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What is this thing called CST?

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DOI: 10.1007/978-0-585-34651-9_1

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 1

What ls This Thing Called CST?

Gerald Midgley

1.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces and critiques some early ideas about Critical Systems Thinking
(CST), a research perspective that is said to embrace a set of fundamental commitments.
Five were identilied by Jackson (1991a), and three by Schecter (1991) and Flood and
Jackson (l99la).lThe three commitments are:
. CriticaL ewareness-examining and reexamining taken-for-granted assumptions,
along with the conditions that give rise to them
. Emancipation-ensuring that research is focused on "improvement," defined tem-
porarily and locally, taking issues of power (which may affect the definition) into
tccount
. Methodological pluralisra-using a variety of research methods in a theoretically
coherent manner, becoming aware of their strengths and weaknesses, to address a
corresponding variety of issues.
The definitions given above are my own. They are inevitably an oversimplification of the
range of issues considered important by critical systems thinkers, but are useful for
indicating the general interests pursued by proponents ol the perspective.
Having declared some general interests, it would seem appropriate to ask, "What is
CST?" My immediate response would be to reply, "There is no one such thing." There
, are, in fact, many different perspectives on CST offered in the literature. What they all
rJackson's ori-qinal five comnritments were to critical awareness, emancipation, complementarism at the meth-
odological level, complenrentarism at the theoretical level, and social awareness. When these are reduced to
: three, the two forms of complementarism are expressed as a single commitment to methodological pluralism.
This reduction is possible because methodologies embody theoretical assumptions, so ifmethodological plural-
ism is accepted, theoretical pluralism needs to be dealt with at the same time. Also, Jackson's original
commitment to social awareness, which is defined as awareness of the possible social consequences of applying I

diflerent systerns methodologies. is not listed as a separate comnlitment when they are reduced to three. It
becomes an implicit part of the commitment to emancipation, which ensures that research is focused on
improvement.

Gerald Midglel . Centre lor Systenrs Studies, University of Hull. Hull, England.
Critical Systems Thinking: Current Research and Practice, edited by Flood and Romm, Plenum Press,
New York, 1996.
12 Gerald Midgley

have in common, however, is an interest in questions about, and surrounding, the nature
of the above commitments. But there are no consensually accepted definitions ol them.
lndeed, diff,erent writers have evolved very diflerent understandin_qs, and continue to
develop their ideas in communication with otherpeople. CST can therefbre be seen as an
evolvin-s debate around a set of themes that are considered important by a signilicant
number of systems practitioners. The term "debate" is central here as it emphasizes
dynamism and continued development rather than the stasis of a final definition.
In consequence, the view I will present of CST in this chapter should be seen as a
further contribution to the debate rather than as a statement of a final position. And I will
be treating the work of other writers in a similar manner. I intend to focus on one
particular vision of CST (presented in a number of places by Flood and Jackson, but most
notably in Flood & Jackson, 1991a), and will highlight son.re problems with their argu-
ment that I believe require further attention. I will then draw for inspiration on earlier
work by Churchman (e.g., 1979) and Ulrich (1983) in order to argue that it is possible to
address these problems. A diflerent vision of CST will emerge as a result.
However, before presenting Flood and Jackson's views, I need to say why I have
decided to focus on their work rather than that of the many other authors who have either
written explicitly about CST, or have done work in a similar vein. My answer is that,
between 1988 and 1991, Flood and Jackson produced a substantial body of literature
communicating their own particular vision of CST, and this has been quite influential. Two
particularly notable contributions are Jackson ( I 99 I a) and Flood and Jackson ( I 99 I a). The
first seeks to provide concise definitions ol Jackson's original five commitments. The
second is a book of edited readings by a variety of authors, and in my view the commentary
surrounding the chapters is exceptionally clearly written. In fact, both of these works are so
clearly written that I believe there is a danger that Flood and Jackson's vision could be
regarded as definitive, and this could threaten the continued development of CST.
Now, when I talk about Flood and Jackson as a pair, it must be noted that they
stopped writing together in 1991. Since then, Flood has shifted his position on CST
substantially. In my view, this shift is best seen in Flood (1995) and Flood and Romm
(1996 and this volume). However, I do not wish to discuss this later work because it be-
longs to a "new era" of CST. I would suggest that the seeds of this "new era" were already
germinating in Midgley (1990,1992a,b), Flood (1990), and Gregory (1992), and the pub-
lication of the book you are now reading marks the opening of some of its first flowers.
So, what is CST from Flood and Jackson's (pre-1992) point of view? I will answer
this question by taking each of the three commitments in turn, clarifying the meanings the
two authors give them. In producing this review, I do not wish to imply that the authors
share the same perspective on every issue, but there is a substantial amount of common
ground. At this stage I should also make it clear that the accounts I shall give will
inevitably be oversimplified, and I suggest that interested readers consult the original
literature as referenced.

