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On Determinism
On Determinism
On Determinism
2. An indeterministic universe is such that every time it begins from the same cause, it may unfold
according to a different scenario than before.
2.1 A deterministic universe and an indeterministic universe share one thing in common: It is only
through the passage of time that a human agent belonging in either universe is able to identify the
scenario of the universe up to a particular time point.
2.11 The principal difference between the two is that D knowledge exists for the former but not for the
latter.
2.111 The D knowledge exists in comprehensible form for us but is available only to those that can
cross the time axis of our universe at will or to a transcendental being who holds the script of the
scenario.
2.2 An indeterministic universe, however, “constructs” its scenario successively through the passage of
time.
3. Therefore, whether our universe is predetermined or not matters only from a viewpoint that can be
established in the outside of our universe.
3.1 However, if there is nothing outside of the universe, this issue can matter to no one.
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Table of Contents
1. Defining Determinism
2. Law of Cause and Effect
3. Deterministic Knowledge
4. Indeterministic Universe
5. Conclusion
It doesn’t matter whether the events are conceivable in our minds. I will take a stance that there is a
realm of physical phenomena that take place objectively and independently, irrespective of the
existence of the human mind that perceives them.
Concerning the 1st case, I will state that these types of events are only hypothetical.
The 3rd case is more subtle, because it suggests that our consciousness may belong in a separate realm
from that of physical phenomena. No conclusion has been definitively made yet on whether our
consciousness is totally reducible into physics.
In addition, by the “events” of our consciousness, I refer to feelings or thought processes taking place
in our brain.
In a nutshell:
1. It is uncertain whether the cause-and-effect rule applies to every event of our universe.
2. A cause of an event may be of such a nature that cannot be grasped in itself by the human mind.
3. There may be a deterministic chain of events that is not calculable (i.e., unpredictable).
3. [Deterministic Knowledge]
Assumption 1: The cause and effect principle applies rigidly to every event of the universe except for
its first cause (e.g., the Big Bang).
Assumption 2: There are only two types of events in our universe: Perceivable physical
phenomena and the events of our consciousness.
Assumption 3: Every chain of events is calculable.
Assumption 3 is posited by contradicting the 3rd point under “In a nutshell” in “Law of Cause and
Effect.” That is, every event is in principle calculable. Based on these assumptions, it is deduced that
there should necessarily exist “deterministic knowledge” that can be, in principle, deduced by the
human mind. In addition, I define deterministic knowledge as follows:
Deterministic Knowledge:
The totality of all the descriptions of all the past, present, and future events of the universe
“Does the D knowledge remain “intact” even after we access it? That is, is the D knowledge that we are
accessing the same D knowledge that there was prior to our access to its content?”
The D knowledge may not exist in tangible form (e.g., a vast collection of books in an immensely huge
library or a wide electronic screen of a gigantic iPad). However, the D knowledge does exist as an
abstract “entity” of facts. For instance, the laws of physics may not be tangible, but they are
established facts that exist independently of the college textbooks that describe them.
Admittedly, it is unrealistic to expect that our technology will ever unravel the D knowledge. However,
it is still possible to contemplate the logical consequences of assuming that humans have access to the
D knowledge, because such an assumption is not logically impossible.
The above underlined question can be rephrased as follows: To recognize the descriptions narrated by
the D knowledge is in itself an event that apparently is not included in but should have already been
stated in the D knowledge.
Upon a closer look, it appears that this paradox is closely related to the infinite regress of (1) self-
reference. To assume the whole content of the D knowledge for a finite duration of time – the very
act of “assuming” having to be, in principle, included in the scenario of the D knowledge – is like to
attempt to squeeze a totality into one of its parts. This is akin to the Cretan liar paradox, i.e., “This
sentence is false” = “This sentence.” Let us delve into this resemblance further.
Cretan paradox:
S= “This sentence is false.”
(1) S is false. (that is, S is not true)
(2) “S is false” is false. (that is, S is true)
(3) S is false is false is false. (that is, S is not true)
… (ad inifinitum)
Deterministic Universe:
(each capital letter represents a particular event.)
