompetence, jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
con lict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall
appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. household. forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their
Regime of Separation of Properties Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all
his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to
ARTICLE 144. Separation of property may refer to present or the respective surviving descendants, or still in default
and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
after the termination of their cohabitation.
case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of
the absolute community. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good nullity of the marriage.
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
ARTICLE 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement
administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither
need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to



declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with other; Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but
authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal
commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private and partnership of gains.
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in 3. Their union is without the bene it of marriage, or their
equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and marriage is void. Paterno v. Arcaya-Chua
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions
on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a The petitioner did not discharge her burden of showing in this appeal
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after that the CA committed reversible error in applying Article 147 of the
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties' properties under Family Code to the case.
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under The parties do not argue that co-ownership of properties acquired
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. during the union governs them under Article 147 of the Family Code.
latter case until the contract is annulled),are irrelevant to the
This was declared in the Valdes c ase.
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law
spouses. The irst paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. So what are
the
common
properties
included
in
the
dissolution
applying paragraphs (2),(3),(4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by of the co-ownership?
its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In
Petitioner's argument implies that despite already being separated de
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
facto, as long as a couple remains married (in paper), pending a court
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
declaration of nullity of their union, all the properties gained by each
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on
in the meantime before the judicial declaration will be included in the
Diño v. Diño, s upra co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
co-ownership regime.
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the
Civil
Code , "partition may Petitioner however should be reminded of the legal effect of a
ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. con irmation of a void ab initio marriage: it is retroactive to the time
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the when the marriage ceremony transpired. In short, after the trial court
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of declared her marriage to Mr. Paterno void in 2005 because of both
marriage . parties' psychological incapacity, the marriage ceremony on
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of
December 27, 1987 was invalidated as if no marriage took place. This
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, Salas Jr. v. Aguila, s upra means then that during their ten-year cohabitation, Ms. Lomongo and
partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article 147
In Diño
v.
Diño, we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies Mr. Paterno lived together merely as common-law spouses. This is
of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on
to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by where Article
147 comes in, dealing with those "properties acquired
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is while they lived together ... obtained by their joint efforts, work or
Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in industry..." and the joint effort includes "the care and maintenance of
Family Code.
this case. the family and of the household."
We agree with petitioner.
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is Her insistence of the common ownership of the monies and
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s properties accumulated subsequent to the de facto separation would
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the have been correct if the properties had to be liquidated (such as in a
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case spouse's death) and an of icial declaration of nullity of marriage was
and respondent in the case before the Court. For Article 147 of the where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological never secured.
Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of
the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, s upra
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each by co-ownership. Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that


● Share of the married party shall go to the ACP or CPG of his

her own independent funds were used to buy the law of ice the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to
existing valid marriage, otherwise, his share will be forfeited in
condominium and the law books subject matter in contention in this him or her exclusively . Then too, contributions in the form of care of
accordance with Art. 147 last paragraph.
case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration,
and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where ARTICLE 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the are excluded i n this regime.
properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on deceased is
a bigamous
marriage , having been solemnized during
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
proportion to
their respective contributions . In the absence
many situations and thus it created a void at irst because it applied (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without is therefore in order.
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Bene it
evidences of credit. Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI,
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void
was illed upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her are clearly remunerations, incentives and bene its from governmental
that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute agencies earned by the deceased as a police of icer. Unless
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly said that she contributed money, property or industry in the
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the acquisition of these monetary bene its. Hence, they are not owned in
prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for
this
presumption manner provided in the
last
paragraph
of
the
preceding common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased
to arise, proof of actual contribution was required . The same Article . alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By
rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and intestate succession, the said "death bene its" of the deceased
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if shall pass to his legal heirs . And, respondent, not being the legal
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to both parties are in both faith.
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute wife of the deceased is not one of them.
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If Nicdao Carino v. Carino, s upra
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if property regime. Considering that the two marriages
are
void
ab barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
both parties were in bad faith. initio , the applicable property regime would not be absolute is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be license.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law irm or in the purchase
Code on "Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage." In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and
of books for the law irm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had
salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
law of ice amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other
presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law of ice space and relationships in
a state
of
concubine,
relationships
where
both did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed "death
the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than man and woman are married to other persons, multiple bene its" were earned by the deceased alone as a government
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law alliances of the same married man , - employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
irm that he headed.
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
"... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the irst
● Effect of dissolution of co-ownership if one party is in bad faith actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the
● If there is legal impediment --- Co-ownership only for actual owned by them in common in proportion to their respective subject "death bene its" under scrutiny shall go to the
contributions ..." In this property regime, the properties acquired by
contribution. petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his


legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. between private respondent Natividad Calaunan-Uy and deceased should be considered as common property of petitioner and
Menilo, Sr., of property evidently acquired during the period of their respondent.
Belcodero v. CA common-law relationship. The governing provisions, applicable to
their case, are now found in Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership
Code, considering that Menilo Uy, Sr. died on 27 September 1990,
acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after having should apply.
well after the effectivity of the Family Code.
deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had been bought
by the husband on installment
basis
prior
to
the
effectivity
of
Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr
the Civil Code of 1950 but the inal deed, as well as the questioned
conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage Module 10. The Family
the latter Code's regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the (Art. 149-162)
note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988. essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code
iled by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr. The Family as an Institution
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949
when an agreement for its purchase on installment basis was entered The crux of the petition is the ownership of Suite 204 of LCG As a basic social institution (See: Art. XV, 1987 Const.)
into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in 1959 when a deed Condominium and how the properties acquired by petitioner and
ARTICLE 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is
of sale was inally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., the legal respondent should be partitioned.
a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
results would be the same. The property remained as
belonging
It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law
to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
Juliana .
City and moved in with respondent in the latter's residence in Metro shall be recognized or given effect.
The appellate court, given the above circumstances, certainly cannot Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their irst child, Michael Bruno Family relations – what is covered
be said to have been without valid basis in concluding that the Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on
property really belonged to the lawful conjugal partnership between March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a ARTICLE 150. Family relations include those:
Alayo and his true spouse Juliana. condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by (1) Between husband and wife ;
a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as the
As regards the property relations between common-law spouses, buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner (2) Between parents a nd children ;
Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codi ied the law established also signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado
through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium (3) Among other ascendants a nd descendants ; and
co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either unit was issued in the name of petitioner.
or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry. The present (4) Among brothers and sisters , whether of the full or
provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code did In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioner's hal blood.
not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its provisions submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties'
cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights. cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code , Earnest effort
to
compromise from suit between members of same
said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. family
It was at the time that the adjudication of ownership was made
ARTICLE 151. No suit between members of the same family
following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo merely allowed the Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
shall prosper unless it should appear from the veri ied
property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not intended and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
to be adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a constructive trust was marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
deemed to have been created by operation of law under the creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire
that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be
provisions of Article 1456 of the Civil Code. during their cohabitation.
dismissed.
Uy v. CA The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was These rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the
purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
The action for partition is predicated on an alleged co-ownership petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it



Gayon v. Gayon Petitioner cannot plausibly look to Article 222 of the Civil Code to
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does effectively dismiss, as presently urged, Civil Case No. 1784 MN. It
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among family cannot be over-emphasized in this regard that the rationale of said
obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides: members. Citing several cases decided by this Court, petitioners provision is to obviate hatred and passion in the family likely to be
"No suit shall be iled or maintained between members of the same claim that whenever a stranger is a party in a case involving spawned by litigation between and among the members thereof. Civil
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to Case No. 1784 MN, however, being merely an action for
revival
of
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private judgment of a dormant decision rendered in an original action, can
the limitations in article 2035." respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in Article 222 of the Code.
the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family What the appellate court said in the decision subject of review on the
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision Code. inapplicability under the premises of Article 222 of the Code is
applies to suits " iled or maintained between members of the same
well-taken:
family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson The rule should have been invoked by [petitioner] in the
be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the
which:
original action [Civil Case 5858 subject of appeal in CA-G.R
case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
"Family relations shall include those: (1) Between husband and No. 69008-CV) where the actual controversy is still at issue and
wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants not in the present case where the actual controversy between the
Martinez v. Martinez
and their descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters." parties had already been decided by the Court and what remains
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an to be done is the enforcement of the decision.
nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the exception to the general rule. Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law
enumeration contained in said Art. 217 - which should be is not included in the enumeration. Vda. De Manalo v. CA
construed strictly , it being an exception to the general rule - and Art 222 of the Civil Code (now Art 151 of the Family Code) is
A party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before
Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at applicable only to ordinary civil actions and not to special
iling a complaint against a family member would render such
bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. proceedings . This is clear from the term "suit" that it refers to an
complaint premature .
222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before iling the action by one person or persons against another or others in a court
complaint does not bar the same. In this case, the decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law
to comply with Article 151 of the Family code and that they failed to affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right,
Hontiveros v. RTC do so is erroneous. whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action iled in a
The absence of the veri ication required in Art. 151 does not court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of
First . Petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondent’s sister-in-law, was a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of
one of the plaintiffs in the MTC. The petitioner is not a member of
the complaint . The veri ication is merely a formal requirement
the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Heirs of Favis, Sr v. Gonzales
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are
true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations Second . The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements The base issue is whether or not the appellate court may dismiss the
regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same of Article 151 of the Family Code because they alleged in their order of
dismissal of
the
complaint
for
failure
to
allege
therein
that
family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. The appellate
this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay. court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The
correction of unveri ied pleadings or act on it and waive strict appellate courts’ decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code.
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be Magbaleta v. Gonong
served. Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial Thus it was made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed
court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest efforts had been Respondent judge premised his refusal to dismiss the complaint efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same
made toward a compromise but the parties' efforts proved upon the sole ground that one of the defendants, petitioner Susana G. family, is not a jurisdictional defect but
merely
a defect
in
the
unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it Baldovi, the alleged buyer of the land in dispute, is a stranger. statement of a cause of action . The defect may however be
is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would the waived by failing to make a seasonable objection, in a motion to
court be justi ied in dismissing the action. Santos v. CA, et al.
dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere procedural imperfection


residence . From the time of its constitution and so long as any

which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
of its bene iciaries actually resides therein, the family home
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale
existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
course. The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to
without a prior motion to dismiss having been iled. The decision in of the value allowed by law.
the bene its accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis of ARTICLE 161. For purposes of availing of the bene its of a Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having been family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may have a retroactive effect.
made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action. In other constitute, or be the bene iciary of, only one family home.
words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to Is
the
family
home
of
petitioner
exempt from execution of the money
comply with a condition precedent was iled in the trial court; neither ARTICLE 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern judgment aforecited? No . The debt or liability which was the basis
was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent existing family residences insofar as said provisions are of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
brought before the Court of Appeals. applicable. accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising
therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the Modequillo v. Breva This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution
respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after iling provided in the Family Code.
their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of Whether or
not
a inal
judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action
absence of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, for damages may be
satis ied
by
way of
execution of
a family home
constituted under the Family Code. Bene iciaries of family home
the appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or
basis to motu propio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. ARTICLE 154. The bene iciaries of a family home are:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. (1) The husband and wife , or an unmarried person who is the
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as head of a family; and
Family Home required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the
premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
Concept of Family Home Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect sisters , whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the who are living in the family home and who
depend
upon
ARTICLE 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the family who owns the home. the head of the family for legal support .
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is
the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not Advantages of a family home is that it is exempt from execution,
land on which it is situated. constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially forced sale and attachment. E xceptions t o the rule
under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of
ARTICLE 156. The family home must be part of the properties ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
law only under Article 153 of the Family Code . It is deemed
of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of sale or attachment except :
constituted as
a family
home upon the
effectivity
of
the Family
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's
Code on August 3, 1988. (1) For nonpayment of taxes;
consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a
family on his or her own property. (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in such constitution; and
on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be provided that “the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern materialmen and others who have rendered service or
constituted as a family home. existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.” furnished material for the construction of the building.
It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
When is it deemed constituted retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed ● Limitations on the value of family home
ARTICLE 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt



reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at property or constituted the family home.
comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being
the time of its constitution, the amount of the PHP300K three hundred absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or
thousand pesos in urban areas , and PHP200K two hundred Ramos v. Pangilinan extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos' family home, the law's
thousand pesos in rural areas , or such amounts as may hereafter be protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners.
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is
ixed by law. Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff exhausted all means
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the
to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos' bank accounts
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers
were already closed while other properties in his or the company's
this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
name had already been transferred, and the only property left was the
home shall be the basis of evaluation. must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot
Pandacan property.
be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
● Disposition and encumbrance of a family home
If the family home was constructed BEFORE the
effectivity
of
the Manacop v. CA
ARTICLE 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been May a writ of execution of a inal and executory judgment issued
assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under before the
effectivity of
the
Family Code be executed on
a house and
written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?
and a majority of the bene iciaries of legal age. In case of con lict, the constitution of the family home requires the iling of a veri ied
court shall decide. petition before the courts and the registration of the court's order True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the
● Can a family home be sold? with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. subject property became his family home under the simpli ied
Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 process embodied in Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not have
mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the
reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family
more than the maximum amount ixed in Article 157, he may apply to constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that
the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
the property under execution. The court shall so order if it inds that the On the other hand, for family homes constructed AFTER the family home, it follows that the law’s protective mantle cannot be
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to availed of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred
by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value constitute extrajudicially or judicially , and the exemption is and the assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3,
exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions
subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or its bene iciaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, of the Family Code.
persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the the family home should belong to the absolute community or
property, or by any of the bene iciaries, the same rule and procedure conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution List of Bene iciary-Occupants Restricted to Those Enumerated
shall apply. must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not in the Code
exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family
Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not
shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied irst to the amount home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary. He
apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made
mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and that
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988 .
and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family
debtor. And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it home. This contention lacks merit.
● Continuance of the family home despite the death of
the is not suf icient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges
owner that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home
be set up and proved. either by the owner thereof or by “any of its bene iciaries” must
ARTICLE 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one be actual . That which is “actual ” is something real, or actually
or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something
ten years or for as long as there is a minor bene iciary , and the constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however,
heirs cannot partition the same unless the court inds compelling



need not be by the owner of the house speci ically. Rather, the Josef v. Santos Family Code;
property may be occupied by the “bene iciaries ” enumerated by
Petitioner argues that the trial court sheriff erroneously attached, b) if petitioner's spouse is still alive, as well as if there
Article 154.
levied and sold on execution the real property covered by TCT No. are other bene iciaries of the family home;
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is N-105280 because the same is his family home.
constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the
law
de initely c) if the petitioner has more than one residence for the
The Order of the RTC did not resolve nor take into account purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his
excludes maids and overseers . They are not the bene iciaries
petitioner's allegations in his Opposition, which are material and family home; and
contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home
relevant in the resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ of
by an overseer like Carmencita V. Abat in this case is insuf icient d) its actual location and value , for the purpose of
execution. This is serious error on the part of the trial court. It should
compliance with the law. applying the provisions of Articles 157 and 160 of
have made an earnest determination of the truth to petitioner's claim
that the house and lot in which he and his children resided was their the Family Code.
Sps Versola v. CA
duly constituted family home. Since it did not, its July 16, 2003 Order
The
issue
in
the
main is
whether or not petitioners timely raised and is thus null and void. Where a judgment or judicial order is void it The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and
proved that their property is exempt from execution. may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw sold at auction. Despite petitioner's allegations in his Opposition, the
and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature of the same,
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under head. whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly
constitutes petitioner's family home, the trial court should have Respondent moved for issuance of a writ of execution on February
the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at 17, 2003 while petitioner iled his opposition on June 23, 2003. The
public auction. It is not suf icient that the person claiming exemption observed the following procedure :
trial court granted the motion on July 16, 2003, and the writ of
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim
for execution was issued on August 20, 2003. Clearly, the trial court had
exemption must
be set
up
and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do 1. Determine if petitioner's obligation to respondent falls
under either of the exceptions under Article 155 of the enough time to conduct the crucial inquiry that would have spared
so would estop the party from later claiming the exception. petitioner the trouble of having to seek relief all the way to this Court.
Family Code;
Indeed, the trial court's inaction on petitioner's plea resulted in
In the case under consideration, petitioners allegedly iled with the
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner's claim that serious injustice to the latter, not to mention that its failure to
trial court an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Auction Sale on the Property
the property was his family home; conduct an ocular conduct an inquiry based on the latter's claim bordered on gross
of Defendants under TCT No. 83104 located at Sunville Subdivision,
inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an ignorance of the law.
Quezon City" which was dated 12 September 2000. The said motion
was iled before 19 September 2000, the scheduled date for the sale interview of members of the community where the alleged
family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner Eulogio et al. v. Bell, Sr. et al.
of the subject property at public auction. The records of
the
case,
however, do
not
disclose that
petitioners in the said motion set actually resided within the premises of the claimed family Re-litigating the issue
of
the
value
of
respondents' family home
up and proved that the property to be sold was their family home; order a submission of photographs of the premises, is barred by res judicata.
home . In any event, said motion was treated by the trial court as a depositions, and/or af idavits of proper individuals/parties;
mere scrap of paper presumably on the ground that such motion did or a solemn examination of the petitioner, his children and In this case, the trial court's inal decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars
not contain a notice of hearing. other witnesses. At the same time, the respondent is given petitioners' move to have the property in dispute levied on execution.
the opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence to
It was only after almost two years from the time of the execution sale the contrary; There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581
and after the "Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale" was issued did petitioners and the subsequent execution proceedings involved the same parties
rigorously claim in their Opposition to private respondent's Ex-parte 3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioner's and subject matter. For these reasons, respondents argue that the
Motion for Issuance of Con irmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property family home, the court should determine: execution sale of the property in dispute under Article 160 of the
of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola that the property in question is Family Code is barred by res judicata, since the trial court has already
a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or determined that the value of the property fell within the statutory
exempt from execution. Even then, there was no showing that
incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the limit.
petitioners adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home.


shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of ordered the execution sale of the property. There is grave abuse of
The CA held that the trial court's Decision, which is indisputably the peso because of currency luctuations, the amount of exemption discretion when one acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
inal, only settled the issue of whether the property in dispute was a shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution despotic manner in the exercise of one's judgment, as in this case in
family home. of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be which the assailed order is bereft of any factual or legal justi ication.
applied to the payment of any of the obligations speci ied in Articles
Applying the above guidelines, the Court inds that the entirety of 155 and 160. Arriola v. Arriola
Civil Case No. 4581 - including the bid of petitioners to execute the
money judgment awarded to them by the trial court - is founded on a Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel
common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its on his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has been
submitted by petitioners during the execution proceedings was the bene iciaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on
Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nulli ied in the main attachment provided the following conditions obtain : record establish that the subject house is a family home within the
proceedings. Concomitantly, the very same defense raised by contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code.
petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had bought the (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution
property from Spouses Bell for P1 million - was utilized to has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and One signi icant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the
substantiate the claim that the current value of respondents' family (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its
home was actually PI million. In fact, the trial court's order for increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit . occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the
respondents' family home to be levied on execution was solely based judicial or extrajudicial processes. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153
on the price stated in the nulli ied Deed of Sale. Otherwise , the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and speci ically extend the scope of the family home not just to the
any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over under Articles 155 and 160. which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as
the same property. Moreover, the same contentions and evidence well as the speci ic portion of the subject land on which it stands are
advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner
respondents' family home have already been used to support their Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family
arguments in the main proceedings. residence 20 years back.
(1) there was an increase in its actual value;
The issue of whether the property in dispute exceeded the statutory (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it
limit of P300,000 has already been determined with inality by the property introduced by the persons constituting the family stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is
trial court. Its inding necessarily meant that the property is exempt home, its owners or any of its bene iciaries; and shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family
from execution. (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed Code.
under Article 157.
Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the
Article 160 of the Family Code. During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves
much less proven - by petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition:
expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code. inality that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was
an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell irst , that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the
exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. The actual value of the property in dispute. unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is
exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the speci ic still a minor bene iciary residing therein; and
articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the The Court thus agrees with the CA's conclusion that the trial court
statutory limit. committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution second , that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the
of the property in dispute under Article 160. The trial court had aforesaid periods unless the court inds compelling reasons
The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or already determined with inality that the property was a family home, therefor.
attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in and there was no proof that its value had increased beyond the
rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the



RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and
home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the To be a bene iciary of the family home, three requisites must only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties. More concur:
importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not
immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in
This signi ies that even if the family home has passed by succession 154 of the Family Code; the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario,
to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of (2) they live in the family home; and Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as bene iciary
them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the contemplated under Article 154 because he did not ful ill the third
ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the family. requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It
law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of
home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the
this wise: If there are bene iciaries who survive and are living in the his parents, being of legal age.
bene iciaries of the family home.
family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the 10 years, there is still a minor bene iciary, in which case the family There is no showing that private respondent is without means to
subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at home continues until that bene iciary becomes of age. support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner,
this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general her grandson's legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner iled
parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10
rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years for the partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve
years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if
following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after
there is still a minor bene iciary residing therein, the family home he
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the the 10-year period ended in 1997.
constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling
constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10
reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and
years and a minor bene iciary still lives therein, the family home With this inding, there is no legal impediment to partition the
order the partition of the property.
shall be preserved only until that minor bene iciary reaches the age subject property.
To recapitulate , the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the
subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. interests of the minor bene iciary until he reaches legal age and Gomez v. Sta. Ines
The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the would now be capable of supporting himself.
According to respondents, the house and lot was constituted jointly
portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the time they
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R.
constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. occupied the same as a family residence in 1972 and that under
Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a
Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be Section 153 of the Family Code, there is no longer any need to
bene iciary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of constitute the said property as family home, whether judicially or
Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013. Private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of extrajudicially, because it became such by operation of law.
deceased Marcelino V. Dario satis ies the irst requisite. Marcelino Furthermore, respondents assert that the money judgment against
Patricio v. Dario III Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent Marietta was rendered by the trial court in January 1989 long after
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the constitution of the said family home.
where one of
the
co-owners refuse
to
accede to such partition on the the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the
ground that a minor bene iciary still resides in the said home. decedent, hence, he satis ies the second requisite. Such contentions are erroneous. Under Article 155 of the Family
Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the
family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has constitution of the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot
cannot be partitioned while a minor bene iciary is still living therein parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal of respondents was not constituted as a family home, whether
namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's parents, judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred her debts.
argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only
same continues as such until the bene iciary becomes of age. immediate family. The law irst imposes the obligation of legal upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the


debts were incurred before the constitution of the family home. judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
Neither is it correct to say that the obligation sought to be satis ied by

accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Module 11. Paternity and Filiation
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property
the levy of the property was incurred only upon the issuance of the became a family home by operation of law and was thus (Art. 163 – 182)
judgment in the original case in January of 1989. As stated by herein prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus
petitioners, the complaint against Marietta was instituted on 17 June correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.
Kinds of Filiation
1986 to seek redress for damages suffered by them due to acts and
omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when she The family home’s exemption from execution ARTICLE 163. The iliation of children may be by nature or by
assumed management and supervision of their deceased mother's must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before adoption . Natural iliation may be legitimate o
r illegitimate .
rice land. This means to say that Marietta's liability, which was the the sale of the property at public auction. Legitimate Children
basis of the judgment, arose long before the levied property was
constituted as a family home by operation of law in August 1988. Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, Meaning of legitimate child
Under the circumstances, it is clear that the liability incurred by should have been exempt from execution, we nevertheless rule that
Marietta falls squarely under one of the instances when a family the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for ARTICLE 164. Children conceived or born during the
home may be the subject of execution, forced sale, or attachment, as nulli ication of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
provided for by Article 155 of the Family Code, particularly, to petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family
Children conceived as a result of arti icial insemination of
answer for debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied
the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or
home. or within a reasonable time thereafter.
both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his
At no other time can the status of a residential house as a family wife, provided , that both of them authorized or rati ied such
Sps. De Mesa v. Sps. Acero et al. insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
home can be set up and proved and its exemption from execution be
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows: recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certi icate
In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a of the child.
First , family residences constructed before the effectivity of the considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject property
Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a
ARTICLE 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid
is a family home and its exemption from execution and forced sale
family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance marriage are illegitimate , unless otherwise provided in this
under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from Code.
to be levied upon and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed
execution; from the time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed of Sale ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s Torrens title was cancelled the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
Second , family residences constructed after the effectivity of the and a new one issued under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents iled a
family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years Grounds to impugn the legitimacy of the child
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its bene iciaries from the time of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the ● DNA to prove of iliation
actually resides therein; subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution. ● Filiation can never be a subject of compromise
Third , family residences which were not judicially or ● Presumption of legitimacy if born during marriage
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission
extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the ARTICLE 165. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on
effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert the following grounds:
considered as family homes by operation of law and are it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
prospectively entitled to the bene its accorded to a family home (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to
personal right , it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and have sexual intercourse with his wife within the irst 120
under the Family Code.
prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family birth of the child because of:
January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same was home.


(a) the physical

incapacity
of
the
husband to have
annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited with
sexual intercourse with his wife; We ind insuf icient basis to sustain Complainant's charge. Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the Arbolarios was
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April, 1971. extra-marital. And consequently, Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are
was not possible; or Yet, no criminal charge was iled, and it was only about eight years illegitimate c hildren of Juan Arbolario.
later, on 5 November 1979, that an administrative complaint was
(c) serious illness of the husband , which presented before this Court. There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this
absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; jurisdiction; and whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, child born after the dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scienti ic
another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and of the spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his or her
reasons , the child could not have been that of the
Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing allegation.
husband, except in the instance provided in the second
enough to prove paternity, as Complainant would want us to believe.
paragraph of Article 164; or
The same must be said of pictures of Jewel and the Respondent Paternity or iliation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be
(3) That in case of children conceived through arti icial showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Such judicially
established . It stands to reason that children born within
insemination, the written authorization or
rati ication evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and much less would it wedlock are legitimate. Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact
of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, prove violation of Complainant's person and honor. or even the presumption of marriage between their parents, Juan
violence, intimidation, or undue in luence. Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a
More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of presumption of legitimacy in their favor.
ARTICLE 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother Complainant and her husband and the presumption
should
be
in
contracted another marriage within three hundred days after favor of
legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was Chua Keng Giap v. IAC
such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall impossible. From the evidence on hand, that presumption has not
govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was In this case, the petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy
registered in his birth certi icate as the legitimate child of the Kao.
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is Complainant and her husband, Tan Le Pok.
The petitioner is beating a dead horse. The issue of his claimed
considered to have been conceived during the former iliation has long been settled, and with inality, by no less than this
marriage , provided it be born within three hundred days Arbolario v. CA
Court. That issue cannot be resurrected now because it has been laid
after the termination of the former marriage; Once a valid marriage is
established, it
is
deemed to
continue to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, decided on September 28, 1984.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty
days
following until proof that it has been legally ended is presented. Thus, In that case, Sy Kao latly and unequivocally declared that she was
the celebration of the subsequent marriage is the
mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not the petitioner's mother.
considered to have been conceived during such not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the
marriage , even though it be born within the three children born of the second union, until and unless there be In said case, Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua Keng Giap
hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. convincing proof that the irst marriage had been lawfully is her son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's
terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into. opposition iled on December 19, 1968, is based principally on the
ARTICLE 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born
ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the
after three hundred days following the termination of the There is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan Kuy.
marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly
or illegitimacy. because Catalina Baloyo, the irst wife, was already dead when they Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was
Tan v. Trocio were born. It does not follow that just because his irst wife has died, really her son? More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say -
a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his as indeed she has said these many years - that Chua Keng Giap was
The issue for determination is whether or not Respondent should be children. A marriage certi icate or other generally accepted proof is not begotten of her womb.
disbarred for immoral conduct. This in turn, hinges on the question necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.
of whether he had, in fact, sexually assaulted the Complainant as a Andal v. Macaraig
consequence of which the latter begot a child by him, named Jewel. Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show that conjugal
union of Juan Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had been judicially The main issue to be determined hinges on the legitimacy of


Mariano Andal insofar as his relation to Emiliano Andal is concerned. show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife petitioner has no obligation to give support.
The determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship; were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was
that had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife during the living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for
period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents
connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal. between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been
suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order
became sick of tuberculosis in January. Sometime thereafter, his swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action
brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his farm. not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In
His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most Tayag v. Court of Appeals , we allowed the integration of an action to
became so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As compel recognition with an action to claim one’s inheritance.
On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculous towards
and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance,
of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and con inement to bed than the consequences of the disease." as in Tayag , the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the
treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano same. Whether or
not respondent Martin
is
entitled to support
died without the presence of his wife,who did not even attend his There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from depends completely on the determination of iliation . A separate
funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria J Duenas gave birth to a boy, who impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence action will only result in a multiplicity of suits , given how
was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase
be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano? Civil Code in favor of the child has not, therefore, been overcome. Tayag , the declaration of iliation is entirely appropriate to these
proceedings.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together,
January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by
Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred impotent, and the child was born within three hundred (300) days this Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also
(300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
irst 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there that it was physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in
any evidence to prove that it was physically impossible for Emiliano carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof. The fact that Given that this is the very irst time that the admissibility
of
DNA
to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis Maria Duenas has committed adultery can not also overcome this testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the
and was so weak that he could hardly move and get up from his bed presumption. focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past
suf icient to overcome this presumption? decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
Agustin v. CA
Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include The irst real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative
Private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc
(1) absence d
uring the initial period of conception, petitioner, Arnel, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of decision in People v. Vallejo where the rape and murder victim’s
(2) impotence w hich is patent, continuing and incurable, and wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were
(3) imprisonment , unless it can be shown that cohabitation relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming that he admitted in evidence.
took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. had ended the relationship long before the child’s conception and
birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there We ind no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both
during the initial period of conception, specially during the period remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit
comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin himself for DNA testing.
is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin
child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers
are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and
who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of



DNA testing technology inally provides a much needed equalizer for presumed legitimate . The child’s legitimacy may be impugned followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards
such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the only under the strict standards provided by law. and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the quali ication of the analyst who conducted the tests.
past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has inally Finally, physical resemblance
between the putative father and child
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence may be offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should
gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than
our stand that DNA testing
is
a valid
means
of
determining likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
paternity. that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then
biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of there is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable
the trier of fact. presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo
Herrera v. Alba
standards.
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA
test is a valid probative In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four
tool
in
this
jurisdiction
to
determine
iliation . Petitioner asks for the aspects. Armi Alba, respondent’s mother, put forward a prima facie Estate of Ong v. Diaz
conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our case when she asserted that petitioner is respondent’s biological
father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA
court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to
test results in a paternity suit.
pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Alba’s assertion. protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
Filiation proceedings are usually iled not just to adjudicate He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that provides:
paternity but also to secure a legal
right associated with paternity, respondent is Armi Alba’s child with another man. Armi Alba Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate
such as citizenship , support (as in the present case), or countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures of respondent although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
inheritance . The burden of proving paternity is on the person who and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. other.
There are four signi icant procedural aspects of a traditional The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor
paternity action which parties have to face: In Co
Tao
v.
Court
of
Appeals , the result of the blood grouping test of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent
showed that the putative father was a “possible father” of the child. case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals :
1. a prima facie c ase, Paternity was imputed to the putative father after the possibility of The presumption of legitimacy does not only low out of a
2. af irmative defenses, paternity was proven on presentation during trial of facts and declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
3. presumption of legitimacy, and circumstances other than the results of the blood grouping test. natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
4. physical resemblance between the putative father and child. presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent
In Jao v. Court of Appeals, the child, the mother, and the putative
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual father agreed to submit themselves to a blood grouping test. The NBI
relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative conducted the test, which indicated that the child could not have been The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the the possible offspring of the mother and the putative father. We held conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the
putative father. that the result of the blood grouping test was conclusive on the contrary.
non-paternity of the putative father.
There are two af irmative defenses a vailable to the putative father. There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts bandied about by the parties to the present petition. But with the
1. The putative father may show incapability of sexual should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. advancement in the ield of genetics, and the availability of new
relations with the mother, because of either physical We reiterate our statement in Vallejo : technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty
absence or impotency. whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA
2. The putative father may also show that the mother had In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence , therefore, testing . Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. courts should consider, among other things, the following data: analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the de initive key to the
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure


commenced. The Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Concepcion v. CA
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, Code, which states:
petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of The status and iliation of a child cannot be compromised. Article
Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing ART. 2035 . No compromise upon the following questions shall be 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born
given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a valid: during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.
remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible
(1) The civil status o
f persons; Gerardo invokes Article 166
(1)(b) of the Family Code. He cannot.
due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of
He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only
complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; Ma. Theresa's husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can
more ostensible than real. Petitioner's argument is without basis
contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the (3) Any ground for legal separation; Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of
any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. (4) Future support ; Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never
became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application (5) The jurisdiction of courts;
legitimacy of her child.
of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological
samples of his DNA. (6) Future legitime .
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow
As de ined above, the term "biological sample " means any organic
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family
material originating from a person's body, even if found in inanimate
question of petitioner's status and iliation, i.e., whether she is an Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no
objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual
saliva, and other body luids, tissues, hairs and bones.
brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2M each. disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the
enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said contrary.
In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the
an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and
of DNA testing. respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement between
wife within the irst 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under
preceded the birth of the child.
Surposa Uy v. Ngo Chua Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take
married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene).
Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her iliation of a child cannot be compromised . Public policy place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
brother, Allan. demands that there be no compromise on the status and iliation of a provinces and they were never together during the period of
child. Paternity and iliation or the lack of the same, is a relationship conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through
entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the violation of prison regulations.
RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special the parties.
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24. Both Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights
were actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate iliation iled between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a
by petitioner against respondent. rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. scant four kilometers apart.
The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties'
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal



access between them. Considering these circumstances, the his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not respondent’s clear and categorical assertions
separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was related to him in any way.
certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to Since iliation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
engage in the marital act. The matter of changing Jose Gerardo's name and effecting the obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence suf icient to and iliation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding . indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the education and transportation, in keeping with the inancial capacity
contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who reason, no inal judgment on the amount of support is made as the
between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights low amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
from the natural right of both parent and child to each other's and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa's statement in her answer to the company. There being no such parent-child relationship between proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
petition for annulment of marriage that she never lived with Mario. them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo. necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
The import of Ma. Theresa's statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her obliged to support.
legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This Gotardo v. Buling
declaration, an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate, is Who can impugn the legitimacy of the child
One can prove iliation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the
the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a inal judgment, an ARTICLE 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
Code.
admission of iliation in a public document or a private handwritten shall be brought within 1 year from the
knowledge of
the
The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and birth
or
its
recording in the civil register , if the husband or,
Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. Public policy continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
demands that there be no compromise on the status and child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
iliation
of
a child . Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those laws. We have held that such other proof of one's iliation may be a
“baptismal certi icate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at
who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
[his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his] the place of birth as de ined in the irst paragraph or where it
The law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and was recorded, the period shall be 2 years if they should
his birth. Although a record of birth or birth certi icate may be used other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of reside in
the
Philippines ; and 3 years if abroad . If the birth
as primary evidence of the iliation of a child, as the status of a child Court.” of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the
is determined by the law itself, proof of iliation is necessary only husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the
status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she fact of registration of said birth , whichever is earlier .
marriage is sought to be established. had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the
time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the
ARTICLE 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the
petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. iliation of the child within the period prescribed in the
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under
preceding article only in the following cases:
attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by
the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual (1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the
presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later period ixed for bringing his action;
uncalled for. date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically
impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months (2) If he should die after the iling of the complaint without
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the having desisted therefrom; or
surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A person's allegations of in idelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
surname or family name identi ies the family to which he belongs allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of De Jesus v. Dizon
and is passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who,


having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born
Succinctly, in an
attempt to
establish their illegitimate iliation
scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to
to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn
the latter's estate under the rules on succession. have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
their legitimate status as
being children of Danilo de Jesus and
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the
The iliation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is Carolina Aves de
Jesus . This step cannot be aptly done because the
grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or
or a inal judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate iliation in a during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy
in proper cases, his heirs.
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by ixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, iliation shall be or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G.
proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as
and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected. the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper.
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children
G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate iliation to the
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner
decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
required . In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be
does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the
aptly adjudicated without an action having been irst been
instead, a claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration
authentic writing, judicial action
within
the applicable statute the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar
of
legitimacy by
law cannot be attacked collaterally , one that can
of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit speci ically brought
acknowledgment . Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled
for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be
that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties
during the marriage of their parents. The certi icates of live birth its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
and within the period limited by law .
would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. adulteress.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more irmly established Babiera v. Catotal
Liyao v. Liyao
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than
A birth certi icate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate
the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able
to
claim
proof that it
is
ictitious.
Thus,
void
is
a certi icate which shows
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
that the mother was already ifty-four years old
at
the
time
of
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during
We deny the present petition. the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil
the irst 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
registrar nor by
the
supposed mother. Because her inheritance
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband
marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the
and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
legitimacy of children does not only low out from a declaration cancellation of the said certi icate.
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in
the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy. which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
and the status conferred by the presumption becomes ixed and offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
unassailable.



Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The the other documents offered in evidence suf iciently corroborate the
herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes ixed, and declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at
all. Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's iliation to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle
relation to impugn in the irst place. any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not
The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship
Certi icate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive available. of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact.
Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certi icate does not prescribe, The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate As an exception , the requirement that there be other proof than the
because it was allegedly void ab initio. children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply
in the present action for reconveyance . This is aside, of course, where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not
Legitimacy can only be assailed in a DIRECT action from the further consideration that private respondent is not the merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of
proper party
to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The some other member of the family.
Tison v. CA
presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of
The bone of contention in private respondent’s demurrer to evidence petitioners unless and until it is rebutted. We are suf iciently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is
is whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde
proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, may
be
relaxed . Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate
legitimacy and iliation. There are two points for consideration the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
before us: irst
is the issue on petitioner’s legitimacy, and second is bene it of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
the question regarding their iliation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. who is disputing the same. admissible and constitutes suf icient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by II. The weight and suf iciency of the evidence regarding petitioner’s
evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is rendered
petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to
per se suf icient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and
avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present
important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in extensive examination.
case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration
the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in made by the decedent.
the irst place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in Petitioners’ evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the
an action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on
petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, marriage certi icates, the various certi ications from the civil
the sole basis of the decedent’s declaration and without need for
corollarily, their iliation. We disagree on both counts. registrar, a family picture, and several joint af idavits executed by
further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of
third persons all of which she identi ied and explained in the course
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court and as part of her testimony.
have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless
on legitimacy. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship
produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence
between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller
submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their
The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only a direct
in Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the
action brought for that purpose , by the proper parties, and within sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s
same may be admitted by reason of private respondent’s failure to
niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree
the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being
which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under
contested by way of
defense or
as
a collateral
issue
in
another offered in evidence.
Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
action for a different purpose .
What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not San Juan Geronimo v. Santos
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action


On the irst issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to prove deceased spouses Ru ino and Caridad is one based on a
one's iliation is admissible only if there is no primary evidence, i.e, misapprehension of facts. The presence of a similar set of circumstances - which were relied
a record of birth or an authentic admission in writing. Petitioner upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at bar -
asserts that herein respondent's birth certi icate constitutes the A mere cursory reading of the birth certi icate of respondent would does not establish that one is a child of the putative parents.
primary evidence enumerated under Article 172 of the Family Code show that it was tampered speci ically on the entries pertaining to
and the ruling of both courts a quo that the document is not the one the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. Using
"envisioned by law" should have barred the introduction of pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent - April 6, 1972 - and the
name of the informant -Emma Dañ o - were both superimposed on the Proofs of Filiation
secondary evidence. Argued differently, with the declaration that the
birth certi icate is a nullity or falsity, the courts a quo should have document. Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still relied
on the prima facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the
ARTICLE 172. The iliation of legitimate children is established by any of
stopped there, ruled that respondent Karen is not the child of Ru ino,
birth certi icate for failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures the following:
and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.
were done and if the alterations were due to the fault of respondent. (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a inal
We grant the petition. judgment; or
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that
Despite its inding that the birth certi icate which respondent offered respondent has proven her iliation by showing that she has enjoyed (2) An admission of legitimate iliation in a public document or a
in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a that open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Ru ino and child of the deceased spouses Ru ino and Caridad. concerned.
Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on secondary evidence that In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate iliation shall be
is similar to proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article We do not agree with the
conclusion
of
both
courts
a quo. The
proved by:
172. appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the
superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or informant made the document questionable. The corroborating legitimate child; or
illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
separate action instituted to prove the iliation of a child. What con irmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of the
laws.
petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is informant are alterations on the birth certi icate which rendered the
applicable only to actions where the legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of a document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did 1. Primary Proofs
child is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar. not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth ● Record of birth;
certi icate. These irregularities and the totality of the circumstances
In the instant case, the iliation of a child - herein respondent - is not ● Admission in a public document or a private
surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are suf icient to
at issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's handwritten instrument signed by the parent.
legitimate child of his deceased brother Ru ino and his wife Caridad. birth certi icate. People v. Tumimpad
What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the
deceased spouses Ru ino and Caridad at all. Finally , we also ind that the concurrence of the secondary evidence Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Ruel C. Prieto were charged
relied upon by both courts a quo does not suf iciently establish the with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the child, Sandra. Sandra gave birth to a baby boy.
secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Article 172 deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a
of the Family Code in this action for annulment of document and legitimate child of her putative parents because she was allowed to Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by
recovery of possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and her testimonial evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives.
examination of the evidence on record that all proof points to the education, she was the bene iciary of the burial bene its of Caridad in The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged
conclusion that herein respondent is not a child of the deceased her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have
spouses Ru ino and Caridad. guardian in relation to the estate left by Ru ino, and she and Caridad been the father of the child.
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Ru ino as his legal
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo heirs. Mariategui v. CA
declaring respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the
The resolution of the issues hinges on the resolution of the



preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint iled by the course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The rule is that although the baptismal record of a natural child
private respondents. describes her as a child of the decedent, yet, if in the preparation of
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate the record the decedent had no intervention, the baptismal record
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the iliation may be proven. However, considering the effectivity of the cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. The reason
children of the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui x x x and Felipa Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the authentic
Velasco"; that "during his lifetime Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have document to prove the legitimate iliation of a child is that such
acknowledged and con irmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, been overtaken by events. Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the priest
in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and there are only two classes of children - legitimate and illegitimate. may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by
"on the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui The ine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children himself or in his presence, like the administration of the sacrament
and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are have been eliminated. upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with
entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate. It prayed, among respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct
others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Article 172 of the said Code provides that the iliation of legitimate
facts which require separate and concrete evidence.
Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the
in the estate of the decedent. civil register or a inal judgment or by the open and continuous Discrediting the above certi icates (birth and baptismal) of the
possession of the status of a legitimate child. illegitimate spurious children which do not constitute proof of
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows iliation with the deceased Judge Berciles, what remains are the
that the action is principally one of partition . The allegation with Evidence on record proves the legitimate iliation of the private
sworn statements
of
Coronacion
Berciles , sister-in-law of the late
respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only respondents. Jacinto's birth certi icate is a record of birth referred to
Judge Berciles wherein she stated that after she was married to her
collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts
husband, they lived together with the family of Pascual Berciles and
contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of
his wife, Flor Fuentebella; that their two families had lived closely
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents’ demand for the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not
enough during the Japanese Occupation and even after. These
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article
statements, however, do not prove the iliation of the children to the
held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
late Judge Pascual Berciles.
deceased. Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
Neither are the family
pictures , which, according to the Committee,
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that
do not indicate that the marriage (between Judge Berciles and Flor
lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo
Fuentebella) took place and that if at all, the said pictures show the
declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article
presence of a family with or without the sanction of marriage. We
testi ied that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to 285 for iling an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
agree and We add that said pictures do not constitute proof of
mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents
iliation.
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported with respect to the iling of the action for partition so long as the
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community heirs for whose bene it prescription is invoked, have not expressly or We also agree with the inding of the Committee that "(t)he letters
to be such. Although no marriage certi icate was introduced to this impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription written by Judge Berciles to her daughters with Flor
effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership Fuentebella especially the one sent to daughter Mercy Berciles
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not is properly repudiated by the co-owner. wherein he vigorously af irmed that it's only her mother, Flor
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are Fuentebella, and no other woman who was recognized as his wife and
present. loved by her parents deserve scant consideration. Pascual Berciles
2. Secondary Proofs could not be expected to admit the existence of his other family. This
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have
would be disastrous to his efforts at preventing one family from
taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man ● Open and continuous possession of the status of
a knowing the other." Not only do they deserve scant consideration but
and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have legitimate child; also, there is jurisprudence that a type written letter signed by the
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful ● Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court. father is not an authentic writing .
wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is
legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary Berciles v. GSIS
Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz



Whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra. was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on "May the parent concerned.”
25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte."
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certi icate of Live
direct action seasonably iled by the proper party, as held in Spouses A certi icate of live birth is a public document that consists of Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the
Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al ., this Court however deems it necessary to entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which
pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to made in the performance of a duty by a public of icer (Civil necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence –
determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the Registrar). Thus, being public documents, the respondents' particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit “G”) – to prove
question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as certi icates of live birth are presumed valid , and are prima facie iliation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere
alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the evidence o f the truth of the facts stated in them. proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
parties in the pre-trial. child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certi icate must be signed by is evidence of iliation under the irst paragraph thereof, the
At irst blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between the father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate iliation same being an express recognition in a public instrument .
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photocopy of the marriage does not ind support in law and jurisprudence. Only in the
contract, and (2) the canonical certi icate of marriage, cannot be used registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that To repeat what was stated in De Jesus , iliation may be proved by an
as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul the birth certi icate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of admission of legitimate iliation in a public document or a private
with the Rules on Evidence. Nevertheless, a reproduction of the the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and
original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence the child. such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
subject to certain requirements. consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
Nonetheless, the respondents' certi icates of live birth also intimate court action is required .
On the other hand, a canonical certi icate of marriage is not a that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and
public document. They are private writings and their authenticity wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two Finally , if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the
must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in children—the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three Aguilar spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter’s estate.
accordance with the rules of evidence. Accordingly, since there is no years after their irst child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt
showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical proof to establish the validity of marriage. Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar’s estate, since succession pertains, in the
certi icate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it irst place, to the descending direct line.
cannot be admitted in evidence. Aguilar v. Siasat
Reyes v. CA
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born
establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches during the marriage of their parents. The certi icates of live birth The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is must be irst recognized voluntarily or by court action is well settled
than the marriage certi icate. Hence, even a person's birth certi icate perhaps no presumption of the law more irmly established and in Our jurisprudence.
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. We ind that there was no suf icient legal recognition of petitioner
his parents.
Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado.
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate iliation, the respondents Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it
must be concluded that petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, It can be seen from the record of birth that the name of the
presented their respective Certi icates of Live Birth issued by the
or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria petitioner was Irene Ramero and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of
National Statistics Of ice where Fidela signed as the Informant in
Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths – has suf iciently an unknown father. Any of these records of birth cannot be suf icient
item no. 17 of both documents.
proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As recognition under the law. The birth certi icate, to be suf icient
A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS
Form
E-1 (Exhibit recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the
apparently born to the same parents — their father's name is “G”) satis ies the requirement for proof of iliation and relationship to mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized ;
Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name is the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth certi icate, the
Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate iliation in a placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by incompetent evidence of paternity of said child.


nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with
Since any of the certi icates of birth presented were not signed by the action for this must be brought within the proper prescriptive related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition
Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove period. Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her alleged by the father must bear his signature.
recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certi icate be taken as father died, and she had not presented any discovered document
a recognition in a public instrument. wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written
recognition is already barred. instrument must af ix his signature thereon is clearly implied in
Irene's certi icate of baptism cannot be taken as proof of Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1,
recognition. In the case of Macadangdang vs. CA , this Court said WE af irm the indings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene Reyes Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not
that while baptismal certi icates may be considered public alias Irene Delgado is not an heir of the late Francisco Delgado. "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein speci ied, but not the veracity of the San Juan De la Cruz v. Gracia In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk. Dominique's Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San satis ies the requirement of the law.
Irene's secondary student permanent record nor the written Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto.
consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife First , Dominique died about two months prior to the child's birth.
cannot be taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing does without the bene it of marriage. They resided in the house of Second , the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably
not have to be a public instrument, it is suf icient that it is genuine Dominique's parents. handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
and not a forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged parent testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third , Jenie's testimony is
(Madredejo vs. De Leon , supra) unless the whole instrument is in On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or corroborated by the Af idavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique's
the handwriting of the alleged parent and the facts mentioned therein on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique's father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
correspond to actual and real facts (Varela vs. Villanueva ). Thus. parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration
Irene's secondary student permanent record and her written consent Dela Cruz "Aquino." of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances
to the operation of her father, not being signed nor written in the indicating Dominique's paternity of the child give life to his
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended,
handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an authentic statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY
does not expressly require that the private handwritten instrument
writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father. WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS
containing the putative father's admission of paternity must be
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
The marriage contract of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, signed by him. They add that the deceased's handwritten
wherein it was stated that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is suf icient. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted
advice for Irene Delgado to marry, and that he was her father cannot statements in Dominique's Autobiography have been made and
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not inding
be also taken as recognition in an authentic document because it was written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant
that Dominique's handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear and
not signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado. It cannot also herein - that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living
unmistakable" recognition of the child's paternity.
be taken as recognition in a public instrument as held in the case of together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his
Lim vs. CA . Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an parents' house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two
The family pictures presented by Irene, showing Irene posing with months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child - they suf iciently
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of
Francisco Delgado, cannot be a suf icient proof of recognition. In the establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique's.
birth appearing in the civil register, OR through an admission made
case of Bercilles vs. GSIS , supra, it was held that pictures do not
in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made
constitute proof of iliation. In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it it to
in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of af ixing the
What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous acknowledgment of the child's paternity; hence, no separate action
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is not natural. But for judicial approval is necessary.
instrument wherein an admission of iliation of a legitimate or
such fact alone without a valid recognition in a record of birth, will, illegitimate child is made:
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed,
statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does not
explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. She 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece
acknowledging the child's paternity must be signed by the putative



of evidence submitted to prove iliation, there should be as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and 3. a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
strict compliance with the requirement that the same must without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is 4. common reputation respecting his pedigree,
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of 5. admission by silence,
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous 6. the testimonies of witnesses, and
by other relevant and competent evidence , it suf ices and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. 7. other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.
that the claim of iliation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the
merely corroborative of such other evidence. Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that
recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have probed
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39 on Act or
"paramount consideration " in resolving questions affecting him. declaration about pedigree.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the although they were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not
investigation of the paternity and iliation
of
children , especially true, as the respondent court observed, that this could have been entirely accurate. To set the record straight, we will stress that it was
of illegitimate
children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae because defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual only Isaac Mendoza who testi ied on this question of pedigree, and he
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to live with did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was
other conditions prejudicial to their development ." him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and
this case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child's best interests to apparently without objection from the latter. We also note that
allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be
enter it in his birth certi icate. course, not decisive of one's status. No less signi icantly, the complied
with
before
the act or declaration regarding pedigree
regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through may be admitted in evidence:
Mendoza v. CA Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been suf iciently
established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances 1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
The private respondent, Teopista Tunacao, claimed she was the 2. The pedigree must be in issue.
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her were "off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the
plaintiff's testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath she 3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose
claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and pedigree is in issue.
dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate said that her mother solely spent for her education and in another
that Casimiro helped in supporting her. 4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. 5. The relationship between the declarant and the person
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence
We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of other than such declaration.
at their respective conclusions, focused on the question of whether or
not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of Casimiro , we ind that she has nevertheless established that status
by another method . All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons
an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was understandable who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely,
because Teopista herself had apparently based her claim on this the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito,
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into
particular ground as proof of iliation. were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed iliation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of referred to the iliation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro,
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the
Court and special laws ," according to the Civil Code, or "by which were the very issues involved in the complaint for
status of
an
illegitimate
child ," it is necessary to comply with compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the
evidence or
proof
in
his
favor
that
the
defendant
is
her
father ,"
certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous " does not mean complaint was iled by Teopista or before the controversy arose
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his
that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the
shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The 1. baptismal certi icate, declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child 2. a judicial admission, such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate


of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of that the man, who was a paralytic, was taken by his mother in 1953,
his heirs. before Saturnina started having an affair with Manuel Ong in 1954. In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had illicit
Private respondent Alfredo Ong, Jr. was born on June 28, 1955, more sexual relation with Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957)
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the than a year after the paralytic had left Saturnina. The other private which, had it been openly done, would have constituted cohabitation
private respondent and her witnesses, such as the inancial doles respondent, Robert Caballes, was born on August 17, 1956. Hence, under par. 3 is proof that private respondents were conceived and
made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's husband private respondents could not have been conceived during the period born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of Ong’s
to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle of cohabitation of their mother with the unidenti ied paralytic. paternity. This relationship was further established through the
and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the testimony of Constancia Lim. The evidence for private respondents is
permission he gave Lolito Tuñ acao to build a house on his land after The Court of Appeals declared private respondents the illegitimate not negated by the admission of Saturnina Caballes that she had
he found that the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less children of Manuel Ong pursuant to Art. 283, pars. 2, 3 and 4. In relation with another man before, because the relationship
remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, regard to the inding that private respondents had been in the terminated at least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two
we can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate continuous possession of status as children of Manuel Ong. years before the birth of the second child Robert Caballes.
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
Petitioner contends that Manuel Ong’s acts of recognition were Jison v. CA
We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in intermittent and isolated and not continuous, as Alfredo Ong, Jr.
view of the other circumstances of this case, Teopista Toring claims to have encountered his putative father only four times, Under Article
175
of the Family Code, illegitimate iliation, such as
Tuñacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of whereas Robert had only two such encounters. Petitioner also MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same
Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. contends that the refusal of Manuel Ong to recognize and give support evidence as that of legitimate children.
to private respondents is proof that he never recognized them as his
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate iliation under
Ong v. CA children.
the second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has
The records of this case bear out the following indings of both the We agree that this case does not fall under pars. 2 and 3 of Art. 283 of none of the evidence mentioned in the irst paragraph, a “high
Court of Appeals and the trial court: the Civil Code. As petitioner well states, the four times during which standard of proof ” is required. Speci ically, to prove open and
(1) that Manuel Ong introduced himself to Saturnina Caballes as Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter money cannot be continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child ,
Alfredo Go; considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
(2) that Saturnina Caballes and Manuel Ong had an illicit The father’s conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
relationship from 1954 until sometime in March of 1957, uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Here there are no acts shown of continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
during which they had repeated sexual intercourses; Manuel Ong treating Alfredo Ong, Jr. as his son except on the four which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such
(3) that during this period, Manuel Ong gave support to occasions during which they met. In the case of Robert Caballes, a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
Saturnina and private respondents; there is no proof at all that Manuel Ong treated him as his son. the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations
(4) that Dolores Dy, Manuel’s common law wife, treated private in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
respondents like close relatives of Manuel Ong by giving Nor can it be said that there was proof of cohabitation in this case.
them on November 2, 1979 and January 6, 1977 tokens of While Saturnina Caballes testi ied that she and Manuel Ong lived By “continuous ” is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not
affection, such as family pictures of Dolores Dy and Manuel together for four months as husband and wife in order to justify a require any particular length of time.
Ong, and by visiting them in their house on A. Lopez Street inding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and public so
in 1980; The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one’s iliation is
as to constitute cohabitation. While the parties are not required to
(5) that on two occasions Manuel Ong gave money to Alfredo, founded on the principle that an order for recognition and support
hold themselves out as husband and wife, neither must they act
irst, as the latter’s high school graduation gift and second, may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the
clandestinely or secretly, otherwise they will be considered to have
for the latter’s educational support. family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if
merely engaged in illicit sexual intercourse.
paternity or iliation is established by clear and convincing
Two circumstances are mentioned which allegedly make it Nonetheless, we hold that the evidence in this case suf iciently evidence .
improbable that Manuel Ong was the father of private respondents. makes this case fall under the last paragraph of Art. 283, i.e., any
The irst is that Saturnina Caballes admitted having cohabited with We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by
other evidence showing that Manuel Ong was the father of private
another man before meeting Manuel Ong. The records show, however, MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that
respondents.
occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with



FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, part. In like manner, FRANCISCO’s lack of participation in the In Bagayas v.
Bagayas, this Court reiterated that courts must refrain
overwhelmingly established the following facts: preparation of the baptismal certi icates and school records from making a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action
renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former because "matters relating to the rights of iliation and heirship must
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA’s father and she was conceived at being competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the
the time when her mother was in the employ of the former; of baptism on the date so speci ied. However, despite the purpose of determining such rights." Straightforwardly, the CA is
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they precluded from determining the issue of iliation in a proceeding
overt acts and conduct which the Court of Appeals took may be admitted as part of MONINA’s testimony to corroborate her for the quieting of title and accion reivindicatoria .
pains to enumerate, thus: claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.
While there are exceptions to this rule, none obtains in this case.
Like sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the There is no allegation on record that, as regards the parties, a special
fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the certi icates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal proceeding was instituted but was inally closed and terminated. In
Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellant’s certi icates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove the proceedings before the RTC, none of the parties exhaustively
hospitalization expenses, providing her with a monthly MONINA’s iliation. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as presented evidence regarding the issue of iliation, save for the
allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellant’s proof of such iliation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as above-cited testimony of Margarito Belarmino. Neither did the trial
mother, acknowledging appellant’s paternal greetings circumstantial evidence to prove the same. court make any pronouncement as regards that issue. Given,
and calling appellant his “Hija” or child, instructing his therefore, the dearth of evidence and discussion on iliation a quo,
of ice personnel to give appellant’s monthly allowance, As to the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO’s the CA should not have adjudicated the status of Elvira Alcantara as a
recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, relatives , namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and legitimate daughter or an adopted child in succeeding to the rights of
Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINA’s Asuncion Alimon.
Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone iliation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue,
calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents,
apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these
allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the 3. Filiation not established
and other records. declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the
Labagala v. Santiago
relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and other than the documents in question. The notes and letters as Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
manifested throughout the years publicly, spontaneously, private documents not constituting "family possessions" as assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife.
continuously and in an uninterrupted manner. discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's
Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation. not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
probative value of some of MONINA’s documentary evidence. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, the notes and letters, possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive
MONINA’s reliance on the certi ication issued by the Local Civil inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINA's school records, properly periods.
Registrar concerning her birth is clearly misplaced. It is settled that be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that,
a certi icate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter. At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel
not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certi icate indicating that
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said All told, MONINA’s evidence hurdled “the high
standard
of
proof ” she is Ida Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life.
certi icates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a iliation when relying upon the provisions regarding “open and Petitioner opted not to present her birth certi icate to prove her
third person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the continuous possession” or “any other means allowed by the Rules of relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal
birth certi icate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the Court and special laws;” moreover, MONINA proved her iliation by certi icate. A baptismal certi icate , a private document, is not
inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null more than mere preponderance of evidence. conclusive proof of iliation.
and void; the mere certi icate by the registrar without the signature of
the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latter’s Sps. Alcantara v. Sps. Belen We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of


her birth certi icate but petitioner, without advancing any reason recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certi ication form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded,
that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such Vencer answered that "xxx during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his iliation with the late
were the case. We ind petitioner's silence concerning the absence of were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certi icate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D")
her birth certi icate telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within the
birth certi icate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of Jose meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled
Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil to the issuance of letters of administration.
certi icate would raise the presumption that if such evidence were Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No. 102,
presented, it would be adverse to her claim. Petitioner's counsel revised in July, 1956. We ind no irregularity here. Indeed, it is
argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all her life. However, logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used
several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is
4. Action to claim legitimacy – Prescriptive period
use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
unlikely . ARTICLE 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual inding of the Court
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and
back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago
Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, cases, the heirs shall have a period of ive years within which to
and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that
not sewn like the other entries. institute the action.
petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession.
5. Rights of a legitimate child
Locsin v. Locsin The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit
"D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore ARTICLE 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
A Certi icate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records
copy of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to of all other certi icates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in
the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein other certi icates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
stated. However, if there are material discrepancies between them, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in
the one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails . business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the
child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported provisions of this Code on Support; and
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and
survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of other details of his Residence Certi icate were not illed up. (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights
administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged granted to them by the Civil Code.
natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person The records of the instant case adequately support a inding that
in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should
established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased? have been given more faith and credence by the courts below. Illegitimate Children
Here, respondent, in order to establish his iliation with the deceased, Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his 1. How Filiation is established
presented to the trial court his Certi icate of Live Birth No. 477 mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C.
(Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo 2. When action to claim illegitimate filiation be filed
of the deceased. Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not
ARTICLE 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
appear.
When entries in the Certi icate of Live Birth recorded in the Local iliation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the children.
the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the cof in
of
the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof The action must be brought within the same period speci ied in Article
variance has to be clari ied in a more persuasive and rational manner. of iliation, lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
In this regard, we ind Vencer's explanation not convincing. would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
picture taken while standing before a cof in with others and thereafter alleged parent.
Respondent's Certi icate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was



