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Regulations Lecture Notes - Auer (PART 2) - v6 22 10 14
Regulations Lecture Notes - Auer (PART 2) - v6 22 10 14
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Mag. Robert Auer, M.B.L.-HSG
Attorney-at-Law & Founding Partner – auer-law, Bad Vöslau, Austria
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Mag. Robert Auer, M.B.L.-HSG
Education:
• Diploma (Mag. iur.) in Law at the University of Vienna
• Diploma (Executive M.B.L.-HSG) in European and International Business Law at the University of St. Gallen
• Bar exam taken at the upper regional court of Vienna with distinctions („Rechtsanwaltsprüfung“)
• Ongoing advanced training in project finance, law and social competence matters
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Content, Evaluation Method, Bibliography
Part 2 – Auer
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Risk appétit: moral hazard & payment systems
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Why Corporate Governance?
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Why Corporate Governance?
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Why Corporate Governance?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKYWhOeYv3w
• Founded by Calisto Tanzi in 1961
• Parmalat collapsed in 2003 with a € 14bn ($20bn; £13bn) hole in its accounts in what
remains Europe's biggest bankruptcy.
• In 2008 Tanzi was found to have embezzled an estimated 800 million euros from the
company, and was jailed for fraud
• Tanzi was found guilty of falsifying accounts, misleading investors and manipulating
the market while he was CEO of the Italian dairy group, particularly between 1992 and
2003
• Parmalat’s financial statements had been misstated since at least 1990.
• Parmalat’s fraud began in 1990 as an attempt to cover losses at a South American
subsidiary.
• 1997–2001: Parmalat begins using derivative transactions to hide losses at its recently
acquired non-dairy subsidiaries.
• 1999: Parmalat enters into billions of euros’ worth of interest rate swap contracts
through its Bonlat offshore subsidiary. Parmalat also issued bonds to generate cash,
using Bonlat’s (fake) assets as collateral.
• 2003: CEO Calisto Tanzi steps down as the Parmalat board hires turnaround expert
Enrico Bondi to resolve the crisis, engaging PWC to review Parmalat’s finances.
• Also, Bank of America’s New York branch notifies secondary auditor Grant Thornton
that subsidiary Bonlat’s bank account, which allegedly held €3.95 billion of cash and
equivalents, does not exist.
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Factors shaping Corporate Governance
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Main theories associated with Corporate Governance
Agency Stewardship
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Stakeholder theory vs. transaction cost economics
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Context and structure of a corproate governance system
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Summary of background to Corporate Governance
• Various scandals led to the development of good governance principles for corporations, i.e.
Corporate Governance constituted by codifications
• Corporate Governance is a relatively new area and its development has been affected by
theories from a number of disciplines; agency theory probably having had the most significant
influence
• In Central Europe, stakeholder theory is more common, taking into account a wider group of
constituents
• The development of Corporate Governance is a global occurrence and, as such, is a
complex area, including legal, cultural, ownership and other structural differences.
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Agenda
0. Introduction
1. History and triggers of Corporate Governance
2. Corporate Governance and Codes around the world
3. Selected Codifications
– Austrian and German Corporate Governance Code
– The impact of the UK Corporate Governance Code and Stewardship Code on the treasury function
– Governance regulation including Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
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Corporate Governance Codes around the world
EU-Memberstates
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Corporate Governance Codes around the world
Comply or Explain
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Corporate Governance Codes around the world
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Corporate Governance Codes around the world
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Corporate Governance Codes around the world
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Basics in company law
Source: ICFJ
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Company Forms
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Agenda
0. Introduction
1. History and triggers of Corporate Governance
2. Corporate Governance and Codes around the world
3. Selected Codifications
– Austrian and German Corporate Governance Code
– The impact of the UK Corporate Governance Code and Stewardship Code on the treasury function
– Governance regulation including Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
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The Austrian Corporate Governance Code
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Case study – Erste Group Bank AG
• Erste Bank has declared its commitment to the Austrian Corporate Governance Code („ACGC“) since 2003
• In Principle, Erste Bank fully complies with all L-, C-, and R-Rules, with 2 exceptions:
• C-Rules 2 and 52a
DIE ERSTE österreichische Spar-Casse
Privatstiftung is, however, granted the right to
nominate up to one third of the members of the
supervisory board to be elected by the shareholder
meeting as long as it is liable for all present and
One vote per share and no right to nominate future liabilitiesof Erste Group Bank AG in case of
members of the supervisory board its insolvency according to section 92 para 9 of the
Austrian Banking Act..