QWERTYUIOP…X[=event of accessing D knowledge]…ASDFGHJKL
QWERTYUIOP…X[=event of accessing [QWERTYUIOP…X…ASDFGHJKL]]…ASDFGHJKL
… (ad inifinitum)
If we try to bypass the “D knowledge” paradox by assuming the case where we only partially access the
D knowledge or cut out significant portions of the D knowledge that generate this self-reference
paradox, we would have to admit that we can have only limited knowledge of the D knowledge or have
“actively” rendered the D knowledge incomplete.
This paradox can also be understood by employing a somewhat (2) adaptive version of Cantor’s
diagonal argument. Say we can nevertheless access the D knowledge and that this “accessed” D
knowledge is genuine. Then, this would generate “diagonal” D knowledge that is different from the
original D knowledge. Say we further access this diagonal D knowledge. Then we would thereby create
diagonal-diagonal D knowledge that we yet have to subsume. (This diagonal generation is very similar
to an ongoing progress of consciousness.) Meanwhile, if we assume that we can access D knowledge
without generating any diagonal D knowledge (hereinafter, “diag D knowledge”), it would be that the
D knowledge provided to us is a complete void. That is, no meaningful knowledge can be made of the
D knowledge unless we taint it by accessing it.
(*Again, I emphasize, we should note that there may be no such diagonal D knowledge in the first
place. If diag. D knowledge is a type of D knowledge, it means that the very first D knowledge we
accessed hadn’t been D knowledge at all from the very beginning.)
In the above, I wrote that the idea of Cantor’s diagonal argument can be used for refuting the belief
that deterministic knowledge is accessible even if it may actually exist. However, one should wonder
how it is possible to access the genuine form of D knowledge in the first place, because if determinism
is true it is logically impossible to include our access to D knowledge as an actual “event” in the totality
of the events of our consciousness in the universe. There may be one way this is possible.
If the event of injection occurs, the D knowledge becomes accessible to us as a set of meaningful
descriptions of how the universe could have been if we had not accessed the D knowledge.
Furthermore, the D knowledge loses its place as an absolutistic set of descriptions of our universe. It is
noteworthy that the D knowledge of our universe does not comprise any statement on a potential
event of injection of itself into our universe. That is, the D knowledge includes no “if” statement.
However, if the information on the potential injection of the D knowledge into the deterministic
universe was “available” to the D knowledge, the D knowledge would have been structured differently.
As such, our access to deterministic knowledge is enabled only by introduction of an indeterministic
factor from a larger realm beyond.
I contend that it is clear by now that the three assumptions of this section need revision.
We can block this paradox by changing assumption 2 or 3 or both.
For example, we can change only assumption 3 by stating that NOT every chain of events is
calculable. By adopting such a particular set of axioms for a model of a deterministic universe, we are
able to posit the existence of D knowledge (i.e., the universe is deterministic) that does exist in
comprehensible form but can never enter into the realm of our understanding (which reminds us of
the Platonic realm). This “transcendental” D knowledge is, however, distinct from Kantian things-in-
themselves or Plato’s Idea, because the former perspective posits a realm that is beyond human
understanding and the latter position suggests that we can reach Idea through reason.
How do we know that the D knowledge still exists despite the incalculability of some of the chains of
events? As noted earlier discussing the law of cause and effect, some of the phenomena may occur
according to a strictly predetermined script but may not be subject to any generalizable law (at least
from the human perspective). If we have generalizable laws that govern every event of our universe,
this means that the universe is calculable.
Another way of rendering the D knowledge unreachable would be to change assumption 2 by adding
“imperceivable phenomena” to the types of events in our deterministic universe. We thereby make D
knowledge unreachable on our own. Note, however, that the D knowledge will still exist. Suppose that
imperceivable event A causes a perceivable transition from perceivable event B into perceivable event
C. Though we will never figure out the existence of imperceivable event A, the D knowledge will show
us – if we can access it – that event C was “caused” by event B. The D knowledge only has to include
perceivable events and scenarios. Say imperceivable event A causes an imperceivable transition from
imperceivable event A to B. This has no meaning to the human mind and is thus excluded from the D
knowledge. In this way, we can dismiss the imperceivable events of the universe.