Ilano v. CA decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on

whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate they do not directly prove petitioner’s iliation to Inocentes, they
marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father
children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as
(Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully
generally classi ied into two groups: Inocentes’ legitimate son ante litem motam.
discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed
(1) Natural , whether actual or by iction, were those born
Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of Lourdes’ denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she
conception of the child, were not disquali ied by any Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the
impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; petitioner’s daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she
Article 269, new Civil Code) and Petitioner’s irst burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. When
(2) Spurious , whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner,
those born of parents who, at the time of conception, were subsistence of their marriage. his wife and the couple’s children -- slyly explaining that she could
disquali ied to marry each other on account of certain legal not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect.
impediments. Pugeda vs. Trias ruled that when the question of whether a marriage
Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven Although a baptismal certi icate is indeed not a conclusive proof of
Merciditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following iliation, it is one of “the other means allowed under the Rules of
Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other would constitute competent evidence: Court and special laws” to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in
than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals.
children by legal iction are entitled to support and such successional 1. the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,
rights as are granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these 2. the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the
rights to them because the transgressions of social conventions wife after the alleged wedlock, Trinidad family by either consanguinity or af inity, her testimony
committed by the parents should not be visited upon them. They 3. the birth and the baptismal certi icates of children born does not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it
were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to during such union, and cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioner’s legitimacy.
surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of 4. the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly
their parents. However, before Article 287 can be availed of, there
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certi ication from the Of ice of preponderates over private respondents’ self-serving negations.
must irst
be
a recognition
of
paternity either voluntarily or by
the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and
court action . In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose Doctrinally, a collateral attack on iliation is not permitted. Rather
marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese
not because he was the true or real child of his parents but because than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his
occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to
under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a iliation and of his parents’ marriage. Hence, there is no more need to
petitioner’s case. Although the marriage contract is considered the
child. rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioner’s cause.
primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant
evidence may take its place. Baluyot v. Baluyot
it is likewise our inding, that private respondent's evidence to
establish her iliation with and the paternity of petitioner is too The trial court found that petitioners are the illegitimate children of
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by
overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the highly the deceased Enrique M. Baluyut. This inding was shared by
petitioner. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certi icate
improbable and fatally lawed testimony of Melencio and the respondent Court of Appeals.
(Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the
inherently weak denials of petitioner.
child’s father and mother. However, proof of iliation of the petitioners to the late Enrique M.
Trinidad v. CA Baluyut is not suf icient to confer upon them any hereditary right in
As for iliation , Petitioner submitted in evidence a certi ication that
the estate of the deceased. What is necessary to be established by an
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certi icate, records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last
illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to
how may marriage and iliation be proven? world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground
successional rights under Article 887 of the New Civil Code, is not
on June 17, 1956. To prove his iliation, he presented in evidence two
the fact of his bare iliation but a iliation acknowledged by the
The partition of the late Patricio’s real properties requires family pictures, his baptismal certi icate and Gerardo’s testimony.
putative parent.
preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the



alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; and to have the same proceed to inal adjudication in accordance with
Were the
petitioners voluntarily
recognized
by
the
late Enrique that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious children? been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family
petitioners were recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory
his spurious children. The petitioners’ records of birth, although in complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and
the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was even if it does, the same is barred by prescription. proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its
no authentic writing presented nor any statement in a court of record operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or
which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since
deceased. that at the time of the iling of the complaint therein, the petitioner in procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the
that case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be
With regard to compulsory recognition, Article 283 enumerates the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code inds no
cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child as his. an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect
from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his iliation to the adversely a right of private respondent and, consequently, of the
The grounds relied upon by petitioners for compelling the heirs of
latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the
Baluyut to recognize them as the heirs of the deceased were the
the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate iling of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in
alleged possession by the petitioners of the status of recognized
child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in
illegitimate spurious children and that they were conceived at the
the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
time when their mother cohabited with the deceased. Since the
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition prescribed .
petitioners were still minors at the time of the death of Enrique M.
which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The
Baluyut, the action for compulsory recognition was correctly iled by
ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of Potenciano v. Reynoso
petitioners’ guardian ad litem and mother, Norma Urbano. However,
action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of
as correctly pointed out by respondent appellate court, since the Petitioners argue that the suit against them cannot be maintained by
acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
recognition sought in the case is compulsory, strictness in the private respondents, because the latter have not established their
application of the rules applies. We agree with respondent appellate Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although iliation to Pareja as their father. Petitioners further contend that
court that the evidence presented by petitioners failed to satisfy the petitioner contends that the complaint iled by herein private Felipe B. Pareja’s unprobated Last Will and Testament cannot be used
high standard of proof required for the success of their action for respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an to establish respondents’ iliation. Again, we disagree with this
compulsory recognition. illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for contention. The way to prove the iliation of illegitimate children is
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered provided by the Family Code.
In order to prove the continuous possession of the status of a natural
as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of
child, the acts must be of such a nature that they reveal, not only the The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing
inheritance, may be joined
in
one
complaint is
not
new in
our
the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and
jurisprudence .
accidentally, but continuously. In an action for compulsory no further court action is required. Under the Family Code, iliation
acknowledgment under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code, a The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel may likewise
be
established
by
holographic
as
well
as
notarial
birth certi icate which, on its face, was not signed by the recognition has prescribed. wills , except that they no longer need to be probated or to be strictly
supposed natural father is incompetent evidence on paternity. in conformity with the formalities thereof for purposes of
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the establishing iliation.
Tayag v. CA right of action of the minor child has been vested by the iling of the
complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the Bernabe v. Alejo
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al .,
wherein the petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate
private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her share recent case of Republic vs.
CA,
et
al. where we held that the fact of children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and iling of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to ile it effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four



years from attaining majority age within which to ile an action for mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since
recognition. We deny the petition. parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be un it.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from iling an action for Article 176 of the Family Code provides that "illegitimate children
recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate
supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the their mother , and shall be entitled to support in conformity with children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change
latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father of the surname to that of respondent?
would be impaired. We do not agree. admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly
refused to register the certi icate of live birth of petitioner’s Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian’s right to illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code,
an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much as amended by RA 9255.
Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of
Code. Our answer is af irmative. We hold that Article 285 of the Civil adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if
they
Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to ile his adopter, entitled to use his surname. want to use the surname of their father or not . It is not the
petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to ile Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior prohibited by law. children.
to its enactment.
Grande v. Antonio Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his
3. Rights of an illegitimate child surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their The use of the word “shall” in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment.
- Right to legitime iliation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of “may” in Art. 176
- Right to support Family Code. This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary
- To use surname only of the mother by RA 9255. controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known.
ARTICLE 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The Republic v. Abadilla
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her iliation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if
appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public as husband and wife without the bene it of marriage. During their
their iliation has been expressly recognized by the father
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael. In
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the the Certi icates of Birth of these two children, they were registered
when an admission in a public document or private
father. with the surname “Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
as “Herson” Abadilla. Moreover, the entry in the date and place of
father has the right to institute an action before the regular
In the case at bar, respondent iled a petition for judicial approval of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as June 19, 1987 at
courts to prove non- iliation during his lifetime. The legitime
recognition of the iliation of the two children with the prayer for the Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (as amended by RA No 9255 ) correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary There is no dispute that Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla
Mossesgeld v. CA public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to are illegitimate children, their parents, Spouses Herson and
establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial Luzviminda not being married to each other even up to now.
The issue raised is whether mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil
Registrar to register a certi icate of live birth of an illegitimate child conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an of icial
During the birth of Emerson and Rafael, the Family Code was already
using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
the governing law. As per Art. 176, as illegitimate children, Emerson
paternity. and Rafael should
bear the surname of their mother , Luzviminda
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the



Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in their birth 1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to from the beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid
certi icates which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of
of parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the
surname should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their these three children cannot be legitimated nor
in
any
way be time of their conception, their parents were disquali ied from
mother’s surname. considered legitimate since at the time
they
were born,
there marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting
was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his marriage.
Leonardo v. CA irst wife , Teresita B. Tabiliran.
In this case, the term "natural children by legal iction" was invented,
In the case at bar, the primary issue to be resolved before determining Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly
petitioner's available remedy under the facts of the case is whether an born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs.
Gmur , 42 Phil. 855). The not to be confused with "natural children" as de ined under Art. 269
illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code has the Family Code in Art 177 reiterated this. but by iction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural
right to use her father's surname. This Court rules in the negative . children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: obligations of the latter. Does this cluster of rights include the right to
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
be legitimated?
parental authority of their mother. The rule applies even if 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
petitioner's father admits paternity. 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are
successional rights; enjoyed by children, depending on their iliation: use of surname,
Legitimated Children 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social succession, and support.
mores change;
1. Concept 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three.
adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of
ARTICLE 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a
marriage;
of parents who, at the time of conception of the former, were privilege, available only to natural children proper, as de ined under
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry
not disquali ied by any impediment to marry each other, or Art. 269. Although natural children by legal iction have the same
many years after the birth of the child.
were so disquali ied only because either or both of them were rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the
below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated. (as It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the right to
amended by RA No 9858 ) give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent. be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case,
ARTICLE 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent when the legally existing marriage between the children's father and
valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable De Santos v. Angeles his estranged irst wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage"
marriage shall not affect the legitimation. between their parents.
Can natural children by legal iction be legitimized?
2. Requisites The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring
A child's parents should not have been disquali ied to marry each
of the second union affected by the irst wife's death and the ensuing
Abadilla v.Tabiliran other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
celebration of a valid marriage between her widower and his
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to ostensible second wife?
respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived
illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan. Natural children by legal iction cannot be legitimized in this fashion.
and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was
Our archaic law on family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish
still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were
We hold that the charge has been duly established. An examination of Civil Law, frowns upon illegal relations such that the bene its of
married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of
the birth certi icates of respondent's three illegitimate children with legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were they
divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a
Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his intended to extend, to natural children by legal iction. Article 269
divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at the
legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as
time.
is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and de ined thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to
Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and In the case at bench, the marriage under question is considered "void exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the


understanding and security towards the full and harmonious 3. that he/she has been certi ied by his/her diplomatic or
purview of the law.
development of his/her personality. consular of ice or any appropriate government agency that
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and
child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in 4. that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
3. Rights of a legitimated child accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) country as his/her adopted son/daughter:
Convention on the Rights of the Child. ● Exemption from the 3 years residence requirements for
ARTICLE 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights (c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her foreigners
as legitimate children. biological parent(s).
Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and
4. Who can impugn legitimation and when?
Domestic Adoption Law certi ication of the alien's quali ication to adopt in his/her country
ARTICLE 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those may be waived for the following:
who are prejudiced in their rights, within 5 years from the Pre-adoption Services 1. a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within
time their cause of action accrues. the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or af inity; or
Section 5.
Location
of
Unknown
Parent(s). – It shall be the
5. Effects of legitimation duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring 2. one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
agency which has custody of the child to exert all
efforts
to Filipino spouse; or
ARTICLE 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the 3. one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
locate
his/her unknown biological parent(s) . If such efforts
time of the child's birth. jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
6. Posthumous legitimation subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she degree of consanguinity or af inity of the Filipino spouse.
shall be declared abandoned .
ARTICLE 181. The legitimation of children who died before the C. The
guardian
with respect to the ward after the termination of the
celebration of the marriage shall bene it their descendants. Who may adopt guardianship and clearance of his/her inancial accountabilities.
A. Filipino ● Joint adoption of Husband and Wife if adapter is married

Module 12. Adoption 1. of legal age,
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except i n the following cases:
2. in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights,
Concept 3. of good moral character, 1. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
4. has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, other; or
De inition of Adoption 5. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, 2. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
Adoption
is de ined as the process of making a child, whether related 6. at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse has
or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a 7. who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in signi ied his/her consent thereto; or
legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates keeping with the means of the family. 3. if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
legitimate paternity and iliation. The modern trend is to consider adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental
authority shall
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent be exercised by the spouses.
and iliation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
status. B. Foreigners Republic v. Toledano
State policy on adoption Any alien possessing the same quali ications as above stated for The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private
Filipino nationals: Provided , respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are
The Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.
Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that 1. That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its Republic of the Philippines, Private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. 2. that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three Solomon Joseph Alcala. There can be no question that private
(3) continuous years prior to the iling of the application for respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not quali ied to adopt Solomon Joseph
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted
of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, decree is entered,



one who was voluntarily committed by his/her parent(s) or legal

provision. In the irst place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a
guardian. Under The Child And Youth Welfare Code, Private Respondent Had
natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second
place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity Whose consent is necessary to the adoption The Right To File A Petition For Adoption By Herself, Without Joining
nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private Her Husband Therein. When Mrs. Bobiles Filed Her Petition, She Was
respondents spouses Clouse jointly iled the petition to adopt After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or Exercising Her Explicit And Unconditional Right Under Said Law.
Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the Upon Her Filing Thereof, Her Right To File Such Petition Alone And
Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her following to the adoption is hereby required: To Have The Same Proceed To Final Adjudication, In Accordance With
Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the The Law In Force At The Time, Was Already Vested And Cannot Be
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
United States in 1988. Prejudiced Or Impaired By The Enactment Of A New Law.
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has Cathey v. Republic
to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She legal custody of the child;
The spouses Robert H. Cathey and Helen O. Cathey petitioned the
was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations for the adoption of the
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in
age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; minor Bertha Ann Rivera. Among other things their petition alleged
her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint
that petitioners are both of legal age and residents of Manila; that
adoption by the husband and wife. (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over,
Robert Cathey is an American citizen, residing in the Philippines
of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's
since 1945 and Helen Cathey is a Filipino citizen residing here since
spouse, if any; and
birth; that they had the care and custody of the child Bertha Ann
Who may be adopted (e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. Rivera three days after her birth on January 19, 1963; that Bertha is
the natural child of Violeta O. Rivera who has given her written
The following may be adopted: Republic v. CA
consent to the adoption; that a copy of said consent is attached as
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been Zenaida Corteza Bobiles Filed A Petition To Adopt Jason Condat, Then Annex A to the petition; that the child's natural father is unknown;
administratively or judicially declared available for adoption; Six (6) Years Old And Who Had Been Living With Her Family Since He that petitioners have no children and are quali ied to adopt.
Was Four (4) Months Old.
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other Contrary to the court's opinion that genuine efforts were not exerted
spouse; The Petition For Adoption Filed By Private Respondent Zenaida C. to bring the mother to testify before it, the evidence before Us shows
Bobiles On February 2, 1988, When The Law Applicable Was that petitioners, after their own efforts had failed, sought the help of
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a quali ied adopter to improve
Presidential Decree No. 603, The Child And Youth Welfare Code. the Chief of Police of Angeles, Pampanga to locate the mother.
his/her status to that of legitimacy;
Under Said Code, A Petition For Adoption May Be Filed By Either Of
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has The Spouses Or By Both Of Them. However, After The Trial Court Even the Solicitor General, concerned about the child's welfare, iled a
been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as Rendered Its Decision And While The Case Was Pending On Appeal In brief praying for the adoption to be granted, reasoning that the
his/her own child since minority; The Court Of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, The Family Code, mother's act of leaving the baby to the Catheys three days after her
Took Effect On August 3, 1988. Under The Said New Law, Joint birth constituted abandonment which under Sec. 3, Rule 100 (now
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or Sec. 3, Rule 99) even dispenses with the need for consent.
Adoption By Husband And Wife Is Mandatory.
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died:
Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) On The Foregoing Considerations, Petitioner Contends That The Petitioner, Robert H. Cathey though an American citizen, is a resident
months from the time of death of said parent(s). Petition For Adoption Should Be Dismissed Outright As Was Filed alien entitled to remain in the Philippines, as his Immigrant
Solely By Private Respondent Without Joining Her Husband, In Certi icate of Residence shows. He is legally married to Helen Olalia
R.A. 9523 on DSWD Certi ication of Availability for Adoption Violation Of Article 185 Of The Family Code Which Requires Joint and presently is the administrative of icer of the U.S. Naval
Child Legally Available for Adoption refers to a child in whose Adoption By The Spouses. It Argues That The Family Code Must Be Construction of ice at Clark Air Base with an annual compensation of
favor a certi ication was issued by the DSWD that he/she is legally Applied Retroactively To The Petition Filed By Mrs. Bobiles, As The $6,295.00 and has P25,000 worth of personal properties in the
available for adoption after the fact of abandonment or neglect has Latter Did Not Acquire A Vested Right To Adopt Jason Condat By The Philippines. As petitioner spouses have no child of their own, they
been proven through the submission of pertinent documents, or Mere Filing Of Her Petition For Adoption. We Are Not Persuaded. wish to adopt Bertha Ann Rivera and thus make her their heir. The


welfare of the child being the paramount consideration under the law obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children." view of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted
(Art. 363, New Civil Code), the child now sought to be adopted being It can thus readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment approving the children exclude irst cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil
virtually unwanted by her own mother, who, by the way, has seven adoption does not use the word "abandoned", its indings suf iciently Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be—as in
other children to feed, We see no reason why the adoption should not contain a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes a the instant case—considered valid.
be granted. inding of abandonment.
Cang v. CA
Santos v. Aranzanso It follows, therefore, that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing,
under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that Can minor children be legally adopted without the written
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was iled the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. This is consent of a natural parent on the ground that the
latter
has
by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes. Paulina Santos was then 17 so even if such fact of abandonment is deemed jurisdictional, a point abandoned them?
years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, which was which we need not—and do not—rule upon in this case.
under oath, alleged inter alia, that the whereabouts of the minors' When private respondents iled the petition for adoption on
nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were unknown; that since For the same reason, it is not in point to argue here that Simplicio September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth
the outbreak of the war said minors have been abandoned by their Santos "in fact concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
respective parents; and that for years, since their infancy, said parents, thereby rendering the judgment obtained therein null and
children have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. A During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3,
void for being secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well recognized
guardian ad
litem
Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the 1988, the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare
that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only
minors. Said guardian ad litem forthwith gave his written consent to Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its
in a separate action brought for that purpose; not by way of collateral
the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen years of age, retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
attack.
likewise gave her written consent thereto. acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Anent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption proceedings on the
The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of
natural parents, suf ice it to mark that adoption is a proceeding
respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and
Ventura,
could
assail in the natural
parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for
in rem and that constructive notice , such as the publication duly its validity . Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99
the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of made as aforesaid, is enough where the residence of the parents is
Paulina and Aurora Santos. In sustaining their right to make such a of the Rules of Court.
unknown. Notice, moreover,
is
not
required in adoption cases in
collateral attack, the respondent Court of Appeals rested as regard to the abandoning parent . Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
abovementioned on the premise that failure to obtain the consent of
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child
or
that
the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption Assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly married to Juliana such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court
void ab initio. Reyes, it will not make any difference as far as the right of may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written
respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings is concerned. consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition
Under our law on the matter, consent by the parents to the Juliana Reyes should then be deemed to have iled the petition for
adoption is NOT an absolute requisite . for adoption alleges facts suf icient to warrant exemption from
adoption as a person whose status is single, not married. The defect compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with
would then lie only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
If the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the
to another person (a point that we do not decide in this case), could
adoption by the guardian ad litem suf ices. This brings us to the
not adopt without joining his wife in the petition. It being the In the instant case, only the af idavit of consent of the natural mother
question whether in the proceedings at bar the Court of Appeals can
estate—of Juliana Reyes that is the subject matter of the settlement was attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner’s consent, as the
still review the evidence in the adoption case and conclude that it
proceedings, the law, if any, would not affect the consideration of the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition suf iciently
was not suf iciently established therein that the parents of Paulina
right of Paulina and Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of alleged the
fact
of
abandonment of
the
minors
for
adoption
by
and Aurora Santos had abandoned them.
Juliana Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents. the natural father . The father of the children, Herbert Cang, had
Abandonment—under persuasive American rulings— imports "any already left his wife and children and had already divorced the
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents-oppositors former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
Aranzanso and Ventura and those who, like them (Pasion sisters), issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, U.S.A. which was
forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
claim an interest in the estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged irst iled at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long after he abandoned his
child". It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in family to live in the United States as an illegal immigrant.



