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AUKUS

Gen

1. AUKUS. The AUKUS is defined as a “enhanced trilateral security partnership”


that seeks to bolster the “longstanding and ongoing bilateral ties” the three states
share. The partnership will focus on “deeper integration of security and defense-
related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains.” Most important,
however, is going to be the significant push AUKUS will give to the “security and
defense capabilities,” particularly of Australia. This outlook has already been
implemented via the first initiative announced by the trilateral. Based on their
“common tradition as maritime democracies,” the US and the UK plan to deliver eight
nuclear-powered submarines to Canberra based on the US prized nuclear
propulsion technology that has so far been shared only with its long-time ally, the
UK. Such a venture will draw expertise from the UK and the US’ submarine
programs; as a joint project, the goal will be to increase “interoperability,
commonality and mutual benefits.” Although the initiative is still in its nascent
stages, AUKUS has already announced an 18-month timeline to devise an “optimal
pathway” and put the project into operation – showing the priority accorded to it
within their foreign and security policies. 1

Fig 1: Australia & US Alliances : Defense, Intelligence, and Security Groups

Necessity for AUKUS

2. Fundamentally, the strategic necessity for AUKUS stemmed from: (i) the US
President Joe Biden’s goal to reinforce alliances in a bid to make America a world
leader again; (ii) Australia’s growing recognition of the China threat driving its urgent
need to enter the nuclear-powered submarine club; and (iii) the UK’s aim to build its
image as a major Indo-Pacific actor as part of its post-Brexit “Global Britain” outlook.
1
https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2021/10/AUKUS-Resetting-European-Thinking-on-the-Indo-Pacific-
25.10.21.pdf
These three outlooks also ultimately culminate in a bid to curb China’s growing
assertiveness, both military and economically. Australia’s “all-time low” ties with
China have greatly abetted its decision to participate in this assignment as it
recognizes that “military modernisation is occurring at an unprecedented rate” and
Australia’s technological edge has narrowed considerably. 2

Key Points: AUKUS

3. The key takeaways from AUKUS are as under:-

(a) The US and Europe have markedly different threat perceptions on


China with Europe reluctant to be embroiled in US-China “systemic
competition” as it balances economic benefits with national security concerns.
Here, AUKUS is a signal that the US is not willing to wait for a shift in
European perceptions.

(b) The AUKUS’ expansive, security-focused agenda indicates that the


member countries will be engaged in the region for several decades to come,
making the grouping poised to become a critical and permanent fixture in the
Indo-Pacific.

(c) For Brussels, the manner of AUKUS’ announcement and the lack of
consultations between the US and its European allies, including the European
Union (EU), projected a picture of a divided West.

(d) AUKUS could lead to an intense arms race in Asia with maritime
capabilities becoming a primary factor of focus

(e) Japan has welcomed AUKUS as it marks a clear commitment of


alliance partner US to the Indo-Pacific region

(f) to India’s interest, AUKUS could emerge as an effective deterrent in


limiting China’s aggression.

Implications for China

4. None of the three specifically name China in their statements. They didn’t
have to. For China, AUKUS is a targeted and substantial threat to be reckoned with.
This is another historic move in the process of forging an “Asia-Pacific version of
NATO”. AUKUS would endanger the strategic balance and escalate the conflict.
Once deployed to the South China Sea, the nuclear-powered submarine should act
as an imperative link in the air, surface and underwater anti-submarine net
2
AUKUS and Indo-Pacific Security. Congressional Research Service May 19, 2022. Retrieved from
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12113
assembled by the US and its allies, whose intention to target China’s nuclear
submarine is abundantly clear. Some analysts believe that this will pose a threat to
China’s nuclear retaliation capability, undermine China’s strategic deterrence, and
thus sabotage the existing strategic balance. Moreover, China will endeavour to
avoid ‘Russification’ in Asia Pacific. What the US is doing against China is almost a
reproduction of the strategy of using NATO as a tool to expel Russia in Europe since
the 1990s. The consequence is that Russia has almost no meaningful voice in
Europe on security, and even its legitimate security concerns are ultimately being
fulfilled in fierce conflict with the West; and economically, Russia has also been left
out.3

3
AUKUS: Resetting European Thinking on the Indo-Pacific?. Retrieved from https://isdp.eu/content/
uploads/2021/10/ AUKUS-Resetting-European-Thinking-on-the-Indo-Pacific-25.10.21.pdf

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