However, the D knowledge in the case of modified assumption 2 is different from the D knowledge in
the case of modified assumption 3, because the former D knowledge is only a subset of the
unreachable holistic scenario of the universe while the latter D knowledge represents the totality of
the universe.
In conclusion, by changing one or two of the original assumptions, we can completely either obliterate
the very logical possibility of the D knowledge seeping into our consciousness.
In a nutshell:
If the universe is deterministic, at least one of the two following propositions is true: That there are
imperceivable phenomena and that meaningfully affect perceivable phenomena; and that not every
event of the universe is calculable.
4. [Indeterministic Universe]
A universe that newly repeats the same scenario beginning from the same first cause (e.g., Aristotle’s
Unmoved Mover or the Big Bang) is not an indeterministic universe; that is, it is a deterministic
universe.
Therefore, we can define an indeterministic universe as follows:
An indeterministic universe is such that every time it begins from the same cause, it may unfold
according to a different scenario than before.
Both a deterministic universe and an indeterministic universe share one thing in common. It is only
through the passage of time that a human agent belonging in either universe is able to identify the
scenario of the universe up to a particular time point. The only principal difference between the two is
that D knowledge exists for the former but not for the latter.
In a deterministic universe, everything is dictated by the D knowledge according to which the scenario
of the universe unfolds; however, the D knowledge is outside of the deterministic universe. The D
knowledge exists in comprehensible form for us but is available only to those that can cross the time
axis of our universe at will or to a transcendental being who holds the script of the scenario.
An indeterministic universe, however, “constructs” its scenario successively through the passage of
time.
5. [Conclusion]
As noted above, in a deterministic universe, we have no way of knowing the future unless the future
actually arrives. Existence of the D knowledge does not ensure that a human agent belonging in the
universe can get to it. Nor can we ever know whether the universe is deterministic. That being the
case, to the human mind, an indeterministic universe is no different from a deterministic universe.
Whether the universe that is deterministic or not, it is only by looking into the past and present in
hindsight that we gain knowledge of what it has become. I do not mean to suggest that it justifies the
viewpoint of compatibilism. (In fact, a deterministic universe and an indeterministic universe are very
different, but only from a bird’s-eye point of view.) I instead argue that the only justifiable position is
an agnostic viewpoint with regard to the in/determinism controversy.
Whether our universe is predetermined or not matters only from a viewpoint from the outside of our
universe. However, if there is nothing outside of the universe, this issue can matter to no one.
* [Metaconsciousness]
Supposing that God gave us a book containing sufficiently clear verbal descriptions of the present
moment as well as our immediate future (i.e., the D knowledge) so as to prove that even our
metaconsciousness was determined, it would be natural to conclude that the speed of our perception
required for understanding the verbal descriptions would drastically slow down, because it is not
allowed for our metaconsciousness to “precede” our thoughts foretold through the descriptions; for to
happen otherwise would contradict the law of determinism. (Just as in the case of Einstein’s theory of
relativity.) In fact, our brain process that enables a critical examiner’s evaluation of God’s
demonstration should “coincide” with our understanding of the verbal descriptions so that neither
could precede the other. This matching relationship is precisely like that between two parallel
continuous (not discrete) horizontal lines extending from the same vertical coordinate with exactly the
same speed.
It is doubtful whether the above “coincidence” would even be possible, because I’m not sure how this
“oneness” can be achieved between our perception of the descriptions and the metaconsciousness
(remember Lacan’s quote: “There is no sexual relationship.”). Spinoza once said that the mind and the
body are parallel expressions of the one underlying reality; however, within the head of a single agent,
there can be no parallel between consciousness and its subsequent metaconsciousness. Rather, they
are only in a serial relationship.
In relation to the parallel line analogy, to see why there won’t be such a “parallel line” relationship in
our reality, let us consider the following situation:
From the viewpoint of an agent whose brain process is undergoing the above sequence of thoughts,
the only way to collectively contemplate the whole sequence is to transition to the subsequent time
point, t5.
In order for there to be a separate consciousness that perceives the whole series (from t1 to t4) exactly
at t4, there should be a separate thinking entity. That is, it is impossible for the primary agent to
collectively look upon the chain of thoughts at t4.