In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.

However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily Lim These requirements on residency and certi ication of the alien's
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether quali ication to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section
he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree
determination . The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, of consanguinity or af inity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must irst whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own,
the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
petition for adoption be considered on its merits. were the children's parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). the age of majority. This is untenable. It is true that when the child
This Court inds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals reaches the age of emancipation -- that is, when he attains the age of
failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should
have Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the majority or 18 years of age -- emancipation terminates parental
elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be
petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his birth of a child. quali ied and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental
consent to the adoption unnecessary. authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt. It is Adoption has, thus, the following effects :
abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were iled,
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all petitioner had already remarried. She iled the petitions by herself, (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of
the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents recourse but to af irm the trial court's decision denying the petitions the adopter;
owe their children." for adoption. Dura lex sed lex . The law is explicit. (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish enumerated in Section 7. First , the children to be adopted are not the
but not limited to:
all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second ,
a. the right of the adopter to choose the name the child
Physical estrangement alone, without inancial and moral the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third ,
is to be known; and
desertion, is
not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
b. the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, compulsory heirs of each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care
Af idavit of Consent does not suf ice. There are certain requirements
and support for his children. He maintained regular communication Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
that Olario must comply being an American citizen . He must meet
with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all
the quali ications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as:
send packages by mail and catered to their whims. the rights of a legitimate child such as:
(1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother;
the Republic of the Philippines;
surprising why the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring (2) to receive support from their parents; and
(2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
not only evidence on inancial support but also the emotional (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
continuous years prior to the iling of the application for
exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead,
adoption; Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
the courts below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree child, enjoy all the bene its to which biological parents are entitled
to his children and the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these
is entered; such as support and successional rights .
were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts below
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
attached a high premium to the prospective adopters’ inancial status
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter's country as the
but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the adoption
latter's adopted child. None of these quali ications were
on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
shown and proved during the trial.



stating the reasons for the reduction of the period. However, for alien
Procedures in Adoption adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial custody except
The birth of Doribel disquali ied her parents from adopting.
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is
1. No hurried decision for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).
not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born
In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that the If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of
biological parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her prospective adopter(s) through a pre-adoption placement authority the child that she was her natural mother.
from making hurried decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall enjoy all the
bene its to which biological parent(s) is entitled from the date the The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The
the child, and to sustain that all measures to strengthen the family have
adoptee is placed with the prospective adopter(s). petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the
been exhausted and that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her own
ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at
home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest. 4. Issuance of the Decree of Adoption the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
2. Case Study If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been complied with, denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after
consideration of the case studies, the quali ications of the adopter(s), On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late
worker of the Department, the social service of ice of the local now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became inal
government unit, or any child-placing or child-caring agency has made a trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced
that the petitioners are quali ied to adopt, and that the adoption would and executory. That was way back in 1967. Assuming that the
case study of the adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was
adopter(s), and has submitted the report and recommendations on the redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be
entered which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of
matter to the court hearing such petition. Doribel that disquali ied Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
iled. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier,
social worker shall con irm with the Civil Registry the real identity and the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by which the child is to be before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although
registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was not known. Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the
concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered. 5. Con idential nature of adoption A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally,
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally All hearings in adoption cases shall be con idential and shall not be
as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally
available for adoption and that the documents to support this fact are open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to the
addressing the issue.
valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the adopter(s) shall adoption cases in the iles of the court, the Department, or any other
ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the adoption is in the best agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be The settled rule is that a inding that the requisite jurisdictional facts
interest of the child. kept strictly con idential. exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
If the court inds that the disclosure of the information to a third person proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it inds, after
is necessary for purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts
the conduct of the case studies, that the petition should be denied. The
and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, the court may merit the were proven.
case studies and other relevant documents and records pertaining to the
adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved by the Department. necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes for which
An adoption order implies the inding of the necessary facts and the
it may be used.
3. Supervised trial custody burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered
Sayson v. CA void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is
No petition for adoption shall be inally granted until the adopter(s) has obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such
been given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their
as the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be
(6) months within which the parties are expected to adjust capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The
essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption,
psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding petitioners deny them that right, asserting it for themselves to the
this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the
relationship. During said period, temporary parental authority shall be exclusion of all others.
decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or
vested in the adopter(s). necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand until reversed on
trial period if it inds the same to be in the best interest of the adoptee, 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If this were not the


rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be
the evidence might not be the same at all investigations, and might be their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, unfair and unconscionable.
regarded with different effect by different tribunals, and the adoption anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental
would hold it to have been of no avail. authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the
the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and good father of a family to prevent the damage. custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been
intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to Article 979 of In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air completed at the time of the air ri le shooting; in any case, actual
the Civil Code. ri le occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would adopting parents.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of
thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for Effects of adoption
represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate damages.
estate of her grandparents. 1. Parental Authority
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter,
because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in
Edmundo, to whom in the grandparents were total strangers. While it all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the
is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
latter as adopting parents as of the time of the iling of the petition for
and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer with ad air ri le. 2. Legitimacy
include the right of
representation . The relationship created The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any
The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the
child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the
the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of relationship existing
between the parents and the
minor child adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the means of the family.
under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the parents exercise supervision and control . 3. Succession
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding
that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
her grandparents’ intestate estate, the other private respondents being having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate
only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro. parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air ri le shooting iliation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting Santos, Jr. v. Republic
parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no
Effectivity of Adoption Decree actual or physical custody over the adopted child . Retroactive Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.
effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
Tamargo v. CA We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor bene it or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, pointed to Us by the Solicitor General who argues for the State in this
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged case, that relatives by blood or by af inity, are prohibited from
authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a adopting one another. The only objection raised is the alleged
assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could "incongruity" that will result, in the relation of the petitioner-wife
commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and the adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is the


legitimate brother of the adopter, will also be her son by adoption. between the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual relationship also to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
The theory is, therefore, advanced that adoption among people who result under our law on marriage when persons who are already
are related by nature should not be allowed, in order that dual related, by blood or by af inity, marry each other. But as long as the Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
relationship should not result. relationship is not within the degrees prohibited by law, such Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
marriages are allowed, notwithstanding the resulting dual child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not relationship. And as We do not ind any provision in the law that the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to be consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same prevented. Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the In the matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia precede the surname of the father.
law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural
child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by May an
illegitimate child,
upon adoption
by
her
natural
father, Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued
their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will
step-mother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all maintain her maternal lineage . It is to be noted that Article 189(3)
The name of an individual has two parts: of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in these cases where
there already exists a relationship of parent and child between them adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate
heir
of
(1) the given or proper name and
by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed when the his/her biological parent . Hence, Stephanie can well assert or
(2) the surname or family name.
adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at
relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the should be liberally construed to carry out the bene icent
surname or family name is that which identi ies the family to
law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given purposes of adoption . The interests and welfare of the adopted
paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for surname to which the child is entitled is ixed by law. reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and ful ill
unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
adoption of such children by persons who can properly rear and As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Since there is
no law prohibiting an
illegitimate child
adopted
educate them.
by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use as middle name
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in her mother’s surname, we ind no reason why she
should not
will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and be allowed to do so.
brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added. Rescission of adoption
other is by iction of law. The relationship established by the
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee Grounds for Rescission of Adoption . – Upon petition of the adoptee,
adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to
may use. with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18)
their other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the
years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may
adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the
and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children
shall bear the surname of the adopters.” Again, it is silent whether he adopter(s):
which they may have after the adoption except that the law imposes
can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of
certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s)
right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the
the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. despite having undergone counseling;
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
So even considered in relation to the rules on succession which are in (c) sexual assault or violence; or
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
pari materia, the adoption under consideration would not be (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant
objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting dual relationship



undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the i) possesses all the quali ications and none of the
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to
Philippines. disquali ications provided herein and in other applicable
rescission by the adopter(s) . However , the adopter(s) may
Philippine laws.
disinherit
the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil 2. Basic policy behind Inter-country adoption
Code. 4. Who may be adopted
It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide every neglected
Effects of rescission of adoption and abandoned child with a family that will provide such child with Only a legally
free
child may be the subject of inter-country adoption.
love and care as well as opportunities for growth and development. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the following
If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's
Towards this end, efforts shall be exerted to place the child with an documents must be submitted to the Board:
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department
adoptive family in the Philippines. However, recognizing that
shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The a) Child study;
inter-country adoption may be considered as allowing aliens, not
reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to b) Birth certi icate/foundling certi icate;
presently allowed by law to adopt Filipino children if such children
each other shall be extinguished. c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death
cannot be adopted by quali ied Filipino citizens or aliens, the State shall
The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended take measures to ensure that inter-country adoptions are allowed when certi icate of parents;
certi icate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth the same shall prove bene icial to the child's best interests, and shall d) Medical evaluation/history;
certi icate. serve and protect his/her fundamental rights. e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
f) Recent photo of the child.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as 3. Who may adopt
of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or
An alien
or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may ile involuntarily committed to the Department, in accordance with the
prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she: Child and Youth Welfare Code.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without
a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen 5. Where to ile application
prejudice to the penalties imposable under the Penal Code if the
(16) years older than the child to be adopted, at the time of
criminal acts are properly proven. An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be iled either with the
application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the
Rectification of simulated birth child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent; Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or
b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly ile for the adoption; with the Board , through an intermediate agency, whether governmental
A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and or an authorized and accredited agency, in the country of the
of a child shall not be punished for such act: responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance
and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an with the requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and
Provided , That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of
accredited counselor in his/her country; regulations to be promulgated by the Board.
the child and that he/she has been consistently considered and treated
by that person as his/her own son/daughter: d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; The application shall be supported by the following documents written
e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law; and of icially translated in English:
Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to
registration and petition for adoption shall be iled within ive (5) years give the necessary moral values and example to all his a) Birth certi icate of applicant(s);
from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: children, including the child to be adopted; b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable;
g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above
Provided, inally , That such person complies with the procedure as
under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the ten (10) years of age, in the form of sworn statement;
speci ied in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined
Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly
by the Department.
implement the provisions of this Act; licensed physician and psychologist;
Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has e) Income tax returns or any document showing the inancial
diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a capability of the applicant(s);
1. Concept similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption f) Police clearance of applicant(s);
is allowed under his/her national laws; and g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the
Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a
applicant's employer and a member of the immediate
Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing
community who have known the applicant(s) for at least ive
abroad where the petition is iled, the supervised trial custody is
(5) years; and



h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his (2) Legitimate ascendants a nd descendants ;
The governmental agency or the authorized and accredited
immediate family. (3) Parents and their legitimate children and the
agency in the country of the adoptive parents which iled the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial application for inter-country adoption shall be responsible for the trial
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the
proceedings. custody and the care of the child. It shall also provide family counseling
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
and other related services. The trial custody shall be for a period of six
6. The Inter-Country Adoption Board (5) Legitimate brothers
and
sisters , whether of full or
(6) months from the
time
of
placement. Only after the lapse of the
half-blood.
Acts as the central authority in matters relating to inter-country period of trial custody shall a decree of adoption be issued in the said
adoption. It shall act as the policy-making body for purposes of country, a copy of which shall be sent to the Board to form part of the Support between brothers and sisters
carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation and coordination records of the child.
with the Department, the different child-care and placement agencies, ARTICLE 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related,
9. Read: Rule on Adoption (Domestic and Inter-Country
adoptive agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations engaged whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support
Adoption) under A .M. No. 02-6-02-SC
in child-care and placement activities. As such, it shall: each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only
when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age,
a) Protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, traf icking
Module 13. Support is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or
and/or sale or any other practice in connection with adoption
negligence.
which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child;
b) Collect, maintain, and preserve con idential information about
What support comprises Future support cannot be waived/renounced in advance.
the child and the adoptive parents;
ARTICLE 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for De Asis v. CA
c) Monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of the
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
child through authorized and accredited agency; The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor
and transportation, in keeping with the inancial capacity of the
d) Prevent improper inancial or other gain in connection with an transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support
family.
adoption and deter improper practices contrary to this Act; cannot be the subject of a compromise.
e) Promote the development of adoption services including The education of the person entitled to be supported referred
post-legal adoption; to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to
f) License and accredit child-caring/placement agencies and training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the
collaborate with them in the placement of Filipino children; the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life
g) Accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency in the going to and from school, or to and from place of work. itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is
placement of Filipino children in their own country; and the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
Thus, support includes:
h) Cancel the license to operate and blacklist the child-caring and
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family
placement agency or adoptive agency involved from the 1. Sustenance
right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the
accreditation list of the Board upon a inding of violation of
2. Dwelling conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to
any provision under this Act.
public policy.
3. Clothing
7. Procedures in Inter-country adoption
4. Medical attendance In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in
The Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child the irst case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it
under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-country 5. Education seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his
adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board 6. Transportation paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is
shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the predicated on the existence of iliation between the minor child and
child in the Philippines before the child is placed for inter-country Who are obliged to support each other the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such
adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number that may be manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him
allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year ARTICLE 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for
for the irst ive (5) years. articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the support.
whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
8. Who will grant the decree of adoption The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the irst case,
(1) The spouses ;



which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint separation. In this case the legal evidence raises a presumption of asking support to be taken from petitioner's personal funds or
for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that law; in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a wherewithal, but from the conjugal property - which, was her
gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his mere allegation—a fact in issue—and a simple fact in issue must not documentary evidence x x x". It is, therefore, doubtful whether
putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered be confounded with an established right recognized by a inal adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite. In Quintana
into between the petitioner and respondent's mother for the judgment or based upon a legal presumption. The civil status of vs.
Lerma , the action for support was based on the obligation of the
dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned marriage being denied, and this civil status, from which the right to husband to support his wife.
upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a support is derived, being in issue, it is dif icult to see how any effect
compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has In
determining the
amount
to
be
awarded
as support pendente
prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. been made as to the existence of the cause. lite , it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being
suf icient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence
It is true that in order to claim support, iliation and/or paternity Quintana v. Lerma which it may deem suf icient to enable it to justly resolve the
must irst be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional
paternity and iliation or the lack of the same is a relationship that This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a sum of character of the resolution to be entered. Mere af idavits may satisfy
must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its money due upon a contract between the plaintiff and defendant the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the husband and wife, for support. enough that the facts be established by af idavits or other
parties. Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be documentary evidence appearing in the record.
The action is by a wife against her husband for support. It is based
binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most
upon a written contract. The agreement in suit is void. The wife, Considering the high cost of living due to in lation and the inancial
evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of iliation.
however, has a right of action against her husband for support under ability of the petitioner as shown by the documents of record, We
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal the provisions of the Civil Code and, although the contract in ind that the amount of P4,000.00 a month granted by the respondent
with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res
judicata question is void, her right of action does not for that reason fail. Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not
on the subsequent case for support. excessive.
We are of the opinion that the special defense of adultery set up by
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case 88-935 and the defendant in his answer both to the original and the amended
Sps. Lim v. Lim et al.
the lower court's pronouncement that such dismissal was with complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained
prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper. will defeat the action. Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to
provide support to respondents.
Yangco v. Rhode Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
YES. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of
It
is
a civil
status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond
action for support—the civil status of marriage or that of support. However, the alleged adultery of the wife must be cavil.
relationship. established by competent evidence. The mere allegation that the wife
has committed adultery will not bar her from the right to receive Petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default
In the present case the action for the support or alimony is brought support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or
by a woman who alleges that she is a wife; therefore it is necessary proved and sustained will defeat the action. suspension during the children's minority. Because at the time
for her to prove possession of the civil status of a spouse—that is, a respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental
marriage, without which one has no right to the title of husband or In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to
wife. pendente lite, the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the support the latter's offspring ends with them.
allegation that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had
This evidence being lacking, and the civil status of marriage being in committed adultery with any person. Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental
litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same
point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts
granting of alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the alleged adultery of his wife when the action for legal separation is during the obligee's lifetime. Also, while parental authority under
same manner as to a person who conclusively establishes by legal heard on the merits. It is to be noted, however, that as pointed out by Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents,
proof that he or she is such spouse, and sues for divorce or the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the



obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only child,

therefore , has
a right
to
support from its progenitors , whether it is suf icient prima facie to overcome the application.
upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against
suf icient support. admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil, 285).
child is only "en ventre de sa mere," just as a conceived child, even if Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of
obligation to provide suf icient legal support to her children, then all the same code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such.
school-bound. It is also undisputed that: the amount of support may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it
Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insuf icient the testamentary heir, even if .such child should be born after the would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of
to meet respondents' basic needs. This inability of Edward and death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code). course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being
Cheryl to suf iciently provide for their children shifts a portion of
suf icient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence
their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the which it may deem suf icient to enable it to justly resolve the
paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional
Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners' illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet character of the resolution to be entered.
theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme unborn", violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition
material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. Although mere af idavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the
adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more application, nevertheless, the failure to accompany the opposition
than able to ill the void. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be therewith did not justify the court in ignoring said opposition, just
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further because of this omission, inasmuch as an opportunity to present
However, petitioners' partial concurrent obligation extends only to "provided it be born later with the conditions speci ied in the evidence has been asked. It may be that the defendant could not get
their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to following article" (i. e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is hold of af idavits in support of his opposition, but he may have on
relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners' grandchildren by completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, hand other evidence of greater weight.
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived
III belong to this category. child: for if it were, the irst part of Article 40 would become entirely If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks
useless and ineffective. for an opportunity to present evidence, it is error to deny him this
Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option
opportunity.
Petitioners pray that they be allowed to ful ill their obligation by
The decision rendered by the Court of Appeals is reversed, and it is
maintaining respondents at petitioners' Makati residence. The option Support pendente lite ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunity to present
is unavailable to petitioners.
evidence in support of his defense against the application for support
Validity of the relationship must be proven irst
Here, the persons entitled to receive support are petitioners' pendente lite.
grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in ARTICLE 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for
Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of Dolina v. Vallecera
however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported This case is about a mother's claim for temporary support of an
her, is the scene of her husband's in idelity. While not rising to the from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the
level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl's charge against Edward for partnership. After the inal judgment granting the petition, the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the
concubinage did not prosper for insuf icient evidence, her steadfast obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. supposed father.
insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that
bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause. the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, Dolina evidently iled the wrong action to obtain support for her
specifying the terms of such order. child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she iled the case is the
Quimiguing v. Icao Sanchez v. Zulueta protection and safety of women and children who are victims of
abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of determining support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code. The unborn



to a protection order and to legal support. Proportionality Payment shall be made within the irst ive days of each
corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, irst When
the obligation
to
give
support to one person falls on several shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance.
establish the iliation of the child, if the same is not admitted or persons
acknowledged. Since Dolina's demand for support for her son is Jocson, et al. v. Empire Insurance Co.
based on her claim that he is Vallecera's illegitimate child, the latter ARTICLE 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon It is appellants' contention that the expenses for their education and
is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided clothing during their minority were part of the support they were
Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The child's remedy is between them in proportion to the resources of each. entitled to receive from their father, so that when the latter paid those
to ile through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, expenses from the guardianship funds, he made illegal
compulsory recognition . If iliation is beyond question, support the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support disbursements therefrom for which his bond as guardian should be
follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the made to answer.
entitled to support and successional rights but their iliation must be other obligors the share due from them.
duly proved. The contention is clearly without merit. Support does include what is
If several persons demanded support from one person and his necessary for the education and clothing of the person entitled
Dolina's remedy is to ile for the bene it of her child an action against means is not enough to satisfy their claim thereto. But support must be demanded and the right to it established
Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish before it becomes payable (Marcelo vs.
Estacio , 70 Phil., 215). For
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support
iliation and then demand support . Alternatively, she may the right to support does not arise from the mere fact of relationship,
from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should
directly ile an action for support , where the issue of even from the relationship of parents and children, but "from
the latter not have suf icient means to satisfy all claims, the
compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. imperative necessity without which it cannot be demanded, and the
order established in the preceding article shall be followed,
unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a law presumes that such necessity does not exist unless support is
Sources child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall demanded."
be preferred.
ARTICLE 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, In the present case, it does not appear that support for the minors, be
whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, How much is the amount of support to be given? it only for their education and clothing, was ever demanded from
whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the their father and the need for it duly established. The need for support,
ARTICLE 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in as already stated, cannot be presumed, and especially must this be
separate property of the person obliged to
give
support
Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or true in the present case where it appears that the minors had means
shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. of their own. In the circumstances, the disbursements made by the
separate property, the absolute community or
the
conjugal
partnership , if inancially capable, shall advance the ARTICLE 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding deceased guardian Jocson, with the approval of the court, for the
support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according education and clothing of the appellant minors cannot be said to be
obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient illegal, so that the lower court did not err in holding the guardian's
the conjugal partnership. and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the bond not liable for the same. Furthermore, the claim for support
same. should be enforced in a separate action and not in these guardianship
Order of priority proceedings.
Order of support will not be inal.
ARTICLE 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to Corral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3158 .
give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
When demandable and when payable
persons in the order herein provided: Option available to supporter
ARTICLE 203. The obligation to give support shall be
(1) The spouse; demandable from the time the person who has a right to ARTICLE 204. The person obliged to give support shall have
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be the option to ful ill the obligation either by paying the
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. allowance ixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family
(4) The brothers and sisters. dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral
Rules of Court. or legal obstacle t hereto.