1.2. METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM

Let us start with the commitment to methodological pluralism, or "complementar-

ism" as Flood and Jackson also sometimes call it. The principal publications by Flood and
Jackson (and co-workers) dealin_u with this issue include Jackson and Keys (1984),
What ls This Thing Called CST? 13

Jackson (1985a, 1987a.b, 1990, l991a,b), Flood (1989, 1990, 1993, 1995), and Flood
and Jackson (1991a,b). Methodolo-sical pluralism, as Jackson (1987a) and Flood (1989)
define it, niakes explicit use of a metatheory to identily the strengths and weaknesses of
different methodolo-eies. and the methodolo-uies are thereby viewed as complementary.
Jackson and Keys (1984) and Jackson (1987b) develop a pluralist metatheory by
classifyin-e systems methodologies according to the assumptions they make about social
reality. For example, quantitative modeling methods assume that there is agrcentent on
what the research problem is (il there isn't, then it is diflicult for the researcher to know
what to model), while qualitative debating methods work on the assumption that there is
disagreement that needs to be discussed (if there is full agreement, then debate becomes
redundant). The authors argue that, because different methodologies make different as-
sumptions, it is appropriilte to use them in practice in a complementary fashion to deal
with a variety of dit'ferent contexts. Thus, they propose a specific metatheory, "the system
of systems methodolo-sies," which aligns various methodolo-eies with the contexts that, in
an ideal world, they should be most capable of dealing with. Flood (1990) describes this
treatment of methodologies as "metaparadigmatic": the system of systems methodologies
sits above and coordinates methodological paradigms. It can therefore be used in practice
to aid critical reflection on methodolo-ey choice.
This is the instrumental aspect of Flood and Jackson's work on methodological
pluralism. where the focus is on how methodologies can most appropriately be used in
practice. However, it has also been underpinned by an epistemological theory (a theory
about the nature of knowledge) originally proposed by Habermas (1912). Habermas calls
this the "theory of knowledge-constitutive interests," and it was first introduced into Flood
and Jackson's vision of CST by Jackson (1985a). Now, Habernras's work is immensely
broad, and cannot be summarized adeqLrately in a few paragraphs. Nevertheless, Jackson
(1985a) offers his own understanding of the theory of knowledge-constitutive interests,
which I have reproduced below:
According to Habernras there are tu'o fundamental conditions underpinning the socio-cultur-
al form of lit'e of the human species-'work' and 'interaction'.
'Work' enables human beings to achieve goals and to bring about material well-being
through social labour. The importance of work to the human species leads human beings to have
what Habermas calls a 'technical interest' in the prediction and control of natural and social
events. The importance of interaction'calls fbrth another'interest', the'practical interest'. Its
concem is with securing and expanding the possibilities of mutual understanding among all those
involved in the reproduction ofsocial lii'e. Disagrcement among diff'erent groups can bejust as
nruch a threat to the reproduction of the socio-cultural tbrm of life as a failure to predict and
control natural and social af'fairs.
While work and interaction have for Habermas . . pre-eminent anthropological status, the
analysis of porver and the way it is exercised is equally essential, Habermas argues, for the
understanding of all past and present social arrangements. The exercise of power in the social
proccss can prevent the open and free discussion necessary tbr the success of interaction. Human
beings therelore also have an 'emancipatory interest' in freeing themselves from constrlints
imposed by power relations and in leaming, through a process of genuine participatory democra-
cy. involving discursive will-formation. to control their own destinv-