Suppose God nevertheless doesn’t want to stop trying, and He wants to achieve the status of self-
referentiality in the human agent’s consciousness. I can think of one provisional way that would be
possible. Suppose that God makes the following scenario come true:
In the above flow chart, note that “metaconsciousness(2)” is in the place where
“metaconsciousness(1)” should belong. If God’s omnipotence allows the consciousness to skip
“metaconsciousness(1)” and fast forward to “metaconsciousness(2),” which is therefore experienced at
t3, this case may be similar to the “state of consciousness in which the agent understands the proof
demonstrating the determinacy of the said particular state.” However, “metaconsciousness(2)”
(hereinafter, “M2”) is dependent upon “metaconsciousness(1)” (hereinafter, “M1”) in God’s eyes. If
flow chart 2 is achieved in reality, that means there is a lapse (or a disconnect) in the human agent’s
consciousness. In other words, the agent “time-travels” and thereby achieves self-reference. However,
it is questionable whether this genuinely achieves self-reference. Even if it were possible to place M2
in where M1 should exist, it wouldn’t change the fact that, from the meta-perspective, that M2 can
exist only because of M1. Let us look into the self-referential definition of consciousness again.
[state of consciousness in which the agent understands the proof demonstrating the determinacy of
the said particular state]
If M2 were put in the place where M1 (alpha) should have been and if that really achieves self-
reference, it might also be suggested that the content of M2 (at t3) in flow chart 2 is identical to the
content of M1 (alpha), because M1 (beta) is originally supposed to mean a state of metaconsciousness
that the agent was meant to be in. In other words, M2(at t3) = M1(beta). However, M2 (either at t3 or
at t4) is by definition different from M1 (alpha). This causes a contradiction. This contradiction is
removed only when we treat the two “M1”s (namely, alpha and beta) differently. That is, the world
where God substitutes M1 with M2 as in flow chart 2 should be a different world from the world of
flow chart 1. To reiterate, the world where M1 (beta) exists is different from the world where M1
(alpha) exists. This can perhaps explain the occurrence of déjà vu.
Therefore, it is concluded that genuine self-reference is impossible, because while it is possible to
create two worlds whereby self-reference is apparently possible, it is impossible to achieve self-
reference exactly in one world.
Say we still want to believe that self-reference is possible in one world. How could that be achieved? If
the speed of transition from the time point of M1 to that of M2 is “infinitely” high, t3 would be
virtually identical to t4. In that case, the self-reference of consciousness may be achieved virtually at
the same time point (just as two people talking through Time Division Duplex in telecommunications
don’t realize that they are taking alternate turns). However, I argue that our consciousness is unable to
achieve it in an ideal sense, based on both scientific and philosophical grounds. First, it contradicts
Einstein. Second, our consciousness should perish into nothing in order to achieve an ideal state of
self-referentiality. Infinitely high speed means no lapse in time. In other words, there is no flow of
time, which means that there is no consciousness.
In the critique of pure reason, Kant famously said that time exists because our mind is constructed to
view the universe in terms of it. That is, according to Kant, time does not exist independently of our
mind. Time exists because of our consciousness, and vice versa. If we adopt this view of Kant’s, we can
say that our consciousness and the D knowledge progress in parallel. That is, consciousness is dictated
by but also dictates the D knowledge.
Note the word “gravity.” The pull of gravity is so powerful that any attempt to escape its influence is
essentially meaningless. You can only expect to hop several times off the ground and the gravity will
never set you free. Nevertheless, the existentialist Nietzsche never stops dancing. He may be dragged
down again and again but continues to reaffirm his will to life through the constancy of his fights. In
this respect, this dancing described by Zarathustra is a tearful moral victory. The fate is so much more
powerful than you are, which is the reason why any Schopenhauerian pessimists will stop resisting
and sigh in helplessness. However, for Nietzsche, it was precisely his finitude in front of the fate that
added greater aesthetic, poetic beauty to his bloody ongoing fight against it. Nietzsche’s superman is a
superman not because he can exercise some supernatural talent or power to fend off the mighty fate.
Rather, it is the continuation of his fight that makes him a superman; he carries on despite his
awareness of his smallness.
Likewise, a practitioner of amor fati may be a puppet whose movements are controlled by the
determined laws of the universe, but he remains a distinct existentialist of character in his spirit.