BIOTERRORISM CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 1

Bioterrorist Capabilities and Resources: Hostile Nations V. Individuals and Terrorist Groups

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Bioterrorist Capabilities and Resources: Hostile Nations V. Individuals and Terrorist Groups

The plausibility of the bioterrorism threats increased after the 9/11 attacks. Seven days

after the attacks, anthrax-laced letters that resulted in more than twenty infections and five

fatalities (Fong & Alibeck, 2010) exemplified the need for countries’ security and emergency

management apparatuses as well the public to widen the scope of their watchfulness. In addition

to casualties, bioterrorist attacks can wreak widespread panic, incapacitation of critical

infrastructures, and hefty economic costs. While bioterrorism threats are posed by both hostile

nations and individuals and terrorist groups operating without infrastructure or support, their

bioterrorist capabilities and resources differ.

Bioweapons may be preferred as the ideal tools to advance terrorism causes because of

their potential to cause mass casualties, public fear, disruption of critical infrastructures, and

substantial economic costs. Fong & Alibeck (2010) observe that the infamous anthrax-laced

letters that were preceded by the 9/11 attacks may not have caused massive casualties but they

definitely sparked fear not only in the United States but also globally. The country incurred

millions of dollars in containing the threat of further anthrax attacks, treating the infected

individuals, decontaminating the pathogen-polluted premises, and responding to bioterrorism

hoaxes (Fong & Alibeck, 2010). In the event of a large-scale bioterrorist attack, the healthcare

system can be overwhelmed, thus aggravating the consequences of the attack. Concluding

sentence.

Hostile nations, individuals and terrorist groups are all capable of instigating bioterrorist

attacks whose consequences could be far-reaching. However, hostile nations are more endowed

with capabilities and resources to perpetrate bioterrorist attacks compared to individuals and

terrorist groups operating without infrastructure or support. Ursano, Norwood & Fullerton (2004)

posit that states are most likely to have technical capabilities, organizational capacity to assemble
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the individuals, know-how, material and equipment required to produce massive biological

weapons and to clandestinely deliver them to targets.

The challenge of acquiring materials and recruiting people with skills and knowledge to

create highly lethal biological weapons is a barrier that limits the abilities of individuals and

terrorist groups to engage in bioterrorist activities (Ursano, Norwood & Fullerton, 2004).

Further, even in the event that some materials and resources needed to develop biological

weapons can be acquired easily (in view of the current advances in biotechnology) under the

disguise of legitimate scientific or industrial purposes, handling highly pathogenic biological

materials, transforming them into biological weapons and delivering them in a manner capable of

causing massive casualties would be a formidable task for individuals and terrorist organizations.

Even for states, marshaling the resources and capabilities to launch devastating attacks

using biological agents has proved to be a daunting task. Ursano, Norwood & Fullerton (2004)

note that several states heightened their efforts to develop biological warfare programs in the

twentieth century. However, the effectiveness of these programs in terms of actual employment

of biological weapons and fatalities was limited. Only Germany in WWI and Japan in WWII are

in the record for significant use of biological weapons in the modern history. However, if a state

went hostile or rogue, its technical capabilities and resources to unleash massive bioterrorist

attacks would heavily outweigh those of individuals and terrorist organizations.

While hostile nations, such as North Korea and Iran are capable of developing biological

weapons, their capacity to engage in bioterrorist activities is curtailed by fear of devastating

retaliation by the international community (Frinking et al., 2016). Open source intelligence

postulates that North Korea has stockpiles of classic biological weapons, including botulinum,

anthrax, and strains of smallpox virus (Kasapoglu, 2018). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that North
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Korea would contemplate risking political and military repercussions that would ensue upon

discovery of covert or overt use of biological weapons in contravention of international

conventions. Ursano, Norwood & Fullerton (2004) also note that hostile nations that sponsor

terror would be less inclined to provide terrorist organizations with biological weapons for covert

or overt use due to fear that retribution by the international community would be directed against

them if they are associated with a terrorist organization that uses biological weapons.

On the other hand, non-state actors (individuals and terrorist organizations), do not

submit to internal conventions. They are much unconstrained by the threats of retribution by the

international community, and this gives them a greater incentive to engage in bioterrorist

activities than hostile nations, assuming they are able to acquire biological agents and fashion

them into biological weapons (Frinking et al., 2016). Indeed, with the current milestones in

biotechnology rendering production of certain biological agents easier and cheaper, individuals

and terrorist organizations have more access to biological agents than they would have had a few

decades ago. Accordingly, they are capable of engaging in small-scale bioterrorist acts using

anthrax and other common pathogens (Frinking et al., 2012). Since the 9/11 anthrax-laced letters

were not traced to a state actor, there is a possibility that they originated from a terrorist

organization.

Both hostile states and individuals and terrorist groups with no infrastructure or support

are capable of conducting bioterrorist attacks. Hostile states have more technical capabilities and

resources than individuals and terrorist groups to develop and deliver large-scale bioweapons.

However, international conventions and the fear of retribution by the international community

limit the incentive of hostile states to engage in bioterrorist activities, including providing

bioweapons to terrorist groups. Individuals and terrorist organizations have weak bioterrorist
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capabilities due to barriers in acquisition of lethal biological agents and skills and know-how to

develop and deploy bioweapons. However, biotechnology advances make it possible for

individuals and terrorist organizations to have relatively easy access to common pathogens and

conduct small-scale bioterrorist attacks. Since they are not bound by international laws and fear

of retaliation, they have a greater incentive to conduct bioterrorist acts.

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References

Fong, W., & Alibek, K. (2010). Bioterrorism and infectious agents. New York: Springer New

York.

Frinking, E., Bontje, E., Sinning, P., Frattina, C., Frattina, d., & Abdalla, M. (2016). The

increasing threat of biological weapons: Handle with sufficient and appropriate care.

Hague: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies.

Kasapoglu, C. (2018). North Korea’s asymmetric military capability. Retrieved from

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis-news/north-korea-s-asymmetric-military-capability/

892844

Ursano, R., Norwood, A., & Fullerton, C. (2004). Bioterrorism: Psychological and public health

interventions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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