Emilio’s Effort to Diplomitize

Speaking inside the mind of the Philippine President himself, Emilio did not want to fight the United
States. As much as possible he would send envoys and treat war matters with utmost diplomacy. Emilio
tasked Felipe Agoncillo to set a mission of peace between the two nations, a mission to acquaint
President McKinley with our own government (Malolos), prevent the country to return to Spain, and if
accepted, to help run Philippines with American advice and military protection (Aguinaldo and Pacis
1957, 83 - 84).

McKinley only treated Agoncillo more as a nuisance than an assistance than a wise decision. The
President, however, is interested in becoming Philippines protectorate under the memorandum signed
by David J Hill, a former assistant secretary of state. In this document, the Philippines is extended and
recognized as a protectorate status which was nonviable since the Philippines has the presence of a
responsible and effective government which was the duly standing Republic of Malolos (90). This
however, continued the American administration to set foot towards occupation.

Miong Did Not Want to Fight America

Aguinaldo’s efforts in avoiding the war between America and recognizing Philippine sovereignty has
always been his intention. In his book My Memoirs, he wrote these books in an objective to help
historians synthesize details, to refresh the minds of the present generation the difficulties and
sacrifices that their elders had made in a struggle for independence, and to arouse a genuine love and
desire to defend the country. (Aguinaldo 1967, vi).

The outbreak on February 4, 1899 can be avoided if only McKinley or the US War Department have
ordered their commanders in Manila to avoid the fight. Even efforts from Aguinaldo himself were
turned down with arrogance (Aguinaldo and Pacis 1957, 93). On his personal account, Miong told
Agoncillo’s experience in Washington. Despite McKinley accepted Agoncillo in the White House,
McKinley secretly instructed the his Secretary of State, Aivay Adee that the President (McKinley) will be
receiving him unofficially and informally and by doing so, Agonicllo was not recognized as an official
envoy from the Philippines.

McKinley has purposely put Philippines’ emissary down by acting deaf towards Philippine’s request in
recognition of an independent nation. Further on, Emilio Aguinaldo’s later actions towards the war
were ultimately self-defense. As he emphasized that the act of resistance to America is not defiance but
an upholding of America's value of a Jeffersonian government, a government that is free-ruling and
independent

We contended then, and I feel that we were in the right, thatSpain could not convey sovereignty
over the Philippines to the United States because we had superseded the Spanish government
with our own. Our act of resistance against American attack was not, therefore, a defiance of
American sovereignty.We were in our own country upholding to the death the sound and sacred
Jeffersonian principle that government should be with the consent of the governed.
But the period of discussion was over. Logic palled before the brutal facts of war. Self-defense
was our only choice.
- Emilio Aguinaldo in Second Look At America
(Aguinaldo and Pacis, 100)

The Shot that Started it All

Edwin Wildman was a former Vice and Deputy Consul-General and to events that happened during the
Philippine-American War. He is also a war correspondent that covers first-hand stories during the
Philippine revolt. His real-time experience during the war and scenes from the battlefield have been
engraved in memory; he wanted to write the account of Aguinaldo with earnest and purport sincerity–a
narrative that Wildman felt needs to be written as a witness and a student of things. He garners
sympathy towards the Filipinos by its racial treatment, political consideration, and personal ambitions:
to strive for independence (Wildman 1901, 5 - 6).

According to a correspondence between General MacArthur and Coronel San Miguel, the events that
happened during the San Juan bridge incident wherein Grayson shot a Filipino lieutenant and private
who entered blockhouse number 7 (195). Stuart Creighton Miller, a professor at San Francisco State
University wrote a copious account and context of the aftermath of the San Juan bridge.

On February 5, 4AM the navy fired heavy artillery and Filipinos were not prepared and
fled in panic, leaving along dead bodies. The Pennsylvania volunteers continued to charge
Filipinos up the hill and dozed a hail of bullets (on account of Private Christner). Several
soldiers reminisced the memory as “Picking off niggers in the water” while dead Filipinos
piled up “thicker than buffalo chips”. Coronel Funston led his troops in pursuit of the
 running Filipinos and even went far beyond their original objectives as their enthusiasm
carried them to kill Filipinos over two miles (Miller 1982, 67).

The American soldier’s view towards the Filipinos confirms their racial prejudices for the country, with
immoderate insulations and ehtnic slur. All of this went all over their primary objective to defend San
Juan and exceeded to massacre and eagerly chase and pin down Filipinos.

Additionally, the Nebraskans (Willliam W. Grayson was also a Nebraskan) are tasked to capture the San
Juan Bridge, in order to take out the water supply of the Manila soldier through dismantling the pumps
completely. This fits well on Grayson’s account as he “retreated to the pipeline and got behind the
water main” (195)(67).

Generals Otis and Aguinaldo

Albeit the Filipinos sustained heavy casualties with approximately 3,000 Filipino soldiers perished
compared to 60 Americans. Emilio Aguinaldo sent a ranking member of staff the morning after the
shooting (on February 5) a flag of truce to General Otis to convey that the firing had been against
Aguinaldo’s orders and wished to stop further hostilities. Emilio also proposed the establishment of a
neutral zone wide enough so that accidental contact would be impossible. (Aguinaldo and Pacis 1957,
93 - 94). Wilman’s account added that Emilio’s other purpose of the proposed establishment of the
neutral zone was to conduct peace negotiations so no further danger of conflict arises (Wildman 1901,
207). According to both accounts, General Elwell Otis had roughly replied “fighting, having begun, must
go on to the grim end” (94)(208).

Aguinaldo’s sentiments at the conclusion of the chapter We Did Not Want to Fight the U.S. wrapped in
these two liner propitiation. “Armegeddon was loose—against our desires and in spite of our earnest
and sincere efforts to befriend America.” (94).