COMPLY OR EXPLAIN 30
Case study - Erste Group Bank AG
External evaluation:
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Specific sources of conflict: Agency relationships
Management Supervisory
Shareholders
(Board) Board
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Management - Shareholder conflicts
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Supervisory Board - Shareholder conflicts
The supervisory board is an intermediary between the shareholders and management, and
represent shareholders’ interests by:
• Monitoring managers;
• Approving strategies and policies;
• Approving mergers and acquisitions;
• Approving audit contracts;
• Reviewing audit contracts and financial contracts;
• Establishing management compensation;
• Disciplining poorly performing managers.
Austria: See Section 95 Austrian Stock Corporation Act – catalogue of business transactions requiring
approval of the supervisory board
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Responsibilities of the Supervisory Board
Establish corporate
values and governance
structures for the
company;
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Examples of environmental, social and governance risks
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Risks of weak corporate governance
Strategic
Accounting risk Asset risk Liability risk
policy risk
• The risk that a • The risk that the • The risk that • The risk that
company’s firm’s assets management managers may
financial may be will enter into enter into
statement misappropriated excessive transactions or
recognition and by managers or obligations that incur other
related directors. destroy the business risks
disclosures are value of that are self-
incomplete, shareholders’ serving and may
misleading, or equity. not be in the
materially best long-term
misstated. interest of
shareholders.
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Benefits from strong corporate governance
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Corporate Governance Issues
Minimum public notice period for general shareholder meetings and
requirements for sending notification to all shareholders
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Corporate Governance Issues
Deadline for holding the meeting after shareholder requests
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Corporate Governance Issues
Minimum shareholding requirements to request a shareholder meeting and to
place items on the agenda
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The German Corporate Governance Code
Recommends
appointment
basis for
drafts
1. German Corporate Governance Code (early 2002)
contributes to
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The German Corporate Governance Code
• The German Corporate Governance Code (the “Code”) incorporates significant statutory
requirements for the management and supervision (governance) of German listed
corporations and contains internationally and nationally accepted standards of good and
responsible governance.
• The objective of the Code is to make the German Corporate Governance system transparent
and understandable. It aims to promote confidence in the management and supervision of
German listed corporations by international and national investors, customers, employees and the
general public.
• The Code highlights the obligation of the Management and Supervisory Boards to ensure
the continued existence of the company and its sustainable value creation in line with the
principles of the social market economy (the company’s best interests).
• A dual board management system is required by law for German stock corporations
• The Management Board is responsible for managing the company. Its members are jointly
accountable for managing the company. The Chair coordinates the work of the Management Board.
• The Supervisory Board appoints, supervises and advises the members of the Management
Board, and is directly involved in decisions of fundamental importance to the company. The
Chair of the Supervisory Board coordinates the work of the Supervisory Board.
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The German Corporate Governance Code
• The members of the Supervisory Board are elected by the shareholders at the
corporation’s General Meeting.
• 30% of Supervisory Board members of companies with more than 500 employees in
Germany have to be employee representatives. The statutory percentage of employee
representatives is 50% for companies with more than 2,000 employees in Germany.
• For companies with more than 2,000 employees, the Chair of the Supervisory Board, who is
almost always a shareholder representative, has the casting vote in case of tied votes.
• Shareholder representatives and employee representatives are obliged in equal measure to act in
the best interests of the company.
• Alternatively, German corporations may choose the legal structure of the European Company
(Societas Europaea, SE), an internationally widespread legal structure that provides for a one-tier
system of governance (Administrative Board).
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The German Corporate Governance Code
• Recommendations of the Code are indicated in the text by using the word “shall”.
– Corporations may depart from recommendations, but in this case they are obliged to
disclose and explain any departures each year (comply or explain). This enables
corporations to reflect sector- or company-specific requirements.
– Well-justified departures from recommendations of the Code may be in the best interests of
good corporate governance. Thus, the Code contributes to greater flexibility and more self-
regulation in the German corporate constitution.
• Additionally, the Code contains suggestions from which corporations may depart without
disclosure; suggestions are indicated in the text by using the word “should”.