It is this theory that Flood and Jackson claim can be used to underpin the system of
systems methodologies. However, the two authors are not in total agreement on how this
underpinnin_q should be achieved. To keep matters simple, I will concentrate on the
position that has been discussed most widely in the literature-that proposed jointly by
Flood and Jackson (l99lb). In short, they suggest that "'hard'and cybernetic systems
14 Gerald Midgley

approaches can support the technical interest, soft methodologies the practical interest,
and critical systems heuristics can aid the emancipatory interest."
To explain in more detail, "hard" and cybernetic systems approaches are those that
have modeling as theircentral activity. In relation to the theory of knowledge-constitutive
interests, these methodologies are viewed as supporting one particular human interest-
our technical interest in predicting and controlling our environment. In contrast, "soft"
methodologies involve managing debate between people so that learning may be facili-
tated, ideas evaluated, and plans for action developed. In relation to the theory olknowl-
edge-constitutive interests, these too are seen as supporting one interest-this time, our
practical interest in achieving mutual understanding. Finally, critical systems heuristics is
concerned with subjecting assumptions in planning to ethical critique. It asks both the
researcher and participants in dialogue to address a number of questions concerning the
issue of whose views should enter into the planning process, and how this shoulcl be
achieved. According to Flood and Jackson (199 lb), this can support the remaining human
interest-our emancipatory interest in freeing ourselves from restrictive power relations.
We therelore see that Flood and Jackson have a particular understanding of meth-
odological pluralism that critically aligns methodologies with contexts for use, and that
supports this alignment with an epistemological theory of universal human participation in
work and interaction. It is the notion that work and interaction are fundamental to the
human condition that gives rise to our interests in prediction and control, mutual under-
standing, and freedom from oppressive power relations. We can now move on to examine
Flood and Jackson's understanding of the commitment of CST to emancipation.

1.3. EMANCIPATION

The principal publications by Flood and Jackson dealing with the notion of emanci-
pation include Jackson (1985b, 1991a,b), Flood (1990), and Flood and Jackson (l99la).
It is important to note that Jackson (l99la) talks in terms of human emancipation.
According to him,
critical systems thinking is dedicated to hLunan emanciparrorr and seeks to achieve for all individ-
uals the maximum development oftheirpotential. This is to be achieved by raising the quality of
work and life in the organizations and societies in which they participate.

This is linked into Habermas's (1972) theory ol knowledge-constitutive interests, de-

scribed in the previous section. Jackson (1991a) argues that emancipation, in the terms
specified above, can only be achieved by addressing all three human interests (in predic-
tion and control, mutual understanding, and lreedom from oppressive power relations) as
and when issues concerning them arise in systems practice. This view is also promoted by
FloodandJacksonintheir(l99la)jointwork. Havingclarif,iedthemeaningforFloodand
Jackson of the commitment to emancipation, we can now look at their work on critical
awareness.

1.4. CRITICAL AWARENESS

The principal publications by Flood and Jackson (and co-workers) dealing with the
commitment to critical awareness include Jackson (1982, 1985b, 1990, l99la,b), Flood
What ls This Thing Called CST? 15

(1990), Flood and Ulrich (1990), and Flood and Jackson (1991a). Between them, the
authors identify three interlinked forms of critical awareness: "understanding the strengths
and weaknesses and the theoretical underpinnings of available systems methods, tech-
niques and methodologies" (Jackson, l99la), understanding both the context of applica-
tion (assessing alternative interpretations of it) and the possible consequences of using
various methodologies once the context has been defined (Flood, 1990; Jackson, 1990),
and "closely examining the assumptions and values entering into actually existing systems
designs or any proposals for a systems design" (Jackson, 1991a).
The first two forms of critical awareness clearly support the commitment to meth-
odological pluralism. The first involves critical thinking about methodology, so that
effective metatheories can be developed, and the second involves the critical use of
methodology, where the focus of critique is the context of application. The third form of
critical awareness primarily suppofts the commitment to emancipation. It is through
ethical critique that power relations can be understood and "improvement" defined.

1.5. CRITICAL ISSUES

Having given a brief description of CST as interpreted through the writings of Flood
and Jackson, I wish to highlight six problems that I see in their position. I will list these
briefly below, and will then move on to address them through the production of an
alternative vision of CST.
The first problem is in Flood and Jackson's understanding of methodological plural-
ism. Flood ( 1990) claims that their work is "metaparadigmatic"-coordinating the use of
other systems paradigms. I would argue that this cannot be the case given that Flood and
Jackson make assumptions about human knowledge drawn from Habermas's (1912)
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests. These assumptions are alien to, and incom-
mensurable with, assumptions made by the proponents of other systems paradigms. Far
from being metaparadigmatic, CST embodies its own unique assumptions, meaning that
its proponents are trying to establish the foundations for a new paradigm. ln the process,
they may learn from the proponents of other paradigms: for example, they may borrow
methods from other methodologies. But once used as part of the practice of CST, these
methods never remain the same as their creators intended. They are imbued with new
assumptions.
It is also possible to identify a significant problem with Habermas's (1972) theory of
knowledge-constitutive interests. By suggesting that human beings have an interest in
"predictin_g and controlling" the natural and social worlds, Habermas risks perpetuating
the myth of the human domination of nature. This myth leads people to regard natural
phenomena as "resources" for control and consumption, with often unpredictable side
ellects. As a number of authors have pointed out, many of our current ecological prob-
lems stem from this myth. It would be preferable to talk in terms of human bein,us having
an interest in building and preservin-q a sustainable, interactive relationship with their
nonhuman environment (see also Eckersley, 1992).
There are also difliculties with Flood and Jackson's vision of the commitment to
emancipation, the first of which follows on from my previous point concerning ecological
sustainability. Jackson (199 la) is quite specific that his concern is with human emancipa-
tion. While I would argue that human well-being is served by building and preserving a
16 Geratd Midgley