Goitia v. Campos Rueda Module 14. Parental Authority

Petitioner argues that she would be deserving to take care of
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside Concept Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12 children of her own
of the conjugal domicile. herself; that she has the inancial means to carry out her plans for
ARTICLE 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents Angelica.
The husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, over the person and property of their unemancipated children,
do so by paying her a ixed pension or by receiving and maintaining parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring In the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody
her in his own home. May the husband, on account of his conduct for and rearing them for civic consciousness and ef iciency and of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was
toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the the development of their moral, mental and physical character merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or
pension? The option may not be exercised in any and all cases. and well-being. renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental
Medina v. Makabali authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
Amount of
support
to
be
received
cannot
be
attached
or
levied by authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
creditors The right of parents to the company and custody of their children is children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the
ARTICLE 205. The right to receive support under this Title as but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the case at bar.
children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and
well as any money or property obtained as such support shall
civic training and development. Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
not be levied upon on attachment or execution.
that “the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one
ARTICLE 206. When, without the knowledge of the person Zenaida Medina left the child, Joseph, with Dra. Makabali from his of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law
obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own son; had him and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed. Manila, until he recovered his health; and sent him to school. From nature of the parental relationship.
birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and
ARTICLE 207. When the person obliged to support another never paid for his expenses. Santos v. CA
unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed
by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy Zenaida proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to The CA granted custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
individual, with right of reimbursement from the person provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with maternal grandparents and not to his father, Santos, Sr.
obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother
the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the child could The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority
derive from being coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman
unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child
be compelled to stay with his mother and witness her irregular Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume
when urgently needed.
menage a trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife. control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent
Contractual support required by the latter's needs.
Zenaida’s claim for custody was denied. We see no reason to disturb
ARTICLE 208. In case of contractual support or that given by the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the right of a Parental authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical
support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. basic principle that "in all questions of the care, custody, education preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount", and intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights,
adjustment whenever modi ication is necessary due to changes that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered
separated from the mother but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare
of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the of the minor.’
parties.
Sagala-Eslao v. CA
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may
The right of the mother to the custody of her daughter is the issue in not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
the case at bar. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the
law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,



guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan The respondents, particularly Soledad, are strangers to the child. She their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, is not related to him in any degree by consanguinity or af inity. never counts the cost and her sacri ices, ever treasuring memories of
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is Furthermore, the document wherein the boy's mother is supposed to her associations with her child, however unpleasant and
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation have de initely renounced custody over the child cannot be disappointing. Flesh and blood count.
of parental authority. Even if a de inite renunciation is manifest, the reasonably interpreted as having contemplated such renunciation. In
law still disallows the same. the irst document she merely entrusted her son to Soledad because Joint exercise of parental authority
she did not have the means to bring him up. The word "entrusted "
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated cannot convey
the
idea
of
de inite and
permanent renunciation
ARTICLE 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody of the mother's custody of her child . parental authority over the persons of their common children.
and company. The child's welfare is always the paramount In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. The second document merely designated respondent Soledad as the unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
"real
guardian " of the child. The designation of one as the guardian
of another cannot and does not mean that said guardian will always Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards
The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother
assume and discharge the duties of the of ice or position. their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the
of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the
Guardianship is always or almost invariably understood to be children are under parental authority.
father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically
apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of temporary. While one is a minor or is incompetent, a guardian is Hirsch v. CA
legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of appointed; but when minority has passed or incapacity has ceased,
guardianship also terminates. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint
the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife
custody of the minor child to both parents.
has failed. While petitioner Ileana was still unable to care for and support her
child and because she could not bring said child to live with her in The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that "in all
Santos, Sr. has not been shown to be an unsuitable and un it parent.
the home of her father, she entrusted its custody and care to actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
respondent. Now that she has been emancipated from the parental social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over
authority of her father and now that she has already been married and or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
the grandparents . The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, is now in a position to care for and support her own child, this with consideration." The Child and Youth Welfare Code, in the same way,
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, the consent and desire of her husband, who joins her in the petition, unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was there can no longer be any reason for depriving her of the custody of custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the
unable to provide inancial support for his minor son from birth up her boy. In her legitimate efforts, and to have her realize her natural paramount consideration.
to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without desire in this respect, the law and this Court should give her every
permission, should not be suf icient reason to strip him of his help. The so-called "tender-age presumption " under Article 213 of the
permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having mother's un itness . Here, the mother was not shown to be
cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told,
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of mother's custody.
misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacri ice due to
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to Rule on parental authority for illegitimate child
prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacri ices and
her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy Dempsey v. RTC
and support which a father can give.
come true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster The respondent court ruled that Christina Dempsey is not entitled to
Renunciation mother and a child is not natural but arti icial. If the child turns out to the rights arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she
be a failure or forgetful of what it's foster parents had done for him, being an illegitimate child. Reliance was made on Art. 17 of P.D. 603
ARTICLE 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be said parents might yet count and appraise all that they have done and which de ines the joint parental authority of parents over their
renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and legitimate or adopted children. The respondent court’s
Celis v. Cafuir even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into



observations are wrong because the law itself protects even absent a inding of strong reasons to rule otherwise, the preference of of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
illegitimate children. a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be un it."
respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a
Illegitimate children have rights to the same nature as legitimate and competent court in favor of a parent, is not, to reiterate, permanent. It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent
adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3, P.D. 603 which spouse the "exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the
provides that “ALL children shall be entitled to the rights herein set Geoffrey, Jr., at the time when he persistently refused to be turned child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights
forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social over to his father, was already over 7 years of age. As such, he was with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have
status, political antecedents, and other factors.” Rights must be very much capable of deciding, based on his past experiences, with the right to the child’s services and earnings, and the right to direct
enforced or protected to the extent that it is possible to do so. whom he wanted to stay. Clearly, absent any evidence to the contrary, his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control,
Geoffrey, Jr. chose to live with his mother for a reason, which education, health and religion.
Rule in case of separation of parents respondent judge, consistent with the promotion of the best interest
of the child, provisionally granted through the issuance of the In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority,
ARTICLE 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental disputed Order. the joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents.
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant Cang v. CA, s upra Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The
years of age, unless the parent chosen is un it. In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
1. In case of disagreement, the court will decide who between the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan
parents will have custody.
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
2. Basic rule is if the child is below 7 years old, he should be with the Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if inancial such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
mother. If over 7 years old, he will decide. consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation
3. Best interest and welfare of the child rule whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. of parental authority. Even if a de inite renunciation is manifest, the
4. Joint custody is not encouraged. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account law still disallows the same.
Beckett v. Sarmiento, Jr the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual
needs of the child. The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody
favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly and company.
The more appropriate description of the legal situation engendered af luent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so
by the Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been
returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited idelity to guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award
jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate,
interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of custody , to the more important emotional tie between him and his children. The that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the
borrow from Espiritu v.
Court
of
Appeals , “is not permanent and children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims agreement of the spouses.
unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted .” but also because he was a person they could share with their daily
activities, problems and triumphs. While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject
In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the to a compromise, there was no factual inding in the legal separation
well-settled rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of case that petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should
separated from the mother, unless the court inds compelling reasons the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner be deprived of custody of his children or that there are grounds under
to order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of age, the child’s of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the
choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of
be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be un it. separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the custody over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The
parent designated by the court." In awarding custody, the court shall order was not implemented because of Anna Marie’s motion for
In the light of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of take into account "all relevant considerations, especially the choice reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently
the charges hurled by the complainant against him for the reason that



objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for duty of lower courts to enforce a inal decision of appellate courts in
latter was forced to ile a contempt charge against them. (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket, the law
decides for preference of the child, to stay with her grandparents instead of her
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the
separated or
divorced parents
how best to
take care
of the biological parents and who had signi ied her intention to kill herself
the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in child and that is to give custody to the separated mother . or run away from home if she should be separated from her
the legal separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in grandparents and forced to live with her biological parents.
whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is In the instant case, the petitioners claim that the child's manifestation
authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or to the trial court that she would kill herself or run away from home if
cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because, as af licted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a she should be forced to live with the private respondents is a
this Court has demonstrated earlier, the inding of the courts below child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to supervening event that would justify the cancellation of the execution
on the issue of petitioner’s abandonment of his family was based on preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime of the inal decision rendered by the Court of Appeals.
a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts under the second paragraph of Article 213.
on record. We ind merit in the petition. The manifestation of the child
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if she
Dacasin v. Del Mundo-Dacasin Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the child's should be taken away from the herein petitioners and forced to live
seventh year. From the eighth year until the child's emancipation, the with the private respondents, made during the hearings on the
For review is a dismissal of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution and reiterated in
law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual
child custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction. her letters to the members of the Court, and during the hearing of the
contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see it to
adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not case before this Court, is a circumstance that would make the
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's suit but not to
barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of execution of the judgment rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417
enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity
Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal .
considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner's suit and
call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie's custody over Stephanie. Respondent's act effectively brought the
parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second In all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property
custody. of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. This means that the
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent
sole custody of Stephanie. best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the
At the time the parties executed the Agreement, two facts are
rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case,
undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old; and (2)
A custody agreement can never be regarded as “permanent and the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in
petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of
unbending,” the simple reason being that the situation of the parents an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do
the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant
and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in
arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best interest. In a very choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her
law is also undisputed: "no child under seven
years
of
age
shall
real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child physical, moral and intellectual development.
be separated from the mother ." Clearly then, the Agreement's
object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
Balatbat v. Balatbat, 98 Phil. 998
respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old
contravenes Philippine law. Luna v. IAC Chua v. Cabangbang
Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of Petitioner's thesis is that pursuant to the mandate contained in the
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co-petitioner
has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow Civil Code she cannot be separated from her child who was less than
Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her seven years of age, and that she cannot be deprived of her parental
joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the co-respondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for authority over the child because not one of the grounds for the
Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is termination, loss, suspension or deprivation of parental authority
joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon the subject of this child custody case.
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the provided the same Code obtains in this case.
law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the The issue is whether or not procedural rules, more particularly the Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty


Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, is an issue that is now moot and petitioner's settled purpose and intention to completely forego all person to take charge of such child, or commit it to any suitable
academic. The child is now 11 years of age. Consequently, the parental responsibilities and forever relinquish all parental claim in asylum, children's home, or benevolent society."
second paragraph of Art. 363 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the respect to the child.
separation of a child under seven years of age from her mother, Laxamana v. Laxamana
"unless the court inds compelling reasons for such measure, has no She surrendered custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958.
She waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a period of ive long years, This is another sad tale of an estranged couple’s tug-of-war over the
immediate relevance.”
before she brought action to recover custody. Her claim that she did custody of their minor children.
The petitioner correctly argues, however, that the reasons relied upon not take any step to recover her child because the Cabangbangs were
In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their
by the lower court - i.e., "petitioner is not exactly an upright powerful and in luential, does not deserve any modicum of credence.
minor children, the contending parents stand on equal footing before
woman " and "it will be for the welfare of the child" - are not, A mother who really loves her child would go to any extent to be
the court who shall make the selection according to the best interest
strictly
speaking,
proper grounds
in
law to deprive a mother of reunited with her. The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner -
of the child. The child, if over seven years of age, may be permitted to
her
inherent
right
to
parental
authority over her
child . It must once informed, as she alleged, that her child was in the custody of the
choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not
be conceded that minor children - be they legitimate, recognized Cabangbangs - should have been to move heaven and earth, to use a
bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is un it. In all cases, the
natural, adopted, natural by legal iction or illegitimate, other than worn-out but still respectable cliché , in order to recover her. Yet she
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social
natural - are by law under the parental authority of both the father and lifted not a inger.
and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
the mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case may be. But
The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course of the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the
we take the view that on the basis of the aforecited seemingly
proceedings reveal that her motives do not low from the wellsprings opposing parents.
unpersuasive factual premises, the petitioner can be deprived of her
parental authority. For while in one breath Art. 313 of the Civil Code of a loving mother's heart. Upon the contrary, they are unmistakably
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have
lays down the rule that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or sel ish - nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a leverage to obtain
conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to
transferred, except in cases of guardianship or adoption approved by concessions - inancial and otherwise - either from the alleged father
submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the
the courts, or emancipation by concession," it indicates in the next or the Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for her would
psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, the father is not estopped
that "The courts may, in cases speci ied by law, deprive parents of be forthcoming - or so she thinks - from the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay.
from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said
their parental authority." And there are indeed valid reasons, as will On the other hand, if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she
psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding
presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental would agree provided they gave her a jeep and some money.
custody to the mother, is insuf icient to justify the decision. The
authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of
Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does nothing but
con irm her intention to abandon the child - from the very outset children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
It is the lower court's inding that the child was given to the
when she allowed Villareal to give her away to the Cabangbangs. It disputes which involve the family and the youth.
Cabangbangs by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of the
petitioner. In support of this inding, it cited the facts that the must be noted that the abandonment took place when the child,
While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records
petitioner did not at all - not ever - report to the authorities the barely four months old, was at the most fragile stage of life and
are inadequate as to his moral, inancial and social well-being. The
alleged disappearance of her daughter, and had not taken any step to needed the utmost care and solicitude of her mother. And for ive
results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet
see the child when she allegedly discovered that she was in the long years thereafter she did not once move to recover the child.
“completely cured” may render him un it to take custody of the
custody of the Cabangbangs. It discounted the petitioner's claim that children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is un it to
she did not make any move to recover the child because the The absence of any kinship between the child and the
provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as
Cabangbangs are powerful and in luential. Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the lower court from awarding
moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the
her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that in certain cases
children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the
Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving parents of the custody of a child may be awarded even to strangers, as against
promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their
parental authority over their children. Was the petitioner's either the father or the mother or against both. Thus, in proceedings
choice as to which parent they want to live with.
acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her child to the involving a child whose parents are separated - either legally or de
Cabangbangs tantamount to abandonment of the child ? To our facto - and where it appears that both parents are improper persons to In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court leave much
mind, mere acquiescence - without more - is not suf icient to whom, to entrust the care, custody and control of the child, "the court to be desired. While a remand of this case would mean further delay,
constitute abandonment. But the record yields a host of may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the the children’s paramount interest demand that further proceedings be
circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably betray the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet



conducted to determine the itness of both petitioner and respondent held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
to assume custody of their minor children. may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. person of her own free will.
Gualberto v. Gualberto But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove The grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the
parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a concurrence of the following requisites:
The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her
for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years un it to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor;
of age. There being no suf icient proof of any compelling reason custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from
to
separate
the
minor from his
mother, custody should remain lapses have had
an
adverse
effect on
the
welfare of the child or the petitioner by the respondent; and
with her . have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in
parental care . the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother inds its raison d’etre in the basic need It is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The dismissal of this
of minor children for their mother’s loving care. was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her petition is thus warranted.
purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence
The word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Madrinan v. Madrinan
of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory
proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the
character . Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation
There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case
in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are
sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.
separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de facto
development suffered as a result.
separation. In the present case, the parents are living separately as a The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the
matter of fact. jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs
Sombong v. CA
of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot
The principle of “best
interest
of the child ” pervades Philippine Every so often two women claim to be the legitimate parent of the be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding
cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, same child. One or the other, whether for inancial gain or for sheer the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary
minors in con lict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it cupidity, should be an impostor. The court is consequently called Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA
has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom upon to decide as to which of them should have the child’s lawful 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the custody. from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
paramount consideration. Courts are mandated to take into account minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony
all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children’s While we sympathize with the plight of petitioner who has been
with RA 7029 and BP 129 - that family courts have concurrent
well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and separated from her daughter for more than eight years, we cannot
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
the moral and social situations of each parent, other factors may also grant her the relief she is seeking, because the evidence in this case
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to does not support a inding that the child, Cristina, is in truth and in
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children. fact her child, Arabella; neither is there suf icient evidence to support We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañ aque residence
Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown by the inding that private respondents’ custody of Cristina is so illegal on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered
each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. In general, the by different judicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton
home environment and time availability; as well as the children’s purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a interpretation of RA 8369's provision on jurisdiction precisely
emotional and educational needs. particular person is legally held. addressed.
The so-called "tender-age presumption " under Article 213 of the Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where "the rightful Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that
Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in
mother's un itness . Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus
the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b)
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been



conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of different attitude than petitioner's in this case. Under the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court inds no thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The alternative than to grant private respondent no more than visitorial which she had apparently formed an attachment.
writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of rights over the child in question. Anyway, decisions even of this
jurisdiction, con licting decisions, interference by a co-equal court Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are always open to Moreover, whether a mother is a it parent for her child is a question
and judicial instability. adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before
in the light of the in lexible criterion We have mentioned above. the trial court.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court
or judicial of icer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means Tonog v. Daguimol We are not in the best position to assess the parties’ respective
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or merits vis-à -vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound
of icer. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now
case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference
incidents and ancillary matters. the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the and opinion must irst be sought in the choice of which parent should
illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from have the custody over her person.
Meaning of compelling reasons her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.
Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is Cervantes v. Fajardo
The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in now twelve years old.
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to
one or more of the following instances:
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship
1. neglect, decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His
2. abandonment, of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord
3. unemployment, the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop
4. immorality, Family Code provides that “no child under seven years of age shall be into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina
5. habitual drunkenness, separated from the mother, unless the court inds compelling reasons Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another
6. drug addiction, to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who
7. maltreatment of the child, strong bias is created in favor of the mother. eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C.
8. insanity, or Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true
9. af liction with a communicable disease. This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor.
play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be
Unson III v. Navarro and Araneta that both parents “complement each other in giving nurture and morally, physically, inancially, and socially capable of supporting
The Court inds no dif iculty in this case in seeing that it is in the best providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother
interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also
unwholesome, not to say immoral in luence, that the situation in child.” For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give
which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, custody of her child who is below seven years of age for her.
might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in “compelling reasons .”
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the
her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary
that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the
mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is
proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case,
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should
notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
have inal custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of
with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody
the said minor as the controlling factor, we ind that the appellate
hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and
court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to
in her life. No respectable father, properly concerned with the moral responsibility over him.
retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the
well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a