• The remaining passages of the Code that do not use these words relate to descriptions of
statutory requirements and explanations.
• Code stipulations covering not only the corporation itself but also its group entities use the word
“company” rather than “corporation”.
• Primarily, the Code addresses listed corporations and corporations with access to capital
markets pursuant to section 161 (1) sentence 2 of the Stock Corporation Act. Corporations
whose securities are not publicly traded are also encouraged to follow the Code.
• Listed credit institutions and insurance undertakings are subject to the applicable
prudential requirements, which are not reflected in the Code (see Regulation (EU)
No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU)
No 648/2012 Text with EEA relevance).
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Co-determination in German companies
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GdvhOgto56k
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Objectives of co-determination
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Work council rights – German co-determination model
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Legislation on company & group level co-determination
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Co-determination according to the Coal and Steel Co-
determination Act of 1951
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Co-determination according to the Third Party Act of 2004
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Co-determination according to the Co-determination Act of
1976
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Co-determination in other countries
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Co-determination in other countries – level of participation
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Co-determination in other countries – level of participation
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Co-determination in other countries – level of participation
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The Stewardship Code 2010 (last revised 2020)
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Key problem related to stewardship
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Key problem related to stewardship
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Key problem related to stewardship
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The Stewardship Code 2010 (last revised 2020)
Overall objective
Comply or Explain
• Enhance the quality of
dialogue of institutional
investors with companies
to help improve long-term
returns to shareholders
• Reduce the risk of
catastrophic outcomes
due to bad strategic
decisions
• Help with the efficient
exercise of governance
responsibilities
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Key problem related to stewardship
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Key problem related to stewardship
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Key problem related to stewardship
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Stewardship Codes around the World
Italy 2015
South Africa
2011
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Group exercise – Corporate Governance Codes around the
World
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Group exercise – Corporate Governance Codes around the
World
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Excursus: The Shareholder Rights Directive (EU) 2017/828
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Excursus: The new Shareholder Rights Directive (EU) 2017/828
• Background: The Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II) sets out to strenghten the position of
shareholders and to ensure that decisions are made for the long-term stability of a company and by
amending SRD I (Directive 2007/36/EC).
• Goal: Improving corporate governance in companies whose securities are traded on the EU‘s
regulated markets.
• Applies to: companies with their registered office in a Member State AND shares of the company
are admitted to trading on a regulated market situated or operating within a Member State
Facilitation of exercise of
Transmission of information Asset managers and proxy advisors
shareholder rights
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Excursus: The new Shareholder Rights Directive (EU) 2017/828
• Right for companies to identify their
shareholders (Article 3a)
Identification of shareholders – Possibility for Member States to exclude
from identifications
– shareholders holding no more than 0,5%
of shares
Transmission of information • Transmission of information between
companies and shareholders (Article 3b)
• Facilitating exercise of shareholder rights
(Article 3c)
Facilitation of exercise of
shareholder rights – Confirmation of votes
• Proportionality of costs and non-
discrimination (Article 3d)
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Excursus: The new Shareholder Rights Directive (EU) 2017/828
• Disclosure of the engagement policy
(institutional investors and asset managers)
(Article 3g)
– Description of the engagement policy
– Annual implementation of the policy
Transparency of institutional • Disclosure requirements for institutional
investors investors (Article 3h)
– Main elements of the investment strategy
– Key information about the mandates
Asset managers and proxy advisors • Disclosure requirements for asset
managers (Article 3i)
– Key information about investment
approach and execution of mandate
• Transparency of proxy advisors (Article 3j)
– Report about code of conduct applied
– Key information about the activitites
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Excursus: The new Shareholder Rights Directive (EU) 2017/828
• Remuneration policy (Article 9a)
– Content of the policy
– Vote by shareholders
• Remuneration report (Article 9b)
– Content of the report
Remuneration of directors and
– Vote by shareholders
related party transactions
– Protection of personal data
• Related party transactions (Article 9c)
– Public announcement
– Approval rules
– Optional fairness report
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The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018
• 5 key sections
• 18 main principles
• detailed by supporting principles
• 41 provisions
• Comply or explain
• Applies to all companies with a
premium listing, whether incorporated in
the UK or elsewhere
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The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018
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The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018
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The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018
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The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018
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The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018
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Developments in Corporate Governance in the UK
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Sarbanes Oxley Act – Introduction
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xW9pSAwaeO0
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Sarbanes-Oxley enhance corporate responsibility, financial
disclosures and fight against corporate/accounting fraud I/III
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Sarbanes-Oxley) into law
Timing Sarbanes-Oxley is the most important securities legislation affecting public
companies, and thus, officers and directors of public companies, since the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was formed in 1934
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) is a United States federal law which
mandated a number of reforms to enhance corporate responsibility, enhance
financial disclosures and combat corporate and accounting fraud.