sustainable, interactive relationship with our nonhuman environment, the ramifications in

terms of the need to change or-qanizational, societal, and global priorities are not -eenerally
well appreciated. Even when they are appreciated. the enfbrced dependency of people,
especially in the West, on unsustainable forms of social lile (traditional forms of employ-
ment, high energy consumption, the frequent use of cars, and so on) makes it very
dillicult for them to chan_ge their life-styles, even if they want to (Gregory, 1992). lt is lor
this reason that the term "human emancipation" will usually be interpreted as the promo-
tion of human well-being septtrate from consideration of the "environment."2 ln my view,
talking about a commitment to human emancipation, rather than a more -eeneral commit-
ment to "in-rprovement" (and':sustainable improven.rent" in particular), does nothing to
encourage people to challenge the automatic prioritization of a human boundary in sys-
tems practice.
Another dilficulty that arises in connection with the commitment to emancipation is
the extent to rvhich we can talk about improvement of human well-being in absolute, or
near absolute, terms. Flood and Jackson only make very general comments on the com-
mitment to enrancipation, but their use of Habermas's (1972) theory of knowledge-
constitutive interests raises a question about whether they agree with Habermas that
human society is in a process of social evolution. If they do, this would mean that the term
"emancipation" could be tied in with the idea of mankind's supposed "march of progress."
Given the problems of deciding what is or is not "progress" (progress for some may be a
setbackforothers),manyauthors(e.g.,Rorty, 1989)havearguedthattheoriesof social
evolution have little credibility. I do not want to put words into the mouths of Flood and
Jackson, as there is no positive indication that this is what they actually do believe, but
there is a need for further clarification here.
The fifth problem I need to raise relates to the commitment of CST to critical
awareness. We need to ask, "What form does critical awareness take?" Flood and Jackson
talk about studying the strengths and weaknesses of methodologies, asking questions
about the nature of the context when intervening, and revealing the ethical assumptions
that flow into systems practice. But ftou,? While Flood ( 1990) proposes a general theory of
critical awareness-there is a need both to "liberate knowledges" (alternative views of the
situation) and then choose between these in practice-this is not translated into methodol-
ogy. Interestingly, the problem would appear to stem from Flood and Jackson's vision of
methodological pluralism. A writer who has considered the need for apractice of critical
awareness is Ulrich (1983), and he proposes the methodology of critical systems heuris-
tics. In Flood and Jackson's vision, however, critical systems heuristics is just one
methodology amon-q many, and is specifically aligned with contexts characterized by
coercion. This means that, in practice, it will only be used on an occasional basis. Now, I
am not suggesting that critical systems heuristics gives us all we need to enact critical
awareness (several criticisms can be raised against it, as a number of authors have pointed
out,-r and it does not provide a method for critiquing other methodologies), but the
question remains, "How is the commitment to critical awareness enacted in situations
where coercion is nor identified?"
:l place quotation marks around the word "environnlent" because the separation I am talking about is even
present in the language I em usin-s.
rAuthors who have critiqued critical systems heuristics include Jackson (1985c, l99lb), Willmon (1989),
Ivanov (1991), Flood and Jackson (1991b,c). Mingers (1992), Romm (1994, l995a.b), Midgley (1997), and
Brown (this volume).
What ls This Thing Called CST? 17

The sixth and final problem fbllows on from this. Because a lot of systems practice is
commissioned by organizations wishing to deal with problematic issues, the lack of a
methodological aspect to critical awareness (other than that offered when coercion is
identified) could have important implications. There could be a tendency to take the
commissioning organization's agenda as given, and there could also be a failure to take
sufficient account of the effects of that agenda on the organization's wider environment
(both people and planet). This can be described as taking an organizational boundary for
granted. To see whether this is indeed a problem for Flood and Jackson's vision olCST,
we need to look at some examples of their practice. Flood and Jackson (1991b) contains
several reports of the authors' systems practice, but it is beyond the scope of this short
chapter to study these in detail. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting the fact that the
reports contain little discussion of the boundaries defining who determined the remit of the
work. Also, ali of the reports except one (a report of the use of critical systems heuristics)
concern problems of design or planning within an organization. There is no indication in
these reports, apart from the one describing the use ofcritical systems heuristics, that any
boundary other than the organizational one was considered.

