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(Sample 2) Runge - Et - Al - 2022 - SMJ
(Sample 2) Runge - Et - Al - 2022 - SMJ
Research question
How each dimension of overlap shapes a firm’s learning and competitive tension in R&D
alliance?
※Key argument: Product market overlap is the only factor that increases the firm’s
motivation to compete in R&D alliance.
Product market overlap may lead the firm to exploit knowledge
misappropriation opportunities in the alliance instead of pursuing common
objectives.
3. Methodology
Sample
215 R&D alliances formed by 94 U.S. pharmaceutical firms between 1996 and 2013
- Primary operations in SIC codes: 2834, 2836
- Active in intra-industry R&D alliances and patenting
- Starting year (1996) and U.S.: due to data availability
- End year (2013): adequate time after alliance formation for inventions to be
patented
Data source
SDC platinum database: identify R&D alliances
- Ambiguous cases: validated using the LexisNexis database, U.S. SEC 10-K filings
PATSTAT
Firms’ product markets
Compustat
- Missing data were complemented by using SEC 10-K filings
Variables
Dependent variable: invention performance
- Sum of a firm’s value-weighted patents over the alliance’s duration
Alliance’s duration: 4-year windows (common assumption in literature), 1-year
lag after alliance announcement
Value-weighted: a weighted index considering the number of claims, forward
citations of a patent within 5 years of application, backward citations of a
patent
Independent variables
Technological overlap (similarity of the firms’ technological profiles)
- Each firm’s distribution of all patents across technology class
Geographical overlap
- Using zip code of the firms’ headquarters…
- D: distance in miles
- i: firm; j: partner; r: radius of the earth; lat: latitude; long: longitude
Control variables
- Firm level: firm size (ln(1+total assets); firm age (ln(1+a firm’s years since
incorporation); firm R&D expenditures (in billions of U.S. dollars); firm alliance
experience (number of alliances a firm had formed in the 5 years preceding the
alliance); firm prior ties (number of prior alliances with the partner)
- Firm relative scale (firm’s assets / partner’s assets); firm past performance (ROA),
firm financial slack ((current assets – inventory) / current liabilities); market
pressure (HHI of peer firms’ revenues); firm vertical relatedness; firm geographical
dispersion (number of U.S. states where a firm has business activities)
- Alliance level: alliance scope (whether a focal alliance includes manufacturing
and/or marketing in addition to R&D); alliance partner geographical dispersion;
equity joint venture (whether the focal alliance is organized as joint venture)
- Firm and year fixed effects, business similarity dummy (biotech X pharma)
Model
Unit of analysis: each focal firm alliance
Negative binomial regression model
4. Result
All hypotheses were supported except for Hypothesis 2 (Geographical overlap ~
invention performance)
Robustness check
- Alternative measures of patent value
- Inverted U-shaped association between technological (market) overlap and
invention performance no support
- Run regressions with uncentered measures of independent variables
- Excluding outliers (cutoff: top and bottom 2.5%)
- Interaction between technological- and geographical-overlap no support
- Three-way interaction effect
5. Discussion
Critic
- This paper assumes that firms sharing same primary SIC codes are in competitive
relationship with each other. However, I think it is better to narrow down the scope
of competitors (such as firms whose patents’ therapeutic classes are highly
overlapped) because not all pharmaceutical firms may regard others as
competitors.
>> (Duyster et al., 2020) “…we identified competitors by tracking publicly traded
firms that had at least one patent class overlapping with those of the focal firm in the
past five years”
>> confusing part: increase in technological- and/or market overlap itself implies
that partners in R&D alliance are more likely to be in a competitive relationship
Additional idea
- R&D alliance partner change
(Jain & Mitchell, 2022) The impact of scientist specialization on R&D
productivity and impact, moderating role of team member change
According to Jain & Mitchell (2022), less change in collaborator within a
team enables the effective division of labor, whereas frequent change
disrupts existing coordinated activities. Applying Jain & Mitchell (2022)’s
logic to this paper (though Jain & Mitchell was collaborator change in
inventor team), what if there occurs firm’s R&D alliance partner change?
Would it be any dynamics, or change in learning and competitive tension
over time depending on the change in alliance partners?
Knowledge misappropriation
- Authors of this paper argue that increase in competitive tension in alliance
relationship makes partners to become less transparent in knowledge sharing,
which in turn leads to decrease in invention performance of the firm.
- However, it may be possible that the focal firm may create complementary or
process technology for the partner, which may receive few forward citations. If we d