Still in Aguinaldo's book, he asserted that President McKinley would fear that the American citizens
would be critical if they have heard Otis’ rough explanation and decided to simply put a grey lie by
putting embellishments of false statements. One of the false statements was made when Otis called
Washington and soon after, the front page of the Call announced that (Miller 1982, 69).
 Aguinaldo Weeps for His Blunder
Sits Crying in His Quarters
Afraid to Surrender to the Americans
- Front page of the Call (San Francisco Call 1902)

In spite of that, current media and documents put the Philippine in limelight as McKinley made public
speeches and statements twisting truths on Filipino insurgency

"The first blow was struck by the inhabitants," the President (McKinley) repeatedly claimed in
public speeches soon after the outbreak of hostilities. "They assailed our sovereignty, and there
will be no useless parley, no pause, until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority
acknowledged and established." (Aguinaldo and Pacis 1957, 94).

Intriguingly, Wildman did not find any Filipino papers or documents that retells Aguinaldo’s flag of truce
and proposition neutral zone to General Otis.

Neither in Buencamino's address to the United States Senate, dated Tarlac, August 20, 1899,
nor in Aguinaldo's Authentic Review of the Philippine Revolution, dated Tarlac, September 23,
1899, is there made a claim that he offered to establish a neutral zone and suspend hostilities
during the month of February.
- Edwin Wildman at Aguinaldo: A Narrative of Filipino Ambitions
(Wildman 1901, 208)

Wildman continued to scour for more sources and found out that Aguinaldo only said that the fighting
had accidentally begun and it was not authorized by him. Here follows a correspondence between
General Otis and Judge Torres

General Otis replied that Judge Torres, citizen, resident of Manila, who served as member of
Insurgent commission, reported to him on the evening of February 5, and asked if something
could not be done to stop fighting and establish a neutral zone. " I replied," continued General
Otis, " that Aguinaldo had commenced the fighting and must apply for cessation. I had nothing
to request from the Insurgent government."
- Edwin Wildman at Aguinaldo: A Narrative of Filipino Ambitions
(Wildman 1901, 208)
This implies that President Aguinaldo did not apply for cessation. Otis also pinned it down to Aguinaldo,
starting the shooting. The way Otis retorted was with a hinge of accusation that he has nothing to
request of the sort.

Did Aguinaldo truly send an emissary back on February 5, 1899 to have halted and stopped the war at
the very root? If Aguinaldo truly sent out an emissary in efforts to establish a neutral zone and call a
truce, would Otis' prejudice towards the Filipinos might accept it?

Is There Even A Declaration of War?

Oddly off putting, the primary resources for Emilio’s Declaration of War towards the United States were
not introduced in his written work, A Second Look at America. A document this important should have
been imprinted towards the thoughts of the president as he is writing his book. Extending the scope of
the search with Ambeth Ocampo’s books that capture the Philippines history of revolution with The
Centennial Countdown and 101 Stories on the Philippine Revolution and upon further perusal, there was
no present mentioning of the said declaration. The highly sought documentary book, Benevolent
Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 has no copy or even stating that
Aguinaldo has declared a State of War towards the United States.

Fortunately, in the evening of the outbreak during February 4, 1899, General Aguinaldo had published a
General Order to the Philippine army that resembles John Taylor’s Philippine Insurgent Records
straightforward Philippine Declaration of War. Wildman accounts this document as same as the
declaration of war

The evening of the outbreak of hostilities Aguinaldo published a General Order to the Philippine
army in which he stated that the American forces were the aggressors, and that he had
endeavored at all costs to preserve the friendship of the army of occupation, but summoned by the
unexpected provocation, urged by the duties imposed upon him by honor and patriotism and for
the defence of his nation, calling on God as a witness of good faith and uprightness of his
intentions, he ordered and commanded that peace and friendly relations having been broken
between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation, the latter would be treated
as enemies, with the tenets prescribed by the laws of war. That American soldiers captured by the
 Philippine forces would be treated as prisoners of war. He sent the proclamation to the foreign
consuls in Manila, and to Congress, in order, he said, that it may accord the suspension of the
constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war (Wildman 1901, 206).

Emilio Aguinaldo may have chosen to leave out the act of declaration itself in his own memoirs. As the
pages preceding the outbreak of San Juan bridge have shed fault towards the Americans, “Armegeddon
was loose—against our desires and in spite of our earnest and sincere efforts to befriend America.”
(Aguinaldo and Pacis 1977, 94).

Interestingly, why did Aguinaldo press against the flag of truce and the proposed establishment of a
neutral zone, the morning after he proclaimed a Declaration of War to the Philippines? And why is the
flag of truce and proposed establishment of the neutral zone not reflected in Wildman and Miller’s
books? Wildman here did his scholarly duty to at least scout for the said document that may prove the
flag of truce but have found claims that nothing was brought up.

Again, Miong here could have left and added these happenings to highlight the Philippine's difficulty as
he tried to lead a whole nation under oppressors arms. Miong may want to err on the side of the
Americans and pose himself as a diplomatic individual, putting the Philippines as a victim of the
problem who only wished to have friendly ties with the Western superpower.
 References
Aguinaldo, Emilio and Pacis, Vincente. 1957. A Second Look at America. New York: Robert Speller &
Sons, Publishers, Inc.
Miller, Stuart. 1982. Benevolent Assimilation. Connecticut: Yale University Press
Ocampo, Ambeth. 1998. The Centennial Countdown. Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc.
San Francisco Call. 1902. Aguinaldo Weeps for His Blunder Sits Crying in His Quarters Afraid to Surrender
to the Americans. San Francisco
Wildman, Edwin. 1901. Aguinaldo: A Narrative of Filipino Ambitions. Boston: Lothrop Publishing
Company