1.6. THE ETHICAL CRITIQUE OF BOUNDARY JUDGMENTS

Having highlighted some problems with Flood and Jackson's vision of CST, it is
now time to look at how we can address them. In the process, a different vision of CST
will emer-qe. My starting point for creating this new vision is further reflection on the
problem of critical awareness mentioned toward the end of the previous section. I noted
that the commitment to criticai awareness is not translated into methodology in Flood and
Jackson's vision, except through their use of the methodology of critical systems heuris-
tics when coercion is identified. I also noted that the concept of making boundary judg-
ments is important in understanding critical awareness. My intention is to address the
problem of critical awareness by seeking inspiration from the work of Churchman and
Ulrich. both of whom have explored the concept of "boundary" in depth. I will first
summarize the main strands of their work before going on to look at its implications for
CST. Let us start with Churchman.
Churchman (e.g., 1968a,b, 1971,1919) has made a major contribution to systems
thinking, and it is impossible to do his ideas justice in only a few paragraphs. Neverthe-
less, a flavor ofhis thinking can be provided, especially his thinking about the concept of
"improvement." For Churchman, the business of delining improvement is a systems
problem. It is a systems problem because lhe boundary of analysis is crucial. As he makes
clear, what is to be included in, or excluded from, the analysis is a vital consideration:
what may appear to be improvement within a narrowly defined boundary may not be
improvement at all if the boundaries are pushed out.
This way of thinkin-e involves a fundamental shift in our understanding of the nature
ol "system." Prior to the work of Churchman, many people assumed that the boundaries
of a system are "given" by the structure of reality. In contrast, Churchman made it clear
that boundaries are constructs that define the limits of, the knowledge that is to be taken as
pertinent. There is also another important element of Churchman's understanding ol
"sydtem." When it comes to human systems, pushing out the boundaries of analysis may
also involve pushin-e out the boundaries of who may le,eitimately be considered a decision
18 Gerald Midgley

maker (Churchman, 1970). Thus, the business of setting boundaries defines both the
knowled-ee to be considered pertinent and the people who generate that knowledge (and
who also have a stake in the results of any attempts to improve the system).
Not only did Churchman introduce this fundamental change in our understanding of
"system," but he also made clear the importance of critique. When discussing "improve-
ment," Churchman (e.g., 1979) followed Hegel, who stressed the need to expose our
most cherished assumptions to the possibility of overthrow. To be as sure as we can that
we are definin-e improvement adequately, we should seek out the strongest possible
"enemies" of our ideas and enter into a process of rational argumentation. Only if we
listen closely to their views and our arguments survive should we pursue the improve-
ment.
Churchman produced a great deal of highly influential work in the 1960s and 1970s,
and in the 1980s several other authors began to build on it in significant new ways. One of
these authors was Ulrich, who has acknowledged his considerable intellectual debt to
Churchman in several "tribute" papers (Ulrich, 1988a,b, 1994). Once again I must say
that it is impossible to do Ulrich's work justice in only a few paragraphs, so I recommend
consulting his original work. particularly Ulrich (1983).
Ulrich created the methodology of critical systems heuristics. For him, the term
"critical" has its roots in the work of Habermas, but mostly his later writings.a Habermas
(e.g., 1976) argues that critique is a dialogical process emerging from the inherent
potential of language to allow us to question. However, dialogue may be distorted through
the effects of power either directly, when one participant coerces another, or indirectly,
when participants make unquestioned assumptions about the absolute necessity for, or
inevitable future existence of, particular social systems. To overcome these effects of
power, we need to establish what Habermas calls an "ideal speech situation": a situation
where any assumption can be questioned and all viewpoints can be heard.
However, while Ulrich ( 1983) accepts the principle of Habermas's understanding of
critique, he nevertheless criticizes him for being utopian. For all viewpoints to be heard,
the ideal speech situation would have to extend debate to every citizen of the world, both
present and future. This is quite simply impossible. Ulrich sees his task asthepragmatiza-
tion of the ideal speech situation, and the marriage between critical and systems thinking
is the means by which this can be achieved. Truly rational inquiry is said to be critical,
in that no assumption held by participants in inquiry should be beyond question. lt is
also s1's/emic, however, in that boundaries always have to be established within which
critique can be conducted. Indeed, Ulrich claims that both ideas are inadequate without
the other. Critical thinking without system boundaries will inevitably fall into the trap
of continual expansion and eventual loss of meaning (as everything can be seen to have a
context with which it interacts, questionin_{ becomes infinite). However, systems thinking
without the critical idea may result in a "hardening of the boundaries" where destruc-
tive assumptions remain unquestioned because the system boundaries are regarded as
absolute.
A priority fbr Ulrich is to evolve practical guidelines that can help people steer the
process olcritical reflection on the ethics of drawing system boundaries. Forthis purpose,