David v. CA regardless of which party is successful, amount to res

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., judicata in the other, are present .
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was
time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even By petitioner's iling of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage
was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody before the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the appellate court
the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven for petitioner to replead his prayer for custody for, as Articles 49 and
Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody years of age, unless the parent chosen is un it" and here it has not 50 of the Family Code provide, the custody issue
in
a declaration
of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the been shown that the mother is in any way un it to have custody of her of nullity case is deemed pleaded . Section 21 of the "Rule on
writ of habeas corpus. child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Indeed, Rule 102, §1 makes no distinction between the case of a condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to Voidable Marriages" directs the court taking jurisdiction over a
mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the him petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the custody
custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only
by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her Yu v. Yu mean that the iling of
a new action is not necessary for the court
rightful custody of her child. to consider the issue of custody of a minor .
The main issue raised in the present petition is whether the question
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may of custody over Bianca should be litigated before the Pasay RTC or The petition iled by petitioner for the declaration of nullity of
be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for before the Pasig RTC. marriage before the Pasig RTC is the more appropriate action to
giving him custody of the child. determine the issue of who between the parties should have custody
Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for over Bianca in view of the express provision of the second paragraph
before the Pasig RTC, regardless of which party would prevail, would
depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially of Article 50 of the Family Code. This must be so in line with the
constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay
considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.
RTC since the former has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
own since they were born. Cooperation, compassion, love and matter.
concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig and Pasay because Silva v. CA, s upra
it is. there is identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution
of the identical issue raised in both actions — whether it would serve Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of af luence that the best interest of Bianca to be in the custody of petitioner rather care for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their
private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, than respondent or vice versa. best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not
however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them.
support her children according to her means. Since the ground invoked in the petition for declaration of nullity of Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other
marriage before the Pasig RTC is respondent's alleged psychological is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations as provided remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this af inity
purpose, the grant of support in this case is justi ied by the fact that in Article 36 of the Family Code, the evidence to support this cause of to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the
private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor action necessarily involves evidence of respondent's itness to take well-being of the child.
child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned custody of Bianca. Thus, the elements of litis pendentia , to wit:
on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Family Code, a person obliged to give support can ful ill his a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
obligation either by paying the allowance ixed by the court or by interest in both actions; Who will exercise substitute parental authority?
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief
entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal being founded on the same facts; and ARTICLE 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed
obstacle thereto." c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, parental authority over the child in the order indicated:


(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; Substitute Parental authority by Surviving Grandparents
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of
age, unless un it or disquali ied; and
ARTICLE 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the who should be held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the evidence that he had earlier con iscated an unlicensed gun from one
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of
surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
age, unless un it or disquali ied.
designated by the court, taking into account the same disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of the authority. sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the
preference shall be observed. shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that the con iscated and
Amadora v. CA returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
What is a foundling?
At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
ARTICLE 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the
abused children and other children similarly situated, parental notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made
authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to inish his responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the
institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As other private respondents for none of them has been found to have
previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been
Who will exercise special parental authority
friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such
ARTICLE 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or would have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities. custody.
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
have special parental authority and responsibility over the held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as PSBA v. CA
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or previously de ined. Each of them was exercising only a general
custody. A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while
authority over the student body and not the direct control and on the second- loor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities in luence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to ile
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The suit for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate of icers. At
institution. evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year
the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants
Extent of liability of those exercising special parental authority gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not were not members of the school's academic community but were
ARTICLE 219. Those given the authority and responsibility necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, elements from outside the school.
under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. The law holds
minor shall be subsidiarily liable. of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve
the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article
What are the available defenses for them
was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And 2180 by ‘proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of damage.’ This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case.”
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused
establishes the rule of in loco parentis . This Court discussed this
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
doctrine in the cases of Exconde , Mendoza , Palisoc and, more
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised
recently, in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals . In all such cases, it had
quasi-delicts. due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in
been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the
maintaining that discipline.



damage should have been caused or in licted by pupils or students of And, even if there be a inding of negligence, the same could give rise Petitioner was held liable for damages arising from an accident that
the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material Cangco, supra , the negligence of the school would not be relevant the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only
the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for
acts the school could be made liable. other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles
218
and
219 of the
school’s liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a
However, does the appellate court’s failure to consider such material independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor
facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. students in the jeep.
not necessarily follow.
The school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a inding that the
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral here statutorily de ined to be the omission of that degree of diligence the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding connection to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to
the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that to the circumstances of persons, time and place. show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the
would presumably suf ice to equip him with the necessary tools and death of the victim.
skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, Effect of Parental Authority Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the
the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner
Upon the Person of their Children
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or “built-in” Civil liability of parents for damage caused by their steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that unemancipated children not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages Respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that “those
sciences when bullets are lying or grenades exploding in the air or caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to children living in their company and under their parental shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts
life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. or omissions of the unemancipated minor” was unfounded.
are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises Defense of the parents Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Libi v. IAC minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children
quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive
under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, the jeep at the time of the accident.
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not good father of a family to prevent such damages . Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However,
the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the Tamargo v. CA, s upra guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily.
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract .
Article 221 of the Family Code insists upon the requisite that the The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
yet, no inding that the contract between the school and Bautista had of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage. intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpetanos
Cuadra v. Monfort



value of the property or annual income , to guarantee the

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the the powers vested on them, as legal administrators of their child's
performance of the obligations prescribed for general
burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the property. As there was no such petition and bond, the consent given
guardians.
exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove by the father-guardian, for and in behalf of the minor son, without
it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, A veri ied petition for approval of the bond shall be iled in the prior court authorization, to the policy loan application and the
especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child surrender of said policy, was insuf icient and ineffective, and
immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place defendant-appellee was justi ied in disapproving the proposed
calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all where the property or any part thereof is situated. transactions in question.
the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special The result would be the same even if we regarded the interest of the
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every
proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the ward to be worth less than P2,000.00. While the father or mother
individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such
performance of the obligations referred to in the second would in such event be exempt from the duty of iling a bond, and
diligence the damage could have been prevented.
paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. securing judicial appointment, still the parent's authority over the
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory estate of the ward as a legal-guardian would not extend to acts of
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or encumbrance or disposition, as distinguished from acts of
due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which management or administration.
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his Hermanos v. Castro
duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her ARTICLE 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned
or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or The record shows that at the time of the agreement, the opponents
to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall and appellants herein, Ines, Concepcion, and Dolores Castro, were
act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank
be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, minors under the judicial guardianship of their mother Anacleta
not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however
unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. Cortes Vda. de Castro. Inasmuch as it does not appear that at the time
careful, would have any special reason to anticipate, much less guard
of the agreement entered into with Ambrosio Sison and the Ledesma
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the Brothers with regard to those lots, Anacleta Cortes Vda. de Castro
trait in the child's character which would re lect unfavorably on her child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's acted on behalf of said minor children, not that she had authority
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the from the court to that end, that agreement is null and void in so far as
parents. family. said minors are concerned, and does not affect their rights to those
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and ARTICLE 227. If the parents entrust the management or lots. The opponents-appellants Ines, Concepcion, and Dolores Castro,
sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all are each of them entitled to one-tenth of those three lots in undivided
administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated
obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal ownership.
child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the
sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly
conscience. De Visaya v. Suguitan, et al.
allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner
would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Upon the Property of their Children owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the
proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to Permanent Termination
ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise the child's legitime.
legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated ARTICLE 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In Nario v. Philippine American Life Ins. Co
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless It appearing that the minor bene iciary's vested interest or right on (2) Upon the death of the child; or
there is a judicial order to the contrary. the policy exceeds two thousand pesos (P2,000.00); that plaintiffs (3) Upon emancipation of the child.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income did not ile any guardianship bond to be approved by the court;
plaintiffs should have, but had not, iled a formal application or ARTICLE 232. If the person exercising parental authority has
of the child exceeds P50,000 , the parent concerned shall be
petition for guardianship, plaintiffs-parents cannot possibly exercise subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual
required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may
determine, but not less
than
ten
per
centum
(10%)
of
the



abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court the same proceeding if the court inds that the cause therefor
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the
of such authority. has ceased and will not be repeated
duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children
Terminated unless subsequently revived Corporal punishment prohibited and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the
second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 229. Unless subsequently revived by a inal judgment, ARTICLE 233. The person exercising substitute parental (as amended by RA 6809 )
parental authority also terminates: authority shall have the same authority over the person of the
child as the parents. Elcano v. Hill
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian; In
no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child engaged in child care exercising special parental authority emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
in a case iled for the purpose; in lict corporal punishment upon the child. his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
(4) Upon inal judgment of a competent court divesting appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
Salvana and Saliendra v. Gaela upheld.
the party concerned of parental authority; or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of The Court is of the opinion and so hold:
the person exercising parental authority. The marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty
(1) That the writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to
Ipso Facto Suspension enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter, any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for
even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
ARTICLE 230. Parental authority is suspended upon her own free will; and property which cannot be done by their minor married child without
conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a
(2) that neither the fact that the parents of a minor daughter their consent.
crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction .
The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the sought to compel her to marry against her will, where it
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. does not appear such a purpose has continued, nor their
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
refusal to consent to her marriage to another young man, by
Suspension by court action inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
whom she is pregnant, is a legal ground for depriving said
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that
ARTICLE 231. The court in an action iled for the purpose in a parents of their parental authority and the custody of said
of his son.
related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent daughter.
or the person exercising the same: Libi v. IAC, s upra
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
Module 15. Emancipation and Age of Majority Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children
(3) Compels the child to beg; or When emancipation takes place? under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
of lasciviousness. ARTICLE 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of
father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is
majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code
the age of eighteen years . (as amended by RA 6809 )
which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of
or the person exercising parental authority. Liability of
parents for
acts
committed
by
their
child
between
the age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
age of 18 and 21 even though married. discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but
child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of ARTICLE 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed
parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be over the person and property of the child who shall then be pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
proper under the circumstances. quali ied and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
parental authority revived in a case iled for the purpose or in Contracting marriage shall require parental
consent
until
mother. This was ampli ied by the Child and Youth Welfare Code
the age of twenty-one .



which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in ARTICLE 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer Republic v. CA
case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her or encumber speci ic separate property of the abandoning The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for
death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be spouse and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful of the family shall also be governed by these rules. nature of
a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30
offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now,
Where to ile? days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal,
without such alternative quali ication, the responsibility of the
ile with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal.
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor ARTICLE 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is
offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by notice to the other spouse, be exercised by the proper court 15 days from notice or decision or inal order appealed from and the
minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional appeal is perfected by iling a notice of appeal.
and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modi ied. trial court or its equivalent sitting in the place where either of
the spouses resides. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a
was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, Decision is immediately inal and unappealable
wrong" while a special proceeding
under Section 3(c) of the same
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
ARTICLE 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately rule is de ined as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modi ications of the
inal and executory. status, a right or a particular fact.
premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal
imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its indings that said B. Cases Involving Parental Authority The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive
petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding
familias to prevent such damages. ARTICLE 249. Petitions iled under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this
Code involving parental authority shall be veri ied. involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall
be iled and served in like manner.
● Petition iled by Parents for an Order from the court providing
Module 16. Summary Judicial Proceedings in disciplinary action against a disobedient child. (Art 223) By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is
● Disagreement between parents on how to manage the property gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent
Family Law of their child (Art 225) spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to
A. Cases involving Separation in Fact between Husband and Wife contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that
ARTICLE 250. Such petitions shall be veri ied and iled in the proper purpose is a "summary proceeding ," following above-quoted Art.
Petition for
Judicial
Approval
of
transaction that requires consent court of the place where the child resides.
41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
of the other spouse
ARTICLE 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
C. Other Matter Subject to Summary Proceedings: PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision,
or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial
authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other 1. Petition for Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death of a inter alia:
spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or Spouse (Art. 41)
cannot be obtained, a veri ied petition may be iled in court 2. Petition for the Delivery of Presumptive Legitime of the Child ARTICLE 238. Until modi ied by the Supreme Court, the
alleging the foregoing facts. (Art. 51) procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as
3. Petition for Judicial Determination of the Family Domicile in regards separation in fact between husband and wife,
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving
case of Disagreement of the Spouses (Art. 69)
the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said parental authority.
4. Petition for Judicial Determination of the Validity of the
transaction and state the reason why the required consent
Objection of A Spouse to Exercise of the Other Spouse's
thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the inal deed duly there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and
Profession or Calling (Art. 73)
executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a
5. Petition iled by the Wife Questioning the Decision Of the
the court. special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which
Husband on the Matter of Administration of the Common
calls for the iling of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary
Petition for Judicial Authority to encumber or sell the exclusive Property (Art. 96 and 124)
ordinary proceeding, the iling of a Notice of Appeal from the trial
property of
abandoning spouse to
answer
for
the expenses of
the 6. Appointment of One Spouse as the Sole Administrator of the
court's order suf iced.
family Common Property.



Code, the child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the
(not during the lifetime of the parents) and even after the death of the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the
Final Provisions parents. In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate.
lives.
Retroactivity of the Family Code It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to
Be that as it may, Article 173
of
the
Family
Code cannot be given establish his claimed iliation by "any other means allowed by the
ARTICLE 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at bench because it will Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certi icate, a
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in prejudice the vested rights
of
petitioners transmitted to
them judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. at the time of the death of their father , Eutiquio Marquino. entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
Concept of vested rights "Vested right " is a right in property which has become ixed and silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. It admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
A vested right is de ined as “one which is absolute, complete and expresses the concept of present ixed interest, which in right reason
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action. The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.” seeks to prove his iliation under the second paragraph of Article 172
Uyguangco v. CA of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged
Bernabe v. Alejo, s upra father's death in 1975.
The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent,
Tayag v. CA, s upra
who has been excluded from the family and inheritance of the It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this
Belcodero v. CA, s upra petitioners. What we are asked to decide is whether he should be time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of
allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged iliation
Sps Marquino v. IAC
who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special
For resolution are the following issues: required by the Civil Code. laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead
and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's
(1) the effect of the death of the natural child
during
the We ind that this case must be decided under a new if not entirely illegitimate iliation.
pendency of her action for recognition; dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase. The Civil Code provisions they Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the
In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She
invoke have been superseded, or at least modi ied, by the illegitimate child of Apolinario Uyguangco, whose estate is the
sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly,
corresponding articles in the Family Code, which became effective on subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be proved
she died on March 17, 1983 before she could present her proof of
August 3, 1988. in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in
recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its personal
the said complaint, where the issue of Graciano's iliation is being
nature and intransmissibility. While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the raised only collaterally. The complaint is indeed a circumvention of
(2) the effect of the death of the putative parent also documents mentioned in the irst paragraph of Art 172, he insists that Article 172, which allows proof of the illegitimate child's iliation
during the pendency of the case. he has nevertheless been “in open and continuous possession of the under the second paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of the
status of an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible as alleged parent.
We rule against its continuance. In an action for compulsory evidence of iliation.
recognition, the party in the best position to oppose the same is the Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it, established
putative parent himself. The need to hear the side of the putative Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, at least prima facie proof of his alleged iliation, we ind it regrettable
parent is an overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling receiving support from him during that time; that he has been using that his action should be barred under the said article. But that is the
effects of such an action on the peace and harmonious relationship in the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the law and we have no choice but to apply it. Even so, the Court
the family of the putative parent. petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of expresses the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of
attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one rapprochement, based on fraternal and moral ties if not the strict
Our law providing for the intransmissibility of an action for by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the pro its of the copra language of the law, that will allow the private respondent an
recognition, however, has been superseded by the New Family Code business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that equitable share in the disputed estate. Blood should tell.
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Under Article 173 of the Family he was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Castro v. CA



There is no question that the private respondent is an illegitimate and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we,
child of Eustaquio Castro. Her father Eustaquio was a widower when therefore, apply the provision of the Family Code which states that it The law simply con ines the right and duty to make funeral
Pricola Maregmen, her mother, went to live with him. The two could shall have retroactive effect since the respondents have no clear arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s
not validly enter into a marriage because when Pricola led from her vested rights in their favor. common law partner. As applied to this case, it is clear that the law
own wedding party on May 23, 1913, the wedding rites to Felix de gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she
Maya had already been solemnized. In other words, the marriage was Under the Code's Title VI on Paternity and Filiation, there are only being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
celebrated although it could not be consummated because the bride two classes of children – legitimate and illegitimate. The ine living separately from her husband and was in the United States when
hurriedly ran away to join the man she really loved. distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been he died has no controlling signi icance. To say that Rosario had, in
eliminated. effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and
We apply the more liberal provisions of the new Family Code duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is
considering the facts and equities of this case. There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
First , Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending her status renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
Eustaquio Castro who was quali ied to legally marry when she was in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.
conceived and born. From her birth on March 27, 1919 until the during her lifetime.
father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should
her father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code.
only child. The private respondents, themselves, admitted in their Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be buried
complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is a forced heir of
Effectivity of the Family Code in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted,
Eustaquio Castro. August 3, 1988 however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to
be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was
Second , the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate Modequillo v. Breva, s upra presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario
family is of no special relevance here because Benita and her mother equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the Adriano
Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. Republic Act No. 8369 or Family Court Act of 1997
family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed
There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife contesting burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and inde inite. Considering
the inheritance of Benita.
Module 17. Civil Code Provisions Not Affected this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that
supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be
Third , it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported By The Family Code said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a
and registered. There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Arts. 305-310; Arts. 356-396; and Arts. 407-413 of the Civil Code
should have known in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a
child, he should also have signed the certi icate and seen to it that it Funerals At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent
was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal with respect to his funeral are not absolute. The dispositions or
steps including judicial action to establish her status as his Order of Preference: Duty and Right to Make Funeral wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be
recognized natural child during the reglementary period to do so. Arrangement contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglementary
provisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains,
Fourth , it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding ARTICLE 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the
whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place
to Cipriano Naval. The couple continued to live with the father even funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established
of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.
after the wedding and until the latter's death. for support, under Article 199 (Family Code). In case of descendants of
the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are
Fifth , the certi icate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of
during the wake for Eustaquio may not be suf icient proof of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right
Valino v. Adriano et al.
recognition under the Civil Code but they add to the equities of this and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of
case favoring the petitioner. The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and their loved-one.
Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
To remove any possible doubts about the correctness of the indings