Objective • Improvement in quality & transparency in financial reporting
• Independent audit & accounting services for the listed companies.
• Creation of Public Accounting Oversight Board
• Increased corporate responsibility
SOX applies to all public companies in the U.S. and international companies
that have registered equity or debt securities with the Securities and
Applicability
Exchange Commission and the accounting firms that provide auditing
services to them
Source: Deloitte; Web Search
85
Sarbanes-Oxley enhance corporate responsibility, financial
disclosures and fight against corporate/accounting fraud II/III
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Sarbanes-Oxley enhance corporate responsibility, financial
disclosures and fight against corporate/accounting fraud III/III
Certification
•CEOs and CFO must certify periodic SEC reports (both the 10Q and 10K) Corporate
governance
•Independent Audit Committee directly responsible for appointment, pre-approval,
compensation, and oversight of the public accounting firm, including the resolution of
disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial reporting
Source: Deloitte
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Main differences between SOX and UK CGC
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Main differences between SOX and UK CGC
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Agenda
0. Introduction
1. History and triggers of Corporate Governance
2. Corporate Governance and Codes around the world
3. Selected Codifications
– The impact of the UK Corporate Governance Code and Stewardship Code on the treasury function
– Governance regulation including Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
– German and Austrian Corporate Governance Code
90
Compliance – definition
▪ Compliance
„Compliance“ can be defined as „behaviour
in accordance with legal regulations and
compliance with regulative provisions“ (for
example: laws, contractual obligations and
internal regulations or directives)
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Compliance – a necessary evil
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Corruption
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How to identify corruption risk?
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Compliance – organizational issues
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Compliance management systems – IDW 980
7. Compliance 1. Compliance
monitoring and culture
improvement
• CMS Training
• Whistleblower System 6. Compliance
communication 2. Compliance
and information objectives
5. Compliance 3. Compliance
organisation risks
• Senior Management
• Compliance Officer (CO) 4. Compliance
programme
97
Targets of compliance management systems
▪ Protection of senior management, executive staff, employees, customers
▪ Creates Trust of customers and partners in the structure of the organisation
▪ Promotes Identification with the organisation
▪ Provides Confidence in handling legally or criminally relevant situations
▪ Creation of values and guidelines
▪ Communication to the public and other stakeholders, that the organisation operates actively
in terms of a corruption-free business
98
KYC – Know Your Customer
https://www.lexisnexis.com/dd/auth/checkbrow
ser.do;jsessionid=71D635E5CC68823CE9D21
5DEB732FA81.2fOO7i2HNV9jqG0qp8Si7Q?t=
1511516761030&bhcp=1
99
Sanctions and compliance with Sanctions
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y84WKS_r
https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/
OQ8
Sanction regimes
100
Sanction measures
Arms
Arms embargo Arms export Arms import
procurement
Asset freeze
and prohibition Embargo on Dual-use goods Financial
to make funds dual-use goods export sanctions
available
101
Sanctions measures continued
Restrictions on
Prohibition to satisfy Restrictions on
Ports and vessels equipment used for
claims admission
internal repression
Gold, precious
Restrictions on goods Aviation and jet fuel Cultural property
metals, diamonds
Telecommunications
Luxury goods Other items Petrol products
equipment
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Fines for non-compliance
103
Compliance with regulations related to Financial Markets
AML directive
Prospectus regulation
Transparency directive
105
Sanctions for breach of financial market regulations
AML directive
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Sanctions for breach of financial market regulations
Prospectus directive
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Sanctions for breach of financial market regulations
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Sanctions for breach of financial market regulations
109
Sanctions for breach of financial market regulations
Transparency directive
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Sanctions for breach of financial market regulations
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Repetition of most relevant issues
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Contact Details Robert Auer
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