rFlood and Jackson base their vision of methodological pluralism on Habermas's earlier work, althou-eh they
also draw on his later work in other contcxts.
What ls This Thing Called CST? 19

Ulrich (1983) developecl a list of l2 questions that can be used heuristically to define what
the system currently is and what it ought to be. lt is important to note that some of these
questions relate to who should be involved in discussing boundary judgments in the first
place, meaning that there is always the possibility for people to enter or leave discussions.
it is also important to note Ulrich's 1993 claim that his 12 questions can be used to
enhance critical thinking about boundary judgments regardless of the systems method that
is being entplo-ved: Whether the intention is to engage in quantitative modelin-e or qualita-
tive debate, ethical reflection on boundary judgments is still important.
Of course, I do not want to suggest that the work of Churchman and Ulrich alone will
answer all of the issues I h.ave raised in relation to Flood and Jackson's vision of CST'
Neither do I want to claim that they have said all there is to be said about critical
awareness. On the contrary, significant criticisms have been ieveled at both Churchman
(e.g., Jackson, 1982) and Ulrich (e.g., Jackson, 1985c, 1991b;Willmott, 1989; Ivanov,
1991; Flood & Jackson, l991b,c,Mingers, 1992;Romm, 1994,l995a,b;Midgley, 1997;
and Brown, this volume).s What is important for this chapter, however, is that the
princ.iple of boundary critique-being critical about systems-is sound, and that it is
possible to translate it into methodology. While some of the background theory may
require further work, the basic principle and the possibility of methodology is not dam-
aged by the theoretical difficulties so far identified.

1.7" THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CRITICAL SYSTEMS THINKING

I will now use the work of Churchman and Ulrich on critical boundary judgments as
a starting point for addressing the issues I raised earlier conceming Flood and Jackson's
vision of CST. I will take the issues one by one, starting with the problem of opera-
tionalizing the commitment to critical awareness. A different vision of CST will emerge
through this process.
You will remember that operationalizing the commitment to critical awareness be-
comes a problem in Flood and Jackson's vision because critical systems heuristics, the
only systems-based methodology specifically designed to do this, is reserved for situa-
tions where coercion is identified. My proposal for a first step to colrect this problem is to
suppoft Ulrich's (1993) argument that methods to support critical reflection on making
boundary judgments should be used to enhance critical thinking up-front-both when we
enter into interventions, and periodically after that. I say that this is a "first step" because
Ulrich's critical systems heuristics is currently the only systems-based method we have for

5Arguably the most important criticism of Ulrich is that he has an ambivalent attitude to the possibility that
stakeholders (especially "the powertul") may achieve new understandings by listening to others (Romm,
1995a): sometimes he argues strongly tbr critical systems heuristics to be used in dialogue so that all stake-
holders can transcend their initial interests, and other times he suggests that "the powerful" will have no
motivation to do this. In thc latter case. he claims that all that can be achieved is consciousness raising by "the
disadvantaged," ancl possibly the embarrassment of"the powerful." My own view is that there is no need for
anrbivalence: both scenarios (where people talk and where they refuse to talk) can happen, and the methodology
of critical systems heuristics can be used in several difterent ways-by rndividuals to enhance critical self-
reflection, by single stakeholder groups for consciousness raising, or by groups embracing many ditferent
stakeholders to find mutually acceptable ways of transcending the dit'terences between them.
20 Gerald Midgley