Care and Education of Children Illegitimate Children

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside
the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain P.D. 603 or The Child and Youth Welfare Code
ARTICLE 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear
right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent the surname of the mother.
burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who Duties of Parents
Mossesgeld v. CA, s upra
have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right , ARTICLE 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute parental
arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, R.A. 9255: Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use
the
Surname
of
authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are respected and his
also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for their Father, amending Art. 176 of F.C.
duties complied with, and shall particularly, by precept and example,
purposes of burial to have it remain in its inal resting place, or to imbue the child with highmindedness, love of country, veneration for Alba v. CA
even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may the national heroes, idelity to democracy as a way of life, and
receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry
attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.
no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected
third persons. Duty of the State through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court. Being a
ARTICLE 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties proceeding in rem , acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
Kind of Funeral Arrangements of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish, petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough
ARTICLE 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position whenever possible: that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
of the deceased. (1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional
religious instruction shall be taught as part of the curriculum at An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
ARTICLE 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed The absence of personal service of the order to Armi was therefore
the option of the parent or guardian;
wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious cured by the trial court's compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which
(2) Puericulture and similar centers;
beliefs or af iliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, requires notice by publication.
(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to
(4) Juvenile courts.
make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of Petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the
the family. Custody of Children trial court's decision. In an action for annulment of judgment, the
petitioner must convince the court that something may indeed be
Retention, Interment, Disposal or Exhumation of Dead ARTICLE 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and achieved should the assailed decision be annulled. Under Article 176
ARTICLE 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed property of children the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9255, which
shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the
of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in articles
court inds compelling reasons for such measure. surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their iliation,
294 and 305.
Cervantes v. Fajardo , supra in which case they may bear the father's surname.
Funeral Expenses
Unson III v. Navarro, s upra It is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an
Disrespect to the dead is a ground for damages
Luna v. IAC, s upra illegitimate child because she was never married to private
ARTICLE 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or respondent. Considering that the latter strongly asserts that he is not
wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the Chua v. Cabangbang, s upra the father of petitioner minor, the latter is therefore an unrecognized
deceased for damages, material and moral. illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his mother.
Use of Surnames
Construction of a tombstone or mausoleum of a spouse is
chargeable to the conjugal funds. Legitimate and Legitimated Children Grande v. Antonio, s upra
ARTICLE 34. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use Married Women
ARTICLE 310. The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be
deemed a part of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to the the surname of the father. ARTICLE 370. A married woman may use:
conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.
Adopted Children (1) Her maiden irst name and surname and add her husband's
ARTICLE 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. surname, or



(2) Her maiden irst name and her husband's surname or

using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not status for the bene it of all concerned.
(3) Her husband's full name, but pre ixing a word indicating that
prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.
she is his wife, such as "Mrs." The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for
Remo v. Sec. of Foreign Affairs However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband's change of her name from Elisea L. Santa-maria, the one she has been
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden name, giving
We agree with petitioner that the use of the word "may" in the above name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. as reason or cause therefor her being legally separated from the
provision indicates that the use of the husband's surname by the wife These instances are: husband, Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact that they have ceased to
is permissive rather than obligatory. live together for many years.
(1) death of husband,
A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the (2) divorce, There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article (3) annulment, or proceedings, the procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of
370 of the Civil Code. She is therefore allowed to use not only any of (4) nullity of marriage. Court for change of name has been observed. But from the petition
the three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name quoted in full at the beginning of this opinion, the only reason relied
upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her Since petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, she may not upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally
maiden name once she is married because when a woman marries, resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him
she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103
interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames must be based only on the severance of the marriage. which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the
indicate descent. speci ic provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards
Even assuming RA 8239 con licts with the Civil Code, the provisions to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even,
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and of RA 8239 which is a special law speci ically dealing with passport however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation
who opted to use her husband's surname in her old passport, issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil alone which is
the
only basis for
the petition at
bar—is, in
our
requested to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. opinion, not
a suf icient ground to
justify
a change of the name
arguing that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name.
of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be
to
provide
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law
Since petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of
the said
recognizes the passport applicant's constitutional right to travel.
outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances Article 372 .
However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the
when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents
she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Widow
proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the
This prohibition, according to petitioner, con licts with and, thus, property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the ARTICLE 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as
operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code. passport as long as it is valid and the same may not be surrendered to though he were still living, in accordance with article 370.
any person or entity other than the government or its representative.
Petitioner is mistaken. The con lict between Article 370 of the Civil Additional Names and Surnames, when allowed
Code and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 is more imagined than real. RA Legally Separated Wife Article 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger
8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not
ARTICLE 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will
prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her
avoid confusion.
passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
married woman who applies for a passport for the irst time to use separation. Identity of Names and Surnames between ascendants and
her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her Descendants
Laperal v. Republic
husband's surname.
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the ARTICLE 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and ascendants and descendants, the word "Junior" can be used only by a
adopt her husband's surname or continuously use her maiden name. surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
If she chooses to adopt her husband's surname in her new passport, married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no (1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that (2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
copy of the marriage certi icate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged



Change of Name persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the judicial authority to use her husband's name by pre ixing the word
use of surnames, speci ically the law which requires that legitimate "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's
ARTICLE 376. No person can change his name or surname without children shall principally use the surname of their father. surname to her maiden irst name. The law grants her such right (Art.
judicial authority. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no
Republic v. Vicencio Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as
Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek
The appealed decision granted private respondent Cynthia Vicencio’s surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of judicial con irmation of the change in her civil status in order to
petition for change of surname, from "Vicencio" to "Yu", her name is a privilege , not a matter of right, addressed to the sound revert to her maiden name as use of her former husband's is optional
step-father’s surname. discretion of the court. and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she
did not change her but only her civil status. Neither was she required
In Republic vs. Hernandez, we have recognized inter alia, the Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent’s to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after
following as suf icient grounds to warrant a change of parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with the marriage as no law requires it.
name : grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent
to bear her step-father’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted Calderon v. Republic
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely by him. While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the
dif icult to write or pronounce; surname of their respective step-fathers even without the bene it of A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be
(b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption, these instances should be distinguished from the present granted only where to do so is dearly for the best interest of the child.
adoption; case. When the mother of the petitioner iled the instant petition she had in
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since In Calderon vs. Republic , and Llaneta vs. Agrava , this Court considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one
childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-father, supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child's using his
parentage; but unlike the situation in the present case where private respondent surname. The other had considered the generous attitude of her
(e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a is a legitimate child, in those cases the children were not of husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good legitimate parentage . enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a
faith and without prejudice to anybody; and stigma of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to surname is that of her illegitimate father.
showing that the desired change of name was for a that of her step-father’s legitimate children, a plausible reason the
fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would petition for change of name was iled in the irst place. Moreover, it is While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal
prejudice public interest. laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, iction as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of
providing for all her needs as a father would his own lesh and blood. the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the However, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondent’s from taking another surname with the latter's consent and for
justi iable grounds aforecited. She says that confusion has arisen as desire to use her stepfather’s surname. Further, there is no assurance justi iable reasons.
to her parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for
as her father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if Usurpation of Name
Since she is known in society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
claims that she has been subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a
ARTICLE 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of
different surname, causing her much humiliation and Yasin v. Shari'a District Court, Third Sharia Judicial District an action for damages and other relief.
embarrassment. However, it is not denied that private respondent has Unauthorized Use of Surname
Petitioner iled with the Shari'a District Court a "Petition to resume
used Vicencio as her surname in her school records and related
the use of maiden name" in view of the dissolution of her marriage ARTICLE 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's
documents.
by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the surname gives a right of action to the latter.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another
woman. Pen Name or Stage Name
‘proper
and
reasonable
cause ’ for which the change is sought. The
assailed decision as af irmed by the appellate court does not
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek



ARTICLE 379. The employment of pen names or stage names is which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that
permitted, provided it is done in good faith and there is no injury to The following are the elements of usurpation of a name: "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence
third persons. Pen names and stage names cannot be usurped. showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his
1) there is an actual use of another's name by the defendant; second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar
Alias Name 2) the use is unauthorized; and Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he
3) the use of another's name is to designate personality or was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if
ARTICLE 380. Except as provided in the preceding article, no person identify a person.
shall use different names and surnames. he had identi ied himself properly at the Of ice of the Ombudsman,
petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a
Tolentino v. CA None of these elements exists in the case at bar and neither is there a
matter of right, and the Of ice of the Ombudsman could not refuse
claim by the petitioner that the private respondent impersonated her.
Whether or not a woman who has been legally divorced from him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to
In fact, it is of public knowledge that Constancia Tolentino is the legal
her husband may be
enjoined
by the latter's
present wife
from inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
wife of Arturo Tolentino so that all invitations for Senator and Mrs.
using the surname of her former husband. circumstances.
Tolentino are sent to Constancia. Consuelo never represented herself
after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino but simply as Mrs.
The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against Read : R.A. 9048 or the Clerical Error Act
Consuelo David-Tolentino. The private respondent has legitimate
the private respondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the
private respondent of the surname of her former husband. As it is,
children who have every right to use the surname Tolentino. Absence
action was brought only in November 23, 1971 with only verbal Ursua v. CA A. Provisional Measures in Case of Absence (Temporary
demands in between and an action to reconstitute the divorce case.
The petitioner should have iled her complaint at once when it Petitioner contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended Absence)
became evident that the private respondent would not accede to her by R. A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar
Perez" his alias. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabout
demands instead of waiting for twenty (20) years.
being unknown, and without leaving an administrator of his
Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because Art. 371 speaks The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to properties
of annulment while the case before us refers to absolute divorce curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of
ARTICLE 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his
where there is a severance of valid marriage ties. The effect of divorce different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in
whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to
is more akin to the death of the spouse where the deceased woman the ield of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of
administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party,
continues to be referred to as the Mrs. of her husband even if the using ictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be
a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that
latter has remarried rather than to annulment since in the latter case, successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly,
may be necessary.
it is as if there had been no marriage at all. claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. CA. No. 142 thus
penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the
The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil power conferred by the absentee has expired.
the petitioner would be an act of serious dislocation to her. She has register.
Appointment of an Administrator of his property. His wife is
given proof that she entered into contracts with third persons,
Hence, the use of a ictitious name or a different name belonging to prefered to administrator.
acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the
surname Tolentino. The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication ARTICLE 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article
show that she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of legal that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real having been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to
rights inasmuch as she can use her husband's surname and be fully name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify the
protected in case the respondent uses the surname Tolentino for contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench. powers, obligations and remuneration of his representative, regulating
illegal purposes. them, according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Of ice of
guardians.
There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the
this case so that the mere use of the surname Tolentino by the private messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that ARTICLE 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present
respondent cannot be said to have injured the petitioner's rights. of ice in the irst place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely shall be preferred when there is no legal separation.
serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in



(2) Marriages;
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any In these cases the administrator shall cease in the performance of his
(3) Deaths;
competent person may be appointed by the court. of ice, and the property shall be at the disposal of those who may have a
(4) legal separations;
right thereto.
B. Declaration of Absence (5) annulments of marriage;
C. Presumption of Death (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
Declaration of Absence by the court if the disappearance is two (2) (7) legitimations;
years, and if he left behind an administrator of his properties he Ordinary disappearance (7 years) (8) adoptions;
can be declared an absentee after ive (5) years. (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
ARTICLE 390. After an absence of seven years , it being unknown
ARTICLE 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the (10) naturalization;
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
(11) loss, or
absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and ive years in case the purposes, except for those of succession.
(12) recovery of citizenship;
absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his
Opening up of estate (10 years) (13) civil interdiction;
property, his absence may be declared.
(14) judicial determination of iliation;
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
Who can ask for declaration of absence (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
succession till after an absence of ten years . If he disappeared after the
(16) changes of name.
ARTICLE 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence: age of seventy- ive years, an absence of ive years shall be suf icient in
order that his succession may be opened. Duty of the Clerk of Court
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic Extra-Ordinary disappearance (4 years) ARTICLE 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and
copy of the same; other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the
ARTICLE 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy; duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to
right subordinated to the condition of his death. (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four municipality where the court is functioning.
When judicial declaration of absence will take effect
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
Civil Registrar's Books are Public Documents
ARTICLE 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and
until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general has been missing for four years ; ARTICLE 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents
circulation. (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
Administration of the Property of the Absentee years.
Kinds of Errors or Mistakes Subject of Correction
ARTICLE 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the ARTICLE 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his
husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in ARTICLE 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any
property, or that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial authority. which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been unauthorized alteration made in any civil register, to any person
alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either suffering damage thereby. However, the civil registrar may exempt
ARTICLE 389. The administration shall cease in any of the following
fruits or rents. himself from such liability if he proves that he has taken every
cases:
reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful alteration.
(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent; Civil Register
ARTICLE 413. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
(2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or
Acts, Events and Matters to be Registered without a judicial order.
intestate heirs appear;
(3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper document ARTICLE 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil Republic v. Olaybar
that he has acquired the absentee's property by purchase or status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. Respondent requested from the National Statistics Of ice (NSO) a
other title.
ARTICLE 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: Certi icate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for
her marriage with her boyfriend of ive years. Upon receipt thereof,
(1) Births; she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune,



a Korean National. She, thus, iled a Petition for Cancellation of Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial petition to oppose it was posted as well as published for the required
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the period; that notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor
portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar;
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. document examiner, testi ied. Several documents were also and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the
considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by
The issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nulli ies the subject marriage certi icate was different from respondent’s signature
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, appearing in some of her government issued identi ication cards. The What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel
petitioner raised a pure question of law. court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature and Carlito's parents rendered the trial short of the required
in the marriage certi icate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. adversary proceeding and the trial court's judgment void. Barco v.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no Court of Appeals has ruled that the publication of the order of
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The such marriage was celebrated. hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is indispensable party.
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine
recti ication affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to certi icate of marriage shows that indeed they were married on
adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v.
Valencia
in 1986, contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito
the Court has repeatedly ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper,
registry may be corrected through a petition iled under Rule 108, examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nulli ication of adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were
with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.
availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.” An the record of such marriage to re lect the truth as set forth by the Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject the minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully certi icate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial bring about no change at all in the nature of their iliation.
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the marriage to speak of. The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito's and
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. his siblings' birth certi icates of the entry "Married " opposite the
Republic v. Kho date of marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certi icate of certi ication issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was the citizenship of Carlito's mother as it appeared in his birth Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935
not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In certi icate and delete the "married" status of Carlito's parents in but have never contracted marriage legally.
other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if his and his siblings' respective birth certi icates, as well as change
there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It the date
of
marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction A certi ication from the of ice of the city registrar, which was
must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, appended to respondents' Amended Petition, likewise stated that it
from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments . has no record of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania.[29] Under
Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the
the marriage certi icate. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary "date of marriage of parents" is warranted.
proceeding. When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108
In iling the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to With respect to the correction in Carlito's birth certi icate of his
respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is name from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted
alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise satis ied. under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the
undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of
were complied with. The Of ice of the Solicitor General was likewise There is no dispute that the trial court's Order setting the petition for name falls under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of
noti ied of the petition which in turn authorized the Of ice of the City hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the Rule 108. Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103


(which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied Rule 108 of the Rules of Court citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is
with, observance of the provisions of Rule
108 suf ices to effect the merely to correct a clerical error then the court may issue an order in
Republic Act No. 9048
correction sought for. order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party,
The correction of the mother's citizenship from Chinese to Filipino General to Correct a Clerical or typographical errors in an Entry and/or the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon
as appearing in Carlito's birth record was also proper. Of note is the Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random
fact that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Judicial Order in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which
Epifania, he did not deem it to question her citizenship. Such failure will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might
to oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not as amended by Republic Act 10172 (August 19, 2012)
arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon
respondents' fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature Babiera v. Catotal, s upra the theory that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is
of the proceedings. summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving
The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth
controversial issues.
Also signi icant to note is that the birth certi icates of Carlito's Certi icate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive
siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. It is our opinion that the petition under consideration does not
disallow the correction in Carlito's birth record of his mother's Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certi icate does not prescribe, merely call for a correction of a clerical error. It involves a matter
citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal because it was allegedly void ab initio. which concerns the citizenship not only of petitioner but of his
circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the children. It is therefore an important controversial matter which can
same mother and father. Chuc Siu v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila and should only be threshed out in an appropriate action.
A summary petition as authorized by Article 412 of the New Civil
Onde v. The Of ice of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pinas Code does not lie where the matter "concerns the citizenship
not Republic v. Valencia
We agree with the RTC that the irst name of petitioner and his only of petitioner but of his children." There is need for its being In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of
mother as appearing in his birth certi icate can be corrected by the "threshed out in an appropriate action." entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of
city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no the City of Cebu was iled by respondent Leonor Valencia on January
longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point. Indeed, under Section Substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and
27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February
1 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry Records, can not be
4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3)
civil register can be corrected and changes of irst name can be done ordered by the court unless irst threshed out in an ‘appropriate
consecutive weeks in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general
by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the
noti ied or represented' (see Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court),
Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order
In Silverio v. Republic , we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction and that the summary proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code
likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar
over applications for change of irst name is now primarily lodged only justify an order to correct innocuous or clerical errors, such as
and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under
with administrative of icers. The intent and effect of said law is to misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or
the entries whose corrections were sought, to ile their opposition to
exclude the change of irst name from the coverage of Rules 103 obvious to the understanding.
the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in iled by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an Ty Kong Tin v. Republic
trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and
administrative petition for change of name is irst iled and This is a petition iled by Ty Kong Tin to correct certain mistakes presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The
subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating which had allegedly been committed in the civil register of the Civil Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor
change of irst name are primarily administrative in nature, not Registrar of the City of Manila concerning his citizenship . Valencia.
judicial.
The bone of contention was the extent or scope of the matters that We are of the opinion that the petition iled by the respondent in the
Correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certi icate that his parents may be changed or corrected as contemplated in Art 412 of the Civil lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to “not married” is a Code. An opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and
substantial correction requiring
adversarial
proceedings . Said are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place
correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert those which may affect the civil status or the nationality or thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or
him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one.



appropriate action. middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and did not make the proceedings less adversarial in nature. Considering
integrate himself into Singaporean society. that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present
In Re Petition for Change of Name Julian Carulasan Wang v. Cebu respondent's evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so,
City Civil Registrar In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such defective. In this regard, this Court adheres to the principle that even
Petitioner sought to drop
his
middle
name and have his registered change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by
use of his middle name would cause confusion and dif iculty does the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
Does
the
law
allow
one
to
drop
the
middle
name from his registered
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
name ? We have to answer in the negative .
registered complete name.
A name is said to have the following characteristics:
Republic v. Vergara
(1) It is absolute , intended to protect the individual from being The Court inds no error on the part of the CA when it held that
confused with others. respondent's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated
(2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but for correction of
entries
without a name. under Rule 108 of the same Rules. What respondent seeks is the
(3) It is ixed , unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, correction of clerical errors which were committed in the recording
and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial of her name and sex. This Court has held that not all alterations
proceedings. allowed in one's name are con ined under Rule 103 and that
(4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or
mortis causa . The evidence presented by respondent, to wit: baptismal certi icate,
(5) It is imprescriptible . certi icate of con irmation, school and employment records as well
as NBI clearance, indeed shows that, since birth, she has been using
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this the name "Kris Anne." As to her sex, she presented medical and
does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal laboratory reports to show that she is, biologically, a female.
signi icance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal Respondent's mother also testi ied that she and her husband do not
lineage or iliation of a person as well as further distinguish him have any son by the name of "Ronald" and that they only have two
from others who may have the same given name and surname as he children - herein respondent and Christian Gregor who was born on
has. April 17, 1986. Thus, it is evident from the foregoing that respondent
never had any intention to change her name and sex. What she seeks
An illegitimate child whose iliation is not recognized by the father,
is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her
bears only a given name and his mother's surname. The name of the
registered sex and given name, and to set aright the same to
unrecognized illegitimate child identi ies him as such. It is only
conform to her real sex and the name she grew up with .
when said child is recognized that he may use his father's surname,
re lecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child. In any event, even granting that Rule 103 applies to this case, it still
cannot be denied that respondent complied with the requirements for
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
an adversarial proceeding before the RTC. The publication and
individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the
posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation
certi icate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
and the notices sent to the OSG, the Civil Registrar-General and the
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a
Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City are suf icient indicia of an adverse
middle name, and a surname.
proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and

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Compiled by Rehne Gibb N. Larena | JD-NT-4 | AY 2020-21 | University of San Carlos

Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 2 of 142

Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 3 of 142

Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 4 of 142

one of those authorized in our country. entitled thereto.

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ARTICLE 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory Waiver of Rights

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Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 10 of 142

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bereft of merit. University of the East v. Jader

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Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 14 of 142

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Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 17 of 142

Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 18 of 142

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however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before

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were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in

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material interest in maintaining the

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solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or

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Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 37 of 142

Ninal v. Bayadog, s upra ⭐Domingo v. CA

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Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 40 of 142

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unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or

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Based on the Syllabus of Dean Monteclar By RGL 46 of 142

force, intimidation or undue in luence disappeared or

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Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of

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(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the

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