this6; there is still a crying need fbr further research, both to enhance critical systems
heuristics (in theory and practice) and to develop other approaches to making critical
boundary judgments. ln particular, we must begin to move away from "mechanical"
applications of critical systems heuristics, where participants in inquiry simply answer the
l2 questions in the form of alist, toward a situation where they become an integral part of
the whole inquiry process, interwoven (where appropriate) with other systems methods.
Encouragingly, research along these lines is already well under way (see, e.g., Cohen &
Midgley. l99ul; Gregory, Romm, & Walsh, 1994; Flood & Romm, 1995)' What I am
proposing, then, is to define the commitment to critical awareness in terms of the ethical
iritique ofboundaries, and to continue to conduct research to enhance both the theory and
practice of boundary critique.T
It is important for me to give further support to this position, especially as it chal-
lenges Flood and Jackson's understanding of methodological pluralism, where all of the
different systems approaches are aligned with their most appropriate contexts of applica-
tion. Flood and Jackson could reply to me by saying that boundary critique is redundant in
situations where coercion has not been identified. However, the most immediate question
that springs to ntind is, "How do we identify coercion?" and related to this, "Whose views
do we take into account?" Answering these questions will involve the researcher and other
interested parties in making c'ritical bountlary judgments.ln other words, making up-front
boundary judgments cannot be avoided in criv research situation. Failure to realize the full
implications of this will inevitably result in some of the most important boundary judg-
ments-those that determine who the researcher will talk to and how the initial remit of
the work will be defined-being made in an uncritical manner'
Having dealt with the first problen of critical awareness in Flood and Jackson's
vision of CST. we can now move on to the second: the tendency to give uncritical priority
in interventions to an organizational boundary. This is directly addressed by bringing to
the fore the notion of making critical boundary judgments. lf the researcher and/or
participants engage in a process of questioning boundary judgments, then the proposed
use of' an organizational boundary would have to be justified. While some researchers
might fear that commissioning organizations will be put off by this kind of questioning,
.y o*n experience is that this rarely happens: many people welcome the chance to look at
how the problem they have identified interfaces with others, and appreciate systemic
logic. People often understand that their own activities have a wider impact that needs to

6Flood ancl I arc currently working on the development of a new approach to making critical boundary judge-
ments rhat will become an integral part of Total Systenrs Intervention [a meta-methodology first proposed by
Flood and Jackson (l99lb) and thcn substantially developed by Flood (1995)1. We hope that this will be
published during 1997 or 1998.
TOfcourse. defining critical awareness in this way does not mean that we are in a position to abandon critical
thinking about the difterent possible uses of methods. For Flood and Jackson. critical awareness about meth-
odology, is of principle concern. However. I view the critique of methods as a special case of critical awareness,
suppoiting the pursuit ofnrethodological pluralism. I also argue that analyses ofthe strengths and weaknesses
of ntethotls could usefully incorporatc the ethical critique ofboundaries: judgements about the appropriate uses
of methods are dependent on boundary judgements about what possible et'lects we should be looking out for.
Interestingly, a method fbr critiquing other methods and methodologies and then integrating them into a
pluralist frarnework has recently becn developed by Flood (1995) and Wilby (1996, and this volume). In my
view this oft'ers an effective means of operationalizing critical awareness about methodology, but could be more
explicit about the need tbr an ethical critique of boundaries
Whai ls This Thing Called CST? 21

be taken into account if unanticipated, negative reactions from others are to be avoided.
Examples of studies conducted by critical systems thinkers that use boundaries other than
the organizational one are now appearing regularly in the literature.s
Bringing critical boundary judgments to the fbre in CST also gives us the means to
address both of the issues I raised concerning Flood and Jackson's understanding of the
comnlitment to emancipation. The first of these was a concern that the term "human
emancipation" will often be interpreted as the promotion of human well-bein_e sepqrate
fi'om consideration of the "environment." Certainly, the ethical critique of boundary
judgments will. to an extent, address this, but I would also suggest a change of terminol-
ogy. Instead of talking about a commitment to human emancipation, why not call it a
comrnitment to iniprovement'? This deemphasizes the "human," and brin-qs CST more in
line with Churchman (1970), for whorn "improvement" (especially sustcrinable improve-
ment) is a concept of, central imporlance.
The second issue conceming Flood and Jackson's understandin-e of the commitment
to emancipation relates to the possibility of interpreting it in absolute, or near absolute,
terms. Habermas (1972) argues that human society is in a process of social evolution. If
Flood and Jackson agree with this, then their understanding of "emancipation" could be
tied in with the idea of mankind's supposed "march of progress." In contrast, I would
argue that "progress" is difficult to define, except locally and temporarily from the
viewpoints of stakeholders. Now, if we brin-e the notion ol the ethical critique of boundary
judgments to the fore, the "march of progress" interpretation is no longer possible. Any
vision of "improvement" or "emancipation" that is employed in systems practice would
inevitably be a function of the boundary judgements defining who is involved in the
process of generating that vision. Of cor.rrse, this has profound implications for systems
practice, and is an issue that merits further research.
We n.ray now move on to the dilficulties I raised earlier with Flood and Jackson's
understandin-e of methodological pluralism. The first one I will tackle is their acceptance
of Habermas's view (1972) that human beings have a fundamental interest in "predicting
and controlling" their nonhuman environment rather than building and preserving a sus-
tainable, interactive relationship with it. They thereby run the risk of perpetuating the
myth ol the hun.ran domination of nature. I suggest that we should abandon the use of
Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests because of this problem. However,
this leaves us in need of a new ontological or epistemological theory to underpin the
practice ol methodological pluralism. While the four previous issues have all been re-
solved through recourse to the notion of the ethical critiqLre olboundary judgments, this is
not enou,gh for the task at hand. There are currently three alternative pluralist theories in
the Critical Systems literature, which are described in Chapters 2,3, and 5. I believe these
demonstrate that it ls possible to underpin methodolo-qical pluralisn with a philosophical
theory without ntaking the assumption that human beings have an inherent interest in
"predictin-e and controlling" the natural world.
The final problem with Flood and Jackson's vision of CST is the claim that it is
"metaparadi-smatic" (Flood, 1990). I have argued that this cannot be the case
_eiven that

sThese arc mostly nrulti-agency interventions (e-g., Cohen & Midgley.

1994; Gregory & Midgley, 1994;
Gregory. Romm, and Walsh. 1994; Flood, 1995; Midgley & Milne. 1995) and systems studies involving
community panicipation in service planning and evaluation (e.g.. Mid_uley, Kadiri & vahl, 1995).
22 Gerald Midgley

Flood and Jackson make assumptions about human knowledge that are alien to, and
incommensurable with, assumptions made by the proponents of other systems paradigms.
Far from being metaparadigmatic, CST is trying to establish the foundations for a new
paradigm. Interestingly, Flood (1990) accepts the incommensurability argument: he sug-
gests that it is possible to have methodological commensurabiliry while acknowledging
theoretical incommensurabitity. However, it would seem to me that this stands in opposi-
tion to his claim that CST is "metaparadigmatic": it means that, if CST is indeed theoretical
in nature, we must recognize that it is incommensurable with other perspectives based on
different theoretical assumptions. This does not mean that critical systems thinkers cannot
learn from other paradigms, or that the proponents of other paradigms cannot learn from
CST (Gregor y , 1992) , but it does make the claim to a metaparadigmatic status problematic .
My understanding is that Flood and Jackson felt they needed to claim that CST is
metaparadigmatic because they wished to promote a form of methodological pluralism
where no one methodology was seen to dominate. However, if we take on board the idea
that the ethical critique of boundary judgments is of central importance, then there is no
longer a need to describe methodological pluralism in this "neutral" manner. We can
accept that there may be many different visions of methodological pluralism, including
one that rests on the assumptions of CST outlined here, and our task is then to justify why
any one is preferable. We can therefore drop the claim that CST is "metaparadigmatic."
I have now addressed all of the issues I raised earlier in response to Flood and
Jackson's (pre-1992) understanding of CST, and the outline of a new vision has emerged.
My hope is that this can be used as the basis for further theoretical and practical research.
In the spirit of the (revised) commitment of CST to improvement, it will be important to
continue to improve CST itself.

1.8. CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have described CST as an evolving debate around a set ofthemes that
are considered important by a significant number of systems practitioners. ln the spirit of
debate, I have focused on Flood and Jackson's (pre-1992) vision of CST, which has been
particuiarly influential in recent years. I have raised some issues that concern me, and in
addressing them I have returned to the earlier work of Churchman and Uirich for inspira-
tion. As a result, the outline oi a new vision of CST has emerged. Whether or not you agree
with what I have proposed, I hope you are stimulated by it and wish to engage in dialogue' It
is only through further debate that CST will continue to develop and change.

AcrNowl-EoGMENTS

would like to acknowledge the excellent feedback I received from Bob Flood,
I
Wendy Gregory, and Norma Romm on the first draft of this chapter.

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